Anderson Cargo Services, LLC

THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Mailed: January 21, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Anderson Cargo Services, LLC
_____
Serial No. 98122802
_____
Darius C. Gambino and Jennifer M. Oprosko, of Saul Ewing LLP,
for Anderson Cargo Services, LLC.
Joe DeMarco, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 133,
Laurie Kaufman, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Greenbaum, Allard, and Elgin,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Elgin, Administrative Trademark Judge:
I. Background
Anderson Cargo Services, LLC (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal
Register of the composite mark (“home delivery” disclaimed) for the
following services:

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Last mile assembly services for commercial retailers
relating to the specialized installation of large -scale
consumer items, namely furniture, electronics, exercise
equipment, massage chairs, mattresses being Smart beds
and bases, TVs, and appliances with gas and water
hookups, in International Class 37;
Last-mile delivery and storage of goods for commercial
retailers; last-mine [sic] delivery of goods by truck for
commercial retailers; lastmile [sic] delivery of consumer
products for commercial retailers; temporary storage of
deliveries for commercial retailers; transport and last-mile
delivery of goods for commercial retailers, in International
Class 39.1
The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration in both classes under
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant ’s
mark, when used in connection with the identified services, so resembles the
registered composite mark (“classics” disclaimed) for
“Cushions; Furniture for house, office and garden; Furniture made from wood or
substitutes for wood; Lawn furniture; Metal furniture; Metal furniture and furniture
for camping; Outdoor furniture; Patio furniture; Plastic furniture for gardens;
Residential and commercial furniture; Residential and commercial wrought iron
1 Application Ser. No. 98122802 was filed on August 8, 2023 under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), alleging June 1, 2018 as the date of first use anywhere
and date of first use in commerce for the services in Classes 37 and 39. The mark is described
as consisting of the word “ALLEGRO” in uppercase, bold letters appearing directly over the
words “HOME DELIVERY” in uppercase letters, to the left of a silhouette of a conductor with
six horizontal lines of varying length coming from its back and overlapping with portions of
the “ALLEGRO” wording. Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark. We presume that
“last mine” and “lastmile” in the Class 39 identification are typographical errors and were
intended to state “last-mile.” Applicant should note that obvious typographical errors in the
identification may be corrected post-registration. See 37 C.F.R. § 2.173.

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furniture; Tables; Upholstered furniture” in International Class 25,2 that it is likely
to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive.
When the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed and requested
reconsideration. After the Examining Attorney denied the request for
reconsideration, the appeal was resumed and is now fully briefed.3 For the reasons
set forth below, we affirm the refusal to register in both classes.
II. Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so
resembles a registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the
goods or services of the applicant, to cause confusion, mistake, or deception. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d). See also In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the probative
evidence of record bearing on a likelihood of confusion. In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”); see also In re Majestic Distilling
Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003). When analyzing the likelihood of confusion
factors, the overriding concerns are not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the
2 Registration No. 4944314 issued on the Principal Register on April 26, 2016; Declaration of
Use under Trademark Act Section 8, 15 U.S.C. § 1058, accepted. The mark is described as
consisting of the design of a chaise lounge chair with the words “Allegro Classics” written
below the image. The entire mark use appears in teal outlined in black. The colors teal and
black are claimed as a feature of the mark.
3 Citations to the prosecution file are to the USPTO’s Trademark Status & Document
Retrieval (“TSDR”) system in .pdf format. Citations to the appeal record are to TTABVUE,
the Board’s online docketing system. We caution the reader that the citations in the
Examining Attorney’s brief to the prosecution record are to documents as they appear in the
TSDR system, which may differ from the .pdf versions used in this opinion.

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source of the goods or services, but also to protect registrants from adverse
commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil
Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207-08 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
In any likelihood of confusion analysis, different DuPont factors may play a
dominant role and some factors may not be relevant. Naterra Int’l, Inc. v. Bensalem,
92 F.4th 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (citing Tiger Lily Ventures Ltd. v. Barclays Cap.
Inc., 35 F.4th 1352, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2022)). In addition, varying weight may be
assigned to each factor depending on the evidence presented, and “any one of the
factors may control a particular case.” Id.; see also Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1381.
Although we consider each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument,
In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019), two key considerations
are the similarities between the marks and the similarities between the goods and
services. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko
Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). These
factors, and others, are discussed below.
A. The Marks
The first DuPont factor involves an analysis of the similarity or dissimilarity of
the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial
impression. Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En
1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Stone Lion Cap. Partners, L.P. v.
Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “Similarity in any one of these
elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St.

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John’s, LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 170, at *13 (quoting In re Davia, No.
85497617, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 214, at *4), aff’d mem., 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed. Cir.
2019); accord Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA
1968) (“It is sufficient if the similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely
to cause confusion.”) (citation omitted).
“‘[S]imilarity is not a binary factor but is a matter of degree.’” In re St. Helena
Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d
1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). The proper test regarding similarity “‘is not a side-by-
side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar
in terms of their commercial impression such that persons who encounter the marks
would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.’” Cai v. Diamond Hong,
Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph
Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). “The focus is on the recollection
of the average purchaser, who normally retains a general rather than a specific
impression of trademarks.” In re St. Julian Wine Co., No. 87834973, 2020 TTAB
LEXIS 196, at *13.
Our analysis cannot be predicated on dissecting the marks into their various
components; that is, our finding must be based on the entire marks, not just part of
the marks. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see
also Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 1007 (CCPA 1981) (“It is
axiomatic that a mark should not be dissected and considered piecemeal; rather, it
must be considered as a whole in determining likelihood of confusion.”). “No element

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of a mark is ignored simply because it is less dominant, or would not have trademark
significance if used alone.” In re Electrolyte Labs. Inc., 929 F.2d 645, 647 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (citing Spice Islands, Inc. v. Frank Tea & Spice Co., 505 F.2d 1293 (CCPA
1974)). Nonetheless, “in articulating reasons for reaching a conclusion on the issue of
confusion, there is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less
weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate
conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties.” In re Detroit
Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d
at 1058).
Even though the parties’ marks likely would not be seen side-by-side,
i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1323, we present them here for purposes of convenience
and analysis:
Applicant argues that the first DuPont factor weighs against a likelihood of
confusion because the commercial impressions and meanings of the marks differ due
to the disclaimed matter in each mark (HOME DELIVERY and CLASSICS). More
specifically, Applicant contends that “HOME DELIVERY” in Applicant’s mark
immediately indicates Applicant’s main service is home delivery, and that the
combination of the term “ALLEGRO” and the conductor and horizontal line design

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(the lines intending to represent a musical staff) informs consumers that Applicant
will fully orchestrate and manage home delivery services of goods with speed and
efficiency. In contrast, Applicant argues, “CLASSICS” and the abstract chaise lounge
chair design in Registrant’s mark evoke comfort, elegance, and the classical style of
Registrant’s furniture.4 Applicant cites to two cases in support of its argument that
the design elements in the involved marks are dominant and sufficient to obviate
confusion: In re Covalinski, No. 85685983, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 353, at *6; and the
nonprecedential decision in In re Calder, No. 85143799, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 17.5
The Examining Attorney counters that the first DuPont factor favors a likelihood
of confusion because the marks share a dominant feature, namely, the distinctive
leading term ALLEGRO, which has greater weight.6 Further, the Examining
Attorney argues that the disclaimed matter does not obviate consumer confusion
because it is highly descriptive and has little source identifying significance, and
consumers are likely to shorten the literal elements of marks.7 The Examining
4 6 TTABVUE 10-12.
5 Id. at 11-12. Although nonprecedential cases may be cited and considered for whatever
persuasive value they may have, they are not binding on the Board. See In re Tapio GmbH,
No. 87941532, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 483, at *26-29 n.30 (“Generally, the practice of citing non-
precedential opinions is not encouraged”; Board found unpersuasive non-precedential
decisions decided on different records). Applicant also cites a number of federal court
infringement cases, which are distinguishable on their facts and the principles of law that
govern them. See 12 TTABVUE 5-6. Grand Canyon W. Ranch LLC v. Hualapai Tribe, No.
91162008, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 33, at *18 n.2 (parties cited Ninth Circuit authority
extensively, but Board relied on precedent from Federal Circuit).
6 9 TTABVUE 4-6.
7 Id.

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Attorney argues the cases cited by Applicant are distinguishable because the designs
in those cases were much larger.8
Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks share the leading term ALLEGRO, followed
by matter disclaimed as merely descriptive (i.e., HOME DELIVERY and CLASSICS).
The shared leading term is the dominant feature of both marks. See, e.g., Detroit
Athletic, 903 F.3d at 1303 (“the identity of the marks’ initial two words is particularly
significant because consumers typically notice those words first.”). Descriptive
matter, such as the disclaimed terms, typically are less significant or less dominant
when comparing marks. See Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 947 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (“Regarding descriptive terms, this court has noted that the descriptive
component of a mark may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood
of confusion.”) (quoting Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1060). Moreover, in the case of
marks that consist of words and a design, the words are normally accorded greater
weight because they would be used by purchasers to request the goods and services.
See Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1362 (“In the case of a composite mark containing both words
and a design, ‘the verbal portion of the mark is the one most likely to indicate the
origin of the [services] or goods to which it is affixed.’”) (quoting CBS, Inc. v. Morrow,
708 F.2d 1579, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); In re Dakin’s Miniatures, Inc., No.
74706577, 1999 TTAB LEXIS 636, at *8 (“words are normally accorded greater
weight because they would be used by purchasers to request the goods [and
services]”) (citation omitted).
8 Id. at 7.

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In this case, we find that the conductor and music staff design is subordinate to
the literal terms of Applicant’s mark and does not obviate the similarity of the marks.
Although Applicant explains the suggestive significance of the term ALLEGRO in its
own mark, it does not explain why a consumer would focus instead on the descriptive
terms HOME DELIVERY in its mark, or CLASSICS in Registrant’s mark, rather
than the shared leading distinctive term ALLEGRO. We also are not convinced that
a consumer would focus on the descriptive terms merely because of the visual designs
appurtenant to the marks. Moreover, the term ALLEGRO appears to be arbitrary as
used in Registrant’s mark, and thus highly distinctive. Applicant’s conductor design
reinforces and draws attention to the shared ALLEGRO term.
We also are not convinced by Applicant’s reliance on prior Board decisions on
different marks. The involved mark in Covalinski included design features that
played a much more prominent role than those of Applicant’s mark:
The cited mark was RACEGIRL (in standard character format). The Board, in finding
the design to be the dominant element of the applicant’s mark, provided the following
rationale:
Here, Applicant’s design mark includes the very large,
prominently displayed letters RR. The bodies of the Rs are
filled with a checkerboard pattern resembling a racing flag.
To each R an elongated horizontal “leg” of gradually
increasing thickness is appended, each of which ends in a
heart design. Inside the legs appear the rest of the letters
(i.e., the letter strings “edneck” and “acegirl”), in a form in
which the initial letters of each string are displayed in

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relatively tiny typeface and subsequent letters are
displayed in increasing thickness. Together, these graphic
devices serve not only to draw attention to the RR letters
apart from the wording, but also make the letters that form
the “a-c-e” of the word “RACEGIRL” difficult to notice.
Since these goods are clothing, consumers would be likely
to encounter the mark in a retail setting on hang tags or
neck labels. In that context, the visual impression of the
mark is likely to be more important.
Covalinski, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 353, at *6-7. None of these reasons are present in this
case. The literal portions of Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks do not appear in
“relatively tiny typeface” in a letter string “difficult to notice.” To the contrary, the
fonts are large, bold, easy-to-read lettering. The goods and services are furniture and
furniture delivery and assembly services, not clothing.9
We next consider Applicant’s argument that USPTO practice supports
registration of marks which share a common term.10 Applicant submitted records of
third-party marks co-existing on the Principal Register which share terms such as
“SUMMIT,” “HAVEN,” “EVEREST,” and “ALLEGRA” in Class 20 for various
furniture products to demonstrate that “shared terms do not inherently create
confusion.”11
It is well-settled that neither the Board nor any examining attorney is bound by
prior decisions of examining attorneys to register marks. To the contrary, “the
[US]PTO must decide each application on its own merits, and decisions regarding
9 The non-precedential decision in Calder, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 17, is distinguishable for much
the same reasons.
10 6 TTABVUE 16-18.
11 Id. at 16.

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other registrations do not bind either the [USPTO] or [the reviewing] court.” See In
re Boulevard Entm’t, 334 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003); accord, In re USA
Warriors Ice Hockey Program, Inc., No. 86489116, 2017 TTAB LEXIS 143, at
*10 n.10. The decisions of prior examining attorneys to allow other marks to register
were based on the records before them, which are necessarily different than the
record before the Examining Attorney and the Board in the present appeal. Cf. In re
Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Even if some prior
registrations had some characteristics similar to [Applicant’s] application, the PTO’s
allowance of such prior registrations does not bind the Board ….”).12
Having considered the marks at issue in their entireties, and keeping in mind that
the marks “must be considered … in light of the fallibility of memory,” St. Helena
Hosp., 774 F.3d at 751 (citation omitted), we find that Applicant’s mark and the cited
mark are similar in sight, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.
Accordingly, the first DuPont factor weighs in favor of likelihood of confusion.
B. The Goods and Services and Channels of Trade
The second DuPont factor “considers the similarity or dissimilarity and nature of
the goods [and services] as described in the involved application and cited
12 We note Reg. Nos. 5764949 and 3110004 for ALLEGRA for “living room furniture” and
“office furniture,” which marks bear some similarity to the ALLEGRO-formative marks here.
See Feb. 7, 2025 Request for Reconsideration, at TSDR 56-64. Reg. No. 5764949, however,
was cancelled under Trademark Act Section 8. Cf. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Clement Wheel Co., 1979 TTAB LEXIS 64, at *3 n.3 (taking judicial notice based on a change
in the registration’s status). Cancelled registrations are evidence of nothing other than the
fact that they once issued. Sunnen Prods. Co. v. Sunex Int’l Inc., No. 91069733, 1987 TTAB
LEXIS 92, at *7.

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registration,” In re Samsung Display Co., No. 90502617, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 258, at
*6 (citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361), and “contemplates whether the consuming
public may perceive the respective goods [and services] as related enough to cause
confusion about their source or origin.” Id. (cleaned up, internal citation omitted). In
tandem, we consider the third DuPont factor, which considers “[t]he similarity or
dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels.” Id. at *17 (quoting
DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361).
Under the second factor, “[t]he goods [and services] need not be identical or even
competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.” Id. at *6 (citing On-line Careline Inc. v.
Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d
1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). “They need only be ‘related in some manner and/or if the
circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the
mistaken belief that the goods [and services] emanate from the same source.’”
Id. (quoting Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1369).
Evidence of relatedness may include news articles or
evidence from computer databases showing that the
relevant goods [and services] are used together or used by
the same purchasers; advertisements showing that the
relevant goods [and services] are advertised together or
sold by the same manufacturer or dealer; or copies of prior
use-based registrations of the same mark for both
applicant’s goods [or services] and the goods [and services]
listed in the cited registration. . . . In addition, [t]he
application and registration themselves may provide
evidence of the relationship between the services.
In re OSF Healthcare Sys., No. 88706809, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 353, at *9 (cleaned up).
In a multiple-class application as presented here, each class stands on its own as
it would if it was in a separate application. See In re Bonni Keller Collections, Ltd.,

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No. 73446902, 1987 TTAB LEXIS 12, at *5 (a multiple-class application is, actually,
two separate applications combined for the convenience of applicant and the Office).
Accordingly, we must make determinations of relatedness for each individual class.
It is sufficient for a finding of likelihood of confusion if relatedness is established for
any item encompassed by the identification of goods or services within a particular
class in the application. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335,
1336 (CCPA 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, No. 91196527, 2014 TTAB
LEXIS 166, at *37. In this case, the Examining Attorney argues that the services in
both Applicant’s classes are closely related to the goods identified in the cited
registration based on evidence of third-party registrations and use.13
“We begin with the identifications of . . . [goods and] services in the registration
and application under consideration.” OSF Healthcare, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 353, at
*10 (cleaned up; citation omitted). “[W]e must construe the [goods] identified in the
cited registration as broadly as reasonably possible ‘to include all [goods and services]
of the nature and type described therein,’” id. at *11 (quoting In re Solid State Design
Inc., No. 87269041, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 1, at *16 (internal quotation omitted)), and
“we must resolve any ambiguities regarding their coverage in favor of the cited
registrant ‘given the presumptions afforded the registration under Section 7(b)’ of the
Trademark Act.” Id. (quoting In re C.H. Hanson Co., No. 77983232, 2015 TTAB
LEXIS 357, at *14 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b)). We must also “give the [goods and]
13 See 9 TTABVUE 8-13.

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services identified in the application their full scope in our analysis of the second
DuPont factor.” Id. (citation omitted).
As a reminder, the goods in the cited registration include broadly identified
“cushions,” “furniture for house, office,” and “residential and commercial furniture.”
Applicant’s services in Class 37 include “last mile assembly services for commercial
retailers relating to the specialized installation of large -scale consumer items, namely
furniture.” In Class 39, the services include “last-mile delivery and storage of goods
for commercial retailers,” and “[last-mile] delivery of consumer products for
commercial retailers.”
We must first determine the meaning of the term “last-mile” as used in Applicant’s
identification of furniture delivery and assembly services. Applicant made of record
excerpts of its website which make clear that the term refers to delivery and assembly
services of items such as furniture or appliances to a consumer’s home, a retail store,
or a builder job site.14 The Examining Attorney made of record evidence from the
company Alvy to demonstrate that “last mile delivery focuses on the final step of the
logistics chain — delivering the product to the end customer’s doorstep.”15 Other
website evidence made of record from Ryder explains that “last mile” delivery options
include: front-door delivery (item left outside the front door); over the threshold
delivery (carrying item into the home); room of choice delivery (carrying item into a
14 July 10, 2024 Resp. to Office Action, at TSDR 51.
15 March 13, 2025 Denial of Request for Reconsideration, at TSDR 28.

Serial No. 98122802
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specific room); and “white glove” delivery, which adds unboxing, assembly,
installation of the product, and haul-away services.16
There is no question that Applicant’s “last-mile” delivery and assembly services of
furniture in Class 37 can involve the delivery and assembly of Registrant’s
residential, office, and/or commercial furniture. And, reading Applicant’s Class 39
identification broadly, as we must, last-mile delivery and storage of “goods” and
“consumer products” may include Registrant’s cushions and furniture. It is well
recognized that confusion may be likely to occur from the use of the same or similar
marks for goods, on the one hand, and for services involving those goods, on the
other. See, e.g., Detroit Athletic, 903 F.3d at 1307 (clothing and sports apparel retail
services related as “confusion is likely where one party engages in retail services that
sell goods of the type produced by the other party”); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc.,
837 F.2d 463, 464 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (furniture and retail grocery and general
merchandise store services related); In re Country Oven, Inc., No. 87354443, 2019
TTAB LEXIS 381, at *6 (bread buns and retail bakery shops related).
In addition, the Examining Attorney made of record evidence of third-party uses
of the same mark for furniture and installation of furniture. These include:
• BMC EMERGING FROM FUTURE & design (Reg. No. 5891785) for
“furniture” and “furniture installation”;
• DTANK (Reg. No. 3607005) for “furniture made of wood, plastic, metal
or glass” and “installation of furniture”;
16 Id. at TSDR 33.

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• THE RESULT IS QUALITY (Reg. No. 3237852) for “metal furniture,
namely, desks, chairs, tables, file cabinets, storage cabinets, mobile
carts, and work benches” and “installation of metal furniture”;
• OVERNIGHT OFFICE & design (Reg. No. 3728875) for “office
furniture” and “installation of furniture”;
• MBEST PRACTICES (Reg. No. 3431956) for “office furniture” and
“installation of office furniture for others”;
• TIMBER & TOIL CABINETRY (Reg. No. 5662551) for “furniture made
from wood, namely, cabinets and built-in furniture” and “installation of
furniture”; and
• SHIFTSPACES (Reg. No. 7300073) for “office furniture” and “furniture
installation.”17
The Examining Attorney also made of record excerpts of third-party websites to
show that “third party commercial furniture retailers commonly market delivery,
assembly, installation, and transport services, all under the same mark as their
furniture goods.”18 These include:
• Couch Potatoes (furniture and local delivery of furniture);19
• West Elm (furniture and in-home delivery/assembly services);20
• KFRooms (furniture and local delivery/assembly services);21
• Caravana Furniture (furniture and local delivery and assembly/set-
up services);22
17 April 16, 2024 Office Action, at TSDR 11-26.
18 9 TTABVUE 10. We have reviewed these uses; some are only commercial furniture retailers
(such that they are providing furniture retail services, not furniture, under the retail brand).
We have endeavored to narrow the uses to those that sell furniture under the same brand as
the delivery services.
19 April 16, 2024 Office Action, at TSDR 32-39.
20 August 7, 2024 Office Action, at TSDR 11-18, 64.
21 Id. at TSDR 20-27.
22 Id. at TSDR 29-40.

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• Scott Jordan Furniture (furniture and in-home delivery and
assembly services);23
• Norman Furniture (custom furniture and local delivery and setup
services);24
• Jennifer Furniture (furniture and local delivery services);25
• Bench Made Modern (custom furniture and threshold and white
glove delivery services);26
• Crate and Barrel (furniture and in-home delivery services, including
white glove delivery);27 and
• Morris Home (furniture and in-home delivery services, including
full service and room-of-choice delivery).28
Also, a news article made of record summarizes the “white glove” delivery services
of a number of well-known companies which sell their own branded furniture,
including Ashley Furniture, Crate & Barrel, Ethan Allen, Pier 1 Imports, Pottery
Barn, Restoration Hardware, Room and Board, Rooms To Go, West Elm, and
Williams-Sonoma.29
We agree with the Examining Attorney that this evidence shows that last-mile
furniture delivery and assembly services are related to Registrant’s goods in-part
because consumers encounter entities offering them under the same mark in the
marketplace. Hewlett-Packard, 281 F.3d at 1267. This same evidence also shows that
23 Id. at TSDR 41-55.
24 Id. at TSDR 60-63.
25 March 13, 2025 Denial of Request for Reconsideration, at TSDR 5-10, 74-78.
26 Id. at TSDR 16-27.
27 Id. at TSDR 47-53.
28 Id. at TSDR 60-65.
29 Id. at TSDR 11-14.

Serial No. 98122802
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furniture and last-mile furniture delivery and assembly services are complementary
in nature because they are inherently purchased and used together.
“[C]omplementary use has long been recognized as a relevant consideration in
determining a likelihood of confusion.” In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc.,
748 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
We are not persuaded by Applicant’s attempts to distinguish its last-mile
furniture delivery and assembly services from Registrant’s furniture. Applicant
argues that, although some furniture companies provide delivery and assembly
services, many businesses specialize in either one or the other.30 Applicant provides
examples of companies that specialize in pick-up and delivery services such as
Roadie, Lugg, Dolly, Goshare, and Two Men and a Truck.31 Applicant also argues,
without evidence, that West Elm contracts with third parties to provide delivery
services.32 Attorney argument is not evidence. Cai, 901 F.3d at 1371. Even if
Applicant’s assertions are true, the relationship with an outside delivery company is
not made clear to the consumer. For example, West Elm’s website touts its delivery
services as follows: “Our In-Home Delivery team, servicing the contiguous 48 states,
ensures that you furniture arrives safely in your home”; “Our delivery team will
assemble these furniture pieces and remove all packaging from your home.”; “We are
available to answer your questions about the delivery of your furniture item. Contact
30 6 TTABVUE 15.
31 Id.; Feb. 7, 2025 Office Action Response, at TSDR 65-81.
32 6 TTABVUE 16.

Serial No. 98122802
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us seven days a week….”33 None of Applicant’s arguments or evidence contradicts the
evidence of record and Applicant’s concessions above that many companies provide
both furniture and furniture delivery and assembly services under the same mark.
As for the third DuPont factor, where, as here, the goods and services are not
identical, we presume that they travel in whatever trade channels are normal for
each type of good or service. Packard Press, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 227 F.3d
1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“When the registration does not contain limitations
describing a particular channel of trade or class of customer, the goods or services are
assumed to travel in all normal channels of trade.”).
We are faced with the limitations on channels of trade in Applicant’s identification
that its services are “for commercial retailers.” Applicant argues that its “customers
are commercial operations (retailers, distributors and manufacturers) seeking ‘last-
mile’ delivery orchestration of large-scale consumer products.”34 Respondent’s goods
are unlimited as to channels of marketing or trade. See, e.g., Packard Press, 227 F.3d
33 See Aug. 7, 2024 Office Action, at TSDR 11 (emphasis added). Also, in its reply brief, for
the first time, Applicant embeds hyperlinks to several websites to demonstrate other retailers
who purportedly use third party delivery services. 12 TTABVUE 9. The Board does not
consider hyperlinks embedded in briefs. In re ADCO Indus. - Techs., L.P., No. 87545258, 2020
TTAB LEXIS 7, at *4 (web addresses or hyperlinks are insufficient to make the underlying
webpages of record); In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, No. 86928469, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 108,
at *27 n.21 (Board does not consider websites for which only links are provided). Further, it
is too late to introduce evidence at the briefing stage. Trademark Rule 2.142(d), 37 C.F.R. §
2.142(d) (“The record should be complete prior to the filing of an appeal. Evidence should not
be filed with the Board after the filing of a notice of appeal.”); see also, e.g., In re Fitch IBCA,
Inc., No. 75628232, 2002 TTAB LEXIS 70, at *1 n.2 (new evidence attached to brief not
considered; “Applicant did not comply with the established rule that the evidentiary record
in an application must be complete prior to the filing of the notice of appeal.”). We have not
considered the material at the hyperlinks.
34 6 TTABVUE 16.

Serial No. 98122802
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at 1361 (goods or services in an unrestricted application or registration are presumed
to travel in all normal channels of trade to all prospective purchasers for the relevant
goods or services); Nike, Inc. v. WNBA Enters., LLC, No. 91160755, 2007 TTAB LEXIS
39, at *20 (“Absent any restrictions in the respective applications and registrations,
we must presume that applicant’s apparel and bags and opposer’s apparel are sold
through all normal channels of trade for those goods, including all the usual retail
outlets.”). This means that Registrant’s identified furniture goods (which include
“commercial furniture”) may be directed to commercial retailers. In any case,
Applicant made of record evidence demonstrating that “Registrant sells its products
to designers or commercial trade accounts,”35 demonstrating that its furniture may
be sold in the same channels of trade as Applicant’s delivery and assembly services
“for commercial retailers.”
We are cognizant of the fact that “Applicant’s clients would actually be large-scale
consumer goods retailers who need to increase efficiency by handing off product
delivery to a third-party (e.g., Best Buy).”36 But Applicant’s delivery and assembly
services pass through to ordinary consumers and businesses of all sizes and
sophistication, which – if faced with ALLEGRO CLASSICS furniture delivered and
assembled by ALLEGRO HOME DELIVERY services — would be more likely to
presume a connection between the two, when in fact there is none.
35 July 16, 2024 Resp. to Office Action, at TSDR 49-50. As noted above, we do not consider
the embedded hyperlinks to websites to demonstrate Registrant’s and Applicant’s client lists
and Applicant’s services (12 TTABVUE 8, 11). See note 33, supra.
36 12 TTABVUE 8.

Serial No. 98122802
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We conclude that the second and third DuPont factors weigh in favor of likelihood
of confusion.
C. Purchaser Sophistication
We turn next to the conditions under which the goods and services are likely to be
purchased, e.g., whether on impulse or after careful consideration, as well as the
degree, if any, of sophistication of the consumers, the fourth DuPont factor. Purchaser
sophistication or degree of care may tend to minimize likelihood of confusion.
Conversely, impulse purchases of inexpensive goods may tend to have the opposite
effect. Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1376.
Applicant argues that both Registrant’s and Applicant’s customers “are
accustomed to vetting service providers to ensure they meet specific operational
standards.”37 In reply, Applicant further argues that “only sophisticated purchasers
would purchase both Applicant and Registrant’s goods and service s….”38
Applicant again incorrectly focuses on Registrant’s actual channels of trade of
“designers and commercial trade accounts” rather than the broader categories of
potential customers of furniture and other goods in the cited registration, which are
not limited by channels of trade or potential consumers. Consumers of Registrant’s
broadly described furniture and other goods (such as cushions) may be ordinary
consumers, who exercise no more than ordinary care. We must base our decision on
37 6 TTABVUE 19.
38 12 TTABVUE 11.

Serial No. 98122802
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“the least sophisticated potential purchasers.” Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1325 (citations
omitted).
We conclude that the fourth DuPont factor is neutral.
D. Actual Confusion
In its reply brief, Applicant raised for the first time the issue of lack of actual
confusion.39 The question of actual confusion is addressed in the seventh and eighth
DuPont factors, which consider the “nature and extent of any actual confusion” and
the “length of time during and conditions under which there has been concurrent use
without evidence of actual confusion.” See In re Jimenez, No. 97551823, 2025 TTAB
LEXIS 441, at *20 (citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361).
There is no evidence relating to these factors in the record (such as declarations).
Nonetheless, such evidence is of limited value in the ex parte context where there is
no opportunity to hear from the owner of the cited mark. See In re Opus One, Inc.,
No. 75722593, 2001 TTAB LEXIS 707, at *19 (“The fact that an applicant in an ex
parte case is unaware of any instances of actual confusion is generally entitled to
little probative weight in the likelihood of confusion analysis, inasmuch as the Board
in such cases generally has no way to know whether the registrant likewise is
unaware of any instances of actual confusion….”) (citations omitted). “The Examining
Attorney is under no obligation to adduce such evidence in an ex parte appeal.”
Jimenez, 2025 TTAB LEXIS 441, at *20.
39 See id. at 9-10.

Serial No. 98122802
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Moreover, absence of any reported instances of confusion is meaningful only if the
record indicates appreciable and continuous use by Applicant of its mark for a
significant period of time in the same markets as those served by the Registrant
under the cited mark. Id. at *20; Gillette Can. Inc. v. Ranir Corp., No. 91082769,
1992 TTAB LEXIS 24, at *19. In other words, for the absence of actual confusion to
be probative, there must have been a reasonable opportunity for confusion to have
occurred. Barbara’s Bakery Inc. v. Landesman, No. 91157982, 2007 TTAB LEXIS
9, at *14 (the probative value of the absence of actual confusion depends upon there
being a significant opportunity for actual confusion to have occurred). We do not find
Applicant’s argument convincing in this case given that there is no evidence of record
as to the scope and extent of Applicant’s identified services under its involved mark;
or the scope and extent of Registrant’s use of its cited mark in connection with the
goods listed in the cited registration. Therefore, the seventh and eighth DuPont
factors are neutral.
E. Other Arguments
Applicant also argues that the USPTO did not previously refuse registration of
what it claims is its earlier application for the mark ALLEGRO HOME DELIVERY
(in another form) in connection with “similar” Class 39 services in view of the cited
registration.40 Applicant argues that consistency requires approval of the subject
application. We consider this argument under the thirteenth DuPont factor, “any
other established fact probative of the effect of use”, which “accommodates the need
40 6 TTABVUE 8-9; see also 12 TTABVUE 10-11.

Serial No. 98122802
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for flexibility in assessing each unique set of facts.” USA Warriors, 2017 TTAB LEXIS
143, at *8-9 (quoting, in part, In re Strategic Partners, Inc., No. 77903451, 2012 TTAB
LEXIS 80, at *6).
Applicant made of record office actions relating to an application for the mark
ALLEGRO HOME DELIVERY in standard characters (Ser. No. 90018425) for
Delivery and storage of goods; Delivery of goods; Delivery
of goods by air, ocean, truck etc; Delivery of consumer
products; Providing ocean transportation, storage and
delivery services; Storage and delivery of goods; Supply
chain logistics and reverse logistics services, namely,
storage, transportation and delivery of goods for others by
air, rail, ship or truck; Temporary storage of deliveries;
Transport and delivery of goods; Transportation and
delivery services by air, road, rail and sea, in International
Class 39.41
Applicant alleges that this application was abandoned due to a “procedural oversight”
in responding to an office action.42 The evidence shows application was refused, in
part, based on likelihood of confusion with another registration, but Registrant’s
registration was not cited against the mark in these office actions.
Applicant’s argument under the thirteenth DuPont factor is not convincing for two
reasons. First, Applicant’s claimed prior application evidently was abandoned. An
abandoned application (even one owned by Applicant) has “no probative value other
than as evidence that the application was filed.” Kemi Organics, LLC v. Gupta, No.
92065613, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 149, at *17 (citations omitted). Second, as we stated
41 July 16, 2024 Resp. to Office Action, at TSDR 17-48. The identification of services appears
at TSDR 18.
42 Id.

Serial No. 98122802
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above, the USPTO must decide each application on its own merits. See Boulevard
Entm’t, 334 F.3d at 1343; USA Warriors., 2017 TTAB LEXIS 143, at *10 n.10.
We find the thirteenth DuPont factor to be a neutral factor in our analysis.
F. Conclusion on Likelihood of Confusion
Finally, we must weigh the DuPont factors for which there has been evidence and
argument in this appeal. Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1381 (“[I]t is important ...
that the Board ... weigh the DuPont factors used in its analysis and explain the
results of that weighing.”). In this case, all of the factors weigh in favor of likelihood
of confusion.
Registrant’s ALLEGRO CLASSICS and design mark and Applicant’s ALLEGRO
HOME DELIVERY and design marks are similar when compared in their entireties
under the first DuPont factor. This weighs heavily in favor of a finding that confusion
is likely. The goods and services of Registrant and Applicant are related and
complementary in that they are both sold under the same marks and are purchased
and used together, also weighing heavily in favor of a finding that confusion is likely.
The goods and services travel in overlapping trade channels under the third
DuPont factor. There is no evidence of record regarding the least sophisticated
consumers or purchasing conditions that would indicate a heightened or a lower
degree of consumer care. The fourth DuPont factor, therefore, is neutral. The seventh
and eighth factors regarding actual confusion are neutral. The existence of
Applicant’s claimed abandoned application to register a similar mark also is neutral
under the thirteenth factor.

Serial No. 98122802
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Considering the DuPont factors for which there has been evidence and argument,
we find that confusion is likely between ALLEGRO CLASSICS and design mark for
goods in Class 20 and Applicant’s ALLEGRO HOME DELIVERY and design for the
services in Classes 37 and 39.
Decision
The refusal to register Application Ser. No. 98122802 is affirmed in both classes.