Thomas, Kimberlee v. Duracell-Cleveland

FILED
Mar 11, 2024
10:24 AM(CT)
TENNESSEE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
APPEALS BOARD

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Kimberlee Thomas ) Docket No. 2020-01-0624
)
v. ) State File No. 6668-2018
)
Duracell-Cleveland, et al. )
)
)
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) Heard February 7, 2024
Compensation Claims ) via Microsoft Teams
Audrey A. Headrick, Judge )

Affirmed in Part, Vacated in Part, and Remanded

In this appeal, the employer asks whether an employee can voluntarily dismiss a pending
claim when the employer also filed a petition for benefit determination. The employee
reported sustaining injuries while pulling a pallet jack, and the employer provided certain
workers’ compensation benefits. The employer later denied medical treatment, and the
employee filed a petition for benefit determination. Subsequently, the parties engaged in
mediation and came to an agreement regarding certain issues, and the mediator prepared a
dispute resolution statement. Several months later, the employer filed its own petition for
benefit determination seeking to move the claim to resolution. When the parties were
unable to fully resolve the claim, a dispute certification notice was issued. The trial court
entered a scheduling order that, among other things, set a deadline for expert proof. Shortly
after that deadline passed, the employee filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, to which the
employer objected. Initially, the trial court denied the employee’s attempt to dismiss her
case, noting that the employer had filed the petition for benefit determination. Upon
reconsideration, the court noted the employee’s initial petition for benefit determination
was inadvertently omitted from the trial court’s record. Because the employee had filed
the initial petition, the court allowed the employee to voluntarily dismiss her claim without
prejudice. The employer has appealed. Upon careful consideration of the record and the
arguments of counsel, we affirm in part and vacate in part the trial court’s order and remand
the case.

Judge Meredith B. Weaver delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding
Judge Timothy W. Conner and Judge Pele I. Godkin joined.

Garett P. Franklyn, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellant, Duracell-Cleveland

1
Ronald J. Berke, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the employee-appellee, Kimberlee Thomas

Factual and Procedural Background

Kimberlee Thomas (“Employee”) was working for Duracell-Cleveland
(“Employer”) on January 20, 2018, when she reported suffering injuries to her left
shoulder, neck, back, and hip while pulling a pallet jack. Employer initially provided
benefits but later denied certain medical treatment. On September 14, 2020, Employee
filed a petition for benefit determination (“PBD”) seeking assistance in obtaining medical
benefits. 1 Thereafter, through the Bureau’s mediation process, the parties reached an
agreement regarding discovery and ongoing medical treatment, which the mediator
documented in a “dispute resolution statement.” The dispute resolution statement
specifically stated, “[i]f additional issues arise in the course of this claim, either party may
file an amended Petition . . . utilizing the same docket number,” as well as “[s]hould there
be disputed issues . . . either party may file a petition.”

In August 2021, Employer filed its own PBD seeking assistance in “[f]inalizing the
benefit resolution aspect of this claim.” In this petition, Employer stated, “[w]e are ready
to mediate in hopes of resolving the claim.” The parties were unable to resolve the case
through mediation, and a dispute certification notice (“DCN”) was issued on November
29, 2022, identifying compensability, medical benefits, temporary disability benefits, and
permanent disability benefits as disputed issues. The “other” category was also marked,
with an email from Employer’s counsel attached to the DCN stating, “[f]or additional
defenses: Extent of permanent impairment related to left shoulder and neck,
compensability (and permanency) of back and/or left hip conditions, and overpayment
credit.”

Thereafter, the trial court issued a scheduling order requiring all lay witnesses to be
deposed by July 31, 2023; all proof depositions of expert witnesses to be taken by October
20, 2023; and for post-discovery mediation to occur on October 31, 2023. In addition to
other deadlines, the court set the final compensation hearing for November 29, 2023. The
court later extended the deadline for discovery depositions when Employee failed to appear
for her deposition, but all other deadlines remained in place. On October 31, eleven days
after the deadline for expert depositions passed, Employee filed a notice of voluntary
dismissal. On that same date, the post discovery mediation occurred, and another DCN
was filed with the court on November 8, with the categories of medical benefits, temporary
disability benefits, and permanent disability benefits marked as disputed issues. Employer
also submitted an email on November 1 to the mediator noting its objection to any new
issues not previously raised, stating the only issue certified to the court was related to the

1
In Section D of the Bureau’s PBD form, the filing party is asked to “[i]dentify the workers’ compensation
issues that apply to the claim.” In her petition, Employee marked “Employee has not received medical care
from Employer or the insurance company.” No other issues were marked.

2
neck, asserting that the claimant had been rated and released by her two authorized treating
physicians, and again claiming an overpayment credit.

Employer filed an objection to Employee’s notice of voluntary dismissal, arguing
that the matter was proceeding based on Employer’s PBD and, thus, Employee was not
entitled to voluntarily dismiss Employer’s petition. The trial court issued an order denying
the voluntary dismissal based on that argument, reasoning that the PBD was “the general
equivalent of a complaint” and “the plaintiff is master of the complaint.” See Crawford v.
Wal-Mart Associates, Inc., No. 2019-08-0951, 2021 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 17,
at *10 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. June 18, 2021); Mullins v. State, 294 S.W.3d 529,
540 (Tenn. 2009).

Employee filed a motion to reconsider and a response to Employer’s objection,
explaining that she filed the initial petition for benefit determination and was entitled to
voluntarily dismiss her own claim. She also argued that Rule 0800-02-21-.24 states “a
party may move to voluntarily dismiss a petition for benefit determination,” and as such,
either party “has a right to take a voluntary dismissal.” (Emphasis added.) The court
reconsidered its prior order and noted that the initial petition for benefit determination
Employee filed in September 2020 was inadvertently omitted from the trial court’s record.
The court then granted Employee’s request for a voluntary dismissal of her “claim” without
prejudice “to its refiling within the applicable period.” Employer has appealed.

Standard of Review

The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision presumes the court’s
factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2023). Appellate review of a trial court’s decision to
grant or deny a voluntary dismissal is governed by an abuse-of-discretion standard.
Stewart v. University of Tennessee, 519 S.W.2d 591, 593 (Tenn. 1974). When the trial
judge has had the opportunity to observe a witness’s demeanor and to hear in-court
testimony, we give considerable deference to factual findings made by the trial court.
Madden v. Holland Grp. of Tenn., Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tenn. 2009). However,
“[n]o similar deference need be afforded the trial court’s findings based upon documentary
evidence.” Goodman v. Schwarz Paper Co., No. W2016-02594-SC-R3-WC, 2018 Tenn.
LEXIS 8, at *6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 18, 2018). Similarly, the interpretation
and application of statutes and regulations are questions of law that are reviewed de novo
with no presumption of correctness afforded the trial court’s conclusions. See Mansell v.
Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn. 2013). We are also
mindful of our obligation to construe the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly,
impartially, and in accordance with basic principles of statutory construction” and in a way
that does not favor either the employee or the employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116
(2023).

3
Analysis

In its appeal brief, Employer presents several questions for review, including
whether it was an abuse of discretion to allow Employee to voluntarily dismiss her PBD
when the issues raised in that PBD no longer remained disputed as evidenced by the filing
of a dispute resolution statement. However, at oral argument, Employer’s counsel
emphasized the following issues to be addressed: (1) the impact of a second PBD filed in
the same action that raises issues separate and apart from the initial PBD, or in other words,
whether a second PBD constitutes a counterclaim under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure
13; and (2) if the first question is answered in the affirmative, whether a voluntary nonsuit
by one party can dismiss the entire action. For her part, Employee contends that Employer
has not raised any issues separate or apart from her initial PBD, and that Rule 0800-02-21-
.24 conflicts with Rule 41.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure; thus, the relevant
provisions in Rule 41.01 do not apply in the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims.

Dispute Resolution Statements

First and foremost, we address the subject matter of the initial PBD and the function
and purpose of a dispute resolution statement as used by Bureau mediators. The term
“dispute resolution statement” is not defined or discussed in the Bureau’s regulations
governing the mediation process. The term is also not contained in Tennessee Code
Annotated section 50-6-236, which discusses the duties of Bureau mediators and the
procedures for mediating claims, nor is it contained in any other section of the Workers’
Compensation Law. The dispute resolution statement is an internal form issued by a
mediator to summarize the terms of any agreement reached by the parties as to one or more
preliminary issues in the case, or it is used to indicate the parties have chosen not to proceed
with prosecuting the case at that time. However, a mediator’s issuance of a dispute
resolution statement has no legal impact on the pendency of the claim. Instead, the petition
remains active and unresolved until one of the following events occurs: (1) an order of
voluntary dismissal is entered by the court; (2) an order of involuntary dismissal is entered
after the issuance of a DCN; (3) a settlement agreement is reached by the parties and
approved by a workers’ compensation judge pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-240; or (4) a compensation order is issued by the trial court. Taylor v.
American Tire Distributors, No. 2015-06-0361, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 48,
at *6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Aug. 15, 2017). In short, a dispute resolution
statement issued by a mediator does not serve to dismiss or resolve a claim, and that petition
remains pending until one of the four events noted above occurs.

Here, after Employee filed her PBD requesting additional medical treatment, the
parties reached an agreement regarding certain discovery issues and the additional medical
treatment. The terms of that agreement were reflected in a dispute resolution statement.
However, as explained above, the Employee’s petition remained pending. Although
Employer conceded at oral argument that the dispute resolution statement did not dismiss

4
the initial PBD, it argued that the dispute resolution statement confined the issues of the
initial PBD to one of medical benefits and discovery. We conclude there is nothing in the
workers’ compensation statutes, rules, or regulations that authorizes a mediator to “narrow”
or “confine” the issues through a dispute resolution statement. Although dispute resolution
statements may be useful tools in the mediation process, the statements themselves have
no legal bearing on the pendency of the claim, the disputed issues in a case, or the rights
and obligations of the parties.

Thus, given that Employee’s original petition remained active and unresolved after
the issuance of the dispute resolution statement, we must next address whether the trial
court abused its discretion in granting Employee a voluntarily dismissal. We hold it did
not. Rule 0800-02-21-.24(1) states that “[a] party may move to voluntarily dismiss a
petition for benefit determination only once.” The rule further provides that a request for
voluntary dismissal cannot be granted if the trial court has issued an interlocutory order for
benefits or if a motion for summary judgment is pending. As such, although Employee
filed a “notice” of voluntarily dismissal rather than a motion as articulated in the regulation,
it was the first time a voluntary dismissal was sought, there was no interlocutory order for
benefits, and there was no motion for summary judgment pending. “A trial court abuses
its discretion when it causes an injustice by applying an incorrect legal standard, reaching
an illogical decision, or by resolving the case on a clearly erroneous assessment of the
evidence.” Henderson v. SAIA, Inc., 318 S.W.3d 328, 335 (Tenn. 2010) (internal citation
and quotation marks omitted). “[I]n most situations, a voluntary non-suit may be taken as
a matter of right.” Ewan v. Hardison Law Firm, 465 S.W.3d 124,130 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2014). Here, we conclude Employer has failed to show that the trial court’s order granting
the voluntary dismissal was illogical or erroneous or applied an incorrect legal standard.
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a voluntary dismissal of
Employee’s PBD.

Second PBD as a Counterclaim

Employer raises several arguments regarding the PBD it filed in August 2021.
Notably, it contends that its PBD raised issues separate and distinct from Employee’s
original petition; as such, it should be treated as a counterclaim pursuant to applicable rules
of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, it contends it has the ability to
proceed on that counterclaim despite Employee’s voluntary dismissal of her PBD.
Conversely, Employee contends that she has a right under that same rule to seek a voluntary
dismissal of her claim and that the pending PBD Employer filed should not have any
bearing on that right under Rule 0800-02-21-.21 of the Bureau’s regulations. Furthermore,
she contends Rule 41.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure is in direct conflict
with Rule 0800-02-21-.21 and, therefore, the Bureau’s regulation controls the outcome.

The threshold question is whether a second PBD filed by an opposing party can
constitute a counterclaim under Rule 41.01. Previously, we have stated a PBD is the

5
functional equivalent of a complaint. Valladares v. Transco Products, Inc., Nos. 2015-01-
0117, -118, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 31, at *17 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App.
Bd. July 27, 2016). As such, it is the vehicle by which a claim is commenced in the Court
of Workers’ Compensation Claims and by which the statute of limitations is tolled. See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-203(b) (2023). As Employee’s counsel noted at oral argument,
the form for the PBD states “[t]he legal process for a workers’ compensation claim begins
with this filing.” We have further stated that while there is no requirement under workers’
compensation statutes or the Bureau’s regulations for the responding party to file a formal
answer, the DCN gives an employer the opportunity to assert any defenses to the claim. 2
Morgan v. Macy’s, No. 2016-08-0270, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 39, at *20-
21 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Aug. 31, 2016). The Bureau provides no form for
filing a formal answer or for asserting a counterclaim, nor is there a regulation detailing
how to properly raise a counterclaim in the statutes or the Bureau’s regulations. 3

Without any specific guidance from the statutes or regulations regarding this issue
of first impression, we look to precedent. In the pre-reform case of Blake v. Plus-Mark,
Inc., 952 S.W.2d 413 (Tenn. 1997), the Tennessee Supreme Court considered a
counterclaim filed by the employer in the context of a workers’ compensation case. In that
case, the employee had filed a complaint in chancery court seeking workers’ compensation
benefits. Id. at 414. The employer filed an answer, averring defenses of notice and statute
of limitations, as well as a counter-complaint, which ‘“adopted the allegations of its
answer’ and ‘[sought] a determination . . . of the rights, duties and obligations of the parties
and general relief.’” Id. At the time of trial, the employee requested a continuance, which
the trial court denied. Id. The employee then asked for a voluntary dismissal of her claim
without prejudice, which the trial court granted. Id. However, the court proceeded to trial
based on the employer’s counterclaim to determine what benefits, if any, the employee was
owed based on the evidence before it. Id. at 415. After neither party submitted any
evidence, the trial court entered an order denying benefits to the employee. Id. The
employee appealed, first asserting error by the trial court in denying the continuance, and
then error in hearing the counterclaim given that it purportedly raised no separate or distinct
claims or independent grounds for relief. Id.

The Supreme Court in Blake found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial
of the continuance, and it then thoroughly reviewed the definition of a counterclaim. Id. at

2
Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239(b), the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims
is limited to hearing only the issues certified by the mediator on the dispute certification notice except in
the limited circumstances outlined in subsection 239(b)(2).
3
We further note that in circumstances where neither the workers’ compensation statutes nor the regulations
speak to a procedural issue, the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure apply. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
239(c)(1). Hence, we find nothing that prohibits a party from filing an answer or counterclaim in
accordance with Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 7, 8, and 13 if the issues raised in such pleadings have
been certified by the mediator on a dispute certification notice.

6
415-17. It first noted that Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(a)(1) authorized
“the employee and also the employer to submit a workers’ compensation controversy to
the court for determination.” Id. at 415 (emphasis added). The court determined that the
employer in the case asserted that right in the form of counterclaim. Id. The court then
reiterated that once there is a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41.01, “[i]f a counterclaim
has been pleaded by the defendant prior to the service upon the defendant of the plaintiff’s
motion to dismiss, the defendant may elect to proceed on such counterclaim in the capacity
of the plaintiff.” Id. at 416 (citing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01). Thus, the Court was called on
to address the exact question facing us today, which is whether “a defendant [in a workers’
compensation case] may proceed on a counterclaim even though the plaintiff has taken a
nonsuit.” Id. The Court also examined “whether the employer’s pleading set forth a
counterclaim within the meaning of the rule.” Id. The Court then explained:

Historically, in equity practice, the dismissal of an original bill ordinarily
carried with it the dismissal of a cross bill or an answer filed as a cross bill,
unless the answer or cross bill set up grounds for affirmative relief. . . . Under
Rule 13.01 a compulsory counterclaim is ‘any claim, other than a tort claim,
which at the time of the serving of the pleading the pleader has against any
opposing party, if it arises out of the . . . occurrence that is the subject matter
of the opposing party’s claim.”

Id. The court then held that an employer’s “statutory right to submit the entire matter for
determination” in a workers’ compensation case constituted a counterclaim under
Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01:

The counterclaim in this case incorporates the material contained in the
answer, identifies the parties, acknowledges that the employee has filed a
claim for workers’ compensation benefits, and sets forth additional
information . . . . The employers’ pleadings assert that any claim is barred by
the . . . statute of limitation and that the employee did not give
notice. . . . The pleadings assert that the employee has not sustained a work-
related injury in the course of her employment and she is not entitled to any
benefits. These allegations by the employer are more than “mere denials of
the plaintiff’s cause of action.” They would have been sufficient to state a
claim for relief under the workers’ compensation statute as an original
complaint filed by the employer.

Id. at 416. The court went on to explain that even though the employer was the defendant
as to the employee’s original complaint, it pled a valid counterclaim and, when the
employee voluntarily dismissed the complaint, the employer became the plaintiff in the
case and had the burden of proof. Id. at 416-17. As such, the employer was not entitled to
a judgment without satisfying its burden to provide evidence supporting the assertions in
its pleadings. Id. at 417.

7
As we have explained previously, “reliance on precedent from the Tennessee
Supreme Court is appropriate unless it is evident the Supreme Court’s decision or rationale
relied on a remedial interpretation of pre-July 1, 2014 statutes, that it relied on specific
statutory language no longer contained in the Workers’ Compensation Law, and/or that it
relied on an analysis that has since been addressed by the general assembly through general
statutory amendments.” McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing, No. 2014-06-0063,
2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *13 n.4 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd.
March 27, 2015). The Blake court relied on language in section 50-6-225, which at the
time contained the following provision:

In the case of a dispute over or failure to agree upon compensation under the
Workers’ Compensation Law between the employer and employee . . . either
party may submit the entire matter for determination to the judge . . . of the
county court . . . and such judge is vested with jurisdiction to hear and
determine the issues and render and enforce judgment.

Tenn. Code. Ann. § 50-6-225 (Supp. 1993). Although the procedures for initiating
litigation changed with the passage of the 2013 Workers’ Compensation Reform Act; the
Supreme Court in Blake relied primarily on the fact that either party could file a petition
with the court to initiate litigation in a workers’ compensation case. That procedure
remains despite the amendments to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225. 4 See
Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-21-.02(23)(a) (2023) (“Any party may file a petition as
provided under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-203.”). Furthermore, we find no
indication that the remedial nature of the pre-July 1, 2014 law was pertinent to the Court’s
analysis in Blake. Hence, we conclude that Blake supports the proposition that any party
who did not file the original petition can assert a counterclaim in a workers’ compensation
case pending in the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims and, if the party who filed the
original petition elects to seek a voluntary dismissal of the original petition, a party who
has properly asserted a counterclaim can elect to proceed as provided in Rule 41.01 of the
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

To the extent Employee’s counsel argues that Rule 0800-02-21-.24(1) conflicts with
Rule 41.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we are unpersuaded. Pursuant to
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239(c)(1), “[w]henever the administrator has
adopted an alternate procedural rule or evidentiary rule that conflicts with the Tennessee
Rules of Civil Procedure or the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, the rule adopted by the
administrator shall apply.” Employee asserts such a conflict exists as Rule 41.01 of the
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure allows the “plaintiff” to take a voluntary dismissal,

4
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225 now contains the procedure for pursuing an appeal to the
Supreme Court, whereas section 50-6-239 now sets out the procedures for presenting a case in the Court of
Workers’ Compensation Claims.

8
whereas Rule 0800-02-21-.24(1) allows “a party” to move for voluntary dismissal. This
argument fails to consider the entirety of the first sentence of the regulation. Rule 0800-
02-21-.24 reflects the fact that, in workers’ compensation cases, either party can file a
petition for benefit determination, and the parties to a workers’ compensation claim are
generally referred to as “employee” and “employer” rather than “plaintiff” and
“defendant.” We conclude the first sentence of Rule 0800-02-21-.24(1) merely speaks to
the number of times the party who filed the petition can move for voluntary dismissal of
that petition, and the rule is not in conflict with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01.5
As such, we hold that Rule 41.01 applies in the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims,
and parties who have properly asserted counterclaims can elect to proceed pursuant to that
rule despite an order voluntarily dismissing the other party’s petition.

Here, the trial court’s order granting the employee’s request for voluntary dismissal
is silent regarding the status of the PBD filed by Employer or any asserted counterclaim.
Thus, the trial court has not addressed whether Employer’s PBD and/or subsequent filings,
including the dispute certification notices and/or any attachments thereto, properly assert a
counterclaim and, if so, whether the counterclaim survived the voluntary dismissal of
Employee’s petition as described in Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01. It would be
inappropriate for us, in the first instance, to address such issues. See Buckner v. Eaton
Corp., No. 2016-01-0303, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 84, at *12 (Tenn.
Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Nov. 9, 2016) (“[I]t is not our place to address . . . issues [not
resolved by the trial court] in the first instance on appeal.”).

We therefore conclude the trial court’s order must be vacated to the extent it
suggests the entire “claim” has been voluntarily dismissed, including any possible
counterclaims asserted by Employer. Moreover, we conclude the case must be remanded
for the trial court to address whether, in light of its order granting Employee’s voluntary
dismissal of her petition, Employer’s PBD and/or other filings constitute a counterclaim
and, if so, whether the counterclaim survived the voluntary dismissal of Employee’s
petition pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01. 6

Conclusion

5
Taken to its logical conclusion, Employee’s proposed interpretation would suggest that, in every case
where an employee has filed a PBD, the employer has the right to “voluntarily” dismiss the employee’s
petition. Such an interpretation is both illogical and unfeasible.
6
During oral argument, Employee’s counsel advised that Employee had filed another PBD while this appeal
has been pending. As such, on remand, the trial court will need to address the effect of that PBD in light
of this opinion.

9
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order dismissing Employee’s cause
of action, vacate the trial court’s order to the extent that it could be interpreted as dismissing
Employer’s petition, and remand the case for the trial court to determine if Employer filed
an actionable counterclaim. Costs on appeal are taxed to Employer.

10
TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Kimberlee Thomas ) Docket No. 2020-01-0624
)
v. ) State File No. 6668-2018
)
Duracell-Cleveland, et al. )
)
)
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) Heard February 7, 2024
Compensation Claims ) via Microsoft Teams
Audrey A. Headrick, Judge )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the referenced
case was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 11th day
of March, 2024.

Name Certified First Class Via Via Sent to:
Mail Mail Fax Email
Garett P. Franklyn X gpfranklyn@mijs.com
ghfuller@mijs.com
dmduignan@mijs.com
Ronald J. Berke X ronnie@berkeattys.com
margo@berkeattys.com
Audrey A. Headrick, Judge X Via Electronic Mail
Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge X Via Electronic Mail
Penny Shrum, Clerk, Court of X penny.patterson-shrum@tn.gov
Workers’ Compensation Claims

Olivia Yearwood
Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board
220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B
Nashville, TN 37243
Telephone: 615-253-1606
Electronic Mail: WCAppeals.Clerk@tn.gov