Hendry, Bonnie v. 111 Travel Center, LLC

FILED
Jun 26, 2026
11:30 AM(CT)
TENNESSEE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
APPEALS BOARD

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Bonnie Hendry Docket No. 2023-04-3856

v. State File No. 860247-2023

111 Travel Center, LLC, et al.

Appeal from the Court of Workers’
Compensation Claims
Robert V. Durham, Judge

Affirmed and Remanded

In this interlocutory appeal, the employer asserts the trial court erred in declining to exclude
a Standard Form Medical Report presented by the employee from evidence at an upcoming
trial. The employer asserted that certain information contained in the Standard Form
Medical Report contradicted prior testimony from that expert’s deposition and, thus, the
“cancellation rule” supported its exclusion as evidence. The employer has appealed the
trial court’s order declining to exclude the document as evidence. Having carefully
reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision and remand the case.

Presiding Judge Timothy W. Conner delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which
Judge Pele I. Godkin and Judge Meredith B. Weaver joined.

Nicholas A. Lastra and Lily-Ana Fairweather, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the employer-
appellant, 111 Travel Center, LLC

Bonnie Hendry, employee-appellee, pro se

Memorandum Opinion 1

This interlocutory appeal involves an evidentiary dispute. We review a trial court’s
determinations regarding the admissibility or exclusion of evidence under an abuse-of-
discretion standard of review. See, e.g., Allen v. MJ Resurrection, Inc., No. 2024-80-6984,
2025 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 17, at *8 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. May 7,
2025) (“A trial court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”). As

1
This decision is being filed pursuant to Tenn. Comp. R. and Regs. 0800-02-22-.03(1) (2023).

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we have noted previously, an abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court “applied incorrect
legal standards, reached an illogical conclusion, based its decision on a clearly erroneous
assessment of the evidence, or employ[ed] reasoning that causes an injustice to the
complaining party.” Graves v. Southall Adventures, LLC, No. 2024-50-5540, 2026 TN
Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at *17-18 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Apr. 23,
2026) (quoting Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346,
358 (Tenn. 2008)).

In the present case, Employee deposed a medical expert, Dr. Christopher Jones, on
February 25, 2025. 2 During that deposition, Dr. Jones acknowledged during his cross-
examination that his treatment of Employee was “limited solely to her complaints
involving her hip and pelvic regions.” However, Dr. Jones clarified that “in my line of
work . . . there’s often a lot of overlap with lumbar spine disease.” When asked whether
he could state with medical certainty what caused the labral tear in her hip, Dr. Jones
replied, “I can’t.” When asked if he could state with medical certainty what caused the
“small full thickness tear involving the distal gluteus minimus posteriorly,” Dr. Jones
replied that it could “be from an acute injury . . . . It could be from repetitive strain.” He
then clarified, “It’s difficult to say.”

Almost one year later, on February 23, 2026, Employee filed a notice of intent to
use a Standard Form Medical Report (“Form C-32”) completed by Dr. Jones at trial
pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-235. That section provides that such
a report “shall be admissible at any stage of a workers’ compensation claim in lieu of a
deposition . . . if notice of intent to use the sworn statement is provided to the opposing
party or counsel not less than twenty (20) days before the date of intended use.” Tenn.
Code Ann. § 50-6-235(c)(2) (2025). However, the statute also provides that “[a]ll parties
have the right to take the physician’s deposition on cross examination concerning the
contents of the medical report.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-235(c)(1) (2025). To do so, the
opposing party must file an objection to the use of the Form C-32 “within ten (10) days of
the receipt of the notice,” and must “depose the physician within a reasonable period of
time or the objection shall be deemed to be waived.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-235(c)(2).

Here, instead of filing an objection to the use of the Form C-32 as mandated by
section 235(c)(2), Employer filed a “Motion in Limine to Strike the Form C-32 . . . or, In
the Alternative, a Motion for a Continuance.” In support of its motion, Employer quoted
extensively from Dr. Jones’s deposition and asserted that the quoted passages directly
contradicted statements he made in his Form C-32. It then argued that the “cancellation
rule” justified excluding Dr. Jones’s Form C-32 from evidence at the upcoming
compensation hearing. The trial court denied Employer’s motion to exclude, and Employer
has appealed.

2
At the time of that deposition, Employee was represented by counsel. Employee’s counsel subsequently
withdrew his representation, and Employee has proceeded in a self-represented capacity since that time.
2
The “cancellation rule” is a judicially-created doctrine that allows a trial court to
exclude evidence from a witness that directly contradicts prior statements of that same
witness. As explained by the Tennessee Supreme Court’s Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel:

Tennessee follows the rule that contradictory statements by the same witness
regarding a single fact cancel each other out. The Tennessee Supreme Court
has characterized mutually contradictory statements by the same witness as
“no evidence” of the fact sought to be proved. When the testimony of a
witness is susceptible of multiple interpretations, one of which would
produce no inconsistency, we are reluctant to apply the cancellation rule.

For the cancellation rule to apply, a witness must give conflicting or
contradictory statements on material issues that are susceptible to only one
interpretation.

Grooms v. City of Trenton, No. W2012-01872-WC-R3-WC, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 728, at
*10 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Sep. 12, 2013) (internal citations and some quotation
marks omitted).

Here, there are several reasons why the trial court concluded the cancellation rule
was not applicable under the circumstances of this case. First, for the cancellation rule to
apply, the alleged inconsistencies must be “unexplained,” or those statements must not be
capable of corroboration “by other evidence.” Helderman v. Smolin, 179 S.W.3d 493, 501
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Taylor v. Nash. Banner Publ’g Co., 573 S.W.2d 476, 483
(Tenn. 1978)). As noted by the trial court, it is impossible to know in the present case what
other evidence might be introduced by either side because the trial has not yet occurred.
Employee has not yet testified. The trial court has had no opportunity to assess the
credibility of any witnesses or the impact of such testimony in light of Dr. Jones’s
statements in both his deposition and the Form C-32.

Second, at an interlocutory stage of the case, the alleged inconsistency must
represent an “unequivocal and irreconcilable conflict.” Id. at 507. We agree with the trial
court that Employer has not met the burden of showing that Dr. Jones’s various statements
are “irreconcilable” or that the alleged inconsistencies are “unequivocal” at this stage of
the litigation.

Third, there is a statutorily mandated procedure for objecting to a Form C-32, which
Employer has declined to follow in the present case. Employee’s “Notice of Intent to Use
Form C-32 in Lieu of Physician Deposition” was filed February 23, 2026, but Employer’s
motion to strike was not filed until April 1, well beyond the ten-day time period within
which an objection to the use of a Form C-32 must be filed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
235(c)(2).

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In short, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in declining to strike
Dr. Jones’s Form C-32 prior to trial. We further conclude that the alleged inconsistencies
between Dr. Jones’s deposition testimony and any statements in the Form C-32 go to the
weight, not the admissibility, of this evidence. See, e.g., Wilson v. Jennings, No. E2012-
01966-WC-R3-WC, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 766, at *12 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Sep.
19, 2013).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court and remand the
case. Costs on appeal are taxed to Employer.

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