Farmer, Joseph v. Five Star Building Group, LLC

FILED
Jul 30, 2025
01:51 PM(CT)
TENNESSEE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
APPEALS BOARD

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Joseph Farmer ) Docket No. 2024-60-7231
)
v. ) State File No. 14720-2024
)
Five Star Building Group, LLC, et al. )
)
)
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )
Compensation Claims )
Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge )

Affirmed and Remanded

In this appeal, the employer asserts the trial court’s refusal to hear its dispositive motion
until after an expedited hearing had taken place was an abuse of discretion and a violation
of its right to procedural due process. The regulations governing dispositive motions
specify that such motions must include the date of the hearing in the body of the motion
and will not be heard until a scheduling order has been entered. The trial court issued a
“Scheduling Order/Order Setting Expedited Hearing,” which stated that the employer
“may file a dispositive motion, but it will not be heard until after the expedited hearing.”
The employer has appealed. Upon careful consideration of the record, we affirm the trial
court’s order and remand the case.

Judge Pele I. Godkin delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding Judge
Timothy W. Conner and Judge Meredith B. Weaver joined.

Houston M. Gunn and Gregory H. Fuller, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the employer-
appellant, Five Star Building Group, LLC

Ashely B. McGee, Nashville, Tennessee, for the employee-appellee, Joseph Farmer

Factual and Procedural Background

Joseph Farmer (“Employee”) reported injuring his low back and left wrist on
December 4, 2023, while working for Five Star Building Group, LLC (“Employer”).
Employer initially accepted the compensability of the claim and provided a panel of
physicians in March 2024. Employer paid temporary disability benefits and authorized
medical treatment with Dr. Jason Smith, Dr. Robert Todd, Dr. Peter Casey, and Dr. Brad

1
Wilson. Dr. Todd opined that Employee’s back injury was primarily caused by his
employment.

Employer filed a petition in October 2024, seeking an employer’s examination with
Dr. Tarek Elalayli. Employee declined to attend the appointment unless he could have a
videographer present. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered Employee to attend the
evaluation without the presence of a videographer, and the examination took place on
January 15, 2025. After deposing Employee in February, Employer filed a notice of denial
in March 2025, asserting Employee failed to provide timely notice of his alleged work-
related injury.

On April 3, 2025, Employer filed a request for a scheduling hearing. At the hearing
for that motion on May 12, the trial court requested that the parties provide a status update.
Employer advised the court that Dr. Elalayli had performed the employer’s examination
and opined that Employee had reached maximum medical improvement with a 2%
impairment rating. Employee notified the court that he still wanted the medical treatment
recommended by the authorized treating physician and that, because Employer had denied
the claim, he intended to file a request for an expedited hearing with the court within the
next few days. When asked by the court, counsel for Employer indicated he did not believe
additional depositions would be required. Employer’s counsel requested that the court
issue a scheduling order as required by Bureau regulations so Employer could file a motion
for summary judgment. On May 14, 2025, the trial court issued an order entitled
“Scheduling Order/Order Setting Expedited Hearing,” which stated that “Five Star may
file a dispositive motion, but it will not be heard until after the expedited hearing.” The
expedited hearing was scheduled for July 16.

On May 21, one week later, counsel for Employer emailed court staff to request
available dates to schedule a hearing on a motion for summary judgment because a hearing
date must be included in a dispositive motion when it is filed. See Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs.
0800-02-21-.18(1)(c) (2023). In the email, counsel identified multiple weeks during which
he would like to schedule the hearing, with all but one week and two separate days
occurring before the expedited hearing set for July 16. Employer was advised that the court
would not schedule a summary judgment hearing until after the expedited hearing order
had been entered. Employer then appealed the May 14 order, asserting the trial court
abused its discretion by refusing to hear its dispositive motion until after an expedited
hearing had occurred. Employer also contends that the trial court’s “mandate on
dispositive motions” violates its right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 1

1
On June 17, 2025, the employer-appellant filed a motion for oral argument. The motion is denied. See
Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-22-.08(1) (2023).
2
Standard of Review

A trial court’s decisions affecting the timing and pace of litigation are discretionary
and will be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Smith v. The Newman Grp.,
LLC, No. 2015-08-0075, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 30, at *9 (Tenn. Workers’
Comp. App. Bd. Sept. 21, 2015). An abuse of discretion is found if the trial court “applied
incorrect legal standards, reached an illogical conclusion, based its decision on a clearly
erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employ[ed] reasoning that causes an injustice to
the complaining party.” Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 249
S.W.3d 346, 358 (Tenn. 2008). “Whether a court applied an incorrect legal standard is a
question of law that is reviewed de novo.” Funk v. Scripps Media, Inc., 570 S.W.3d 205,
210 (Tenn. 2019). We are required to “review a [trial] court’s discretionary decision to
determine (1) whether the factual basis for the decision is properly supported by the
evidence in the record, (2) whether the [trial] court properly identified and applied the most
appropriate legal principles applicable to the decision, and (3) whether the [trial] court’s
decision was within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions.” Lee Med., Inc. v.
Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524-25 (Tenn. 2010) (internal citations omitted). The abuse of
discretion standard does not permit us to merely substitute our judgment for that of the trial
court. See Discover Bank v. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d 479, 487 (Tenn. 2012).

Moreover, this Board does not have the authority to consider facial challenges to
the constitutionality of any statute or regulation. Worrell v. Obion Cnty. Sch. Dist., 694
S.W.3d 158, 164 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel 2024); Wigdor v. Elec. Rsch., No. W2023-
01733-SC-R3-WC, 2024 Tenn. LEXIS 504, at *4 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Dec. 12,
2024). However, in cases in which a party challenges the constitutionality of the
application of a statute or regulation in a given case, also known as an “as-applied
challenge,” Tennessee courts have acknowledged an administrative tribunal’s authority to
address the issue. Richardson v. Bd. of Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446, 454 (Tenn. 1995).

Analysis

On appeal, Employer asserts the trial court abused its discretion by declining to hear
its dispositive motion until after an expedited hearing. Specifically, Employer argues that
the trial court abused its discretion in “arbitrarily mandating any dispositive motion be
heard after an expedited hearing because (1) it is beyond the statutory/regulatory
requirements for dispositive motions; and (2) it is in conflict with the founding principles
of efficiency under the workers’ compensation act.” Employer also contends that the
court’s refusal to hear its dispositive motion until after an expedited hearing violated its
right to procedural due process.

3
Dispositive Motions

With respect to a trial court’s discretion over when to hear pre-trial dispositive
motions, we previously observed that:

[T]he text of Rule 56 does not specify a time within which a trial court must
conduct a hearing on a previously filed motion for summary judgment . . . .
It gives a trial court significant discretion to determine the appropriate time
in the course of litigation to conduct a hearing on a party’s motion for
summary judgment.

Hollis v. Komyo America, No. 2016-03-0298, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 25,
at *7 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 7, 2017). We also explained that “in setting
hearings on pending motions, a trial court must balance the interests of both parties, give
each side a reasonable and meaningful opportunity to prepare for the motion hearing, and
set the hearing as expeditiously as it deems appropriate under the circumstances of the
case.” Id. at *10.

In Oldham v. Freeman Webb Company Realtors d/b/a Sunnybrook, No. 2022-03-
0420, 2024 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 8 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 6,
2024), we addressed whether a trial court must entertain such motions at an interlocutory
stage of the case if requested to do so by a party. In that appeal, we concluded that a trial
court’s decision regarding whether to resolve any particular issues at an interlocutory stage
of the case is within its sound discretion and noted that we would disturb such
determinations only upon a showing that the trial court had abused its discretion. Id. at *14
(citing Ellison v. Alley, 902 S.W.2d 415 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (“A trial court will not be
placed in error for failing or refusing to rule on a motion unless the record clearly reflects
that it was asked to do so and thereafter, without just cause, refused to act.”)).

Here, Employer argues that the trial court’s order is an abuse of discretion because
“it is not a mere discretionary exercise of the docket but a promulgation of an additional
procedural requirement, directly on [Employer], in conflict with the current regulations and
outside of the trial court’s authority.” Further, it contends that “the enforcement of the trial
court’s order bars [Employer’s] ability to even file a dispositive motion” prior to the
expedited hearing, even though its May 14 order states that Employer “may file a
dispositive motion, but it will not be heard until after the expedited hearing.” Employer
also argues that policy considerations, such as judicial efficiency, are not served by the
court’s refusal to hear the dispositive motion before conducting an expedited hearing.

We respectfully disagree. First, we find nothing in this record suggesting that
Employer was prohibited from filing a dispositive motion. Tenn. Comp. R. and Regs.
0800-02-21-.18(1) specifies that a dispositive motion may be filed “in accordance with the
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.” Moreover, Employer could have filed its motion and

4
complied with the applicable regulation requiring that the hearing date appear
conspicuously on the face of the motion by requesting additional hearing dates after July
16, the date the court had set for the expedited hearing.

Second, as noted above, a trial court has broad discretion to manage its own docket.
Valladares v. Transco Prods., Inc., Nos. 2015-01-0117, -0118, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App.
Bd. LEXIS 31, at *26 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. July 27, 2016). Based on the facts
before us, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in declining to hear
Employer’s dispositive motion before the expedited hearing. We find no applicable rule
or regulation mandating that a court set a hearing on a dispositive motion at any particular
point in the course of litigation, and we decline to impose such an obligation on trial courts.
See Oldham, 2024 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 8; Hollis, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App.
Bd. LEXIS 25. Employer has not identified how the trial court “applied incorrect legal
standards, reached an illogical conclusion, based its decision on a clearly erroneous
assessment of the evidence, or employ[ed] reasoning that causes an injustice to
[Employer].” Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cnty Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346,
358 (Tenn. 2008). Rather, the trial court has elected to structure its docket in a particular
way, which it has considerable discretion to do. As we have noted previously:

[T]rial courts have been charged with controlling the pace of litigation
through the use of supervision and docket management which will ensure
efficient disposition of civil cases. While we are mindful of the general
assembly’s emphasis on efficiency and timeliness in the 2013 Workers’
Compensation Reform Act, we conclude that allowing a trial court to
exercise discretion in controlling the pace of litigation and in efficiently
disposing of its cases does not run afoul of these objectives.

Smith, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 30, at *9 (citing Sissom v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., No. M2011-00363-WC-R3-WC, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 411
(Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Panel June 20, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
find no abuse of discretion here.

Procedural Due Process

Employer next asserts that the trial court violated its procedural due process by
declining to hear dispositive motions until after an expedited hearing. 2 Specifically,
Employer argues that the trial court’s order denied it the opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, resulting in a private property interest being
affected by an “official action.” Employer contends that by “denying [it] the opportunity
2
As noted above, we have no authority to consider a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute or
regulation. Worrell, 694 S.W.3d at 164. For purposes of this discussion, therefore, we address only whether
the pertinent regulation was applied in a manner that implicates or infringes on the appellant’s procedural
due process rights.
5
to have its motion for summary judgment heard, [it] faces an appreciable risk of erroneous
deprivation of its property because[,] at an expedited hearing, [Employee] need not prove
every element of his claim” by a preponderance of the evidence. Finally, Employer argues
that the government does not have a “direct interest in mandating an expedited hearing to
be held prior to hearing any dispositive motions because this workers’ compensation claim
is a proceeding between two private parties, not a private party and the government.”

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from
“depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Our state constitution mirrors the Due Process Clause with what
is known as the “Law of the Land” provision, stating “no man shall be . . . deprived of his
life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.” Tenn.
Const. art. I, § 8; see also Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d
393, 407 (Tenn. 2013). In contrast to substantive due process, which “bars certain
arbitrary, wrongful government actions ‘regardless of the fairness of the procedures used
to implement them,’” see, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (quoting
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)), procedural due process concerns the
“minimal requirements of notice and a hearing,” Procedural Due Process, Black’s Law
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). As the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained, the federal
and state constitutions contain clauses that are “intended to secure the individual from the
arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.” Keller v. Casteel, 602 S.W.3d 351, 357
(Tenn. 2020) (quoting Tenn. Dept. of Corr. v. Pressley, 528 S.W.3d 506, 513-14 (Tenn.
2017)).

Here, Employer asserts that the trial court’s refusal to conduct a hearing on its
motion for summary judgment prior to an expedited hearing constitutes an as-applied
procedural due process violation. It argues that its inability to test the merits of Employee’s
claim prior to an expedited hearing may result in the deprivation of its property because
Employee’s burden of proof is lower at an expedited hearing than a summary judgment
hearing. However, in making its argument, Employer fails to acknowledge that the
converse is true as well, as an injured worker could be forced to a hearing on the merits of
the claim before having an opportunity to assert entitlement to certain benefits at an
expedited hearing as contemplated by statute. Moreover, Employer has not demonstrated
that it would be somehow prohibited from offering the same evidence and making the same
arguments in defense of Employee’s claims at an expedited hearing as it would make at a
dispositive motion hearing. The law vests considerable discretion with the trial court to
control its docket to ensure that both employers and employees are able to have their claims
and defenses fairly heard.

In short, Employer has not been denied a hearing on its motion for summary
judgment. The trial court’s order specifically contemplates that such a motion hearing will

6
occur after an expedited hearing, which it scheduled. 3 It has provided no support for its
assertion that the trial court committed an as-applied procedural due process violation and
has pointed to nothing more than a theoretical harm it may suffer in the future. 4 Thus, we
conclude Employer “has offered no evidence or argument that the trial court’s process in
conducting hearings, selecting trial dates, and/or controlling the pace of litigation is
arbitrary or otherwise runs afoul of those constitutional protections.” Cutsinger v. AT & T
Mobility Services, LLC, Nos. 2021-06-0007, 2022-06-1079, 2024 TN Wrk. Comp. App.
Bd. LEXIS 29, at *8 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. July 22, 2024). Thus, we find this
argument without merit.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the court’s decision under the particular
circumstances of this case and remand the case. Costs on appeal are taxed to Employer.

3
In its brief on appeal, Employer notes that although most of the dates it suggested for a motion hearing
were before the scheduled expedited hearing, it also included a few proposed dates after the date of the
expedited hearing, consistent with the trial court’s order. Employer asserts it was advised by court staff
that a date for its dispositive motion would only be scheduled after the court had issued its expedited hearing
order and the appeal deadline for that order had expired. The email on which Employer relies for this
argument is not evidence in the case, was not considered by the trial court, and is unauthenticated.
Moreover, it does not constitute an order of the court. Although we agree that the email communication
from court staff regarding the scheduling of a dispositive motion hearing, if authentic, appears inconsistent
with the language in the trial court’s order, the record does not reflect that Employer sought relief or further
clarification from the court regarding the terms of its earlier order. It is a well-established principle that a
court “speaks through its orders.” See, e.g., Andric v. Costco Wholesale Mbrshp., Inc., No. W2017-01661-
SC-R3-WC, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 395, at *9 n.2 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Aug. 2, 2018) (quoting
Alexander v. JB Partners, 380 S.W.3d 772, 777 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2011)). Here, the court’s order
did not deny Employer the opportunity to file a dispositive motion or set it for hearing, but it directed the
timing of when that hearing would occur in the course of this particular litigation. We conclude Employer
has not shown that its apparent inability to schedule a dispositive motion hearing in a time frame it
demanded constituted an abuse of discretion.
4
On this point, Employer’s argument presumes that Employee will be successful at an expedited hearing
in securing an order for some or all of the relief he seeks, which is speculative.
7
TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Joseph Farmer ) Docket No. 2024-60-7231
)
v. ) State File No. 14720-2024
)
Five Star Building Group, LLC, et al. )
)
)
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )
Compensation Claims )
Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the referenced case
was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 30th day of
July, 2025.

Name Certified First Class Via Via Sent to:
Mail Mail Fax Email
Houston M. Gunn X hmgunn@mijs.com
Gregory H. Fuller ghfuller@mijs.com
emloh@mijs.com
Ashley B. McGee X ashleymcgee@rockylawfirm.com
paige@rockylawfirm.com
Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge X Via Electronic Mail
Penny Shrum, Clerk, Court of X penny.patterson-shrum@tn.gov
Workers’ Compensation Claims

Olivia Yearwood
Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board
220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B
Nashville, TN 37243
Telephone: 615-253-1606
Electronic Mail: WCAppeals.Clerk@tn.gov