CITY OF COLUMBUS et al. v. OURS GARAGE AND WRECKER SERVICE, INC., et al.

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
424 OCTOBER TERM, 2001
Syllabus
CITY OF COLUMBUS et al. v. OURS GARAGE AND
WRECKER SERVICE, INC., et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 01–419. Argued April 23, 2002—Decided June 20, 2002
Federal law preempts prescriptions by “a State [or] political subdivision
of a State . . . related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . .
with respect to the transportation of property,” 49 U. S. C. § 14501(c)(1).
Exceptions to this general rule provide that the preemption directive
“shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with re-
spect to motor vehicles,” § 14501(c)(2)(A); “does not apply to the trans-
portation of household goods,” § 14501(c)(2)(B); and “does not apply to
the authority of a State or a political subdivision of a State” to regulate
“the price of for-hire motor vehicle transportation by a tow truck . . .
performed without the prior consent . . . of the [towed vehicle’s] owner
or operator,” § 14501(c)(2)(C). Petitioner Columbus, Ohio (City), exten-
sively regulates the operation of tow trucks seeking to pick up vehicles
within city limits. Plaintiff-respondents, a tow-truck operator and a
trade association of such operators, brought this suit to enjoin enforce-
ment of the City’s tow-truck regulations on the ground that they were
preempted by § 14501(c)(1). The Federal District Court granted the
plaintiffs summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed based on its
earlier decision in Petrey v. Toledo, in which it held that city tow-truck
regulations similar to those of Columbus were preempted. Observing
that § 14501(c)(1)’s preemption rule explicitly applies to “a State [or] po-
litical subdivision of a State,” while the exception for safety regulations,
§ 14501(c)(2)(A), refers only to the “authority of a State,” the Petrey
court determined that the contrast in statutory language indicated that
Congress meant to limit the safety exception to States alone. This
reading, the court further reasoned, was consistent with Congress’
deregulatory purpose of encouraging market forces by eliminating a
myriad of complicated and potentially conflicting state regulations. Yet
another level of regulation at the local level, the court inferred, would
be disfavored.
Held: Section 14501(c) does not bar a State from delegating to munici-
palities and other local units the State’s authority to establish safety
regulations governing motor carriers of property, including tow trucks.
Pp. 432–442.

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
425 Cite as: 536 U. S. 424 (2002)
Syllabus
(a) Had § 14501(c) contained no reference at all to “political subdivi-
sion[s] of a State,” § 14501(c)(2)(A)’s exception for exercises of the
“safety regulatory authority of a State” undoubtedly would have em-
braced both state and local regulation under Wisconsin Public Interve-
nor v. Mortier, 501 U. S. 597. It was there held that the exclusion of
political subdivisions cannot be inferred from a federal law’s express
authorization to the “States” to take action, for such subdivisions are
components of the very entity the statute empowers, and are created as
convenient agencies to exercise such of the State’s powers as it chooses
to entrust to them, id., at 607–608. This case is a closer call than Mor-
tier because, in contrast to § 14501(c)(2)(A)’s singularly bare reference
to “[s]tate” authority, almost every other provision of § 14501 links
States and their political subdivisions. Nevertheless, that does not
mean that Congress intended to limit the exception to States alone, as
respondents contend. Respondents rely on Russello v. United States,
464 U. S. 16, 23, in which the Court observed that, where particular
language is included in one section of a federal statute but omitted
from another, Congress is generally presumed to have acted intention-
ally and purposely. Reading § 14501(c)’s exceptions in combination and
context, however, leads the Court to conclude that § 14501 does not pro-
vide the requisite “clear and manifest indication that Congress sought
to supplant local authority.” Mortier, 501 U. S., at 611. Section
14501(c)(2)(C) refers to the “authority of a State or a political subdivision
of a State to enact or enforce” regulations in particular areas, wording
which parallels that of § 14501(c)(1). Accord, § 14501(c)(3). This paral-
lel structure does not imply, however, that § 14501(c)(2)(A)’s concise
statement must be read to use the term “State” restrictively. In con-
trast to §§ 14501(c)(2)(C) and (c)(3), neither the safety exception,
§ 14501(c)(2)(A), nor the exception for the transportation of household
goods, § 14501(c)(2)(B), refers to the “authority . . . to enact or enforce a
law, regulation, or other provision.” The Russello presumption—that
the presence of a phrase in one provision and its absence in another
reveals Congress’ design—grows weaker with each difference in the
formulation of the provisions under inspection. Furthermore, the
Court notes, § 14501(c)(1) preempts the power of both States and locali-
ties to “enact or enforce” rules related to the “price, route, or service of
any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property”;
reading the term “State” in § 14501(c)(2)(A) to exclude localities would
prevent those units not only from enacting such rules but also from
enforcing them, even when such rules were enacted by the state legisla-
ture. Finally, resort to the Russello presumption here would yield a
decision at odds with our federal system’s traditional comprehension of
the regulatory authority of a State. Local governmental units are cre-

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
426 COLUMBUS v. OURS GARAGE & WRECKER
SERVICE, INC.
Syllabus
ated to exercise such of the State’s powers as the State may entrust
to them in its absolute discretion. Mortier, 501 U. S., at 607–608. In
contrast to programs in which Congress restricts that discretion
through its spending power, § 14501(c)(2)(A) evinces a clear purpose to
ensure that the preemption of States’ economic authority over motor
carriers of property “not restrict” the preexisting and traditional state
police power over safety, “a field which the States have traditionally
occupied.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 485. Preemption
analysis “start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of
the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Ibid. Because a
State’s “safety regulatory authority” includes the choice to delegate
power to localities, forcing a State to refrain from doing so would effec-
tively “restrict” that very authority. Absent a basis more reliable than
statutory language insufficient to demonstrate a “clear and manifest
purpose” to the contrary, federal courts should resist attribution to Con-
gress of a design to disturb a State’s decision on the division of authority
between the State’s central and local units over safety on municipal
streets and roads. Pp. 432–440.
(b) Contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s reading, declarations of deregula-
tory purpose in the statute and legislative history do not justify inter-
preting through a deregulatory prism aspects of the state regulatory
process that Congress determined should not be preempted. Giving
§ 14501(c)(2)(A)’s safety exception the narrowest possible construction
is resistible here, for that provision does not necessarily conflict with
Congress’ deregulatory purposes. The area Congress sought to dereg-
ulate was state economic regulation; the exemption in question is for
state safety regulation. Local regulation of tow-truck prices, routes,
or services that is not genuinely responsive to safety concerns garners
no exemption from preemption. The construction of § 14501 that re-
spondents advocate, moreover, does not guarantee uniform regulation.
On their reading as on petitioners’, for example, a State could, with-
out affront to the statute, pass discrete, nonuniform safety regulations
applicable to each of its several constituent municipalities. Further-
more, § 31141—which authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to void
any state safety law or regulation upon finding that it has no safety
benefit or would cause an unreasonable burden on interstate com-
merce—affords a means to prevent § 14501(c)(2)(A)’s safety exception
from overwhelming Congress’ deregulatory purpose. Pp. 440–442.
(c) The Court expresses no opinion on whether Columbus’ particular
regulations, in whole or in part, qualify as exercises of “safety regula-

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
427 Cite as: 536 U. S. 424 (2002)
Syllabus
tory authority” or otherwise fall within § 14501(c)(2)(A)’s compass.
This question, which was not reached by the Sixth Circuit, remains open
on remand. P. 442.
257 F. 3d 506, reversed and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined.
Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O’Connor, J., joined, post,
p. 442.
Jeffrey S. Sutton argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Traci L. Lovitt, Ronald E. Laymon,
and Susan E. Ashbrook.
Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the
brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral McCallum, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Mark
B. Stern, Dana Martin, Kirk K. Van Tine, Paul M. Geier,
and Dale C. Andrews.
Richard A. Cordray argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the briefs was David A. Ferris.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Kan-
sas et al. by Carla J. Stovall, Attorney General of Kansas, and Stephen
R. McAllister, State Solicitor, joined by the Attorneys General for their
respective States as follows: Bill Lockyer of California, Ken Salazar of
Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida,
Steve Carter of Indiana, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Jeremiah W.
(Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, Frankie Sue Del
Papa of Nevada, Eliot Spitzer of New York, Betty D. Montgomery of
Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode
Island, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, John Cornyn of Texas, Mark L.
Shurtleff of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, and Christine O. Grego-
ire of Washington; for the City of Dallas by Christopher D. Bowers; for
Miami-Dade County by Leonard Leigh Elias; for the City and County of
San Francisco et al. by Rose-Ellen Heinz, Moses W. Johnson IV, Michael
F. Dean, Charles M. Hinton, Jr., Brad Neighbor, Scott H. Howard, Henry
W. Underhill, Jr., Michael G. Colantuono, William B. Conners, Michael
A. Cardozo, Leonard J. Koerner, George Rios, Valerie J. Armento, Debra
E. Corbett, and Robert E. Murphy; for the City of Toledo et al. by Barry

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
428 COLUMBUS v. OURS GARAGE & WRECKER
SERVICE, INC.
Opinion of the Court
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
Federal preemption prescriptions relating to motor carri-
ers, contained in 49 U. S. C. § 14501(c) (1994 ed., Supp. V),
specifically save to States “safety regulatory authority . . .
with respect to motor vehicles,” § 14501(c)(2)(A). This case
presents the question whether the state power preserved in
§ 14501(c)(2)(A) may be delegated to municipalities, permit-
ting them to exercise safety regulatory authority over local
tow-truck operations.
The federal legislation preempts provisions by “a State
[or] political subdivision of a State . . . related to a price,
route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the
transportation of property.” § 14501(c)(1). As an exception
to this general rule, Congress provided that the preemption
directive “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority
of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” § 14501(c)(2)(A).
Section 14501(c)(1)’s statement of the general rule explicitly
includes “State[s]” and their “political subdivision[s].” The
exception for safety regulation, however, specifies only
“State[s]” and does not mention “political subdivision[s].”
§ 14501(c)(2)(A).
We hold that § 14501(c) does not bar a State from delegat-
ing to municipalities and other local units the State’s author-
ity to establish safety regulations governing motor carriers
of property, including tow trucks. A locality, as § 14501(c)
recognizes, is a “political subdivision” of the State. Ordi-
narily, a political subdivision may exercise whatever portion
M. Byron, John E. Gotherman, and James G. Burkhardt; and for Coalition
for Local Sovereignty by Kenneth B. Clark.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American
Trucking Associations, Inc., et al. by Evan M. Tager, Beth L. Law, and
Robert Digges, Jr.; for the California Dump Truck Owners Association by
Edward J. Hegarty; for the Cargo Airline Association by Paul T. Fried-
man, Ruth N. Borenstein, Drew S. Days III, and Beth S. Brinkmann; for
the Towing and Recovery Association of America by Erik S. Jaffe and
Michael P. McGovern; and for VRC LLC et al. by James C. Mosser.

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
429 Cite as: 536 U. S. 424 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
of state power the State, under its own constitution and laws,
chooses to delegate to the subdivision. Absent a clear state-
ment to the contrary, Congress’ reference to the “regulatory
authority of a State” should be read to preserve, not pre-
empt, the traditional prerogative of the States to delegate
their authority to their constituent parts.
I
The Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the Federal
Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, 108 Stat.
1606, and the ICC Termination Act of 1995, 109 Stat. 899,
generally preempts state and local regulation “related to a
price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect
to the transportation of property”; enumerated matters,
however, are not covered by the preemption provision. The
Act prescribes:
“(1) General Rule.—Except as provided in para-
graphs (2) and (3), a State, political subdivision of a
State, or political authority of 2 or more States may not
enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision
having the force and effect of law related to a price,
route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect
to the transportation of property.
“(2) Matters not covered.—Paragraph (1)—
“(A) shall not restrict the safety regulatory author-
ity of a State with respect to motor vehicles . . . or
the authority of a State to regulate motor carriers with
regard to minimum amounts of financial responsibility
relating to insurance requirements and self-insurance
authorization;
“(B) does not apply to the transportation of household
goods; and
“(C) does not apply to the authority of a State or a
political subdivision of a State to enact or enforce a
law, regulation, or other provision relating to the price
of for-hire motor vehicle transportation by a tow truck,

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
430 COLUMBUS v. OURS GARAGE & WRECKER
SERVICE, INC.
Opinion of the Court
if such transportation is performed without the prior
consent or authorization of the owner or operator of the
motor vehicle.
“ ( 3 ) S t a t e s t a n d a r d t r a n s p o r t a t i o n
practices.—
“(A) Continuation.—[Section 14501(c)(1)] shall not
affect any authority of a State, political subdivision of
a State, or political authority of 2 or more States to
enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision,
with respect to the intrastate transportation of property
by motor carriers, related to—[inter alia] uniform
cargo liability rules . . . if such law, regulation, or pro-
vision meets [various enumerated] requirements.” 49
U. S. C. § 14501(c).
Tow trucks, all parties to this case agree, are “motor carri-
er[s] of property” falling within § 14501(c)’s compass. This
reading is corroborated by § 14501(c)(2)(C), which relates to
nonconsensual tows, e. g., of illegally parked or abandoned
vehicles. That provision plainly indicates that tow trucks
qualify as “motor carrier[s] of property”; it exempts from
federal preemption state and local regulation of “the price of
for-hire motor vehicle transportation by a tow truck” when
the towing “is performed without the prior consent . . . of
the [towed vehicle’s] owner or operator.”
Petitioner, the City of Columbus, Ohio (City), extensively
regulates the operation of any tow truck that seeks to pick
up vehicles within city limits. Columbus’ regulations re-
quire tow-truck operators to obtain city licenses, submit to
city inspections, meet city standards for insurance and rec-
ordkeeping, and conform their vehicles to the City’s detailed
equipment requirements. See Columbus, Ohio, City Code
§§ 549.02–549.06 (1991); App. to Pet. for Cert. 37a–52a.
Plaintiff-respondent Ours Garage and Wrecker Service,
Inc., joined by a trade association of tow-truck operators, the
Towing and Recovery Association of Ohio (TRAO), brought
suit in Federal District Court against the City of Columbus

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
431 Cite as: 536 U. S. 424 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
and two city officials to enjoin enforcement of the City’s tow-
truck regulations. The complaint alleged that Columbus’
regulations were preempted by § 14501(c)(1). On cross-
motions for summary judgment, the District Court ruled for
the plaintiffs; the court declared the City’s tow-truck regula-
tions preempted and enjoined their enforcement. Columbus
and its officials appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit.
During the pendency of Columbus’ appeal, the Sixth Cir-
cuit decided Petrey v. Toledo, 246 F. 3d 548 (2001). Petrey
held that city of Toledo tow-truck regulations, resembling
those of Columbus, were preempted by § 14501(c).1 The
court observed first that § 14501(c)(1)’s preemption rule
explicitly applies to “a State [or] political subdivision
of a State,” while the exception for safety regulations,
§ 14501(c)(2)(A), refers only to the “authority of a State.”
The contrast in statutory language indicated to the court
that Congress meant to limit the safety exception to States
alone. Id., at 563. This reading, the court further rea-
soned, was consistent with Congress’ deregulatory purpose.
“Congress intended to encourage market forces . . . through
the elimination of a myriad of complicated and potentially
conflicting state regulations,” the court observed; “yet an-
other level of regulation at the local level,” the court in-
ferred, “would be disfavored.” Ibid.
Eleven weeks after rendering its judgment in Petrey, the
Sixth Circuit decided this case. Holding Petrey dispositive,
the appeals court affirmed the District Court’s injunction
against enforcement of Columbus’ tow-truck regulations.
257 F. 3d 506, 507–508 (2001).
The Courts of Appeals have divided on the question
whether § 14501(c)(2)(A)’s safety regulation exception to pre-
1 The court excepted regulations governing the city’s own purchase of
towing services, which it held fell within the “municipal proprietor” excep-
tion applicable to federal preemption rules. See Petrey, 246 F. 3d, at
558–559.

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
432 COLUMBUS v. OURS GARAGE & WRECKER
SERVICE, INC.
Opinion of the Court
emption encompasses municipal regulations. Compare Pe-
trey, 246 F. 3d 548; Stucky v. San Antonio, 260 F. 3d 424
(CA5 2001); Tocher v. Santa Ana, 219 F. 3d 1040, 1051 (CA9
2000); and R. Mayer of Atlanta, Inc. v. Atlanta, 158 F. 3d
538 (CA11 1998) (all holding that local safety and insurance
regulations are preempted), with Ace Auto Body & Towing,
Ltd. v. New York, 171 F. 3d 765 (CA2 1999) (holding that local
safety and insurance regulations are not preempted). We
granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, see 534 U. S. 1073
(2002), and now reverse the Sixth Circuit’s judgment.
II
We begin our consideration of the question presented with
an observation that is beyond genuine debate. Had 49
U. S. C. § 14501(c) contained no reference at all to “political
subdivision[s] of a State,” the preemption provision’s excep-
tion for exercises of the “safety regulatory authority of a
State,” § 14501(c)(2)(A), undoubtedly would have embraced
both state and local regulation. Accord, post, at 445
(Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court’s decision in Wisconsin
Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U. S. 597 (1991), would
have been definitive. There the Court considered a provi-
sion of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act authorizing a “State [to] regulate the sale or use of any
federally registered pesticide or device in the State,” 7
U. S. C. § 136v(a); the provision was “silent with reference to
local governments.” 501 U. S., at 607. “Mere silence,” we
held, “cannot suffice to establish a clear and manifest pur-
pose to pre-empt local authority.” Ibid. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
As Justice White stated for the Court in Mortier, “[w]hen
considering pre-emption, ‘we start with the assumption that
the historic police powers of the States were not to be super-
seded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and mani-
fest purpose of Congress.’ ” Id., at 605 (quoting Rice v.

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
433 Cite as: 536 U. S. 424 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947)). Fur-
thermore, Justice White explained:
“The principle is well settled that local governmental
units are created as convenient agencies for exercising
such of the governmental powers of the State as may be
entrusted to them in its absolute discretion. The exclu-
sion of political subdivisions cannot be inferred from the
express authorization to the States because political
subdivisions are components of the very entity the stat-
ute empowers.” 501 U. S., at 607–608 (internal quota-
tion marks, citations, and alterations omitted).
This case is a closer call than Mortier. Here, the general
preemption provision, § 14501(c)(1)—from which § 14501(c)
(2)(A) excepts “the safety regulatory authority of a State”—
explicitly preempts regulation both by “a State” and by a
“political subdivision of a State.” The exception for state
safety regulation is the first in a series of four statutory
exceptions to the preemption rule. The third exception in
the series, covering regulation of prices for nonconsensual
tow-truck services, matches the general preemption provi-
sion; it explicitly applies to the “authority of a State or a
political subdivision of a State.” § 14501(c)(2)(C). States
and their political subdivisions are likewise linked in al-
most every other provision of § 14501. See §§ 14501(a),
14501(b)(1), 14501(c)(3)(A), 14501(c)(3)(B), 14501(c)(3)(C).
Respondents Ours Garage and TRAO, in line with several
Courts of Appeals, home in on the statute’s repeated refer-
ences to both States and their political subdivisions; in con-
trast, they urge, the singularly bare reference to “[s]tate”
authority in § 14501(c)(2)(A)’s exception for safety regulation
must mean that Congress intended to limit the exception to
States alone. See Brief for Respondents 15–16, 26–29. Re-
spondents rely particularly on Russello v. United States,
464 U. S. 16 (1983). In that case, we observed: “Where Con-
gress includes particular language in one section of a statute

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
434 COLUMBUS v. OURS GARAGE & WRECKER
SERVICE, INC.
Opinion of the Court
but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in
the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Id., at 23 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (cited in Petrey, 246 F. 3d, at 561;
Stucky, 260 F. 3d, at 441; and Tocher, 219 F. 3d, at 1051).
The dissent asserts the same argument vigorously. In its
words: “The only conceivable reason” for the separate
enumeration of States and their political subdivisions in
§ 14501(c)(1) is to “establish . . . two separate categories of
state power—state power exercised through political sub-
divisions and state power exercised by the State directly—
that are later treated differently in the exceptions to the
rule.” Post, at 445.
We acknowledge that § 14501(c)’s “disparate inclusion [and]
exclusion” of the words “political subdivisions” support an
argument of some force, one that could not have been made
in Mortier. Nevertheless, reading § 14501(c)’s set of excep-
tions in combination, and with a view to the basic tenets of
our federal system pivotal in Mortier, we conclude that the
statute does not provide the requisite “clear and manifest
indication that Congress sought to supplant local authority.”
501 U. S., at 611.
Respondents Ours Garage and TRAO, as just noted, con-
trast the first statutory exception to § 14501(c)’s preemption
rule, i. e., the exception preserving “the safety regulatory
authority of a State,” § 14501(c)(2)(A), with the third excep-
tion, preserving the “authority of a State or a political subdi-
vision to enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provi-
sion relating to the price” charged for nonconsensual towing,
§ 14501(c)(2)(C). See Brief for Respondents 15–16. The
nonconsensual towing exception tracks the language and
structure of the general preemption rule, omitting only the
reference to a “political authority of 2 or more States.”
Similarly styled, the fourth exception, for carrier-requested
regulations in areas such as “uniform cargo liability” and an-
titrust immunity, § 14501(c)(3), completely parallels the word-

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
435 Cite as: 536 U. S. 424 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
ing of § 14501(c)(1): It provides that preemption “shall not
affect any authority of a State, political subdivision of a
State, or political authority of 2 or more States to enact or
enforce a law, regulation, or other provision” in those areas.
The safety exception of § 14501(c)(2)(A), however, does not
borrow language from § 14501(c)(1). It simply states that
preemption “shall not restrict the safety regulatory author-
ity of a State.” Notably, the second statutory exception, on
which respondents train no attention, is stated with similar
economy. That exception mentions neither States nor polit-
ical subdivisions; it simply says that the general preemption
rule, § 14501(c)(1), “does not apply to the transportation of
household goods,” § 14501(c)(2)(B). Yet it is abundantly
clear that, notwithstanding this difference in verbal formula-
tion, § 14501(c)(2)(B), like its neighbor § 14501(c)(2)(C), per-
mits both state and local regulation. Accord, post, at 446
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
The inclusion of the phrase “the authority of a State or
a political subdivision of a State to enact or enforce a
law, regulation, or other provision” no doubt synchronizes
the nonconsensual towing provision with § 14501(c)(1)’s
main rule. The parallel structure of §§ 14501(c)(1) and
14501(c)(2)(C) does not imply, however, that § 14501(c)(2)(A)’s
concise statement must be read to use the term “State”
restrictively. Respondents’ inference from the absence of
“political subdivision of a State” in § 14501(c)(2)(A) would
be more persuasive if the omission were the sole difference
in the expression of the general rule and the safety excep-
tion. In contrast to §§ 14501(c)(2)(C) and (c)(3), however,
neither the safety exception nor the household-goods excep-
tion refers to the “authority . . . to enact or enforce a law,
regulation, or other provision.” 2 The Russello presump-
2 The dissent insists that § 14501(c)(2)(B) is irrelevant because its phras-
ing “ha[s] nothing to do with the issue of separating state and local author-
ity.” Post, at 446 (emphasis deleted). We ultimately draw the same
conclusion, of course, regarding the phrasing of the safety exception in

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
436 COLUMBUS v. OURS GARAGE & WRECKER
SERVICE, INC.
Opinion of the Court
tion—that the presence of a phrase in one provision and its
absence in another reveals Congress’ design—grows weaker
with each difference in the formulation of the provisions
under inspection.
Respondents’ restrictive reading of the term “State,” we
note, introduces an interpretive conundrum of another kind.
Section 14501(c)(1) preempts the power of both States and
localities to “enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other pro-
vision.” (Emphasis added.) Those conjoined words travel
together. If, as Ours Garage and TRAO argue, the safety
exception of § 14501(c)(2)(A) reaches only States, then locali-
ties are preempted not only from enacting, but equally from
enforcing, safety regulations governing motor carriers of
property—even if those regulations are enacted by the state
legislature. It is unlikely that Congress would preserve
States’ power to enact safety rules and, at the same time, bar
the ordinary method by which States enforce such rules—
through their local instrumentalities.3
§ 14501(c)(2)(A). The dissent, although it urges that “we should take seri-
ously the references to States and subdivisions of States where they ap-
pear,” post, at 447, rests upon the fact that subdivisions of States do not
appear in the safety exception—as they also do not in the household-goods
exception of § 14501(c)(2)(B). That § 14501(c)(2) comprises three excep-
tions, each differently stated, seems to us indeed relevant to the interpre-
tive weight that may be attached to the variation among them.
3 Faced with this argument, the dissent is converted, however temporar-
ily, to the view that “federal interference with the ‘historic powers of the
States’ must be evinced by a ‘plain statement.’ ” Post, at 450, n. 4 (quot-
ing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 461 (1991)). The dissent finds no
plain statement in § 14501(c)(1)’s prohibition on local enforcement because
it can be read to mean only that “a political subdivision may not enact new
laws or enforce its previously enacted laws” relating to motor carriage of
property. Post, at 450, n. 4. This is by no means the most natural read-
ing of the preemption provision. The suggestion of the dissent is that, as
applied to localities, § 14501(c)(1) preempts only local enforcement of
locally enacted laws. See ibid. This interpretation raises the startling
possibility that, although § 14501(c)(1) prohibits both States and localities

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
437 Cite as: 536 U. S. 424 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
Finally, we reiterate, reading the term “State” as used in
§ 14501 to exclude political subdivisions would yield a de-
cision at odds with our federal system’s traditional compre-
hension of “the safety regulatory authority of a State,”
§ 14501(c)(2)(A). To repeat the essential observation made
in Mortier: “The principle is well settled that local govern-
mental units are created as convenient agencies for exercis-
ing such of the governmental powers of the State as may be
entrusted to them in its absolute discretion.” 501 U. S., at
607–608 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Whether and how to use that discretion is a question central
to state self-government. See, e. g., Holt Civic Club v. Tus-
caloosa, 439 U. S. 60, 71 (1978) (States enjoy “extraordinarily
wide latitude . . . in creating various types of political sub-
divisions and conferring authority upon them”).
In Ohio, as in other States, the delegation of governing
authority from State to local unit has long occupied the at-
tention of the State’s lawmakers. See D. Wilcox, Municipal
Government in Michigan and Ohio: A Study in the Relations
of City and Commonwealth 52–54, 63 (1896) (citing Ohio
Const., Art. XIII (1851)). The Ohio Constitution currently
grants municipalities within the State general authority “to
exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and
enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and
other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with the
general laws.” Art. XVIII, § 3. Ohio’s Legislature has
enacted several statutes empowering cities to regulate
motor vehicles and highways. See, e. g., Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 715.22 (Anderson 2000) (municipality may regulate
motor vehicles and highways); § 723.01 (“Municipal corpora-
tions shall have special power to regulate the use of the
streets.”). Particularly relevant here, Ohio has exempted
tow trucks from the State’s regulation of motor carriers,
from “enact[ing]” new laws, it permits localities (but not States) to enforce
previously enacted state laws relating to motor carriage of property.

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
438 COLUMBUS v. OURS GARAGE & WRECKER
SERVICE, INC.
Opinion of the Court
§ 4921.02(A)(8), thus leaving tow-truck regulation largely to
the cities, Cincinnati v. Reed, 27 Ohio App. 3d 115, 500 N. E.
2d 333 (1985).
It is the expressed intent of § 14501(c)(2)(A) that the
preemption rule of § 14501(c)(1) “not restrict” the exist-
ing “safety regulatory authority of a State.” Compare
§ 14501(c)(2)(A) with §§ 14501(c)(2)(B) and (C) (preemption
“does not apply” to state or local power to regulate in partic-
ular areas), and § 14501(c)(3) (preemption rule “shall not
affect” multistate, state, or local authority to regulate par-
ticular areas at the behest of carriers). Preemption anal-
ysis “start[s] with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Fed-
eral Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 485
(1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Sec-
tion 14501(c)(2)(A) seeks to save from preemption state
power “in a field which the States have traditionally occu-
pied.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). A saving provision of that order is hardly comparable
to exercises of congressional spending authority that, as a
condition for receipt of funds, explicitly restrict the preroga-
tive of States to entrust governance of a matter to localities.
Such programs typically make uniform statewide regulation
a condition of funding, or, conversely, provide funds to locali-
ties on the condition that they be spent at that level in ac-
cordance with federal prescriptions and without state inter-
ference. See, e. g., 23 U. S. C. § 153 (grants to support traffic
safety conditioned on a motorcycle helmet law that applies
“throughout the State”); § 158 (highway grants withheld un-
less “State has in effect a law” setting the drinking age at
21); 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(1) (Medicaid grants available only
if a State ensures that its plan for medical assistance is “in
effect in all political subdivisions of the State, and, if admin-
istered by them, be mandatory upon them”); Lawrence
County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist. No. 40–1, 469 U. S.

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
439 Cite as: 536 U. S. 424 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
256, 270 (1985) (State may not restrict local use of funds that
the United States makes available to localities to spend at
their discretion).4
This case, by contrast, deals not with States’ voluntary
agreements to relinquish authority vis-a` -vis their political
subdivisions in exchange for federal funds, but with preemp-
tion stemming from Congress’ power to regulate commerce,
in a field where States have traditionally allowed locali-
ties to address local concerns. Congress’ clear purpose in
§ 14501(c)(2)(A) is to ensure that its preemption of States’
economic authority over motor carriers of property,
§ 14501(c)(1), “not restrict” the preexisting and traditional
state police power over safety. That power typically in-
cludes the choice to delegate the State’s “safety regulatory
authority” to localities. Forcing a State to refrain from
doing so would effectively “restrict” that very authority.
Absent a basis more reliable than statutory language insuf-
ficient to demonstrate a “clear and manifest purpose” to the
4 Nor, the dissent’s suggestion notwithstanding, see post, at 448, is
§ 14501 similar to the Clean Air Act, which mandates that States under-
take an environmental planning process that of necessity cannot respect
local political boundaries. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 7407(c), 7410(a)(1) (1994 ed.)
(States must develop implementation plans for air quality in each of its
“air quality control region[s],” whose borders are defined by the Adminis-
trator of the Environmental Protection Agency based not upon local juris-
dictional lines but upon criteria she “deems necessary or appropriate for
the attainment . . . of [national] ambient air quality standards”); cf. 33
U. S. C. § 1313(d)(1)(A) (under the Clean Water Act, each State must de-
velop pollution abatement plans based upon a “priority ranking” of all
“waters within its boundaries for which . . . effluent limitations . . . are not
stringent enough to implement [applicable] water quality standard[s]”).
Even so, States may delegate implementation authority under the Clean
Air Act to their political subdivisions, subject to the requirement that
the State bear ultimate oversight responsibility. See § 7410(a)(2)(E)(iii)
(State must provide “necessary assurances that, where the State has re-
lied on a local or regional government, agency, or instrumentality for the
implementation of any [state] plan provision, the State has responsibility
for ensuring adequate implementation of such plan provision”).

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
440 COLUMBUS v. OURS GARAGE & WRECKER
SERVICE, INC.
Opinion of the Court
contrary, federal courts should resist attribution to Congress
of a design to disturb a State’s decision on the division of
authority between the State’s central and local units over
safety on municipal streets and roads.
III
The Cour t of Appea ls suppor ted its readi ng of
§ 14501(c)(2)(A) to disallow delegation from State to city in
part by reference to the statute’s deregulatory purpose.
See Petrey, 246 F. 3d, at 563; accord, Stucky, 260 F. 3d, at
444–446; Tocher, 219 F. 3d, at 1048, 1051; R. Mayer, 158 F. 3d,
at 546. We now turn to that justification.
The Conference Report on the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration Authorization Act of 1994 observed that “[s]tate eco-
nomic regulation of motor carrier operations . . . is a huge
problem for national and regional carriers attempting to con-
duct a standard way of doing business.” H. R. Conf. Rep.
No. 103–677, p. 87 (1994). Carrying more weight, in the Act
itself Congress reported its finding that “the regulation of
intrastate transportation of property by the States” unrea-
sonably burdened free trade, interstate commerce, and
American consumers. Pub. L. 103–305, § 601(a)(1), 108 Stat.
1605. Congress therefore concluded that “certain aspects
of the State regulatory process should be preempted.”
§ 601(a)(2). These declarations of deregulatory purpose,
however, do not justify interpreting through a deregulatory
prism “aspects of the State regulatory process” that Con-
gress determined should not be preempted.
A congressional decision to enact both a general policy
that furthers a particular goal and a specific exception that
might tend against that goal does not invariably call for the
narrowest possible construction of the exception. Such a
construction is surely resistible here, for § 14501(c)(1)’s pre-
emption rule and § 14501(c)(2)(A)’s safety exception to it do
not necessarily conflict. The problem to which the congres-
sional conferees attended was “[s]tate economic regulation”;

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
441 Cite as: 536 U. S. 424 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
the exemption in question is for state safety regulation.
Corroboratively, the measure’s legislative history shows that
the deregulatory aim of the legislation had been endorsed by
a key interest group—the American Trucking Association—
subject to “some conditions that would allow regulatory pro-
tection to continue for non-economic factors, such as . . . in-
surance [and] safety.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 103–677, at 88.
The conferees believed that the legislation “address[ed] these
conditions.” Ibid.; see also Ace Auto Body, 171 F. 3d, at 776.
The construction of § 14501 that respondents Ours Garage
and TRAO advocate, moreover, does not guarantee uniform
regulation. On respondents’ reading as on petitioners’, a
State could, without affront to the statute, pass discrete,
nonuniform safety regulations applicable to each of its sev-
eral constituent municipalities. Ohio thus could adopt the
Columbus regulations to govern in that city, the Toledo regu-
lations to govern there, and so on down the line. See Tr. of
Oral Arg. 37–38. Indeed, because § 14501(c)(2)(A) refers
only to “political” subdivisions, nothing in the statute’s text
would impede a State from creating an administrative
agency organized into local offices, each of which could craft
local rules suitable to its assigned jurisdiction. There is no
reason to suppose that Congress meant to stop the States
from spreading their authority among municipalities unless
they employ such artificial or inefficient schemes.
Furthermore, 49 U. S. C. § 31141 (1994 ed.) affords the
Secretary of Transportation a means to prevent the safety
exception from overwhelming the lawmakers’ deregulatory
purpose. That provision authorizes the Secretary to void
any “State law or regulation on commercial motor vehicle
safety” that, in the Secretary’s judgment, “has no safety
benefit . . . [or] would cause an unreasonable burden on in-
terstate commerce.” §§ 31141(a), (c)(4); see also § 31132(8)
(“ ‘State law’ includes [for the purposes of § 31141] a law
enacted by a political subdivision of a State”); § 31132(9) (par-
allel definition of “State regulation”). Under this authority,

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
442 COLUMBUS v. OURS GARAGE & WRECKER
SERVICE, INC.
Scalia, J., dissenting
the Secretary can invalidate local safety regulations upon
finding that their content or multiplicity threatens to clog
the avenues of commerce.
We reiterate that § 14501(c)(2)(A) shields from preemption
only “safety regulatory authority” (and “authority of a State
to regulate . . . with regard to minimum amounts of financial
responsibility relating to insurance requirements”). Local
regulation of prices, routes, or services of tow trucks that
is not genuinely responsive to safety concerns garners no
exemption from § 14501(c)(1)’s preemption rule.
* * *
For the reasons stated, we hold that § 14501(c)(2)(A) spares
from preemption local as well as state regulation. We ex-
press no opinion, however, on the question whether Colum-
bus’ particular regulations, in whole or in part, qualify
as exercises of “safety regulatory authority” or otherwise
fall within § 14501(c)(2)(A)’s compass. This question, which
was not reached by the Court of Appeals,5 remains open on
remand.
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice O’Connor joins,
dissenting.
The dispute in the present case arises from the fact that a
reference to “State” power or authority can be meant to in-
clude all that power or authority, including the portion exer-
cised by political subdivisions (as, for example, in the ordi-
nary reference to “the State’s police power”); but can also be
5 Nor was it reached in Petrey v. Toledo, 246 F. 3d 548 (CA6 2001), which
the Sixth Circuit stated “controls the disposition of this case,” 257 F. 3d
506, 508 (2001). See Petrey, 246 F. 3d, at 563–564.

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
443 Cite as: 536 U. S. 424 (2002)
Scalia, J., dissenting
meant to include only that power or authority exercised at
the state level (as, for example, in the phrase “State and local
governmental authority”). The issue is whether, when 49
U. S. C. § 14501(c)(2)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V) excepts from the
preclusionary command of § 14501(c)(1) “the safety regula-
tory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles,” it
means to except the safety regulatory authority of cities and
counties as well. In my view it plainly does not.
I
There are four exceptions to the preclusionary rule of
§ 14501(c)(1), which read as follows:
“(2) Matters not covered.—[The preemption
rule]—
“(A) shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority
of a State with respect to motor vehicles, the authority
of a State to impose highway route controls or limita-
tions based on the size or weight of the motor vehicle or
the hazardous nature of the cargo, or the authority of a
State to regulate motor carriers with regard to mini-
mum amounts of financial responsibility relating to in-
surance requirements and self-insurance authorization;
“(B) does not apply to the transportation of household
goods; and
“(C) does not apply to the authority of a State or a
political subdivision of a State to enact or enforce a
law, regulation, or other provision relating to the price
of for-hire motor vehicle transportation by a tow truck,
if such transportation is performed without the prior
consent or authorization of the owner or operator of the
motor vehicle.
“ ( 3 ) S t a t e s t a n d a r d t r a n s p o r t a t i o n
practices.—
“(A) Continuation.—[The preemption rule] shall
not affect any authority of a State, political subdivision
of a State, or political authority of 2 or more States to

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
444 COLUMBUS v. OURS GARAGE & WRECKER
SERVICE, INC.
Scalia, J., dissenting
enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision,
with respect to the intrastate transportation of property
by motor carriers, related to—[inter alia] uniform
cargo liability rules, . . . if such law, regulation, or pro-
vision meets the requirements of subparagraph (B).”
§§ 14501(c)(2), (3) (emphases added).
It is impossible to read this text without being struck
by the fact that the term “political subdivision of a State”
is added to the term “State” in some of the exceptions,
§§ 14501(c)(2)(C), (c)(3), but not in the exception at issue here,
§ 14501(c)(2)(A). “ ‘[W]here Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Con-
gress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclu-
sion or exclusion.’ ” Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16,
23 (1983). The only way to impart some purpose and intent
here is to assume that the word “State” is used in its nar-
rower sense, so that political subdivisions are not covered by
the term. The Court admits that the rule applied in Rus-
sello “support[s] an argument of some force,” ante, at 434,
that the exception for the “safety regulatory authority of a
State” does not include local safety regulation.
But while the Russello argument is strong, it alone does
not fully describe the clarity with which § 14501(c)(2)(A) ex-
cludes political subdivisions. For the clarity begins not just
with the various exceptions, but with the very preemption
rule to which the exceptions are appended. That rule reads:
“Except as provided [in §§ 14501(c)(2), (3)], a State, polit-
ical subdivision of a State, or political authority of 2 or
more States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation,
or other provision having the force and effect of law re-
lated to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . .
or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight for-
warder with respect to the transportation of property.”
49 U. S. C. § 14501(c)(1).

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
445 Cite as: 536 U. S. 424 (2002)
Scalia, J., dissenting
Since the lawmaking power of a political subdivision of a
State is a subset of the lawmaking power of the State, Hess
v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513 U. S. 30,
47 (1994); Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U. S.
597, 607–608 (1991), the preemption rule would have pre-
cisely the same scope if it omitted the reference to “political
subdivision of a State.” It is a well-established principle of
statutory construction (and of common sense) that when such
a situation occurs, when “two words or expressions are cou-
pled together, one of which generically includes the other, it
is obvious that the more general term is used in a meaning
excluding the specific one.” J. Sutherland, Statutes and
Statutory Construction § 266, p. 349 (1891). The only con-
ceivable reason for this specification of “political subdivision”
apart from “State” is to establish, in the rule, the two sepa-
rate categories of state power—state power exercised
through political subdivisions and state power exercised by
the State directly—that are later treated differently in the
exceptions to the rule.
The situation is comparable to the following hypothetical
using the term “football” (which may be used to include
soccer, see Webster’s New International Dictionary 983 (2d
ed. 1950)): Assume a statute which says that “football and
soccer shall not be played on the town green” (§ 14501(c)(1)),
except that “football and soccer may be played on Saturdays”
(§ 14501(c)(2)(C)), “football and soccer may be played on sum-
mer nights” (§ 14501(c)(3)(A)), and “football may be played
on Mondays” (§ 14501(c)(2)(A)). In today’s opinion, the
Court says soccer may be played on Mondays. I think it
clear that soccer is not to be regarded as a subset of football
but as a separate category. And the same is true of “politi-
cal subdivision” here.
II
The Court reaches the opposite conclusion merely because
§ 14501(c) exhibits uneven drafting. First, the Court notes
that § 14501(c)(2)(A) does not “trac[k] the language and

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
446 COLUMBUS v. OURS GARAGE & WRECKER
SERVICE, INC.
Scalia, J., dissenting
structure of the general preemption rule.” Ante, at 434.
Whereas other exceptions to the rule refer to the authority
of a State or other political entity “to enact or enforce a law,
regulation, or other provision,” § 14501(c)(2)(A) merely refers
to the “safety regulatory authority of a State.” Second, the
Court notes that another exception to the preemption rule,
§ 14501(c)(2)(B), is “stated with similar economy.” Ante,
at 435. It addresses merely the subject of regulation (trans-
portation of household goods) instead of both the subject and
the source of regulation (a State, political subdivision, or po-
litical authority of two or more States). This has, the Court
notes, the same effect as its neighbor, § 14501(c)(2)(C), of
permitting both state and local regulation.1 Ibid. These
inconsistencies in the statute’s drafting style, the Court
contends, undermine the conclusion we would ordinarily
draw from the absence of the term “ ‘political subdivision’ ”
in § 14501(c)(2)(A). Ibid.
The weakness of this argument should be self-evident.
How can inconsistencies of style, on points that have nothing
to do with the issue of separating state and local authority,
cause the text’s crystal-clear distinction between state and
local authority to disappear? It would certainly reflect
more orderly draftsmanship if the statute consistently used
the formulation “to enact or enforce a law, regulation, or
other provision,” rather than replacing it in § 14501(c)(2)(A)
with the equivalent phrase “regulatory authority of a State”;
and if the statute referred to subject matter alone (a` la
§ 14501(c)(2)(B)) either never at all, or else whenever the ex-
ception applied to all three categories of States, subdivisions
of States, and political authorities of two or more States.
1 Not only is this point (as the text proceeds to discuss) irrelevant in
principle; it is misleading in its description of fact, suggesting that the two
neighboring sections produce the same result with different language. It
is true enough that § 14501(c)(2)(C), like § 14501(c)(2)(B), permits both state
and local regulation. But § 14501(c)(2)(C), unlike § 14501(c)(2)(B), also
permits regulation by a “political authority of 2 or more States.”

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
447 Cite as: 536 U. S. 424 (2002)
Scalia, J., dissenting
But it is impossible to imagine how this imperfect drafts-
manship in unrelated matters casts any doubt upon the pre-
cise meaning of the subject-matter-plus-source provisions
where they appear. Unless the Court is appealing to some
hitherto unknown canon of interpretation—perhaps (bor-
rowed from the law of evidence) negligens in uno, negligens
in omnibus—the diverse styles of § 14501(c)’s exceptions
have nothing to do with whether we should take seriously
the references to States and subdivisions of States where
they appear.
What is truly anomalous here is not the fact that the ter-
minology of § 14501(c) is diverse with regard to presently ir-
relevant matters, but the fact that the Court has today come
up with a judicial interpretation of § 14501(c) that renders
the term “political subdivision of a State,” which appears
throughout, utterly superfluous throughout. Although the
Court claims that the “Russello presumption . . . grows
weaker with each difference in the formulation of the provi-
sions under inspection,” ante, at 435–436, it cites no author-
ity for that proposition—nor could it, because we have rou-
tinely applied the Russello presumption in cases where a
statute employs different “verbal formulation[s]” in sections
that include particular language and in sections that omit
such language. See, e. g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534
U. S. 438, 452–454 (2002); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167,
173–174 (2001); Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S. 236, 249–250
(1998); United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997).
III
Lacking support in the text of the statute, the Court in-
vokes federalism concerns to justify its decision. “Absent a
basis more reliable than statutory language insufficient to
demonstrate a ‘clear and manifest purpose’ to the contrary,”
the Court reasons, “federal courts should resist attribution
to Congress of a design to disturb a State’s decision on the
division of authority between the State’s central and local

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
448 COLUMBUS v. OURS GARAGE & WRECKER
SERVICE, INC.
Scalia, J., dissenting
units over safety on municipal streets and roads.” Ante,
at 439–440. Well of course we think there is “clear and man-
ifest purpose here”; but besides that, the Court‘s federalism
concerns are overblown. To begin with, it should not be
thought that the States’ power to control the relationship
between themselves and their political subdivisions—their
“traditional prerogative . . . to delegate” (or to refuse to dele-
gate) “their authority to their constituent parts,” ante, at
429—has hitherto been regarded as sacrosanct. To the con-
trary. To take only a few examples,2 the Federal Govern-
ment routinely gives directly to municipalities substantial
grants of funds that cannot be reached or directed by “the
politicians upstate” (or “downstate”), see, e. g., Office of Man-
agement and Budget, 2001 Catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance AEI–1 to AEI–29; Lawrence County v. Lead-
Deadwood School Dist. No. 40–1, 469 U. S. 256, 270 (1985);
and many significant federal programs require laws or reg-
ulations that must be adopted by the state government
and cannot be delegated to political subdivisions, see, e. g.,
42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a) (Medicaid); 23 U. S. C. §§ 153, 158
(Federal-Aid Highway System); 42 U. S. C. §§ 7407(a), 7410
(1994 ed.) (Clean Air Act).3 This “interference” of the Fed-
2 The Court thinks these examples are “hardly comparable” to § 14501(c)
because many involve Spending Clause legislation. Ante, at 438. A
sufficient answer is that one of them does not, see 42 U. S. C. § 7410 (1994
ed.) (Clean Air Act), and that other examples not involving Spending
Clause legislation could be added, see, e. g., 33 U. S. C. §§ 1313(d), 1362(3)
(Clean Water Act). But in any event, a siphoning off of the States’ “his-
toric powers” to delegate has equally been achieved, whether it has come
about through the coercion of deprivation of Spending Clause funds or
through other means. The point is that it is not unusual for Congress to
interfere in this matter.
3 The Court thinks the Clean Air Act is a bad example merely be-
cause a State can rely on political subdivisions to enforce the State’s
implementation plan. Ante, at 439, n. 4; see 42 U. S. C. §§ 7407(a),
7410(a)(2)(E)(iii). So what? Only States may adopt implementation
plans; this duty cannot be delegated to localities. Moreover, as I explain in

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
449 Cite as: 536 U. S. 424 (2002)
Scalia, J., dissenting
eral Government with the States’ “traditional preroga-
tive . . . to delegate their authority to their constituent parts”
has long been a subject of considerable debate and contro-
versy. See, e. g., Hills, Dissecting the State: The Use of
Federal Law to Free State and Local Officials from State
Legislatures’ Control, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1201 (1999).
With such major impositions as these already on the books,
treating § 14501(c)(1) as some extraordinary federal obstruc-
tion of state allocation of power is absurd. That provision
preempts the authority of political subdivisions to regulate
“a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . or any
motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with re-
spect to the transportation of property.” (Emphasis added.)
The italicized language massively limits the scope of preemp-
tion to include only laws, regulations, and other provisions
that single out for special treatment “motor carriers of prop-
erty.” § 14501(c). States and political subdivisions re-
main free to enact and enforce general traffic safety laws,
general restrictions on the weight of cars and trucks that
may enter highways or pass over bridges, and other regula-
tions that do not target motor carriers “with respect to the
transportation of property.” In addition, the exception con-
tained in § 14501(c)(2)(A) allows a State—but not a political
subdivision—to apply special safety rules (rules adopted
under its “safety regulatory authority”) to motor carriers of
property.4
n. 4, infra, the statute at issue here is no different. Under 49 U. S. C.
§§ 14501(c)(1) and (c)(2)(A), a State may enact regulations pursuant to
its “safety regulatory authority” and rely on localities to enforce those
regulations.
4 This interpretation of the statutory scheme “introduces an interpretive
conundrum of another kind,” the Court asserts, because § 14501(c)(1) de-
clares that a political subdivision may not “enact or enforce” laws, regula-
tions, or other provisions relating to motor carriers of property. Ante,
at 436. In the Court’s view, if the term “State” does not include “subdivi-
sion of a State,” § 14501(c)(1) will prevent a State from relying on localities

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
450 COLUMBUS v. OURS GARAGE & WRECKER
SERVICE, INC.
Scalia, J., dissenting
This relatively modest burden on the “historic powers of
the States” to delegate authority to political subdivisions,
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 461 (1991) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted), is unambiguously imposed by the
statute. The Court repeatedly emphasizes the fact that
§ 14501(c)(2)(A) declares that § 14501(c)(1) shall “ ‘not restrict’
the existing ‘safety regulatory authority of a State,’ ” ante,
at 438—which, it says, “includes the choice to delegate . . .
to localities,” ante, at 439. This entirely begs the question,
which is precisely whether the statute’s reference to the au-
thority of a “State” includes authority possessed by a munici-
pality on delegation from the State. As I have described,
the text and structure of the statute leave no doubt that it
does not—that “State” does not include “subdivision of a
State.” Even when we are dealing with the traditional
powers of the States, “[e]vidence of pre-emptive purpose is
sought in the text and structure of the statute at issue.”
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U. S. 658, 664 (1993)
(emphasis added); see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947).
to “enforce” rules adopted under its “safety regulations.” Ante, at 435–
436. But the conclusion that § 14501(c)(1) prevents a political subdivision
from enforcing regulations enacted by the State can only be reached by
ignoring (for this issue) the rule that the Court is so insistent upon else-
where: that federal interference with the “historic powers of the States”
must be evinced by a “plain statement,” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452,
461 (1991). A natural reading of the phrase “a . . . political subdivision of
a State . . . may not enact or enforce a law”—and a reading faithful to
Gregory’s plain statement rule—is that a political subdivision may not
enact new laws or enforce its previously enacted laws. The Court be-
lieves this reading “raises the startling possibility,” ante, at 436, n. 3, that
§ 14501(c)(1) prevents States but not political subdivisions from enforcing
previously enacted state regulations relating to motor carriage of prop-
erty. I think not. A possibility so startling (and unlikely to occur) is
well enough precluded by the rule that a statute should not be interpreted
to produce absurd results. The municipalities’ reserved power to enforce
state law does not include the power to enforce state law that the State
has no continuing power to enact or enforce.

536US1 Unit: $U73 [01-14-04 18:31:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
451 Cite as: 536 U. S. 424 (2002)
Scalia, J., dissenting
* * *
I believe the text and structure of § 14501(c) show plainly
that “the safety regulatory authority of a State” does not
encompass the authority of a political subdivision. For this
reason, I respectfully dissent.