UNITED STATES v. DRAYTON et al.

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194 OCTOBER TERM, 2001
Syllabus
UNITED STATES v. DRAYTON et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 01–631. Argued April 16, 2002—Decided June 17, 2002
The driver of the bus on which respondents were traveling allowed three
police officers to board the bus as part of a routine drug and weapons
interdiction effort. One officer knelt on the driver’s seat, facing the
rear of the bus, while another officer stayed in the rear, facing forward.
Officer Lang worked his way from back to front, speaking with individ-
ual passengers as he went. To avoid blocking the aisle, Lang stood next
to or just behind each passenger with whom he spoke. He testified that
passengers who declined to cooperate or who chose to exit the bus at
any time would have been allowed to do so without argument; that most
people are willing to cooperate; that passengers often leave the bus for
a cigarette or a snack while officers are on board; and that, although he
sometimes informs passengers of their right to refuse to cooperate, he
did not do so on the day in question. As Lang approached respondents,
who were seated together, he held up his badge long enough for them
to identify him as an officer. Speaking just loud enough for them to
hear, he declared that the police were looking for drugs and weapons
and asked if respondents had any bags. When both of them pointed to
a bag overhead, Lang asked if they minded if he checked it. Respond-
ent Brown agreed, and a search of the bag revealed no contraband.
Lang then asked Brown whether he minded if Lang checked his person.
Brown agreed, and a patdown revealed hard objects similar to drug
packages in both thigh areas. Brown was arrested. Lang then asked
respondent Drayton, “Mind if I check you?” When Drayton agreed, a
patdown revealed objects similar to those found on Brown, and Drayton
was arrested. A further search revealed that respondents had taped
cocaine between their shorts. Charged with federal drug crimes, re-
spondents moved to suppress the cocaine on the ground that their con-
sent to the patdown searches was invalid. In denying the motions, the
District Court determined that the police conduct was not coercive and
respondents’ consent to the search was voluntary. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit reversed and remanded based on its prior holdings that bus passen-
gers do not feel free to disregard officers’ requests to search absent
some positive indication that consent may be refused.
Held: The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to advise
bus passengers of their right not to cooperate and to refuse consent to
searches. Pp. 200–208.

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(a) Among its rulings in Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, this Court
held that the Fourth Amendment permits officers to approach bus pas-
sengers at random to ask questions and request their consent to
searches, provided a reasonable person would feel free to decline the
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter, id., at 436. The Court
identified as “particularly worth noting” the factors that the officer, al-
though obviously armed, did not unholster his gun or use it in a threat-
ening way, and that he advised respondent passenger that he could re-
fuse consent to a search. Relying on this last factor, the Eleventh
Circuit erroneously adopted what is in effect a per se rule that evidence
obtained during suspicionless drug interdictions on buses must be sup-
pressed unless the officers have advised passengers of their right not to
cooperate and to refuse consent to a search. Pp. 200–203.
(b) Applying Bostick’s framework to this case demonstrates that the
police did not seize respondents. The officers gave the passengers no
reason to believe that they were required to answer questions. When
Lang approached respondents, he did not brandish a weapon or make
any intimidating movements. He left the aisle free so that respondents
could exit. He spoke to passengers one by one and in a polite, quiet
voice. Nothing he said would suggest to a reasonable person that he
or she was barred from leaving the bus or otherwise terminating the
encounter, or would indicate a command to answer his questions.
There were ample grounds to conclude that their encounter was cooper-
ative and not coercive or confrontational. There was no overwhelming
show or application of force, no intimidating movement, no brandishing
of weapons, no blocking of exits, no threat, and no command, not even
an authoritative tone of voice. Had this encounter occurred on the
street, it doubtless would be constitutional. The fact that an encounter
takes place on a bus does not on its own transform standard police ques-
tioning into an illegal seizure. See Bostick, supra, at 439–440. In-
deed, because many fellow passengers are present to witness officers’
conduct, a reasonable person may feel even more secure in deciding not
to cooperate on a bus than in other circumstances. Lang’s display of
his badge is not dispositive. See, e. g., Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U. S.
1, 5–6. And, because it is well known that most officers are armed, the
presence of a holstered firearm is unlikely to be coercive absent active
brandishing of the weapon. Officer Hoover’s position at the front of the
bus also does not tip the scale to respondents, since he did nothing to
intimidate passengers and said or did nothing to suggest that people
could not exit. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210, 219. Finally, Lang’s
testimony that only a few passengers refuse to cooperate does not sug-
gest that a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the en-
counter. See id., at 216. Drayton argues unsuccessfully that no rea-
sonable person in his position would feel free to terminate the encounter

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after Brown was arrested. The arrest of one person does not mean
that everyone around him has been seized. Even after arresting
Brown, Lang provided Drayton with no indication that he was required
to answer Lang’s questions. Pp. 203–206.
(c) Respondents were not subjected to an unreasonable search.
Where, as here, the question of voluntariness pervades both the search
and seizure inquiries, the respective analyses turn on very similar facts.
For the foregoing reasons, respondents’ consent to the search of their
luggage and their persons was voluntary. When respondents told Lang
they had a bag, he asked to check it. And when he asked to search
their persons, he inquired first if they objected, thus indicating to
a reasonable person that he or she was free to refuse. Moreover,
officers need not always inform citizens of their right to refuse when
seeking permission to conduct a warrantless consent search. See, e. g.,
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 227. While knowledge of
the right to refuse is taken into account, the Government need not es-
tablish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent.
Ibid. Nor does a presumption of invalidity attach if a citizen consented
without explicit notification that he or she was free to refuse to cooper-
ate. Instead, the totality of the circumstances controls, without giv-
ing extra weight to whether this type of warning was given. See,
e. g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U. S. 33, 39–40. Although Lang did not
give such a warning, the totality of the circumstances indicates that
respondents’ consent was voluntary, and the searches were reasonable.
Pp. 206–208.
231 F. 3d 787, reversed and remanded.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Souter,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., joined,
post, p. 208.
Larry D. Thompson argued the cause for the United
States. On the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, Assist-
ant Attorney General Chertoff, Deputy Solicitor General
Dreeben, Jeffrey A. Lamken, and Kathleen A. Felton.
Gwendolyn Spivey, by appointment of the Court, 535 U. S.
903, argued the cause for respondents. With her on the
brief were Randolph P. Murrell, Steven L. Seliger, by ap-

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Opinion of the Court
pointment of the Court, 535 U. S. 903, Jeffrey T. Green, and
Jacqueline G. Cooper.*
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Fourth Amendment permits police officers to ap-
proach bus passengers at random to ask questions and to
request their consent to searches, provided a reasonable
person would understand that he or she is free to refuse.
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429 (1991). This case requires
us to determine whether officers must advise bus passengers
during these encounters of their right not to cooperate.
I
On February 4, 1999, respondents Christopher Drayton
and Clifton Brown, Jr., were traveling on a Greyhound bus
en route from Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, to Detroit, Michigan.
The bus made a scheduled stop in Tallahassee, Florida. The
passengers were required to disembark so the bus could be
refueled and cleaned. As the passengers reboarded, the
driver checked their tickets and then left to complete paper-
work inside the terminal. As he left, the driver allowed
three members of the Tallahassee Police Department to
board the bus as part of a routine drug and weapons interdic-
tion effort. The officers were dressed in plain clothes and
carried concealed weapons and visible badges.
Once onboard Officer Hoover knelt on the driver’s seat and
faced the rear of the bus. He could observe the passengers
*Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp filed a brief for the Washington
Legal Foundation et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Leon Friedman and Joshua L. Dratel filed a brief for the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging
affirmance.
James P. Manak, Wayne W. Schmidt, Richard Weintraub, Bernard J.
Farber, and Carl Milazzo filed a brief for Americans For Effective Law
Enforcement, Inc., et al. as amici curiae.

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and ensure the safety of the two other officers without block-
ing the aisle or otherwise obstructing the bus exit. Officers
Lang and Blackburn went to the rear of the bus. Blackburn
remained stationed there, facing forward. Lang worked his
way toward the front of the bus, speaking with individual
passengers as he went. He asked the passengers about
their travel plans and sought to match passengers with lug-
gage in the overhead racks. To avoid blocking the aisle,
Lang stood next to or just behind each passenger with whom
he spoke.
According to Lang’s testimony, passengers who declined
to cooperate with him or who chose to exit the bus at any
time would have been allowed to do so without argument.
In Lang’s experience, however, most people are willing to
cooperate. Some passengers go so far as to commend the
police for their efforts to ensure the safety of their travel.
Lang could recall five to six instances in the previous year
in which passengers had declined to have their luggage
searched. It also was common for passengers to leave the
bus for a cigarette or a snack while the officers were on
board. Lang sometimes informed passengers of their right
to refuse to cooperate. On the day in question, however,
he did not.
Respondents were seated next to each other on the bus.
Drayton was in the aisle seat, Brown in the seat next to the
window. Lang approached respondents from the rear and
leaned over Drayton’s shoulder. He held up his badge long
enough for respondents to identify him as a police officer.
With his face 12-to-18 inches away from Drayton’s, Lang
spoke in a voice just loud enough for respondents to hear:
“I’m Investigator Lang with the Tallahassee Police
Department. We’re conducting bus interdiction [sic],
attempting to deter drugs and illegal weapons being
transported on the bus. Do you have any bags on the
bus?” App. 55.

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Both respondents pointed to a single green bag in the over-
head luggage rack. Lang asked, “Do you mind if I check
it?,” and Brown responded, “Go ahead.” Id., at 56. Lang
handed the bag to Officer Blackburn to check. The bag con-
tained no contraband.
Officer Lang noticed that both respondents were wearing
heavy jackets and baggy pants despite the warm weather.
In Lang’s experience drug traffickers often use baggy cloth-
ing to conceal weapons or narcotics. The officer thus asked
Brown if he had any weapons or drugs in his possession.
And he asked Brown: “Do you mind if I check your person?”
Brown answered, “Sure,” and cooperated by leaning up in
his seat, pulling a cell phone out of his pocket, and opening
up his jacket. Id., at 61. Lang reached across Drayton
and patted down Brown’s jacket and pockets, including his
waist area, sides, and upper thighs. In both thigh areas,
Lang detected hard objects similar to drug packages
detected on other occasions. Lang arrested and handcuffed
Brown. Officer Hoover escorted Brown from the bus.
Lang then asked Drayton, “Mind if I check you?” Id.,
at 65. Drayton responded by lifting his hands about eight
inches from his legs. Lang conducted a patdown of Dray-
ton’s thighs and detected hard objects similar to those found
on Brown. He arrested Drayton and escorted him from the
bus. A further search revealed that respondents had duct-
taped plastic bundles of powder cocaine between several
pairs of their boxer shorts. Brown possessed three bundles
containing 483 grams of cocaine. Drayton possessed two
bundles containing 295 grams of cocaine.
Respondents were charged with conspiring to distribute
cocaine, in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, and
with possessing cocaine with intent to distribute it, in viola-
tion of § 841(a)(1). They moved to suppress the cocaine, ar-
guing that the consent to the patdown search was invalid.
Following a hearing at which only Officer Lang testified, the

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United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida denied their motions to suppress. The District
Court determined that the police conduct was not coercive
and respondents’ consent to the search was voluntary. The
District Court pointed to the fact that the officers were
dressed in plain clothes, did not brandish their badges in an
authoritative manner, did not make a general announcement
to the entire bus, and did not address anyone in a menacing
tone of voice. It noted that the officers did not block the
aisle or the exit, and stated that it was “obvious that [re-
spondents] can get up and leave, as can the people ahead of
them.” App. 132. The District Court concluded: “[E]very-
thing that took place between Officer Lang and Mr. Drayton
and Mr. Brown suggests that it was cooperative. There was
nothing coercive, there was nothing confrontational about
it.” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed
and remanded with instructions to grant respondents’ mo-
tions to suppress. 231 F. 3d 787 (2000). The court held that
this disposition was compelled by its previous decisions in
United States v. Washington, 151 F. 3d 1354 (1998), and
United States v. Guapi, 144 F. 3d 1393 (1998). Those cases
had held that bus passengers do not feel free to disregard
police officers’ requests to search absent “some positive indi-
cation that consent could have been refused.” Washington,
supra, at 1357.
We granted certiorari. 534 U. S. 1074 (2002). The re-
spondents, we conclude, were not seized and their consent to
the search was voluntary; and we reverse.
II
Law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely by
approaching individuals on the street or in other public
places and putting questions to them if they are willing to
listen. See, e. g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 497 (1983)

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(plurality opinion); see id., at 523, n. 3 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U. S. 1, 5–6 (1984) (per
curiam) (holding that such interactions in airports are “the
sort of consensual encounter[s] that implicat[e] no Fourth
Amendment interest”). Even when law enforcement offi-
cers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual,
they may pose questions, ask for identification, and request
consent to search luggage—provided they do not induce co-
operation by coercive means. See Florida v. Bostick, 501
U. S., at 434–435 (citations omitted). If a reasonable person
would feel free to terminate the encounter, then he or she
has not been seized.
The Court has addressed on a previous occasion the spe-
cific question of drug interdiction efforts on buses. In Bos-
tick, two police officers requested a bus passenger’s consent
to a search of his luggage. The passenger agreed, and the
resulting search revealed cocaine in his suitcase. The Flor-
ida Supreme Court suppressed the cocaine. In doing so it
adopted a per se rule that due to the cramped confines on-
board a bus the act of questioning would deprive a person of
his or her freedom of movement and so constitute a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment.
This Court reversed. Bostick first made it clear that for
the most part per se rules are inappropriate in the Fourth
Amendment context. The proper inquiry necessitates a
consideration of “all the circumstances surrounding the en-
counter.” Id., at 439. The Court noted next that the tra-
ditional rule, which states that a seizure does not occur so
long as a reasonable person would feel free “to disregard the
police and go about his business,” California v. Hodari D.,
499 U. S. 621, 628 (1991), is not an accurate measure of the
coercive effect of a bus encounter. A passenger may not
want to get off a bus if there is a risk it will depart before
the opportunity to reboard. Bostick, 501 U. S., at 434–436.
A bus rider’s movements are confined in this sense, but this
is the natural result of choosing to take the bus; it says noth-

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ing about whether the police conduct is coercive. Id., at 436.
The proper inquiry “is whether a reasonable person would
feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise ter-
minate the encounter.” Ibid. Finally, the Court rejected
Bostick’s argument that he must have been seized because
no reasonable person would consent to a search of luggage
containing drugs. The reasonable person test, the Court ex-
plained, is objective and “presupposes an innocent person.”
Id., at 437–438.
In light of the limited record, Bostick refrained from decid-
ing whether a seizure occurred. Id., at 437. The Court,
however, identified two factors “particularly worth noting”
on remand. Id., at 432. First, although it was obvious that
an officer was armed, he did not remove the gun from its
pouch or use it in a threatening way. Second, the officer
advised the passenger that he could refuse consent to the
search. Ibid.
Relying upon this latter factor, the Eleventh Circuit has
adopted what is in effect a per se rule that evidence obtained
during suspicionless drug interdiction efforts aboard buses
must be suppressed unless the officers have advised passen-
gers of their right not to cooperate and to refuse consent to
a search. In United States v. Guapi, supra, the Court of
Appeals described “[t]he most glaring difference” between
the encounters in Guapi and in Bostick as “the complete lack
of any notification to the passengers that they were in fact
free to decline the search request. . . . Providing [this] simple
notification . . . is perhaps the most efficient and effective
method to ensure compliance with the Constitution.” 144
F. 3d, at 1395. The Court of Appeals then listed other fac-
tors that contributed to the coerciveness of the encounter:
(1) the officer conducted the interdiction before the passen-
gers disembarked from the bus at a scheduled stop; (2) the
officer explained his presence in the form of a general an-
nouncement to the entire bus; (3) the officer wore a police
uniform; and (4) the officer questioned passengers as he

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moved from the front to the rear of the bus, thus obstructing
the path to the exit. Id., at 1396.
After its decision in Guapi the Court of Appeals decided
United States v. Washington and the instant case. The
court suppressed evidence obtained during similar drug in-
terdiction efforts despite the following facts: (1) the officers
in both cases conducted the interdiction after the passengers
had reboarded the bus; (2) the officer in the present case did
not make a general announcement to the entire bus but in-
stead spoke with individual passengers; (3) the officers in
both cases were not in uniform; and (4) the officers in both
cases questioned passengers as they moved from the rear to
the front of the bus and were careful not to obstruct passen-
gers’ means of egress from the bus.
Although the Court of Appeals has disavowed a per se re-
quirement, the lack of an explicit warning to passengers is
the only element common to all its cases. See Washington,
151 F. 3d, at 1357 (“It seems obvious to us that if police offi-
cers genuinely want to ensure that their encounters with
bus passengers remain absolutely voluntary, they can simply
say so. Without such notice in this case, we do not feel a
reasonable person would have felt able to decline the agents’
requests”); 231 F. 3d, at 790 (noting that “[t]his case is
controlled by” Guapi and Washington, and dismissing any
factual differences between the three cases as irrelevant).
Under these cases, it appears that the Court of Appeals
would suppress any evidence obtained during suspicion-
less drug interdiction efforts aboard buses in the absence of
a warning that passengers may refuse to cooperate. The
Court of Appeals erred in adopting this approach.
Applying the Bostick framework to the facts of this partic-
ular case, we conclude that the police did not seize respond-
ents when they boarded the bus and began questioning
passengers. The officers gave the passengers no reason
to believe that they were required to answer the officers’
questions. When Officer Lang approached respondents, he

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did not brandish a weapon or make any intimidating move-
ments. He left the aisle free so that respondents could exit.
He spoke to passengers one by one and in a polite, quiet
voice. Nothing he said would suggest to a reasonable per-
son that he or she was barred from leaving the bus or other-
wise terminating the encounter.
There were ample grounds for the District Court to con-
clude that “everything that took place between Officer Lang
and [respondents] suggests that it was cooperative” and that
there “was nothing coercive [or] confrontational” about the
encounter. App. 132. There was no application of force, no
intimidating movement, no overwhelming show of force, no
brandishing of weapons, no blocking of exits, no threat,
no command, not even an authoritative tone of voice. It is
beyond question that had this encounter occurred on the
street, it would be constitutional. The fact that an encoun-
ter takes place on a bus does not on its own transform stand-
ard police questioning of citizens into an illegal seizure. See
Bostick, 501 U. S., at 439–440. Indeed, because many fellow
passengers are present to witness officers’ conduct, a rea-
sonable person may feel even more secure in his or her deci-
sion not to cooperate with police on a bus than in other
circumstances.
Respondents make much of the fact that Officer Lang dis-
played his badge. In Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U. S., at 5–6,
however, the Court rejected the claim that the defendant
was seized when an officer approached him in an airport,
showed him his badge, and asked him to answer some ques-
tions. Likewise, in INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210, 212–213
(1984), the Court held that Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) agents’ wearing badges and questioning work-
ers in a factory did not constitute a seizure. And while nei-
ther Lang nor his colleagues were in uniform or visibly
armed, those factors should have little weight in the analysis.
Officers are often required to wear uniforms and in many
circumstances this is cause for assurance, not discomfort.

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Much the same can be said for wearing sidearms. That
most law enforcement officers are armed is a fact well known
to the public. The presence of a holstered firearm thus is
unlikely to contribute to the coerciveness of the encounter
absent active brandishing of the weapon.
Officer Hoover’s position at the front of the bus also does
not tip the scale in respondents’ favor. Hoover did nothing
to intimidate passengers, and he said nothing to suggest that
people could not exit and indeed he left the aisle clear. In
Delgado, the Court determined there was no seizure even
though several uniformed INS officers were stationed near
the exits of the factory. Id., at 219. The Court noted: “The
presence of agents by the exits posed no reasonable threat
of detention to these workers, . . . the mere possibility that
they would be questioned if they sought to leave the build-
ings should not have resulted in any reasonable apprehension
by any of them that they would be seized or detained in any
meaningful way.” Ibid.
Finally, the fact that in Officer Lang’s experience only a
few passengers have refused to cooperate does not suggest
that a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate
the bus encounter. In Lang’s experience it was common for
passengers to leave the bus for a cigarette or a snack while
the officers were questioning passengers. App. 70, 81.
And of more importance, bus passengers answer officers’
questions and otherwise cooperate not because of coercion
but because the passengers know that their participation en-
hances their own safety and the safety of those around them.
“While most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact
that people do so, and do so without being told they are free
not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of
the response.” Delgado, supra, at 216.
Drayton contends that even if Brown’s cooperation with
the officers was consensual, Drayton was seized because no
reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter
with the officers after Brown had been arrested. The Court

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of Appeals did not address this claim; and in any event the
argument fails. The arrest of one person does not mean that
everyone around him has been seized by police. If anything,
Brown’s arrest should have put Drayton on notice of the
consequences of continuing the encounter by answering
the officers’ questions. Even after arresting Brown, Lang
addressed Drayton in a polite manner and provided him
with no indication that he was required to answer Lang’s
questions.
We turn now from the question whether respondents were
seized to whether they were subjected to an unreasonable
search, i. e., whether their consent to the suspicionless search
was involuntary. In circumstances such as these, where the
question of voluntariness pervades both the search and sei-
zure inquiries, the respective analyses turn on very similar
facts. And, as the facts above suggest, respondents’ consent
to the search of their luggage and their persons was volun-
tary. Nothing Officer Lang said indicated a command to
consent to the search. Rather, when respondents informed
Lang that they had a bag on the bus, he asked for their per-
mission to check it. And when Lang requested to search
Brown and Drayton’s persons, he asked first if they objected,
thus indicating to a reasonable person that he or she was
free to refuse. Even after arresting Brown, Lang provided
Drayton with no indication that he was required to consent
to a search. To the contrary, Lang asked for Drayton’s per-
mission to search him (“Mind if I check you?”), and Dray-
ton agreed.
The Court has rejected in specific terms the suggestion
that police officers must always inform citizens of their right
to refuse when seeking permission to conduct a warrantless
consent search. See, e. g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U. S. 33,
39–40 (1996); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 227
(1973). “While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is
one factor to be taken into account, the government need not
establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective

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consent.” Ibid. Nor do this Court’s decisions suggest that
even though there are no per se rules, a presumption of inva-
lidity attaches if a citizen consented without explicit notifi-
cation that he or she was free to refuse to cooperate. In-
stead, the Court has repeated that the totality of the
circumstances must control, without giving extra weight to
the absence of this type of warning. See, e. g., Schneckloth,
supra; Robinette, supra, at 39–40. Although Officer Lang
did not inform respondents of their right to refuse the
search, he did request permission to search, and the totality
of the circumstances indicates that their consent was volun-
tary, so the searches were reasonable.
In a society based on law, the concept of agreement and
consent should be given a weight and dignity of its own.
Police officers act in full accord with the law when they ask
citizens for consent. It reinforces the rule of law for the
citizen to advise the police of his or her wishes and for the
police to act in reliance on that understanding. When this
exchange takes place, it dispels inferences of coercion.
We need not ask the alternative question whether, after
the arrest of Brown, there were grounds for a Terry stop
and frisk of Drayton, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), though
this may have been the case. It was evident that Drayton
and Brown were traveling together—Officer Lang observed
the pair reboarding the bus together; they were each dressed
in heavy, baggy clothes that were ill-suited for the day’s
warm temperatures; they were seated together on the bus;
and they each claimed responsibility for the single piece of
green carry-on luggage. Once Lang had identified Brown as
carrying what he believed to be narcotics, he may have had
reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop and frisk on
Drayton as well. That question, however, has not been pre-
sented to us. The fact the officers may have had reasonable
suspicion does not prevent them from relying on a citizen’s
consent to the search. It would be a paradox, and one most
puzzling to law enforcement officials and courts alike, were

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208 UNITED STATES v. DRAYTON
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we to say, after holding that Brown’s consent was voluntary,
that Drayton’s consent was ineffectual simply because the
police at that point had more compelling grounds to detain
him. After taking Brown into custody, the officers were
entitled to continue to proceed on the basis of consent and to
ask for Drayton’s cooperation.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Stevens and
Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.
Anyone who travels by air today submits to searches of
the person and luggage as a condition of boarding the air-
craft. It is universally accepted that such intrusions are
necessary to hedge against risks that, nowadays, even small
children understand. The commonplace precautions of air
travel have not, thus far, been justified for ground transpor-
tation, however, and no such conditions have been placed on
passengers getting on trains or buses. There is therefore
an air of unreality about the Court’s explanation that bus
passengers consent to searches of their luggage to “enhanc[e]
their own safety and the safety of those around them.”
Ante, at 205. Nor are the other factual assessments under-
lying the Court’s conclusion in favor of the Government
more convincing.
The issue we took to review is whether the police’s ex-
amination of the bus passengers, including respondents,
amounted to a suspicionless seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.1 If it did, any consent to search was plainly
1 The Court proceeds to resolve the voluntariness issue on the heels of
its seizure enquiry, but the voluntariness of respondents’ consent was not
within the question the Court accepted for review. Accord, Reply Brief
for United States 20, n. 7 (stating that the consent issue “is not presented
by this case; the question here is whether there was an illegal seizure

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209 Cite as: 536 U. S. 194 (2002)
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invalid as a product of the illegal seizure. See Florida v.
Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 507–508 (1983) (plurality opinion)
(“[T]he consent was tainted by the illegality and . . . ineffec-
tive to justify the search”); id., at 509 (Powell, J., concurring);
id., at 509 (Brennan, J., concurring in result).
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429 (1991), established the
framework for determining whether the bus passengers
were seized in the constitutional sense. In that case, we
rejected the position that police questioning of bus passen-
gers was a per se seizure, and held instead that the issue of
seizure was to be resolved under an objective test consider-
ing all circumstances: whether a reasonable passenger would
have felt “free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise
terminate the encounter,” id., at 436. We thus applied to a
bus passenger the more general criterion, whether the per-
son questioned was free “to ignore the police presence and
go about his business,” id., at 437 (quoting Michigan v. Ches-
ternut, 486 U. S. 567, 569 (1988)).
Before applying the standard in this case, it may be worth
getting some perspective from different sets of facts. A
perfect example of police conduct that supports no colorable
claim of seizure is the act of an officer who simply goes up
to a pedestrian on the street and asks him a question. See
Royer, 460 U. S., at 497; see id., at 523, n. 3 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). A pair of officers questioning a pedestrian,
in the first place”). While it is true that the Eleventh Circuit purported
to address the question “whether the consent given by each defendant for
the search was ‘uncoerced and legally voluntary,’ ” 231 F. 3d 787, 788
(2000), elsewhere the court made it clear that it was applying the test in
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429 (1991), which is relevant to the issue of
seizure, 231 F. 3d, at 791, n. 6. There is thus no occasion here to reach
any issue of consent untainted by seizure. If there were, the consent
would have to satisfy the voluntariness test of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U. S. 218 (1973), which focuses on “the nature of a person’s subjective
understanding,” id., at 230, and requires consideration of “the characteris-
tics of the accused [in addition to] the details of the interrogation,” id.,
at 226.

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without more, would presumably support the same conclu-
sion. Now consider three officers, one of whom stands
behind the pedestrian, another at his side toward the open
sidewalk, with the third addressing questions to the pedes-
trian a foot or two from his face. Finally, consider the same
scene in a narrow alley. On such barebones facts, one may
not be able to say a seizure occurred, even in the last case,
but one can say without qualification that the atmosphere
of the encounters differed significantly from the first to the
last examples. In the final instance there is every reason to
believe that the pedestrian would have understood, to his
considerable discomfort, what Justice Stewart described as
the “threatening presence of several officers,” United States
v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 554 (1980) (opinion of Stewart,
J.). The police not only carry legitimate authority but also
exercise power free from immediate check, and when the at-
tention of several officers is brought to bear on one civilian
the imbalance of immediate power is unmistakable. We all
understand this, as well as we understand that a display of
power rising to Justice Stewart’s “threatening” level may
overbear a normal person’s ability to act freely, even in the
absence of explicit commands or the formalities of detention.
As common as this understanding is, however, there is little
sign of it in the Court’s opinion. My own understanding of
the relevant facts and their significance follows.
When the bus in question made its scheduled stop in Talla-
hassee, the passengers were required to disembark while the
vehicle was cleaned and refueled. App. 104. When the
passengers returned, they gave their tickets to the driver,
who kept them and then left himself, after giving three
police officers permission to board the bus in his absence.
Id., at 77–78. Although they were not in uniform, the offi-
cers displayed badges and identified themselves as police.
One stationed himself in the driver’s seat by the door at the
front, facing back to observe the passengers. The two oth-
ers went to the rear, from which they worked their way for-

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ward, with one of them speaking to passengers, the other
backing him up. Id., at 47–48. They necessarily addressed
the passengers at very close range; the aisle was only 15
inches wide, and each seat only 18.2 The quarters were
cramped further by the overhead rack, 19 inches above the
top of the passenger seats. The passenger by the window
could not have stood up straight, id., at 55, and the face of
the nearest officer was only a foot or 18 inches from the face
of the nearest passenger being addressed, id., at 57. During
the exchanges, the officers looked down, and the passengers
had to look up if they were to face the police. The officer
asking the questions spoke quietly. He prefaced his re-
quests for permission to search luggage and do a body pat-
down by identifying himself by name as a police investigator
“conducting bus interdiction” and saying, “ ‘We would like
for your cooperation. Do you have any luggage on the
bus?’ ” Id., at 82.
Thus, for reasons unexplained, the driver with the tickets
entitling the passengers to travel had yielded his custody of
the bus and its seated travelers to three police officers,
whose authority apparently superseded the driver’s own.
The officers took control of the entire passenger compart-
ment, one stationed at the door keeping surveillance of all
the occupants, the others working forward from the back.
With one officer right behind him and the other one forward,
a third officer accosted each passenger at quarters extremely
close and so cramped that as many as half the passengers
could not even have stood to face the speaker. None was
asked whether he was willing to converse with the police
or to take part in the enquiry. Instead the officer said the
police were “conducting bus interdiction,” in the course
of which they “would like . . . cooperation.” Ibid. The
reasonable inference was that the “interdiction” was not a
consensual exercise, but one the police would carry out what-
2 The figures are from a Lodging filed by respondents (available in Clerk
of Court’s case file). The Government does not dispute their accuracy.

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ever the circumstances; that they would prefer “cooperation”
but would not let the lack of it stand in their way. There
was no contrary indication that day, since no passenger had
refused the cooperation requested, and there was no reason
for any passenger to believe that the driver would return
and the trip resume until the police were satisfied. The
scene was set and an atmosphere of obligatory participation
was established by this introduction. Later requests to
search prefaced with “Do you mind . . .” would naturally
have been understood in the terms with which the encoun-
ter began.
It is very hard to imagine that either Brown or Drayton
would have believed that he stood to lose nothing if he re-
fused to cooperate with the police, or that he had any free
choice to ignore the police altogether. No reasonable pas-
senger could have believed that, only an uncomprehending
one. It is neither here nor there that the interdiction was
conducted by three officers, not one, as a safety precaution.
See id., at 47. The fact was that there were three, and when
Brown and Drayton were called upon to respond, each one
was presumably conscious of an officer in front watching, one
at his side questioning him, and one behind for cover, in case
he became unruly, perhaps, or “cooperation” was not forth-
coming. The situation is much like the one in the alley, with
civilians in close quarters, unable to move effectively, being
told their cooperation is expected. While I am not prepared
to say that no bus interrogation and search can pass the
Bostick test without a warning that passengers are free to
say no, the facts here surely required more from the officers
than a quiet tone of voice. A police officer who is certain to
get his way has no need to shout.
It is true of course that the police testified that a bus pas-
senger sometimes says no, App. 81, but that evidence does
nothing to cast the facts here in a different light. We have
no way of knowing the circumstances in which a passenger
elsewhere refused a request; maybe that has happened only

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when the police have told passengers they had a right to
refuse (as the officers sometimes advised them), id., at 81–82.
Nor is it fairly possible to see the facts of this case differently
by recalling INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210 (1984), as prece-
dent. In that case, a majority of this Court found no seizure
when a factory force was questioned by immigration officers,
with an officer posted at every door leading from the work-
place. Id., at 219. Whether that opinion was well reasoned
or not, the facts as the Court viewed them differed from the
case here. Delgado considered an order granting summary
judgment in favor of respondents, with the consequence that
the Court was required to construe the record and all issues
of fact favorably to the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. See id., at 214; id., at 221 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). The Court therefore emphasized that even after
“th[e] surveys were initiated, the employees were about their
ordinary business, operating machinery and performing
other job assignments.” Id., at 218. In this case, however,
Brown and Drayton were seemingly pinned-in by the officers
and the customary course of events was stopped flat. The
bus was going nowhere, and with one officer in the driver’s
seat, it was reasonable to suppose no passenger would tend
to his own business until the officers were ready to let him.
In any event, I am less concerned to parse this case against
Delgado than to apply Bostick’s totality of circumstances
test, and to ask whether a passenger would reasonably have
felt free to end his encounter with the three officers by
saying no and ignoring them thereafter. In my view the
answer is clear. The Court’s contrary conclusion tells me
that the majority cannot see what Justice Stewart saw, and
I respectfully dissent.