DEVLIN v. SCARDELLETTI et al.

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CASES ADJUDGED
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AT
OCTOBER TERM, 2001
DEVLIN v. SCARDELLETTI et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit
No. 01–417. Argued March 26, 2002—Decided June 10, 2002
Petitioner retiree participates in a defined benefits pension plan (Plan)
that was amended in 1991 to add a cost of living increase (COLA).
Because the Plan could not support such a large benefits increase, its
trustees ultimately eliminated the COLA in 1997 and filed a class action
in the Maryland Federal District Court, seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that the 1997 amendment was binding on all Plan members or that
the 1991 COLA was void. Petitioner’s separate challenge to the 1997
amendment was dismissed by a New York Federal District Court, which
found that the Maryland court should resolve the matter. By this time,
the Maryland court had already conditionally certified a class under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1). After the trustees asked the
court to approve their settlement with the class representatives, pe-
titioner moved to intervene. The District Court denied his motion
as untimely. It then heard objections to the settlement, including
those advanced by petitioner, and approved the settlement. Petitioner
appealed. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial of
intervention and held that, because petitioner was not a named class
representative and because he had been properly denied the right to
intervene, he lacked standing to challenge the settlement.
Held: Nonnamed class members like petitioner who have objected in a
timely manner to approval of a settlement at a fairness hearing have
the power to bring an appeal without first intervening. Pp. 6–14.
1

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2 DEVLIN v. SCARDELLETTI
Syllabus
(a) This issue, though framed by the Fourth Circuit as one of stand-
ing, does not implicate the jurisdiction of the courts, as petitioner satis-
fies both constitutional and prudential standing requirements. What is
at issue is whether petitioner is a “party” for purposes of appealing the
settlement approval, for only a lawsuit’s parties, or those that properly
become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment. This Court has
never restricted the right to appeal to named parties. Petitioner’s
interest in the settlement approval is similar to those of the nonnamed
parties this Court has allowed to appeal in the past. He objected to the
settlement at the fairness hearing, as permitted by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. And the settlement’s approval notwithstanding his
objections amounted to a final decision of his right or claim sufficient
to trigger his right to appeal. That right cannot be effectively accom-
plished through the named class representative—once the named par-
ties reach a settlement that is approved over the petitioner’s objections,
petitioner’s interests diverge from those of the class representative.
Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U. S. 301, in which white police officers who were
not members of the class of minority officers who had brought a racial
discrimination suit were not allowed to appeal the settlement, is not to
the contrary. Although the settlement affected them, the District
Court’s decision did not dispose of any right or claim they might have
had because they were not class members. Nor does considering non-
named class members as parties for the purpose of bringing an appeal
conflict with any other aspect of class action procedure. Such members
may be parties for some purposes and not for others. What is impor-
tant here is that they are parties in the sense of being bound by the
settlement. Allowing them to appeal a settlement approval when they
have objected at the fairness hearing preserves their own interests in a
settlement that will bind them, despite their expressed objections be-
fore the trial court. Allowing such appeals will not undermine the class
action goal of preventing multiple suits. Restricting the power to ap-
peal to those members who objected at the fairness hearing limits the
class of potential appellants considerably. Pp. 6–11.
(b) This Court rejects the Government’s argument that class mem-
bers should be required to intervene for purposes of appeal. Nor does
the Court agree with the Government that the structure of class action
procedural rules requires intervention for purposes of appeal. A proce-
dure that allows nonnamed class members to object to a settlement at
the fairness hearing without first intervening should similarly allow
them to appeal the district court’s decision to disregard their objections.
Moreover, no statute or procedural rule directly addresses the question
of who may appeal from approval of class action settlements, while the

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Opinion of the Court
right to appeal from an action that finally disposes of one’s rights has a
statutory basis. 28 U. S. C. § 1291. Pp. 11–14.
265 F. 3d 195, reversed and remanded.
O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined.
Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Kennedy and Thomas,
JJ., joined, post, p. 15.
Thomas C. Goldstein argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Erik S. Jaffe and Brian
Wolfman.
Laurence Gold argued the cause for respondents. With
him on the brief were Andrew D. Roth, David L. Shapiro,
William F. Hanrahan, and Kenneth M. Johnson.
Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for the United States
et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. On the brief were
Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Mc-
Callum, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Gregory G.
Garre, Marleigh D. Dover, Irene M. Solet, David M. Becker,
Jacob H. Stillman, and Eric Summergrad.*
Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, a nonnamed member of a class certified under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1), sought to appeal
the approval of a settlement over objections he stated at the
fairness hearing. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that he lacked the power to bring such an appeal
because he was not a named class representative and because
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Council of
Institutional Investors by Mark C. Hansen and Neil M. Gorsuch; and for
Charles C. Yeomans by Katherine K. Yunker.
Seth P. Waxman, Edward C. DuMont, and Christopher R. Lipsett filed
a brief for Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., as amicus curiae urging
affirmance.
Thaddeus Holt filed a brief for Charles L. Grimes et al. as amici
curiae.

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4 DEVLIN v. SCARDELLETTI
Opinion of the Court
he had not successfully moved to intervene in the litigation.
We now reverse.
I
Petitioner Robert Devlin, a retired worker represented
by the Transportation Communications International Union
(Union), participates in a defined benefits pension plan (Plan)
administered by the Union. In 1991, on the recommenda-
tion of the Plan’s trustees, the Plan was amended to add a
cost of living adjustment (COLA) for retired and active em-
ployees. As it turned out, however, the Plan was not able
to support such a large benefits increase. To address this
problem, the Plan’s new trustees sought to freeze the COLA.
Because they were concerned about incurring Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) liability by
eliminating the COLA for retired workers, see 29 U. S. C.
§ 1054(g)(1) (1994 ed.) (providing that accrued benefits “may
not be decreased by an amendment of the plan”), the trustees
froze the COLA only as to active employees. Because the
Plan still lacked sufficient funds, the new trustees obtained
an equitable decree from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland in 1995 declaring that the former
trustees had breached their fiduciary duties and that ending
the COLA for retired workers would not violate ERISA.
Scardelletti v. Bobo, 897 F. Supp. 913 (Md. 1995); Scardelletti
v. Bobo, No. JFM–95–52 (D. Md., Sept. 8, 1997). Accord-
ingly, in a 1997 amendment, the new trustees eliminated the
COLA for all Plan members.
In October 1997, those trustees filed the present class ac-
tion in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1997
amendment was binding on all Plan members or, alterna-
tively, that the 1991 COLA amendment was void. Origi-
nally, petitioner was proposed as a class representative for a
subclass of retired workers because of his previous involve-
ment in the issue. He refused to become a named repre-
sentative, however, preferring to bring a separate action in

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the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, arguing, among other things, that the 1997 Plan
amendment violated the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq.
(1994 ed. and Supp. V). The New York District Court dis-
missed petitioner’s claim involving the 1997 amendment,
which was later affirmed by the Second Circuit because:
“The exact COLA issue that the appellants are pur-
suing . . . is being addressed by the district court in
Maryland. . . . It seems eminently sensible that the
Maryland district court should resolve fully the COLA
amendment issue.” Devlin v. Transportation Commu-
nications Int’l Union, 175 F. 3d 121, 132 (CA2 1999).
At the time petitioner’s claim was dismissed, the District
Court in Maryland had already conditionally certified a class
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1), dividing it
into two subclasses: a subclass of active employees and a sub-
class of retirees. On April 20, 1999, petitioner’s attorney
sent a letter to the District Court informally seeking to in-
tervene in the class action. On May 12, 1999, petitioner sent
another letter repeating this request. He did not, however,
formally move to intervene at that time.
Also in May, the Plan’s trustees and the class representa-
tives agreed on a settlement whereby the COLA benefits
would be eliminated in exchange for the addition of other
benefits. On August 27, 1999, the trustees filed a motion for
preliminary approval of the settlement. On September 10,
1999, petitioner formally moved to intervene pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. On November 12, 1999,
the District Court denied petitioner’s intervention motion as
“absolutely untimely.” Scardelletti v. Debarr, 265 F. 3d 195,
201 (CA4 2001). It then heard objections to the settlement,
including those advanced by petitioner, and, concluding that
the settlement was fair, approved it. App. C to Pet. for
Cert. 1–3.

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Shortly thereafter, petitioner noted his appeal, challenging
the District Court’s dismissal of his intervention motion as
well as its decision to approve the settlement. The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s
denial of intervention under an abuse of discretion standard.
265 F. 3d, at 203–204. It further held that, because peti-
tioner was not a named representative of the class and be-
cause he had been properly denied the right to intervene, he
lacked standing to challenge the fairness of the settlement
on appeal. Id., at 208–210.
Petitioner sought review of the Fourth Circuit’s holding
that he lacked the ability to appeal the District Court’s ap-
proval of the settlement. We granted certiorari, 534 U. S.
1064 (2001), to resolve a disagreement among the Circuits as
to whether nonnamed class members who fail to properly
intervene may bring an appeal of the approval of a settle-
ment. Compare Cook v. Powell Buick, Inc., 155 F. 3d 758,
761 (CA5 1998) (holding that nonnamed class members who
have not successfully intervened may not appeal settlement
approval); Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F. 3d 1004, 1008–1009 (CA10
1993) (same); Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F. 2d 626, 628–629 (CA11
1987) (same); Shults v. Champion Int’l Corp., 35 F. 3d 1056,
1061 (CA6 1994) (same), with In re PaineWebber Inc. Ltd.
Partnerships Litigation, 94 F. 3d 49, 53 (CA2 1996) (any non-
named class member who objected at the fairness hearing
may appeal); Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 5 F. 3d 707,
710 (CA3 1993) (same); Marshall v. Holiday Magic, Inc., 550
F. 2d 1173, 1176 (CA9 1977) (same).
II
Although the Fourth Circuit framed the issue as one of
standing, 265 F. 3d, at 204, we begin by clarifying that this
issue does not implicate the jurisdiction of the courts under
Article III of the Constitution. As a member of the retiree
class, petitioner has an interest in the settlement that creates
a “case or controversy” sufficient to satisfy the constitutional

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requirements of injury, causation, and redressability. Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555 (1992); see also In re
Navigant Consulting, Inc., Securities Litigation, 275 F. 3d
616, 620 (CA7 2001).
Nor do appeals by nonnamed class members raise the
sorts of concerns that are ordinarily addressed as a matter
of prudential standing. Prudential standing requirements
include:
“[T]he general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another
person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of
generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in
the representative branches, and the requirement that
a plaintiff ’s complaint fall within the zone of interests
protected by the law invoked.” Allen v. Wright, 468
U. S. 737, 751 (1984).
Because petitioner is a member of the class bound by the
judgment, there is no question that he satisfies these three
requirements. The legal rights he seeks to raise are his
own, he belongs to a discrete class of interested parties, and
his complaint clearly falls within the zone of interests of the
requirement that a settlement be fair to all class members.
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(e).
What is at issue, instead, is whether petitioner should be
considered a “party” for the purposes of appealing the ap-
proval of the settlement. We have held that “only parties
to a lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, may ap-
peal an adverse judgment.” Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U. S. 301,
304 (1988) (per curiam). Respondents argue that, because
petitioner is not a named class representative and did not
successfully move to intervene, he is not a party for the pur-
poses of taking an appeal.
We have never, however, restricted the right to appeal to
named parties to the litigation. In Blossom v. Milwaukee &
Chicago R. Co., 1 Wall. 655 (1864), for instance, we allowed
a bidder for property at a foreclosure sale, who was not a

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8 DEVLIN v. SCARDELLETTI
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named party in the foreclosure action, to appeal the refusal
of a request he made during that action to compel the sale.
In Hinckley v. Gilman, C., & S. R. Co., 94 U. S. 467 (1877),
we allowed a receiver, who was an officer of the court rather
than a named party to the case, to appeal from an order
“relat[ing] to the settlement of his accounts,” reasoning that
“[f]or this purpose he occupies the position of a party to
the suit.” Id., at 469. More recently, we have affirmed that
“[t]he right of a nonparty to appeal an adjudication of con-
tempt cannot be questioned,” United States Catholic Confer-
ence v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U. S. 72, 76
(1988), given the binding nature of that adjudication upon
the interested nonparty.
Justice Scalia attempts to distinguish these cases by
characterizing them as appeals from collateral orders to
which the appellants “were parties.” Post, at 16 (dissenting
opinion). But it is difficult to see how they were parties in
the sense in which Justice Scalia uses the term—those
“ ‘named as a party to an action,’ ” usually “ ‘in the caption
of the summons or complaint.’ ” Post, at 15 (quoting Re-
statement (Second) of Judgments § 34(1), p. 345 (1980); id.,
Comment a, Reporter’s Note, at 347). Because they were
not named in the action, the appellants in these cases were
parties only in the sense that they were bound by the order
from which they were seeking to appeal.
Petitioner’s interest in the District Court’s approval of the
settlement is similar. Petitioner objected to the settlement
at the District Court’s fairness hearing, as nonnamed parties
have been consistently allowed to do under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(e)
(“A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised with-
out the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed
dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the
class in such manner as the court directs”); see also 2 H.
Newberg & A. Conte, Class Actions § 11.55, p. 11–132 (3d ed.
1992) (explaining that Rule 23(e) entitles all class members

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to an opportunity to object). The District Court’s approval
of the settlement—which binds petitioner as a member of
the class—amounted to a “final decision of [petitioner’s] right
or claim” sufficient to trigger his right to appeal. See Wil-
liams v. Morgan, 111 U. S. 684, 699 (1884) (describing the
cases discussed above). And like the appellants in the prior
cases, petitioner will only be allowed to appeal that aspect
of the District Court’s order that affects him—the District
Court’s decision to disregard his objections. Cf. supra, at 6.
Petitioner’s right to appeal this aspect of the District Court’s
decision cannot be effectively accomplished through the
named class representative—once the named parties reach
a settlement that is approved over petitioner’s objections,
petitioner’s interests by definition diverge from those of the
class representative.
Marino v. Ortiz, supra, is not to the contrary. In that
case, we refused to allow an appeal of a settlement by a
group of white police officers who were not members of the
class of minority officers that had brought a racial discrimi-
nation claim against the New York Police Department. Al-
though the settlement affected them, the District Court’s de-
cision did not finally dispose of any right or claim they might
have had because they were not members of the class.
Nor does considering nonnamed class members parties for
the purposes of bringing an appeal conflict with any other
aspect of class action procedure. In a related case, the Sev-
enth Circuit has argued that nonnamed class members can-
not be considered parties for the purposes of bringing an
appeal because they are not considered parties for the pur-
poses of the complete diversity requirement in suits under
28 U. S. C. § 1332. See Navigant Consulting, 275 F. 3d, at
619; see also Snyder v. Harris, 394 U. S. 332, 340 (1969). Ac-
cording to the Seventh Circuit, “[c]lass members cannot have
it both ways, being non-parties (so that more cases can come
to federal court) but still having a party’s ability to litigate
independently.” 275 F. 3d, at 619. Nonnamed class mem-

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10 DEVLIN v. SCARDELLETTI
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bers, however, may be parties for some purposes and not
for others. The label “party” does not indicate an absolute
characteristic, but rather a conclusion about the applicability
of various procedural rules that may differ based on context.
Nonnamed class members are, for instance, parties in the
sense that the filing of an action on behalf of the class tolls
a statute of limitations against them. See American Pipe
& Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538 (1974). Otherwise, all
class members would be forced to intervene to preserve their
claims, and one of the major goals of class action litigation—
to simplify litigation involving a large number of class mem-
bers with similar claims—would be defeated. The rule that
nonnamed class members cannot defeat complete diversity
is likewise justified by the goals of class action litigation.
Ease of administration of class actions would be compro-
mised by having to consider the citizenship of all class mem-
bers, many of whom may even be unknown, in determining
jurisdiction. See 7A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Fed-
eral Practice and Procedure § 1755, pp. 63–64 (2d ed. 1986).
Perhaps more importantly, considering all class members for
these purposes would destroy diversity in almost all class
actions. Nonnamed class members are, therefore, not par-
ties in that respect.
What is most important to this case is that nonnamed class
members are parties to the proceedings in the sense of being
bound by the settlement. It is this feature of class action
litigation that requires that class members be allowed to ap-
peal the approval of a settlement when they have objected
at the fairness hearing. To hold otherwise would deprive
nonnamed class members of the power to preserve their own
interests in a settlement that will ultimately bind them, de-
spite their expressed objections before the trial court. Par-
ticularly in light of the fact that petitioner had no ability to
opt out of the settlement, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b)(1),
appealing the approval of the settlement is petitioner’s only

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means of protecting himself from being bound by a disposi-
tion of his rights he finds unacceptable and that a reviewing
court might find legally inadequate.
Justice Scalia rightly notes that other nonnamed par-
ties may be bound by a court’s decision, in particular, those
in privity with the named party. See post, at 18. True
enough. It is not at all clear, however, that such parties
may not themselves appeal. Although this Court has never
addressed the issue, nonnamed parties in privity with a
named party are often allowed by other courts to appeal
from the order that affects them. 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appellate
Review § 265 (1995).
Respondents argue that, nonetheless, appeals from non-
named parties should not be allowed because they would un-
dermine one of the goals of class action litigation, namely,
preventing multiple suits. See Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F. 2d,
at 629 (arguing that allowing nonnamed class members’ ap-
peals would undermine a “fundamental purpose of the class
action”: “to render manageable litigation that involves nu-
merous members of a homogenous class, who would all other-
wise have access to the court through individual lawsuits”).
Allowing such appeals, however, will not be as problematic
as respondents claim. For one thing, the power to appeal is
limited to those nonnamed class members who have objected
during the fairness hearing. This limits the class of poten-
tial appellants considerably. As the longstanding practice of
allowing nonnamed class members to object at the fairness
hearing demonstrates, the burden of considering the claims
of this subset of class members is not onerous.
III
The Government, as amicus curiae, admits that nonnamed
class members are parties who may appeal the approval of a
settlement, but urges us nonetheless to require class mem-
bers to intervene for purposes of appeal. See Brief for

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12 DEVLIN v. SCARDELLETTI
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United States et al. as Amici Curiae 12–27. To address the
fairness concerns to objecting nonnamed class members
bound by the settlement they wish to appeal, however, the
Government also asserts that such a limited purpose inter-
vention generally should be available to all those, like peti-
tioner, whose objections at the fairness hearing have been
disregarded. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) pro-
vides for intervention as of right:
“Upon timely application . . . when the applicant claims
an interest relating to the property or transaction which
is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situ-
ated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability to pro-
tect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is ade-
quately represented by existing parties.”
According to the Government, nonnamed class members who
state objections at the fairness hearing should easily meet
these three criteria. For one thing, it claims, a settlement
binding on them will establish the requisite interest in the
action. Moreover, it argues, any intervention motion filed
“within the time period in which the named plaintiffs could
have taken an appeal” should be considered “timely filed” for
the purposes of such limited intervention. United Airlines,
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 396 (1977). Finally, it as-
serts, the approval of a settlement over a nonnamed class
member’s objection, and the failure of a class representative
to appeal such an approval, should “invariably” show that
the class representative does not adequately represent the
nonnamed class member’s interests on appeal. Brief for
United States et al. as Amici Curiae 20.
Given the ease with which nonnamed class members who
have objected at the fairness hearing could intervene for
purposes of appeal, however, it is difficult to see the value of
the Government’s suggested requirement. It identifies only

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a limited number of instances where the initial intervention
motion would be of any use: where the objector is not actu-
ally a member of the settlement class or is otherwise not
entitled to relief from the settlement, where an objector
seeks to appeal even though his objection was successful,
where the objection at the fairness hearing was untimely, or
where there is a need to consolidate duplicative appeals from
class members. Id., at 23–25. In such situations, the Gov-
ernment argues, a district court can disallow such problem-
atic and unnecessary appeals.
This seems to us, however, of limited benefit. In the first
two of these situations, the objector stands to gain nothing
by appeal, so it is unlikely such situations will arise with any
frequency. Justice Scalia argues that if such objectors
were undeterred by this fact at the time they filed their orig-
inal objections, they will be undeterred at the appellate level.
See post, at 21–22. This misunderstands the point. As to
the first group—those who are not actually entitled to re-
lief—one would not expect them to have filed objections in
the district court in the first place. The few irrational per-
sons who wish to pursue one round of meaningless relief will,
we agree, probably be irrational enough to pursue a second.
But there should not be many of such persons in any case.
As for the second—those whose objections were successful
at the district court level—they were far from irrational in
the filing of their initial objections, and they should not gen-
erally be expected to lose this level of sensibility when faced
with the prospect of a meaningless appeal. Moreover, even
if such cases did arise with any frequency, such concerns
could be addressed by a standing inquiry at the appellate
level.
The third situation—dealing with untimely objections—
implicates basic concerns about waiver and should be easily
addressable by a court of appeals. A court of appeals also
has the ability to avoid the fourth by consolidating cases rais-

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14 DEVLIN v. SCARDELLETTI
Opinion of the Court
ing duplicative appeals. Fed. Rule App. Proc. 3(b)(2). If
the resolution of any of these issues should turn out to be
complex in a given case, there is little to be gained by requir-
ing a district court to consider these issues, which are the
type of issues (standing to appeal, waiver of objections below,
and consolidation of appeals) typically addressed only by an
appellate court. As such determinations still would most
likely lead to an appeal, such a requirement would only add
an additional layer of complexity before the appeal of the
settlement approval may finally be heard.
Nor do we agree with the Government that, regardless of
the desirability of an intervention requirement for effective
class management, the structure of the rules of class action
procedure requires intervention for the purposes of appeal.
According to the Government, intervention is the method
contemplated under the rules for nonnamed class members
to gain the right to participate in class action proceedings.
We disagree. Just as class action procedure allows non-
named class members to object to a settlement at the fair-
ness hearing without first intervening, see supra, at 8–9, it
should similarly allow them to appeal the District Court’s
decision to disregard their objections. Moreover, no federal
statute or procedural rule directly addresses the question of
who may appeal from approval of class action settlements,
while the right to appeal from an action that finally disposes
of one’s rights has a statutory basis. 28 U. S. C. § 1291.
IV
We hold that nonnamed class members like petitioner who
have objected in a timely manner to approval of the settle-
ment at the fairness hearing have the power to bring an
appeal without first intervening. We therefore reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.

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Scalia, J., dissenting
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Kennedy and
Justice Thomas join, dissenting.
“The rule that only parties to a lawsuit, or those that prop-
erly become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment, is
well settled.” Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U. S. 301, 304 (1988)
(per curiam); Fed. Rule App. Proc. 3(c)(1) (“The notice
of appeal must . . . specify the party or parties taking the
appeal”). This is one well-settled rule that, thankfully,
the Court leaves intact. Other chapters in the hornbooks
are not so lucky.
I
The Court holds that petitioner, a nonnamed member of
the class in a class action litigated by a representative mem-
ber of the class, is a “party” to the judgment approving the
class settlement. This is contrary to well-established law.
The “parties” to a judgment are those named as such—
whether as the original plaintiff or defendant in the com-
plaint giving rise to the judgment, or as “[o]ne who [though]
not an original party . . . become[s] a party by intervention,
substitution, or third-party practice,” Karcher v. May, 484
U. S. 72, 77 (1987). As the Restatement puts it, “[a] person
who is named as a party to an action and subjected to the
jurisdiction of the court is a party to the action,” Restate-
ment (Second) of Judgments § 34(1), p. 345 (1980) (herein-
after Restatement); “[t]he designation of persons as parties
is usually made in the caption of the summons or complaint
but additional parties may be named in such pleadings as a
counterclaim, a complaint against a third party filed by a
defendant, or a complaint in intervention,” id., § 34, Com-
ment a, Reporter’s Note, at 347. As was the case here, the
only members of a class who are typically named in the com-
plaint are the class representatives; thus, it is only these
members of the class, and those who intervene or otherwise
enter through third-party practice, who are parties to the
class judgment. This is confirmed by the application of
those Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that confer upon

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16 DEVLIN v. SCARDELLETTI
Scalia, J., dissenting
“parties” to the litigation the rights to take such actions as
conducting discovery and moving for summary judgment,
e. g., Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 30(a)(1), 31(a)(1), 33(a), 34(a), 36(a),
45(a)(3), 56(a), 56(b), 56(e). It is undisputed that the class
representatives are the only members of the class who have
such rights.
Petitioner was offered the opportunity to be named the
class representative, but he declined; nor did he successfully
intervene. Ante, at 4, 5. Accordingly, he is not a party to
the class judgment.
A
The Court does not deny that, at least as a general matter,
only those persons named as such are the “parties.” Rather,
it contends that persons “may be parties for some purposes
and not for others,” ante, at 10, and that petitioner is a party
to the class judgment at least for the “purposes of appeal-
ing,” ante, at 7. 1 The Court bases these contentions on
three of our precedents, which it says stand for the proposi-
tion that “[w]e have never . . . restricted the right to appeal
to named parties to the litigation.” Ibid. These prece-
dents stand for nothing of the sort.
All of these precedents are perfectly consistent with the
rule that only named parties to a judgment can appeal the
judgment because they involved appeals not from judgments
but from collateral orders. The appellants were allowed to
appeal from the collateral orders to which they were parties,
1 The Court provides only one other example of a purpose for which a
nonnamed class member is purportedly a “party”: we have, it says, tolled
the statute of limitations for such a person between the time the class
action is filed and the time class certification is denied. Ante, at 10 (citing
American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538 (1974)). Not even
petitioner, however, is willing to advance the novel and surely erroneous
argument that a nonnamed class member is a party to the class-action
litigation before the class is certified. Brief for Petitioner 24–26. This
lonesome example is, in other words, entirely irrelevant to the question of
party status.

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17 Cite as: 536 U. S. 1 (2002)
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even though they were not named parties to (and hence
would not have been able to appeal from) the underlying
judgments. We made this distinction between appealing
the judgment and appealing a collateral order quite explicit
in Blossom v. Milwaukee & Chicago R. Co., 1 Wall. 655
(1864). In that case, the appellant was not a named party
to the underlying foreclosure decree, from which it was
therefore “certainly true that he [could not] appeal,” yet he
was a party (obviously, as the movant) to the motion he filed
asking the court to complete the foreclosure sale, and there-
fore could appeal from the order denying that motion. Ibid.
Our decisions in Hinckley v. Gilman, C., & S. R. Co., 94 U. S.
467 (1877), and United States Catholic Conference v. Abor-
tion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U. S. 72 (1988), are to the
same effect. In the former, the appellant was not a named
party to the underlying foreclosure decree, from which we
said he “cannot and does not attempt to appeal,” but he was
obviously a party to the collateral order directing him by
name to transfer funds to the court, from which we said he
could appeal. 94 U. S., at 469. In the latter, witnesses who
had been dismissed as named parties to the underlying litiga-
tion, 487 U. S., at 75, were allowed to appeal from a collateral
order holding them in contempt for their failure to comply
with a subpoena addressed to them (and to which they were
therefore obviously parties), id., at 76. These cases dem-
onstrate why, even though petitioner should not be able to
appeal the District Court’s judgment approving the class
settlement, there is no dispute that petitioner could (and
did) appeal the District Court’s collateral order denying his
motion to intervene; as the movant, he was a party to the
latter. See Marino, 484 U. S., at 304 (“[S]uch motions are,
of course, appealable”).2
2 The Court finds it “difficult” to understand how the appellants in these
cases can be considered parties in the traditional sense because they were
not named in the “summons or complaint.” Ante, at 8 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Quite so. Our whole point is that, in order to appeal a

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18 DEVLIN v. SCARDELLETTI
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B
The Court’s other grounds for holding that petitioner is a
party to the class judgment are equally weak. First, it con-
tends that petitioner should be considered a party to the
judgment because, as a member of the class, he is bound by
it. Ante, at 10 (“What is most important to this case is that
nonnamed class members are parties to the proceedings in
the sense of being bound by the settlement”). This will
come as news to law students everywhere. There are any
number of persons who are not parties to a judgment yet are
nonetheless bound by it. See Restatement § 41(1), at 393
(listing examples); id., § 75, Comment a, at 210 (“A person is
bound by a judgment in an action to which he is not a party
if he is in ‘privity’ with a party”). Perhaps the most promi-
nent example is precisely the one we have here. Nonnamed
members of a class are bound by the class judgment, even
though they are not parties to the judgment, because they
are represented by class members who are parties:
“A person who is not a party to an action but who is
represented by a party is bound by and entitled to the
benefits of a judgment as though he were a party. A
person is represented by a party who is . . . [t]he repre-
sentative of a class of persons similarly situated, desig-
nated as such with the approval of the court, of which
the person is a member.” Id., § 41(1)(e), at 393.
Accord, id., § 75, Comment a, at 210 (“Persons bound through
representation by virtue of a relationship with a party are
to be contrasted with persons bound by a judgment because
they are parties . . .”). Petitioner here, in the words of the
Restatement, “is not a party” but “is bound by [the] judg-
collateral order, one need not be a party to the underlying litigation (and
therefore need not be named in the complaint giving rise to that litigation),
but need only be a party to the collateral proceedings (and therefore need
only be named in the filings giving rise to those proceedings).

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19 Cite as: 536 U. S. 1 (2002)
Scalia, J., dissenting
ment as though he were a party.” Because our “well-
settled” rule allows only “parties” to appeal from a judg-
ment, petitioner may not appeal the class settlement.3
Second, the Court contends that petitioner should be con-
sidered a party to the judgment because he filed an objection
to the class settlement. We have already held, however,
that filing an objection does not make one a party if he does
not also intervene. Marino, supra, at 304.
II
The most pernicious aspect of today’s decision, however, is
not its result, but its reasoning. I mentioned in a recent
dissent the Court’s “penchant for eschewing clear rules that
might avoid litigation,” US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535
U. S. 391, 412 (2002). Today’s opinion not only eschews such
3 The Court contends that those in privity with the parties to a judg-
ment are “often allowed by other courts” to appeal by mere virtue of the
fact that they are bound by the judgment. Ante, at 11 (citing 5 Am. Jur.
2d § 265 (1995)). I should think that the significant datum on this point is
not that such appeals have been “often allowed by other courts,” but that
they have never been allowed by this Court. Indeed, the “other courts”
whose opinions are cited by the authority on which the Court relies consist
entirely of state courts, with the exception of one federal case decided
before our decision in Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U. S. 301 (1988) (per curiam),
which affirmed the “well-settled” rule that in federal court “only parties
to a lawsuit . . . may appeal an adverse judgment.” Id., at 304. While
this difference between the procedures of federal and state courts seem-
ingly escapes the Court’s attention, it was well enough recognized (and
the clear federal rule acknowledged) in the very next paragraph of the
American Jurisprudence annotation on which the Court relies:
“Caution: Applicable rules of procedure may bar a nonparty from taking
an appeal notwithstanding his or her interest in the subject matter of the
case. Thus, the United States Supreme Court has, under the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, rejected the principle of permitting appeal
by a nonparty who has an interest affected by the trial court’s judgment,
stating that the better practice is for such nonparty to seek intervention
for the purposes of appeal.” 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appellate Review § 265, at 40
(citing Marino, supra).

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20 DEVLIN v. SCARDELLETTI
Scalia, J., dissenting
a rule; it destroys one that previously existed. It abandons
the bright-line rule that only those persons named as such
are parties to a judgment, in favor of a vague inquiry “based
on context.” Ante, at 10 (“The label ‘party’ does not indi-
cate an absolute characteristic, but rather a conclusion about
the applicability of various procedural rules that may differ
based on context”). Although the Court does not say how
one goes about selecting the result-determinative “context”
for its oh-so-sophisticated new inquiry, I gather from its re-
peated invocation of this phrase that the relevant context in
the present case is the “goals of class action litigation,” ante,
at 10, 11. This means, I suppose, that, in a labor case, who
are the parties to a judgment will depend on the goals of the
labor laws, and, in a First Amendment case, who are the
parties to a judgment will depend on the goals of the First
Amendment. Or perhaps not.
What makes this exponential increase in indeterminacy es-
pecially unfortunate is the fact that it is utterly unnecessary.
Despite the Court’s assertion in one breath that treating
nonnamed class members as parties is the “only means” by
which they would not be “deprive[d] . . . of the power to
preserve their . . . interests,” ante, at 10, the Court in the
next breath concedes that there is another—and very easy—
means for nonnamed class members to do just that: becoming
parties to the judgment by moving to intervene. Ante, at
12 (noting “the ease with which nonnamed class members
who have objected at the fairness hearing could intervene
for purposes of appeal”). The Court does not dispute that
nonnamed class members will typically meet the require-
ments for intervention as of right under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 24, including intervention only for the pur-
pose of appeal, and even after the class judgment has been
entered.4 Ante, at 11–12.
4 It is true that petitioner’s motion to intervene was denied as untimely
by the District Court. Even if this decision was correct, a question on
which petitioner did not seek certiorari, it does not cast doubt on the

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Scalia, J., dissenting
The Court does dispute whether there is any “value” in
requiring nonnamed class members who object to the settle-
ment to intervene in order to take an appeal. Ante, at 12.
In my view, avoiding the reduction to indeterminacy of the
hitherto clear rule regarding who is a party is “value”
enough. But beyond that, it makes sense to require objec-
tors to intervene before appealing, for the reason advanced
by the Government: to enable district courts “to perform an
important screening function.” Brief for United States
et al. as Amici Curiae 23. For example, when considering
whether to allow an objector to intervene, a district court
can verify that the objector does not fall outside the defini-
tion of the settlement class and is otherwise entitled to relief
in the class action, that the objection has not already been
resolved in favor of the objector in the approved settlement,
and that the objection was presented in a timely manner.
Id., at 23–24. The Court asserts that there is no “value” to
these screening functions because a court of appeals can pass
on those matters just as easily, and in any event an objector
who is unable to obtain relief from the class settlement will
not seek to appeal “with any frequency,” as he “stands to
gain nothing by appeal.” Ante, at 13.
As to the last point: The person who has nothing to gain
from an appeal also had nothing to gain from filing his objec-
tion in the first place, but was undeterred (as many are), see,
e. g., Shaw v. Toshiba American Information Systems, Inc.,
91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 973–974, and nn. 17–18 (ED Tex. 2000).
The belief that meritless objections, undeterred the first
time, will be deterred the second, surely suggests the tri-
ability of the ordinary nonnamed class member to intervene for purposes
of appeal. Petitioner was not the ordinary nonnamed class member seek-
ing intervention for purposes of appeal. He moved to intervene gen-
erally, Brief for Petitioner 6, despite having rejected invitations to par-
ticipate in the litigation until after the settlement was preliminarily
approved.

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22 DEVLIN v. SCARDELLETTI
Scalia, J., dissenting
umph of hope over experience.5 And as for the suggestion
that the court of appeals can pass on these questions just as
easily: Since when has it become a principle of our judicial
administration that what can be left to the appellate level
should be left to the appellate level? Quite the opposite is
true. District judges, who issue their decrees in splendid
isolation, can be multiplied ad infinitum. Courts of appeals
cannot be staffed with too many judges without destroying
their ability to maintain, through en banc rehearings, a pre-
dictable law of the circuit. In any event, the district court,
being intimately familiar with the facts, is in a better posi-
tion to rule initially upon such questions as whether the ob-
jections to the settlement were procedurally deficient, late
filed, or simply inapposite to the case. If it denies interven-
tions on such grounds, and if the denials are not appealed,
the court of appeals will be spared the trouble of considering
those objections altogether. And even when the denials are
appealed, the court of appeals will have the benefit of the
district court’s opinion on these often fact-bound questions.
(Typically, the only occasion the district court would have
had to pass on these questions is in the course of considering
the motion to intervene; when considering whether to ap-
prove the class settlement, district courts typically do not
treat objections individually even on substance, let alone
form. E. g., id., at 973–974.) Finally, it is worth observing
that the Court’s assertions regarding the merits of allowing
objectors to appeal a class settlement without intervening
apply with equal force to the objectors who sought to appeal
5 The Court assures us that these appeals will be “few” because, like
the objections on which they are based, they are “irrational.” Ante, at
13. To say that the substance of an objection (and of the corresponding
appeal) is irrational is not to say that it is irrational to make the objection
and file the appeal. See Shaw, 91 F. Supp. 2d, at 973–974, and n. 18 (not-
ing “ ‘canned’ objections filed by professional objectors who seek out class
actions to simply extract a fee by lodging generic, unhelpful protests”).
The Court cites nothing to support its sunny surmise that the appeals
will be few.

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the class judgment in Marino. Yet there we concluded
(no doubt for the reasons discussed above) that “the better
practice” is to require objectors “to seek intervention for
purposes of appeal.” 484 U. S., at 304.
For these reasons, I would affirm the Court of Appeals.