VERIZON MARYLAND INC. v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND et al.

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635 OCTOBER TERM, 2001
Syllabus
VERIZON MARYLAND INC. v. PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit
No. 00–1531. Argued December 5, 2001—Decided May 20, 2002*
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Act) requires that incumbent local-
exchange carriers (LECs) “provide . . . interconnection with” their exist-
ing networks when a new entrant seeks access to a market, 47 U. S. C.
§ 251(c)(2); that the carriers then establish “reciprocal compensation
arrangements” for transporting and terminating the calls of each
others’ customers, § 251(b)(5); and that their interconnection agreements
be submitted to a state utility commission for approval, § 252(e)(1).
Petitioner Verizon Maryland Inc., the incumbent LEC in Maryland, ne-
gotiated an interconnection agreement with a competitor later acquired
by respondent MCI WorldCom, Inc. After the Maryland Public Service
Commission (Commission) approved the agreement, Verizon informed
WorldCom that it would no longer pay reciprocal compensation for
calls made by Verizon’s customers to the local access numbers of Inter-
net Service Providers (ISPs) because ISP traffic was not “local traffic”
subject to the reciprocal compensation agreement. WorldCom filed a
complaint with the Commission, which ordered Verizon to make the
payments for past and future ISP-bound calls. Verizon then filed an
action in Federal District Court, citing § 252(e)(6) and 28 U. S. C. § 1331
as the basis for jurisdiction, and naming as defendants the Commis-
sion, its individual members in their official capacities, WorldCom, and
other competing LECs. Verizon sought a declaratory judgment that
the order was unlawful and an injunction prohibiting its enforcement,
alleging that the determination that Verizon must pay reciprocal com-
pensation for ISP traffic violated the 1996 Act and a Federal Commu-
nications Commission ruling. The District Court dismissed the action.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Commission had not
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit; that the doctrine
of Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, does not permit suit against the in-
dividual commissioners in their official capacities; and that neither
§ 252(e)(6) nor § 1331 provides a basis for jurisdiction over Verizon’s
claims against the private defendants.
*Together with No. 00–1711, United States v. Public Service Commis-
sion of Maryland et al., also on certiorari to the same court.

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636 VERIZON MD. INC. v. PUBLIC SERV. COMM’N OF MD.
Syllabus
Held:
1. Section 1331 provides a basis for jurisdiction over Verizon’s claim
that the Commission’s order requiring reciprocal compensation for ISP-
bound calls is pre-empted by federal law. Federal courts have juris-
diction under § 1331 where the petitioner’s right to recover will be
sustained if federal law is given one construction and will be defeated
if it is given another, unless the claim clearly appears to be immate-
rial and made solely to obtain jurisdiction, or is wholly insubstantial
and frivolous. Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S.
83, 89. Here, resolution of Verizon’s claim turns on whether the Act,
or an FCC ruling, precludes the Commission from ordering payment
of reciprocal compensation, and there is no suggestion that the claim
is immaterial or insubstantial and frivolous. Even if § 252(e)(6) (which
provides that a party aggrieved by a state commission’s determination
under § 252 may bring a federal action to determine whether an inter-
connection agreement meets the requirements of §§ 251 and 252) does
not confer jurisdiction, it does not divest the district courts of their
authority under § 1331. Cf. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S.
136, 141. Section 252 does not establish a distinctive review mechanism
for the commission actions that it covers, and it does not distinctively
limit the substantive relief available. Finally, none of the Act’s other
provisions evince any intent to preclude federal review of a commission
determination. Pp. 641–644.
2. The doctrine of Ex parte Young permits Verizon’s suit to go for-
ward against the state commissioners in their official capacities. The
Court thus need not decide whether the Commission waived its im-
munity from suit by voluntarily participating in the regulatory regime
established by the Act. In determining whether the Ex parte Young
doctrine avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only
conduct a “straightforward inquiry” into whether the complaint alleges
an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly character-
ized as prospective. Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U. S.
261, 296, 298–299. Here, Verizon’s prayer for injunctive relief—that
state officials be restrained from enforcing an order in contravention of
controlling federal law—clearly satisfies our “straightforward inquiry.”
As for Verizon’s prayer for declaratory relief, even though Verizon seeks
a declaration of the past, as well as the future, ineffectiveness of the
Commission’s action, so that the private parties’ past financial liability
may be affected, no past liability of the State, or of any of its commis-
sioners, is at issue, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 668. The
Fourth Circuit’s suggestion that the doctrine of Ex parte Young is in-
applicable because the Commission’s order was probably not inconsist-
ent with federal law is unavailing: The inquiry into whether suit lies

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637 Cite as: 535 U. S. 635 (2002)
Syllabus
under Ex parte Young does not include an analysis of the merits of the
claim, see Coeur d’Alene, supra, at 281. Nor is there any merit to the
Commission’s argument that § 252(e)(6) constitutes a detailed and ex-
clusive remedial scheme like the one held in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U. S. 44, 75, to implicitly exclude Ex parte Young actions.
Pp. 645–648.
240 F. 3d 279, vacated and remanded.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Mem-
bers joined, except O’Connor, J., who took no part in the consideration
or decision of the cases. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion, post,
p. 648. Souter, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Ginsburg and
Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 649.
Mark L. Evans argued the cause for petitioner Verizon
Maryland Inc. With him on the briefs were Michael K. Kel-
logg, Sean A. Lev, Aaron M. Panner, William P. Barr, Mark
J. Mathis, Michael D. Lowe, and David A. Hill. Barbara
McDowell argued the cause for the United States. With her
on the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, Acting Assistant
Attorney General Katsas, Deputy Solicitor General Wal-
lace, Mark B. Stern, Charles W. Scarborough, and John A.
Rogovin.
Susan Stevens Miller argued the cause and filed a brief for
respondent Public Service Commission of Maryland. Paul
M. Smith, William M. Hohengarten, Michael B. DeSanctis,
Darryl M. Bradford, John J. Hamill, Thomas F. O’Neil III,
William Single IV, and Brian J. Leske filed briefs for re-
spondent MCI WorldCom, Inc., et al.†
†Lesley Szanto Friedman, Aidan Synnott, Martha F. Davis, Isabelle
Katz Pinzler, Steven R. Shapiro, Karen K. Narasaki, Vincent A. Eng,
Herbert Semmel, Marcia D. Greenberger, Dina R. Lassow, and Elliot M.
Mincberg filed a brief for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund
et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of
Illinois by James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor
General, A. Benjamin Goldgar and Michael P. Doyle, Assistant Attor-
neys General, Myra L. Karegianes, John P. Kelliher, and Thomas R. Stan-

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638 VERIZON MD. INC. v. PUBLIC SERV. COMM’N OF MD.
Opinion of the Court
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases present the question whether federal district
courts have jurisdiction over a telecommunication carrier’s
claim that the order of a state utility commission requir-
ing reciprocal compensation for telephone calls to Internet
Service Providers violates federal law.
I
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act or Act),
Pub. L. 104–104, 110 Stat. 56, created a new telecommunica-
tions regime designed to foster competition in local tele-
phone markets. Toward that end, the Act imposed various
obligations on incumbent local-exchange carriers (LECs),
including a duty to share their networks with competitors.
See 47 U. S. C. § 251(c) (1994 ed., Supp. V). When a new en-
trant seeks access to a market, the incumbent LEC must
“provide . . . interconnection with” the incumbent’s existing
network, § 251(c)(2), and the carriers must then establish
“reciprocal compensation arrangements” for transporting
and terminating the calls placed by each others’ customers,
§ 251(b)(5). As we have previously described, see AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U. S. 366, 371–373 (1999),
an incumbent LEC “may negotiate and enter into a bind-
ing agreement” with the new entrant “to fulfill the du-
ties” imposed by §§ 251(b) and (c), but “without regard to
the standards set forth” in those provisions. §§ 252(a)(1),
ton; and for the Virginia State Corporation Commission by William H.
Chambliss.
[Reporter’s Note: On January 22, 2002, 534 U. S. 1110, the Court
granted the motion of TCG Maryland, Inc., to treat the brief for AT&T
Communications of Illinois, Inc., et al., in Mathis v. WorldCom Technolo-
gies, Inc., post, p. 682, as the brief for respondent TCG Maryland, Inc., in
these cases.
On January 7, 2002, 534 U. S. 1076, and February 19, 2002, 534 U. S.
1124, the Court granted the motions of amici curiae filers in Mathis v.
WorldCom Technologies, Inc., supra, to have their amici curiae briefs
considered as briefs amici curiae in these cases.]

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Opinion of the Court
251(c)(1). That agreement must be submitted to the state
commission for approval, § 252(e)(1), which may reject it if it
discriminates against a carrier not a party or is not consist-
ent with “the public interest, convenience, and necessity,”
§ 252(e)(2)(A).
As required by the Act, the incumbent LEC in Maryland,
petitioner Verizon Maryland Inc., formerly known as Bell
Atlantic Maryland, Inc., negotiated an interconnection agree-
ment with competitors, including MFS Intelenet of Mary-
land, later acquired by respondent MCI WorldCom, Inc.
The Maryland Public Service Commission (Commission) ap-
proved the agreement. Six months later, Verizon informed
WorldCom that it would no longer pay reciprocal compen-
sation for telephone calls made by Verizon’s customers to the
local access numbers of Internet Service Providers (ISPs),
claiming that ISP traffic was not “local traffic” 1 subject to
the reciprocal compensation agreement because ISPs con-
nect customers to distant Web sites. WorldCom disputed
Verizon’s claim and filed a complaint with the Commission.
The Commission found in favor of WorldCom, ordering
Verizon “to timely forward all future interconnection pay-
ments owed [WorldCom] for telephone calls placed to an
ISP” and to pay WorldCom any reciprocal compensation
that it had withheld pending resolution of the dispute. Veri-
zon appealed to a Maryland state court, which affirmed the
order.
1 Section 1.61 of the interconnection agreement provides: “ ‘Reciprocal
Compensation’ is As Described in the Act, and refers to the payment
arrangements that recover costs incurred for the transport and termina-
tion of Local Traffic originating on one Party’s network and terminating
on the other Party’s network.” In turn, § 1.44 defines “ ‘Local Traffic’ ”
as “traffic that is originated by a Customer of one Party on that Party’s
network and terminates to a Customer of the other Party on that other
Party’s network, within a given local calling area, or expanded area serv-
ice (‘EAS’) area, as defined in [Bell Atlantic’s] effective Customer tariffs.
Local Traffic does not include traffic originated or terminated by a com-
mercial mobile radio service carrier.”

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640 VERIZON MD. INC. v. PUBLIC SERV. COMM’N OF MD.
Opinion of the Court
Subsequently, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) issued a ruling—later vacated by the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit, see Bell Atlantic
Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 206 F. 3d 1 (2000)—which categorized ISP-
bound calls as nonlocal for purposes of reciprocal compen-
sation but concluded that, absent a federal compensation
mechanism for those calls, state commissions could construe
interconnection agreements as requiring reciprocal compen-
sation. Verizon filed a new complaint with the Commission,
arguing that the FCC ruling established that Verizon was
no longer required to provide reciprocal compensation for
ISP traffic. In a 3-to-2 decision, the Commission rejected
this contention, concluding that, as a matter of state contract
law, WorldCom and Verizon had agreed to treat ISP-bound
calls as local traffic subject to reciprocal compensation.
Verizon filed an action in the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, citing 47 U. S. C. § 252(e)(6) and
28 U. S. C. § 1331 as the basis for jurisdiction, and naming as
defendants the Commission, its individual members in their
official capacities, WorldCom, and other competing LECs.
In its complaint, Verizon sought declaratory and injunctive
relief from the Commission’s order, alleging that the de-
termination that Verizon must pay reciprocal compensation
to WorldCom for ISP traffic violated the 1996 Act and the
FCC ruling.
The District Court dismissed the action, and a divided
panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed. 240 F. 3d 279 (2001). The Fourth Circuit held that
the Commission had not waived its immunity from suit by
voluntarily participating in the regulatory scheme set up
under the 1996 Act, and that the doctrine of Ex parte Young,
209 U. S. 123 (1908), does not permit suit against the individ-
ual commissioners in their official capacities. It then held
that neither 47 U. S. C. § 252(e)(6) nor 28 U. S. C. § 1331 pro-
vides a basis for jurisdiction over Verizon’s claims against
the private defendants. Both Verizon and the United

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641 Cite as: 535 U. S. 635 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
States, an intervenor below, petitioned this Court for re-
view of the four questions resolved by the Fourth Circuit.
Because we had previously granted certiorari in Mathias v.
WorldCom Technologies, Inc., 532 U. S. 903 (2001), which
raised all but the question whether § 1331 provides a basis
for jurisdiction, we granted certiorari only on the § 1331
question and set the case for oral argument in tandem with
Mathias. 533 U. S. 928 (2001). After oral argument, for
reasons explained in our decision in Mathias released today,
post, p. 682, we granted certiorari on the remaining three
questions presented in these cases. 534 U. S. 1072 (2001).
II
WorldCom, Verizon, and the United States contend that
47 U. S. C. § 252(e)(6) and 28 U. S. C. § 1331 independently
grant federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction to deter-
mine whether the Commission’s order requiring that Veri-
zon pay WorldCom reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound
calls violates the 1996 Act. Section 252 sets forth pro-
cedures relating to formation and commission approval of
interconnection agreements, and commission approval and
continuing review of interconnection terms and conditions
(called “[s]tatements of generally available terms,” § 252(f))
filed by LECs. Section 252(e)(6) provides, in relevant part:
“In any case in which a State commission makes a deter-
mination under this section, any party aggrieved by such
determination may bring an action in an appropriate Federal
district court to determine whether the agreement or state-
ment meets the requirements of section 251 of this title and
this section.” The determination at issue here is neither the
approval or disapproval of a negotiated agreement nor the
approval or disapproval of a statement of generally available
terms. WorldCom, Verizon, and the United States argue,
however, that a state commission’s authority under § 252 im-
plicitly encompasses the authority to interpret and enforce
an interconnection agreement that the commission has ap-

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642 VERIZON MD. INC. v. PUBLIC SERV. COMM’N OF MD.
Opinion of the Court
proved,2 and that an interpretation or enforcement decision
is therefore a “determination under [§ 252]” subject to fed-
eral review. Whether the text of § 252(e)(6) can be so con-
strued is a question we need not decide. For we agree with
the parties’ alternative contention, that even if § 252(e)(6)
does not confer jurisdiction, it at least does not divest the
district courts of their authority under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 to
review the Commission’s order for compliance with federal
law.
Verizon alleged in its complaint that the Commission vio-
lated the Act and the FCC ruling when it ordered payment
of reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound calls. Verizon
sought a declaratory judgment that the Commission’s order
was unlawful, and an injunction prohibiting its enforce-
ment. We have no doubt that federal courts have juris-
diction under § 1331 to entertain such a suit. Verizon seeks
relief from the Commission’s order “on the ground that
such regulation is pre-empted by a federal statute which, by
virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must
prevail,” and its claim “thus presents a federal question
which the federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1331 to resolve.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S.
85, 96, n. 14 (1983).
The Commission contends that since the Act does not
create a private cause of action to challenge the Commis-
sion’s order, there is no jurisdiction to entertain such a suit.
We need express no opinion on the premise of this argument.
“It is firmly established in our cases that the absence of a
2 The Fourth Circuit suggested that both Maryland law and the Fed-
eral Communications Act of 1934 grant the Commission authority to inter-
pret and enforce interconnection agreements that it approves under § 252.
240 F. 3d 279, 304 (2001) (citing 47 U. S. C. § 152(b), and Md. Pub. Util.
Cos. Code Ann. § 2–113 (1998)). The parties dispute whether it is in
fact federal or state law that confers this authority, but no party con-
tends that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to interpret and enforce
the agreement.

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Opinion of the Court
valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not im-
plicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i. e., the courts’ statutory
or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Steel Co. v.
Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 89 (1998).
As we have said, “the district court has jurisdiction if ‘the
right of the petitioners to recover under their complaint
will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United
States are given one construction and will be defeated if
they are given another,’ unless the claim ‘clearly appears
to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of ob-
taining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly in-
substantial and frivolous. ’ ” Ibid. (citations omitted).
Here, resolution of Verizon’s claim turns on whether the Act,
or an FCC ruling issued thereunder, precludes the Commis-
sion from ordering payment of reciprocal compensation, and
there is no suggestion that Verizon’s claim is “ ‘immaterial’ ”
or “ ‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’ ” Ibid.
Verizon’s claim thus falls within 28 U. S. C. § 1331’s
general grant of jurisdiction, and contrary to the Fourth
Circuit’s conclusion, nothing in 47 U. S. C. § 252(e)(6) pur-
ports to strip this jurisdiction. Section 252(e)(6) provides
for federal review of an agreement when a state commission
“makes a determination under [§ 252].” If this does not in-
clude (as WorldCom, Verizon, and the United States claim it
does) the interpretation or enforcement of an interconnection
agreement, then § 252(e)(6) merely makes some other actions
by state commissions reviewable in federal court. This is
not enough to eliminate jurisdiction under § 1331. Although
the situation is not precisely parallel (in that here the elimi-
nation of federal district-court review would not amount
to the elimination of all review), we think what we said in
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 141 (1967), is
nonetheless apt: “The mere fact that some acts are made
reviewable should not suffice to support an implication of
exclusion as to others.” (Internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted.) And here there is nothing more than that

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644 VERIZON MD. INC. v. PUBLIC SERV. COMM’N OF MD.
Opinion of the Court
mere fact. Section 252 does not establish a distinctive re-
view mechanism for the commission actions that it covers
(the mechanism is the same as § 1331: district-court review),
and it does not distinctively limit the substantive relief avail-
able. Cf. United States v. Fausto, 484 U. S. 439, 448–449
(1988). Indeed, it does not even mention subject-matter
jurisdiction, but reads like the conferral of a private right of
action (“[A]ny party aggrieved by such determination may
bring an action in an appropriate Federal district court,”
§ 252(e)(6)). Cf. Steel Co., supra, at 90–91 (even a statutory
provision that uses the word “jurisdiction” may not relate to
“subject-matter jurisdiction”); see also Davis v. Passman,
442 U. S. 228, 239, n. 18 (1979).
And finally, none of the other provisions of the Act evince
any intent to preclude federal review of a commission deter-
mination. If anything, they reinforce the conclusion that
§ 252(e)(6)’s silence on the subject leaves the jurisdictional
grant of § 1331 untouched. For where otherwise applicable
jurisdiction was meant to be excluded, it was excluded ex-
pressly. Section 252(e)(4) provides: “No State court shall
have jurisdiction to review the action of a State commission
in approving or rejecting an agreement under this section.”
In sum, nothing in the Act displays any intent to withdraw
federal jurisdiction under § 1331; we will not presume that
the statute means what it neither says nor fairly implies.3
3 The Commission also suggests that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine pre-
cludes a federal district court from exercising jurisdiction over Verizon’s
claim. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. S.
462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413 (1923). The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine merely recognizes that 28 U. S. C. § 1331 is a
grant of original jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to
exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, which Con-
gress has reserved to this Court, see § 1257(a). The doctrine has no appli-
cation to judicial review of executive action, including determinations
made by a state administrative agency.

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Opinion of the Court
III
The Commission nonetheless contends that the Eleventh
Amendment bars Verizon’s claim against it and its individual
commissioners. WorldCom, Verizon, and the United States
counter that the Commission is subject to suit because it
voluntarily participated in the regulatory regime established
by the Act. Whether the Commission waived its immunity
is another question we need not decide, because—as the
same parties also argue—even absent waiver, Verizon may
proceed against the individual commissioners in their official
capacities, pursuant to the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209
U. S. 123 (1908).
In determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young
avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need
only conduct a “straightforward inquiry into whether [the]
complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and
seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Idaho
v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U. S. 261, 296 (1997)
(O’Connor, J., joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment); see also id., at
298–299 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, JJ., dissenting). Here Verizon sought injunctive
and declaratory relief, alleging that the Commission’s order
requiring payment of reciprocal compensation was pre-
empted by the 1996 Act and an FCC ruling. The prayer
for injunctive relief—that state officials be restrained from
enforcing an order in contravention of controlling federal
law—clearly satisfies our “straightforward inquiry.” We
have approved injunction suits against state regulatory com-
missioners in like contexts. See, e. g., Prentis v. Atlantic
Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 230 (1908) (“[W]hen the rate is
fixed a bill against the commission to restrain the members
from enforcing it will not be bad . . . as a suit against a State,
and will be the proper form of remedy”); Alabama Pub.
Serv. Comm’n v. Southern R. Co., 341 U. S. 341, 344, n. 4

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646 VERIZON MD. INC. v. PUBLIC SERV. COMM’N OF MD.
Opinion of the Court
(1951); McNeill v. Southern R. Co., 202 U. S. 543 (1906);
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1898); Reagan v. Farmers’
Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362 (1894). Indeed, Ex parte
Young itself was a suit against state officials (including state
utility commissioners, though only the state attorney gen-
eral appealed) to enjoin enforcement of a railroad commis-
sion’s order requiring a reduction in rates. 209 U. S., at 129.
As for Verizon’s prayer for declaratory relief: That, to be
sure, seeks a declaration of the past, as well as the future,
ineffectiveness of the Commission’s action, so that the past
financial liability of private parties may be affected. But
no past liability of the State, or of any of its commissioners,
is at issue. It does not impose upon the State “a monetary
loss resulting from a past breach of a legal duty on the part
of the defendant state officials.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U. S. 651, 668 (1974). Insofar as the exposure of the State
is concerned, the prayer for declaratory relief adds nothing
to the prayer for injunction.
The Fourth Circuit suggested that Verizon’s claim could
not be brought under Ex parte Young, because the Com-
mission’s order was probably not inconsistent with federal
law after all. 240 F. 3d, at 295–297. The court noted that
the FCC ruling relied upon by Verizon does not seem to
require compensation for ISP traffic; that the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit has vacated the
ruling; and that the Commission interpreted the interconnec-
tion agreement under state contract-law principles. It may
(or may not) be true that the FCC’s since-vacated ruling does
not support Verizon’s claim; it may (or may not) also be true
that state contract law, and not federal law as Verizon con-
tends, applies to disputes regarding the interpretation of
Verizon’s agreement. But the inquiry into whether suit lies
under Ex parte Young does not include an analysis of the
merits of the claim. See Coeur d’Alene, supra, at 281 (“An
allegation of an ongoing violation of federal law . . . is ordi-
narily sufficient” (emphasis added)).

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Opinion of the Court
Nor does the 1996 Act display any intent to foreclose juris-
diction under Ex parte Young—as we concluded the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act did in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U. S. 44 (1996). There an Indian Tribe sued
the State of Florida for violating a duty to negotiate imposed
under that Act, 25 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(3). Congress had speci-
fied the means to enforce that duty in § 2710(d)(7), a provi-
sion “intended . . . not only to define, but also to limit signifi-
cantly, the duty imposed by § 2710(d)(3).” 517 U. S., at 74.
The “intricate procedures set forth in that provision” pre-
scribed that a court could issue an order directing the State
to negotiate, that it could require the State to submit to
mediation, and that it could order that the Secretary of the
Interior be notified. Id., at 74–75. We concluded that
“this quite modest set of sanctions” displayed an intent not
to provide the “more complete and more immediate relief ”
that would otherwise be available under Ex parte Young.
517 U. S., at 75. Permitting suit under Ex parte Young
was thus inconsistent with the “detailed remedial scheme,”
517 U. S., at 74—and the limited one—that Congress had
prescribed to enforce the State’s statutory duty to negotiate.
The Commission’s argument that § 252(e)(6) constitutes a de-
tailed and exclusive remedial scheme like the one in Semi-
nole Tribe, implicitly excluding Ex parte Young actions, is
without merit. That section provides only that when state
commissions make certain “determinations,” an aggrieved
party may bring suit in federal court to establish compli-
ance with the requirements of §§ 251 and 252. Even with
regard to the “determinations” that it covers, it places no
restriction on the relief a court can award. And it does not
even say whom the suit is to be brought against—the state
commission, the individual commissioners, or the carriers
benefiting from the state commission’s order. The mere
fact that Congress has authorized federal courts to review
whether the Commission’s action complies with §§ 251 and
252 does not without more “impose upon the State a liabil-

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648 VERIZON MD. INC. v. PUBLIC SERV. COMM’N OF MD.
Kennedy, J., concurring
ity that is significantly more limited than would be the lia-
bility imposed upon the state officer under Ex parte Young.”
Seminole Tribe, supra, at 75–76.
* * *
We conclude that 28 U. S. C. § 1331 provides a basis for
jurisdiction over Verizon’s claim that the Commission’s order
requiring reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound calls is
pre-empted by federal law. We also conclude that the doc-
trine of Ex parte Young permits Verizon’s suit to go forward
against the state commissioners in their official capacities.
We vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and re-
mand these cases for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or
decision of these cases.
Justice Kennedy, concurring.
For the reasons well stated by the Court, I agree Verizon
Maryland Inc. may proceed against the state commission-
ers in their official capacity under the doctrine of Ex parte
Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908). When the plaintiff seeks to
enjoin a state utility commissioner from enforcing an order
alleged to violate federal law, the Eleventh Amendment
poses no bar. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho,
521 U. S. 261, 271 (1997) (principal opinion of Kennedy, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C. J.).
This is unlike the case in Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of
Idaho, supra, where the plaintiffs tried to use Ex parte
Young to divest a State of sovereignty over territory within
its boundaries. In such a case, a “ ‘straightforward inquiry,’ ”
which the Court endorses here, ante, at 645, proves more
complex. In Coeur d’Alene seven Members of this Court
described Ex parte Young as requiring nothing more than
an allegation of an ongoing violation of federal law and a

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649 Cite as: 535 U. S. 635 (2002)
Souter, J., concurring
request for prospective relief; they divided four to three,
however, over whether that deceptively simple test had
been met.
In my view, our Ex parte Young jurisprudence requires
careful consideration of the sovereign interests of the State
as well as the obligations of state officials to respect the
supremacy of federal law. See Coeur d’Alene, supra, at
267–280 (principal opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehn-
quist, C. J.). I believe this approach, whether stated in
express terms or not, is the path followed in Coeur d’Alene
as well as in the many cases preceding it. I also believe
it necessary. Were it otherwise, the Eleventh Amendment,
and not Ex parte Young, would become the legal fiction.
The complaint in this litigation, however, parallels the
very suit permitted by Ex parte Young itself. With this
brief explanation, I join the opinion of the Court.
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg and
Justice Breyer join, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion, Part III of which rests on a
ground all of us can agree upon: 1 on the assumption of an
Eleventh Amendment 2 bar, relief is available under the
doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908). Although
that assumption apparently has been made from the start of
the litigation, I think it is open to some doubt and so write
separately to question whether these cases even implicate
the Eleventh Amendment.
1 In so doing, I set aside for the moment my continuing conviction
that the interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment that a majority of
this Court has embraced is fundamentally mistaken. See Alden v. Maine,
527 U. S. 706, 760 (1999) (dissenting opinion); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U. S. 44, 100 (1996) (dissenting opinion).
2 “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 11.

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650 VERIZON MD. INC. v. PUBLIC SERV. COMM’N OF MD.
Souter, J., concurring
While the State of Maryland is the named defendant, it
is only a nominal one. Verizon Maryland Inc., the private
party “suing” it, does not seek money damages, or the sort
of declaratory or injunctive relief that could be had against
a private litigant.3 Nor does Verizon seek an order enjoin-
ing the State from enforcing purely state-law rate orders of
dubious constitutionality, the relief requested in Ex parte
Young itself, id., at 129–131. Instead, Verizon claims that
the Maryland Public Service Commission has wrongly de-
cided a question of federal law 4 under a decisional power
conferred by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Act), a
power that no person may wield. Verizon accordingly seeks
not a simple order of relief running against the state com-
mission, but a different adjudication of a federal question
3 Cf. e. g., Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356,
360 (2001) (money damages from the State as employer under Title I of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of
Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 66 (2000) (money damages from the State as em-
ployer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967); Alden
v. Maine, supra, at 712 (money damages from the State as employer
under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 in state court); Florida Pre-
paid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S.
627, 633 (1999) (money damages and injunctive and declaratory relief
against a State for patent infringement); College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, 671 (1999) (same
for trademark violations); Seminole Tribe, supra, at 47 (suit to compel
State to negotiate in good faith); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890)
(money damages for failure to honor state securities). In Seminole Tribe,
a majority of this Court observed “that the relief sought by a plaintiff
suing a State is irrelevant to the question whether the suit is barred by
the Eleventh Amendment,” 517 U. S., at 58, but this was said in the
context of a suit for injunctive relief (to enforce a duty to negotiate) as
opposed to money damages. My point is that conventional relief of both
sorts (and declaratory relief) is different in kind from the judicial review
of agency action sought in these cases.
4 Whether the interpretation of a reciprocal-compensation provision
in a privately negotiated interconnection agreement presents a federal
issue is a different question which neither the Court nor I address at the
present.

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Souter, J., concurring
by means of appellate review in Federal District Court,5
whose jurisdiction to entertain the claim of error the Court
today has affirmed. If the District Court should see things
Verizon’s way and reverse the state commission qua federal
regulator, what dishonor would be done to the dignity of the
State, which has accepted congressionally conferred power
to decide matters of federal law in the first instance?
One answer might be that even naming the state com-
mission as a defendant in a suit for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief in federal court is an unconstitutional indignity.
But I do not see how this could be right. At least where
the suit does not seek to bar a state authority from apply-
ing and enforcing state law, a request for declaratory or in-
junctive relief is simply a formality for obtaining a process
of review. Cf. 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 206
(2d ed. 1983) (“[T]he suit for injunction and declaratory judg-
ment in a district court under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 . . . is now
always available to reach reviewable [federal] administrative
action in absence of a specific statute making some other
remedy exclusive”). And as for the nominal position of a
State as defendant, “[i]t must be regarded as a settled doc-
trine of this court . . . ‘that the question whether a suit
is within the prohibition of the 11th Amendment is not
always determined by reference to the nominal parties on
the record.’ ” In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 487 (1887) (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S.
270, 287 (1885)). If the applicability of the Eleventh Amend-
ment pivots on the formalism that a State is found on the
wrong side of the “v.” in the case name of a regulatory ap-
peal, constitutional immunity becomes nothing more than an
accident of captioning practice in utility cases reviewed by
courts. For that matter, the formal and nominal position
of a governmental body in these circumstances is not even
5 Judicial review of Federal Communications Commission determina-
tions under the Act is committed directly to the Courts of Appeal. 28
U. S. C. § 2342(1); 47 U. S. C. § 402(a) (1994 ed.).

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652 VERIZON MD. INC. v. PUBLIC SERV. COMM’N OF MD.
Souter, J., concurring
the universal practice. While the regulatory commission is
generally a nominal defendant when a party appeals in the
federal system,6 this is not the uniform practice among
the States, several of which caption utility cases on judicial
review in terms of the appealing utility.7
The only credible response, which Maryland to its credit
advances, is that the State has a strong interest in any case
where its adjudication of a federal question is challenged.8
See Supplemental Brief for Respondents MCI WorldCom,
Inc., et al. 21–24. An adverse ruling in one appeal can no
doubt affect the state commission’s ruling in future cases.
But this is true any time a state court decides a federal ques-
tion and a successful appeal is made to this Court, and no
one thinks that the Eleventh Amendment applies in that in-
stance. See Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 412 (1821) (a
writ of error from a state-court decision is not a “suit” under
6 See 5 U. S. C. §§ 702–703; Fed. Rule App. Proc. 15(a)(2)(B).
7 See, e. g., In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., 81 Haw. 459, 918 P. 2d 561 (1996);
In re Petition of Interstate Power Co., 416 N. W. 2d 800 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987); Appeal of Campaign for Ratepayers Rights, 145 N. H. 671, 766 A.
2d 702 (2001); In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling of Northwestern Pub-
lic Serv. Co., 560 N. W. 2d 925 (S. D. 1997); In re Citizens Util. Co., 171
Vt. 447, 769 A. 2d 19 (2000).
8 The Fourth Circuit obliquely questioned the strength of the State’s
interest, noting that “under Maryland law, it is not necessary for the State
commission, much less the individual commissioners, to be a party to an
appeal for State-court review of its determinations.” Bell Atlantic Md.,
Inc. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 240 F. 3d 279, 295 (2001). But while the
Maryland statute which the Fourth Circuit cited, Md. Pub. Util. Cos. Code
Ann. § 3–204(d) (1998), does provide that “[t]he Commission may,” not
must, “be a party to an appeal,” the Maryland courts have specified that
the Public Service Commission is one of certain agencies “ ‘the functions
of which are so identified with the execution of some definite public policy
as the representative of the State, that their participation in litigation
affecting their decisions is regarded by the Legislature as essential to the
adequate protection of the State’s interests.’ ” Calvert County Planning
Comm’n v. Howlin Realty Management, Inc., 364 Md. 301, 315, 772 A. 2d
1209, 1216–1217 (2001) (quoting Zoning Appeals Board v. McKinney, 174
Md. 551, 561, 199 A. 540, 545 (1938)).

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Souter, J., concurring
the Eleventh Amendment); McKesson Corp. v. Division of
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business
Regulation, 496 U. S. 18, 31 (1990) (“The Eleventh Amend-
ment does not constrain the appellate jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court over cases arising from state courts”) (unani-
mous Court); cf. U. S. Const., Art. VI (“This Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme
Law of the Land”).9 Whether an issue comes from a state-
agency or a state-court decision, the federal court is review-
ing the State’s determination of a question of federal law,
and it is neither prudent nor natural to see such review as
impugning the dignity of the State or implicating the States’
sovereign immunity in the federal system.
9 A possible ground for distinction is that the Supreme Court reviews
state-court decisions while a federal district court initially reviews state-
commission decisions under the Act. The argument would be that the
Constitution requires any controversy in which a State’s dignitary inter-
ests are implicated to be decided by this Court, and no other federal court,
as a sign of respect for the State’s sovereignty. See Farquhar v. Georgia
(C. C. D. Ga. 1791) (Iredell, J.), reprinted in 5 Documentary History of the
Supreme Court of the United States, 1789–1800, pp. 148–154 (M. Marcus
ed. 1994) (“It may also fairly be presumed that the several States thought
it important to stipulate that so awful [and] important a Trial [to which
a State is party] should not be cognizable by any Court but the Supreme”).
But this position has long been rejected and is inconsistent with the
doctrine of congressional abrogation, which presumes that States may
be sued in federal district court in the first instance when Congress
properly so provides, see Seminole Tribe, 517 U. S., at 55.