ALABAMA v. BOZEMAN

533US1 Unit: $U72 [11-21-01 06:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
146 OCTOBER TERM, 2000
Syllabus
ALABAMA v. BOZEMAN
certiorari to the supreme court of alabama
No. 00–492. Argued April 17, 2001—Decided June 11, 2001
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (Agreement) creates uniform pro-
cedures for lodging and executing a detainer, i. e., a legal order that
requires a State to hold a currently imprisoned individual when he has
finished serving his sentence so that he may be tried by a different
State for a different crime. As relevant here, the Agreement provides
that a State that obtains a prisoner for purposes of trial must try him
within 120 days of his arrival, Art. IV(c), and if it returns him to his
“original place of imprisonment” prior to that trial, charges “shall” be
dismissed with prejudice, Art. IV(e). While respondent Bozeman was
serving a federal prison sentence in Florida, the Covington County, Ala-
bama, district attorney sought temporary custody of Bozeman to arraign
him on firearms charges and to appoint counsel. When taken to Cov-
ington County, Bozeman spent the night in the county jail, appeared in
local court the next morning, obtained local counsel, and was returned
to federal prison that evening. About one month later, he was brought
back to the county for trial. Bozeman’s counsel moved to dismiss the
state charges on the ground that, because Bozeman had been “returned
to the original place of imprisonment” (namely, the federal prison) “prior
to” “trial” on state charges being “had,” in violation of Article IV(e),
the local court had to dismiss the charges with prejudice in light of Art.
IV(e)’s command as to remedy. Bozeman was convicted, and an appeals
court affirmed. The State Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
Agreement’s literal language controlled and required dismissal of the
state charges.
Held: The literal language of Article IV(e) bars any further criminal pro-
ceedings when a defendant is returned to the original place of imprison-
ment before trial. Pp. 152–157.
(a) Alabama claims that Article IV(e)’s basic purpose is to prevent
shuttling that would interrupt a prisoner’s rehabilitation and that,
since the one-day interruption here did not interrupt rehabilitation
significantly, any violation is “technical,” “harmless,” or “de minimis.”
However, the Agreement’s language militates against an implicit excep-
tion, for it is absolute, as the word “shall” is ordinarily the language
of command. Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U. S. 482, 485. Moreover,
the Agreement makes no distinction among different kinds of arrivals,
e. g., exempting those that are followed by return within a short, speci-

533US1 Unit: $U72 [11-21-01 06:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
147 Cite as: 533 U. S. 146 (2001)
Syllabus
fied time period, or those that are simply for arraignment purposes.
Pp. 152–154.
(b) Even assuming that the Agreement exempts violations that,
viewed in terms of its purposes, are de minimis, the violation here could
not qualify as trivial, because the “no return” provision’s purpose cannot
be a simple, direct effort to prevent the interruption of rehabilitation.
Article IV(e)’s requirement that the prisoner remain in the county jail
means that he will typically spend 120 days away from the sending
State’s rehabilitation programs, whereas returning him prior to trial—
in violation of IV(e)—would permit him to participate in the sending
State’s program for some of those days. To call such a violation “tech-
nical,” because it means fewer days spent away from the sending State,
is to call virtually every conceivable antishuttling violation “technical.”
The Agreement may seek to remove rehabilitation obstructions in a
different way: Requiring the receiving State to pay for the prisoner’s
incarceration during the pretrial period (pursuant to Article V) may
give the State an incentive to shorten that period and dispose of detain-
ers expeditiously. Alternatively, the Agreement’s drafters may have
sought to minimize the number of shuttles in the belief that the “shut-
tling” itself adds to the uncertainties obstructing rehabilitation pro-
grams, see Art. I. Regardless of the antishuttling remedy’s original
purpose, given the Agreement’s absolute language, it is enough to
explain why Alabama’s view is not plausible and to point to other pur-
poses more easily squared with Article IV(e)’s text and operation.
Pp. 154–156.
(c) Alabama’s additional claim that return to the sending State after
a brief journey to the receiving State for pretrial purposes is helpful,
not harmful, to the prisoner is a policy argument more appropriately
addressed to legislatures. And the federal statutory provision to which
the Solicitor General points governs only when the United States is a
receiving State, which does not help Alabama’s cause. Although this
Court rejects Alabama’s interpretation of the Agreement, a receiving
State is not barred from returning a prisoner when it would be mutually
advantageous and the prisoner accordingly waives his Article IV(e)
rights. Pp. 156–157.
781 So. 2d 165, affirmed.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, Parts I, II–A, and II–C
of which were unanimous, and Part II–B of which was joined by Rehn-
quist, C. J., and Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Gins-
burg, JJ.

533US1 Unit: $U72 [11-21-01 06:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
148 ALABAMA v. BOZEMAN
Opinion of the Court
Sandra Jean Stewart, Assistant Attorney General of Ala-
bama, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the
briefs was Bill Pryor, Attorney General.
Jeffrey A. Lamken argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief
were Acting Solicitor General Underwood, Acting Assistant
Attorney General Keeney, and Deputy Solicitor General
Dreeben.
Mark John Christensen, by appointment of the Court, 531
U. S. 1141, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.*
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.†
Forty-eight States, the Federal Government, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia (all of which, for simplicity, we shall call
“States”) have entered into the Interstate Agreement on De-
tainers (Agreement), 18 U. S. C. App. § 2, p. 692, an interstate
compact. The Agreement creates uniform procedures for
lodging and executing a detainer, i. e., a legal order that re-
quires a State in which an individual is currently imprisoned
to hold that individual when he has finished serving his sen-
tence so that he may be tried by a different State for a differ-
ent crime.
The Agreement provides for expeditious delivery of the
prisoner to the receiving State for trial prior to the termina-
tion of his sentence in the sending State. And it seeks to
minimize the consequent interruption of the prisoner’s ongo-
ing prison term. In particular, Article IV(c) specifies that
the receiving State shall begin the prisoner’s “trial . . .
within one hundred and twenty days of the arrival of the
prisoner in the receiving State.” At the same time, Article
IV(e) prohibits return of the individual to the sending State
before that trial is complete. It says:
*Mary E. Hunley and Alexander Taylor filed a brief for the National
Association of Extradition Officials as amicus curiae urging reversal.
†Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas join all but Part II–B of this
opinion.

533US1 Unit: $U72 [11-21-01 06:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
149 Cite as: 533 U. S. 146 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
“If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or
complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner’s
being returned to the original place of imprisonment
pursuant to article V(e) hereof, such indictment, infor-
mation, or complaint shall not be of any further force or
effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the
same with prejudice.” (Emphasis added.)
The case before us requires us to interpret the Article IV
language that we have just quoted. See New York v. Hill,
528 U. S. 110, 111 (2000) (“As ‘a congressionally sanctioned
interstate compact’ within the Compact Clause of the United
States Constitution, Art. I, § 10, cl. 3, the [Interstate Agree-
ment on Detainers] is a federal law subject to federal con-
struction”) (quoting Carchman v. Nash, 473 U. S. 716, 719
(1985); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S. 433, 442 (1981)). The
case concerns a defendant whose initial imprisonment was
interrupted briefly—for a single day—during which time he
was brought to the receiving State for purposes of arraign-
ment and then returned immediately to his original place of
imprisonment. The question is whether, in such circum-
stances, the literal language of Article IV(e) bars any further
criminal proceedings—because the defendant was “returned
to the original place of imprisonment” before “trial” was
“had.” We conclude that Article IV(e) does bar further pro-
ceedings, despite the fact that the interruption of the initial
imprisonment lasted for only one day.
I
A
The Council of State Governments drafted the language of
the Agreement in 1956. See United States v. Mauro, 436
U. S. 340, 349–350 (1978). The United States joined in 1970.
Id., at 343. And Alabama is one of the 49 other current
members. Hill, supra, at 111; Ala. Code § 15–9–81 (1995).
The Agreement contains nine articles. Article I sets forth

533US1 Unit: $U72 [11-21-01 06:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
150 ALABAMA v. BOZEMAN
Opinion of the Court
the problems that led to the Agreement’s creation, namely,
that
“charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based
on untried indictments, informations, or complaints and
difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already
incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertain-
ties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment
and rehabilitation.”
Article I then adds that “it is the . . . purpose of this agree-
ment to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of
such charges and determination of the proper status of . . .
detainers . . . .”
Article II sets forth definitions. Article III gives a pris-
oner against whom a detainer has been lodged the right to
“request” a “final disposition” of the relevant charges, in
which case “he shall be brought to trial within one hundred
and eighty days” (unless extended by the trial court for
“good cause”); otherwise, the relevant “indictment, informa-
tion, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect,
and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with
prejudice.” Art. III(a), (d).
Article IV gives “the jurisdiction in which an untried in-
dictment, information, or complaint is pending,” i. e., the re-
ceiving State, the right “to have a prisoner against whom”
it “has lodged a detainer . . . made available” for trial.
Art. IV(a). It says further that, once the prisoner arrives
in the receiving State, the “trial” must begin “within one
hundred and twenty days” unless extended for “good cause.”
Art. IV(c). Article IV also sets forth the “antishuttling”
provision at issue here. To repeat: that provision says that
trial must be “had . . . prior to the prisoner’s being returned
to the original place of imprisonment”; otherwise, the
charges “shall” be dismissed with prejudice. Art. IV(e).
Article V sets forth conditions on the receiving State obtain-
ing temporary custody of the prisoner. The remaining arti-

533US1 Unit: $U72 [11-21-01 06:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
151 Cite as: 533 U. S. 146 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
cles deal with subsidiary matters, not relevant here with one
exception: Article IX provides that the “agreement shall be
liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes.”
For present purposes, it is important to keep in mind that
the Agreement basically (1) gives a prisoner the right to de-
mand a trial within 180 days; and (2) gives a State the right
to obtain a prisoner for purposes of trial, in which case the
State (a) must try the prisoner within 120 days of his arrival,
and (b) must not return the prisoner to his “original place of
imprisonment” prior to that trial.
B
In January 1997, respondent Michael Bozeman was serving
a sentence of imprisonment for a federal drug crime in fed-
eral prison in Marianna, Florida. At the beginning of that
month, the district attorney of Covington County, Alabama,
who had earlier lodged a detainer against Bozeman in con-
nection with charges related to discharging firearms, sought
temporary custody in order to arraign Bozeman on those
firearms charges and secure the appointment of counsel. On
January 23, federal authorities released Bozeman to local of-
ficials. Those officials took him to Covington County, about
80 miles from the federal prison, where he arrived later in
the day. Bozeman spent the night in the county jail, ap-
peared in local court the next morning, obtained local ap-
pointed counsel, and was transported back to federal prison
that evening. About one month later, Bozeman was brought
back to Covington County for trial.
At that time, Bozeman’s local counsel filed a motion to dis-
miss the state charges on the ground that in January Boze-
man had been “returned to the original place of imprison-
ment” (namely, the federal prison) “prior to” “trial” on state
charges being “had.” See App. 37–42. Consequently, he
argued, under Article IV(e) the state charges were without
“any further force or effect,” and the local court had to
“enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.”

533US1 Unit: $U72 [11-21-01 06:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
152 ALABAMA v. BOZEMAN
Opinion of the Court
Bozeman was convicted, and the trial court subsequently
denied Bozeman’s motion for dismissal. It wrote that it
“made much sense to bring” Bozeman “into the county
briefly” to deal with “short pre-trial matters” and then to
“return him to the surroundings to which he was accus-
tomed.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. Doing so furthered
Bozeman’s “interest in maintaining . . . rehabilitation avail-
able to him in federal prison.” Ibid. In the trial judge’s
view, Bozeman “certainly would not [have] receive[d] much
rehabilitation in a county jail.” Ibid. Consequently, the
judge concluded, the January transfer was “wholly consistent
with” the Agreement’s goal, “to expedite the prosecution of
state charges without interfering with any rehabilitative
programs of the federal government.” Id., at 29a.
An intermediate State Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction. 738 So. 2d 934 (1998). But the Alabama State
Supreme Court reversed by a 5-to-3 vote. 781 So. 2d 165
(2000). In its view, the literal language of the Agreement
controlled and required dismissal of the state charges. The
dissenters argued that the Agreement violation was merely
“technical,” and consequently did not require dismissal. Id.,
at 170. The State petitioned for certiorari. In light of
differences among the lower courts, we granted the writ.
Compare, e. g., United States v. Schrum, 638 F. 2d 214, 215
(CA10 1981) (per curiam) (adopting District Court’s literal
interpretation of Agreement), with United States v. Daniels,
3 F. 3d 25, 27–28 (CA1 1993) (rejecting literal interpretation
of Agreement). And we now affirm the Alabama Supreme
Court’s decision.
II
Alabama does not deny a violation of Article IV(e) as liter-
ally interpreted, for it concedes that its officials “returned”
Bozeman to his “original place of imprisonment,” before
Bozeman’s county court “trial” was “had.” Nor does Ala-
bama claim that Bozeman waived the right to trial before
return that Article IV provides. See Reply Brief for Peti-

533US1 Unit: $U72 [11-21-01 06:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
153 Cite as: 533 U. S. 146 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
tioner 1, n. 1. Cf. Hill, 528 U. S., at 114–115 (holding that
defendant may waive his rights under Art. III of the Agree-
ment). Rather, Alabama, supported by the United States
Solicitor General and others, claims that Article IV(e)’s basic
purpose is to prevent shuttling that would interrupt the pris-
oner’s rehabilitation. See, e. g., United States v. Roy, 830
F. 2d 628, 636 (CA7 1987) (provision is “meant to protect the
prisoner against endless interruption of the rehabilitation
programs because of criminal proceedings in other jurisdic-
tions”). They say the one-day interruption that occurred
here did not interrupt rehabilitation significantly. Hence,
any violation is “technical,” “harmless,” or “de minimis.”
And Article IV(e) contains an implicit exception for such
trivial violations. Brief for Petitioner 26; Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 12–13. Cf. Wisconsin Dept. of
Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U. S. 214, 231
(1992) (laws ordinarily are enacted with understanding that
de minimis exceptions will be recognized). We cannot ac-
cept this argument, however, for two reasons.
A
First, the language of the Agreement militates against an
implicit exception, for it is absolute. It says that, when a
prisoner is “returned” before trial, the indictment, informa-
tion, or complaint “shall not be of any further force or effect,
and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with
prejudice.” Art. IV(e) (emphasis added). “The word ‘shall’
is ordinarily ‘the language of command.’ ” Anderson v.
Yungkau, 329 U. S. 482, 485 (1947) (quoting Escoe v. Zerbst,
295 U. S. 490, 493 (1935)).
The cases Alabama cites as supporting a “harmless error”
construction involved statutes that lacked this absolute
language. See, e. g., United States v. Montalvo-Murillo,
495 U. S. 711, 716–717 (1990) (Bail Reform Act “is silent
on the issue of a remedy for violations of its time limits”).
Cf. William Wrigley, Jr., supra, at 231–232 (applying “de

533US1 Unit: $U72 [11-21-01 06:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
154 ALABAMA v. BOZEMAN
Opinion of the Court
minimis exception” presumption as “part of the established
background of legal principles against which all enact-
ments are adopted,” where text did not provide a “contrary
indication”).
Moreover, the Agreement makes no distinction among dif-
ferent kinds of IV(c) “arrivals,” say, by exempting those that
are followed by return within a short, specified period of
time, or those that are simply for the purpose of arraign-
ment. Given the Agreement’s language and the important
consequences of starting the running of the 120-day time
limit, we see no basis for such a distinction. Hence, we must
assume that every prisoner arrival in the receiving State,
whether followed by a very brief stay or a very long
stay in the receiving State, triggers IV(e)’s “no return”
requirement.
B
Second, even were we to assume for argument’s sake that
the Agreement exempts violations that, viewed in terms of
the Agreement’s purposes, are de minimis, cf. Article IX
(stating that Agreement “shall be liberally construed so as
to effectuate its purposes”), we could not say that the viola-
tion at issue here qualifies as trivial. That is because the
purpose of the “no return” provision cannot be as Alabama
and the Solicitor General describe it, namely, as a simple,
direct effort to prevent the interruption of rehabilitation. A
provision that prevents returning a prisoner who has arrived
in the receiving State does not directly increase the number
of days the prisoner will spend in rehabilitation in the send-
ing State. Rather, it directly and intentionally decreases
the number of days that prisoner will spend in the sending
State.
This point is obvious once one keeps in mind that the trial
must take place within 120 days of the prisoner’s arrival in
the receiving State. Article IV(e)’s requirement that the
prisoner remain in the county jail means that the prisoner
will spend all of those 120 days away from the sending

533US1 Unit: $U72 [11-21-01 06:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
155 Cite as: 533 U. S. 146 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
State’s rehabilitation programs. By contrast, returning the
prisoner prior to trial—in violation of Article IV(e)—would
permit the prisoner to participate in the sending State’s pro-
gram for some of those days. But to call such a violation
“technical,” because it means fewer days spent away from
the sending State, is to call virtually every conceivable anti-
shuttling violation “technical”—a circumstance which, like
the 13th chime of the clock, shows that Alabama’s conception
of the provision’s purpose is seriously flawed.
Article IV(e) may seek to remove obstructions to prisoner
rehabilitation in a different way. The Agreement not only
prevents “return,” but it also requires the receiving State to
pay for the prisoner’s incarceration in that State during the
period prior to trial. Art. V(h) (“From the time that a party
State receives custody of a prisoner pursuant to this agree-
ment until such prisoner is returned to the territory and cus-
tody of the sending State, the [receiving] State . . . shall be
responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of
transporting, caring for, keeping, and returning the pris-
oner”). That requirement may provide the receiving State
with an incentive to shorten the pretrial period—to proceed
to trial faster than 120 days or not to seek extensions—thus
disposing of detainers, and the attendant “uncertainties
which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabili-
tation,” in the most “expeditious” manner. Art. I. See also
Cuyler, 449 U. S., at 449 (discussing negative effects of de-
tainers on prisoners). But if that is Article IV(e)’s purpose,
the transfer here was inconsistent with it. By returning
Bozeman to federal prison, the county saved itself the cost
of housing him—and for a nontrivial several week period,
which may have allowed it to delay resolving the detainer.
Alternatively, the Agreement’s drafters may have thought
that the “shuttling” itself, i. e., the movement back and forth
among prisons, adds to the “uncertainties which obstruct
programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.” Art. I

533US1 Unit: $U72 [11-21-01 06:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
156 ALABAMA v. BOZEMAN
Opinion of the Court
(emphasis added). And they may have sought to minimize
the number of “shuttles” for that reason alone.
Viewing the Agreement in terms of either purpose, we
cannot say that the one-day violation here is de mimimis,
technical, or harmless. Neither do the briefs (or, to our
knowledge, any lower court opinion) point to any other
plausible rehabilitation-related purpose of Article IV(e) spe-
cifically, in terms of which the violation here might count as
trivial. But we need not decide precisely what led Congress
and the many other legislatures to agree to Article IV(e)’s
antishuttling remedy. Given the Agreement’s absolute lan-
guage, it is enough to explain why Alabama’s view of the
Agreement’s purpose is not plausible and to point to other
purposes more easily squared with Article IV(e)’s text and
operation.
C
Alabama and amici make additional claims, basically elab-
orating on the trial court’s view that return to the sending
State after a brief journey to the receiving State for pretrial
purposes is helpful, not harmful, to the prisoner. But given
Article IV’s text, which indicates a contrary view, the parties
would more appropriately address these policy arguments
to legislatures.
The Solicitor General also points to a federal statutory
provision that says expressly that an “order of a court dis-
missing any indictment, information, or complaint may be
with or without prejudice,” depending on the “seriousness of
the offense,” the “facts and circumstances of the case,” and
the “impact of a reprosecution on the administration of the
agreement” and “on the administration of justice.” 18
U. S. C. App. § 9(1), p. 695. This statutory provision, how-
ever, governs only when “the United States is a receiving
State.” § 9. And here the United States is not the receiv-
ing State. We fail to see how this provision helps, rather
than hurts, Alabama’s cause. Although we reject Alabama’s
interpretation of the Agreement, our decision does not bar a

533US1 Unit: $U72 [11-21-01 06:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
157 Cite as: 533 U. S. 146 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
receiving State from returning a prisoner when it would be
mutually advantageous and the prisoner accordingly waives
his rights under Article IV(e). Cf. Hill, 528 U. S., at 114–
115 (holding that defendant may waive his rights under
Art. III of the Agreement)
For these reasons, the judgment of the Alabama Supreme
Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.