EASLEY,* GOVERNOR OF NORTH CAROLINA, et al. v. CROMARTIE et al.

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EASLEY,* GOVERNOR OF NORTH CAROLINA, et al.
v. CROMARTIE et al.
appeal from the united states district court for the
eastern district of north carolina
No. 99–1864. Argued November 27, 2000—Decided April 18, 2001†
After this Court found that North Carolina’s Legislature violated the
Constitution by using race as the predominant factor in drawing its
Twelfth Congressional District’s 1992 boundaries, Shaw v. Hunt, 517
U. S. 899, the State redrew those boundaries. A three-judge District
Court subsequently granted appellees summary judgment, finding that
the new 1997 boundaries had also been created with racial considera-
tions dominating all others. This Court reversed, finding that there
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the evidence was
consistent with a race-based objective or the constitutional political
objective of creating a safe Democratic seat. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526
U. S. 541. Among other things, this Court relied on evidence proposed
to be submitted by appellants to conclude that, because the State’s
African-American voters overwhelmingly voted Democratic, one could
not easily distinguish a legislative effort to create a majority-minority
district from a legislative effort to create a safely Democratic one;
that data showing voter registration did not indicate how voters would
actually vote; and that data about actual behavior could affect the litiga-
tion’s outcome. Id., at 547–551. On remand, the District Court again
held, after a 3-day trial, that the legislature had used race driven cri-
teria in drawing the 1997 boundaries. It based that conclusion on
three findings—the district’s shape, its splitting of towns and counties,
and its heavily African-American voting population—that this Court
had considered when it found summary judgment inappropriate, and on
the new finding that the legislature had drawn the boundaries to collect
precincts with a high racial, rather than political, identification.
Held: The District Court’s conclusion that the State violated the Equal
Protection Clause in drawing the 1997 boundaries is based on clearly
erroneous findings. Pp. 241–258.
*Governor Michael F. Easley is hereby substituted for former Governor
James B. Hunt, Jr., pursuant to this Court’s Rule 35.3.
†Together with No. 99–1865, Smallwood et al. v. Cromartie et al., also
on appeal from the same court.

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(a) The issue here is evidentiary: whether there is adequate support
for the District Court’s finding that race, rather than politics, drove
the legislature’s districting decision. Those attacking the district have
the demanding burden of proof to show that a facially neutral law is
unexplainable on grounds other than race. Cromartie, supra, at 546.
Because the underlying districting decision falls within a legislature’s
sphere of competence, Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 915, courts must
exercise extraordinary caution in adjudicating claims such as this one,
id., at 916, especially where, as here, the State has articulated a legiti-
mate political explanation for its districting decision and the voting
population is one in which race and political affiliation are highly coordi-
nated, see Cromartie, supra, at 551–552. This Court will review the
District Court’s findings only for “clear error,” asking whether “on the
entire evidence” the Court is “left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 395. An extensive review of the District
Court’s findings is warranted here because there was no intermediate
court review, the trial was not lengthy, the key evidence consisted pri-
marily of documents and expert testimony, and credibility evaluations
played a minor role. Pp. 241–243.
(b) The critical District Court determination that “race, not politics,”
predominantly explains the 1997 boundaries rests upon the three find-
ings that this Court found insufficient to support summary judgment,
and which cannot in and of themselves, as a matter of law, support the
District Court’s judgment here. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U. S. 952, 968.
Its determination also rests upon five new subsidiary findings, which
this Court also cannot accept as adequate. First, the District Court
primarily relied on evidence of voting registration, not voting behavior,
which is precisely the kind of evidence that this Court found inadequate
the last time the case was here. White registered Democrats “cross-
over” to vote Republican more often than do African-Americans, who
register and vote Democratic between 95% and 97% of the time. Thus,
a legislature trying to secure a safe Democratic seat by placing reliable
Democratic precincts within a district may end up with a district con-
taining more heavily African-American precincts for political, not racial,
reasons. Second, the evidence to which appellees’ expert, Dr. Weber,
pointed—that a reliably Democratic voting population of 60% is neces-
sary to create a safe Democratic seat, but this district was 63% reliable;
that certain white-Democratic precincts were excluded while African-
American-Democratic precincts were included; that one precinct was
split between Districts 9 and 12; and that other plans would have cre-
ated a safely Democratic district with fewer African-American pre-
cincts—simply does not provide significant additional support for the

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236 EASLEY v. CROMARTIE
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District Court’s conclusion. Also, portions of Dr. Weber’s testimony
not cited by the District Court undercut his conclusions. Third, the
District Court, while not accepting the contrary conclusion of appellants’
expert, Dr. Peterson, did not (and as far as the record reveals, could
not) reject much of the significant supporting factual information he
provided, which showed that African-American-Democratic voters were
more reliably Democratic and that District 12’s boundaries were drawn
to include reliable Democrats. Fourth, a statement about racial bal-
ance made by Senator Cooper, the legislative redistricting leader, shows
that the legislature considered race along with other partisan and geo-
graphic considerations, but says little about whether race played a pre-
dominant role. And an e-mail sent by Gerry Cohen, a legislative staff
member responsible for drafting districting plans, offers some support
for the District Court’s conclusion, but is less persuasive than the kinds
of direct evidence that this Court has found significant in other re-
districting cases. Fifth, appellees’ maps summarizing voting behavior
evidence tend to refute the District Court’s “race, not politics,” conclu-
sion. Pp. 243–257.
(c) The modicum of evidence supporting the District Court’s conclu-
sion—the Cohen e-mail, Senator Cooper’s statement, and some aspects
of Dr. Weber’s testimony—taken together, does not show that racial
considerations predominated in the boundaries’ drawing, because race
in this case correlates closely with political behavior. Where majority-
minority districts are at issue and racial identification correlates highly
with political affiliation, the party attacking the boundaries must show
at the least that the legislature could have achieved its legitimate politi-
cal objectives in alternative ways that are comparably consistent with
traditional districting principles and that those alternatives would have
brought about significantly greater racial balance. Because appellees
failed to make any such showing here, the District Court’s contrary
findings are clearly erroneous. Pp. 257–258.
133 F. Supp. 2d 407, reversed.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens,
O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dis-
senting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia and Kennedy,
JJ., joined, post, p. 259.
Walter E. Dellinger argued the cause for the state appel-
lants. With him on the briefs were Michael F. Easley, for-
mer Attorney General of North Carolina, Tiare B. Smiley
and Norma S. Harrell, Special Deputy Attorneys General,

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and Brian D. Boyle. Adam Stein argued the cause for ap-
pellants Smallwood et al. With him on the briefs were Todd
A. Cox, Norman J. Chachkin, and Jacqueline A. Berrien.
Robinson O. Everett argued the cause for appellees in both
cases. With him on the brief were Martin B. McGee and
Douglas E. Markham.‡
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal, we review a three-judge District Court’s
determination that North Carolina’s Legislature used race as
the “predominant factor” in drawing its 12th Congressional
District’s 1997 boundaries. The court’s findings, in our view,
are clearly erroneous. We therefore reverse its conclusion
that the State violated the Equal Protection Clause. U. S.
Const., Amdt. 14, § 1.
I
This “racial districting” litigation is before us for the
fourth time. Our first two holdings addressed North Caro-
lina’s former Congressional District 12, one of two North
Carolina congressional districts drawn in 1992 that con-
tained a majority of African-American voters. See Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U. S. 630 (1993) (Shaw I); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U. S.
899 (1996) (Shaw II).
A
In Shaw I, the Court considered whether plaintiffs’ factual
allegation—that the legislature had drawn the former dis-
trict’s boundaries for race-based reasons—if true, could un-
derlie a legal holding that the legislature had violated the
Equal Protection Clause. The Court held that it could. It
wrote that a violation may exist where the legislature’s
boundary drawing, though “race neutral on its face,” none-
‡Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States
by Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Yeo-
mans, Deputy Solicitor General Underwood, James A. Feldman, David
K. Flynn, and Louis E. Peraertz; and for the American Civil Liberties
Union by Laughlin McDonald, Neil Bradley, and Cristina Correia.

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theless can be understood only as an effort to “separate vot-
ers into different districts on the basis of race,” and where
the “separation lacks sufficient justification.” 509 U. S.,
at 649.
In Shaw II, the Court reversed a subsequent three-
judge District Court’s holding that the boundary-drawing
law in question did not violate the Constitution. This Court
found that the district’s “unconventional,” snakelike shape,
the way in which its boundaries split towns and counties,
its predominately African-American racial makeup, and its
history, together demonstrated a deliberate effort to create
a “majority-black” district in which race “could not be
compromised,” not simply a district designed to “protec[t]
Democratic incumbents.” 517 U. S., at 902–903, 905–907.
And the Court concluded that the legislature’s use of racial
criteria was not justified. Id., at 909–918.
B
Our third holding focused on a new District 12, the bound-
aries of which the legislature had redrawn in 1997. Hunt
v. Cromartie, 526 U. S. 541 (1999). A three-judge District
Court, with one judge dissenting, had granted summary
judgment in favor of those challenging the district’s bound-
aries. The court found that the legislature again had “used
criteria . . . that are facially race driven,” in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause. App. to Juris. Statement in
No. 99–1864, p. 262a (hereinafter App. to Juris. Statement).
It based this conclusion upon “uncontroverted material
facts” showing that the boundaries created an unusually
shaped district, split counties and cities, and in particular
placed almost all heavily Democratic-registered, predomi-
nantly African-American voting precincts, inside the dis-
trict while locating some heavily Democratic-registered,
predominantly white precincts, outside the district. This
latter circumstance, said the court, showed that the legis-
lature was trying to maximize new District 12’s African-

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American voting strength, not the district’s Democratic vot-
ing strength. Ibid.
This Court reversed. We agreed with the District Court
that the new district’s shape, the way in which it split
towns and counties, and its heavily African-American voting
population all helped the plaintiffs’ case. 526 U. S., at 547–
549. But neither that evidence by itself, nor when coupled
with the evidence of Democratic registration, was sufficient
to show, on summary judgment, the unconstitutional race-
based objective that plaintiffs claimed. That is because
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
evidence also was consistent with a constitutional political
objective, namely, the creation of a safe Democratic seat.
Id., at 549–551.
We pointed to the affidavit of an expert witness for de-
fendants, Dr. David W. Peterson. Dr. Peterson offered to
show that, because North Carolina’s African-American vot-
ers are overwhelmingly Democratic voters, one cannot easily
distinguish a legislative effort to create a majority-African-
American district from a legislative effort to create a safely
Democratic district. Id., at 550. And he also provided data
showing that registration did not indicate how voters would
actually vote. Id., at 550–551. We agreed that data show-
ing how voters actually behave, not data showing only how
those voters are registered, could affect the outcome of this
litigation. Ibid. We concluded that the case was “not
suited for summary disposition” and we reversed the District
Court. Id., at 554.
C
On remand, the parties undertook additional discovery.
The three-judge District Court held a 3-day trial. And the
court again held (over a dissent) that the legislature had
unconstitutionally drawn District 12’s new 1997 bound-
aries. It found that the legislature had tried “(1) [to] cur[e]
the [previous district’s] constitutional defects” while also
“(2) drawing the plan to maintain the existing partisan bal-

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ance in the State’s congressional delegation.” Cromartie v.
Hunt, 133 F. Supp. 2d 407, 413 (EDNC 2000). It added
that to “achieve the second goal,” the legislature “drew the
new plan (1) to avoid placing two incumbents in the same
district and (2) to preserve the partisan core of the existing
districts.” Ibid. The court concluded that the “plan as
enacted largely reflects these directives.” Ibid. But the
court also found “as a matter of fact that the General Assem-
bly . . . used criteria . . . that are facially race driven” without
any compelling justification for doing so. Id., at 420.
The court based its latter, constitutionally critical, con-
clusion in part upon the district’s snakelike shape, the way
in which it split cities and towns, and its heavily African-
American (47%) voting population, id., at 413–415—all
matters that this Court had considered when it found
summary judgment inappropriate, Cromartie, 526 U. S., at
544. The court also based this conclusion upon a specific
finding—absent when we previously considered this litiga-
tion—that the legislature had drawn the boundaries in order
“to collect precincts with high racial identification rather
than political identification.” 133 F. Supp. 2d, at 420 (em-
phasis added).
This last-mentioned finding rested in turn upon five sub-
sidiary determinations:
(1) that “the legislators excluded many heavily-Democratic
precincts from District 12, even when those precincts im-
mediately border the Twelfth and would have established
a far more compact district,” id., at 419; see also id.,
at 421 (“more heavily Democratic precincts . . . were
bypassed . . . in favor of precincts with a higher African-
American population”);
(2) that “[a]dditionally, Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Weber, showed
time and again how race trumped party affiliation in the
construction of the 12th District and how political expla-
nations utterly failed to explain the composition of the
district,” id., at 419;

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(3) that Dr. Peterson’s testimony was “ ‘unreliable’ and not
relevant,” id., at 420 (citing testimony of Dr. Weber);
(4) that a legislative redistricting leader, Senator Roy Coo-
per, had alluded at the time of redistricting “to a need
for ‘racial and partisan’ balance,” ibid.; and
(5) that the Senate’s redistricting coordinator, Gerry Cohen,
had sent Senator Cooper an e-mail reporting that Cooper
had “moved Greensboro Black community into the 12th,
and now need[ed] to take [about] 60,000 out of the 12th,”
App. 369; 133 F. Supp. 2d, at 420.
The State and intervenors filed a notice of appeal. 28
U. S. C. § 1253. We noted probable jurisdiction. 530 U. S.
1260 (2000). And we now reverse.
II
The issue in this case is evidentiary. We must determine
whether there is adequate support for the District Court’s
key findings, particularly the ultimate finding that the legis-
lature’s motive was predominantly racial, not political. In
making this determination, we are aware that, under Shaw I
and later cases, the burden of proof on the plaintiffs (who
attack the district) is a “demanding one.” Miller v. John-
son, 515 U. S. 900, 928 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
The Court has specified that those who claim that a legis-
lature has improperly used race as a criterion, in order,
for example, to create a majority-minority district, must
show at a minimum that the “legislature subordinated tradi-
tional race-neutral districting principles . . . to racial con-
siderations.” Id., at 916 (majority opinion). Race must
not simply have been “a motivation for the drawing of
a majority-minority district,” Bush v. Vera, 517 U. S. 952,
959 (1996) (O’Connor, J., principal opinion) (emphasis in
original), but “the ‘predominant factor’ motivating the leg-
islature’s districting decision,” Cromartie, supra, at 547
(quoting Miller, supra, at 916) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs

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must show that a facially neutral law “ ‘is “unexplainable
on grounds other than race.” ’ ” Cromartie, supra, at 546
(quoting Shaw I, 509 U. S., at 644, in turn quoting Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429
U. S. 252, 266 (1977)).
The Court also has made clear that the underlying dis-
tricting decision is one that ordinarily falls within a legis-
lature’s sphere of competence. Miller, 515 U. S., at 915.
Hence, the legislature “must have discretion to exercise the
political judgment necessary to balance competing inter-
ests,” ibid., and courts must “exercise extraordinary caution
in adjudicating claims that a State has drawn district lines
on the basis of race,” id., at 916 (emphasis added). Caution
is especially appropriate in this case, where the State has
articulated a legitimate political explanation for its district-
ing decision, and the voting population is one in which race
and political affiliation are highly correlated. See Cromar-
tie, supra, at 551–552 (noting that “[e]vidence that blacks
constitute even a supermajority in one congressional district
while amounting to less than a plurality in a neighboring
district will not, by itself, suffice to prove that a jurisdiction
was motivated by race in drawing its district lines when the
evidence also shows a high correlation between race and
party preference”).
We also are aware that we review the District Court’s
findings only for “clear error.” In applying this stand-
ard, we, like any reviewing court, will not reverse a lower
court’s finding of fact simply because we “would have de-
cided the case differently.” Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470
U. S. 564, 573 (1985). Rather, a reviewing court must ask
whether, “on the entire evidence,” it is “left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364,
395 (1948).
Where an intermediate court reviews, and affirms, a trial
court’s factual findings, this Court will not “lightly overturn”
the concurrent findings of the two lower courts. E. g., Neil

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v. Biggers, 409 U. S. 188, 193, n. 3 (1972). But in this in-
stance there is no intermediate court, and we are the only
court of review. Moreover, the trial here at issue was not
lengthy and the key evidence consisted primarily of docu-
ments and expert testimony. Credibility evaluations played
a minor role. Accordingly, we find that an extensive review
of the District Court’s findings, for clear error, is warranted.
See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,
466 U. S. 485, 500–501 (1984). That review leaves us “with
the definite and firm conviction,” United States Gypsum Co.,
supra, at 395, that the District Court’s key findings are
mistaken.
III
The critical District Court determination—the matter for
which we remanded this litigation—consists of the finding
that race rather than politics predominantly explains Dis-
trict 12’s 1997 boundaries. That determination rests upon
three findings (the district’s shape, its splitting of towns and
counties, and its high African-American voting population)
that we previously found insufficient to support summary
judgment. Cromartie, 526 U. S., at 547–549. Given the un-
disputed evidence that racial identification is highly corre-
lated with political affiliation in North Carolina, these facts
in and of themselves cannot, as a matter of law, support
the District Court’s judgment. See Vera, 517 U. S., at 968
(O’Connor, J., principal opinion) (“If district lines merely
correlate with race because they are drawn on the basis of
political affiliation, which correlates with race, there is no
racial classification to justify”). The District Court rested,
however, upon five new subsidiary findings to conclude that
District 12’s lines are the product of no “mer[e] correlat[ion],”
ibid., but are instead a result of the predominance of race in
the legislature’s line-drawing process. See supra, at 240–
241.
In considering each subsidiary finding, we have given
weight to the fact that the District Court was familiar with

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this litigation, heard the testimony of each witness, and con-
sidered all the evidence with care. Nonetheless, we cannot
accept the District Court’s findings as adequate for reasons
which we shall spell out in detail and which we can summa-
rize as follows:
First, the primary evidence upon which the District Court
relied for its “race, not politics,” conclusion is evidence of
voting registration, not voting behavior; and that is pre-
cisely the kind of evidence that we said was inadequate
the last time this case was before us. See infra, at 245–246.
Second, the additional evidence to which appellees’ expert,
Dr. Weber, pointed, and the statements made by Senator
Cooper and Gerry Cohen, simply do not provide significant
additional support for the District Court’s conclusion. See
infra, at 246–250, 253–254. Third, the District Court, while
not accepting the contrary conclusion of appellants’ expert,
Dr. Peterson, did not (and as far as the record reveals, could
not) reject much of the significant supporting factual infor-
mation he provided. See infra, at 251–253. Fourth, in any
event, appellees themselves have provided us with charts
summarizing evidence of voting behavior and those charts
tend to refute the court’s “race, not politics,” conclusion.
See infra, at 254–257; Appendixes, infra.
A
The District Court primarily based its “race, not politics,”
conclusion upon its finding that “the legislators excluded
many heavily-Democratic precincts from District 12, even
when those precincts immediately border the Twelfth and
would have established a far more compact district.” 133
F. Supp. 2d, at 419; see also id., at 420 (“[M]ore heavily Dem-
ocratic precincts . . . were bypassed . . . in favor of precincts
with a higher African-American population”). This finding,
however—insofar as it differs from the remaining four—
rests solely upon evidence that the legislature excluded
heavily white precincts with high Democratic Party registra-

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tion, while including heavily African-American precincts
with equivalent, or lower, Democratic Party registration.
See id., at 413–414, 415. Indeed, the District Court cites at
length figures showing that the legislature included “several
precincts with racial compositions of 40 to 100 percent
African-American,” while excluding certain adjacent pre-
cincts “with less than 35 percent African-American popula-
tion” but which contain between 54% and 76% registered
Democrats. Id., at 414.
As we said before, the problem with this evidence is that
it focuses upon party registration, not upon voting behavior.
And we previously found the same evidence, compare ibid.
(District Court’s opinion after trial) with App. to Juris.
Statement 249a–250a (District Court’s summary judgment
opinion), inadequate because registration figures do not accu-
rately predict preference at the polls. See id., at 174a; see
also Cromartie, supra, at 550–551 (describing Dr. Peterson’s
analysis as “more thorough” because in North Carolina,
“party registration and party preference do not always cor-
respond”). In part this is because white voters registered
as Democrats “cross-over” to vote for a Republican candidate
more often than do African-Americans, who register and
vote Democratic between 95% and 97% of the time. See
Record, Deposition of Gerry Cohen 37–42 (discussing data);
App. 304 (stating that white voters cast about 60% to 70% of
their votes for Republican candidates); id., at 139 (Dr. Web-
er’s testimony that 95% to 97% of African-Americans regis-
ter and vote as Democrats); see also id., at 118 (testimony
by Dr. Weber that registration data were the least reliable
information upon which to predict voter behavior). A legis-
lature trying to secure a safe Democratic seat is interested
in Democratic voting behavior. Hence, a legislature may, by
placing reliable Democratic precincts within a district with-
out regard to race, end up with a district containing more
heavily African-American precincts, but the reasons would
be political rather than racial.

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Insofar as the District Court relied upon voting registra-
tion data, particularly data that were previously before us,
it tells us nothing new; and the data do not help answer the
question posed when we previously remanded this litigation.
Cromartie, 526 U. S., at 551.
B
The District Court wrote that “[a]dditionally, [p]laintiffs’
expert, Dr. Weber, showed time and again how race trumped
party affiliation in the construction of the 12th District and
how political explanations utterly failed to explain the com-
position of the district.” 133 F. Supp. 2d, at 419. In sup-
port of this conclusion, the court relied upon six different
citations to Dr. Weber’s trial testimony. We have examined
each reference.
1
At the first cited pages of the trial transcript, Dr. Weber
says that a reliably Democratic voting population of 60% is
sufficient to create a safe Democratic seat. App. 91. Yet,
he adds, the legislature created a more-than-60% reliable
Democratic voting population in District 12. Hence (we
read Dr. Weber to infer), the legislature likely was driven by
race, not politics. Tr. 163; App. 314–315.
The record indicates, however, that, although Dr. Weber is
right that District 12 is more than 60% reliably Democratic,
it exceeds that figure by very little. Nor did Dr. Weber ask
whether other districts, unchallenged by appellees, were
significantly less “safe” than was District 12. Id., at 148.
In fact, the figures the legislature used showed that Dis-
trict 12 would be 63% reliably Democratic. App. to Juris.
Statement 80a (Democratic vote over three representative
elections averaged 63%). By the same measures, at least
two Republican districts (Districts 6 and 10) are 61% reliably
Republican. Ibid. And, as Dr. Weber conceded, incum-
bents might have urged legislators (trying to maintain a

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six/six Democrat/Republican delegation split) to make their
seats, not 60% safe, but as safe as possible. App. 149. In a
field such as voting behavior, where figures are inherently
uncertain, Dr. Weber’s tiny calculated percentage differences
are simply too small to carry significant evidentiary weight.
2
The District Court cited two parts of the transcript where
Dr. Weber testified about a table he had prepared listing
all precincts in the six counties, portions of which make up
District 12. Tr. 204–205, 262. Dr. Weber said that Dis-
trict 12 contains between 39% and 56% of the precincts
(depending on the county) that are more-than-40% reliably
Democratic, but it contains almost every precinct with
more-than-40% African-American voters. Id., at 204–205.
Why, he essentially asks, if the legislature had had politics
primarily in mind, would its effort to place reliably Dem-
ocratic precincts within District 12 not have produced a
greater racial mixture?
Dr. Weber’s own testimony provides an answer to this
question. As Dr. Weber agreed, the precincts listed in the
table were at least 40% reliably Democratic, but virtually
all the African-American precincts included in District 12
were more than 40% reliably Democratic. Moreover, none
of the excluded white precincts were as reliably Demo-
cratic as the African-American precincts that were included
in the district. App. 140. Yet the legislature sought pre-
cincts that were reliably Democratic, not precincts that were
40% reliably Democratic, for obvious political reasons.
Neither does the table specify whether the excluded
white-reliably-Democratic precincts were located near
enough to District 12’s boundaries or each other for the leg-
islature as a practical matter to have drawn District 12’s
boundaries to have included them, without sacrificing other
important political goals. The contrary is suggested by the

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fact that Dr. Weber’s own proposed alternative plan, see id.,
at 106–107, would have pitted two incumbents against each
other (Sue Myrick, a Republican from former District 9 and
Mel Watt, a Democrat from former District 12). Dr. Weber
testified that such a result—“a very competitive race with
one of them losing their seat”—was desirable. Id., at 153.
But the legislature, for political, not racial, reasons, believed
the opposite. And it drew its plan to protect incumbents—
a legitimate political goal recognized by the District Court.
133 F. Supp. 2d, at 412–413.
For these reasons, Dr. Weber’s table offers little insight
into the legislature’s true motive.
3
The next part of the transcript the District Court cited
contains Dr. Weber’s testimony about a Mecklenburg County
precinct (precinct 77) which the legislature split between
Districts 9 and 12. Tr. 221. Dr. Weber apparently thought
that the legislature did not have to split this precinct,
placing the more heavily African-American segment within
District 12—unless, of course, its motive was racial rather
than political. But Dr. Weber simultaneously conceded that
he had not considered whether District 9’s incumbent Re-
publican would have wanted the whole of precinct 77 left in
her own district where it would have burdened her with a
significant additional number of reliably Democratic voters.
App. 156–157. Nor had Dr. Weber “test[ed]” his conclusion
that this split helped to show a racial (rather than political)
motive, say, by adjusting other boundary lines and deter-
mining the political, or other nonracial, consequences of such
adjustments. Id., at 132.
The maps in evidence indicate that to have placed all of
precinct 77 within District 12 would have created a Dis-
trict 12 peninsula that invaded District 9, neatly dividing
that latter district in two, see id., at 496—a conclusive non-
racial reason for the legislature’s decision not to do so.

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4
The District Court cited Dr. Weber’s conclusion that
“race is the predominant factor.” Tr. 251. But this state-
ment of the conclusion is no stronger than the evidence that
underlies it.
5
The District Court’s final citation is to Dr. Weber’s as-
sertion that there are other ways in which the legislature
could have created a safely Democratic district without plac-
ing so many primarily African-American districts within
District 12. Id., at 288. And we recognize that some such
other ways may exist. But, unless the evidence also shows
that these hypothetical alternative districts would have bet-
ter satisfied the legislature’s other nonracial political goals
as well as traditional nonracial districting principles, this fact
alone cannot show an improper legislative motive. After all,
the Constitution does not place an affirmative obligation
upon the legislature to avoid creating districts that turn out
to be heavily, even majority, minority. It simply imposes
an obligation not to create such districts for predominantly
racial, as opposed to political or traditional, districting moti-
vations. And Dr. Weber’s testimony does not, at the pages
cited, provide evidence of a politically practical alternative
plan that the legislature failed to adopt predominantly for
racial reasons.
6
In addition, we have read the whole of Dr. Weber’s testi-
mony, including portions not cited by the District Court.
Some of those portions further undercut Dr. Weber’s conclu-
sions. Dr. Weber said, for example, that he had developed
those conclusions while under the erroneous impression that
the legislature’s computer-based districting program pro-
vided information about racial, but not political, balance.
App. 137–138; see also id., at 302 (reflecting Dr. Weber’s
erroneous impression in the declaration he submitted to

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the District Court). He also said he was not aware of “any-
thing about political dynamics going on in the [l]egislature
involving” District 12, id., at 135, sometimes expressing dis-
dain for a process that we have cautioned courts to respect,
id., at 150–151; Miller, 515 U. S., at 915–916.
Other portions support Dr. Weber’s conclusions. Dr.
Weber testified, for example, about a different alternative
plan that, in his view, would have provided both greater ra-
cial balance and political security, namely, a plan that the
legislature did enact in 1998, and which has been in effect
during the time the courts have been reviewing the constitu-
tionality of the 1997 plan. App. 156–157. The existence of
this alternative plan, however, cannot help appellees signifi-
cantly. Although it created a somewhat more compact dis-
trict, it still divides many communities along racial lines,
while providing fewer reliably Democratic District 12 voters
and transferring a group of highly Democratic precincts into
two safely Republican districts, namely, the 5th and 6th Dis-
tricts, which political result the 1997 plan sought to avoid.
See Tr. 352, 355. Furthermore, the 1997 plan before this
Court, unlike the 1998 plan, joined three major cities in a
manner legislators regarded as reflecting “a real commonal-
ity of urban interests, with inner city schools, urban health
care . . . problems, public housing problems.” App. 430
(statement of Sen. Winner); see also id., at 421 (statement
of Sen. Martin). Consequently, we cannot tell whether the
existence of the 1998 plan shows that the 1997 plan was
drawn with racial considerations predominant. And, in any
event, the District Court did not rely upon the existence of
the 1998 plan to support its ultimate conclusion. See Kelley
v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 319 U. S. 415, 420–422 (1943)
(per curiam).
We do not see how Dr. Weber’s testimony, taken as a
whole, could have provided more than minimal support for
the District Court’s conclusion that race predominantly
underlay the legislature’s districting decision.

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C
The District Court found that the testimony of the State’s
primary expert, Dr. Peterson, was “ ‘unreliable’ and not rele-
vant.” 133 F. Supp. 2d, at 420 (quoting Dr. Weber and citing
Tr. 222–224, 232). Dr. Peterson’s testimony was designed to
show that African-American Democratic voters were more
reliably Democratic and that District 12’s boundaries were
drawn to include reliable Democrats. Specifically, Dr. Pe-
terson compared precincts immediately within District 12
and those immediately without to determine whether the
boundaries of the district corresponded better with race than
with politics. The principle underlying Dr. Peterson’s anal-
ysis is that if the district were drawn with race predomi-
nantly in mind, one would expect the boundaries of the dis-
trict to correlate with race more than with politics.
The pages cited in support of the District Court’s re-
jection of Dr. Peterson’s conclusions contain testimony by
Dr. Weber, who says that Dr. Peterson’s analysis is unreliable
because (1) it “ignor[es] the core” of the district, id., at 223,
and (2) it fails to take account of the fact that different pre-
cincts have different populations, id., at 223–224. The first
matter—ignoring the “core”—apparently reflects Dr. Web-
er’s view that in context the fact that District 12’s heart
or “core” is heavily African-American by itself shows that
the legislature’s motive was predominantly racial, not po-
litical. The District Court did not argue that the racial
makeup of a district’s “core” is critical. Nor do we see why
“core” makeup alone could help the court discern the rele-
vant legislative motive. Nothing here suggests that only
“core” makeup could answer the “political/racial” question
that this Court previously found critical. Cromartie, 526
U. S., at 551–552.
The second matter—that Dr. Peterson’s boundary seg-
ment analysis did not account for differences in population
between precincts—relates to one aspect of Dr. Peterson’s

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testimony. Appellants presented Dr. Peterson’s testimony
and data in support of four propositions: first, that regis-
tration figures do not accurately reflect actual voting be-
havior, see App. to Juris. Statement 173a–174a; second, that
African-Americans are more reliable Democrats than whites,
see id., at 159a–160a; third, that political affiliation explains
splitting cities and counties as well as does race, see id., at
189a, 191a–192a, 182a–185a; and fourth, that differences in
the racial and political makeup of the precincts just inside
and outside the boundaries of District 12 show that politics
is as good an explanation as is race for the district’s bound-
aries, see id., at 161a–167a; 181a–182a. The District Court’s
criticism of Dr. Peterson’s testimony at most affects the re-
liability of the fourth element of Dr. Peterson’s testimony,
his special boundary segment analysis. The District Court’s
criticism of Dr. Peterson’s boundary segment analysis does
not undermine the data related to the split communities.
The criticism does not undercut Dr. Peterson’s presentation
of statistical evidence showing that registration was a poor
indicator of party preference and that African-Americans are
much more reliably Democratic voters, nor have we found in
the record any significant evidence refuting that data.
At the same time, appellees themselves have used the
information available in the record to create maps com-
paring the district’s boundaries with Democratic/Republican
voting behavior. See Appendixes A, B, and C, infra. Be-
cause no one challenges the accuracy of these maps, we as-
sume that they are reliable; and we can assume that Dr. Pe-
terson’s testimony is reliable insofar as it confirms what the
maps themselves contain and appellees themselves concede.
Those maps, with certain exceptions discussed below, see
infra, at 254–257, further indicate that the legislature drew
boundaries that, in general, placed more-reliably Democratic
voters inside the district, while placing less-reliably Demo-
cratic voters outside the district. And that fact, in turn,

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supports the State’s answers to the questions we previously
found critical.
D
The District Court also relied on two pieces of “direct”
evidence of discriminatory intent.
1
The court found that a legislative redistricting leader,
Senator Roy Cooper, when testifying before a legislative
committee in 1997, had said that the 1997 plan satisfies a
“need for ‘racial and partisan’ balance.” 133 F. Supp. 2d, at
419. The court concluded that the words “racial balance”
referred to a 10-to-2 Caucasian/African-American balance
in the State’s 12-member congressional delegation. Ibid.
Hence, Senator Cooper had admitted that the legislature had
drawn the plan with race in mind.
Senator Cooper’s full statement reads as follows:
“Those of you who dealt with Redistricting before real-
ize that you cannot solve each problem that you encoun-
ter and everyone can find a problem with this Plan.
However, I think that overall it provides for a fair, geo-
graphic, racial and partisan balance throughout the
State of North Carolina. I think in order to come to an
agreement all sides had to give a little bit, but I think
we’ve reached an agreement that we can live with.”
App. 460.
We agree that one can read the statement about “racial . . .
balance” as the District Court read it—to refer to the cur-
rent congressional delegation’s racial balance. But even as
so read, the phrase shows that the legislature considered
race, along with other partisan and geographic considera-
tions; and as so read it says little or nothing about whether
race played a predominant role comparatively speaking.
See Vera, 517 U. S., at 958 (O’Connor, J., principal opinion)
(“Strict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting

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254 EASLEY v. CROMARTIE
Opinion of the Court
is performed with consciousness of race”); see also Miller,
515 U. S., at 916 (legislatures “will . . . almost always be
aware of racial demographics”); Shaw I, 509 U. S., at 646
(same).
2
The second piece of “direct” evidence relied upon by
the District Court is a February 10, 1997, e-mail sent from
Gerry Cohen, a legislative staff member responsible for
drafting districting plans, to Senator Cooper and Senator
Leslie Winner. Cohen wrote: “I have moved Greensboro
Black community into the 12th, and now need to take [about]
60,000 out of the 12th. I await your direction on this.”
App. 369.
The reference to race—i. e., “Black community”—is ob-
vious. But the e-mail does not discuss the point of the
reference. It does not discuss why Greensboro’s African-
American voters were placed in the 12th District; it does
not discuss the political consequences of failing to do so;
it is addressed only to two members of the legislature; and
it suggests that the legislature paid less attention to race in
respect to the 12th District than in respect to the 1st Dis-
trict, where the e-mail provides a far more extensive, de-
tailed discussion of racial percentages. It is less persuasive
than the kinds of direct evidence we have found significant
in other redistricting cases. See Vera, supra, at 959 (O’Con-
nor, J., principal opinion) (State conceded that one of its
goals was to create a majority-minority district); Miller,
supra, at 907 (State set out to create majority-minority
district); Shaw II, 517 U. S., at 906 (recounting testimony
by Cohen that creating a majority-minority district was
the “principal reason” for the 1992 version of District 12).
Nonetheless, the e-mail offers some support for the District
Court’s conclusion.
E
As we have said, we assume that the maps appended
to appellees’ brief reflect the record insofar as that record

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255 Cite as: 532 U. S. 234 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
describes the relation between District 12’s boundaries and
reliably Democratic voting behavior. Consequently we shall
consider appellees’ related claims, made on appeal, that the
maps provide significant support for the District Court, in
that they show how the legislature might have “swapped”
several more heavily African-American District 12 precincts
for other less heavily African-American adjacent precincts—
without harming its basic “safely Democratic” political objec-
tive. Cf. supra, at 246–247.
First, appellees suggest, without identifying any specific
swap, that the legislature could have brought within District
12 several reliably Democratic, primarily white, precincts in
Forsyth County. See Brief for Appellees 30. None of these
precincts, however, is more reliably Democratic than the pre-
cincts immediately adjacent and within District 12. See Ap-
pendix A, infra (showing Democratic strength reflected by
Republican victories in each precinct); App. 484 (showing
Democratic strength reflected by Democratic registration).
One of them, the Brown/Douglas Recreation Precinct, is
heavily African-American. See ibid. And the remainder
form a buffer between the home precinct of Fifth District
Representative Richard Burr and the District 12 border,
such that their removal from District 5 would deprive Rep-
resentative Burr of a large portion of his own hometown,
making him more vulnerable to a challenge from elsewhere
within his district. App. to Juris. Statement 209a; App. 623.
Consequently the Forsyth County precincts do not signifi-
cantly help appellees’ “race, not politics,” thesis.
Second, appellees say that the legislature might have
swapped two District 12 Davidson County precincts (Thom-
asville 1 and Lexington 3) for a District 6 Guilford County
precinct (Greensboro 17). See Brief for Appellees 30, n. 25.
Whatever the virtues of such a swap, however, it would have
diminished the size of District 12, geographically producing
an unusually narrow isthmus linking District 12’s north with
its south and demographically producing the State’s smallest

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Opinion of the Court
district, deviating by about 1,300 below the legislatively en-
dorsed ideal mean of 552,386 population. Traditional dis-
tricting considerations consequently militated against any
such swap. See Record, Deposition of Linwood Lee Jones
122 (stating that legislature’s goal was to keep deviations
from ideal population to less than 1,000); App. 199 (testimony
of Sen. Cooper to same effect).
Third, appellees suggest that, in Mecklenburg County,
two District 12 precincts (Charlotte 81 and LCI-South) be
swapped with two District 9 precincts (Charlotte 10 and 21).
See Brief for Appellees 30, n. 25. This suggestion is difficult
to evaluate, as the parties provide no map that specifically
identifies each precinct in Mecklenburg County by name.
Nonetheless, from what we can tell, such a swap would make
the district marginally more white (decreasing the African-
American population by about 300 persons) while making
the shape more questionable, leaving the precinct immedi-
ately to the south of Charlotte 81 jutting out into District 9.
We are not convinced that this proposal materially advances
appellees’ claim.
Fourth, appellees argue that the legislature could have
swapped two reliably Democratic Greensboro precincts out-
side District 12 (11 and 14) for four reliably Republican High
Point precincts (1, 13, 15, and 19) placed within District 12.
See ibid. The swap would not have improved racial balance
significantly, however, for each of the six precincts have an
African-American population of less than 35%. Addition-
ally, it too would have altered the shape of District 12 for
the worse. See Appendix D, infra; see also App. 622 (testi-
mony of Gerry Cohen). And, in any event, the decision to
exclude the two Greensboro precincts seems to reflect the
legislature’s decision to draw boundaries that follow main
thoroughfares in Guilford County. App. to Juris. Statement
205a; App. 575.
Even if our judgments in respect to a few of these pre-
cincts are wrong, a showing that the legislature might

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have “swapped” a handful of precincts out of a total of 154
precincts, involving a population of a few hundred out of a
total population of about half a million, cannot significantly
strengthen appellees’ case.
IV
We concede the record contains a modicum of evidence
offering support for the District Court’s conclusion. That
evidence includes the Cohen e-mail, Senator Cooper’s refer-
ence to “racial balance,” and to a minor degree, some aspects
of Dr. Weber’s testimony. The evidence taken together,
however, does not show that racial considerations pre-
dominated in the drawing of District 12’s boundaries. That
is because race in this case correlates closely with political
behavior. The basic question is whether the legislature
drew District 12’s boundaries because of race rather than
because of political behavior (coupled with traditional, non-
racial districting considerations). It is not, as the dissent
contends, see post, at 266 (opinion of Thomas, J.), whether a
legislature may defend its districting decisions based on a
“stereotype” about African-American voting behavior. And
given the fact that the party attacking the legislature’s deci-
sion bears the burden of proving that racial considerations
are “dominant and controlling,” Miller, 515 U. S., at 913,
given the “demanding” nature of that burden of proof, id., at
929 (O’Connor, J., concurring), and given the sensitivity, the
“extraordinary caution,” that district courts must show to
avoid treading upon legislative prerogatives, id., at 916 (ma-
jority opinion), the attacking party has not successfully
shown that race, rather than politics, predominantly accounts
for the result. The record leaves us with the “definite and
firm conviction,” United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S., at 395,
that the District Court erred in finding to the contrary.
And we do not believe that providing appellees a further
opportunity to make their “precinct swapping” arguments in
the District Court could change this result.

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We can put the matter more generally as follows: In a case
such as this one where majority-minority districts (or the
approximate equivalent) are at issue and where racial identi-
fication correlates highly with political affiliation, the party
attacking the legislatively drawn boundaries must show at
the least that the legislature could have achieved its legiti-
mate political objectives in alternative ways that are com-
parably consistent with traditional districting principles.
That party must also show that those districting alterna-
tives would have brought about significantly greater racial
balance. Appellees failed to make any such showing here.
We conclude that the District Court’s contrary findings are
clearly erroneous. Because of this disposition, we need not
address appellants’ alternative grounds for reversal.
The judgment of the District Court is
Reversed.
[Appendixes containing maps from appellees’ and appel-
lants’ briefs follow this page.]

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Thomas, J., dissenting
Justice Thomas, with whom The Chief Justice, Jus-
tice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy join, dissenting.
The issue for the District Court was whether racial con-
siderations were predominant in the design of North Caro-
lina’s Congressional District 12. The issue for this Court
is simply whether the District Court’s factual finding—
that racial considerations did predominate—was clearly erro-
neous. Because I do not believe the court below committed
clear error, I respectfully dissent.
I
The District Court’s conclusion that race was the pre-
dominant factor motivating the North Carolina Legislature
is a factual finding. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U. S. 541,
549 (1999); Lawyer v. Department of Justice, 521 U. S. 567,
580 (1997); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U. S. 899, 905 (1996); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 910 (1995). See also Anderson v.
Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564, 573 (1985) (“[I]ntentional dis-
crimination is a finding of fact . . .”). Accordingly, we should
not overturn the District Court’s determination unless it is
clearly erroneous. See Lawyer, supra, at 580; Shaw, supra,
at 910; Miller, supra, at 917. We are not permitted to re-
verse the court’s finding “simply because [we are] convinced
that [we] would have decided the case differently.” Ander-
son, supra, at 573. “Where there are two permissible views
of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot
be clearly erroneous.” 470 U. S., at 574. We should upset
the District Court’s finding only if we are “ ‘left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been com-
mitted.’ ” Id., at 573 (quoting United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 395 (1948)).
The Court does cite cases that address the correct stand-
ard of review, see ante, at 242, and does couch its conclusion
in “clearly erroneous” terms, see ante, at 257–258. But
these incantations of the correct standard are empty ges-
tures, contradicted by the Court’s conclusion that it must

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260 EASLEY v. CROMARTIE
Thomas, J., dissenting
engage in “extensive review.” See ante, at 243. In several
ways, the Court ignores its role as a reviewing court and
engages in its own factfinding enterprise.1 First, the Court
suggests that there is some significance to the absence of
an intermediate court in this action. See ante, at 242–243.
This cannot be a legitimate consideration. If it were le-
gitimate, we would have mentioned it in prior redistricting
cases. After all, in Miller and Shaw, we also did not have
the benefit of intermediate appellate review. See also
United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc., 343 U. S. 326,
330, 332 (1952) (engaging in clear error review of factual
findings in a Sherman Act case where there was no interme-
diate appellate review). In these cases, we stated that the
standard was simply “clearly erroneous.” Moreover, the
implication of the Court’s argument is that intermediate
courts, because they are the first reviewers of the factfinder’s
conclusions, should engage in a level of review more rigorous
than clear error review. This suggestion is not supported
by law. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a) (“Findings of fact,
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous . . .”). In fact, the very
case the Court cited to articulate clear error review dis-
cussed the standard as it applied to an intermediate appel-
late court, which obviously did not have the benefit of an-
other layer of review. See ante, at 242 (citing Anderson,
supra, at 573).
Second, the Court appears to discount clear error review
here because the trial was “not lengthy.” Ante, at 243.
Even if considerations such as the length of the trial were
relevant in deciding how to review factual findings, an as-
1 Despite its citation of Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., 466 U. S. 485 (1984), ante, at 243, I do not read the Court’s opinion to
suggest that the predominant factor inquiry, like the actual malice inquiry
in Bose, should be reviewed de novo because it is a “constitutional fac[t].”
466 U. S., at 515 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Nor could it, given our hold-
ings in Lawyer v. Department of Justice, 521 U. S. 567 (1997), Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U. S. 900 (1995), and Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U. S. 899 (1996).

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Thomas, J., dissenting
sumption about which I have my doubts,2 these considera-
tions would not counsel against deference in this action.
The trial was not “just a few hours” long, Bose Corp. v. Con-
sumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 500
(1984); it lasted for three days in which the court heard the
testimony of 12 witnesses. And quite apart from the total
trial time, the District Court sifted through hundreds of
pages of deposition testimony and expert analysis, including
statistical analysis. It also should not be forgotten that one
member of the panel has reviewed the iterations of District
12 since 1992. If one were to calibrate clear error review
according to the trier of fact’s familiarity with the case, there
is simply no question that the court here gained a working
knowledge of the facts of this litigation in myriad ways over
a period far longer than three days.
Third, the Court downplays deference to the District
Court’s finding by highlighting that the key evidence was
expert testimony requiring no traditional credibility deter-
minations. See ante, at 243. As a factual matter, the Court
overlooks the District Court’s express assessment of the leg-
islative redistricting leader’s credibility. See Cromartie v.
Hunt, 133 F. Supp. 2d 407, 419, 420, n. 8 (EDNC 2000).
It is also likely that the court’s interpretation of the e-mail
written by Gerry Cohen, the primary drafter of District 12,
was influenced by its evaluation of Cohen as a witness. See
id., at 420, n. 8. See also App. 261–268. And, as a legal
matter, the Court’s emphasis on the technical nature of the
2 Bose, which the Court cites to support its discounting of clear error
review, ante, at 243, does state that “the likelihood that the appellate court
will rely on the presumption [of correctness of factual findings] tends to
increase when trial judges have lived with the controversy for weeks or
months instead of just a few hours.” 466 U. S., at 500. It is unclear,
however, what bearing this statement of fact—that appellate courts will
defer to factual findings more often when the trial was long—had on our
understanding of the scope of clear error review. In Bose, we held that
a lower court’s “actual malice” finding must be reviewed de novo, see
id., at 514, not that clear error review must be calibrated to the length
of trial.

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Thomas, J., dissenting
evidence misses the mark. Although we have recognized
that particular weight should be given to a trial court’s credi-
bility determinations, we have never held that factual find-
ings based on documentary evidence and expert testimony
justify “extensive review,” ante, at 243. On the contrary,
we explained in Anderson that “[t]he rationale for def-
erence . . . is not limited to the superiority of the trial judge’s
position to make determinations of credibility.” 470 U. S.,
at 574. See also Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a) (specifically re-
ferring to oral and documentary evidence). Instead, the ra-
tionale for deference extends to all determinations of fact
because of the trial judge’s “expertise” in making such deter-
minations. 470 U. S., at 574. Accordingly, deference to the
factfinder “is the rule, not the exception,” id., at 575, and I
see no reason to depart from this rule in the case before
us now.
Finally, perhaps the best evidence that the Court has
emptied clear error review of meaningful content in the re-
districting context (and the strongest testament to the fact
that the District Court was dealing with a complex fact
pattern) is the Court’s foray into the minutiae of the record.
I do not doubt this Court’s ability to sift through volumes of
facts or to argue its interpretation of those facts persua-
sively. But I do doubt the wisdom, efficiency, increased ac-
curacy, and legitimacy of an extensive review that is any
more searching than clear error review. See id., 574–575
(“Duplication of the trial judge’s efforts . . . would very likely
contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determina-
tion at a huge cost in diversion of judicial resources”). Thus,
I would follow our precedents and simply review the District
Court’s finding for clear error.
II
Reviewing for clear error, I cannot say that the District
Court’s view of the evidence was impermissible.3 First, the
3 I assume, because the District Court did, that the goal of protecting
incumbents is legitimate, even where, as here, individuals are incumbents

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court relied on objective measures of compactness, which
show that District 12 is the most geographically scattered
district in North Carolina, to support its conclusion that the
district’s design was not dictated by traditional districting
concerns. 133 F. Supp. 2d, at 419. Although this evidence
was available when we held that summary judgment was
inappropriate, we certainly did not hold that it was irrele-
vant in determining whether racial gerrymandering oc-
curred. On the contrary, we determined that there was a
triable issue of fact. Moreover, although we acknowledged
“that a district’s unusual shape can give rise to an inference
of political motivation,” we “doubt[ed] that a bizarre shape
equally supports a political inference and a racial one.”
Hunt, 526 U. S., at 547, n. 3. As we explained, “[s]ome
districts . . . are ‘so highly irregular that [they] rationally
cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to
segregat[e] . . . voters’ on the basis of race.” Ibid. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Second, the court relied on the expert opinion of Dr.
Weber, who interpreted statistical data to conclude that
there were Democratic precincts with low black popula-
tions excluded from District 12, which would have created
a more compact district had they been included.4 133
F. Supp. 2d, at 419. And contrary to the Court’s assertion,
Dr. Weber did not merely examine the registration data in
reaching his conclusions. Dr. Weber explained that he refo-
by virtue of their election in an unconstitutional racially gerrymandered
district. No doubt this assumption is a questionable proposition. Be-
cause the issue was not presented in this action, however, I do not read
the Court’s opinion as addressing it.
4 I do not think it necessary to impose a new burden on appellees to
show that districting alternatives would have brought about “significantly
greater racial balance.” Ante, at 258. I cannot say that it was imper-
missible for the court to conclude that race predominated in this action
even if only a slightly better district could be drawn absent racial consid-
erations. The District Court may reasonably have found that racial moti-
vations predominated in selecting one alternative over another even if the
net effect on racial balance was not “significant.”

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264 EASLEY v. CROMARTIE
Thomas, J., dissenting
cused his analysis on performance. He did so in response
to our concerns, when we reversed the District Court’s sum-
mary judgment finding, that voter registration might not be
the best measure of the Democratic nature of a precinct.
See ibid. (citing Trial Tr., which appears at App. 90–92, 105–
107, 156–157). This fact was not lost on the District Court,
which specifically referred to those pages of the record cov-
ering Dr. Weber’s analysis of performance.
Third, the court credited Dr. Weber’s testimony that the
districting decisions could not be explained by political mo-
tives.5 133 F. Supp. 2d, at 419. In the first instance, I, like
the Court, ante, at 246–247, might well have concluded that
District 12 was not significantly “safer” than several other
districts in North Carolina merely because its Democratic
reliability exceeded the optimum by only 3 percent. And I
might have concluded that it would make political sense for
incumbents to adopt a “the more reliable the better” policy
5 Dr. Weber admitted that, when he first concluded that race was the
motivating factor, he was under the mistaken impression that the legis-
lature’s computer program provided only racial, not political, data. The
Court finds that this admission undercut the validity of Dr. Weber’s
conclusions. See ante, at 249–250. Although the District Court could
have found that this impression was a sufficiently significant assumption
in Dr. Weber’s analysis that the conclusions drawn from the analysis were
suspect, it was not required to do so as a matter of logic. The court
reasonably could have believed that the false impression had very little
to do with the statistical analysis that was largely responsible for
Dr. Weber’s conclusions.
In addition, the Court discounts Dr. Weber’s testimony because he “ex-
press[ed] disdain for a process that we have cautioned courts to respect,”
ante, at 250. Dr. Weber did openly state that he believes that the best
districts he had seen in the 1990’s were those drawn by judges, not by
legislatures. App. 150–151. However, whether Dr. Weber was simply
stating the conclusions he has reached through his experience or was ex-
pressing a feeling of contempt toward the legislature is precisely the kind
of tone, demeanor, and bias determination that even the Court acknowl-
edges should be left to the factfinder, cf. ante, at 243.

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in districting. However, I certainly cannot say that the
court’s inference from the facts was impermissible.6
Fourth, the court discredited the testimony of the State’s
witness, Dr. Peterson. 133 F. Supp. 2d, at 420 (explaining
that Dr. Weber testified that Dr. Peterson’s analysis “ig-
nor[ed] the core,” “ha[d] not been appropriately done,” and
was “unreliable”). Again, like the Court, if I were a district
court judge, I might have found that Dr. Weber’s insistence
that one could not ignore the core was unpersuasive.7 How-
ever, even if the core could be ignored, it seems to me that
Dr. Weber’s testimony—that Dr. Peterson had failed to ana-
lyze all of the segments and thus that his analysis was incom-
plete, App. 119–120—reasonably could have supported the
court’s conclusion.
Finally, the court found that other evidence demonstrated
that race was foremost on the legislative agenda: an e-mail
6 The Court also criticizes Dr. Weber’s testimony that Precinct 77’s split
was racially motivated and his proposed alternative that all of Precinct 77
could have been moved into District 9. Apparently the Court believes
that it is obvious that the Republican incumbent in District 9 would not
have wanted the whole of Precinct 77 in her district. See ante, at 248.
But the Court addresses only part of Dr. Weber’s alternative of how the
districts could have been drawn in a race-neutral fashion. Dr. Weber
explained that the alternative was not simply to move Precinct 77 into
District 9. The alternative would also include moving other reliably
Democratic precincts out of District 9 and into District 12, which pre-
sumably would have satisfied the incumbent. App. 157. This move
would have had the result, not only of keeping Precinct 77 intact, but
also of widening the corridor between the eastern and western portions
of District 9 and thereby increasing the functional contiguity. The
Court’s other criticism, that moving all of Precinct 77 into District 12
would not work, is simply a red herring. Dr. Weber talked only of moving
all of Precinct 77 into District 9, not of moving all of Precinct 77 into
District 12.
7 Of course, considering that District 12 has never been constitutionally
drawn, Dr. Weber’s criticism—that the problem with the district lies not
just at its edges, but at its core—is not without force.

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from the drafter of the 1992 and 1997 plans to senators in
charge of legislative redistricting, the computer capability
to draw the district by race, and statements made by Sena-
tor Cooper that the legislature was going to be able to avoid
Shaw’s majority-minority trigger by ending just short of the
majority.8 133 F. Supp. 2d, at 420. The e-mail, in combina-
tion with the indirect evidence, is evidence ample enough to
support the District Court’s finding for purposes of clear
error review. The drafter of the redistricting plans re-
ported in the bluntest of terms: “I have moved Greensboro
Black community into the 12th [District], and now need to
take . . . 60,000 out of the 12th [District].” App. 369. Cer-
tainly the District Court was entitled to believe that the
drafter was targeting voters and shifting district boundaries
purely on the basis of race. The Court tries to belittle the
import of this evidence by noting that the e-mail does not
discuss why blacks were being targeted. See ante, at 254.
However, the District Court was assigned the task of deter-
mining whether, not why, race predominated. As I see it,
this inquiry is sufficient to answer the constitutional ques-
tion because racial gerrymandering offends the Constitution
whether the motivation is malicious or benign. It is not a
defense that the legislature merely may have drawn the dis-
trict based on the stereotype that blacks are reliable Demo-
8 The court also relied on the statement of legislative redistricting leader
Senator Cooper to the North Carolina Legislature, see 133 F. Supp. 2d, at
419, in which the senator mentioned the goals of geographical, political,
and racial balance, App. 460. In isolation, this statement does appear to
support only the finding that race was a motive. Unlike this Court, how-
ever, the District Court had the advantage of listening to and watching
Senator Cooper testify. I therefore am in no position to question the
court’s likely analysis that, although Senator Cooper mentioned all three
motives, the predominance of race was apparent. This determination was
made all the more reasonable by the fact that the District Court found
the senator’s claim regarding the “happenstance” final composition of the
district to lack credibility in light of the e-mail. 133 F. Supp. 2d, at 420,
n. 8.

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cratic voters. And regardless of whether the e-mail tended
to show that the legislature was operating under an even
stronger racial motivation when it was drawing District
1 than when it was drawing District 12, cf. ibid., I am
convinced that the District Court permissibly could have
accorded great weight to this e-mail as direct evidence of
a racial motive. Surely, a decision can be racially motivated
even if another decision was also racially motivated.
If I were the District Court, I might have reached the
same conclusion that the Court does, that “[t]he evidence
taken together . . . does not show that racial considerations
predominated in the drawing of District 12’s boundaries,”
ante, at 257. But I am not the trier of fact, and it is not my
role to weigh evidence in the first instance. The only ques-
tion that this Court should decide is whether the District
Court’s finding of racial predominance was clearly erroneous.
In light of the direct evidence of racial motive and the infer-
ences that may be drawn from the circumstantial evidence,
I am satisfied that the District Court’s finding was permissi-
ble, even if not compelled by the record.