SHAW et al. v. MURPHY

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Syllabus
SHAW et al. v. MURPHY
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 99–1613. Argued January 16, 2001—Decided April 18, 2001
While respondent Murphy was incarcerated in state prison, he learned
that a fellow inmate had been charged with assaulting a correctional
officer. Murphy decided to assist the inmate with his defense and sent
him a letter, which was intercepted in accordance with prison policy.
Based on the letter’s content, the prison sanctioned Murphy for violat-
ing prison rules prohibiting insolence and interfering with due process
hearings. Murphy then sought declaratory and injunctive relief under
42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging that the disciplinary action violated, inter
alia, his First Amendment rights, including the right to provide legal
assistance to other inmates. In granting petitioners summary judg-
ment, the District Court applied the decision in Turner v. Safley, 482
U. S. 78, 89—that a prison regulation impinging on inmates’ constitu-
tional rights is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests—and found a valid, rational connection between the inmate
correspondence policy and the objectives of prison order, security, and
inmate rehabilitation. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that inmates
have a First Amendment right to give legal assistance to other inmates
and that this right affected the Turner analysis.
Held:
1. Inmates do not possess a special First Amendment right to pro-
vide legal assistance to fellow inmates that enhances the protections
otherwise available under Turner. Prisoners’ constitutional rights are
more limited in scope than the constitutional rights held by individuals
in society at large. For instance, some First Amendment rights are
simply inconsistent with the corrections system’s “legitimate peno-
logical objectives,” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 822, and thus this
Court has sustained restrictions on, e. g., inmate-to-inmate written
correspondence, Turner, supra, at 93. Moreover, because courts are ill
equipped to deal with the complex and intractable problems of prisons,
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 404–405, this Court has generally
deferred to prison officials’ judgment in upholding such regulations
against constitutional challenge. Turner reflects this understanding,
setting a unitary, deferential standard for reviewing prisoners’ claims
that does not permit an increase in the constitutional protection when-
ever a prisoner’s communication includes legal advice. To increase

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224 SHAW v. MURPHY
Syllabus
the constitutional protection based upon a communication’s content
first requires an assessment of that content’s value. But the Turner
test simply does not accommodate valuations of content. On the con-
trary, it concerns only the relationship between the asserted peno-
logical interests and the prison regulation. Moreover, prison officials
are to remain the primary arbiters of the problems that arise in prison
management. 482 U. S., at 89. Seeking to avoid unnecessarily per-
petuating federal courts’ involvement in prison administration affairs,
the Court rejects an alteration of the Turner analysis that would entail
additional federal-court oversight. Even if this Court were to consider
giving special protection to particular kinds of speech based on content,
it would not do so for speech that includes legal advice. Augmenting
First Amendment protection for such advice would undermine prison
officials’ ability to address the complex and intractable problems of
prison administration. Id., at 84. The legal text could be an excuse
for making clearly inappropriate comments, which may circulate among
prisoners despite prison measures to screen individual inmates or offi-
cers from the remarks. Pp. 228–232.
2. To prevail on remand on the question whether the prison regu-
lations, as applied to Murphy, are reasonably related to legitimate pe-
nological interests, he must overcome the presumption that the prison
officials acted within their broad discretion. P. 232.
195 F. 3d 1121, reversed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Ginsburg,
J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 232.
David L. Ohler, Special Assistant Attorney General of
Montana, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on
the briefs were Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, and
Diana Leibinger-Koch, Special Assistant Attorney General.
Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief
were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Ogden, Deputy Solicitor General Underwood, Gregory
G. Garre, Barbara L. Herwig, and John Hoyle.
Jeffrey T. Renz argued the cause and filed a brief for
respondent.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Flor-
ida et al. by Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, Thomas
E. Warner, Solicitor General, and Cecilia Bradley, Assistant Attorney

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Opinion of the Court
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under our decision in Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78 (1987),
restrictions on prisoners’ communications to other inmates
are constitutional if the restrictions are “reasonably related
to legitimate penological interests.” Id., at 89. In this
case, we are asked to decide whether prisoners possess a
First Amendment right to provide legal assistance that en-
hances the protections otherwise available under Turner.
We hold that they do not.
I
While respondent Kevin Murphy was incarcerated at the
Montana State Prison, he served as an “inmate law clerk,”
providing legal assistance to fellow prisoners. Upon learn-
ing that inmate Pat Tracy had been charged with assaulting
Correctional Officer Glen Galle, Murphy decided to assist
Tracy with his defense. Prison rules prohibited Murphy’s
assignment to the case,1 but he nonetheless investigated
the assault. After discovering that other inmates had com-
plained about Officer Galle’s conduct, Murphy sent Tracy a
letter, which included the following:
General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as
follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, Mark Pryor of Arkansas, M. Jane Brady
of Delaware, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Carla
J. Stovall of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Thomas F. Reilly
of Massachusetts, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Philip T. McLaughlin of
New Hampshire, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, Betty D. Montgomery
of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Jan Graham of Utah, Wil-
liam H. Sorrell of Vermont, and Mark L. Earley of Virginia; and for the
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles
L. Hobson.
Daniel L. Greenberg, John Boston, Elizabeth Alexander, Margaret
Winter, David C. Fathi, and Stephen Bright filed a brief for the Legal Aid
Society of the City of New York et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
1 Tracy had requested that Murphy be assigned to his case. App. 84.
Prison officials, however, denied that request because prison policy forbade
high-security inmates, such as Murphy, from meeting with maximum-
security inmates, including Tracy. App. to Pet. for Cert. 19. Prison offi-
cials offered Tracy another law clerk to assist him. App. 84.

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“I do want to help you with your case against Galle.
It wasn’t your fault and I know he provoked what-
ever happened! Don’t plead guilty because we can get
at least 100 witnesses to testify that Galle is an over
zealous guard who has a personal agenda to punish
and harrass [sic] inmates. He has made homo-sexual
[sic] advances towards certain inmates and that can be
brought up into the record. There are petitions against
him and I have tried to get the Unit Manager to do
something about what he does in Close II, but all
that happened is that I received two writeups from
him myself as retaliation. So we must pursue this out
of the prison system. I am filing a suit with everyone
in Close I and II named against him. So you can use
that too!
“Another poiont [sic] is that he grabbed you from be-
hind. You tell your lawyer to get ahold of me on this.
Don’t take a plea bargain unless it’s for no more time.”
App. 50.
In accordance with prison policy, prison officials inter-
cepted the letter, and petitioner Robert Shaw, an officer in
the maximum-security unit, reviewed it. Based on the ac-
cusations against Officer Galle, Shaw cited Murphy for vio-
lations of the prison’s rules prohibiting insolence, interfer-
ence with due process hearings, and conduct that disrupts
or interferes with the security and orderly operation of the
institution. After a hearing, Murphy was found guilty of
violating the first two prohibitions. The hearings officer
sanctioned him by imposing a suspended sentence of 10 days’
detention and issuing demerits that could affect his custody
level.
In response, Murphy brought this action, seeking declara-
tory and injunctive relief under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983. The case was styled as a class action, brought on
behalf of himself, other inmate law clerks, and other pris-
oners. The complaint alleged that the disciplining of Mur-

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Opinion of the Court
phy violated due process, the rights of inmates to access
the courts, and, as relevant here, Murphy’s First Amend-
ment rights, including the right to provide legal assistance
to other inmates.
After discovery, the District Court granted petitioners’
motion for summary judgment on all of Murphy’s claims.
On the First Amendment claim, the court found that Murphy
was not formally acting as an inmate law clerk when he
wrote the letter, and that Murphy’s claims should therefore
“be analyzed without consideration of any privilege that law
clerk status might provide.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 24. The
District Court then applied our decision in Turner v. Safley,
482 U. S. 78 (1987), which held that a prison regulation im-
pinging on inmates’ constitutional rights is valid “if it is rea-
sonably related to legitimate penological interests,” id., at
89. Finding a “valid, rational connection between the prison
inmate correspondence policy and the objectives of prison
order, security, and inmate rehabilitation,” the District
Court rejected Murphy’s First Amendment claim. App. to
Pet. for Cert. 25.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It
premised its analysis on the proposition that “inmates have
a First Amendment right to assist other inmates with their
legal claims.” 195 F. 3d 1121, 1124 (1999). Murphy enjoyed
this right of association, the court concluded, because he
was providing legal advice that potentially was relevant
to Tracy’s defense. The Court of Appeals then applied our
decision in Turner, but it did so only against the backdrop of
this First Amendment right, which, the court held, affected
the balance of the prisoner’s interests against the govern-
ment’s interests. Concluding that the balance tipped in
favor of Murphy, the Court of Appeals upheld Murphy’s First
Amendment claim.
Other Courts of Appeals have rejected similar claims.
See, e. g., Gibbs v. Hopkins, 10 F. 3d 373, 378 (CA6 1993)
(no constitutional right to assist other inmates with legal

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claims); Smith v. Maschner, 899 F. 2d 940, 950 (CA10 1990)
(same); Gassler v. Rayl, 862 F. 2d 706, 707–708 (CA8 1988)
(same). To resolve the conflict, we granted certiorari. 530
U. S. 1303 (2000).
II
In this case, we are not asked to decide whether prison-
ers have any First Amendment rights when they send legal
correspondence to one another. In Turner, we held that
restrictions on inmate-to-inmate communications pass con-
stitutional muster only if the restrictions are reasonably re-
lated to legitimate and neutral governmental objectives.
482 U. S., at 89. We did not limit our holding to nonlegal
correspondence, and petitioners do not ask us to construe
it that way. Instead, the question presented here simply
asks whether Murphy possesses a First Amendment right
to provide legal advice that enhances the protections other-
wise available under Turner. The effect of such a right, as
the Court of Appeals described it, 195 F. 3d, at 1127, would
be that inmate-to-inmate correspondence that includes legal
assistance would receive more First Amendment protection
than correspondence without any legal assistance. We con-
clude that there is no such special right.
Traditionally, federal courts did not intervene in the in-
ternal affairs of prisons and instead “adopted a broad hands-
off attitude toward problems of prison administration.”
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 404 (1974). Indeed,
for much of this country’s history, the prevailing view was
that a prisoner was a mere “slave of the State,” who “not
only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except
those which the law in its humanity accords him.” Jones
v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U. S.
119, 139 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Ruffin v.
Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 796 (1871)) (alterations and in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). In recent decades, how-
ever, this Court has determined that incarceration does not
divest prisoners of all constitutional protections. Inmates

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retain, for example, the right to be free from racial discrimi-
nation, Lee v. Washington, 390 U. S. 333 (1968) (per curiam),
the right to due process, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539
(1974), and, as relevant here, certain protections of the First
Amendment, Turner, supra.
We nonetheless have maintained that the constitutional
rights that prisoners possess are more limited in scope than
the constitutional rights held by individuals in society at
large. In the First Amendment context, for instance, some
rights are simply inconsistent with the status of a prisoner
or “with the legitimate penological objectives of the correc-
tions system,” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 822 (1974).
We have thus sustained proscriptions of media interviews
with individual inmates, see id., at 833–835, prohibitions on
the activities of a prisoners’ labor union, see North Carolina
Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., supra, at 133, and restrictions
on inmate-to-inmate written correspondence, see Turner,
supra, at 93. Moreover, because the “problems of prisons in
America are complex and intractable,” and because courts
are particularly “ill equipped” to deal with these problems,
Martinez, supra, at 404–405, we generally have deferred to
the judgments of prison officials in upholding these regula-
tions against constitutional challenge.
Reflecting this understanding, in Turner we adopted a
unitary, deferential standard for reviewing prisoners’ con-
stitutional claims: “[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on
inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 482
U. S., at 89. Under this standard, four factors are relevant.
First and foremost, “there must be a ‘valid, rational con-
nection’ between the prison regulation and the legitimate
[and neutral] governmental interest put forward to justify
it.” Ibid. (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U. S. 576, 586
(1984)). If the connection between the regulation and the
asserted goal is “arbitrary or irrational,” then the regulation
fails, irrespective of whether the other factors tilt in its

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favor. 482 U. S., at 89–90. In addition, courts should con-
sider three other factors: the existence of “alternative means
of exercising the right” available to inmates; “the impact ac-
commodation of the asserted constitutional right will have
on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison
resources generally”; and “the absence of ready alternatives”
available to the prison for achieving the governmental objec-
tives. Id., at 90.
Because Turner provides the test for evaluating prisoners’
First Amendment challenges, the issue before us is whether
Turner permits an increase in constitutional protection
whenever a prisoner’s communication includes legal advice.
We conclude that it does not. To increase the constitutional
protection based upon the content of a communication first
requires an assessment of the value of that content.2 But
the Turner test, by its terms, simply does not accommodate
valuations of content. On the contrary, the Turner factors
concern only the relationship between the asserted penologi-
cal interests and the prison regulation. Id., at 89.
Moreover, under Turner and its predecessors, prison
officials are to remain the primary arbiters of the problems
that arise in prison management. Ibid.; see also Martinez,
supra, at 405 (“[C]ourts are ill equipped to deal with the
increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and
reform”). If courts were permitted to enhance constitu-
tional protection based on their assessments of the content
of the particular communications, courts would be in a posi-
tion to assume a greater role in decisions affecting prison
administration. Seeking to avoid “ ‘unnecessarily perpetu-
at[ing] the involvement of the federal courts in affairs of
prison administration,’ ” Turner, 482 U. S., at 89 (quoting
Martinez, supra, at 407) (alteration in original), we reject
2 The Court of Appeals made such an assessment when it “ ‘balance[d]
the importance of the prisoner’s infringed right against the importance
of the penological interest served by the rule.’ ” 195 F. 3d 1121, 1127
(CA9 1999) (quoting Bradley v. Hall, 64 F. 3d 1276, 1280 (CA9 1995)).

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Opinion of the Court
an alteration of the Turner analysis that would entail addi-
tional federal-court oversight.
Finally, even if we were to consider giving special pro-
tection to particular kinds of speech based upon content,
we would not do so for speech that includes legal advice.3
Augmenting First Amendment protection for inmate legal
advice would undermine prison officials’ ability to address
the “complex and intractable” problems of prison adminis-
tration. Turner, supra, at 84. Although supervised inmate
legal assistance programs may serve valuable ends, it is
“indisputable” that inmate law clerks “are sometimes a
menace to prison discipline” and that prisoners have an
“acknowledged propensity . . . to abuse both the giving and
the seeking of [legal] assistance.” Johnson v. Avery, 393
U. S. 483, 488, 490 (1969). Prisoners have used legal corre-
spondence as a means for passing contraband and communi-
cating instructions on how to manufacture drugs or weapons.
See Brief for State of Florida et al. as Amici Curiae 6–8;
see also Turner, supra, at 93 (“[P]risoners could easily write
in jargon or codes to prevent detection of their real mes-
sages”). The legal text also could be an excuse for making
clearly inappropriate comments, which “may be expected to
circulate among prisoners,” Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U. S.
401, 412 (1989), despite prison measures to screen individual
inmates or officers from the remarks.
We thus decline to cloak the provision of legal assistance
with any First Amendment protection above and beyond
the protection normally accorded prisoners’ speech. In-
3 Murphy suggests that the right to provide legal advice follows from a
right to receive legal advice. However, even if one right followed from
the other, Murphy is incorrect in his assumption that there is a free-
standing right to receive legal advice. Under our right-of-access prece-
dents, inmates have a right to receive legal advice from other inmates
only when it is a necessary “means for ensuring a ‘reasonably adequate
opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional
rights to the courts.’ ” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343, 350–351 (1996) (quot-
ing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U. S. 817, 825 (1977)).

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Ginsburg, J., concurring
stead, the proper constitutional test is the one we set forth
in Turner. Irrespective of whether the correspondence con-
tains legal advice, the constitutional analysis is the same.
III
Under Turner, the question remains whether the prison
regulations, as applied to Murphy, are “reasonably related
to legitimate penological interests.” 482 U. S., at 89. To
prevail, Murphy must overcome the presumption that the
prison officials acted within their “broad discretion.” Ab-
bott, supra, at 413. Petitioners ask us to answer, rather
than remand, the question whether Murphy has satisfied this
heavy burden. We decline petitioners’ request, however,
because we granted certiorari only to decide whether in-
mates possess a special First Amendment right to provide
legal assistance to fellow inmates.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. It is so ordered.
Justice Ginsburg, concurring.
I agree with the Court that the Ninth Circuit erred in
holding that the First Amendment secures to prisoners a
freestanding right to provide legal assistance to other in-
mates. I note, furthermore, that Murphy does not contest
the prison’s right to intercept prisoner-to-prisoner corre-
spondence. But Murphy’s § 1983 complaint does allege that
the prison rules under which he was disciplined—rules for-
bidding insolence and interference with due process hear-
ings—are vague and overbroad as applied to him in this
case.* The Ninth Circuit passed over that charge when it
*The rule forbidding insolence defines “insolence” as “[w]ords, actions
or other behavior which is intended to harass or cause alarm in an em-
ployee.” Mont. State Prison Policy No. 15–001, Inmate Disciplinary Pol-

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Ginsburg, J., concurring
ruled, erroneously, that an inmate’s provision of legal assist-
ance to another inmate is an activity specially protected by
the First Amendment. 195 F. 3d 1121, 1128 (1999). The
remand for which the Court provides should not impede
Murphy from reasserting claims that the Court of Appeals
so far has left untouched.
icy, Rule 009 (App. 10) (emphasis added). The policy includes the follow-
ing examples of insolence: “Cursing; abusive language, writing or gestures
directed to an employee.” Ibid. (emphasis added). The disciplinary re-
port citing Murphy for violating the rule against insolence contains
no finding that Murphy’s letter was “directed to” Officer Galle or that the
letter was “intended to harass” Officer Galle. App. 52. Although Mur-
phy undoubtedly knew that his letter to Tracy would be read by prison
officials, there is no record evidence contesting Murphy’s sworn state-
ment that he “did not believe that Officer Galle would read the letter.”
Murphy Affidavit ¶ 10 (App. 88).