LEWIS v. LEWIS & CLARK MARINE, INC.

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438 OCTOBER TERM, 2000
Syllabus
LEWIS v. LEWIS & CLARK MARINE, INC.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eighth circuit
No. 99–1331. Argued November 29, 2000—Decided February 21, 2001
Petitioner sued respondent in an Illinois County Court for personal inju-
ries he suffered while working on respondent’s ship. He did not re-
quest a jury trial. In anticipation of his suit, respondent had filed a
complaint for exoneration from, or limitation of, liability in Federal Dis-
trict Court pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act (Limitation Act
or Act). Following the procedure for limitation actions set forth in Sup-
plemental Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rule F, the court approved
a surety bond representing respondent’s interest in the vessel, ordered
that any claim related to the incident be filed with the court within a
specified period, and enjoined the filing or prosecution of any suits re-
lated to the incident. Petitioner, inter alia, moved to dissolve the re-
straining order, stating that he was the only claimant, waiving any res
judicata claim concerning limited liability from a state court judgment,
stipulating that respondent could relitigate limited liability issues in the
District Court, and stipulating that his claim’s value was less than the
value of the limitation fund. The District Court recognized that federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a vessel owner
is entitled to limited liability, but also recognized that the statute confer-
ring exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime suits to federal
courts saves to suitors “all other remedies to which they are otherwise
entitled.” 28 U. S. C. § 1333(1). The court found two exceptions to ex-
clusive federal jurisdiction under which a claimant may litigate his claim
in state court—where the limitation fund’s value exceeds the total value
of all claims asserted against the vessel owner, and where there is a
single claimant. The court dissolved the injunction because petitioner
met the first and, probably, second exceptions, and retained jurisdiction
over the limitation action to protect the vessel owner’s right should
the state proceedings necessitate further federal court proceedings. In
holding that the District Court abused its discretion in dissolving the
injunction, the Eighth Circuit found that respondent had a right to seek
exoneration from, not mere limitation of, liability in federal court; that
because petitioner did not request a jury trial, he had not sought a saved
remedy in state court; and that because there was no conflict between
the saving to suitors clause and the Limitation Act here, there was no
basis for dissolving the injunction.

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Syllabus
Held: Because state courts may adjudicate claims like petitioner’s against
vessel owners so long as the owner’s right to seek limitation of liability
is protected, the Eighth Circuit erred in reversing the District Court’s
decision to dissolve the injunction. Pp. 443–456.
(a) Section 1333(1)’s saving to suitors clause preserves common law
remedies and concurrent state court jurisdiction over some admiralty
and maritime claims. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S.
109, 123–124. The Limitation Act allows a vessel owner to limit liabil-
ity for damage or injury, occasioned without the owner’s privity or
knowledge, to the value of the vessel or the owner’s interest in the
vessel. Potential tension exists between the saving to suitors clause
and the Limitation Act because one gives suitors the right to a choice
of remedies while the other gives vessel owners the right to seek limited
liability in federal court. Claimants generally have been permitted to
proceed with their claims in state court where there is only a single
claimant, see Langnes v. Green, 282 U. S. 531, or where the total claims
do not exceed the value of the limitation fund, see Lake Tankers Corp.
v. Henn, 354 U. S. 147. Pp. 443–451.
(b) The District Court properly exercised its discretion in dissolving
the injunction here. Guided by this Court’s cases, it attempted to rec-
oncile petitioner’s right to his remedy under the saving to suitors clause
with respondent’s right to seek limited liability under the Limitation
Act. It dissolved the injunction after concluding that respondent’s
right would be adequately protected by petitioner’s stipulations and
by the court’s decision to stay the Limitation Act proceedings pend-
ing state court proceedings. The Eighth Circuit misapprehended this
Court’s decisions in holding that the injunction should not have been
dissolved. The Eighth Circuit erred in holding that the Limitation Act
grants vessel owners a right to obtain exoneration of liability where
limitation of liability is not at issue. By its own terms the Act protects
the owners’ right to limit their liability to the vessel’s value. Here, the
District Court concluded that petitioner’s stipulations would protect the
owner’s right to seek limited liability in federal court, and, out of an
abundance of caution, it stayed the limitation proceedings. Nothing
more was required to protect respondent’s Limitation Act rights. Hav-
ing satisfied itself that the vessel owner’s right to seek limitation would
be protected, the decision to dissolve the injunction was well within the
District Court’s discretion. The Eighth Circuit also erred in finding
that petitioner’s failure to demand a jury trial in state court meant that
he had no saved remedy there. The saving to suitors clause protects
all remedies, of which trial by jury is an obvious, but not exclusive,
example. In sum, this Court’s case law makes clear that state courts,
with all of their remedies, may adjudicate claims like petitioner’s against

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440 LEWIS v. LEWIS & CLARK MARINE, INC.
Opinion of the Court
vessel owners so long as the vessel owner’s right to seek limitation of
liability is protected. Pp. 451–456.
196 F. 3d 900, reversed and remanded.
O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Roy C. Dripps argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs was Gail G. Renshaw.
James V. O’Brien argued the cause and filed a brief for
respondent.
Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns a seaman’s ability to sue a vessel owner
in state court for personal injuries sustained aboard a vessel.
Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty
and maritime claims, but the jurisdictional statute “sav[es]
to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are
otherwise entitled.” 28 U. S. C. § 1333(1). Another statute
grants vessel owners the right to seek limited liability in
federal court for claims of damage aboard their vessels. 46
U. S. C. App. § 181 et seq. In this case, the District Court,
after conducting proceedings to preserve the vessel owner’s
right to seek limited liability, dissolved the injunction that
prevented the seaman from litigating his personal injury
claims in state court. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, concluding that the vessel owner had a right to
contest liability in federal court, and that the seaman did not
have a saved remedy in state court. The question presented
is whether the District Court abused its discretion in dissolv-
ing the injunction.
I
Petitioner, James F. Lewis, worked as a deckhand aboard
the M/V Karen Michelle, owned by respondent, Lewis &
Clark Marine, Inc. Petitioner claims that on March 17, 1998,
he was injured aboard the M/V Karen Michelle when he
tripped over a wire and hurt his back. App. 12. In April
1998, petitioner sued respondent in the Circuit Court of Mad-

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Opinion of the Court
ison County, Illinois. Petitioner claimed negligence under
the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 688, unseaworthiness, and
maintenance and cure. A Jones Act claim is an in personam
action for a seaman who suffers injury in the course of em-
ployment due to negligence of his employer, the vessel
owner, or crew members. Ibid.; Plamals v. S. S. “Pinar
Del Rio,” 277 U. S. 151, 155–156 (1928). Unseaworthiness is
a claim under general maritime law based on the vessel own-
er’s duty to ensure that the vessel is reasonably fit to be at
sea. See generally Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U. S.
539, 550 (1960). A claim for maintenance and cure concerns
the vessel owner’s obligation to provide food, lodging, and
medical services to a seaman injured while serving the ship.
See generally Calmar S. S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U. S. 525,
527–528 (1938). Petitioner did not demand a jury trial in
state court.
In anticipation of petitioner’s suit, respondent had filed a
complaint for exoneration from, or limitation of, liability in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act (Limita-
tion Act or Act), 46 U. S. C. App. § 181 et seq. The District
Court followed the procedure for a limitation action provided
in Supplemental Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rule F.
The court entered an order approving a surety bond of
$450,000, representing respondent’s interest in the vessel.
The court ordered that any person with a claim for the
events of March 17, 1998, file a claim with the court within
a specified period. The court then enjoined the filing or
prosecution of any suits against respondent related to the
incident on March 17, 1998. App. 30–33.
Petitioner filed an answer to respondent’s complaint, a
claim for damages for injury, and a motion to dissolve the
restraining order. Petitioner averred that he was the sole
claimant concerning the events of March 17, 1998. He
waived any claim of res judicata concerning limited liability
based on a state court judgment; he stipulated that respond-

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442 LEWIS v. LEWIS & CLARK MARINE, INC.
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ent could relitigate issues relating to the limitation of liabil-
ity in District Court. Id., at 72. Petitioner later stipulated
that the value of his claim was less than the value of the
limitation fund, id., at 102, recanting his earlier allegation
that his claim exceeded the vessel’s value.
The District Court dissolved the restraining order that
prevented petitioner from proceeding with his cause of ac-
tion in state court. In re Complaint of Lewis & Clark Ma-
rine, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (ED Mo. 1998). The court
recognized that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction to
determine whether a vessel owner is entitled to limited lia-
bility. The court also noted, however, that the statute that
confers exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime
claims to federal courts contains a clause that saves to suit-
ors “all other remedies to which they are otherwise enti-
tled.” 28 U. S. C. § 1333(1). The court reasoned that “a ten-
sion exists between the exclusive jurisdiction vested in the
admiralty courts to determine a vessel owner’s right to lim-
ited liability and the savings to suitors clause.” 31 F. Supp.
2d, at 1168.
The District Court found two exceptions to exclusive fed-
eral jurisdiction under which a claimant is allowed to litigate
his claim in state court. The first is where the value of the
limitation fund exceeds the total value of all claims asserted
against the vessel owner. The second is where a single
claimant brings an action against the vessel owner seeking
damages in excess of the value of the vessel. The court con-
cluded that it should dissolve the injunction in this case be-
cause petitioner met the limited fund exception and probably
met the single claimant exception as well. Id., at 1169, and
n. 3. The court decided to retain jurisdiction over the limi-
tation action to protect the vessel owner’s right to limitation
in the event that the state proceedings necessitated further
proceedings in federal court.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the District
Court abused its discretion in dissolving the injunction. 196

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F. 3d 900 (1999). The Court of Appeals, like the District
Court, recognized potential tension between the saving to
suitors clause in the jurisdictional statute and the Limitation
Act. The Court of Appeals, however, perceived no conflict
between those provisions in the instant case. The Court of
Appeals explained that a court must consider whether the
vessel owner has the right to remain in federal court and
whether the claimant is seeking a saved remedy in another
forum. The court concluded that respondent had a right to
seek exoneration from liability, not merely limitation of lia-
bility, in federal court. The court also concluded that be-
cause petitioner did not request a trial by jury, he had not
sought a saved remedy in state court. The court deter-
mined that there was no substantive difference between the
remedies afforded petitioner in state court and federal court.
For these reasons, the court held that there was no basis for
dissolving the injunction.
We granted certiorari, 530 U. S. 1202 (2000), to resolve a
conflict between the Eighth Circuit’s decision and the deci-
sions of other Courts of Appeals. Compare 196 F. 3d 900
(CA8 1999), with Kreta Shipping S. A. v. Preussag Interna-
tional Steel Corp., 192 F. 3d 41 (CA2 1999), Beiswenger En-
terprises Corp. v. Carletta, 86 F. 3d 1032 (CA11 1996), and
Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964 F. 2d 1480
(CA5 1992).
II
A
Article III, § 2, of the United States Constitution vests fed-
eral courts with jurisdiction over all cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction. Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789
codified this grant of exclusive original jurisdiction, but
“sav[ed] to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law
remedy, where the common law is competent to give it.”
Ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 77. In the intervening years, Congress
has revised the language of the saving to suitors clause, but

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its substance has remained largely unchanged. See 28
U. S. C. §§ 41(3) and 371 Third (1940 ed.) (“saving to suitors
in all cases the right of a common-law remedy where the
common law is competent to give it”); 28 U. S. C. § 1333(1)
(1946 ed., Supp. II) (“saving to the libellant or petitioner in
every case any other remedy to which he is otherwise enti-
tled”); Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 79, 63 Stat. 101 (“saving
to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are
otherwise entitled”). The jurisdictional statute now states
that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction, ex-
clusive of the courts of the States, of . . . any civil case of
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all
cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise enti-
tled.” 28 U. S. C. § 1333(1) (emphasis added).
What the drafters of the Judiciary Act intended in creating
the saving to suitors clause is not entirely clear and has been
the subject of some debate. See, e. g., 1 J. Goebel, Anteced-
ents and Beginnings to 1801, History of the Supreme Court
of the United States 474 (1971). Compare Casto, The Ori-
gins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of Priva-
teers, Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 Am. J. Legal Hist. 117,
139–149 (1993), with Gutoff, Original Understandings and
the Private Law Origins of the Federal Admiralty Jurisdic-
tion, A Reply to Professor Casto, 30 J. Mar. L. & Com. 361,
387–390 (1999). This Court theorized that the saving to
suitors clause was “inserted, probably, from abundant cau-
tion, lest the exclusive terms in which the power is conferred
on the District Courts might be deemed to have taken away
the concurrent remedy which had before existed. This
leaves the concurrent power where it stood at common law.”
New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants’ Bank of Boston, 6
How. 344, 390 (1848).
In early cases we defined the limits of the clause. For
instance, proceedings in rem were deemed outside the scope
of the clause because an in rem action was not a common law
remedy, but instead a proceeding under civil law. See, e. g.,

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The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555, 571–572 (1867); The Moses
Taylor, 4 Wall. 411, 431 (1867). We later distinguished be-
tween the concept of rights and remedies. Chelentis v.
Luckenbach S. S. Co., 247 U. S. 372, 383–384 (1918). In Che-
lentis, we held that maritime law governs a seaman’s right
to recovery against a vessel owner for his injuries aboard the
vessel. We explained that “[t]he distinction between rights
and remedies is fundamental. A right is a well founded or
acknowledged claim; a remedy is the means employed to en-
force a right or redress an injury.” Id., at 384.
In a subsequent case, the Court defined the saving to suit-
ors clause as a grant to state courts of in personam jurisdic-
tion, concurrent with admiralty courts. Red Cross Line v.
Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109, 123 (1924). We held en-
forceable an arbitration agreement between an owner of a
steamship and a company that chartered the ship. We rea-
soned that agreements to arbitrate were valid under admi-
ralty law, and that the State of New York had the power to
confer on its courts the authority to compel parties to submit
to arbitration. We explained that the state arbitration law
merely provided a remedy in state court:
“The ‘right of a common law remedy,’ so saved to suit-
ors, does not . . . include attempted changes by the
States in the substantive admiralty law, but it does in-
clude all means other than proceedings in admiralty
which may be employed to enforce the right or to re-
dress the injury involved. It includes remedies in pais,
as well as proceedings in court; judicial remedies con-
ferred by statute, as well as those existing at the com-
mon law; remedies in equity, as well as those enforceable
in a court of law.” Id., at 123–124.
Thus, the saving to suitors clause preserves remedies and
the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts over some admi-
ralty and maritime claims. See also Madruga v. Superior

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Court of Cal., County of San Diego, 346 U. S. 556, 560–561
(1954); Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522, 533–534 (1873).
B
Admiralty and maritime law includes a host of special
rights, duties, rules, and procedures. See, e. g., 46 U. S. C.
App. § 721 et seq. (wrecks and salvage); § 741 et seq. (suits in
admiralty by or against vessels or cargoes of the United
States); 46 U. S. C. § 10101 et seq. (merchant seamen protec-
tion and relief). Among these provisions is the Limitation
Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 181 et seq. The Act allows a vessel
owner to limit liability for damage or injury, occasioned with-
out the owner’s privity or knowledge, to the value of the
vessel or the owner’s interest in the vessel. The central
provision of the Act provides:
“The liability of the owner of any vessel, whether
American or foreign, for any embezzlement, loss, or de-
struction by any person of any property, goods, or mer-
chandise shipped or put on board of such vessel, or for
any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act,
matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occa-
sioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge
of such owner or owners, shall not, except in the cases
provided for in subsection (b) of this section, exceed the
amount or value of the interest of such owner in such
vessel, and her freight then pending.” § 183(a).
See also § 183(b) (requiring supplemental fund for some ves-
sels for personal injury and death claimants).
Congress passed the Limitation Act in 1851 “to encourage
ship-building and to induce capitalists to invest money in this
branch of industry.” Norwich Co. v. Wright, 13 Wall. 104,
121 (1872). See also British Transport Comm’n v. United
States, 354 U. S. 129, 133–135 (1957); Just v. Chambers, 312
U. S. 383, 385 (1941). The Act also had the purpose of “put-
ting American shipping upon an equality with that of other

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maritime nations” that had their own limitation acts. The
Main v. Williams, 152 U. S. 122, 128 (1894). See also Nor-
wich Co., supra, at 116–119 (discussing history of limitation
acts in England, France, and the States that led to the pas-
sage of the Limitation Act).
The Act is not a model of clarity. See 2 T. Schoenbaum,
Admiralty and Maritime Law 299 (2d ed. 1994) (“Th[e] 1851
Act, badly drafted even by the standards of the time, contin-
ues in effect today”). Having created a right to seek limited
liability, Congress did not provide procedures for determin-
ing the entitlement. This Court did not have an opportunity
to review the Act in detail until 20 years after its enactment.
See Norwich Co., supra. Deeming the Act “incapable of ex-
ecution” without further instructions to courts, id., at 123,
we designed the procedures that govern a limitation action,
and promulgated them the same Term, see Supplementary
Rules of Practice in Admiralty, 13 Wall. xii–xiv. We later
explained that the scheme “was sketched in outline” by the
Act, and “the regulation of details as to the form and modes
of proceeding was left to be prescribed by judicial authority.”
Providence & New York S. S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U. S.
578, 590 (1883).
The 1872 rules were “intended to facilitate the proceed-
ings of the owners of vessels for claiming the limitation of
liability secured by the statute.” The “Benefactor,” 103
U. S. 239, 244 (1880). Under the rules, a vessel owner seek-
ing limitation of liability had to file a petition. The district
court would obtain an appraisal of the vessel’s value or the
owner’s interest in the vessel, and ensure that payment or
some guarantee of payment was deposited with the court.
The court would then order all claimants to appear. Supple-
mentary Rule of Practice in Admiralty 54, 13 Wall., at xii–
xiii. In the process of seeking limited liability, the owner
was permitted to contest the fact of liability. Rule 56, 13
Wall., at xiii. The ability to contest liability relieved vessel
owners of the “very onerous” English rule, which required

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vessel owners to confess liability in order to seek the bene-
fit of limitation. The “Benefactor,” supra, at 243 (“[T]his
court, in preparing the rules of procedure for a limitation
of liability, deemed it proper to allow a party seeking such
limitation to contest any liability whatever”). The claim-
ants would then contest the vessel owner’s claims for exoner-
ation and limitation of liability. Rule 56, 13 Wall., at xiii.
If the owner succeeded in its effort to limit liability, but was
not exonerated, the court was responsible for distributing
the fund deposited in the court among the claimants. Rule
55, 13 Wall., at xiii.
The procedure for a limitation action is now found in Sup-
plemental Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rule F. Much
like its predecessor provisions, Rule F sets forth the process
for filing a complaint seeking exoneration from, or limita-
tion of, liability. The district court secures the value of the
vessel or owner’s interest, marshals claims, and enjoins the
prosecution of other actions with respect to the claims. In
these proceedings, the court, sitting without a jury, adjudi-
cates the claims. The court determines whether the vessel
owner is liable and whether the owner may limit liability.
The court then determines the validity of the claims, and if
liability is limited, distributes the limited fund among the
claimants.
C
Some tension exists between the saving to suitors clause
and the Limitation Act. One statute gives suitors the right
to a choice of remedies, and the other statute gives vessel
owners the right to seek limitation of liability in federal
court. We confronted this tension in Langnes v. Green, 282
U. S. 531 (1931). The respondent in Langnes was employed
on the petitioner’s vessel. The employee sued the vessel
owner in state court for $25,000 for personal injuries suffered
aboard the vessel. The vessel owner later filed a petition
for limitation of liability in Federal District Court. The Dis-
trict Court enjoined any further proceedings in state court

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and issued a notice that all claimants appear. The employee
filed his claim in District Court. The parties stipulated that
the vessel was worth no more than $5,000.
The employee sought dissolution of the injunction. He ar-
gued that the state court had jurisdiction over his claim, that
he was the only possible claimant, that there was only one
vessel owner, and therefore the vessel owner could claim the
benefit of the Limitation Act by proper pleading in state
court. The District Court denied the motion and proceeded
to decide the merits, concluding that the vessel owner was
not liable. The Court of Appeals reversed on the issue of
limitation.
On review, this Court concluded that both courts erred in
failing to recognize that the state court was competent to
hear the employee’s personal injury claim and the vessel
owner’s claim for limitation. In our view, the choice before
the District Court was whether it should retain the limita-
tion action and preserve the right of the vessel owner but
destroy the right of the employee in state court to a common
law remedy, or allow the action in state court to proceed and
preserve the rights of both parties. We concluded that the
latter course was just. We decided that the District Court
should have dissolved the injunction and allowed the em-
ployee to proceed with his claim in state court, and retained
jurisdiction over the petition for limitation of liability in the
event that the state proceedings necessitated further pro-
ceedings in federal court. We explained that the District
Court’s decision is “one of discretion in every case,” and re-
manded for further proceedings. Id., at 544.
After our decision, the employee was permitted to pursue
his claim in state court. See Ex parte Green, 286 U. S. 437
(1932). In those proceedings, notwithstanding this Court’s
recognition of the vessel owner’s right to seek limitation of
liability in federal court, the employee sought to litigate that
issue in state court. We approved of the District Court’s
decision to enjoin any further proceedings in state court until

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the employee agreed to withdraw his submission on the issue
of limited liability. Id., at 440.
We have also considered the conflict between the saving to
suitors clause and the Limitation Act in a case where several
claimants attempted to sue a vessel owner in state court.
Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U. S. 147 (1957). A pleas-
ure yacht, the Blackstone, capsized after a collision with a
tug that was push-towing a barge, injuring several persons
and killing one. Claimants sued the owner of the tug and
barge in state court actions. The owner filed a petition for
exoneration from, or limitation of, liability in federal court.
The owner also filed a bond for the tug in the amount of
approximately $119,000 and a bond for the barge in the
amount of $165,000. The District Court enjoined other pro-
ceedings concerning the collision. Thereafter, the claimants
made their demands for damages; the total claims were less
than the amount of the two bonds. All claimants relin-
quished any right to damages in excess of that set forth in
their claims. They further waived any claim of res judicata
relating to the issue of the vessel owner’s ability to limit
liability. The District Court decided to dissolve the injunc-
tion because the total limitation fund exceeded the amount
of the claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
We affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. In examining
the Limitation Act and its history, we found it “crystal clear
that the operation of the Act is directed at misfortunes at
sea where the losses incurred exceed the value of the vessel
and the pending freight.” Id., at 151. Where the value of
the vessel and the pending freight exceed the claims, how-
ever, there is no necessity for the maintenance of the action
in federal court. Id., at 152. The stipulations, in addition
to other restrictions on the state court proceedings, ensured
“beyond doubt that [the owner’s] right of limitation under
the Act was fully protected.” Ibid. We explained that to
expand the scope of exclusive jurisdiction to prevent the
state court actions

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“would transform the Act from a protective instrument
to an offensive weapon by which the shipowner could
deprive suitors of their common-law rights, even where
the limitation fund is known to be more than adequate
to satisfy all demands upon it. The shipowner’s right
to limit liability is not so boundless. The Act is not one
of immunity from liability but of limitation of it and we
read no other privilege for the shipowner into its lan-
guage over and above that granting him limited liability.
In fact, the Congress not only created the limitation
procedure for the primary purpose of apportioning the
limitation fund among the claimants where that fund
was inadequate to pay the claims in full, but it reserved
to such suitors their common-law remedies.” Id., at
152–153.
Since these decisions, the Courts of Appeals have generally
permitted claimants to proceed with their claims in state
court where there is only a single claimant, as in Langnes,
or where the total claims do not exceed the value of the limi-
tation fund, as in Lake Tankers. See, e. g., Beiswenger En-
terprises Corp. v. Carletta, 86 F. 3d 1032 (CA11 1996); Linton
v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964 F. 2d 1480 (CA5 1992).
See also Kreta Shipping S. A. v. Preussag International
Steel Corp., 192 F. 3d 41 (CA2 1999) (foreign forum).
III
In the instant case, we believe that the District Court
properly exercised its discretion in dissolving the injunction
that prevented petitioner from pursuing his claims in state
court. The District Court, guided by our prior cases, at-
tempted to reconcile petitioner’s right to his remedy under
the saving to suitors clause with respondent’s right to seek
limited liability under the Limitation Act. The court dis-
solved the injunction against the state court proceedings
after it concluded that respondent’s right to seek limitation
of liability would be adequately protected. Respondent’s

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452 LEWIS v. LEWIS & CLARK MARINE, INC.
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rights were protected by petitioner’s stipulation that his
claim did not exceed the limitation fund, petitioner’s waiver
of any defense of res judicata with respect to limitation of
liability, and the District Court’s decision to stay the Limita-
tion Act proceedings pending state court proceedings.
The Eighth Circuit held that the District Court should not
have dissolved the injunction without first “finding . . . actual
statutory conflict between the Limitation Act and the ‘saving
to suitors’ clause in the case at bar.” 196 F. 3d, at 906. The
Court of Appeals concluded that there was no conflict here
because respondent had a right to seek exoneration from lia-
bility in federal court, and petitioner did not have a saved
remedy under the saving to suitors clause. That reasoning
misapprehends this Court’s prior decisions.
In this case, there was a conflict between the saving to
suitors clause and the Limitation Act. Petitioner sued re-
spondent in state court; under the saving to suitors clause,
that court had jurisdiction to hear his claims. Respondent
sought limited liability for petitioner’s claims in federal
court; the Limitation Act granted the federal court juris-
diction over that action. Both parties selected legitimate
forums for their claims, and therein lies the conflict. Had
petitioner sought to institute in rem proceedings against re-
spondent in state court, that court would have lacked juris-
diction because the saving to suitors clause does not reach
actions in rem. Similarly, had respondent sought limited
liability for payment of wages in federal court, that court
would not have had jurisdiction under the Limitation Act
because claims for wages due employees are not covered.
46 U. S. C. App. § 189. See also In re East River Towing
Co., 266 U. S. 355, 367 (1924). Here, however, there appears
to have been no obstacle to each party pursuing its claim in
the forum of its choice, except the competing action.
In deciding that the case should proceed in federal court,
the Court of Appeals relied on two flawed premises: that
the Limitation Act grants vessel owners a right to obtain

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exoneration from liability in federal court where limitation of
liability is not at issue, and that the saving to suitors clause
reserves to claimants only the right to receive a jury trial.
By its own terms, the Limitation Act protects the right of
vessel owners to limit their liability to the value of the ves-
sel, provided that the events or circumstances giving rise to
the damage occurred without the vessel owner’s privity or
knowledge. The Act was designed to encourage investment
and protect vessel owners from unlimited exposure to liabil-
ity. We have also made clear, however, that the scope of
exclusive federal jurisdiction is proportional to the federal
interest in protecting the vessel owner’s right to seek limita-
tion of liability. See Lake Tankers, 354 U. S., at 153. We
have explained that “[t]he Act is not one of immunity from
liability but of limitation of it.” Id., at 152. We see no rea-
son to revisit that conclusion and decline respondent’s invita-
tion to expand the scope of the Act.
In construing the Limitation Act, this Court long ago de-
termined that vessel owners may contest liability in the
process of seeking limited liability, and we promulgated rules
to that effect pursuant to our “power to regulate . . . proceed-
ings.” The “Benefactor,” 103 U. S., at 244; Supplementary
Rule of Practice in Admiralty 56, 13 Wall., at xiii; Supple-
mental Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rule F(2). Thus,
we agree with respondent that a vessel owner need not con-
fess liability in order to seek limitation under the Act. The
Act and the rules of practice, however, do not create a free-
standing right to exoneration from liability in circumstances
where limitation of liability is not at issue. In this case,
petitioner stipulated that his claim for damages would not
exceed the value of the vessel and waived any claim of res
judicata from the state court action concerning issues bear-
ing on the limitation of liability. The District Court con-
cluded that these stipulations would protect the vessel own-
er’s right to seek limited liability in federal court. Then, out
of an “abundance of caution,” the court stayed the limitation

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454 LEWIS v. LEWIS & CLARK MARINE, INC.
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proceedings so that it could act if the state court proceedings
jeopardized the vessel owner’s rights under the Limitation
Act. 31 F. Supp. 2d, at 1170–1171. We believe nothing
more was required to protect respondent’s right to seek a
limitation of liability.
The district courts have jurisdiction over actions arising
under the Limitation Act, and they have discretion to stay
or dismiss Limitation Act proceedings to allow a suitor to
pursue his claims in state court. If the district court con-
cludes that the vessel owner’s right to limitation will not be
adequately protected—where for example a group of claim-
ants cannot agree on appropriate stipulations or there is un-
certainty concerning the adequacy of the fund or the number
of claims—the court may proceed to adjudicate the merits,
deciding the issues of liability and limitation. See, e. g.,
Lake Tankers, supra, at 152; Port Arthur Towing Co. v. John
W. Towing, Inc., 42 F. 3d 312, 314 (CA5 1995). But where,
as here, the District Court satisfies itself that a vessel own-
er’s right to seek limitation will be protected, the decision to
dissolve the injunction is well within the court’s discretion.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the District Court
also erred in dissolving the injunction because petitioner had
no saved remedy in state court. The Court of Appeals ap-
parently treated as dispositive petitioner’s failure to demand
a jury trial in state court. The jurisdictional statute, how-
ever, reserves to suitors “all other remedies to which they
are otherwise entitled.” 28 U. S. C. § 1333(1). Tracing the
development of the clause since the Judiciary Act of 1789, it
appears that the clause was designed to protect remedies
available at common law. See, e. g., The Hine v. Trevor, 4
Wall. 555 (1867). We later explained that the clause extends
to “all means other than proceedings in admiralty which may
be employed to enforce the right or to redress the injury
involved.” Red Cross Line, 264 U. S., at 124. Trial by jury
is an obvious, but not exclusive, example of the remedies

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available to suitors. See Lake Tankers, supra, at 153; Red
Cross Line, supra, at 123–125.
The Court of Appeals concluded that forum choice could
not be a saved remedy under the saving to suitors clause
because a claimant does not have the ability to control the
forum in which his claim will be heard. 196 F. 3d, at 909.
The prospect that a vessel owner may remove a state court
action to federal court, however, does not limit a claimant’s
forum choice under the saving to suitors clause any more
than other litigants’ forum choices may be limited. We have
previously refused to hold that admiralty claims, such as a
limitation claim, fall within the scope of federal question ju-
risdiction out of concern that saving to suitors actions in
state court would be removed to federal court and under-
mine the claimant’s choice of forum. Romero v. Interna-
tional Terminal Operating Co., 358 U. S. 354, 371–372 (1959).
We explained that to define admiralty jurisdiction as federal
question jurisdiction would be a “destructive oversimplifica-
tion of the highly intricate interplay of the States and the
National Government in their regulation of maritime com-
merce.” Id., at 373. Moreover, in this case respondent
raised a Jones Act claim, which is not subject to removal to
federal court even in the event of diversity of the parties.
See 28 U. S. C. § 1445(a) (incorporated by reference into the
Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 688(a)). Respondent’s argu-
ments to limit and enumerate the saved remedies under the
saving to suitors clause must fail in view of the consistent
recognition by Congress and this Court that both state and
federal courts may be proper forums for adjudicating claims
such as petitioner’s.
In sum, this Court’s case law makes clear that state courts,
with all of their remedies, may adjudicate claims like peti-
tioner’s against vessel owners so long as the vessel owner’s
right to seek limitation of liability is protected. Respondent
seeks to invert that rule, making run of the mill personal

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456 LEWIS v. LEWIS & CLARK MARINE, INC.
Opinion of the Court
injury actions involving vessels a matter of exclusive federal
jurisdiction except where the claimant happens to seek a
jury trial. We reject that proposal and hold that the Court
of Appeals erred in reversing the District Court’s decision
to dissolve the injunction.
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is re-
manded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.