BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA et al. v. GARRETT et al.

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356 OCTOBER TERM, 2000
Syllabus
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
ALABAMA et al. v. GARRETT et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 99–1240. Argued October 11, 2000—Decided February 21, 2001
Respondents Garrett and Ash filed separate lawsuits against petitioners,
Alabama state employers, seeking money damages under Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits the
States and other employers from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified
individual with a disability because of th[at] disability . . . in regard
to . . . terms, conditions, and privileges of employment,” 42 U. S. C.
§ 12112(a). In an opinion disposing of both cases, the District Court
granted petitioners summary judgment, agreeing with them that the
ADA exceeds Congress’ authority to abrogate the State’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity. The Eleventh Circuit reversed on the ground
that the ADA validly abrogates such immunity.
Held: Suits in federal court by state employees to recover money damages
by reason of the State’s failure to comply with Title I of the ADA are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Pp. 363–374.
(a) Congress may abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity when it both unequivocally intends to do so and acts pursuant to
a valid grant of constitutional authority. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Re-
gents, 528 U. S. 62, 73. Only the second of these requirements is in
dispute here. While Congress may not base abrogation of state immu-
nity upon its Article I powers, see, e. g., id., at 79, it may subject noncon-
senting States to federal-court suit when it does so pursuant to a valid
exercise of its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see, e. g.,
id., at 80. Section 5 authorizes Congress to enforce the substantive
guarantees contained in § 1 of that Amendment by enacting “appro-
priate legislation.” See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 536.
Because it is this Court’s responsibility, not Congress’, to define the
substance of constitutional guarantees, id., at 519–524, § 5 legislation, to
the extent it reaches beyond the precise scope of § 1’s protections, must
exhibit congruence and proportionality between the injury to be pre-
vented or remedied and the means adopted to that end, id., at 520.
Pp. 363–365.
(b) The first step in applying these principles is to identify with some
precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue. Here, that in-
quiry requires examination of the limitations § 1 of the Fourteenth

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357 Cite as: 531 U. S. 356 (2001)
Syllabus
Amendment places upon States’ treatment of the disabled. To do so,
the Court looks to its prior decisions under the Equal Protection Clause
dealing with this issue. Kimel, supra, at 83. In Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432, the Court held, inter alia, that mental
retardation did not qualify as a “quasi-suspect” classification for equal
protection purposes, id., at 435, and that, accordingly, a city ordinance
requiring a special use permit for the operation of a group home for
the mentally retarded incurred only the minimum “rational-basis” re-
view applicable to general social and economic legislation, id., at 446.
Although “negative attitudes” and “fear” often accompany irrational
biases, their presence alone does not a constitutional violation make.
Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment does not require States to make spe-
cial accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions toward
such individuals are rational. They could quite hardheadedly—and
perhaps hardheartedly—hold to job-qualification requirements which
do not make allowance for the disabled. If special accommodations for
the disabled are to be required, they have to come from positive law and
not through the Equal Protection Clause. Pp. 365–368.
(c) The requirements for private individuals to recover money dam-
ages against the States—that there be state discrimination violative
of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the remedy imposed by Con-
gress be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation—are not
met here. First, the ADA’s legislative record fails to show that Con-
gress identified a history and pattern of irrational employment dis-
crimination by the States against the disabled. See, e. g., Kimel, supra,
at 89. Because Eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend to
local governmental units such as cities and counties, see Lincoln County
v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529, 530, the Court rejects respondents’ contention
that the inquiry as to unconstitutional discrimination should extend to
such units as well as to States. Congress made a general finding in
the ADA that “historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate
individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such
forms of discrimination . . . continue to be a serious and pervasive social
problem.” 42 U. S. C. § 12101(a)(2). Although the record includes in-
stances to support such a finding, the great majority of these incidents
do not deal with state activities in employment. Even if it were to be
determined that the half a dozen relevant examples from the record
showed unconstitutional action on the part of States, these incidents
taken together fall far short of even suggesting the pattern of unconsti-
tutional discrimination on which § 5 legislation must be based. See,
e. g., Kimel, supra, at 89–91. Moreover, statements in House and Sen-
ate committee reports indicate that Congress targeted the ADA at em-
ployment discrimination in the private sector. Second, the rights and

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358 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Syllabus
remedies created by the ADA against the States raise the same sort
of concerns as to congruence and proportionality as were found in
City of Boerne, supra. For example, while it would be entirely rational
(and therefore constitutional) for a state employer to conserve scarce
financial resources by hiring employees able to use existing facilities,
the ADA requires employers to make such facilities readily accessible
to and usable by disabled individuals, §§ 12112(5)(B), 12111(9). The
ADA does except employers from the “reasonable accommodatio[n]” re-
quirement where the employer can demonstrate that accommodation
would impose an “undue hardship” upon it, § 12112(b)(5)(A), but, even
with this exception, the accommodation duty far exceeds what is con-
stitutionally required. The ADA’s constitutional shortcomings are ap-
parent when it is compared to the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Holding
the latter Act to be “appropriate” legislation to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment’s protection against racial discrimination in voting, South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, this Court emphasized that Con-
gress had there documented a marked pattern of unconstitutional
action by the States, see id., at 312, and had determined that litigation
had proved ineffective to remedy the problem, see id., at 313. The con-
trast between the kind of evidence detailed in Katzenbach, and the
evidence that Congress considered in the present case, is stark. To
uphold the ADA’s application to the States would allow Congress to
rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court in Cle-
burne. Section 5 does not so broadly enlarge congressional authority.
Pp. 368–374.
193 F. 3d 1214, reversed.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Con-
nor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed
a concurring opinion, in which O’Connor, J., joined, post, p. 374.
Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 376.
Jeffrey S. Sutton argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Bill Pryor, Attorney General of Ala-
bama, Alice Ann Byrne and Margaret L. Fleming, Assistant
Attorneys General, Gregory G. Katsas, and Lisa Huggins.
Michael H. Gottesman argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief were Arlene Mayerson, Laurence
Gold, Deborah Mattison, Sandra Reiss, Ira Burnim, and
Jennifer Mathis.
Solicitor General Waxman argued the cause for the
United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With

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359 Cite as: 531 U. S. 356 (2001)
Counsel
him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Lee,
Deputy Solicitor General Underwood, Patricia A. Millett,
Jessica Dunsay Silver, and Seth M. Galanter.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of
Hawaii et al. by Audrey J. Anderson, Earl I. Anzai, Attorney General
of Hawaii, Charles F. Fell, Senior Deputy Attorney General, and Nancy
Albano, Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their
respective States as follows: Mark Pryor of Arkansas, Alan G. Lance of
Idaho, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Betty
D. Montgomery of Ohio, and Paul G. Summers of Tennessee; for the Crim-
inal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger; and for the Pacific
Legal Foundation by Anne M. Hayes and M. Reed Hopper.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of
Minnesota et al. by Mike Hatch, Attorney General of Minnesota, Alan
I. Gilbert, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and W. Karl Hansen, Assistant
Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective
States as follows: Janet Napolitano of Arizona, Richard Blumenthal
of Connecticut, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, A. B.
“Ben” Chandler III of Kentucky, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland,
Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri,
Patricia A. Madrid of New Mexico, Eliot Spitzer of New York, Heidi
Heitkamp of North Dakota, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, and Christine
O. Gregoire of Washington; for the American Association on Mental Re-
tardation et al. by James W. Ellis, Michael B. Browde, and Christian G.
Fritz; for the American Association of People with Disabilities et al. by
John Townsend Rich; for the American Bar Association by Robert Lewin,
James A. Shifren, and Claude G. Szyfer; for the American Cancer Society
by Daniel G. Jarcho, Michael J. Haungs, William J. Dalton, and Mary
P. Rouvelas; for the Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., et al.
by Catherine A. Hanssens and David S. Buckel; for the National Asso-
ciation of Protection and Advocacy Systems et al. by Mark E. Haddad,
Jacqueline G. Cooper, and Sharon Masling; for the National Council on
Disability by Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr.; for Self-Advocates Becoming Em-
powered et al. by Thomas K. Gilhool, Michael Churchill, Barbara Ran-
som, and Max Lapertosa; for the Voice of the Retarded et al. by William
J. Burke and Tamie Hopp; for Senator Robert Dole et al. by Chai R.
Feldblum; and for Law Professors by Leo G. Rydzewski.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Association of State Correc-
tional Administrators by Marci A. Hamilton; for the Coalition for Local
Sovereignty by Kenneth B. Clark; for the National Employment Lawyers
Association et al. by Daniel F. Goldstein, C. Christopher Brown, and Merl
H. Wayman; for Paralyzed Veterans of America et al. by Ted G. Dane

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360 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Opinion of the Court
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We decide here whether employees of the State of Ala-
bama may recover money damages by reason of the State’s
failure to comply with the provisions of Title I of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 104 Stat.
330, 42 U. S. C. §§ 12111–12117.1 We hold that such suits are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The ADA prohibits certain employers, including the
States, from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual
and Eve Hill; for the Southern Poverty Law Center by Pamela L. Sum-
ners and Elizabeth J. Hubertz; and for Morton Horwitz et al. by Kenneth
W. Brothers, Elizabeth B. McCallum, and Claudia Center. A. Stephen
Hut, Jr., filed a statement by former President George H. W. Bush as
amicus curiae.
1 Respondents’ complaints in the United States District Court alleged
violations of both Title I and Title II of the ADA, and petitioners’ “Ques-
tion Presented” can be read to apply to both sections. See Brief for Peti-
tioners i; Brief for United States I. Though the briefs of the parties dis-
cuss both sections in their constitutional arguments, no party has briefed
the question whether Title II of the ADA, dealing with the “services,
programs, or activities of a public entity,” 42 U. S. C. § 12132, is available
for claims of employment discrimination when Title I of the ADA ex-
pressly deals with that subject. See, e. g., Russello v. United States, 464
U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Courts of Appeals are divided on this issue, compare Zimmerman v.
Oregon Dept. of Justice, 170 F. 3d 1169 (CA9 1999), with Bledsoe v. Palm
Beach Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F. 3d 816 (CA11 1998).
We are not disposed to decide the constitutional issue whether Title II,
which has somewhat different remedial provisions from Title I, is appro-
priate legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when the par-
ties have not favored us with briefing on the statutory question. To the
extent the Court granted certiorari on the question whether respondents
may sue their state employers for damages under Title II of the ADA, see
this Court’s Rule 24.1(a), that portion of the writ is dismissed as improvi-
dently granted. See The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U. S.
180, 184 (1959).

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Opinion of the Court
with a disability because of the disability of such individual
in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advance-
ment, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of em-
ployment.” §§ 12112(a), 12111(2), (5), (7). To this end, the
Act requires employers to “mak[e] reasonable accommoda-
tions to the known physical or mental limitations of an other-
wise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant
or employee, unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the oper-
ation of the [employer’s] business.” § 12112(b)(5)(A).
“ ‘[R]easonable accommodation’ may include—
“(A) making existing facilities used by employees read-
ily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabili-
ties; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified
work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, ac-
quisition or modification of equipment or devices, appro-
priate adjustment or modifications of examinations,
training materials or policies, the provision of qualified
readers or interpreters, and other similar accommoda-
tions for individuals with disabilities.” § 12111(9).
The Act also prohibits employers from “utilizing stand-
ards, criteria, or methods of administration . . . that have
the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability.”
§ 12112(b)(3)(A).
The Act defines “disability” to include “(A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment.” § 12102(2). A disabled individual is other-
wise “qualified” if he or she, “with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires.”
§ 12111(8).

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362 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Opinion of the Court
Respondent Patricia Garrett, a registered nurse, was em-
ployed as the Director of Nursing, OB/Gyn/Neonatal Serv-
ices, for the University of Alabama in Birmingham Hospital.
See App. 31, 38. In 1994, Garrett was diagnosed with breast
cancer and subsequently underwent a lumpectomy, radiation
treatment, and chemotherapy. See id., at 38. Garrett’s
treatments required her to take substantial leave from work.
Upon returning to work in July 1995, Garrett’s supervisor
informed Garrett that she would have to give up her Direc-
tor position. See id., at 39. Garrett then applied for and
received a transfer to another, lower paying position as a
nurse manager. See ibid.
Respondent Milton Ash worked as a security officer for
the Alabama Department of Youth Services (Department).
See id., at 8. Upon commencing this employment, Ash in-
formed the Department that he suffered from chronic asthma
and that his doctor recommended he avoid carbon monoxide
and cigarette smoke, and Ash requested that the Depart-
ment modify his duties to minimize his exposure to these
substances. See ibid. Ash was later diagnosed with sleep
apnea and requested, again pursuant to his doctor’s recom-
mendation, that he be reassigned to daytime shifts to accom-
modate his condition. See id., at 9. Ultimately, the De-
partment granted none of the requested relief. See id., at
8–9. Shortly after Ash filed a discrimination claim with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, he noticed that
his performance evaluations were lower than those he had
received on previous occasions. See id., at 9.
Garrett and Ash filed separate lawsuits in the District
Court, both seeking money damages under the ADA.2 Peti-
tioners moved for summary judgment, claiming that the
ADA exceeds Congress’ authority to abrogate the State’s
Eleventh Amendment immunity. See 989 F. Supp. 1409,
1410 (ND Ala. 1998). In a single opinion disposing of both
2 Garrett raised other claims, but those are not presently before the
Court.

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cases, the District Court agreed with petitioners’ position
and granted their motions for summary judgment. See id.,
at 1410, 1412. The cases were consolidated on appeal to the
Eleventh Circuit. The Court of Appeals reversed, 193 F. 3d
1214 (1999), adhering to its intervening decision in Kimel v.
State Bd. of Regents, 139 F. 3d 1426, 1433 (CA11 1998), aff ’d,
528 U. S. 62 (2000), that the ADA validly abrogates the
States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.
We granted certiorari, 529 U. S. 1065 (2000), to resolve a
split among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether
an individual may sue a State for money damages in federal
court under the ADA.
I
The Eleventh Amendment provides:
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State.”
Although by its terms the Amendment applies only to suits
against a State by citizens of another State, our cases have
extended the Amendment’s applicability to suits by citizens
against their own States. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Re-
gents, 528 U. S. 62, 72–73 (2000); College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S.
666, 669–670 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U. S. 44, 54 (1996); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 15 (1890).
The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that
nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals
in federal court. See Kimel, supra, at 73.
We have recognized, however, that Congress may abrogate
the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it both
unequivocally intends to do so and “act[s] pursuant to a valid
grant of constitutional authority.” 528 U. S., at 73. The

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364 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Opinion of the Court
first of these requirements is not in dispute here. See 42
U. S. C. § 12202 (“A State shall not be immune under the
eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States
from an action in [a] Federal or State court of competent
jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter”). The question,
then, is whether Congress acted within its constitutional au-
thority by subjecting the States to suits in federal court for
money damages under the ADA.
Congress may not, of course, base its abrogation of the
States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity upon the powers
enumerated in Article I. See Kimel, supra, at 79 (“Under
our firmly established precedent then, if the [Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act of 1967] rests solely on Congress’
Article I commerce power, the private petitioners in today’s
cases cannot maintain their suits against their state em-
ployers”); Seminole Tribe, supra, at 72–73 (“The Eleventh
Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III,
and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional
limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction”); College Sav-
ings Bank, supra, at 672; Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627, 636
(1999); Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 730–733 (1999). In
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976), however, we held
that “the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state
sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by
the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.” Id., at 456 (citation omitted). As a result, we con-
cluded, Congress may subject nonconsenting States to suit
in federal court when it does so pursuant to a valid exercise
of its § 5 power. See ibid. Our cases have adhered to this
proposition. See, e. g., Kimel, supra, at 80. Accordingly,
the ADA can apply to the States only to the extent that the
statute is appropriate § 5 legislation.3
3 It is clear that Congress intended to invoke § 5 as one of its bases for
enacting the ADA. See 42 U. S. C. § 12101(b)(4).

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Opinion of the Court
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in rele-
vant part:
“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the
power to enforce the substantive guarantees contained in § 1
by enacting “appropriate legislation.” See City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 536 (1997). Congress is not limited
to mere legislative repetition of this Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence. “Rather, Congress’ power ‘to enforce’ the
Amendment includes the authority both to remedy and to
deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by pro-
hibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including
that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s text.”
Kimel, supra, at 81; City of Boerne, supra, at 536.
City of Boerne also confirmed, however, the long-settled
principle that it is the responsibility of this Court, not Con-
gress, to define the substance of constitutional guarantees.
521 U. S., at 519–524. Accordingly, § 5 legislation reaching
beyond the scope of § 1’s actual guarantees must exhibit
“congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”
Id., at 520.
II
The first step in applying these now familiar principles is
to identify with some precision the scope of the constitutional
right at issue. Here, that inquiry requires us to examine
the limitations § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment places upon
States’ treatment of the disabled. As we did last Term in
Kimel, see 528 U. S., at 83, we look to our prior decisions
under the Equal Protection Clause dealing with this issue.

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366 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
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In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432
(1985), we considered an equal protection challenge to a
city ordinance requiring a special use permit for the opera-
tion of a group home for the mentally retarded. The spe-
cific question before us was whether the Court of Appeals
had erred by holding that mental retardation qualified as
a “quasi-suspect” classification under our equal protection
jurisprudence. Id., at 435. We answered that question in
the affirmative, concluding instead that such legislation
incurs only the minimum “rational-basis” review applicable
to general social and economic legislation.4 Id., at 446. In
a statement that today seems quite prescient, we explained
that
“if the large and amorphous class of the mentally re-
tarded were deemed quasi-suspect for the reasons given
by the Court of Appeals, it would be difficult to find a
principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups
who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting them
off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the
desired legislative responses, and who can claim some
degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at
large. One need mention in this respect only the aging,
the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. We are
reluctant to set out on that course, and we decline to
do so.” Id., at 445–446.
Under rational-basis review, where a group possesses
“distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the
State has the authority to implement,” a State’s decision
4 Applying the basic principles of rationality review, Cleburne struck
down the city ordinance in question. 473 U. S., at 447–450. The Court’s
reasoning was that the city’s purported justifications for the ordinance
made no sense in light of how the city treated other groups similarly situ-
ated in relevant respects. Although the group home for the mentally re-
tarded was required to obtain a special use permit, apartment houses,
other multiple-family dwellings, retirement homes, nursing homes, sani-
tariums, hospitals, boarding houses, fraternity and sorority houses, and
dormitories were not subject to the ordinance. See ibid.

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to act on the basis of those differences does not give rise to
a constitutional violation. Id., at 441. “Such a classification
cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is
a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment
and some legitimate governmental purpose.” Heller v. Doe,
509 U. S. 312, 320 (1993) (citing Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505
U. S. 1 (1992); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976)
(per curiam)). Moreover, the State need not articulate its
reasoning at the moment a particular decision is made.
Rather, the burden is upon the challenging party to negative
“ ‘any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide
a rational basis for the classification.’ ” Heller, supra, at 320
(quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U. S. 307,
313 (1993)).
Justice Breyer suggests that Cleburne stands for the
broad proposition that state decisionmaking reflecting “nega-
tive attitudes” or “fear” necessarily runs afoul of the Four-
teenth Amendment. See post, at 382 (dissenting opinion)
(quoting Cleburne, 473 U. S., at 448). Although such biases
may often accompany irrational (and therefore unconstitu-
tional) discrimination, their presence alone does not a consti-
tutional violation make. As we noted in Cleburne: “[M]ere
negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which
are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not per-
missible bases for treating a home for the mentally retarded
differently . . . .” Id., at 448 (emphases added). This lan-
guage, read in context, simply states the unremarkable and
widely acknowledged tenet of this Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence that state action subject to rational-basis scru-
tiny does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment when it
“rationally furthers the purpose identified by the State.”
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307,
314 (1976) (per curiam).
Thus, the result of Cleburne is that States are not required
by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommoda-
tions for the disabled, so long as their actions toward such
individuals are rational. They could quite hardheadedly—

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368 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
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and perhaps hardheartedly—hold to job-qualification re-
quirements which do not make allowance for the disabled.
If special accommodations for the disabled are to be required,
they have to come from positive law and not through the
Equal Protection Clause.5
III
Once we have determined the metes and bounds of the
constitutional right in question, we examine whether Con-
gress identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional em-
ployment discrimination by the States against the disabled.
Just as § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to
actions committed “under color of state law,” Congress’ § 5
authority is appropriately exercised only in response to
state transgressions. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U. S., at
640 (“It is this conduct then—unremedied patent infringe-
ment by the States—that must give rise to the Fourteenth
Amendment violation that Congress sought to redress in the
Patent Remedy Act”); Kimel, 528 U. S., at 89 (“Congress
never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the
States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that rose
to the level of constitutional violation”). The legislative rec-
ord of the ADA, however, simply fails to show that Congress
did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination
in employment against the disabled.
Respondents contend that the inquiry as to unconsti-
tutional discrimination should extend not only to States
themselves, but to units of local governments, such as cities
and counties. All of these, they say, are “state actors” for
5 It is worth noting that by the time that Congress enacted the ADA in
1990, every State in the Union had enacted such measures. At least one
Member of Congress remarked that “this is probably one of the few times
where the States are so far out in front of the Federal Government, it’s
not funny.” Hearing on Discrimination Against Cancer Victims and the
Handicapped before the Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities of
the House Committee on Education and Labor, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 5
(1987). A number of these provisions, however, did not go as far as the
ADA did in requiring accommodation.

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Opinion of the Court
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brief for Re-
spondents 8. This is quite true, but the Eleventh Amend-
ment does not extend its immunity to units of local gov-
ernment. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529, 530
(1890). These entities are subject to private claims for dam-
ages under the ADA without Congress’ ever having to rely
on § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to render them so.
It would make no sense to consider constitutional violations
on their part, as well as by the States themselves, when only
the States are the beneficiaries of the Eleventh Amendment.
Congress made a general finding in the ADA that “histori-
cally, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals
with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such
forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities
continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.” 42
U. S. C. § 12101(a)(2). The record assembled by Congress in-
cludes many instances to support such a finding. But the
great majority of these incidents do not deal with the activi-
ties of States.
Respondents in their brief cite half a dozen examples from
the record that did involve States. A department head at
the University of North Carolina refused to hire an applicant
for the position of health administrator because he was blind;
similarly, a student at a state university in South Dakota was
denied an opportunity to practice teach because the dean at
that time was convinced that blind people could not teach in
public schools. A microfilmer at the Kansas Department of
Transportation was fired because he had epilepsy; deaf work-
ers at the University of Oklahoma were paid a lower salary
than those who could hear. The Indiana State Personnel Of-
fice informed a woman with a concealed disability that she
should not disclose it if she wished to obtain employment.6
6 The record does show that some States, adopting the tenets of the
eugenics movement of the early part of this century, required extreme
measures such as sterilization of persons suffering from hereditary mental
disease. These laws were upheld against constitutional attack 70 years
ago in Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200 (1927). But there is no indication that

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370 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Opinion of the Court
Several of these incidents undoubtedly evidence an un-
willingness on the part of state officials to make the sort
of accommodations for the disabled required by the ADA.
Whether they were irrational under our decision in Cleburne
is more debatable, particularly when the incident is de-
scribed out of context. But even if it were to be determined
that each incident upon fuller examination showed unconsti-
tutional action on the part of the State, these incidents taken
together fall far short of even suggesting the pattern of un-
constitutional discrimination on which § 5 legislation must
be based. See Kimel, supra, at 89–91; City of Boerne, 521
U. S., at 530–531. Congress, in enacting the ADA, found
that “some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical
or mental disabilities.” 42 U. S. C. § 12101(a)(1). In 1990,
the States alone employed more than 4.5 million people.
U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Ab-
stract of the United States 338 (119th ed. 1999) (Table 534).
It is telling, we think, that given these large numbers,
Congress assembled only such minimal evidence of uncon-
stitutional state discrimination in employment against the
disabled.
Justice Breyer maintains that Congress applied Title I
of the ADA to the States in response to a host of incidents
representing unconstitutional state discrimination in em-
ployment against persons with disabilities. A close review
of the relevant materials, however, undercuts that conclu-
sion. Justice Breyer’s Appendix C consists not of legis-
lative findings, but of unexamined, anecdotal accounts of
“adverse, disparate treatment by state officials.” Post, at
379. Of course, as we have already explained, “adverse, dis-
parate treatment” often does not amount to a constitutional
violation where rational-basis scrutiny applies. These ac-
counts, moreover, were submitted not directly to Congress
but to the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of
any State had persisted in requiring such harsh measures as of 1990 when
the ADA was adopted.

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Opinion of the Court
Americans with Disabilities, which made no findings on the
subject of state discrimination in employment.7 See the
Task Force’s Report entitled From ADA to Empowerment
(Oct. 12, 1990). And, had Congress truly understood this
information as reflecting a pattern of unconstitutional be-
havior by the States, one would expect some mention of that
conclusion in the Act’s legislative findings. There is none.
See 42 U. S. C. § 12101. Although Justice Breyer would
infer from Congress’ general conclusions regarding societal
discrimination against the disabled that the States had like-
wise participated in such action, post, at 378, the House
and Senate committee reports on the ADA flatly contradict
this assertion. After describing the evidence presented to
the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources and
its subcommittee (including the Task Force Report upon
which the dissent relies), the Committee’s Report reached,
among others, the following conclusion: “Discrimination still
persists in such critical areas as employment in the pri-
vate sector, public accommodations, public services, trans-
portation, and telecommunications.” S. Rep. No. 101–116,
p. 6 (1989) (emphasis added). The House Committee on Edu-
cation and Labor, addressing the ADA’s employment provi-
sions, reached the same conclusion: “[A]fter extensive review
and analysis over a number of Congressional sessions, . . .
there exists a compelling need to establish a clear and com-
prehensive Federal prohibition of discrimination on the basis
of disability in the areas of employment in the private
sector, public accommodations, public services, transporta-
7 Only a small fraction of the anecdotes Justice Breyer identifies in
his Appendix C relate to state discrimination against the disabled in em-
ployment. At most, somewhere around 50 of these allegations describe
conduct that could conceivably amount to constitutional violations by the
States, and most of them are so general and brief that no firm conclusion
can be drawn. The overwhelming majority of these accounts pertain to
alleged discrimination by the States in the provision of public services and
public accommodations, which areas are addressed in Titles II and III of
the ADA.

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Opinion of the Court
tion, and telecommunications.” H. R. Rep. No. 101–485,
pt. 2, p. 28 (1990) (emphasis added). Thus, not only is the
inference Justice Breyer draws unwarranted, but there
is also strong evidence that Congress’ failure to mention
States in its legislative findings addressing discrimination
in employment reflects that body’s judgment that no pattern
of unconstitutional state action had been documented.
Even were it possible to squeeze out of these examples
a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the States,
the rights and remedies created by the ADA against the
States would raise the same sort of concerns as to congru-
ence and proportionality as were found in City of Boerne,
supra. For example, whereas it would be entirely rational
(and therefore constitutional) for a state employer to con-
serve scarce financial resources by hiring employees who
are able to use existing facilities, the ADA requires em-
ployers to “mak[e] existing facilities used by employees read-
ily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.”
42 U. S. C. §§ 12112(5)(B), 12111(9). The ADA does except
employers from the “reasonable accommodatio[n]” require-
ment where the employer “can demonstrate that the accom-
modation would impose an undue hardship on the operation
of the business of such covered entity.” § 12112(b)(5)(A).
However, even with this exception, the accommodation duty
far exceeds what is constitutionally required in that it makes
unlawful a range of alternative responses that would be rea-
sonable but would fall short of imposing an “undue burden”
upon the employer. The Act also makes it the employer’s
duty to prove that it would suffer such a burden, instead of
requiring (as the Constitution does) that the complaining
party negate reasonable bases for the employer’s decision.
See ibid.
The ADA also forbids “utilizing standards, criteria, or
methods of administration” that disparately impact the dis-
abled, without regard to whether such conduct has a rational
basis. § 12112(b)(3)(A). Although disparate impact may be

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Opinion of the Court
relevant evidence of racial discrimination, see Washington
v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976), such evidence alone is
insufficient even where the Fourteenth Amendment subjects
state action to strict scrutiny. See, e. g., ibid. (“[O]ur cases
have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official
act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discrimi-
natory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a
racially disproportionate impact”).
The ADA’s constitutional shortcomings are apparent when
the Act is compared to Congress’ efforts in the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 to respond to a serious pattern of constitutional
violations. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301
(1966), we considered whether the Voting Rights Act was
“appropriate” legislation to enforce the Fifteenth Amend-
ment’s protection against racial discrimination in voting.
Concluding that it was a valid exercise of Congress’ enforce-
ment power under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment,8 we
noted that “[b]efore enacting the measure, Congress ex-
plored with great care the problem of racial discrimination
in voting.” Id., at 308.
In that Act, Congress documented a marked pattern of
unconstitutional action by the States. State officials, Con-
gress found, routinely applied voting tests in order to ex-
clude African-American citizens from registering to vote.
See id., at 312. Congress also determined that litigation
had proved ineffective and that there persisted an other-
wise inexplicable 50-percentage-point gap in the registration
of white and African-American voters in some States. See
id., at 313. Congress’ response was to promulgate in the
Voting Rights Act a detailed but limited remedial scheme
designed to guarantee meaningful enforcement of the Fif-
teenth Amendment in those areas of the Nation where abun-
dant evidence of States’ systematic denial of those rights
was identified.
8 Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment is virtually identical to § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.

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374 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Kennedy, J., concurring
The contrast between this kind of evidence, and the evi-
dence that Congress considered in the present case, is stark.
Congressional enactment of the ADA represents its judg-
ment that there should be a “comprehensive national man-
date for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities.” 42 U. S. C. § 12101(b)(1). Congress is the
final authority as to desirable public policy, but in order to
authorize private individuals to recover money damages
against the States, there must be a pattern of discrimination
by the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the remedy imposed by Congress must be congruent and
proportional to the targeted violation. Those requirements
are not met here, and to uphold the Act’s application to
the States would allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth
Amendment law laid down by this Court in Cleburne.9 Sec-
tion 5 does not so broadly enlarge congressional authority.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Reversed.
Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice O’Connor joins,
concurring.
Prejudice, we are beginning to understand, rises not from
malice or hostile animus alone. It may result as well from
insensitivity caused by simple want of careful, rational re-
flection or from some instinctive mechanism to guard against
people who appear to be different in some respects from
ourselves. Quite apart from any historical documentation,
9 Our holding here that Congress did not validly abrogate the States’
sovereign immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages
under Title I does not mean that persons with disabilities have no federal
recourse against discrimination. Title I of the ADA still prescribes
standards applicable to the States. Those standards can be enforced by
the United States in actions for money damages, as well as by private
individuals in actions for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U. S.
123 (1908). In addition, state laws protecting the rights of persons with
disabilities in employment and other aspects of life provide independent
avenues of redress. See n. 5, supra.

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Kennedy, J., concurring
knowledge of our own human instincts teaches that persons
who find it difficult to perform routine functions by reason
of some mental or physical impairment might at first seem
unsettling to us, unless we are guided by the better angels
of our nature. There can be little doubt, then, that persons
with mental or physical impairments are confronted with
prejudice which can stem from indifference or insecurity as
well as from malicious ill will.
One of the undoubted achievements of statutes designed
to assist those with impairments is that citizens have an
incentive, flowing from a legal duty, to develop a better
understanding, a more decent perspective, for accepting
persons with impairments or disabilities into the larger
society. The law works this way because the law can be a
teacher. So I do not doubt that the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990 will be a milestone on the path to a more
decent, tolerant, progressive society.
It is a question of quite a different order, however, to say
that the States in their official capacities, the States as gov-
ernmental entities, must be held in violation of the Con-
stitution on the assumption that they embody the miscon-
ceived or malicious perceptions of some of their citizens.
It is a most serious charge to say a State has engaged in a
pattern or practice designed to deny its citizens the equal
protection of the laws, particularly where the accusation
is based not on hostility but instead on the failure to act
or the omission to remedy. States can, and do, stand apart
from the citizenry. States act as neutral entities, ready to
take instruction and to enact laws when their citizens so
demand. The failure of a State to revise policies now seen
as incorrect under a new understanding of proper policy does
not always constitute the purposeful and intentional action
required to make out a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976).
For the reasons explained by the Court, an equal pro-
tection violation has not been shown with respect to the
several States in this case. If the States had been trans-

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376 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Breyer, J., dissenting
gressing the Fourteenth Amendment by their mistreatment
or lack of concern for those with impairments, one would
have expected to find in decisions of the courts of the States
and also the courts of the United States extensive litigation
and discussion of the constitutional violations. This con-
firming judicial documentation does not exist. That there
is a new awareness, a new consciousness, a new commitment
to better treatment of those disadvantaged by mental or
physical impairments does not establish that an absence of
state statutory correctives was a constitutional violation.
It must be noted, moreover, that what is in question is not
whether the Congress, acting pursuant to a power granted to
it by the Constitution, can compel the States to act. What
is involved is only the question whether the States can be
subjected to liability in suits brought not by the Federal
Government (to which the States have consented, see Alden
v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 755 (1999)), but by private persons
seeking to collect moneys from the state treasury without
the consent of the State. The predicate for money damages
against an unconsenting State in suits brought by private
persons must be a federal statute enacted upon the docu-
mentation of patterns of constitutional violations committed
by the State in its official capacity. That predicate, for rea-
sons discussed here and in the decision of the Court, has
not been established. With these observations, I join the
Court’s opinion.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice
Souter, and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.
Reviewing the congressional record as if it were an ad-
ministrative agency record, the Court holds the statutory
provision before us, 42 U. S. C. § 12202, unconstitutional.
The Court concludes that Congress assembled insufficient
evidence of unconstitutional discrimination, ante, at 370,
that Congress improperly attempted to “rewrite” the law we
established in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473
U. S. 432 (1985), ante, at 374, and that the law is not suffi-

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Breyer, J., dissenting
ciently tailored to address unconstitutional discrimination,
ante, at 372–373.
Section 5, however, grants Congress the “power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation,” the Fourteenth Amendment’s
equal protection guarantee. U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, § 5.
As the Court recognizes, state discrimination in employ-
ment against persons with disabilities might “ ‘run afoul of
the Equal Protection Clause’ ” where there is no “ ‘rational
relationship between the disparity of treatment and some
legitimate governmental purpose.’ ” Ante, at 367 (quoting
Heller v. Doe, 509 U. S. 312, 320 (1993)). See also Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., supra, at 440 (stating that
the Court will sustain a classification if it is “rationally re-
lated to a legitimate state interest”). In my view, Congress
reasonably could have concluded that the remedy before us
constitutes an “appropriate” way to enforce this basic equal
protection requirement. And that is all the Constitution
requires.
I
The Court says that its primary problem with this statu-
tory provision is one of legislative evidence. It says that
“Congress assembled only . . . minimal evidence of unconsti-
tutional state discrimination in employment.” Ante, at 370.
In fact, Congress compiled a vast legislative record docu-
menting “ ‘massive, society-wide discrimination’ ” against
persons with disabilities. S. Rep. No. 101–116, pp. 8–9
(1989) (quoting testimony of Justin Dart, chairperson of the
Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans
with Disabilities). In addition to the information presented
at 13 congressional hearings (see Appendix A, infra), and its
own prior experience gathered over 40 years during which
it contemplated and enacted considerable similar legislation
(see Appendix B, infra), Congress created a special task
force to assess the need for comprehensive legislation. That
task force held hearings in every State, attended by more
than 30,000 people, including thousands who had experi-
enced discrimination first hand. See From ADA to Em-

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Breyer, J., dissenting
powerment, Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of
Americans with Disabilities 16 (Oct. 12, 1990) (hereinafter
Task Force Report). The task force hearings, Congress’
own hearings, and an analysis of “census data, national polls,
and other studies” led Congress to conclude that “people
with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our
society, and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally,
economically, and educationally.” 42 U. S. C. § 12101(a)(6).
As to employment, Congress found that “[t]wo-thirds of all
disabled Americans between the age of 16 and 64 [were] not
working at all,” even though a large majority wanted to, and
were able to, work productively. S. Rep. No. 101–116, at 9.
And Congress found that this discrimination flowed in sig-
nificant part from “stereotypic assumptions” as well as “pur-
poseful unequal treatment.” 42 U. S. C. § 12101(a)(7).
The powerful evidence of discriminatory treatment
throughout society in general, including discrimination by
private persons and local governments, implicates state
governments as well, for state agencies form part of that
same larger society. There is no particular reason to believe
that they are immune from the “stereotypic assumptions”
and pattern of “purposeful unequal treatment” that Con-
gress found prevalent. The Court claims that it “make[s]
no sense” to take into consideration constitutional violations
committed by local governments. Ante, at 369. But the
substantive obligation that the Equal Protection Clause cre-
ates applies to state and local governmental entities alike.
E. g., Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469 (1989).
Local governments often work closely with, and under the
supervision of, state officials, and in general, state and local
government employers are similarly situated. Nor is deter-
mining whether an apparently “local” entity is entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity as simple as the majority
suggests—it often requires a “ ‘detailed examination of the
relevant provisions of [state] law.’ ” Regents of Univ. of Cal.

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Breyer, J., dissenting
v. Doe, 519 U. S. 425, 430, n. 6 (1997) (quoting Moor v. County
of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693, 719–721 (1973)).
In any event, there is no need to rest solely upon evidence
of discrimination by local governments or general societal
discrimination. There are roughly 300 examples of discrimi-
nation by state governments themselves in the legislative
record. See, e. g., Appendix C, infra. I fail to see how this
evidence “fall[s] far short of even suggesting the pattern of
unconstitutional discrimination on which § 5 legislation must
be based.” Ante, at 370.
The congressionally appointed task force collected numer-
ous specific examples, provided by persons with disabilities
themselves, of adverse, disparate treatment by state officials.
They reveal, not what the Court describes as “half a dozen”
instances of discrimination, ante, at 369, but hundreds of in-
stances of adverse treatment at the hands of state officials—
instances in which a person with a disability found it im-
possible to obtain a state job, to retain state employment,
to use the public transportation that was readily available to
others in order to get to work, or to obtain a public educa-
tion, which is often a prerequisite to obtaining employment.
State-imposed barriers also frequently made it difficult or
impossible for people to vote, to enter a public building, to
access important government services, such as calling for
emergency assistance, and to find a place to live due to a
pattern of irrational zoning decisions similar to the discrimi-
nation that we held unconstitutional in Cleburne, 473 U. S.,
at 448. See Appendix C, infra.
As the Court notes, those who presented instances of dis-
crimination rarely provided additional, independent evidence
sufficient to prove in court that, in each instance, the dis-
crimination they suffered lacked justification from a judicial
standpoint. Ante, at 370 (stating that instances of dis-
crimination are “described out of context”). Perhaps this
explains the Court’s view that there is “minimal evidence
of unconstitutional state discrimination.” Ibid. But a leg-

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islature is not a court of law. And Congress, unlike courts,
must, and does, routinely draw general conclusions—for ex-
ample, of likely motive or of likely relationship to legitimate
need—from anecdotal and opinion-based evidence of this
kind, particularly when the evidence lacks strong refutation.
See Task Force Report 16, 20 (task force “met many times
with significant representatives of groups opposed to [the]
ADA,” and as to the general public, although the task force
received “about 2,000 letters” in support of the ADA, there
was only “one letter in opposition”); S. Rep. No. 101–116,
at 10 (summarizing testimony that many reasonable accom-
modations cost “less than $50,” and the expense of others,
such as hiring employees who can interpret for the deaf, is
“frequently exaggerated”). In reviewing § 5 legislation, we
have never required the sort of extensive investigation of
each piece of evidence that the Court appears to contemplate.
Compare ante, at 370–371, with Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U. S. 641, 652–656 (1966) (asking whether Congress’ likely
conclusions were reasonable, not whether there was ade-
quate evidentiary support in the record). Nor has the Court
traditionally required Congress to make findings as to state
discrimination, or to break down the record evidence, cate-
gory by category. Compare ante, at 371–372 (noting state-
ments in two congressional Reports that mentioned state
discrimination in public services and transportation but
not in employment), with Morgan, supra, at 654 (considering
what Congress “might” have concluded); 384 U. S., at 652
(holding that likely discrimination against Puerto Ricans in
areas other than voting supported statute abolishing literacy
test as qualification for voting).
Regardless, Congress expressly found substantial unjus-
tified discrimination against persons with disabilities. 42
U. S. C. § 12101(9) (finding a pattern of “unnecessary dis-
crimination and prejudice” that “costs the United States
billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from
dependency and nonproductivity” (emphasis added)). See
also 2 Legislative History of the Americans with Disabilities

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381 Cite as: 531 U. S. 356 (2001)
Breyer, J., dissenting
Act (Leg. Hist.) (Committee Print compiled for the House
Committee on Education and Labor), Ser. No. 102–B, p. 1620
(1990) (testimony of Arlene B. Mayerson) (describing “un-
justifiable and discriminatory loss of job opportunities”);
id., at 1623 (citing study showing “ ‘strong evidence that em-
ployers’ fears of low performance among disabled workers
are unjustified’ ”). Moreover, it found that such discrimina-
tion typically reflects “stereotypic assumptions” or “purpose-
ful unequal treatment.” 42 U. S. C. § 12101(7). See also 2
Leg. Hist. 1622 (testimony of Arlene B. Mayerson) (“Out-
moded stereotypes whether manifested in medical or other
job ‘requirements’ that are unrelated to the successful per-
formance of the job, or in decisions based on the generalized
perceptions of supervisors and hiring personnel, have ex-
cluded many disabled people from jobs for which they are
qualified”). In making these findings, Congress followed
our decision in Cleburne, which established that not only dis-
crimination against persons with disabilities that rests upon
“ ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group,’ ”
473 U. S., at 447 (quoting Department of Agriculture v. Mo-
reno, 413 U. S. 528, 534 (1973) (omission in Cleburne)), vio-
lates the Fourteenth Amendment, but also discrimination
that rests solely upon “negative attitude[s],” “fea[r],” 473
U. S., at 448, or “irrational prejudice,” id., at 450. Adverse
treatment that rests upon such motives is unjustified dis-
crimination in Cleburne’s terms.
The evidence in the legislative record bears out Congress’
finding that the adverse treatment of persons with disabili-
ties was often arbitrary or invidious in this sense, and thus
unjustified. For example, one study that was before Con-
gress revealed that “most . . . governmental agencies in [one
State] discriminated in hiring against job applicants for an
average period of five years after treatment for cancer,”
based in part on coworkers’ misguided belief that “cancer is
contagious.” 2 Leg. Hist. 1619–1620 (testimony of Arlene
B. Mayerson). A school inexplicably refused to exempt a
deaf teacher, who taught at a school for the deaf, from a

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382 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
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“listening skills” requirement. Government’s Lodging 1503.
A State refused to hire a blind employee as director of an
agency for the blind—even though he was the most qualified
applicant. Id., at 974. Certain state agencies apparently
had general policies against hiring or promoting persons
with disabilities. Id., at 1159, 1577. A zoo turned away
children with Downs Syndrome “because [the zookeeper]
feared they would upset the chimpanzees.” S. Rep. No. 101–
116, at 7. There were reports of numerous zoning decisions
based upon “negative attitudes” or “fear,” Cleburne, supra,
at 448, such as a zoning board that denied a permit for an
obviously pretextual reason after hearing arguments that
a facility would house “ ‘deviants’ ” who needed “ ‘room to
roam,’ ” Government’s Lodging 1068. A complete listing of
the hundreds of examples of discrimination by state and local
governments that were submitted to the task force is set
forth in Appendix C, infra. Congress could have reasonably
believed that these examples represented signs of a wide-
spread problem of unconstitutional discrimination.
II
The Court’s failure to find sufficient evidentiary support
may well rest upon its decision to hold Congress to a strict,
judicially created evidentiary standard, particularly in re-
spect to lack of justification. Justice Kennedy’s empirical
conclusion—which rejects that of Congress—rests heavily
upon his failure to find “extensive litigation and discus-
sion of the constitutional violations,” in “the courts of the
United States.” Ante, at 376 (concurring opinion) (emphasis
added). And the Court itself points out that, when economic
or social legislation is challenged in court as irrational, hence
unconstitutional, the “burden is upon the challenging party
to negative any reasonably conceivable state of facts that
could provide a rational basis for the classification.” Ante,
at 367 (internal quotation marks omitted). Or as Justice
Brandeis, writing for the Court, put the matter many years
ago, “ ‘if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that

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383 Cite as: 531 U. S. 356 (2001)
Breyer, J., dissenting
would sustain’ ” challenged legislation, then “ ‘there is a pre-
sumption of the existence of that state of facts, and one who
assails the classification must carry the burden of show-
ing . . . that the action is arbitrary.’ ” Pacific States Box
& Basket Co. v. White, 296 U. S. 176, 185 (1935) (quoting
Borden’s Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194, 209
(1934)). Imposing this special “burden” upon Congress, the
Court fails to find in the legislative record sufficient indica-
tion that Congress has “negative[d]” the presumption that
state action is rationally related to a legitimate objective.
Ante, at 367.
The problem with the Court’s approach is that neither
the “burden of proof ” that favors States nor any other rule
of restraint applicable to judges applies to Congress when
it exercises its § 5 power. “Limitations stemming from the
nature of the judicial process . . . have no application to
Congress.” Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 248 (1970)
(Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Rational-basis review—with its pre-
sumptions favoring constitutionality—is “a paradigm of judi-
cial restraint.” FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508
U. S. 307, 314 (1993) (emphasis added). And the Congress
of the United States is not a lower court.
Indeed, the Court in Cleburne drew this very institutional
distinction. We emphasized that “courts have been very re-
luctant, as they should be in our federal system and with our
respect for the separation of powers, to closely scrutinize
legislative choices.” 473 U. S., at 441. Our invocation of
judicial deference and respect for Congress was based on the
fact that “[§ ]5 of the [Fourteenth] Amendment empowers
Congress to enforce [the equal protection] mandate.” Id.,
at 439 (emphasis added). Indeed, we made clear that the
absence of a contrary congressional finding was critical to
our decision to apply mere rational-basis review to disability
discrimination claims—a “congressional direction” to apply
a more stringent standard would have been “controlling.”
Ibid. See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 248

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384 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Breyer, J., dissenting
(1976) (refusing to invalidate a law based on the Equal Pro-
tection Clause because a disparate-impact standard “should
await legislative prescription”). Cf. Mitchell, supra, at 284
(Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Con-
gress may paint with a much broader brush than may this
Court, which must confine itself to the judicial function of
deciding individual cases and controversies upon individual
records”). In short, the Court’s claim that “to uphold the
Act’s application to the States would allow Congress to re-
write the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this
Court in Cleburne,” ante, at 374, is repudiated by Cleburne
itself.
There is simply no reason to require Congress, seeking to
determine facts relevant to the exercise of its § 5 authority,
to adopt rules or presumptions that reflect a court’s insti-
tutional limitations. Unlike courts, Congress can readily
gather facts from across the Nation, assess the magnitude
of a problem, and more easily find an appropriate remedy.
Cf. Cleburne, supra, at 442–443 (addressing the problems
of the “large and diversified group” of persons with disabili-
ties “is a difficult and often a technical matter, very much a
task for legislators guided by qualified professionals and not
by the perhaps ill-informed opinions of the judiciary”). Un-
like courts, Congress directly reflects public attitudes and
beliefs, enabling Congress better to understand where, and
to what extent, refusals to accommodate a disability amount
to behavior that is callous or unreasonable to the point of
lacking constitutional justification. Unlike judges, Members
of Congress can directly obtain information from constit-
uents who have firsthand experience with discrimination and
related issues.
Moreover, unlike judges, Members of Congress are elected.
When the Court has applied the majority’s burden of proof
rule, it has explained that we, i. e., the courts, do not “ ‘sit
as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of
legislative policy determinations.’ ” Heller, 509 U. S., at 319

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385 Cite as: 531 U. S. 356 (2001)
Breyer, J., dissenting
(quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976)
(per curiam)). To apply a rule designed to restrict courts
as if it restricted Congress’ legislative power is to stand
the underlying principle—a principle of judicial restraint—
on its head. But without the use of this burden of proof
rule or some other unusually stringent standard of review,
it is difficult to see how the Court can find the legislative
record here inadequate. Read with a reasonably favor-
able eye, the record indicates that state governments sub-
jected those with disabilities to seriously adverse, disparate
treatment. And Congress could have found, in a significant
number of instances, that this treatment violated the sub-
stantive principles of justification—shorn of their judicial-
restraint-related presumptions—that this Court recognized
in Cleburne.
III
The Court argues in the alternative that the statute’s
damages remedy is not “congruent” with and “proportional”
to the equal protection problem that Congress found. Ante,
at 374 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 520
(1997)). The Court suggests that the Act’s “reasonable ac-
commodation” requirement, 42 U. S. C. § 12112(b)(5)(A), and
disparate-impact standard, § 12112(b)(3)(A), “far excee[d]
what is constitutionally required.” Ante, at 372. But we
have upheld disparate-impact standards in contexts where
they were not “constitutionally required.” Compare Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 432 (1971), with Washing-
ton, supra, at 239, and City of Rome v. United States, 446
U. S. 156, 172–173 (1980), with Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S.
55, 62 (1980) (plurality opinion).
And what is wrong with a remedy that, in response to
unreasonable employer behavior, requires an employer to
make accommodations that are reasonable? Of course, what
is “reasonable” in the statutory sense and what is “unreason-
able” in the constitutional sense might differ. In other
words, the requirement may exceed what is necessary to

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386 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Breyer, J., dissenting
avoid a constitutional violation. But it is just that power—
the power to require more than the minimum—that § 5
grants to Congress, as this Court has repeatedly confirmed.
As long ago as 1880, the Court wrote that § 5 “brought
within the domain of congressional power” whatever “tends
to enforce submission” to its “prohibitions” and “to secure to
all persons . . . the equal protection of the laws.” Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 346 (1880). More recently, the Court
added that § 5’s “draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by
a specific provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary
and Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18.” Morgan, 384 U. S.,
at 650 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421
(1819)).
In keeping with these principles, the Court has said that
“[i]t is not for us to review the congressional resolution of . . .
the various conflicting considerations—the risk or pervasive-
ness of the discrimination in governmental services . . . ,
the adequacy or availability of alternative remedies, and the
nature and significance of the state interests that would be
affected.” 384 U. S., at 653. “It is enough that we be able
to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve
the conflict as it did.” Ibid. See also South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 324 (1966) (interpreting the simi-
larly worded Enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment to permit Congress to use “any rational means to effec-
tuate the constitutional prohibition”). Nothing in the words
“reasonable accommodation” suggests that the requirement
has no “tend[ency] to enforce” the Equal Protection Clause,
Ex parte Virginia, supra, at 346, that it is an irrational way
to achieve the objective, Katzenbach, supra, at 324, that it
would fall outside the scope of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, Morgan, supra, at 650, or that it somehow other-
wise exceeds the bounds of the “appropriate,” U. S. Const.,
Amdt. 14, § 5.
The Court’s more recent cases have professed to follow the
longstanding principle of deference to Congress. See Kimel

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387 Cite as: 531 U. S. 356 (2001)
Breyer, J., dissenting
v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 81 (2000) (“Congress’
§ 5 power is not confined to the enactment of legislation
that merely parrots the precise wording of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Rather, Congress can prohibit a “somewhat
broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself
forbidden by the Amendment’s text”); Florida Prepaid Post-
secondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527
U. S. 627, 639 (1999) (“ ‘Congress must have wide latitude’ ”)
(quoting City of Boerne, supra, at 519–520); City of Boerne,
supra, at 528 (reaffirming Morgan); 521 U. S., at 536 (Con-
gress’ “conclusions are entitled to much deference”). And
even today, the Court purports to apply, not to depart from,
these standards. Ante, at 365. But the Court’s analysis
and ultimate conclusion deprive its declarations of practical
significance. The Court ‘sounds the word of promise to the
ear but breaks it to the hope.’
IV
The Court’s harsh review of Congress’ use of its § 5 power
is reminiscent of the similar (now-discredited) limitation that
it once imposed upon Congress’ Commerce Clause power.
Compare Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936), with
United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 123 (1941) (rejecting
Carter Coal’s rationale). I could understand the legal basis
for such review were we judging a statute that discriminated
against those of a particular race or gender, see United
States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515 (1996), or a statute that
threatened a basic constitutionally protected liberty such as
free speech, see Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,
521 U. S. 844 (1997); see also Post & Siegel, Equal Protection
by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Mor-
rison and Kimel, 110 Yale L. J. 441, 477 (2000) (stating that
the Court’s recent review of § 5 legislation appears to ap-
proach strict scrutiny); 1 L. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law § 5–16, p. 959 (3d ed. 2000) (same). The legislation
before us, however, does not discriminate against anyone,
nor does it pose any threat to basic liberty. And it is diffi-

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388 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Breyer, J., dissenting
cult to understand why the Court, which applies “minimum
‘rational-basis’ review” to statutes that burden persons with
disabilities, ante, at 366, subjects to far stricter scrutiny a
statute that seeks to help those same individuals.
I recognize nonetheless that this statute imposes a burden
upon States in that it removes their Eleventh Amendment
protection from suit, thereby subjecting them to potential
monetary liability. Rules for interpreting § 5 that would
provide States with special protection, however, run counter
to the very object of the Fourteenth Amendment. By its
terms, that Amendment prohibits States from denying their
citizens equal protection of the laws. U. S. Const., Amdt. 14,
§ 1. Hence “principles of federalism that might otherwise
be an obstacle to congressional authority are necessarily
overridden by the power to enforce the Civil War Amend-
ments ‘by appropriate legislation.’ Those Amendments
were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power
and an intrusion on state sovereignty.” City of Rome, 446
U. S., at 179. See also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445,
456 (1976); Ex parte Virginia, supra, at 345. And, ironi-
cally, the greater the obstacle the Eleventh Amendment
poses to the creation by Congress of the kind of remedy at
issue here—the decentralized remedy of private damages ac-
tions—the more Congress, seeking to cure important na-
tional problems, such as the problem of disability discrimina-
tion before us, will have to rely on more uniform remedies,
such as federal standards and court injunctions, 42 U. S. C.
§ 12188(a)(2), which are sometimes draconian and typically
more intrusive. See College Savings Bank v. Florida Pre-
paid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, 704–705
(1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Cf. ante, at 374, n. 9. For
these reasons, I doubt that today’s decision serves any con-
stitutionally based federalism interest.
The Court, through its evidentiary demands, its non-
deferential review, and its failure to distinguish between
judicial and legislative constitutional competencies, improp-
erly invades a power that the Constitution assigns to Con-

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389 Cite as: 531 U. S. 356 (2001)
Appendix A to opinion of Breyer, J.
gress. Morgan, 384 U. S., at 648, n. 7 (The “sponsors and
supporters of the [Fourteenth] Amendment were primarily
interested in augmenting the power of Congress”). Its deci-
sion saps § 5 of independent force, effectively “confin[ing] the
legislative power . . . to the insignificant role of abrogating
only those state laws that the judicial branch [is] prepared
to adjudge unconstitutional.” Id., at 648–649. Whether
the Commerce Clause does or does not enable Congress to
enact this provision, see, e. g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Flor-
ida, 517 U. S. 44, 100–185 (1996) (Souter, J., joined by Gins-
burg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting); College Savings Bank,
supra, at 699–700 (Breyer, J., dissenting), in my view, § 5
gives Congress the necessary authority.
For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.
APPENDIX A TO OPINION OF BREYER, J.
Congressional hearings on the Americans with Disabilities
Act
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on H. R.
2273 before the House Committee on the Judiciary and the
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing on H. R. 2273
and S. 933 before the Subcommittee on Transportation and
Hazardous Materials of the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1990).
Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearings on H. R. 2273
before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation of the
House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1990).
Americans with Disabilities: Telecommunications Relay
Services, Hearing on Title V of H. R. 2273 before the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1990).
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearing on H. R.
2273 before the Subcommittee on Select Education of the

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390 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Appendix B to opinion of Breyer, J.
House Committee on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989).
Field Hearing on Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Select Education of the House
Committee on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989).
Hearing on H. R. 2273, The Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1989: Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Select
Education and Employment Opportunities of the House
Committee on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(July 18 & Sept. 13, 1989) (two hearings).
Oversight Hearing on H. R. 4498, Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1988: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Select
Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1989).
Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing before the House
Committee on Small Business, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990);
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933
before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Re-
sources and the Subcommittee on the Handicapped, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (May 1989 Hearings).
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988: Joint Hearing on
S. 2345 before the Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources and the
Subcommittee on Select Education of the House Committee
on Education and Labor, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1989).
APPENDIX B TO OPINION OF BREYER, J.
Disability discrimination laws enacted by Congress prior to
the Americans with Disabilities Act
Act of June 10, 1948, ch. 434, 62 Stat. 351
Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, 42 U. S. C. § 4151 et seq.
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 701 et seq.

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Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. 91–230, Title VI,
84 Stat. 175 (reenacted in 1990 as the Individuals with Dis-
abilities Education Act, 20 U. S. C. § 1400 et seq.)
Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act,
42 U. S. C. § 6000 et seq.
Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act, 42
U. S. C. § 1973ee et seq.
Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, 49 U. S. C. § 41705
Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act of
1986, 42 U. S. C. § 10801 et seq.
Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U. S. C. § 3604.
APPENDIX C TO OPINION OF BREYER, J.
Submissions made by individuals to the Task Force on
Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities.
See the Government’s Lodging (available in Clerk of Court’s
case file).
ALABAMA
Page No.
00002 discrimination against the mentally ill in city zoning
process
00003 inaccessible exercise equipment at University of
Alabama
00004 school failed to train teachers how to work with
students with learning disabilities
00005 courts failed to provide interpretive services for
deaf people
00006 lack of accessible police and court services for deaf
people
00007 inaccessible public transportation
00008 child denied public education because of cerebral
palsy
00009 inaccessible public transportation, which prevented
persons with disabilities from getting to work

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392 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
00010 inaccessible public buildings and services; inacces-
sible transportation
00011 inaccessible public schools; inaccessible public trans-
portation
00013 inaccessible public schools; inaccessible public trans-
portation
00014 failure to enforce building codes requiring access for
persons with disabilities
00015 inaccessible courthouse
00017 lack of instructions for use of voting machine by
blind people; inaccessible restrooms in newly reno-
vated State House
00021 inaccessible public transportation
00023 inaccessible public transportation
00024 failure to enforce state and local laws protecting per-
sons with disabilities
00025 schools failed to provide an adequate education for
children with disabilities
00026 inaccessible public transportation
00027 man denied vocational rehabilitation services based on
his cerebral palsy; inaccessible public transportation
00031 vocational rehabilitation agency failed to provide
services for schizophrenics; zoning discrimination
against group homes
00032 school failed to provide an adequate education
00033 school failed to provide an adequate education
ALASKA
Page No.
00038 school placed child with cerebral palsy in special edu-
cation classes
00041 inaccessible restrooms in state legislature informa-
tion office
00042 inaccessible areas at new Alaska Performing Arts
Center

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Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
00044 inaccessible public transportation, which prevented
persons with disabilities from getting to work
00046 lack of curb cuts in sidewalks near apartment build-
ing for persons with disabilities
00048 child erroneously placed in special education classes
00049 inaccessible new performing arts center
00050 Alaska Psychiatric Institute failed to provide inter-
pretive services for deaf patients
00052 state and local agencies disregarded laws requiring
accessibility
00055 jail failed to provide person with disability medical
treatment
00056 inaccessible government buildings in Seward
00057 inaccessible public transportation
00058 city failed to train employees how to communicate
with people with hearing impairments
00059 segregated seating and inaccessibility at new per-
forming arts center
00061 inaccessibility of State Ferry Columbia and Alaska
Railroad; denial of job interview because person was
in a wheelchair
00062 inaccessible new performing arts center
00063 person using a respirator denied access to Alaska
State Division of Medical Assistance
00065 inaccessible city hall
00067 school district retaliated against teacher for asking
to be assigned to an accessible classroom
00069 inaccessible public transportation
00070 lack of curb cuts; inaccessible public transportation
00071 state agencies failed to provide interpretive services
for deaf people
00072 department of motor vehicles failed to provide inter-
pretive services
00073 inaccessibility of Seward City Hall and other state
and local buildings

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394 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
00075 state university failed to assist in covering expense
of interpretive services for deaf graduate student
00076 inaccessible public buildings
00077 inaccessible public school
ARIZONA
Page No.
00090 survey showing inaccessibility problems in city of
Phoenix’s public services
00110 inaccessible public transportation
00112 inaccessible restrooms at state recreation areas
00116 department of motor vehicles failed to provide visual
signs or other assistance for people with hearing
impairments
00117 person with disability denied police officer job
00119 Arizona Department of Economic Security took 31 ⁄ 2
to 4 years to fix unsafe van lift
00121 county paratransit refused to provide transportation
to college
00124 department of motor vehicles placed restrictions on
driver’s license because of deafness
00125 teacher with hearing impairment denied numerous
jobs
00127 department of motor vehicles failed to assist deaf
people
00129 inaccessible entrance, restroom, water fountain, and
office at building leased by State
00130 woman injured trying to use inaccessible restroom at
roadside rest stop; lack of curb cuts
00131 inaccessible social service agencies
ARKANSAS
Page No.
00136 public school failed to enforce accommodations for
student

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395 Cite as: 531 U. S. 356 (2001)
Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
00138 public school teacher refused to allow student with
disability to use authorized calculator
00139 state university failed to inform student with hearing
impairment about activities and rules
00140 lack of curb cuts
00141 inaccessible public transportation
00143 inaccessible office area at public housing for persons
with disabilities
00144 inaccessible public transportation
00145 inaccessible state office of human services; state
agencies failed to hire persons with disabilities
00146 failure to enforce handicapped parking law
00147 school erroneously placed child with mobility impair-
ment in special education classes
00149 public schools failed to provide interpretive services
for deaf people
00150 inaccessible public transportation
00153 person with disability forced to resign employment
because of architectural barriers
00154 public school held meetings and conferences at in-
accessible locations
00155 physical barriers prevented citizens from voting
00156 rehabilitation services failed to assist people with all
kinds of disabilities
00159 inaccessible city and county buildings
00161 human services office relocated to inaccessible
building
00163 lack of curb cuts
CALIFORNIA
Page No.
00166 inaccessible public recreation sites
00168 California Relay System failed to provide telephone
access to other States for deaf people

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396 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
00180 public transit failed to provide visual signs for deaf
people
00181 inaccessible public transportation
00202 California Children’s Services refused to help with
cost of caring for child with head injury at home
00206 inaccessible county buildings
00208 deaf people denied access to state agencies that
lacked TDD’s
00210 deaf people denied access to state agencies that
lacked TDD’s
00211 public transit failed to provide visual signs for deaf
people
00212 public transit failed to provide visual signs for deaf
people
00213 limited out-of-state telephone relay services
00214 inaccessible public transportation limited access to
community college
00215 inaccessible public transportation
00218 deaf people denied access to state agencies that
lacked TDD’s
00219 state mental health services failed to provide access
for deaf people
00220 government failed to provide interpretive services
for deaf people
00221 inaccessible public transportation; lack of curb cuts
00222 inaccessible public transportation
00223 inaccessible airport; inaccessible public transpor-
tation
00224 California Relay Service failed to enable deaf people
to make interstate calls
00225 California Relay Service failed to enable deaf people
to make interstate calls
00226 inaccessible public transportation; inaccessible rest-
rooms in public buildings

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Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
00227 University of California attempted to terminate em-
ployees with disabilities for taking medical leave
00231 state agencies failed to provide TDD’s
00232 person denied opportunity to serve on jury because
county failed to provide interpretive services for
deaf people
00236 public school district failed to provide TTD for deaf
parents
00237 California Relay Service failed to enable deaf people
to make interstate calls
00240 lack of curb cuts; inaccessible public transportation
00241 inaccessible public transportation
00244 inaccessible public transportation
00245 California Civil Service Exam held at high school
with inaccessible restrooms
00246 inaccessible restrooms in county administration
building; lack of curb cuts
00247 inaccessible public transportation prevented persons
with disabilities from getting to work; State failed to
enforce laws requiring accessibility
00248 inaccessible public transportation
00249 California Relay Service failed to enable deaf people
to make interstate calls
00250 inaccessible public transportation
00252 inaccessible public transportation
00253 inaccessible public transportation
00254 inaccessible county courthouse; street signals too fast
for safe crossing by wheelchair
00255 public functions failed to provide interpretive serv-
ices for deaf people
00258 deaf people denied access to state agencies that
lacked TDD’s

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398 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
00261 California Basic Educational Skills Test discrimi-
nated against deaf adults who wanted to become
teachers of deaf students
00262 department of motor vehicles required doctors to re-
port patients with seizure disorders and revoked
such patients’ licenses, but did not require reporting
of other conditions that could cause erratic driving
COLORADO
Page No.
00266 person in wheelchair passed by five bus drivers, all
of whom claimed that lifts were broken
00267 lack of curb cuts and ramps; inaccessible public
transportation
00268 inaccessible public transportation
00269 inaccessible public transportation
00270 persons with disabilities placed in segregated public
housing
00271 inaccessible public transportation
00272 lack of curb cuts forced person in wheelchair to use
street
00273 inaccessible county courthouse
00274 inaccessible public transportation
00275 inaccessible public transportation in small cities; pub-
lic schools failed to assist students with disabilities
00276 inaccessible public transportation; inaccessible public
facilities and recreation sites
00277 political parties held caucuses at inaccessible pri-
vate home
00280 children with developmental disabilities required to
attend segregated schools
00281 public school system refused to transfer student with
disabilities from special to regular school until she
brought suit

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Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
00283 vocational rehabilitation agency refused to take re-
ferrals from psychiatric halfway house; person de-
nied driver’s license in Virginia because of mental
illness
CONNECTICUT
Page No.
00285 public school inaccessible to parent with disability
00289 state university denied renewal of contract for grad-
uate assistantship because of age and disability
DELAWARE
Page No.
00301 inaccessible public high school; inaccessible public
transportation
00302 inaccessible public schools; inaccessible public
transportation
00303 inaccessible voting machines; inadequate handi-
capped parking
00308 man with physical disability spent 45 minutes crawl-
ing into polling place because it was inaccessible to
wheelchairs
00310 inaccessible public transportation; public ceremony
held at inaccessible building
00314 failure to enforce laws requiring handicapped park-
ing spaces, which were usually occupied by police cars
00315 high percentage of children with disabilities placed
in segregated schools
00317 restrictive zoning limited reintegration of institu-
tionalized people into community
00319 inaccessible voting system
00323 inaccessible public transportation
00325 inaccessible public transportation made person with
disability late for work; inaccessible library and other
public buildings

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400 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
00329 State refused to fund services for people with men-
tal illness
00330 state transit system provided special vouchers for
persons with physical disabilities, but not for men-
tally ill
00331 state criminal justice system failed to provide psy-
chiatric treatment
00333 State kept child with schizophrenia in Delaware
State Hospital because it lacked services for people
who could be released
00335 state labor department’s restrictive policies pre-
vented persons with disabilities from applying for
employment
00336 failure to enforce laws requiring handicapped park-
ing spaces, which were usually occupied by police
cars
00337 public transportation refused to transport person
carrying oxygen
00338 staff and patients at Delaware State Hospital sex-
ually abused women patients
00343 inaccessible public transportation
00345 state police interrogated deaf citizens without pro-
viding interpretive services
00347 vocational high school sought to transfer student
back to special segregated school
GEORGIA
Page No.
00362 public colleges failed to provide assistance for stu-
dents with learning disabilities
00365 University of Georgia students with disabilities faced
architectural barriers, inaccessible public transpor-
tation, lack of housing, and failure to enforce handi-
capped parking laws

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Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
00366 inaccessible classrooms at University of Georgia
00367 University of Georgia located its office of handi-
capped services in inaccessible second floor office
00370 University of Georgia charged students with learn-
ing disabilities $600 per quarter for services that
other students with disabilities received at no cost
00371 Learning Disability Adult Clinic at University of
Georgia charged unreasonable fees
00372 inaccessible public transportation
00374 traffic court failed to provide interpretive services
for deaf person
HAWAII
Page No.
00444 inaccessible public transportation
00446 inaccessible public transportation
00448 state university failed to enforce handicapped park-
ing laws
00451 state employee in wheelchair forced to resign job
because frequently unable to get to office due to
broken elevator in state building; State Commission
on the Handicapped refused employee’s request for
reasonable accommodation
00452 state university failed to provide blind student with
timely or adequate books on tape for coursework;
lack of signs or information for blind people using
public transit
00455 person with disability denied opportunity to testify
because department of labor held hearing in an in-
accessible room
00456 state employment agency refused to provide inter-
pretive services for deaf people
00457 public school put three-year-old deaf child in same
class as fourth graders

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402 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
00458 quadriplegic person who had California driver’s li-
cense denied license by Hawaii
00460 state government office refused to interview persons
with emotional disorder or history of alcoholism
00461 inaccessible state buildings
00462 person with mobility impairment denied serious con-
sideration for state job due to unreliability of acces-
sible public transportation
00463 inaccessible public transportation prevented person
with disability from getting to work; inaccessible
public buildings
00464 lack of curb cuts forced person in wheelchair to use
street
00467 elevators in public buildings not marked for blind
people; bus drivers failed to announce stops for
blind people
00468 inaccessible public transportation; bus drivers har-
assed mentally retarded passengers
00469 inaccessible public transportation
00472 state mental health system had restrictive institu-
tional policies
00473 state social service employees placed limits on oppor-
tunities for persons with disabilities based on stereo-
typical assumptions
00474 lack of curb cuts and ramps
00475 inaccessible public transportation
00476 inaccessible public transportation
00477 inaccessible public library
00479 denial of certain licenses to persons with mental
disabilities
00480 inaccessible restroom in state park; lack of curb cuts
00484 state and local government meetings failed to pro-
vide interpretive services for deaf people
00485 students with disabilities unable to participate in
school interscholastic sports

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Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
00486 blind people prevented from traveling outside State
because quarantine laws permitted no exemption for
their guide dogs
00487 state mental health services unavailable for deaf
people due to failure to train staff
00488 inaccessible public transportation; inaccessible city
and county buildings
00490 handi-van refused service to person paralyzed from
waist down
00491 inaccessible public transportation
00492 state agencies failed to monitor conditions in commu-
nity residential facilities for persons with disabilities
00494 inaccessible public transportation
00495 inaccessible public transportation
00496 inadequate assistance for deaf person at court
appearance
IDAHO
Page No.
00502 inaccessible public transportation
00505 inaccessible public transportation
00506 adult victims of abuse with developmental disabili-
ties denied equal rights to testify in court
00507 inaccessible public recreation activities
00508 inaccessible public transportation
00509 lack of curb cuts
00510 inaccessible public transportation
00511 city and county failed to provide assistance for deaf
people at public meetings
00514 inaccessible public transportation
00515 public school failed to provide adequate assistance
for students with disabilities
00516 inaccessible public transportation

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404 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
00517 public defenders’ offices and public meetings failed
to provide interpretive services for deaf people;
police harassed persons with disabilities who ap-
peared to be intoxicated
00518 vocational rehabilitation agency lacked TTY service
00521 government agencies lacked staff to assist people
with head injuries
00522 inaccessible public transportation
00523 inaccessible public transportation
00524 inaccessible public transportation; inaccessible pub-
lic buildings
00528 limited access at new county courthouse, library, and
city hall
00531 school district refused to hire licensed teacher be-
cause of speech impediment
00533 public school failed to provide assistance for deaf
student
00537 public school failed to provide interpretive services
for deaf student
00540 Idaho lacked statewide telephone relay service for
deaf people
00541 department of employment and department of health
and welfare lacked telephone access for deaf people
00543 inaccessible restrooms at public high school; student
in wheelchair denied admission to regular classes
ILLINOIS
Page No.
00546 state system for providing ballots to people unable
to enter polling place and special bus service caused
long wait outside in cold weather
00548 schools that mainstream deaf children refused to hire
deaf teacher
00553 government failed to provide interpretive services
for deaf people at public hearing on school budget

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405 Cite as: 531 U. S. 356 (2001)
Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
00554 lack of curb cuts; inaccessible public transportation
00559 department of rehabilitation limited services to per-
sons with disabilities by threatening placement in
nursing home
00569 police stations lacked TTY service
00572 deaf people arrested and held in jail overnight with-
out explanation because of failure to provide inter-
pretive services
00573 inaccessible polling place
00574 inaccessible public schools prevented attendance at
PTA meetings
00575 inaccessible public transportation
00576 inaccessible public transportation
00578 lack of curb cuts and ramps for wheelchairs
00579 most state housing agencies lacked telecommunica-
tions devices or interpretive services for deaf people
00581 state and local government agencies lacked tele-
communications devices for deaf people
00583 emergency medical, police, and fire services lacked
TDD’s or personnel trained to receive TDD calls
00585 inaccessible public pools; inaccessible restrooms in
municipal building
00586 inaccessible public transportation
00587 inaccessible polling place
00588 inaccessible polling place
00589 inaccessible public transportation
00590 inaccessible public transportation
00591 inaccessible library
00592 inaccessible voting system
00594 inaccessible polling place
00595 lack of curb cuts
00596 inaccessible public transportation
00597 inaccessible public transportation
00600 inaccessible public transportation
00603 inaccessible public transportation

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406 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
00605 lack of curb cuts; inaccessible public buildings; in-
accessible public transportation; inaccessible polling
place
INDIANA
Page No.
00608 state vocational rehabilitation agency refused to help
person it classified as severely disabled
00609 for five years, state vocational rehabilitation agency
failed to provide assistance
00612 inadequate curb cuts
00613 inaccessible public transportation
00616 inaccessible public transportation
00618 inadequate curb cuts
00619 inaccessible public transportation; inaccessible pub-
lic facilities
00621 inaccessible public transportation
00622 government agencies failed to provide interpretive
services and TTY/TDD’s for deaf people
00629 deaf counselors discouraged from applying for jobs
as rehabilitation counselors for deaf people
00637 staff at state psychiatric facilities abused and physi-
cally dragged patients
00644 person with disability dismissed as director of deaf
unit at Central State Hospital
00651 public meetings held at inaccessible locations
00653 inaccessible polling place
00655 state counselors failed to provide rehabilitation as-
sistance to person with head injury
IOWA
Page No.
00659 person dismissed as city bus operator after seeking
treatment for mental illness
00664 state commission failed to supply necessary equip-
ment for deaf and blind employee

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407 Cite as: 531 U. S. 356 (2001)
Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
00665 high school limited opportunities for mentally re-
tarded student to be integrated
KANSAS
Page No.
00670 Kansas Commission of Civil Rights denied legally
blind person job as investigator because of lim-
ited ability to drive and refused to allow accom-
modation that would have permitted use of public
transportation
00673 police failed to provide interpretive services after
arresting deaf man
00676 Kansas Department of Transportation fired person
because she had epilepsy
00679 state investigator failed to examine employment dis-
crimination claims
00685 inaccessible public transportation
00695 county failed to assist mentally ill with housing and
vocational opportunities
00696 damaged sidewalks and poor street lighting posed
risk to persons with disabilities
00704 inaccessible city-owned arena
KENTUCKY
Page No.
00706 bus driver bypassed person standing at stop with
guide dog
00709 inaccessible public transportation
00712 department of employment services failed to make
reasonable accommodations for persons with dis-
abilities
00717 lack of curb cuts; inaccessible public transportation
00720 inaccessible public transportation
00723 state employment service refused to place person in
wheelchair
00724 inaccessible public buildings

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408 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
00729 public library, police department, and state uni-
versity library lacked personnel trained to use TTY
devices
00731 state university failed to provide assistance to part-
time teacher with a disability
00732 State prevented deaf teachers from teaching deaf stu-
dents by requiring courses such as music education
00733 inaccessible public transportation
00736 inaccessible public transportation
00740 Kentucky School for the Deaf preferred hiring hear-
ing teachers rather than deaf teachers
LOUISIANA
Page No.
00743 inaccessible housing for graduate students at Loui-
siana State University
00745 inaccessible public transportation
00748 police assumed person with coordination problems
was drunk
00751 inaccessible public transportation
00752 vocational rehabilitation program failed to provide
services for person with head injury
00753 inaccessible public transportation prevented persons
with disabilities from getting to work
00758 inaccessible voting machine
00759 Louisiana Sheriffs Pension and Relief Fund denied
membership to person with disability
00773 inaccessible public transportation; lack of curb cuts
00776 inaccessible buildings at Louisiana State University
MAINE
Page No.
00778 inadequate sidewalk ramps; failure to enforce handi-
capped parking laws

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409 Cite as: 531 U. S. 356 (2001)
Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
00780 failure to enforce state regulations requiring accessi-
bility in public buildings
00782 town refused request for interpretive services for
deaf people at town meeting
MARYLAND
Page No.
00785 public transportation unsafe for persons with dis-
abilities
00787 public libraries, state prison, and other state offices
lacked TDD’s
00788 department of human relations failed to provide in-
terpretive services for deaf people and did not an-
swer TTY calls
00789 vocational rehabilitation counselors failed to help
deaf people find jobs
00797 inaccessible public transportation
00798 state hospital refused to provide interpretive serv-
ices for deaf people
MASSACHUSETTS
Page No.
00808 Office for Children refused to license blind person as
day-care assistant
00812 inaccessible courthouse
00813 inaccessible restrooms in state building and state
armory
00816 state college threatened to terminate employee be-
cause of blindness
00829 Massachusetts Adoption Exchange refused to let
family with mother who had muscular dystrophy
adopt child

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410 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
00835 department of vocational rehabilitation hired able-
bodied person instead of qualified person in
wheelchair
MICHIGAN
Page No.
00920 person denied admission to University of Michigan
Medical School because of speech impediment
00921 inaccessible state university campuses
00922 65 percent of voting precincts in Detroit inaccessible
00923 buses with lifts often failed to stop for people in
wheelchairs or their lifts did not work
00924 state employee threatened with discipline for serving
on and attending meetings of Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission advisory committee
00925 state university stadium lacked accessible restrooms,
water fountains, and telephones
00926 inaccessible public transportation
00928 school system failed to hire teachers who could com-
municate with deaf students
00932 state university denied interpretive services to
part-time deaf student
00933 public transportation refused to serve persons in
wheelchairs; public agency refused to provide inter-
pretive services for deaf people
00939 state university had transportation system for stu-
dents with disabilities but not for faculty and staff
00947 state university lacked adequate curb ramps
00950 State denied driver’s license to person with epilepsy
00958 inaccessible public recreation facilities
00960 inaccessible government buildings
00961 state university denied sabbatical proposal of faculty
member with disability
00963 Michigan Rehabilitation Services placed people in
inappropriate positions

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Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
00964 Michigan Rehabilitation Services failed to accommo-
date mentally ill persons
00968 inaccessible public transportation
00969 man with disability forced to use girls’ restroom at
state job
00970 person with disability terminated from county job
and banned from future county employment
MINNESOTA
Page No.
00974 person with disability and score of 100 was finalist
for job as director of agency for the blind, but able-
bodied person with score of 70 was hired
00980 person with cerebral palsy humiliated at interview
for job with state department of education
MISSISSIPPI
Page No.
00853 inaccessible public transportation
00855 inaccessible beaches, pools, and parks
00984 inaccessible classrooms and library at Mississippi
School for the Deaf
00985 no state agency to provide or coordinate community
service programs for deaf adults
00986 inaccessible classrooms at Mississippi School for the
Deaf
00987 public programs failed to provide interpretive serv-
ices for deaf people; government failed to post cau-
tion signs warning drivers of deaf children
00988 inaccessible polling places and voting booths
00989 inaccessible public buildings
00990 courts refused to pay for qualified interpretive serv-
ices for deaf people
00992 inaccessible state university building
00993 teacher denied position at public elementary school
because of need for braces and a cane to walk

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412 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
00994 lack of curb cuts; inaccessible public school rooms;
inaccessible public transportation
00996 inaccessible department of motor vehicles
00997 inaccessible public transportation; inaccessible pub-
lic facilities
00998 inaccessible courthouses
00999 state university instructor refused to teach blind
person
01000 inaccessible public transportation
01001 inaccessible polling place; city employee required to
go outside to get to restroom
MISSOURI
Page No.
01003 lack of curb cuts
01004 inaccessible restrooms in public buildings; lack of
curb cuts
01006 public schools segregated children with disabilities;
inaccessible school buildings
01009 inaccessible public transportation and public build-
ings such as post offices, libraries, schools, and poll-
ing places
01010 state university tried to discourage blind person’s
chosen field of study
01013 inaccessible public transportation
01015 courthouse failed to provide amplified sound system
in courtrooms
MONTANA
Page No.
01017 inadequate curb cuts
01022 inadequate curb cuts in downtown area
01023 state agencies refused to make reasonable accom-
modations to paraplegics seeking employment
01024 inaccessible polling place

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413 Cite as: 531 U. S. 356 (2001)
Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
01026 person in wheelchair forced to vote in street
01027 inaccessible polling place
NEBRASKA
Page No.
01029 government failed to provide interpretive services
for deaf people serving on juries, commissions, and
committees
01031 local school district failed to provide interpretive
services for deaf child
01034 inaccessible entrance at office of county assistance
NEVADA
Page No.
01038 local government failed to provide assistance for peo-
ple with head injuries
01043 inaccessible government buildings and public facilities
01044 person with disability denied access to public trans-
portation because it took too long to get on and off
bus
01046 community college refused to provide interpretive
services for deaf people
01050 city ordinance prevented mentally ill from living in
residential areas
01051 inaccessible public transportation; inadequate curb
cuts and ramps
01053 failure to enforce handicapped parking laws
01054 lack of sidewalk and crosswalk accommodations for
persons in wheelchairs
NEW HAMPSHIRE
Page No.
01057 state agency failed to assist persons with head in-
juries despite availability of state surplus funds

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414 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
01061 vocational rehabilitation counselor tried to cut off
funds and assistance to person with disability
NEW JERSEY
Page No.
01067 commission for the blind and visually impaired de-
moted visually impaired person
01068 zoning commission denied permission to open home
for persons with head injuries
01069 architectural barriers on Cumberland County Col-
lege campus
01072 inadequate curb cuts
NEW MEXICO
Page No.
01080 state university denied entry into school of social
work to blind person but admitted partially sighted
person with lower grades
01083 New Mexico lacked statewide TDD relay service
01091 prisoners with developmental disabilities subjected
to longer terms and abused by other prisoners in
state correctional system
01092 inaccessible public transportation
01095 University of New Mexico failed to provide assist-
ance for blind student
01097 city and county government offices lacked TDD’s
01098 University of New Mexico hospital failed to provide
interpretive services for deaf patients
01099 University of New Mexico failed to provide interpre-
tive services for deaf students
01100 inaccessible buildings on University of New Mexico
campus

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415 Cite as: 531 U. S. 356 (2001)
Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
NEW YORK
Page No.
01109 state agencies failed to hire persons with disabilities
01114 custodian in public high school denied request of per-
son with disability to use locked elevator
01119 at state legislature, person in wheelchair had to wait
45 minutes to use freight elevator
01129 public village meetings held in second floor meet-
ing room with no elevator; many polling places
inaccessible
01130 lack of curb cuts; failure to enforce handicapped park-
ing laws
01134 inaccessible state parks and public beaches
NORTH CAROLINA
Page No.
01144 public elementary school initially denied admission
and then charged extra fee for child with Down’s
Syndrome to attend afterschool day-care program
01155 blind people told not to participate in regular public
parks and recreation programs
01158 state agencies, other than services for the blind and
vocational rehabilitation, employed few persons
with disabilities
01161 police arrested and jailed deaf person without pro-
viding interpretive services
NORTH DAKOTA
Page No.
01170 person with disability denied access to driver’s li-
cense exam because held in inaccessible room
01172 inaccessible polling places
01175 lack of curb cuts; failure to enforce handicapped park-
ing laws; inaccessible polling places; inaccessible city
government meetings

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416 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
01178 failure to enforce handicapped parking laws
01183 inaccessible polling places; inaccessible state and
local government buildings
01185 government agencies failed to enforce policies re-
garding hiring persons with disabilities; inaccessible
polling places; inaccessible public buildings
01186 state and local government failed to hire persons
with disabilities; inaccessible polling places
01187 failure to enforce handicapped parking laws
01196 person with head-injury disability denied considera-
tion for position of election polls inspector
OHIO
Page No.
01215 city failed to trim trees regularly, which posed a
hazard to blind people
01216 inaccessible state, county, and city buildings
01218 inaccessible social service agency offices; inaccessible
public transportation
01221 vocational rehabilitation agency denied assistance to
person with disability
01224 rehabilitation services agency failed to assist para-
noid schizophrenic
01229 vocational rehabilitation agency discouraged person
with disability from being a nurse
01230 persons with disabilities denied jobs because of in-
accessible public transportation
01231 blind person denied driver’s license though legally
eligible
01234 inaccessible public transportation; lack of curb cuts
01235 public paratransit system often left passengers
stranded
01236 vocational rehabilitation agency steered person with
mental disability to menial job, despite his Ph.D.
degree

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Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
01239 police failed to provide interpretive services for deaf
person who was arrested
01241 Cleveland State University lacked wheelchair ramps
01242 inaccessible public transportation
OKLAHOMA
Page No.
01251 Tulsa Housing Authority failed to communicate with
and provide information to tenants with disabilities
01258 state employment office lacked TDD or workers with
interpretive skills; state university paid deaf employ-
ees less than hearing employees; state agencies made
no effort to hire deaf applicants
01265 police officer pointed gun at person with disability
who could not get out of car quickly
01266 inaccessible public transportation
01269 person with speech impediment denied numerous
state jobs
01271 inaccessible restrooms at city parks
01275 state government held meeting at hotel with inacces-
sible restrooms
01278 person in wheelchair worked at polling place with
inaccessible restrooms
01280 inaccessible polling places
01286 qualified blind person who offered to provide own
driver denied job as state social worker
OREGON
Page No.
01370 blind people unable to access printed material from
state government
01375 school system barred child with cerebral palsy from
physical education class and gave her cleaning job
instead

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418 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
01377 person with two college degrees and extensive pro-
fessional experience turned down for appropriate
state government jobs and advised to seek entry-
level jobs because of his disability
01378 commission for the handicapped lacked funds to en-
force laws
PENNSYLVANIA
Page No.
01391 public library had restrictive policy regarding issu-
ance of library cards to residents of group homes
01397 government failed to provide interpretive services
for deaf people at school budget hearing
01399 inaccessible public transportation
01407 inaccessible polling places
01408 inaccessible public transportation
01409 inaccessible polling places
01410 inaccessible polling place
01413 inaccessible public transportation; lack of curb cuts
01421 inaccessible public library
01423 inaccessible automatic ticket dispensers on Pennsyl-
vania Turnpike
01425 bus drivers refused to transport person in wheelchair
01427 inaccessible county offices
01429 lack of curb cuts
01430 GED programs offered at inaccessible public schools;
bus drivers unwilling or unable to use wheelchair
lifts
01432 child unable to enroll in first grade because of in-
accessible classroom
01434 lack of curb cuts; inaccessible public transportation
01435 lack of curb cuts in rural areas
01436 inaccessible polling place

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Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
01439 unsafe curb cuts
01441 inaccessible state office building
SOUTH CAROLINA
Page No.
01454 government failed to provide 911 emergency service
for deaf people
01457 state and local agencies, library, and police and fire
departments lacked TDD’s; government failed to pro-
vide interpretive services for deaf people at meetings
SOUTH DAKOTA
Page No.
01466 school district failed to provide adequate services to
child with disability
01467 traffic light and fire hydrant placed where they posed
obstacle to blind pedestrians and those in wheel-
chairs who needed to use curb cuts
01469 inaccessible polling places
01470 inaccessible public transportation
01472 State failed to hire persons with disabilities without
giving a reason
01475 criminal court failed to provide interpretive services
for deaf people
01476 state university denied blind student opportunity to
practice teach as required for teaching certificate
TEXAS
Page No.
01483 poles obstructed sidewalks; lack of curb cuts; inacces-
sible public transportation
01503 state teachers’ exam required deaf teachers who
wanted to teach deaf children to pass section on
speech assessment and listening

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420 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
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01514 medical examination required for renewal of driver’s
license despite unblemished 20-year driving record
01520 inadequate handicapped parking spaces
01521 state vocational rehabilitation agency refused to as-
sist college student who chose to major in political
science
01522 employee of county human services agency denied
handicapped parking place
01526 failure to enforce handicapped parking laws
01527 inaccessible state university transportation system
01529 denial of driver’s licenses or accommodations to take
driver’s test
01531 inaccessible buildings at state university
01536 state hospital sought to discharge mentally ill boy
with HIV
01540 special transit system refused to transport man with
mental retardation though he could not use regular
bus
01542 deaf man not permitted to take state cosmetology
exam with assistance from interpreter
01543 blind man not permitted to take state chiropractic
exam because he could not read x-rays alone
01549 deaf instructors unable to pass state teachers’ exam
for teachers of deaf students that assessed speech
and language skills
01551 inadequate handicapped parking and enforcement
UTAH
Page No.
01554 state rehabilitation service had never hired deaf
counselor or administrator
01556 child denied admission to public school because first-
grade teacher refused to teach him
01563 public school failed to implement state review panel
findings regarding accommodation for child with
disability

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Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
01576 state office for persons with disabilities failed to hire
such persons; inaccessible public transportation
01577 state government denied persons with disabilities
upper level management jobs
01580 rehabilitation services agency discriminated against
employee with reading disability
01581 qualified blind teacher denied job and told that school
needed teacher who could also coach football, but
school hired sighted person who was not a coach
01584 inaccessible public transportation
01586 inaccessible government office
01587 public school teacher refused to give child with learn-
ing disability his grades and said he did not belong
in public school
01592 Utah denied mainstream education to child with
Down’s Syndrome, though child had been main-
streamed in another State
01595 person with disability involuntarily hospitalized and
abused by state university hospital
01613 inaccessible public high school facilities
VERMONT
Page No.
01634 zoning board denied use permit for community men-
tal health center
VIRGINIA
Page No.
01642 student with learning disability misclassified as men-
tally retarded and deemed ineligible to take drama
class at public school
01646 inaccessible buildings at state school for blind and
deaf youth
01647 failure to enforce handicapped parking laws
01654 inaccessible restrooms in government buildings; fail-
ure to enforce handicapped parking laws

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422 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
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01656 state programs for persons with disabilities failed to
communicate with deaf people
01660 lack of state institutional care to rehabilitate people
with head injuries
01663 inaccessible traffic court
01664 inaccessible public transportation
01667 lack of curb cuts
01668 inaccessible public transportation prevented persons
with disabilities from voting
01671 state and local government failed to provide inter-
pretive services for deaf people at meetings
01674 lack of curb cuts outside county courthouse
01675 deaf people denied access to 911 emergency services
01676 inaccessible courthouse
01677 inaccessible public transportation
01678 lack of curb cuts and ramp for access to courthouse
01679 inaccessible county courthouse
01680 inaccessible courthouse and library
01682 inaccessible high school
01683 lack of curb cuts at city’s main intersection
01684 person in wheelchair received ticket for obstructing
street traffic even though sidewalks not accessible
01686 inaccessible transportation on state university
campus
WASHINGTON
Page No.
01690 deaf people required to pay for interpretive services
in court
01692 state government’s lack of TDD deterred deaf people
from applying for employment
01694 government office lacked TDD and interpretive serv-
ices for deaf people

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423 Cite as: 531 U. S. 356 (2001)
Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
01696 state human rights commission lacked staff to pursue
case of discrimination against blind person
01706 community college failed to provide interpretive
services for deaf students or to assist students with
disabilities in other ways
01716 local sheriff ’s department discontinued TDD
01717 inaccessible restroom at state ferry terminal
WEST VIRGINIA
Page No.
01742 inaccessible public transportation
01745 sheriff denied person with disability use of elevator
in courthouse
01746 law enforcement agencies lacked ability to communi-
cate with deaf people
WISCONSIN
Page No.
01752 public school recreation program refused to provide
interpretive services for deaf child
01755 state university hospital and sheriff ’s office failed to
provide TDD’s or trained personnel
01756 inaccessible polling places
01757 person with disabilities denied admission to graduate
study at state university
01758 inaccessible city hall
01759 state offices lacked TDD’s and failed to provide ma-
terial in braille or on tape
01760 department of motor vehicles revoked person with
diabetes’ driver’s license despite doctor’s report
01761 inaccessible public transportation; lack of curb cuts
or ramps
01766 department of motor vehicles tried to revoke license
of person who used hand controls in car

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424 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ALA. v. GARRETT
Appendix C to opinion of Breyer, J.
01767 inaccessible polling places
01771 blind and deaf people denied equal access to jury
service
WYOMING
Page No.
01773 State lacked telephone relay system for deaf people
01775 inaccessible state buildings
01777 department of motor vehicles denied driver’s license
to person with epilepsy
01780 inaccessible buildings at state university
01781 zoning board denied permit for group home for per-
sons with disabilities
01786 person in wheelchair denied marriage license because
courthouse was inaccessible