VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v. UNITED STATES ex rel. STEVENS

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765 OCTOBER TERM, 1999
Syllabus
VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
UNITED STATES ex rel. STEVENS
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit
No. 98–1828. Argued November 29, 1999—Decided May 22, 2000
Under the False Claims Act (FCA), a private person (the relator) may
bring a qui tam civil action “in the name of the [Federal] Government,”
31 U. S. C. § 3730(b)(1), against “[a]ny person” who, inter alia, “know-
ingly presents . . . to . . . the . . . Government . . . a false or fraudulent
claim for payment,” § 3729(a). The relator receives a share of any pro-
ceeds from the action. §§ 3730(d)(1)–(2). Respondent Stevens brought
such an action against petitioner state agency, alleging that it had
submitted false claims to the Environmental Protection Agency in con-
nection with federal grant programs the EPA administered. Petitioner
moved to dismiss, arguing that a State (or state agency) is not a “per-
son” subject to FCA liability and that a qui tam action in federal court
against a State is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The District
Court denied the motion, and petitioner filed an interlocutory appeal.
Respondent United States intervened in the appeal in support of re-
spondent Stevens. The Second Circuit affirmed.
Held: A private individual may not bring suit in federal court on behalf
of the United States against a State (or state agency) under the FCA.
Pp. 771–788.
(a) A private individual has standing to bring suit in federal court
on behalf of the United States under the FCA. Stevens meets the re-
quirements necessary to establish Article III standing. In particular,
he has demonstrated “injury in fact”—a harm that is both “concrete”
and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Whitmore
v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155. He contends he is suing to remedy
injury in fact suffered by the United States—both the injury to its
sovereignty arising from violation of its laws and the proprietary in-
jury resulting from the alleged fraud. The concrete private interest
that Stevens has in the outcome of his suit, in the form of the bounty
he will receive if the suit is successful, is insufficient to confer stand-
ing, since that interest does not consist of obtaining compensation for,
or preventing, the violation of a legally protected right. An adequate
basis for Stevens’ standing, however, is found in the doctrine that the
assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by
the assignor. Because the FCA can reasonably be regarded as effect-

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766 VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
UNITED STATES ex rel. STEVENS
Syllabus
ing a partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim, the United
States’ injury in fact suffices to confer standing on Stevens. This con-
clusion is confirmed by the long tradition of qui tam actions in England
and the American Colonies, which conclusively demonstrates that such
actions were “cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amena-
ble to, and resolved by, the judicial process.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for
Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 102. Pp. 771–778.
(b) The FCA does not subject a State (or state agency) to liability in
a federal-court suit by a private individual on behalf of the United
States. Such a State or agency is not a “person” subject to qui tam
liability under § 3729(a). The Court’s longstanding interpretive pre-
sumption that “person” does not include the sovereign applies to the
text of § 3729(a). Although not a hard and fast rule of exclusion, the
presumption may be disregarded only upon some affirmative showing
of statutory intent to the contrary. As the historical context makes
clear, various features of the FCA, both as originally enacted and as
amended, far from providing the requisite affirmative indications that
the term “person” included States for purposes of qui tam liability, in-
dicate quite the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the ordi-
nary rule of statutory construction that if Congress intends to alter
the usual constitutional balance between States and the Federal Gov-
ernment, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the
statute’s language, and by the doctrine that statutes should be con-
strued so as to avoid difficult constitutional questions. The Court ex-
presses no view as to whether an action in federal court by a qui tam
relator against a State would run afoul of the Eleventh Amendment,
but notes that there is “a serious doubt” on that score. Ashwander v.
TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 348. Pp. 778–787.
162 F. 3d 195, reversed.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined.
Breyer, J., filed a concurring statement, post, p. 788. Ginsburg, J., filed
an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Breyer, J., joined, post,
p. 788. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, J.,
joined, post, p. 789.
J. Wallace Malley, Jr., Deputy Attorney General of Ver-
mont, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the
briefs were William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Bridget
C. Asay, Mark J. Di Stefano, and Wendy Morgan, Assistant

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767 Cite as: 529 U. S. 765 (2000)
Counsel
Attorneys General, David M. Rocchio, Special Assistant At-
torney General, Ronald A. Shems, and Carter G. Phillips.
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for
respondent United States. With him on the briefs were So-
licitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Ogden, Deputy Solicitor General Underwood, Malcolm
L. Stewart, Michael F. Hertz, Douglas N. Letter, and Michael
E. Robinson.
Theodore B. Olson argued the cause for respondent Ste-
vens. With him on the briefs were Thomas G. Hungar,
Miguel A. Estrada, Stephen J. Soule, Matthew E. C. Pifer,
and Mark G. Hall.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of New
York et al. by Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of New York, Preeta D.
Bansal, Solicitor General, Peter H. Schiff, Deputy Solicitor General, and
Howard L. Zwickel, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys
General for their respective States as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama,
Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Janet Napolitano of Arizona, Mark Pryor of
Arkansas, Bill Lockyer of California, Ken Salazar of Colorado, Richard
Blumenthal of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A. Butter-
worth of Florida, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii,
Alan G. Lance of Idaho, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Jeffrey A. Modisett of
Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Richard P.
Ieyoub of Louisiana, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of
Maryland, Jennifer M. Granholm of Michigan, Mike Moore of Mississippi,
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana,
Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Philip T.
McLaughlin of New Hampshire, John J. Farmer, Jr., of New Jersey, Pa-
tricia A. Madrid of New Mexico, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina,
Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W. A.
Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, D. Michael
Fisher of Pennsylvania, Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island, Mark
Barnett of South Dakota, Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, John Cornyn
of Texas, Jan Graham of Utah, Mark L. Earley of Virginia, Christine O.
Gregoire of Washington, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, and
Gay Woodhouse of Wyoming; for the City of New York et al. by Leonard
J. Koerner, James K. Hahn, Richard A. Devine, Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr.,
Thomas Burnham, Donna M. Lach, Louise H. Renne, and Patrick J. Ma-
honey; for the Alabama Medicaid Agency et al. by Charles A. Miller and
Caroline M. Brown; for the American Medical Association et al. by Jack

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768 VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
UNITED STATES ex rel. STEVENS
Opinion of the Court
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a private individ-
ual may bring suit in federal court on behalf of the United
States against a State (or state agency) under the False
Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. §§ 3729–3733.
I
Originally enacted in 1863, the False Claims Act (FCA) is
the most frequently used of a handful of extant laws creating
a form of civil action known as qui tam.1 As amended, the
R. Bierig, Paul E. Kalb, Michael L. Ile, Anne M. Murphy, and Leonard
A. Nelson; for the American Petroleum Institute by Donald B. Craven,
Clarence T. Kipps, Jr., Alan I. Horowitz, and Peter B. Hutt II; for FMC
Corporation by Donald B. Ayer, Gregory G. Katsas, and John B. Kennedy;
for the National Governors’ Association et al. by Richard Ruda and James
I. Crowley; for the Orleans Parish School Board et al. by Sam A. LeBlanc
III and Robert Markle; for the Regents of the University of Minnesota
et al. by Mark B. Rotenberg and Mark A. Bohnhorst.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the National
WhistleBlower Center by Stephen M. Kohn, Michael D. Kohn, and David
K. Colapinto; and for Taxpayers Against Fraud by Evan H. Caminker
and Jonathan S. Massey.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Aerospace Industries Associa-
tion of America, Inc., by Charles G. Cole, Jerald S. Howe, Jr., and Shannen
W. Coffin; for the American Clinical Laboratory Association by Hope S.
Foster; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America
et al. by Herbert L. Fenster, Stephen A. Bokat, and Robin S. Conrad; for
the Federation of American Health Systems by Walter E. Dellinger and
Charles R. Work; for Friends of the Earth et al. by James S. Chandler, Jr.,
Bruce J. Terris, and Carolyn Smith Pravlik; for the National Employment
Lawyers Association by Frederick M. Morgan, Jr., James B. Helmer, Jr.,
and Paula A. Brantner; for the Project on Government Oversight by
Charles Tiefer and Jonathan W. Cuneo; and for Taxpayers Against Fraud
by Evan H. Caminker and Vicki C. Jackson.
1 Qui tam is short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam
pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which means “who pursues this action
on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own.” The phrase dates from
at least the time of Blackstone. See 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *160.
Three other qui tam statutes, all also enacted over 100 years ago, re-
main on the books. See 25 U. S. C. § 81 (providing cause of action and

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769 Cite as: 529 U. S. 765 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
FCA imposes civil liability upon “[a]ny person” who, inter
alia, “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an
officer or employee of the United States Government . . . a
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.” 31
U. S. C. § 3729(a). The defendant is liable for up to treble
damages and a civil penalty of up to $10,000 per claim. Ibid.
An FCA action may be commenced in one of two ways.
First, the Government itself may bring a civil action against
the alleged false claimant. § 3730(a). Second, as is relevant
here, a private person (the relator) may bring a qui tam civil
action “for the person and for the United States Gov-
ernment” against the alleged false claimant, “in the name of
the Government.” § 3730(b)(1).
If a relator initiates the FCA action, he must deliver a
copy of the complaint, and any supporting evidence, to the
Government, § 3730(b)(2), which then has 60 days to in-
tervene in the action, §§ 3730(b)(2), (4). If it does so, it
assumes primary responsibility for prosecuting the action,
§ 3730(c)(1), though the relator may continue to participate
in the litigation and is entitled to a hearing before voluntary
dismissal and to a court determination of reasonableness
before settlement, § 3730(c)(2). If the Government declines
to intervene within the 60-day period, the relator has the
exclusive right to conduct the action, § 3730(b)(4), and the
Government may subsequently intervene only on a showing
of “good cause,” § 3730(c)(3). The relator receives a share
of any proceeds from the action—generally ranging from 15
share of recovery against a person contracting with Indians in an unlawful
manner); § 201 (providing cause of action and share of recovery against a
person violating Indian protection laws); 35 U. S. C. § 292(b) (providing
cause of action and share of recovery against a person falsely marking
patented articles); cf. 18 U. S. C. § 962 (providing for forfeiture to informer
of share of vessels privately armed against friendly nations, but not ex-
pressly authorizing suit by informer); 46 U. S. C. § 723 (providing for for-
feiture to informer of share of vessels removing undersea treasure from
the Florida coast to foreign nations, but not expressly authorizing suit
by informer).

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770 VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
UNITED STATES ex rel. STEVENS
Opinion of the Court
to 25 percent if the Government intervenes (depending upon
the relator’s contribution to the prosecution), and from 25
to 30 percent if it does not (depending upon the court’s
assessment of what is reasonable)—plus attorney’s fees and
costs. §§ 3730(d)(1)–(2).
Respondent Jonathan Stevens brought this qui tam ac-
tion in the United States District Court for the District
of Vermont against petitioner Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources, his former employer, alleging that it had sub-
mitted false claims to the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) in connection with various federal grant programs
administered by the EPA. Specifically, he claimed that peti-
tioner had overstated the amount of time spent by its em-
ployees on the federally funded projects, thereby inducing
the Government to disburse more grant money than peti-
tioner was entitled to receive. The United States declined
to intervene in the action. Petitioner then moved to dis-
miss, arguing that a State (or state agency) is not a “person”
subject to liability under the FCA and that a qui tam action
in federal court against a State is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. The District Court denied the motion in an
unpublished order. App. to Pet. for Cert. 86–87. Peti-
tioner then filed an interlocutory appeal,2 and the District
Court stayed proceedings pending its outcome. Respondent
United States intervened in the appeal in support of re-
spondent Stevens. A divided panel of the Second Circuit
affirmed, 162 F. 3d 195 (1998), and we granted certiorari,
527 U. S. 1034 (1999).
2 The denial of a motion to dismiss based on a claim of Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity is immediately appealable. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct
and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S. 139 (1993). The
Second Circuit exercised pendent appellate jurisdiction over the statutory
question. See Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U. S. 35, 50–51
(1995).

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Opinion of the Court
II
We first address the jurisdictional question whether re-
spondent Stevens has standing under Article III of the Con-
stitution to maintain this suit. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for
Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 93–102 (1998).
As we have frequently explained, a plaintiff must meet
three requirements in order to establish Article III standing.
See, e. g., Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 180–181 (2000). First,
he must demonstrate “injury in fact”—a harm that is both
“concrete” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypo-
thetical.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, he
must establish causation—a “fairly . . . trace[able]” connec-
tion between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged
conduct of the defendant. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 41 (1976). And third, he
must demonstrate redressability—a “substantial likelihood”
that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in
fact. Id., at 45. These requirements together constitute
the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing, Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992), which is
an “essential and unchanging part” of Article III’s case-or-
controversy requirement, ibid., and a key factor in dividing
the power of government between the courts and the two
political branches, see id., at 559–560.
Respondent Stevens contends that he is suing to remedy
an injury in fact suffered by the United States. It is beyond
doubt that the complaint asserts an injury to the United
States—both the injury to its sovereignty arising from vio-
lation of its laws (which suffices to support a criminal law-
suit by the Government) and the proprietary injury resulting
from the alleged fraud. But “[t]he Art. III judicial power
exists only to redress or otherwise to protect against injury
to the complaining party.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490,

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Opinion of the Court
499 (1975) (emphasis added); see also Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U. S. 727, 734–735 (1972). It would perhaps suffice to
say that the relator here is simply the statutorily designated
agent of the United States, in whose name (as the statute
provides, see 31 U. S. C. § 3730(b)) the suit is brought—and
that the relator’s bounty is simply the fee he receives out
of the United States’ recovery for filing and/or prosecuting a
successful action on behalf of the Government. This analy-
sis is precluded, however, by the fact that the statute gives
the relator himself an interest in the lawsuit, and not merely
the right to retain a fee out of the recovery. Thus, it pro-
vides that “[a] person may bring a civil action for a viola-
tion of section 3729 for the person and for the United States
Government,” § 3730(b) (emphasis added); gives the relator
“the right to continue as a party to the action” even when
the Government itself has assumed “primary responsibility”
for prosecuting it, § 3730(c)(1); entitles the relator to a hear-
ing before the Government’s voluntary dismissal of the suit,
§ 3730(c)(2)(A); and prohibits the Government from settling
the suit over the relator’s objection without a judicial de-
termination of “fair[ness], adequa[cy] and reasonable[ness],”
§ 3730(c)(2)(B). For the portion of the recovery retained by
the relator, therefore, some explanation of standing other
than agency for the Government must be identified.
There is no doubt, of course, that as to this portion of the
recovery—the bounty he will receive if the suit is success-
ful—a qui tam relator has a “concrete private interest in
the outcome of [the] suit.” Lujan, supra, at 573. But the
same might be said of someone who has placed a wager upon
the outcome. An interest unrelated to injury in fact is insuf-
ficient to give a plaintiff standing. See Valley Forge Chris-
tian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 486 (1982); Sierra Club, supra,
at 734–735. The interest must consist of obtaining com-
pensation for, or preventing, the violation of a legally pro-

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Opinion of the Court
tected right. See Lujan, supra, at 560–561. A qui tam re-
lator has suffered no such invasion—indeed, the “right” he
seeks to vindicate does not even fully materialize until the
litigation is completed and the relator prevails.3 This is not
to suggest that Congress cannot define new legal rights,
which in turn will confer standing to vindicate an injury
caused to the claimant. See Warth, supra, at 500. As we
have held in another context, however, an interest that is
merely a “byproduct” of the suit itself cannot give rise to a
cognizable injury in fact for Article III standing purposes.
See Steel Co., supra, at 107 (“[A] plaintiff cannot achieve
standing to litigate a substantive issue by bringing suit for
the cost of bringing suit”); see also Diamond v. Charles, 476
U. S. 54, 69–71 (1986) (holding that assessment of attorney’s
fees against a party does not confer standing to pursue the
action on appeal).
We believe, however, that adequate basis for the relator’s
suit for his bounty is to be found in the doctrine that the
assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact
suffered by the assignor. The FCA can reasonably be re-
garded as effecting a partial assignment of the Govern-
ment’s damages claim.4 Although we have never expressly
recognized “representational standing” on the part of as-
signees, we have routinely entertained their suits, see, e. g.,
3 Blackstone noted, with regard to English qui tam actions, that “no
particular person, A or B, has any right, claim or demand, in or upon
[the bounty], till after action brought,” and that the bounty constituted an
“inchoate imperfect degree of property . . . [which] is not consummated
till judgment.” 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *437.
4 In addressing the Eleventh Amendment issue that we leave open
today, the dissent suggests that we are asserting that a qui tam relator
“is, in effect, suing as an assignee of the United States.” Post, at 802
(opinion of Stevens, J.); see also post, at 796 (same). More precisely, we
are asserting that a qui tam relator is, in effect, suing as a partial assignee
of the United States.

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774 VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
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Opinion of the Court
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U. S.
464, 465 (1962); Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Re-
search, Inc., 339 U. S. 827, 829 (1950); Hubbard v. Tod, 171
U. S. 474, 475 (1898)—and also suits by subrogees, who have
been described as “equitable assign[ees],” L. Simpson, Law
of Suretyship 205 (1950); see, e. g., Vimar Seguros y Rease-
guros, S. A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U. S. 528, 531 (1995);
Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau,
508 U. S. 286, 288 (1993). We conclude, therefore, that the
United States’ injury in fact suffices to confer standing on
respondent Stevens.
We are confirmed in this conclusion by the long tradition
of qui tam actions in England and the American Colonies.
That history is particularly relevant to the constitutional
standing inquiry since, as we have said elsewhere, Article
III’s restriction of the judicial power to “Cases” and “Con-
troversies” is properly understood to mean “cases and con-
troversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved
by, the judicial process.” Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 102; see
also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 460 (1939) (opinion of
Frankfurter, J.) (the Constitution established that “[j]udi-
cial power could come into play only in matters that were
the traditional concern of the courts at Westminster and
only if they arose in ways that to the expert feel of lawyers
constituted ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies’ ”).
Qui tam actions appear to have originated around the
end of the 13th century, when private individuals who had
suffered injury began bringing actions in the royal courts
on both their own and the Crown’s behalf. See, e. g., Prior
of Lewes v. De Holt (1300), reprinted in 48 Selden Soci-
ety 198 (1931). Suit in this dual capacity was a device for
getting their private claims into the respected royal courts,
which generally entertained only matters involving the
Crown’s interests. See Milsom, Trespass from Henry III to
Edward III, Part III: More Special Writs and Conclusions,

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Opinion of the Court
74 L. Q. Rev. 561, 585 (1958). Starting in the 14th century,
as the royal courts began to extend jurisdiction to suits in-
volving wholly private wrongs, the common-law qui tam ac-
tion gradually fell into disuse, although it seems to have
remained technically available for several centuries. See 2
W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 369 (8th ed. 1824).
At about the same time, however, Parliament began en-
acting statutes that explicitly provided for qui tam suits.
These were of two types: those that allowed injured parties
to sue in vindication of their own interests (as well as the
Crown’s), see, e. g., Statute Providing a Remedy for Him
Who Is Wrongfully Pursued in the Court of Admiralty, 2
Hen. IV, ch. 11 (1400), and—more relevant here—those that
allowed informers to obtain a portion of the penalty as a
bounty for their information, even if they had not suffered
an injury themselves, see, e. g., Statute Prohibiting the Sale
of Wares After the Close of Fair, 5 Edw. III, ch. 5 (1331); see
generally Common Informers Act, 14 & 15 Geo. VI, ch. 39,
sched. (1951) (listing informer statutes). Most, though not
all, of the informer statutes expressly gave the informer a
cause of action, typically by bill, plaint, information, or action
of debt. See, e. g., Bill for Leases of Hospitals, Colleges, and
Other Corporations, 33 Hen. VIII, ch. 27 (1541); Act to Avoid
Horse-Stealing, 31 Eliz. I, ch. 12, § 2 (1589); Act to Prevent
the Over-Charge of the People by Stewards of Court-Leets
and Court-Barons, 2 Jac. I, ch. 5 (1604).
For obvious reasons, the informer statutes were highly
subject to abuse, see M. Davies, The Enforcement of English
Apprenticeship 58–61 (1956)—particularly those relating to
obsolete offenses, see generally 3 E. Coke, Institutes of the
Laws of England 191 (4th ed. 1797) (informer prosecutions
under obsolete statutes had been used to “vex and entangle
the subject”). Thus, many of the old enactments were re-
pealed, see Act for Continuing and Reviving of Divers Stat-
utes and Repeal of Divers Others, 21 Jac. I, ch. 28, § 11

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776 VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
UNITED STATES ex rel. STEVENS
Opinion of the Court
(1623), and statutes were passed deterring and penalizing
vexatious informers, limiting the locations in which informer
suits could be brought, and subjecting such suits to relatively
short statutes of limitation, see Act to Redress Disorders in
Common Informers, 18 Eliz. I, ch. 5 (1576); Act Concerning
Informers, 31 Eliz. I, ch. 5 (1589); see generally Davies,
supra, at 63–76. Nevertheless, laws allowing qui tam suits
by informers continued to exist in England until 1951, when
all of the remaining ones were repealed. See Note, The His-
tory and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 Wash. U. L. Q. 81,
88, and n. 44 (citing Common Informers Act, 14 & 15 Geo. VI,
ch. 39 (1951)).
Qui tam actions appear to have been as prevalent in
America as in England, at least in the period immediately
before and after the framing of the Constitution. Although
there is no evidence that the Colonies allowed common-
law qui tam actions (which, as we have noted, were dying
out in England by that time), they did pass several in-
former statutes expressly authorizing qui tam suits. See,
e. g., Act for the Restraining and Punishing of Privateers
and Pirates, 1st Assembly, 4th Sess. (N. Y. 1692), reprinted
in 1 Colonial Laws of New York 279, 281 (1894) (allowing
informers to sue for, and receive share of, fine imposed
upon officers who neglect their duty to pursue privateers
and pirates). Moreover, immediately after the framing, the
First Congress enacted a considerable number of informer
statutes.5 Like their English counterparts, some of them
5 In addition, the First Congress passed one statute allowing injured
parties to sue for damages on both their own and the United States’
behalf. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 2, 1 Stat. 124–125 (allowing
author or proprietor to sue for and receive half of penalty for violation
of copyright); cf. Act of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, § 6, 1 Stat. 103 (allowing cen-
sus taker to sue for and receive half of penalty for failure to cooperate
in census); Act of July 5, 1790, ch. 25, § 1, 1 Stat. 129 (extending same to
Rhode Island).

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provided both a bounty and an express cause of action; 6
others provided a bounty only.7
We think this history well nigh conclusive with respect to
the question before us here: whether qui tam actions were
“cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amena-
ble to, and resolved by, the judicial process.” Steel Co., 523
6 See Act of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, § 3, 1 Stat. 102 (allowing informer to sue
for, and receive half of fine for, failure to file census return); Act of July 5,
1790, ch. 25, § 1, 1 Stat. 129 (extending same to Rhode Island); Act of July
20, 1790, ch. 29, §§ 1, 4, 1 Stat. 131, 133 (allowing private individual to
sue for, and receive half of fine for, carriage of seamen without contract
or illegal harboring of runaway seamen); Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 3,
1 Stat. 137–138 (allowing private individual to sue for, and receive half of
goods forfeited for, unlicensed trading with Indian tribes); Act of Mar. 3,
1791, ch. 15, § 44, 1 Stat. 209 (allowing person who discovers violation
of spirits duties, or officer who seizes contraband spirits, to sue for and
receive half of penalty and forfeiture, along with costs, in action of debt);
cf. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 16, 17, 1 Stat. 116 (allowing informer to
conduct prosecution, and receive half of fine, for criminal larceny or receipt
of stolen goods).
7 See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 29, 1 Stat. 44–45 (giving informer
full penalty paid by customs official for failing to post fee schedule); Act
of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 55, 1 Stat. 173 (same); Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5,
§ 38, 1 Stat. 48 (giving informer quarter of penalties, fines, and forfeitures
authorized under a customs law); Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, § 21, 1 Stat.
60 (same under a maritime law); Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 69, 1 Stat.
177 (same under another customs law); Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 8, 1
Stat. 67 (providing informer half of penalty upon conviction for violation
of conflict-of-interest and bribery provisions in Act establishing Treasury
Department); Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 8, § 1, 1 Stat. 215 (extending same to
additional Treasury employees); Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, §§ 8, 9, 1 Stat.
195–196 (providing informer half or fifth of fines resulting from improper
trading or lending by agents of Bank of United States); cf. Act of Aug. 4,
1790, ch. 35, § 4, 1 Stat. 153 (apportioning half of penalty for failing to
deposit ship manifest to official who should have received manifest, and
half to collector in port of destination).
We have suggested, in dictum, that “[s]tatutes providing for a reward
to informers which do not specifically either authorize or forbid the in-
former to institute the action are construed to authorize him to sue.”
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537, 541, n. 4 (1943).

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U. S., at 102. When combined with the theoretical justifi-
cation for relator standing discussed earlier, it leaves no
room for doubt that a qui tam relator under the FCA has
Article III standing.8 We turn, then, to the merits.
III
Petitioner makes two contentions: (1) that a State (or state
agency) is not a “person” subject to qui tam liability under
the FCA; and (2) that if it is, the Eleventh Amendment bars
such a suit. The Courts of Appeals have disagreed as to
the order in which these statutory and Eleventh Amendment
immunity questions should be addressed. Compare United
States ex rel. Long v. SCS Business & Technical Institute,
Inc., 173 F. 3d 890, 893–898 (CADC 1999) (statutory question
first), with United States ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech Univ.,
171 F. 3d 279, 285–288 (CA5 1999) (Eleventh Amendment
immunity question first).
Questions of jurisdiction, of course, should be given pri-
ority—since if there is no jurisdiction there is no authority
to sit in judgment of anything else. See Steel Co., supra,
at 93–102. “Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and
when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to
the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the
8 In so concluding, we express no view on the question whether qui tam
suits violate Article II, in particular the Appointments Clause of § 2 and
the “take Care” Clause of § 3. Petitioner does not challenge the qui tam
mechanism under either of those provisions, nor is the validity of qui tam
suits under those provisions a jurisdictional issue that we must resolve
here. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 102,
n. 4 (1998) (“[O]ur standing jurisprudence, . . . though it may sometimes
have an impact on Presidential powers, derives from Article III and not
Article II”); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 576–
578 (1992).
The dissent implicitly attacks us for “introduc[ing] [this question] sua
sponte.” Post, at 801. We raise the question, however, only to make
clear that it is not at issue in this case. It is only the dissent that proceeds
to volunteer an answer. See post, at 801–802.

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cause.” Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869). Even
jurisdiction over the person (as opposed to subject-matter
jurisdiction) “is ‘an essential element of the jurisdiction
of a district . . . court,’ without which the court is ‘powerless
to proceed to an adjudication.’ ” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon
Oil Co., 526 U. S. 574, 584 (1999) (quoting Employers Re-
insurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U. S. 374, 382 (1937)).
We nonetheless have routinely addressed before the ques-
tion whether the Eleventh Amendment forbids a particular
statutory cause of action to be asserted against States, the
question whether the statute itself permits the cause of ac-
tion it creates to be asserted against States (which it can do
only by clearly expressing such an intent). See, e. g., Kimel
v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 73–78 (2000); Semi-
nole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44, 55–57 (1996);
cf. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U. S. 21, 25–31 (1991); Mt. Healthy City
Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 277–281 (1977). When
these two questions are at issue, not only is the statutory
question “logically antecedent to the existence of ” the Elev-
enth Amendment question, Amchem Products, Inc. v. Wind-
sor, 521 U. S. 591, 612 (1997), but also there is no realistic
possibility that addressing the statutory question will ex-
pand the Court’s power beyond the limits that the jurisdic-
tional restriction has imposed. The question whether the
statute provides for suits against the States (as opposed, for
example, to the broader question whether the statute creates
any private cause of action whatever, or the question
whether the facts alleged make out a “false claim” under the
statute) does not, as a practical matter, permit the court to
pronounce upon any issue, or upon the rights of any person,
beyond the issues and persons that would be reached under
the Eleventh Amendment inquiry anyway. The ultimate
issue in the statutory inquiry is whether States can be sued
under this statute; and the ultimate issue in the Eleventh
Amendment inquiry is whether unconsenting States can be
sued under this statute. This combination of logical priority

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and virtual coincidence of scope makes it possible, and indeed
appropriate, to decide the statutory issue first. We there-
fore begin (and will end) with the statutory question.
The relevant provision of the FCA, 31 U. S. C. § 3729(a),
subjects to liability “[a]ny person” who, inter alia, “know-
ingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or
employee of the United States Government . . . a false
or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.” We must
apply to this text our longstanding interpretive presumption
that “person” does not include the sovereign. See United
States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600, 604 (1941); United
States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 275 (1947).9 The
9 The dissent claims that, “[a]lthough general statutory references to
‘persons’ are not normally construed to apply to the enacting sover-
eign, when Congress uses that word in federal statutes enforceable by the
Federal Government or by a federal agency, it applies to States and state
agencies as well as to private individuals and corporations.” Post, at 790
(citation omitted). The dissent cites three cases in support of this asser-
tion. None of them, however, involved a statutory provision authorizing
private suit against a State. California v. United States, 320 U. S. 577
(1944), disregarded the presumption in a case brought against a State
by the Federal Government (and under a statutory provision authoriz-
ing suit only by the Federal Government). See id., at 585–586. United
States v. California, 297 U. S. 175 (1936), found the presumption over-
come in similar circumstances—and with regard to a statute that used not
the word “person,” but rather the phrase “common carrier.” See id., at
186–187. And Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159 (1942), held that the pre-
sumption was overcome when, if a State were not regarded as a “person”
for purposes of bringing an action under § 7 of the Sherman Act, it would
be left “without any redress for injuries resulting from practices outlawed
by that Act.” Id., at 162.
The dissent contends that “[t]he reason for presuming that an enacting
sovereign does not intend to authorize litigation against itself simply
does not apply to federal statutes that apply equally to state agencies and
private entities.” Post, at 798. That is true enough, but in the Ameri-
can system there is a different reason, equally valid. While the States do
not have the immunity against federally authorized suit that international
law has traditionally accorded foreign sovereigns, see National City Bank
of N. Y. v. Republic of China, 348 U. S. 356, 358–359 (1955), they are sover-
eigns nonetheless, and both comity and respect for our federal system

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presumption is “particularly applicable where it is claimed
that Congress has subjected the States to liability to which
they had not been subject before.” Will v. Michigan Dept.
of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 64 (1989); Wilson v. Omaha
Tribe, 442 U. S. 653, 667 (1979). The presumption is, of
course, not a “hard and fast rule of exclusion,” Cooper Corp.,
supra, at 604–605, but it may be disregarded only upon
some affirmative showing of statutory intent to the contrary.
See International Primate Protection League v. Adminis-
trators of Tulane Ed. Fund, 500 U. S. 72, 83 (1991).
As the historical context makes clear, and as we have
often observed, the FCA was enacted in 1863 with the prin-
cipal goal of “stopping the massive frauds perpetrated by
large [private] contractors during the Civil War.” United
States v. Bornstein, 423 U. S. 303, 309 (1976); see also United
States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537, 547 (1943).10 Its
demand that something more than mere use of the word “person” demon-
strate the federal intent to authorize unconsented private suit against
them. In any event, Justice Stevens fought and lost this battle in Will
v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58 (1989), in which the Court
applied the presumption to a federal statute when the “person” at issue
was a State. See id., at 64; but see id., at 73 (Brennan, J., dissenting,
joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.). Moreover, Justice
Stevens actually joined the Court’s opinion in Wilson v. Omaha Tribe,
442 U. S. 653 (1979), in which the Court likewise applied the presumption
to a federal statute in a case involving a State. See id., at 667. (Wilson
is omitted from the dissent’s discussion of “[c]ases decided before 1986,”
which it claims “uniformly support” its reading of the statute. Post,
at 790.)
10 The dissent contends that the FCA was “intended to cover the full
range of fraudulent acts, including those perpetrated by States.” Post,
at 793, and n. 4 (quoting United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U. S. 228,
232 (1968); Rainwater v. United States, 356 U. S. 590, 592 (1958); H. R.
Rep. No. 99–660, p. 18 (1985)). The sources the dissent quotes, however,
support its contention only as far as the comma. They stand for the un-
objectionable proposition (codified in § 3729(c)) that the FCA was intended
to cover all types of fraud, not for the additional proposition that the FCA
was intended to cover all types of fraudsters, including States.

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liability provision—the precursor to today’s § 3729(a)—bore
no indication that States were subject to its penalties. In-
deed, far from indicating that States were covered, it did
not even make clear that private corporations were, since
it applied only to “any person not in the military or naval
forces of the United States, nor in the militia called into
or actually employed in the service of the United States,”
and imposed criminal penalties that included imprisonment.11
Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 3, 12 Stat. 698. We do not
suggest that these features directed only at natural persons
cast doubt upon the courts’ assumption that § 3729(a) extends
to corporations, see, e. g., United States ex rel. Woodard v.
Country View Care Center, Inc., 797 F. 2d 888, 890 (CA10
1986)—but that is because the presumption with regard to
corporations is just the opposite of the one governing here:
they are presumptively covered by the term “person,” see
1 U. S. C. § 1. But the text of the original statute does less
than nothing to overcome the presumption that States are
not covered.
Although the liability provision of the original FCA has
undergone various changes, none of them suggests a broad-
ening of the term “person” to include States. In 1982, Con-
gress made a housekeeping change, replacing the phrase
“any person not in the military or naval forces of the United
States, nor in the militia called into or actually employed
in the service of the United States” with the phrase “[a] per-
son not a member of an armed force of the United States,”
thereby incorporating the term of art “member of an armed
force” used throughout Title 10 of the United States Code.
31 U. S. C. § 3729 (1982 ed.). And in 1986, Congress elimi-
nated the blanket exemption for members of the Armed
Forces, replacing the phrase “[a] person not a member of an
11 The criminal provision remains on the books and is currently codified
separately, as amended, at 18 U. S. C. § 287.

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armed force of the United States” with the current “[a]ny
person.” 31 U. S. C. § 3729(a).12
Several features of the current statutory scheme further
support the conclusion that States are not subject to qui
tam liability. First, another section of the FCA, 31 U. S. C.
§ 3733, which enables the Attorney General to issue civil in-
vestigative demands to “any person . . . possessi[ng] informa-
tion relevant to a false claims law investigation,” § 3733(a)(1),
12 The dissent claims that “[t]he term ‘person’ in § 3729(a) that we are
interpreting today was enacted by the 1986 Congress, not by the 1863
Congress.” Post, at 794, n. 5. But the term “person” has remained in
the statute unchanged since 1863; the 1986 amendment merely changed
the modifier “[a]” to “[a]ny.” This no more caused the word “person” to
include States than did the replacement of the word “any” with “[a]” four
years earlier. The dissent’s sole basis for giving the change from “[a]” to
“[a]ny” this precise and unusual consequence is a single sentence of leg-
islative history from the 1986 Congress. That would be unequal to the
task in any event, but as it happens the sentence was not even describing
the consequence of the proposed revision, but was setting forth a Senate
Committee’s (erroneous) understanding of the meaning of the statutory
term enacted some 123 years earlier. The paragraph in which the sen-
tence appears discusses the FCA “[i]n its present,” i. e., pre-1986, “form.”
S. Rep. No. 99–345, p. 8 (1986).
The dissent contradicts its contention that the “intent” of the 1986
Congress, rather than that of the 1863 Congress, controls here, by rely-
ing heavily on a House Committee Report from 1862. Post, at 791–792
(citing H. R. Rep. No. 2, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. ii–a, pp. xxxviii–xxxix
(1862)). Even for those disposed to allow the meaning of a statute to be
determined by a single committee, that Report is utterly irrelevant, since
it was not prepared in connection with the 1863 Act, or indeed in connec-
tion with any proposed false claims legislation. In repeating the Second
Circuit’s unsupported assertion that Congress must have had this Report
in mind a year later when it enacted the FCA, the dissent asks us to
indulge even a greater suspension of disbelief than legislative history nor-
mally requires. And finally, this irrelevant committee Report does not
provide the promised support for the view that “[t]he False Claims Act
is . . . as capable of being violated by state as by individual action,” post,
at 791. The cited portion details a single incident of fraud by a state
official against a State, not an incident of fraud by a State against the
Federal Government.

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contains a provision expressly defining “person,” “[f]or pur-
poses of this section,” to include States, § 3733(l)(4).13 The
presence of such a definitional provision in § 3733, together
with the absence of such a provision from the definitional
provisions contained in § 3729, see §§ 3729(b)–(c), suggests
that States are not “persons” for purposes of qui tam lia-
bility under § 3729.14
Second, the current version of the FCA imposes damages
that are essentially punitive in nature, which would be in-
13 The dissent points out that the definition of “person” in § 3733(l)(4)
also applies to § 3733(l)(2), a definitional provision which defines the
phrase “false claims law investigation” as “any inquiry conducted by any
false claims law investigator for the purpose of ascertaining whether
any person is or has been engaged in any violation of a false claims law.”
See post, at 789, 795. But the effect of assuming a State to be a “person”
for purposes of that definitional section is not to embrace investigations
of States within the definition. A “false claims investigation” will still
not include an investigation of a State, since whether a “person” (however
broadly defined) “is or has been engaged in any violation of a false claims
law” depends on whether that person is subject to the “false claims law,”
which refers us back to § 3729, to which § 3733(l)(4)’s definition of “person”
is explicitly made inapplicable. What the application of § 3733(l)(4) to
§ 3733(l)(2) does achieve is to subject States, not to qui tam liability, but
to civil investigative demands. That is entirely appropriate, since States
will often be able to provide useful evidence in investigations of private
contractors.
14 The dissent contends that our argument “prove[s] too much,” since
the definition of “person” in § 3733(l)(4) includes not just States, but also
“any natural person, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity”; under our reasoning, it contends, all of those entities would also
be excluded from the definition of “person” under § 3729. Post, at 799.
That is not so. Unlike States, all of those entities are presumptively
covered by the term “person.” See 1 U. S. C. § 1. The addition of States
to 31 U. S. C. § 3733, and the failure to add States to § 3729, suggests that
States are not subject to qui tam liability under § 3729.
The dissent attempts to explain the absence of a definitional pro-
vision in § 3729 by suggesting that Congress “simply saw no need to
add a definition of ‘person’ in § 3729 because . . . the meaning of the term
‘person’ was already well understood.” Post, at 799. If that were so, and
if the “understanding” included States, there would have been no need
to include a definition of “person” in § 3733.

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consistent with state qui tam liability in light of the pre-
sumption against imposition of punitive damages on govern-
mental entities. See, e. g., Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,
453 U. S. 247, 262–263 (1981).15 Although this Court sug-
gested that damages under an earlier version of the FCA
were remedial rather than punitive, see Bornstein, 423 U. S.,
at 315; but see Smith v. Wade, 461 U. S. 30, 85 (1983) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting), that version of the statute imposed
only double damages and a civil penalty of $2,000 per claim,
see 31 U. S. C. § 231 (1976 ed.); the current version, by con-
trast, generally imposes treble damages and a civil pen-
alty of up to $10,000 per claim, see 31 U. S. C. § 3729(a).16
Cf. Marcus, 317 U. S., at 550 (noting that double damages in
15 The dissent attempts to distinguish Newport on the basis of a single
sentence in that opinion stating that “courts vie[w] punitive damages
[against governmental bodies] as contrary to sound public policy, because
such awards would burden the very taxpayers and citizens for whose bene-
fit the wrongdoer was being chastised.” Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,
453 U. S., at 263. The dissent contends that Newport is inapplicable
where, as here, “[t]he taxpaying ‘citizens for whose benefit’ the [statute] is
designed are the citizens of the United States, not the citizens of any
individual State that might violate the [statute].” Post, at 801. The
problem with this is that Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983—the statute
at issue in Newport—is, like the FCA, a federal law designed to benefit
“the citizens of the United States, not the citizens of any individual State
that might violate the [statute].” A better reading of Newport is that we
were concerned with imposing punitive damages on taxpayers under any
circumstances. “ ‘[Punitive damages], being evidently vindictive, cannot,
in our opinion, be sanctioned by this court, as they are to be borne by
widows, orphans, aged men and women, and strangers, who, admitting
that they must repair the injury inflicted by the Mayor on the plaintiff,
cannot be bound beyond that amount, which will be sufficient for her in-
demnification.’ ” Newport, supra, at 261 (quoting McGary v. President &
Council of City of Lafayette, 12 Rob. 668, 677 (La. 1846)).
16 As the dissent correctly points out, see post, at 801, n. 11, treble dam-
ages may be reduced to double damages in certain cases, see § 3729(a).
This exception, however, applies only in some of those (presumably few)
cases involving defendants who provide information concerning the vio-
lation before they have knowledge that an investigation is underway.
See ibid.

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original FCA were not punitive, but suggesting that treble
damages, such as those in the antitrust laws, would have
been). “The very idea of treble damages reveals an intent
to punish past, and to deter future, unlawful conduct, not to
ameliorate the liability of wrongdoers.” Texas Industries,
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 639 (1981).
Third, the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act of 1986
(PFCRA), a sister scheme creating administrative reme-
dies for false claims—and enacted just before the FCA was
amended in 1986—contains (unlike the FCA) a definition
of “persons” subject to liability, and that definition does not
include States. See 31 U. S. C. § 3801(a)(6) (defining “per-
son” as “any individual, partnership, corporation, associa-
tion, or private organization”). It would be most peculiar
to subject States to treble damages and civil penalties in
qui tam actions under the FCA, but exempt them from
the relatively smaller damages provided under the PFCRA.
See § 3802(a)(1).17
17 The dissent attempts to distinguish the PFCRA on the ground that
it is a separate and subsequently enacted statute. See post, at 799–800,
and n. 10. But it is well established that a court can, and should, in-
terpret the text of one statute in the light of text of surrounding statutes,
even those subsequently enacted. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., ante, at 133; United States v. Fausto, 484 U. S. 439, 453
(1988). Moreover, there is no question that the PFCRA was designed to
operate in tandem with the FCA. Not only was it enacted at virtually
the same time as the FCA was amended in 1986, but its scope is virtually
identical to that of the FCA. Compare § 3729(a) (FCA) (“Any person
who . . . knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or
employee of the United States Government . . . a false or fraudulent claim
for payment or approval . . .”) with § 3802(a)(1) (PFCRA) (“Any person
who makes, presents, or submits, or causes to be made, presented, or sub-
mitted, a claim that the person knows or has reason to know . . . is false,
fictitious, or fraudulent . . .”). The dissent would, in any event, subject
States to suit under the PFCRA no less than under the FCA—despite its
detailed definition of “person” that does not include States. In justifica-
tion of this the dissent again cites California v. United States, 320 U. S.,

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In sum, we believe that various features of the FCA, both
as originally enacted and as amended, far from providing
the requisite affirmative indications that the term “per-
son” included States for purposes of qui tam liability, in-
dicate quite the contrary. Our conclusion is buttressed by
two other considerations that we think it unnecessary to
discuss at any length: first, “the ordinary rule of statutory
construction” that “if Congress intends to alter the usual
constitutional balance between States and the Federal Gov-
ernment, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably
clear in the language of the statute,” Will, 491 U. S., at 65
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 460–461 (1991); United
States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971), and second, the
doctrine that statutes should be construed so as to avoid
difficult constitutional questions. We of course express no
view on the question whether an action in federal court
by a qui tam relator against a State would run afoul of the
Eleventh Amendment, but we note that there is “a serious
doubt” on that score. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 348
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).18
* * *
We hold that a private individual has standing to bring
suit in federal court on behalf of the United States under
the False Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. §§ 3729–3733, but that the
at 585, and Evans, 316 U. S., at 160. In addition to being inapposite be-
cause they did not authorize suits against States by private parties, see
n. 9, supra, the definitions of “person” in the statutes at issue in those
cases were not as detailed as that of the PFCRA, and set forth what the
term “person” included, rather than, as the PFCRA does, what the term
“person” “means,” see 31 U. S. C. § 3801(a)(6) (emphasis added).
18 Although the dissent concludes that States can be “persons” for pur-
poses of commencing an FCA qui tam action under § 3730(b), see post,
at 794–795, we need not resolve that question here, and therefore leave
it open.

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Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment
False Claims Act does not subject a State (or state agency)
to liability in such actions. The judgment of the Second
Circuit is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court in full. I also join the
opinion of Justice Ginsburg.
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Breyer joins,
concurring in the judgment.
I join the Court’s judgment and here state the extent to
which I subscribe to the Court’s opinion.
I agree with the Court that the qui tam relator is prop-
erly regarded as an assignee of a portion of the Govern-
ment’s claim for damages. See ante, at 773. And I agree,
most vitally, that “Article III’s restriction of the judicial
power to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ is properly under-
stood to mean ‘cases and controversies of the sort tradi-
tionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.’ ”
Ante, at 774. On that key matter, I again agree that his-
tory’s pages place the qui tam suit safely within the “case”
or “controversy” category. See ante, at 774–778.
In Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S.
83 (1998), I reasoned that if Congress did not authorize a
citizen suit, a court should dismiss the citizen suitor’s com-
plaint without opining “on the constitutionality of what Con-
gress might have done, but did not do.” Id., at 134 (opinion
concurring in judgment). I therefore agree that the Court
properly turns first to the statutory question here presented:
Did Congress authorize qui tam suits against the States.
Concluding that Congress did not authorize such suits, the
Court has no cause to engage in an Eleventh Amendment
inquiry, and appropriately leaves that issue open.
I do not find in the False Claims Act any clear statement
subjecting the States to qui tam suits brought by private

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parties, and therefore concur in the Court’s resolution of the
statutory question. See ante, at 787–788. I note, however,
that the clear statement rule applied to private suits against
a State has not been applied when the United States is the
plaintiff. See, e. g., Sims v. United States, 359 U. S. 108, 112
(1959) (state agency ranks as a “person” subject to suit by
the United States under federal tax levy provision); United
States v. California, 297 U. S. 175, 186–187 (1936) (state-
owned railway ranks as a “common carrier” under Federal
Safety Appliance Act subject suit for penalties by the United
States). I read the Court’s decision to leave open the ques-
tion whether the word “person” encompasses States when
the United States itself sues under the False Claims Act.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter joins,
dissenting.
In 1986, Congress amended the False Claims Act (FCA
or Act) to create a new procedure known as a “civil investi-
gative demand,” which allows the Attorney General to ob-
tain documentary evidence “for the purpose of ascertaining
whether any person is or has been engaged in” a viola-
tion of the Act—including a violation of 31 U. S. C. § 3729.
The 1986 amendments also declare that a “person” who
could engage in a violation of § 3729—thereby triggering the
civil investigative demand provision—includes “any State or
political subdivision of a State.” See § 6(a), 100 Stat. 3168
(codified at 31 U. S. C. §§ 3733(l)(1)(A), (2), (4)). In my view,
this statutory text makes it perfectly clear that Congress
intended the term “person” in § 3729 to include States. This
understanding is supported by the legislative history of the
1986 amendments, and is fully consistent with this Court’s
construction of federal statutes in cases decided before those
amendments were enacted.
Since the FCA was amended in 1986, however, the Court
has decided a series of cases that cloak the States with an
increasingly protective mantle of “sovereign immunity” from

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790 VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
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Stevens, J., dissenting
liability for violating federal laws. It is through the lens of
those post-1986 cases that the Court has chosen to construe
the statute at issue in this case. To explain my disagree-
ment with the Court, I shall comment on pre-1986 cases, the
legislative history of the 1986 amendments, and the statutory
text of the FCA—all of which support the view that Con-
gress understood States to be included within the meaning
of the word “person” in § 3729. I shall then briefly explain
why the State’s constitutional defenses fail, even under the
Court’s post-1986 construction of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.
I
Cases decided before 1986 uniformly support the proposi-
tion that the broad language used in the FCA means what it
says. Although general statutory references to “persons”
are not normally construed to apply to the enacting sover-
eign, United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 275
(1947), when Congress uses that word in federal statutes en-
forceable by the Federal Government or by a federal agency,
it applies to States and state agencies as well as to private
individuals and corporations. Thus, for example, the word
“person” in the Sherman Act does not include the sovereign
that enacted the statute (the Federal Government), United
States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600 (1941), but it does in-
clude the States, Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159 (1942).
Similarly, States are subject to regulation as a “person”
within the meaning of the Shipping Act of 1916, California
v. United States, 320 U. S. 577 (1944), and as a “common car-
rier” within the meaning of the Safety Appliance Act, United
States v. California, 297 U. S. 175 (1936). In the latter case,
the State of California “invoke[d] the canon of construction
that a sovereign is presumptively not intended to be bound”
by a statute unless the Act expressly declares that to be
the case. Id., at 186. We rejected the applicability of that
canon, stating:

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“We can perceive no reason for extending it so as to
exempt a business carried on by a state from the other-
wise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, all-
embracing in scope and national in its purpose, which is
as capable of being obstructed by state as by individual
action. Language and objectives so plain are not to be
thwarted by resort to a rule of construction whose pur-
pose is but to resolve doubts, and whose application in
the circumstances would be highly artificial.” Id., at
186–187.1
The False Claims Act is also all-embracing in scope,
national in its purpose, and as capable of being violated
by state as by individual action.2 It was enacted during
the Civil War, shortly after a congressional committee
1 The difference between the post-1986 lens through which the Court
views sovereign immunity issues, on the one hand, and the actual intent
of Congress in statutes like the one before us today, on the other hand, is
well illustrated by the congressional rejection of the holdings in Hoffman
v. Connecticut Dept. of Income Maintenance, 492 U. S. 96 (1989), and
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30 (1992). In those cases,
the Court refused to find the necessary unequivocal waiver of sovereign
immunity against both the States and the Federal Government in § 106(c)
of the Bankruptcy Code.
Congress, however, thought differently: “In enacting section 106(c), Con-
gress intended . . . to make the States subject to a money judgment. But
the Supreme Court in Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of Income
Maintenance, 492 U. S. 96 (1989), held [otherwise.] In using such a nar-
row construction, the Court . . . did not find in the text of the statute an
‘unmistakenly clear’ intent of Congress to waive sovereign immunity . . . .
The Court applied this reasoning in United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.”
See 140 Cong. Rec. 27693 (1994). Congress therefore overruled both of
those decisions by enacting the current version of 11 U. S. C. § 106.
2 It is thus at the opposite pole from the statute construed in Wilson v.
Omaha Tribe, 442 U. S. 653 (1979), which held that the term “white per-
son” did not include the State of Iowa because “it is apparent that in
adopting § 22 Congress had in mind only disputes arising in Indian country,
disputes that would not arise in or involve any of the States.” Id., at 668.

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792 VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
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Stevens, J., dissenting
had decried the “fraud and peculation” by state officials in
connection with the procurement of military supplies and
Government contracts—specifically mentioning the pur-
chases of supplies by the States of Illinois, Indiana, New
York, and Ohio. See H. R. Rep. No. 2, 37th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. ii–a, pp. xxxviii–xxxix (1862). Although the FCA was
not enacted until the following year, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit correctly observed that “it is diffi-
cult to suppose that when Congress considered the bills
leading to the 1863 Act a year later it either meant to ex-
clude the States from the ‘persons’ who were to be liable for
presentation of false claims to the federal government or had
forgotten the results of this extensive investigation.” 162
F. 3d 195, 206 (1998). That observation is faithful to the
broad construction of the Act that this Court consistently
endorsed in cases decided before 1986 (and hardly requires
any “suspension of disbelief ” as the majority supposes, ante,
at 783, n. 12).
Thus, in United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U. S. 228,
232 (1968), after noting that the Act was passed as a result
of investigations of the fraudulent use of federal funds during
the Civil War, we inferred “that the Act was intended to
reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that might re-
sult in financial loss to the Government.” See also Rain-
water v. United States, 356 U. S. 590, 592 (1958) (“It seems
quite clear that the objective of Congress [in the FCA] was
broadly to protect the funds and property of the Government
from fraudulent claims”); H. R. Rep. No. 99–660, p. 18 (1986)
(“[T]he False Claims Act is used as . . . the primary vehicle
by the Government for recouping losses suffered through
fraud”). Indeed, the fact that Congress has authorized
qui tam actions by private individuals to supplement the
remedies available to the Federal Government provides addi-
tional evidence of its intent to reach all types of fraud that
cause financial loss to the Federal Government. Finally, the

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Stevens, J., dissenting
breadth of the “claims” to which the FCA applies 3 only
confirms the notion that the law was intended to cover the
full range of fraudulent acts, including those perpetrated
by States.4
The legislative history of the 1986 amendments discloses
that both federal and state officials understood that States
were “persons” within the meaning of the statute. Thus, in
a section of the 1986 Senate Report describing the history
of the Act, the committee unequivocally stated that the Act
reaches all parties who may submit false claims and that
“[t]he term ‘person’ is used in its broad sense to include
partnerships, associations, and corporations . . . as well as
States and political subdivisions thereof.” S. Rep. No. 99–
345, pp. 8–9.5
3 Title 31 U. S. C. § 3729(c) reads: “For purposes of this section, ‘claim’
includes any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise,
for money or property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or other
recipient if the United States Government provides any portion of the
money or property which is requested or demanded, or if the Government
will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any portion
of the money or property which is requested or demanded.”
4 When Congress amended the FCA in 1986, it noted that “[e]vidence
of fraud in Government programs and procurement is on a steady rise.”
H. R. Rep. No. 99–660, at 18. And at that time, federal grants to state
and local governments had totaled over $108 billion. See U. S. Dept. of
Commerce National Data Book and Guide to Sources, Statistical Abstract
of the United States 301 (108th ed. 1988) (compiling data from 1986). It
is therefore difficult to believe, as the Court contends, that Congress
intended “to cover all types of fraud, [but not] all types of fraudsters,”
ante, at 781, n. 10, a conclusion that would exclude from coverage such a
large share of potential fraud.
5 Petitioner argues that the Senate Report’s statement was simply in-
accurate, because the three cases to which the Report cited for support
did not interpret the meaning of the word “person” in the FCA. Brief
for Petitioner 25–26. The cases stand for the proposition that the statu-
tory term “person” may include States and local governments—exactly
the proposition I have discussed above. See supra, at 790. Petitioner’s
observation that none of the cases cited is directly on point only indicates

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794 VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
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Indeed, a few federal courts had accepted jurisdiction in
qui tam cases brought by the States—thus indicating their
view that States were included among the “persons” who
may bring qui tam actions as relators under § 3730(b)(1).
See United States ex rel. Woodard v. Country View Care
Center, Inc., 797 F. 2d 888 (CA10 1986); United States ex rel.
Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F. 2d 1100 (CA7 1984); see also
United States ex rel. Hartigan v. Palumbo Bros., Inc., 797
F. Supp. 624 (ND Ill. 1992). Not only do these cases express
the view of those federal judges who thought a State could
be a “person” under § 3730(b)(1), but the cases also demon-
strate that the States considered themselves to be statutory
“persons.” In fact, in the Dean case, the United States filed
a statement with the court explicitly stating its view that
“[t]he State is a proper relator.” 729 F. 2d, at 1103, n. 2.
And when the Seventh Circuit in that case dismissed Wis-
consin’s qui tam claim on grounds unrelated to the definition
that the Senate’s understanding was based on an analogy rather than on
controlling precedent.
Petitioner further argues that the text of the FCA as it was originally
enacted in 1863 could not have included States as “persons,” and there-
fore the Senate’s understanding of the pre-1986 Act was erroneous. See
also ante, at 778. Assuming for argument’s sake that the Senate in-
correctly ascertained what Congress meant in 1863, petitioner’s argument
is beside the point. The term “person” in § 3729(a) that we are interpret-
ing today was enacted by the 1986 Congress, not by the 1863 Congress.
See 100 Stat. 3153 (deleting entirely the previously existing introductory
clause in § 3729, including the phrase “[a] person not a member of an armed
force of the United States” and replacing it with the new phrase “[a]ny
person”). Therefore, even if the 1986 Congress were mistaken about
what a previous Legislature had meant by the word “person,” it clearly
expressed its own view that when the 1986 Congress itself enacted the
word “person” (and not merely the word “any” as the Court insists, ante,
at 783, n. 12), it meant the reference to include States. There is not the
least bit of contradiction (as the Court suggests, ibid.) in one Congress
informing itself of the general understanding of a statutory term it enacts
based on its own (perhaps erroneous) understanding of what a past Con-
gress thought the term meant.

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of the word “person,” the National Association of Attorneys
General adopted a resolution urging Congress to make it
easier for States to be relators.6 When Congress amended
the FCA in 1986—and enacted the word “person” in § 3729
at issue here—it had all of this information before it, i. e.,
that federal judges had accepted States as relators (and
hence as “persons”); that the States considered themselves
to be statutory “persons” and wanted greater freedom to be
“persons” who could sue under the Act; and that the United
States had taken a like position. See S. Rep. No. 99–345,
at 12–13.
In sum, it is quite clear that when the 1986 amendments
were adopted, there was a general understanding that States
and state agencies were “persons” within the meaning of
the Act.
II
The text of the 1986 amendments confirms the pre-existing
understanding. The most significant part of the amend-
ments is the enactment of a new § 3733 granting authority
to the Attorney General to issue a civil investigative de-
mand (CID) before commencing a civil proceeding on be-
half of the United States. A series of interwoven defini-
tions in § 3733 unambiguously demonstrates that a State is a
“person” who can violate § 3729.
Section 3733 authorizes the Attorney General to issue a
CID when she is conducting a “false claims law investi-
gation.” § 3733(a). A “false claims law investigation” is
defined as an investigation conducted “for the purpose of as-
certaining whether any person is or has been engaged in
any violation of a false claims law.” § 3733(l)(2) (emphasis
added). And a “false claims law” includes § 3729—the pro-
vision at issue in this case. § 3733(l)(1)(A). Quite plainly,
these provisions contemplate that any “person” may be en-
6 Congress adopted the suggestion of the Attorneys General in
§ 3730(e)(4)(A).

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gaged in a violation of § 3729. Finally, a “person” is defined
to include “any State or political subdivision of a State.”
§ 3733(l)(4). Hence, the CID provisions clearly state that a
“person” who may be “engaged in any violation of a false
claims law,” including § 3729, includes a “State or a politi-
cal subdivision of a State.” 7 These CID provisions thus
unmistakably express Congress’ understanding that a State
may be a “person” who can violate § 3729.
Elsewhere in the False Claims Act the term “person”
includes States as well. For example, § 3730 of the Act—
both before and after the 1986 amendments—uses the word
“person” twice. First, subsection (a) of § 3730 directs the
Attorney General to investigate violations of § 3729, and
provides that if she “finds that a person has violated or
is violating” that section, she may bring a civil action
“under this section against the person.” (Emphases added.)
Second, subsection (b) of § 3730 also uses the word “person,”
though for a different purpose; in that subsection the word
is used to describe the plaintiffs who may bring qui tam
actions on behalf of themselves and the United States.
Quite clearly, a State is a “person” against whom the
Attorney General may proceed under § 3730(a).8 And as
I noted earlier, see supra, at 794, before 1986 States were
considered “persons” who could bring a qui tam action
as a relator under § 3730(b)—and the Court offers nothing
to question that understanding. See ante, at 787, n. 18.
Moreover, when a qui tam relator brings an action on behalf
of the United States, he or she is, in effect, authorized to act
as an assignee of the Federal Government’s claim. See ante,
at 773. Given that understanding, combined with the fact
7 Because this concatenation of definitions expressly references and in-
corporates § 3729, it is no answer that the definitions listed in § 3733 apply,
by their terms, “[f]or the purposes of ” § 3733.
8 Justice Ginsburg, who joins in the Court’s judgment, is careful to
point out that the Court does not disagree with this reading of § 3730(a).
Ante, at 789.

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that § 3730(a) does not make any distinction between possible
defendants against whom the Attorney General may bring
an action, the most normal inference to draw is that qui
tam actions may be brought by relators against the same
category of “persons” that may be sued by the Attorney
General.
To recapitulate, it is undisputed that (under the CID pro-
vision) a State is a “person” who may violate § 3729; that a
State is a “person” who may be named as a defendant in an
action brought by the Attorney General; and that a State
is a “person” who may bring a qui tam action on behalf of
the United States. It therefore seems most natural to read
the adjacent uses of the term “person” in §§ 3729, 3730(a),
3730(b), and 3733 to cover the same category of defendants.
See United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S., at 606 (“It is
hardly credible that Congress used the term ‘person’ in
different senses in the same sentence”). And it seems even
more natural to read the single word “person” (describing
who may commit a violation under § 3729) to have one con-
sistent meaning regardless of whether the action against
that violator is brought under § 3730(a) or under § 3730(b).
See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U. S. 135, 143 (1994)
(“A term appearing in several places in a statutory text is
generally read the same way each time it appears. We have
even stronger cause to construe a single formulation . . . the
same way each time it is called into play” (citation omitted)).
Absent powerful arguments to the contrary, it should follow
that a State may be named as a defendant in an action
brought by an assignee of the United States. Rather than
pointing to any such powerful arguments, however, the
Court comes to a contrary conclusion on the basis of an inap-
plicable presumption and rather strained inferences drawn
from three different statutory provisions.
The Court’s principal argument relies on “our longstand-
ing interpretive presumption that ‘person’ does not include
the sovereign.” Ante, at 780. As discussed earlier, that

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“presumption” does not quite do the heavy lifting the Court
would like it to do. What’s more, the doctrinal origins of
that “presumption” meant only that the enacting sovereign
was not normally thought to be a statutory “person.” See,
e. g., United States v. California, 297 U. S., at 186 (“[T]he
canon of construction that a sovereign is presumptively
not intended to be bound by its own statute unless named
in it . . . has its historical basis in the English doctrine that
the Crown is unaffected by acts of Parliament not specifically
directed against it. The presumption is an aid to consist-
ent construction of statutes of the enacting sovereign when
their purpose is in doubt” (emphasis added)); see also United
States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S., at 275; United States
v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315, 321 (1877); Will v. Michigan Dept.
of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 73 (1989) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). The reason for presuming that an enacting sov-
ereign does not intend to authorize litigation against itself
simply does not apply to federal statutes that apply equally
to state agencies and private entities. Finally, the “affirm-
ative showing” the Court would require to demonstrate
that the word “person” includes States, ante, at 781, is
plainly found in the statutory text discussed above.
The Court’s first textual argument is based on the fact
that the definition of the term “person” included in § 3733’s
CID provision expressly includes States. “The presence of
such a definitional provision in § 3733,” the Court argues,
“together with the absence of such a provision from the
definitional provisions contained in § 3729 . . . suggests that
States are not ‘persons’ for purposes of qui tam liability
under § 3729.” Ante, at 784. Leaving aside the fact that
§ 3733’s definition actually cuts in the opposite direction,
see supra, at 795–796, this argument might carry some
weight if the definitional provisions in § 3729 included some
definition of “person” but simply neglected to mention
States. But the definitional provisions in § 3729 do not in-

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clude any definition of “person” at all. The negative infer-
ence drawn by the Court, if taken seriously, would therefore
prove too much. The definition of “person” in § 3733 in-
cludes not only States, but also “any natural person, part-
nership, corporation, association, or other legal entity.”
§ 3733(l)(4). If the premise of the Court’s argument were
correct—that the inclusion of certain items as a “person” in
§ 3733 implies their exclusion as a “person” in § 3729—then
there would be absolutely no one left to be a “person” under
§ 3729.9 It is far more reasonable to assume that Congress
simply saw no need to add a definition of “person” in § 3729
because (as both the legislative history, see supra, at 791–
795, and the definitions in the CID provisions demonstrate)
the meaning of the term “person” was already well under-
stood. Congress likely thought it unnecessary to include a
definition in § 3729 itself.
The Court also relies on the definition of “person” in a
separate, but similar, statute, the Program Fraud Civil Rem-
edies Act of 1986 (PFCRA). Ante, at 786. The definition
of “person” found in that law includes “any individual, part-
nership, corporation, association, or private organization.”
31 U. S. C. § 3801(a)(6). It is first worth pointing out the
obvious: Although the PFCRA sits next to the FCA in the
United States Code, they are separate statutes. It is there-
fore not altogether clear why the former has much bearing
on the latter.10 Regardless, the Court’s whole argument
9 Not so, the Court says, because natural persons and other entities,
unlike States, are presumed to be included within the term “person.”
Ante, at 784, n. 14. In other words, this supposedly independent tex-
tual argument does nothing on its own without relying entirely on
the presumption already discussed. See supra, at 797–798; ante, at 780–
784. The negative inference adds nothing on its own.
10 Indeed, reliance on the PFCRA seems to contradict the Court’s cen-
tral premise—that in 1863 the word “person” did not include States and
that scattered intervening amendments have done nothing to change that.
Ante, at 781–782. If that were so, the relevant meaning of the word

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about the PFCRA rests entirely on the premise that its
definition of “person” does not include States. That prem-
ise, in turn, relies upon the fact that § 3801(a)(6) in the
PFCRA defines a “person” to include “any individual, part-
nership, corporation, association, or private organization,”
but does not mention States. We have, however, inter-
preted similar definitions of “person,” which included corpo-
rations, partnerships, and associations, to include States as
well, even though States were not expressly mentioned in
the statutory definition. See California v. United States,
320 U. S., at 585; Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S., at 160.
(I draw no definitive conclusions as to whether States are
subject to suit under the PFCRA; I only mean to suggest
that the Court’s premise is not as obvious as it presumes
it to be.) In any event, the ultimate relevant question is
whether the text and legislative history of the FCA make it
clear that § 3729’s use of the word “person” includes States.
Because they do, nothing in any other piece of legislation
narrows the meaning of that term.
Finally, the Court relies on the fact that the current
version of the FCA includes a treble damages remedy that
is “essentially punitive in nature.” Ante, at 784. Citing
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247, 262–263 (1981),
the Court invokes the “presumption against imposition of
punitive damages on governmental entities.” Ante, at 785.
But as Newport explains, “courts vie[w] punitive damages
[against governmental bodies] as contrary to sound public
policy, because such awards would burden the very tax-
“person” would be the meaning adopted by the 1863 Congress, not the
1986 Congress. And on that premise, why should it matter what a differ-
ent Congress, in a different century, did in a separate statute? Of course,
as described earlier, see n. 5, supra, I believe it is the 1986 Congress’
understanding of the word “person” that controls, because it is that word
as enacted by the 1986 Congress that we are interpreting in this case.
But on the Court’s premise, it is the 1863 Congress’ understanding that
controls and the PFCRA should be irrelevant.

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payers and citizens for whose benefit the wrongdoer was
being chastised.” 453 U. S., at 263. That rationale is in-
applicable here. The taxpaying “citizens for whose benefit”
the FCA is designed are the citizens of the United States,
not the citizens of any individual State that might violate the
Act. It is true, of course, that the taxpayers of a State that
violates the FCA will ultimately bear the burden of paying
the treble damages. It is not the coffers of the State (and
hence state taxpayers), however, that the FCA is designed
to protect, but the coffers of the National Government (and
hence the federal taxpayers). Accordingly, a treble dam-
ages remedy against a State does not “burden the very tax-
payers” the statute was designed to protect.11
III
Each of the constitutional issues identified in the Court’s
opinion requires only a brief comment. The historical evi-
dence summarized by the Court, ante, at 774–778, is obvi-
ously sufficient to demonstrate that qui tam actions are
“cases” or “controversies” within the meaning of Article III.
That evidence, together with the evidence that private
prosecutions were commonplace in the 19th century, see
Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83,
127–128, and nn. 24–25 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment), is also sufficient to resolve the Article II question
that the Court has introduced sua sponte, ante, at 778, n. 8.
As for the State’s “Eleventh Amendment” sovereign im-
munity defense, I adhere to the view that Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44 (1996), was wrongly decided.
See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 97–99
(2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe, 517 U. S.,
at 100–185 (Souter, J., dissenting). Accordingly, Congress’
clear intention to subject States to qui tam actions is also
11 It is also worth mentioning that treble damages may be reduced
to double damages if the court makes the requisite findings under
§§ 3729(a)(7)(A)–(C).

529US3 Unit: $U59 [09-26-01 12:32:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN
802 VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
UNITED STATES ex rel. STEVENS
Stevens, J., dissenting
sufficient to abrogate any common-law defense of sovereign
immunity. Moreover, even if one accepts Seminole Tribe
as controlling, the State’s immunity claim would still fail.
Given the facts that (1) respondent is, in effect, suing as an
assignee of the United States, ante, at 773; (2) the Eleventh
Amendment does not provide the States with a defense to
claims asserted by the United States, see, e. g., United States
v. Mississippi, 380 U. S. 128, 140 (1965) (“[N]othing in [the
Eleventh Amendment] or any other provision of the Consti-
tution prevents or has ever been seriously supposed to pre-
vent a State’s being sued by the United States”); and (3) the
Attorney General retains significant control over a relator’s
action, see 162 F. 3d, at 199–201 (case below), the Court of
Appeals correctly affirmed the District Court’s order deny-
ing petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Compare New Hamp-
shire v. Louisiana, 108 U. S. 76 (1883), with South Dakota v.
North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286 (1904).12 I would, accordingly,
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
12 The agency argues that this is essentially an “end run” around the
Eleventh Amendment. Brief for Petitioner 33. It is not at all clear to
me, though, why a qui tam action would be considered an “end run”
around that Amendment, yet precisely the same form of action is not an
“end run” around Articles II and III.