BOND v. UNITED STATES

529US2 Unit: $U44 [09-26-01 10:00:50] PAGES PGT: OPIN
334 OCTOBER TERM, 1999
Syllabus
BOND v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fifth circuit
No. 98–9349. Argued February 29, 2000—Decided April 17, 2000
Border Patrol Agent Cantu boarded a bus in Texas to check the immigra-
tion status of its passengers. As he walked off the bus, he squeezed
the soft luggage which passengers had placed in the overhead storage
space. He squeezed a canvas bag above petitioner’s seat and noticed
that it contained a “brick-like” object. After petitioner admitted own-
ing the bag and consented to its search, Agent Cantu discovered a
“brick” of methamphetamine. Petitioner was indicted on federal drug
charges. He moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that Agent Cantu
conducted an illegal search of his bag. The District Court denied the
motion and found petitioner guilty. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the de-
nial of the motion, holding that Agent Cantu’s manipulation of the bag
was not a search under the Fourth Amendment.
Held: Agent Cantu’s physical manipulation of petitioner’s carry-on bag
violated the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable
searches. A traveler’s personal luggage is clearly an “effect” protected
by the Amendment, see United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 707, and
it is undisputed that petitioner possessed a privacy interest in his bag.
The Government’s assertion that by exposing his bag to the public, peti-
tioner lost a reasonable expectation that his bag would not be physically
manipulated is rejected. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207, and Flor-
ida v. Riley, 488 U. S. 445, are distinguishable, because they involved
only visual, as opposed to tactile, observation. Physically invasive in-
spection is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection. Under
this Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis, a court first asks whether the
individual, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual expectation of pri-
vacy; that is, whether he has shown that “he [sought] to preserve [some-
thing] as private.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 740. Here, peti-
tioner sought to preserve privacy by using an opaque bag and placing
it directly above his seat. Second, a court inquires whether the individ-
ual’s expectation of privacy is “one that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable.” Ibid. Although a bus passenger clearly expects that
other passengers or bus employees may handle his bag, he does not
expect that they will feel the bag in an exploratory manner. But this
is exactly what the agent did here. Pp. 336–339.
167 F. 3d 225, reversed.

529US2 Unit: $U44 [09-26-01 10:00:50] PAGES PGT: OPIN
335 Cite as: 529 U. S. 334 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens,
O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.
Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined, post,
p. 339.
M. Carolyn Fuentes argued the cause for petitioner.
With her on the briefs were Lucien B. Campbell and Henry
J. Bemporad.
Jeffrey A. Lamken argued the cause for the United States.
With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, As-
sistant Attorney General Robinson, and Deputy Solicitor
General Dreeben.*
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case presents the question whether a law enforce-
ment officer’s physical manipulation of a bus passenger’s
carry-on luggage violated the Fourth Amendment’s proscrip-
tion against unreasonable searches. We hold that it did.
Petitioner Steven Dewayne Bond was a passenger on a
Greyhound bus that left California bound for Little Rock,
Arkansas. The bus stopped, as it was required to do, at the
permanent Border Patrol checkpoint in Sierra Blanca, Texas.
Border Patrol Agent Cesar Cantu boarded the bus to check
the immigration status of its passengers. After reaching
the back of the bus, having satisfied himself that the passen-
gers were lawfully in the United States, Agent Cantu began
walking toward the front. Along the way, he squeezed the
soft luggage which passengers had placed in the overhead
storage space above the seats.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the National Asso-
ciation of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by William J. Mertens and
Barbara Bergman; and for the Pro Bono Criminal Assistance Project by
David L. Heilberg.
Stephen R. McSpadden filed a brief for the National Association of
Police Organizations as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

529US2 Unit: $U44 [09-26-01 10:00:50] PAGES PGT: OPIN
336 BOND v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
Petitioner was seated four or five rows from the back of
the bus. As Agent Cantu inspected the luggage in the com-
partment above petitioner’s seat, he squeezed a green canvas
bag and noticed that it contained a “brick-like” object. Peti-
tioner admitted that the bag was his and agreed to allow
Agent Cantu to open it.1 Upon opening the bag, Agent
Cantu discovered a “brick” of methamphetamine. The brick
had been wrapped in duct tape until it was oval-shaped and
then rolled in a pair of pants.
Petitioner was indicted for conspiracy to possess, and pos-
session with intent to distribute, methamphetamine in viola-
tion of 84 Stat. 1260, 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1). He moved to
suppress the drugs, arguing that Agent Cantu conducted an
illegal search of his bag. Petitioner’s motion was denied,
and the District Court found him guilty on both counts and
sentenced him to 57 months in prison. On appeal, he con-
ceded that other passengers had access to his bag, but con-
tended that Agent Cantu manipulated the bag in a way that
other passengers would not. The Court of Appeals rejected
this argument, stating that the fact that Agent Cantu’s ma-
nipulation of petitioner’s bag was calculated to detect contra-
band is irrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes. 167
F. 3d 225, 227 (CA5 1999) (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476
U. S. 207 (1986)). Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
denial of the motion to suppress, holding that Agent Cantu’s
manipulation of the bag was not a search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. 167 F. 3d, at 227. We granted
certiorari, 528 U. S. 927 (1999), and now reverse.
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated . . . .” A traveler’s personal luggage is clearly an
“effect” protected by the Amendment. See United States v.
1 The Government has not argued here that petitioner’s consent to
Agent Cantu’s opening the bag is a basis for admitting the evidence.

529US2 Unit: $U44 [09-26-01 10:00:50] PAGES PGT: OPIN
337 Cite as: 529 U. S. 334 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
Place, 462 U. S. 696, 707 (1983). Indeed, it is undisputed
here that petitioner possessed a privacy interest in his
bag.
But the Government asserts that by exposing his bag to
the public, petitioner lost a reasonable expectation that his
bag would not be physically manipulated. The Government
relies on our decisions in California v. Ciraolo, supra, and
Florida v. Riley, 488 U. S. 445 (1989), for the proposition that
matters open to public observation are not protected by the
Fourth Amendment. In Ciraolo, we held that police obser-
vation of a backyard from a plane flying at an altitude of
1,000 feet did not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Similarly, in Riley, we relied on Ciraolo to hold that police
observation of a greenhouse in a home’s curtilage from a heli-
copter passing at an altitude of 400 feet did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. We reasoned that the property was
“not necessarily protected from inspection that involves no
physical invasion,” and determined that because any member
of the public could have lawfully observed the defendants’
property by flying overhead, the defendants’ expectation of
privacy was “not reasonable and not one ‘that society is pre-
pared to honor.’ ” See Riley, supra, at 449 (explaining and
relying on Ciraolo’s reasoning).
But Ciraolo and Riley are different from this case because
they involved only visual, as opposed to tactile, observation.
Physically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than
purely visual inspection. For example, in Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S. 1, 16–17 (1968), we stated that a “careful [tactile] explo-
ration of the outer surfaces of a person’s clothing all over his
or her body” is a “serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the
person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong
resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.” Al-
though Agent Cantu did not “frisk” petitioner’s person, he
did conduct a probing tactile examination of petitioner’s
carry-on luggage. Obviously, petitioner’s bag was not part
of his person. But travelers are particularly concerned

529US2 Unit: $U44 [09-26-01 10:00:50] PAGES PGT: OPIN
338 BOND v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
about their carry-on luggage; they generally use it to trans-
port personal items that, for whatever reason, they prefer to
keep close at hand.
Here, petitioner concedes that, by placing his bag in the
overhead compartment, he could expect that it would be ex-
posed to certain kinds of touching and handling. But peti-
tioner argues that Agent Cantu’s physical manipulation of
his luggage “far exceeded the casual contact [petitioner]
could have expected from other passengers.” Brief for Pe-
titioner 18–19. The Government counters that it did not.
Our Fourth Amendment analysis embraces two questions.
First, we ask whether the individual, by his conduct, has
exhibited an actual expectation of privacy; that is, whether
he has shown that “he [sought] to preserve [something] as
private.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 740 (1979) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). Here, petitioner sought to
preserve privacy by using an opaque bag and placing that
bag directly above his seat. Second, we inquire whether the
individual’s expectation of privacy is “one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as reasonable.” Ibid. (internal quotation
marks omitted).2 When a bus passenger places a bag in an
overhead bin, he expects that other passengers or bus em-
ployees may move it for one reason or another. Thus, a bus
passenger clearly expects that his bag may be handled. He
does not expect that other passengers or bus employees will,
2 The parties properly agree that the subjective intent of the law en-
forcement officer is irrelevant in determining whether that officer’s actions
violate the Fourth Amendment. Brief for Petitioner 14; Brief for United
States 33–34; see Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806, 813 (1996) (stating
that “we have been unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges
based on the actual motivations of individual officers”); California v. Cira-
olo, 476 U. S. 207, 212 (1986) (rejecting respondent’s challenge to “the au-
thority of government to observe his activity from any vantage point or
place if the viewing is motivated by a law enforcement purpose, and not
the result of a casual, accidental observation”). This principle applies to
the agent’s acts in this case as well; the issue is not his state of mind, but
the objective effect of his actions.

529US2 Unit: $U44 [09-26-01 10:00:50] PAGES PGT: OPIN
339 Cite as: 529 U. S. 334 (2000)
Breyer, J., dissenting
as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner.
But this is exactly what the agent did here. We therefore
hold that the agent’s physical manipulation of petitioner’s
bag violated the Fourth Amendment.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Scalia joins,
dissenting.
Does a traveler who places a soft-sided bag in the shared
overhead storage compartment of a bus have a “reasonable
expectation” that strangers will not push, pull, prod,
squeeze, or otherwise manipulate his luggage? Unlike the
majority, I believe that he does not.
Petitioner argues—and the majority points out—that,
even if bags in overhead bins are subject to general “touch-
ing” and “handling,” this case is special because “Agent
Cantu’s physical manipulation of [petitioner’s] luggage ‘far
exceeded the casual contact [he] could have expected from
other passengers.’ ” Ante, at 338. But the record shows
the contrary. Agent Cantu testified that border patrol offi-
cers (who routinely enter buses at designated checkpoints to
run immigration checks) “conduct an inspection of the over-
head luggage by squeezing the bags as we’re going out.”
App. 9. On the occasion at issue here, Agent Cantu “felt a
green bag” which had “a brick-like object in it.” Id., at 10.
He explained that he felt “the edges of the brick in the bag,”
id., at 12, and that it was a “[b]rick-like object . . . that,
when squeezed, you could feel an outline of something of [a]
different mass inside of it,” id., at 11. Although the agent
acknowledged that his practice was to “squeeze [bags] very
hard,” he testified that his touch ordinarily was not “[h]ard
enough to break something inside that might be fragile.”
Id., at 15. Petitioner also testified that Agent Cantu
“reached for my bag, and he shook it a little, and squeezed
it.” Id., at 18.

529US2 Unit: $U44 [09-26-01 10:00:50] PAGES PGT: OPIN
340 BOND v. UNITED STATES
Breyer, J., dissenting
How does the “squeezing” just described differ from the
treatment that overhead luggage is likely to receive from
strangers in a world of travel that is somewhat less gentle
than it used to be? I think not at all. See United States v.
McDonald, 100 F. 3d 1320, 1327 (CA7 1996) (“ ‘[A]ny person
who has travelled on a common carrier knows that luggage
placed in an overhead compartment is always at the mercy of
all people who want to rearrange or move previously placed
luggage’ ”); Eagan, Familiar Anger Takes Flight with Airline
Tussles, Boston Herald, Aug. 15, 1999, p. 8 (“It’s dog-eat-dog
trying to cram half your home into overhead compart-
ments”); Massingill, Airlines Ride on the Wings of High-
Flying Economy and Travelers Pay Price in Long Lines,
Cramped Airplanes, Kansas City Star, May 9, 1999, p. F4
(“[H]undreds of passengers fill overhead compartments with
bulky carry-on bags that they have to cram, recram, and then
remove”); Flinn, Confessions of a Once-Only Carry-On Guy,
San Francisco Examiner, Sept. 6, 1998, p. T2 (flight attendant
“rearranged the contents of three different overhead com-
partments to free up some room” and then “shoved and
pounded until [the] bag squeezed in”). The trial court,
which heard the evidence, saw nothing unusual, unforesee-
able, or special about this agent’s squeeze. It found that
Agent Cantu simply “felt the outside of Bond’s softside green
cloth bag,” and it viewed the agent’s activity as “minimally
intrusive touching.” App. 23 (Order Denying Motion to
Suppress). The Court of Appeals also noted that, because
“passengers often handle and manipulate other passengers’
luggage,” the substantially similar tactile inspection here
was entirely “foreseeable.” 167 F. 3d 225, 227 (CA5 1999).
The record and these factual findings are sufficient to re-
solve this case. The law is clear that the Fourth Amend-
ment protects against government intrusion that upsets an
“ ‘actual (subjective) expectation of privacy’ ” that is objec-
tively “ ‘reasonable.’ ” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735,
740 (1979) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361

529US2 Unit: $U44 [09-26-01 10:00:50] PAGES PGT: OPIN
341 Cite as: 529 U. S. 334 (2000)
Breyer, J., dissenting
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). Privacy itself implies the
exclusion of uninvited strangers, not just strangers who
work for the Government. Hence, an individual cannot rea-
sonably expect privacy in respect to objects or activities that
he “knowingly exposes to the public.” Id., at 351.
Indeed, the Court has said that it is not objectively reason-
able to expect privacy if “[a]ny member of the public . . .
could have” used his senses to detect “everything that th[e]
officers observed.” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207,
213–214 (1986). Thus, it has held that the fact that stran-
gers may look down at fenced-in property from an aircraft
or sift through garbage bags on a public street can justify a
similar police intrusion. See ibid.; Florida v. Riley, 488
U. S. 445, 451 (1989) (plurality opinion); California v. Green-
wood, 486 U. S. 35, 40–41 (1988); cf. Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S.
730, 740 (1983) (police not precluded from “ ‘ben[ding] down’ ”
to see since “[t]he general public could peer into the interior
of [the car] from any number of angles”). The comparative
likelihood that strangers will give bags in an overhead com-
partment a hard squeeze would seem far greater. See
Riley, supra, at 453 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment)
(reasonableness of privacy expectation depends on whether
intrusion is a “sufficiently routine part of modern life”).
Consider, too, the accepted police practice of using dogs to
sniff for drugs hidden inside luggage. See, e. g., United
States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 699 (1983). Surely it is less
likely that nongovernmental strangers will sniff at another’s
bags (or, more to the point, permit their dogs to do so) than
it is that such actors will touch or squeeze another person’s
belongings in the process of making room for their own.
Of course, the agent’s purpose here—searching for
drugs—differs dramatically from the intention of a driver or
fellow passenger who squeezes a bag in the process of mak-
ing more room for another parcel. But in determining
whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable, it is the
effect, not the purpose, that matters. See ante, at 338, n. 2

529US2 Unit: $U44 [09-26-01 10:00:50] PAGES PGT: OPIN
342 BOND v. UNITED STATES
Breyer, J., dissenting
(“[T]he issue is not [the agent’s] state of mind, but the objec-
tive effect of his actions”); see also Whren v. United States,
517 U. S. 806, 813 (1996); United States v. Dunn, 480 U. S.
294, 304–305 (1987). Few individuals with something to
hide wish to expose that something to the police, however
careless or indifferent they may be in respect to discovery
by other members of the public. Hence, a Fourth Amend-
ment rule that turns on purpose could prevent police alone
from intruding where other strangers freely tread. And the
added privacy protection achieved by such an approach
would not justify the harm worked to law enforcement—at
least that is what this Court’s previous cases suggest. See
Greenwood, supra, at 41 (“[T]he police cannot reasonably be
expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activ-
ity that could have been observed by any member of the
public”); Ciraolo, supra, at 212–213 (rejecting respondent’s
argument that the police should be restricted solely because
their actions are “motivated by a law enforcement purpose,
and not the result of a casual, accidental observation”).
Nor can I accept the majority’s effort to distinguish
“tactile” from “visual” interventions, see ante, at 337, even
assuming that distinction matters here. Whether tactile
manipulation (say, of the exterior of luggage) is more intru-
sive or less intrusive than visual observation (say, through
a lighted window) necessarily depends on the particular
circumstances.
If we are to depart from established legal principles, we
should not begin here. At best, this decision will lead to a
constitutional jurisprudence of “squeezes,” thereby compli-
cating further already complex Fourth Amendment law, in-
creasing the difficulty of deciding ordinary criminal matters,
and hindering the administrative guidance (with its potential
for control of unreasonable police practices) that a less com-
plicated jurisprudence might provide. Cf. Whren, supra, at
815 (warning against the creation of trivial Fourth Amend-
ment distinctions). At worst, this case will deter law en-

529US2 Unit: $U44 [09-26-01 10:00:50] PAGES PGT: OPIN
343 Cite as: 529 U. S. 334 (2000)
Breyer, J., dissenting
forcement officers searching for drugs near borders from
using even the most nonintrusive touch to help investigate
publicly exposed bags. At the same time, the ubiquity of
non-governmental pushes, prods, and squeezes (delivered by
driver, attendant, passenger, or some other stranger) means
that this decision cannot do much to protect true privacy.
Rather, the traveler who wants to place a bag in a shared
overhead bin and yet safeguard its contents from public
touch should plan to pack those contents in a suitcase with
hard sides, irrespective of the Court’s decision today.
For these reasons, I dissent.