VILLAGE OF WILLOWBROOK et al. v. OLECH

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562 OCTOBER TERM, 1999
Syllabus
VILLAGE OF WILLOWBROOK et al. v. OLECH
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the seventh circuit
No. 98–1288. Argued January 10, 2000—Decided February 23, 2000
When respondent Olech and her late husband first asked petitioner Village
of Willowbrook (Village) to connect their property to the municipal
water supply, the Village conditioned the connection on the Olechs
granting it a 33-foot easement. Although it subsequently reduced the
easement to the 15 feet required of other property owners, Olech sued,
claiming that the Village’s demand for an additional 18-foot easement
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, and as-
serting that the easement was irrational and arbitrary, that the Village
was motivated by ill will resulting from the Olechs’ success in an unre-
lated lawsuit against the Village, and that the Village acted either with
the intent to deprive Olech of her rights or in reckless disregard of her
rights. The District Court dismissed the suit for failure to state a
claim, but the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Olech’s spiteful ill
will allegation stated a claim.
Held: The Equal Protection Clause gives rise to a cause of action on behalf
of a “class of one” where the plaintiff does not allege membership in a
class or group, but alleges that she has been intentionally treated differ-
ently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis
for such treatment. See, e. g., Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County,
260 U. S. 441. The Clause secures every person within a State’s juris-
diction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occa-
sioned by a statute’s express terms or by its improper execution. Id.,
at 445. Here, Olech’s allegations that the Village intentionally de-
manded a 33-foot easement from her when it required only 15 feet from
similarly situated property owners, that the demand was irrational and
arbitrary, and that the Village ultimately connected her property in re-
turn for a 15-foot easement—quite apart from the Village’s subjective
motive—state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection analy-
sis. Thus, the Court does not reach the alternative “subjective ill will”
theory on which the Seventh Circuit relied.
160 F. 3d 386, affirmed.
James L. DeAno argued the cause and filed briefs for
petitioners.

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563 Cite as: 528 U. S. 562 (2000)
Per Curiam
Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae. With him on the brief were Solic-
itor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General
Ogden, Deputy Solicitor General Underwood, and Mark B.
Stern.
John R. Wimmer argued the cause and filed a brief for
respondent.*
Per Curiam.
Respondent Grace Olech and her late husband Thaddeus
asked petitioner Village of Willowbrook (Village) to connect
their property to the municipal water supply. The Village
at first conditioned the connection on the Olechs granting the
Village a 33-foot easement. The Olechs objected, claiming
that the Village only required a 15-foot easement from other
property owners seeking access to the water supply. After
a 3-month delay, the Village relented and agreed to provide
water service with only a 15-foot easement.
Olech sued the Village, claiming that the Village’s demand
of an additional 18-foot easement violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Olech asserted
that the 33-foot easement demand was “irrational and wholly
arbitrary”; that the Village’s demand was actually motivated
by ill will resulting from the Olechs’ previous filing of an
unrelated, successful lawsuit against the Village; and that the
Village acted either with the intent to deprive Olech of her
rights or in reckless disregard of her rights. App. 10, 12.
The District Court dismissed the lawsuit pursuant to Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
cognizable claim under the Equal Protection Clause. Rely-
ing on Circuit precedent, the Court of Appeals for the Sev-
*Richard Ruda, James I. Crowley, and Donald B. Ayer filed a brief
for the International City/County Management Association et al. as amici
curiae urging reversal.
Harvey Grossman, Steven R. Shapiro, and Richard J. O’Brien filed a
brief for the ACLU as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

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564 VILLAGE OF WILLOWBROOK v. OLECH
Per Curiam
enth Circuit reversed, holding that a plaintiff can allege an
equal protection violation by asserting that state action was
motivated solely by a “ ‘spiteful effort to “get” him for rea-
sons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective.’ ”
160 F. 3d 386, 387 (1998) (quoting Esmail v. Macrane, 53
F. 3d 176, 180 (CA7 1995)). It determined that Olech’s com-
plaint sufficiently alleged such a claim. 160 F. 3d, at 388.
We granted certiorari to determine whether the Equal Pro-
tection Clause gives rise to a cause of action on behalf of a
“class of one” where the plaintiff did not allege membership
in a class or group.* 527 U. S. 1067 (1999).
Our cases have recognized successful equal protection
claims brought by a “class of one,” where the plaintiff alleges
that she has been intentionally treated differently from oth-
ers similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for
the difference in treatment. See Sioux City Bridge Co. v.
Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441 (1923); Allegheny Pittsburgh
Coal Co. v. Commission of Webster Cty., 488 U. S. 336 (1989).
In so doing, we have explained that “ ‘[t]he purpose of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to
secure every person within the State’s jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution
through duly constituted agents.’ ” Sioux City Bridge Co.,
supra, at 445 (quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of
Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 352 (1918)).
*We note that the complaint in this case could be read to allege a class
of five. In addition to Grace and Thaddeus Olech, their neighbors Rodney
and Phyllis Zimmer and Howard Brinkman requested to be connected to
the municipal water supply, and the Village initially demanded the 33-foot
easement from all of them. The Zimmers and Mr. Brinkman were also
involved in the previous, successful lawsuit against the Village, which al-
legedly created the ill will motivating the excessive easement demand.
Whether the complaint alleges a class of one or of five is of no consequence
because we conclude that the number of individuals in a class is immaterial
for equal protection analysis.

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565 Cite as: 528 U. S. 562 (2000)
Breyer, J., concurring in result
That reasoning is applicable to this case. Olech’s com-
plaint can fairly be construed as alleging that the Village
intentionally demanded a 33-foot easement as a condition of
connecting her property to the municipal water supply
where the Village required only a 15-foot easement from
other similarly situated property owners. See Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45–46 (1957). The complaint also al-
leged that the Village’s demand was “irrational and wholly
arbitrary” and that the Village ultimately connected her
property after receiving a clearly adequate 15-foot easement.
These allegations, quite apart from the Village’s subjective
motivation, are sufficient to state a claim for relief under
traditional equal protection analysis. We therefore affirm
the judgment of the Court of Appeals, but do not reach the
alternative theory of “subjective ill will” relied on by that
court.
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer, concurring in the result.
The Solicitor General and the village of Willowbrook have
expressed concern lest we interpret the Equal Protection
Clause in this case in a way that would transform many ordi-
nary violations of city or state law into violations of the Con-
stitution. It might be thought that a rule that looks only to
an intentional difference in treatment and a lack of a rational
basis for that different treatment would work such a trans-
formation. Zoning decisions, for example, will often, per-
haps almost always, treat one landowner differently from
another, and one might claim that, when a city’s zoning au-
thority takes an action that fails to conform to a city zoning
regulation, it lacks a “rational basis” for its action (at least
if the regulation in question is reasonably clear).
This case, however, does not directly raise the question
whether the simple and common instance of a faulty zoning
decision would violate the Equal Protection Clause. That is
because the Court of Appeals found that in this case respond-

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566 VILLAGE OF WILLOWBROOK v. OLECH
Breyer, J., concurring in result
ent had alleged an extra factor as well—a factor that the
Court of Appeals called “vindictive action,” “illegitimate ani-
mus,” or “ill will.” 160 F. 3d 386, 388 (CA7 1998). And, in
that respect, the court said this case resembled Esmail v.
Macrane, 53 F. 3d 176 (CA7 1995), because the Esmail plain-
tiff had alleged that the municipality’s differential treatment
“was the result not of prosecutorial discretion honestly (even
if ineptly—even if arbitrarily) exercised but of an illegiti-
mate desire to ‘get’ him.” 160 F. 3d, at 388.
In my view, the presence of that added factor in this case
is sufficient to minimize any concern about transforming
run-of-the-mill zoning cases into cases of constitutional right.
For this reason, along with the others mentioned by the
Court, I concur in the result.

Job: 528ORD Take: NOT1 Date/Time: 06-23-01 08:44:14
Reporter’s Note
The next page is purposely numbered 801. The numbers between 566
and 801 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to publish
the orders with permanent page numbers, thus making the official cita-
tions available upon publication of the preliminary prints of the United
States Reports.