RICE v. CAYETANO, GOVERNOR OF HAWAII

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
495 OCTOBER TERM, 1999
Syllabus
RICE v. CAYETANO, GOVERNOR OF HAWAII
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 98–818. Argued October 6, 1999—Decided February 23, 2000
The Hawaiian Constitution limits the right to vote for nine trustees chosen
in a statewide election. The trustees compose the governing authority
of a state agency known as the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, or OHA.
The agency administers programs designed for the benefit of two sub-
classes of Hawaiian citizenry, “Hawaiians” and “native Hawaiians.”
State law defines “native Hawaiians” as descendants of not less than
one-half part of the races inhabiting the islands before 1778, and “Ha-
waiians”—a larger class that includes “native Hawaiians”—as descend-
ants of the peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands in 1778. The trust-
ees are chosen in a statewide election in which only “Hawaiians” may
vote. Petitioner Rice, a Hawaiian citizen without the requisite ancestry
to be a “Hawaiian” under state law, applied to vote in OHA trustee
elections. When his application was denied, he sued respondent Gover-
nor (hereinafter State), claiming, inter alia, that the voting exclusion
was invalid under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The
Federal District Court granted the State summary judgment. Survey-
ing the history of the islands and their people, it determined that Con-
gress and Hawaii have recognized a guardian-ward relationship with
the native Hawaiians, which is analogous to the relationship between
the United States and Indian tribes. It examined the voting qualifica-
tions with the latitude applied to legislation passed pursuant to Con-
gress’ power over Indian affairs, see Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535,
and found that the electoral scheme was rationally related to the State’s
responsibility under its Admission Act to utilize a part of the proceeds
from certain public lands for the native Hawaiians’ benefit. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed, finding that Hawaii “may rationally conclude that Ha-
waiians, being the group to whom trust obligations run and to whom
OHA trustees owe a duty of loyalty, should be the group to decide who
the trustees ought to be.” 146 F. 3d 1075, 1079.
Held: Hawaii’s denial of Rice’s right to vote in OHA trustee elections
violates the Fifteenth Amendment. Pp. 511–524.
(a) The Amendment’s purpose and command are set forth in explicit
and comprehensive language. The National Government and the
States may not deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race.
The Amendment reaffirms the equality of races at the most basic level

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
496 RICE v. CAYETANO
Syllabus
of the democratic process, the exercise of the voting franchise. It pro-
tects all persons, not just members of a particular race. Important
precedents give instruction in the instant case. The Amendment was
quite sufficient to invalidate a grandfather clause that did not mention
race but instead used ancestry in an attempt to confine and restrict the
voting franchise, Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347, 364–365; and it
sufficed to strike down the white primary systems designed to exclude
one racial class (at least) from voting, see, e. g., Terry v. Adams, 345
U. S. 461, 469–470. The voting structure in this case is neither subtle
nor indirect; it specifically grants the vote to persons of the defined
ancestry and to no others. Ancestry can be a proxy for race. It is that
proxy here. For centuries Hawaii was isolated from migration. The
inhabitants shared common physical characteristics, and by 1778 they
had a common culture. The provisions at issue reflect the State’s effort
to preserve that commonality to the present day. In interpreting the
Reconstruction Era civil rights laws this Court has observed that racial
discrimination is that which singles out “identifiable classes of per-
sons . . . solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.”
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U. S. 604, 613. The very ob-
ject of the statutory definition here is to treat the early Hawaiians as a
distinct people, commanding their own recognition and respect. The
history of the State’s definition also demonstrates that the State has
used ancestry as a racial definition and for a racial purpose. The draft-
ers of the definitions of “Hawaiian” and “native Hawaiian” emphasized
the explicit tie to race. The State’s additional argument that the re-
striction is race neutral because it differentiates even among Polynesian
people based on the date of an ancestor’s residence in Hawaii is under-
mined by the classification’s express racial purpose and its actual effects.
The ancestral inquiry in this case implicates the same grave concerns
as a classification specifying a particular race by name, for it demeans a
person’s dignity and worth to be judged by ancestry instead of by his
or her own merit and essential qualities. The State’s ancestral inquiry
is forbidden by the Fifteenth Amendment for the further reason that
using racial classifications is corruptive of the whole legal order demo-
cratic elections seek to preserve. The law itself may not become the
instrument for generating the prejudice and hostility all too often di-
rected against persons whose particular ancestry is disclosed by their
ethnic characteristics and cultural traditions. The State’s electoral re-
striction enacts a race-based voting qualification. Pp. 511–517.
(b) The State’s three principal defenses of its voting law are rejected.
It argues first that the exclusion of non-Hawaiians from voting is per-
mitted under this Court’s cases allowing the differential treatment of
Indian tribes. However, even if Congress had the authority, delegated

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
497 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Syllabus
to the State, to treat Hawaiians or native Hawaiians as tribes, Congress
may not authorize a State to create a voting scheme of the sort created
here. Congress may not authorize a State to establish a voting scheme
that limits the electorate for its public officials to a class of tribal Indians
to the exclusion of all non-Indian citizens. The elections for OHA
trustee are elections of the State, not of a separate quasi sovereign, and
they are elections to which the Fifteenth Amendment applies. Morton
v. Mancari, supra, distinguished. The State’s further contention that
the limited voting franchise is sustainable under this Court’s cases hold-
ing that the one-person, one-vote rule does not pertain to certain special
purpose districts such as water or irrigation districts also fails, for com-
pliance with the one-person, one-vote rule of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not excuse compliance with the Fifteenth Amendment.
Hawaii’s final argument that the voting restriction does no more than
ensure an alignment of interests between the fiduciaries and the benefi-
ciaries of a trust founders on its own terms, for it is not clear that the
voting classification is symmetric with the beneficiaries of the programs
OHA administers. While the bulk of the funds appears to be ear-
marked for the benefit of “native Hawaiians,” the State permits both
“native Hawaiians” and “Hawaiians” to vote for trustees. The argu-
ment fails on more essential grounds; it rests on the demeaning premise
that citizens of a particular race are somehow more qualified than others
to vote on certain matters. There is no room under the Amendment
for the concept that the right to vote in a particular election can be
allocated based on race. Pp. 517–524.
146 F. 3d 1075, reversed.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed
an opinion concurring in the result, in which Souter, J., joined, post,
p. 524. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J.,
joined as to Part II, post, p. 527. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p. 547.
Theodore B. Olson argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Douglas R. Cox and Thomas G.
Hungar.
John G. Roberts, Jr., argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Earl I. Anzai, Attorney General
of Hawaii, Girard D. Lau, Dorothy Sellers, and Charleen M.
Aina, Deputy Attorneys General, and Gregory G. Garre.

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
498 RICE v. CAYETANO
Opinion of the Court
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for
the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman,
Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor Gen-
eral Underwood, Irving L. Gornstein, and Elizabeth Ann
Peterson.*
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
A citizen of Hawaii comes before us claiming that an ex-
plicit, race-based voting qualification has barred him from
voting in a statewide election. The Fifteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, binding on the
National Government, the States, and their political sub-
divisions, controls the case.
The Hawaiian Constitution limits the right to vote for nine
trustees chosen in a statewide election. The trustees com-
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Campaign for
a Color-Blind America et al. by Richard K. Willard and Shannen W. Cof-
fin; and for the Center for Equal Opportunity et al. by Brett M. Kava-
naugh, Robert H. Bork, and Roger Clegg.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of
California et al. by Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, and
Thomas F. Gede, Special Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attor-
neys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Bill Pryor of
Alabama, John F. Tarantino of Guam, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada,
Patricia A. Madrid of New Mexico, Maya B. Kara of the Northern Mari-
ana Islands, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, and Hardy Myers of
Oregon; for the Alaska Federation of Natives et al. by Jeffrey L. Bleich;
for the Kamehameha Schools Bishop Estate Trust by Carter G. Phillips,
Virginia A. Seitz, and C. Michael Hare; for the National Congress of
American Indians by Kim Jerome Gottschalk and Steven C. Moore; for the
State Council of Hawaiian Homestead Associations et al. by Paul Alston,
William M. Tam, Lea Hong, and David M. Forman; and for the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs et al. by Harry R. Sachse, Reid Peyton Chambers, Ar-
thur Lazarus, Jr., Sherry P. Broder, and Jon M. Van Dyke.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Hawai‘i Congressional Delega-
tions by Patricia M. Zell, Jennifer M. L. Chock, and Janet Erickson; for
the Hou Hawaiians et al. by Walter R. Schoettle; and for the Pacific Legal
Foundation by John H. Findley and Sharon L. Browne.

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
499 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
pose the governing authority of a state agency known as the
Office of Hawaiian Affairs, or OHA. Haw. Const., Art. XII,
§ 5. The agency administers programs designed for the ben-
efit of two subclasses of the Hawaiian citizenry. The smaller
class comprises those designated as “native Hawaiians,” de-
fined by statute, with certain supplementary language later
set out in full, as descendants of not less than one-half part
of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 10–2 (1993). The second, larger class of
persons benefited by OHA programs is “Hawaiians,” defined
to be, with refinements contained in the statute we later
quote, those persons who are descendants of people inhabit-
ing the Hawaiian Islands in 1778. Ibid. The right to vote
for trustees is limited to “Hawaiians,” the second, larger
class of persons, which of course includes the smaller class
of “native Hawaiians.” Haw. Const., Art. XII, § 5.
Petitioner Rice, a citizen of Hawaii and thus himself a Ha-
waiian in a well-accepted sense of the term, does not have
the requisite ancestry even for the larger class. He is not,
then, a “Hawaiian” in terms of the statute; so he may not
vote in the trustee election. The issue presented by this
case is whether Rice may be so barred. Rejecting the
State’s arguments that the classification in question is not
racial or that, if it is, it is nevertheless valid for other rea-
sons, we hold Hawaii’s denial of petitioner’s right to vote to
be a clear violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.
I
When Congress and the State of Hawaii enacted the laws
we are about to discuss and review, they made their own
assessments of the events which intertwine Hawaii’s history
with the history of America itself. We will begin with a
very brief account of that historical background. Historians
and other scholars who write of Hawaii will have a different
purpose and more latitude than do we. They may draw
judgments either more laudatory or more harsh than the

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
500 RICE v. CAYETANO
Opinion of the Court
ones to which we refer. Our more limited role, in the pos-
ture of this particular case, is to recount events as under-
stood by the lawmakers, thus ensuring that we accord proper
appreciation to their purposes in adopting the policies and
laws at issue. The litigants seem to agree that two works
in particular are appropriate for our consideration, and we
rely in part on those sources. See L. Fuchs, Hawaii Pono:
An Ethnic and Political History (1961) (hereinafter Fuchs);
1–3 R. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom (1938); (1953);
(1967) (hereinafter Kuykendall).
The origins of the first Hawaiian people and the date they
reached the islands are not established with certainty, but
the usual assumption is that they were Polynesians who voy-
aged from Tahiti and began to settle the islands around A. D.
750. Fuchs 4; 1 Kuykendall 3; see also G. Daws, Shoal of
Time: A History of the Hawaiian Islands xii–xiii (1968) (Mar-
quesas Islands and Tahiti). When England’s Captain Cook
made landfall in Hawaii on his expedition in 1778, the Hawai-
ian people had developed, over the preceding 1,000 years or
so, a cultural and political structure of their own. They had
well-established traditions and customs and practiced a poly-
theistic religion. Agriculture and fishing sustained the
people, and, though population estimates vary, some modern
historians conclude that the population in 1778 was about
200,000–300,000. See Fuchs 4; R. Schmitt, Historical Statis-
tics of Hawaii 7 (1977) (hereinafter Schmitt). The accounts
of Hawaiian life often remark upon the people’s capacity to
find beauty and pleasure in their island existence, but life
was not altogether idyllic. In Cook’s time the islands were
ruled by four different kings, and intra-Hawaiian wars could
inflict great loss and suffering. Kings or principal chief-
tains, as well as high priests, could order the death or sacri-
fice of any subject. The society was one, however, with its
own identity, its own cohesive forces, its own history.
In the years after Cook’s voyage many expeditions would
follow. A few members of the ships’ companies remained on

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
501 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
the islands, some as authorized advisers, others as deserters.
Their intermarriage with the inhabitants of Hawaii was not
infrequent.
In 1810, the islands were united as one kingdom under the
leadership of an admired figure in Hawaiian history, Kame-
hameha I. It is difficult to say how many settlers from
Europe and America were in Hawaii when the King con-
solidated his power. One historian estimates there were no
more than 60 or so settlers at that time. 1 Kuykendall 27.
An influx was soon to follow. Beginning about 1820, mis-
sionaries arrived, of whom Congregationalists from New
England were dominant in the early years. They sought to
teach Hawaiians to abandon religious beliefs and customs
that were contrary to Christian teachings and practices.
The 1800’s are a story of increasing involvement of west-
erners in the economic and political affairs of the Kingdom.
Rights to land became a principal concern, and there was
unremitting pressure to allow non-Hawaiians to use and to
own land and to be secure in their title. Westerners were
not the only ones with pressing concerns, however, for the
disposition and ownership of land came to be an unsettled
matter among the Hawaiians themselves.
The status of Hawaiian lands has presented issues of com-
plexity and controversy from at least the rule of Kame-
hameha I to the present day. We do not attempt to inter-
pret that history, lest our comments be thought to bear upon
issues not before us. It suffices to refer to various of the
historical conclusions that appear to have been persuasive to
Congress and to the State when they enacted the laws soon
to be discussed.
When Kamehameha I came to power, he reasserted suze-
rainty over all lands and provided for control of parts of them
by a system described in our own cases as “feudal.” Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229, 232 (1984); Kai-
ser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 166 (1979). A
well-known description of the King’s early decrees is con-

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
502 RICE v. CAYETANO
Opinion of the Court
tained in an 1864 opinion of the Supreme Court of the King-
dom of Hawaii. The court, in turn, drew extensively upon
an earlier report which recited, in part, as follows:
“ ‘When the islands were conquered by Kamehameha I.,
he followed the example of his predecessors, and divided
out the lands among his principal warrior chiefs, retain-
ing, however, a portion in his own hands to be cultivated
or managed by his own immediate servants or attend-
ants. Each principal chief divided his lands anew and
gave them out to an inferior order of chiefs or persons
of rank, by whom they were subdivided again and again
after (often) passing through the hands of four, five or
six persons from the King down to the lowest class of
tenants. All these persons were considered to have
rights in the lands, or the productions of them, the pro-
portions of which rights were not clearly defined, al-
though universally acknowledged. . . . The same rights
which the King possessed over the superior landlords
and all under them, the several grades of landlords pos-
sessed over their inferiors, so that there was a joint
ownership of the land, the King really owning the allo-
dium, and the person in whose hands he placed the land,
holding it in trust.’ ” In re Estate of His Majesty Ka-
mehameha IV, 2 Haw. 715, 718–719 (quoting Principles
Adopted by the Board of Commissioners to Quiet Land
Titles, 2 Stat. Laws 81–82 (Haw. Kingdom 1847)).
Beginning in 1839 and through the next decade, a succes-
sive ruler, Kamehameha III, approved a series of decrees
and laws designed to accommodate demands for ownership
and security of title. In the words of the Hawaiian Supreme
Court, “[t]he subject of rights in land was one of daily in-
creasing importance to the newly formed Government, for it
was obvious that the internal resources of the country could
not be developed until the system of undivided and undefined
ownership in land should be abolished.” 2 Haw., at 721.

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
503 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
Arrangements were made to confer freehold title in some
lands to certain chiefs and other individuals. The King re-
tained vast lands for himself, and directed that other exten-
sive lands be held by the government, which by 1840 had
adopted the first Constitution of the islands. Thus was ef-
fected a fundamental and historic division, known as the
Great Mahele. In 1850, foreigners, in turn, were given the
right of land ownership.
The new policies did not result in wide dispersal of owner-
ship. Though some provisions had been attempted by which
tenants could claim lands, these proved ineffective in many
instances, and ownership became concentrated. In 1920, the
Congress of the United States, in a Report on the bill estab-
lishing the Hawaiian Homes Commission, made an assess-
ment of Hawaiian land policy in the following terms:
“Your committee thus finds that since the institution of
private ownership of lands in Hawaii the native Hawai-
ians, outside of the King and the chiefs, were granted
and have held but a very small portion of the lands of
the Islands. Under the homestead laws somewhat
more than a majority of the lands were homesteaded to
Hawaiians, but a great many of these lands have been
lost through improvidence and inability to finance farm-
ing operations. Most frequently, however, the native
Hawaiian, with no thought of the future, has obtained
the land for a nominal sum, only to turn about and sell
it to wealthy interests for a sum more nearly approach-
ing its real value. The Hawaiians are not business men
and have shown themselves unable to meet competitive
conditions unaided. In the end the speculators are the
real beneficiaries of the homestead laws. Thus the tax
returns for 1919 show that only 6.23 per centum of
the property of the Islands is held by native Hawaiians
and this for the most part is lands in the possession
of approximately a thousand wealthy Hawaiians, the

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
504 RICE v. CAYETANO
Opinion of the Court
descendents of the chiefs.” H. R. Rep. No. 839, 66th
Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1920).
While these developments were unfolding, the United
States and European powers made constant efforts to pro-
tect their interests and to influence Hawaiian political and
economic affairs in general. The first “articles of arrange-
ment” between the United States and the Kingdom of
Hawaii were signed in 1826, 8 Department of State, Treaties
and Other International Agreements of the United States
of America 1776–1949, p. 861 (C. Bevans comp. 1968), and
additional treaties and conventions between the two coun-
tries were signed in 1849, 1875, and 1887, see Treaty with
the Hawaiian Islands, 9 Stat. 977 (1849) (friendship, com-
merce, and navigation); Convention between the United
States of America and His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian
Islands, 19 Stat. 625 (1875) (commercial reciprocity); Supple-
mentary Convention between the United States of America
and His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, 25 Stat.
1399 (1887) (same). The United States was not the only
country interested in Hawaii and its affairs, but by the later
part of the century the reality of American dominance in
trade, settlement, economic expansion, and political influence
became apparent.
Tensions intensified between an anti-Western, pro-native
bloc in the government on the one hand and western busi-
ness interests and property owners on the other. The con-
flicts came to the fore in 1887. Westerners forced the resig-
nation of the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Hawaii and
the adoption of a new Constitution, which, among other
things, reduced the power of the monarchy and extended the
right to vote to non-Hawaiians. 3 Kuykendall 344–372.
Tensions continued through 1893, when they again peaked,
this time in response to an attempt by the then-Hawaiian
monarch, Queen Liliuokalani, to promulgate a new constitu-
tion restoring monarchical control over the House of Nobles
and limiting the franchise to Hawaiian subjects. A so-called

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
505 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
Committee of Safety, a group of professionals and business-
men, with the active assistance of John Stevens, the United
States Minister to Hawaii, acting with United States Armed
Forces, replaced the monarchy with a provisional govern-
ment. That government sought annexation by the United
States. On December 18 of the same year, President Cleve-
land, unimpressed and indeed offended by the actions of the
American Minister, denounced the role of the American
forces and called for restoration of the Hawaiian monarchy.
Message of the President to the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives, reprinted in H. R. Rep. No. 243, 53d Cong., 2d
Sess., 3–15 (1893). The Queen could not resume her former
place, however, and, in 1894, the provisional government es-
tablished the Republic of Hawaii. The Queen abdicated her
throne a year later.
In 1898, President McKinley signed a Joint Resolution,
sometimes called the Newlands Resolution, to annex the
Hawaiian Islands as territory of the United States. 30
Stat. 750. According to the Joint Resolution, the Republic
of Hawaii ceded all former Crown, government, and public
lands to the United States. Ibid. The resolution further
provided that revenues from the public lands were to be
“used solely for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian
Islands for educational and other public purposes.” Ibid.
Two years later the Hawaiian Organic Act established the
Territory of Hawaii, asserted United States control over the
ceded lands, and put those lands “in the possession, use, and
control of the government of the Territory of Hawaii . . .
until otherwise provided for by Congress.” Act of Apr. 30,
1900, ch. 339, § 91, 31 Stat. 159.
In 1993, a century after the intervention by the Committee
of Safety, the Congress of the United States reviewed this
history, and in particular the role of Minister Stevens. Con-
gress passed a Joint Resolution recounting the events in
some detail and offering an apology to the native Hawaiian
people. 107 Stat. 1510.

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
506 RICE v. CAYETANO
Opinion of the Court
Before we turn to the relevant provisions two other impor-
tant matters, which affected the demographics of Hawaii,
must be recounted. The first is the tragedy inflicted on the
early Hawaiian people by the introduction of western dis-
eases and infectious agents. As early as the establishment
of the rule of Kamehameha I, it was becoming apparent that
the native population had serious vulnerability to diseases
borne to the islands by settlers. High mortality figures
were experienced in infancy and adulthood, even from com-
mon illnesses such as diarrhea, colds, and measles. Fuchs
13; see Schmitt 58. More serious diseases took even greater
tolls. In the smallpox epidemic of 1853, thousands of lives
were lost. Ibid. By 1878, 100 years after Cook’s arrival,
the native population had been reduced to about 47,500 peo-
ple. Id., at 25. These mortal illnesses no doubt were an
initial cause of the despair, disenchantment, and despondency
some commentators later noted in descendents of the early
Hawaiian people. See Fuchs 13.
The other important feature of Hawaiian demographics to
be noted is the immigration to the islands by people of many
different races and cultures. Mostly in response to the de-
mand of the sugar industry for arduous labor in the cane
fields, successive immigration waves brought Chinese, Por-
tuguese, Japanese, and Filipinos to Hawaii. Beginning with
the immigration of 293 Chinese in 1852, the plantations alone
drew to Hawaii, in one estimate, something over 400,000
men, women, and children over the next century. Id., at 24;
A. Lind, Hawaii’s People 6–7 (4th ed. 1980). Each of these
ethnic and national groups has had its own history in Hawaii,
its own struggles with societal and official discrimination, its
own successes, and its own role in creating the present soci-
ety of the islands. See E. Nordyke, The Peopling of Hawai‘i
28–98 (2d ed. 1989). The 1990 census figures show the re-
sulting ethnic diversity of the Hawaiian population. U. S.
Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, 1990 Census of Popu-

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
507 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
lation, Supplementary Reports, Detailed Ancestry Groups
for States (Oct. 1992).
With this background we turn to the legislative enact-
ments of direct relevance to the case before us.
II
Not long after the creation of the new Territory, Congress
became concerned with the condition of the native Hawaiian
people. See H. R. Rep. No. 839, at 2–6; Hearings on the
Rehabilitation and Colonization of Hawaiians and Other Pro-
posed Amendments to the Organic Act of the Territory of
Hawaii before the House Committee on the Territories, 66th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1920). Reciting its purpose to rehabilitate
the native Hawaiian population, see H. R. Rep. No. 839, at
1–2, Congress enacted the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act,
which set aside about 200,000 acres of the ceded public lands
and created a program of loans and long-term leases for the
benefit of native Hawaiians. Act of July 9, 1921, ch. 42, 42
Stat. 108. The Act defined “native Hawaiian[s]” to include
“any descendant of not less than one-half part of the blood
of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to
1778.” Ibid.
Hawaii was admitted as the 50th State of the Union in
1959. With admission, the new State agreed to adopt the
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act as part of its own Consti-
tution. Pub. L. 86–3, §§ 4, 7, 73 Stat. 5, 7 (Admission Act);
see Haw. Const., Art. XII, §§ 1–3. In addition, the United
States granted Hawaii title to all public lands and public
property within the boundaries of the State, save those
which the Federal Government retained for its own use.
Admission Act §§ 5(b)–(d), 73 Stat. 5. This grant included
the 200,000 acres set aside under the Hawaiian Homes Com-
mission Act and almost 1.2 million additional acres of land.
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4.
The legislation authorizing the grant recited that these
lands, and the proceeds and income they generated, were to

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
508 RICE v. CAYETANO
Opinion of the Court
be held “as a public trust” to be “managed and disposed of
for one or more of ” five purposes:
“[1] for the support of the public schools and other public
educational institutions, [2] for the betterment of the
conditions of native Hawaiians, as defined in the Hawai-
ian Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended, [3] for
the development of farm and home ownership on as
widespread a basis as possible[,] [4] for the making of
public improvements, and [5] for the provision of lands
for public use.” Admission Act § 5(f), 73 Stat. 6.
In the first decades following admission, the State appar-
ently continued to administer the lands that had been set
aside under the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act for the
benefit of native Hawaiians. The income from the balance
of the public lands is said to have “by and large flowed to the
department of education.” Hawaii Senate Journal, Standing
Committee Rep. No. 784, pp. 1350, 1351 (1979).
In 1978 Hawaii amended its Constitution to establish the
Office of Hawaiian Affairs, Haw. Const., Art. XII, § 5, which
has as its mission “[t]he betterment of conditions of native
Hawaiians . . . [and] Hawaiians,” Haw. Rev. Stat. § 10–3
(1993). Members of the 1978 constitutional convention, at
which the new amendments were drafted and proposed, set
forth the purpose of the proposed agency:
“Members [of the Committee of the Whole] were im-
pressed by the concept of the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs which establishes a public trust entity for the
benefit of the people of Hawaiian ancestry. Members
foresaw that it will provide Hawaiians the right to de-
termine the priorities which will effectuate the better-
ment of their condition and welfare and promote the pro-
tection and preservation of the Hawaiian race, and that
it will unite Hawaiians as a people.” 1 Proceedings of
the Constitutional Convention of Hawaii of 1978, Com-
mittee of the Whole Rep. No. 13, p. 1018 (1980).

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
509 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
Implementing statutes and their later amendments vested
OHA with broad authority to administer two categories of
funds: a 20 percent share of the revenue from the 1.2 million
acres of lands granted to the State pursuant to § 5(b) of the
Admission Act, which OHA is to administer “for the better-
ment of the conditions of native Hawaiians,” Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 10–13.5 (1993), and any state or federal appropriations or
private donations that may be made for the benefit of “native
Hawaiians” and/or “Hawaiians,” Haw. Const., Art. XII, § 6.
See generally Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 10–1 to 10–16. (The
200,000 acres set aside under the Hawaiian Homes Commis-
sion Act are administered by a separate agency. See Haw.
Rev. Stat. § 26–17 (1993).) The Hawaiian Legislature has
charged OHA with the mission of “[s]erving as the principal
public agency . . . responsible for the performance, develop-
ment, and coordination of programs and activities relating to
native Hawaiians and Hawaiians,” “[a]ssessing the policies
and practices of other agencies impacting on native Hawai-
ians and Hawaiians,” “conducting advocacy efforts for native
Hawaiians and Hawaiians,” “[a]pplying for, receiving, and
disbursing, grants and donations from all sources for native
Hawaiian and Hawaiian programs and services,” and “[s]erv-
ing as a receptacle for reparations.” § 10–3.
OHA is overseen by a nine-member board of trustees, the
members of which “shall be Hawaiians” and—presenting the
precise issue in this case—shall be “elected by qualified vot-
ers who are Hawaiians, as provided by law.” Haw. Const.,
Art. XII, § 5; see Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 13D–1, 13D–3(b)(1)
(1993). The term “Hawaiian” is defined by statute:
“ ‘Hawaiian’ means any descendant of the aboriginal peo-
ples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands which exercised
sovereignty and subsisted in the Hawaiian Islands in
1778, and which peoples thereafter have continued to
reside in Hawaii.” § 10–2.
The statute defines “native Hawaiian” as follows:

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
510 RICE v. CAYETANO
Opinion of the Court
“ ‘Native Hawaiian’ means any descendant of not less
than one-half part of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian
Islands previous to 1778, as defined by the Hawaiian
Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended; provided
that the term identically refers to the descendants of
such blood quantum of such aboriginal peoples which
exercised sovereignty and subsisted in the Hawaiian
Islands in 1778 and which peoples thereafter continued
to reside in Hawaii.” Ibid.
Petitioner Harold Rice is a citizen of Hawaii and a descend-
ant of preannexation residents of the islands. He is not, as
we have noted, a descendant of pre-1778 natives, and so he
is neither “native Hawaiian” nor “Hawaiian” as defined by
the statute. Rice applied in March 1996 to vote in the elec-
tions for OHA trustees. To register to vote for the office of
trustee he was required to attest: “I am also Hawaiian and
desire to register to vote in OHA elections.” Affidavit on
Application for Voter Registration, Lodging by Petitioner,
Tab 2. Rice marked through the words “am also Hawaiian
and,” then checked the form “yes.” The State denied his
application.
Rice sued Benjamin Cayetano, the Governor of Hawaii, in
the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii.
(The Governor was sued in his official capacity, and the At-
torney General of Hawaii defends the challenged enact-
ments. We refer to the respondent as “the State.”) Rice
contested his exclusion from voting in elections for OHA
trustees and from voting in a special election relating to na-
tive Hawaiian sovereignty which was held in August 1996.
After the District Court rejected the latter challenge, see
Rice v. Cayetano, 941 F. Supp. 1529 (1996) (a decision not
before us), the parties moved for summary judgment on the
claim that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution invalidate the law excluding Rice
from the OHA trustee elections.

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
511 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
The District Court granted summary judgment to the
State. 963 F. Supp. 1547 (Haw. 1997). Surveying the
history of the islands and their people, the District Court
determined that Congress and the State of Hawaii have rec-
ognized a guardian-ward relationship with the native Hawai-
ians, which the court found analogous to the relationship
between the United States and the Indian tribes. Id., at
1551–1554. On this premise, the court examined the voting
qualification with the latitude that we have applied to legisla-
tion passed pursuant to Congress’ power over Indian affairs.
Id., at 1554–1555 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535
(1974)). Finding that the electoral scheme was “rationally
related to the State’s responsibility under the Admission Act
to utilize a portion of the proceeds from the § 5(b) lands for
the betterment of Native Hawaiians,” the District Court
held that the voting restriction did not violate the Consti-
tution’s ban on racial classifications. 963 F. Supp., at
1554–1555.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 146 F. 3d 1075 (CA9
1998). The court noted that Rice had not challenged the
constitutionality of the underlying programs or of OHA it-
self. Id., at 1079. Considering itself bound to “accept the
trusts and their administrative structure as [it found] them,
and assume that both are lawful,” the court held that Hawaii
“may rationally conclude that Hawaiians, being the group to
whom trust obligations run and to whom OHA trustees owe
a duty of loyalty, should be the group to decide who the
trustees ought to be.” Ibid. The court so held notwith-
standing its clear holding that the Hawaii Constitution and
implementing statutes “contain a racial classification on their
face.” Ibid.
We granted certiorari, 526 U. S. 1016 (1999), and now
reverse.
III
The purpose and command of the Fifteenth Amendment
are set forth in language both explicit and comprehensive.

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
512 RICE v. CAYETANO
Opinion of the Court
The National Government and the States may not violate a
fundamental principle: They may not deny or abridge the
right to vote on account of race. Color and previous condi-
tion of servitude, too, are forbidden criteria or classifications,
though it is unnecessary to consider them in the present case.
Enacted in the wake of the Civil War, the immediate con-
cern of the Amendment was to guarantee to the emancipated
slaves the right to vote, lest they be denied the civil and
political capacity to protect their new freedom. Vital as its
objective remains, the Amendment goes beyond it. Consist-
ent with the design of the Constitution, the Amendment is
cast in fundamental terms, terms transcending the particular
controversy which was the immediate impetus for its enact-
ment. The Amendment grants protection to all persons, not
just members of a particular race.
The design of the Amendment is to reaffirm the equality
of races at the most basic level of the democratic process,
the exercise of the voting franchise. A resolve so absolute
required language as simple in command as it was compre-
hensive in reach. Fundamental in purpose and effect and
self-executing in operation, the Amendment prohibits all
provisions denying or abridging the voting franchise of any
citizen or class of citizens on the basis of race. “[B]y the
inherent power of the Amendment the word white disap-
peared” from our voting laws, bringing those who had been
excluded by reason of race within “the generic grant of suf-
frage made by the State.” Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S.
347, 363 (1915); see also Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 389
(1881). The Court has acknowledged the Amendment’s
mandate of neutrality in straightforward terms: “If citizens
of one race having certain qualifications are permitted by
law to vote, those of another having the same qualifications
must be. Previous to this amendment, there was no consti-
tutional guaranty against this discrimination: now there is.”
United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 218 (1876).

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
513 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
Though the commitment was clear, the reality remained
far from the promise. Manipulative devices and practices
were soon employed to deny the vote to blacks. We have
cataloged before the “variety and persistence” of these tech-
niques. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 311–
312 (1966) (citing, e. g., Guinn, supra (grandfather clause);
Myers v. Anderson, 238 U. S. 368 (1915) (same); Lane v. Wil-
son, 307 U. S. 268 (1939) (“procedural hurdles”); Terry v.
Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953) (white primary); Smith v. All-
wright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944) (same); United States v. Thomas,
362 U. S. 58 (1960) (per curiam) (registration challenges);
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960) (racial gerryman-
dering); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U. S. 145 (1965) (“in-
terpretation tests”)). Progress was slow, particularly when
litigation had to proceed case by case, district by district,
sometimes voter by voter. See 383 U. S., at 313–315.
Important precedents did emerge, however, which give in-
struction in the case now before us. The Fifteenth Amend-
ment was quite sufficient to invalidate a scheme which did
not mention race but instead used ancestry in an attempt to
confine and restrict the voting franchise. In 1910, the State
of Oklahoma enacted a literacy requirement for voting eligi-
bility, but exempted from that requirement the “ ‘lineal de-
scendant[s]’ ” of persons who were “ ‘on January 1, 1866, or
at any time prior thereto, entitled to vote under any form of
government, or who at that time resided in some foreign
nation.’ ” Guinn, supra, at 357. Those persons whose
ancestors were entitled to vote under the State’s previous,
discriminatory voting laws were thus exempted from the
eligibility test. Recognizing that the test served only to
perpetuate those old laws and to effect a transparent racial
exclusion, the Court invalidated it. 238 U. S., at 364–365.
More subtle, perhaps, than the grandfather device in
Guinn were the evasions attempted in the white primary
cases; but the Fifteenth Amendment, again by its own terms,
sufficed to strike down these voting systems, systems de-

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
514 RICE v. CAYETANO
Opinion of the Court
signed to exclude one racial class (at least) from voting. See
Terry, supra, at 469–470; Allwright, supra, at 663–666 (over-
ruling Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U. S. 45 (1935)). The Fif-
teenth Amendment, the Court held, could not be so circum-
vented: “The Amendment bans racial discrimination in
voting by both state and nation. It thus establishes a na-
tional policy . . . not to be discriminated against as voters in
elections to determine public governmental policies or to se-
lect public officials, national, state, or local.” Terry, supra,
at 467.
Unlike the cited cases, the voting structure now before us
is neither subtle nor indirect. It is specific in granting the
vote to persons of defined ancestry and to no others. The
State maintains this is not a racial category at all but instead
a classification limited to those whose ancestors were in
Hawaii at a particular time, regardless of their race. Brief
for Respondent 38–40. The State points to theories of cer-
tain scholars concluding that some inhabitants of Hawaii as
of 1778 may have migrated from the Marquesas Islands and
the Pacific Northwest, as well as from Tahiti. Id., at 38–39,
and n. 15. Furthermore, the State argues, the restriction
in its operation excludes a person whose traceable ancestors
were exclusively Polynesian if none of those ancestors re-
sided in Hawaii in 1778; and, on the other hand, the vote
would be granted to a person who could trace, say, one sixty-
fourth of his or her ancestry to a Hawaiian inhabitant on
the pivotal date. Ibid. These factors, it is said, mean the
restriction is not a racial classification. We reject this line
of argument.
Ancestry can be a proxy for race. It is that proxy here.
Even if the residents of Hawaii in 1778 had been of more
diverse ethnic backgrounds and cultures, it is far from clear
that a voting test favoring their descendants would not be
a race-based qualification. But that is not this case. For
centuries Hawaii was isolated from migration. 1 Kuyken-
dall 3. The inhabitants shared common physical character-

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
515 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
istics, and by 1778 they had a common culture. Indeed, the
drafters of the statutory definition in question emphasized
the “unique culture of the ancient Hawaiians” in explaining
their work. Hawaii Senate Journal, Standing Committee
Rep. No. 784, at 1354; see ibid. (“Modern scholarship also
identified such race of people as culturally distinguishable
from other Polynesian peoples”). The provisions before us
reflect the State’s effort to preserve that commonality of peo-
ple to the present day. In the interpretation of the Recon-
struction era civil rights laws we have observed that “racial
discrimination” is that which singles out “identifiable classes
of persons . . . solely because of their ancestry or ethnic char-
acteristics.” Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U. S.
604, 613 (1987). The very object of the statutory definition
in question and of its earlier congressional counterpart in
the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act is to treat the early
Hawaiians as a distinct people, commanding their own recog-
nition and respect. The State, in enacting the legislation
before us, has used ancestry as a racial definition and for a
racial purpose.
The history of the State’s definition demonstrates the
point. As we have noted, the statute defines “Hawaiian” as
“any descendant of the aboriginal peoples inhabiting the
Hawaiian Islands which exercised sovereignty and sub-
sisted in the Hawaiian Islands in 1778, and which peo-
ples thereafter have continued to reside in Hawaii.”
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 10–2 (1993).
A different definition of “Hawaiian” was first promulgated
in 1978 as one of the proposed amendments to the State
Constitution. As proposed, “Hawaiian” was defined as “any
descendant of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands, pre-
vious to 1778.” 1 Proceedings of the Constitutional Conven-
tion of Hawaii of 1978, Committee of the Whole Rep. No. 13,
at 1018. Rejected as not ratified in a valid manner, see Ka-
halekai v. Doi, 60 Haw. 324, 342, 590 P. 2d 543, 555 (1979),

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
516 RICE v. CAYETANO
Opinion of the Court
the definition was modified and in the end promulgated in
statutory form as quoted above. See Hawaii Senate Jour-
nal, Standing Committee Rep. No. 784, at 1350, 1353–1354;
id., Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 77, at 998. By the drafters’ own
admission, however, any changes to the language were at
most cosmetic. Noting that “[t]he definitions of ‘native Ha-
waiian’ and ‘Hawaiian’ are changed to substitute ‘peoples’ for
‘races,’ ” the drafters of the revised definition “stress[ed] that
this change is non-substantive, and that ‘peoples’ does mean
‘races.’ ” Ibid.; see also id., at 999 (“[T]he word ‘peoples’ has
been substituted for ‘races’ in the definition of ‘Hawaiian’.
Again, your Committee wishes to emphasize that this sub-
stitution is merely technical, and that ‘peoples’ does mean
‘races’ ”).
The next definition in Hawaii’s compilation of statutes in-
corporates the new definition of “Hawaiian” and preserves
the explicit tie to race:
“ ‘Native Hawaiian’ means any descendant of not less
than one-half part of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian
Islands previous to 1778, as defined by the Hawaiian
Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended; provided
that the term identically refers to the descendants of
such blood quantum of such aboriginal peoples which
exercised sovereignty and subsisted in the Hawaiian
Islands in 1778 and which peoples thereafter continued
to reside in Hawaii.” Haw. Rev. Stat. § 10–2 (1993).
This provision makes it clear: “[T]he descendants . . . of [the]
aboriginal peoples” means “the descendants . . . of the
races.” Ibid.
As for the further argument that the restriction differenti-
ates even among Polynesian people and is based simply on
the date of an ancestor’s residence in Hawaii, this too is in-
sufficient to prove the classification is nonracial in purpose
and operation. Simply because a class defined by ancestry
does not include all members of the race does not suffice to

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
517 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
make the classification race neutral. Here, the State’s argu-
ment is undermined by its express racial purpose and by its
actual effects.
The ancestral inquiry mandated by the State implicates
the same grave concerns as a classification specifying a par-
ticular race by name. One of the principal reasons race is
treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the
dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry in-
stead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities. An
inquiry into ancestral lines is not consistent with respect
based on the unique personality each of us possesses, a re-
spect the Constitution itself secures in its concern for per-
sons and citizens.
The ancestral inquiry mandated by the State is forbidden
by the Fifteenth Amendment for the further reason that the
use of racial classifications is corruptive of the whole legal
order democratic elections seek to preserve. The law itself
may not become the instrument for generating the prejudice
and hostility all too often directed against persons whose
particular ancestry is disclosed by their ethnic characteris-
tics and cultural traditions. “Distinctions between citizens
solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odi-
ous to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the
doctrine of equality.” Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U. S. 81, 100 (1943). Ancestral tracing of this sort achieves
its purpose by creating a legal category which employs the
same mechanisms, and causes the same injuries, as laws or
statutes that use race by name. The State’s electoral re-
striction enacts a race-based voting qualification.
IV
The State offers three principal defenses of its voting law,
any of which, it contends, allows it to prevail even if the
classification is a racial one under the Fifteenth Amendment.
We examine, and reject, each of these arguments.

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
518 RICE v. CAYETANO
Opinion of the Court
A
The most far reaching of the State’s arguments is that ex-
clusion of non-Hawaiians from voting is permitted under our
cases allowing the differential treatment of certain members
of Indian tribes. The decisions of this Court, interpreting
the effect of treaties and congressional enactments on the
subject, have held that various tribes retained some ele-
ments of quasi-sovereign authority, even after cession of
their lands to the United States. See Brendale v. Confeder-
ated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U. S. 408, 425
(1989) (plurality opinion); Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435
U. S. 191, 208 (1978). The retained tribal authority relates
to self-governance. Brendale, supra, at 425 (plurality opin-
ion). In reliance on that theory the Court has sustained a
federal provision giving employment preferences to persons
of tribal ancestry. Mancari, 417 U. S., at 553–555. The
Mancari case, and the theory upon which it rests, are in-
voked by the State to defend its decision to restrict voting
for the OHA trustees, who are charged so directly with pro-
tecting the interests of native Hawaiians.
If Hawaii’s restriction were to be sustained under Man-
cari we would be required to accept some beginning prem-
ises not yet established in our case law. Among other postu-
lates, it would be necessary to conclude that Congress, in
reciting the purposes for the transfer of lands to the State—
and in other enactments such as the Hawaiian Homes Com-
mission Act and the Joint Resolution of 1993—has deter-
mined that native Hawaiians have a status like that of Indi-
ans in organized tribes, and that it may, and has, delegated to
the State a broad authority to preserve that status. These
propositions would raise questions of considerable moment
and difficulty. It is a matter of some dispute, for instance,
whether Congress may treat the native Hawaiians as it does
the Indian tribes. Compare Van Dyke, The Political Status
of the Native Hawaiian People, 17 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 95
(1998), with Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special Re-

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
519 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
lationship: The Case of Native Hawaiians, 106 Yale L. J. 537
(1996). We can stay far off that difficult terrain, however.
The State’s argument fails for a more basic reason. Even
were we to take the substantial step of finding authority in
Congress, delegated to the State, to treat Hawaiians or na-
tive Hawaiians as tribes, Congress may not authorize a State
to create a voting scheme of this sort.
Of course, as we have established in a series of cases, Con-
gress may fulfill its treaty obligations and its responsibilities
to the Indian tribes by enacting legislation dedicated to their
circumstances and needs. See Washington v. Washington
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S.
658, 673, n. 20 (1979) (treaties securing preferential fishing
rights); United States v. Antelope, 430 U. S. 641, 645–647
(1977) (exclusive federal jurisdiction over crimes committed
by Indians in Indian country); Delaware Tribal Business
Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U. S. 73, 84–85 (1977) (distribution of
tribal property); Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U. S. 463, 479–480
(1976) (Indian immunity from state taxes); Fisher v. District
Court of Sixteenth Judicial Dist. of Mont., 424 U. S. 382,
390–391 (1976) (per curiam) (exclusive tribal court jurisdic-
tion over tribal adoptions). As we have observed, “every
piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and reserva-
tions . . . single[s] out for special treatment a constituency of
tribal Indians.” Mancari, supra, at 552.
Mancari, upon which many of the above cases rely, pre-
sented the somewhat different issue of a preference in hiring
and promoting at the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA),
a preference which favored individuals who were “ ‘one-
fourth or more degree Indian blood and . . . member[s] of a
Federally-recognized tribe.’ ” 417 U. S., at 553, n. 24 (quot-
ing 44 BIAM 335, 3.1 (1972)). Although the classification
had a racial component, the Court found it important that
the preference was “not directed towards a ‘racial’ group
consisting of ‘Indians,’ ” but rather “only to members of ‘fed-

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
520 RICE v. CAYETANO
Opinion of the Court
erally recognized’ tribes.” 417 U. S., at 553, n. 24. “In this
sense,” the Court held, “the preference [was] political rather
than racial in nature.” Ibid.; see also id., at 554 (“The pref-
erence, as applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete
racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign
tribal entities whose lives and activities are governed by the
BIA in a unique fashion”). Because the BIA preference
could be “tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’
unique obligation toward the Indians,” and was “reasonable
and rationally designed to further Indian self-government,”
the Court held that it did not offend the Constitution. Id.,
at 555. The opinion was careful to note, however, that the
case was confined to the authority of the BIA, an agency
described as “sui generis.” Id., at 554.
Hawaii would extend the limited exception of Mancari
to a new and larger dimension. The State contends that
“one of the very purposes of OHA—and the challenged vot-
ing provision—is to afford Hawaiians a measure of self-
governance,” and so it fits the model of Mancari. Brief for
Respondent 34. It does not follow from Mancari, however,
that Congress may authorize a State to establish a voting
scheme that limits the electorate for its public officials to a
class of tribal Indians, to the exclusion of all non-Indian
citizens.
The tribal elections established by the federal statutes the
State cites illuminate its error. See Brief for Respondent
22 (citing, e. g., the Menominee Restoration Act, 25 U. S. C.
§ 903b, and the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U. S. C. § 476).
If a non-Indian lacks a right to vote in tribal elections, it is
for the reason that such elections are the internal affair of a
quasi sovereign. The OHA elections, by contrast, are the
affair of the State of Hawaii. OHA is a state agency, estab-
lished by the State Constitution, responsible for the adminis-
tration of state laws and obligations. See Haw. Const., Art.
XII, §§ 5–6. The Hawaiian Legislature has declared that
OHA exists to serve “as the principal public agency in th[e]

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
521 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
State responsible for the performance, development, and co-
ordination of programs and activities relating to native Ha-
waiians and Hawaiians.” Haw. Rev. Stat. § 10–3(3) (1993);
see also Lodging by Petitioner, Tab 6, OHA Annual Report
1993–1994, p. 5 (May 27, 1994) (admitting that “OHA is tech-
nically a part of the Hawai’i state government,” while assert-
ing that “it operates as a semi-autonomous entity”). Fore-
most among the obligations entrusted to this agency is the
administration of a share of the revenues and proceeds from
public lands, granted to Hawaii to “be held by said State as
a public trust.” Admission Act §§ 5(b), (f), 73 Stat. 5, 6; see
Haw. Const., Art. XII, § 4.
The delegates to the 1978 constitutional convention ex-
plained the position of OHA in the state structure:
“The committee intends that the Office of Hawaiian Af-
fairs will be independent from the executive branch and
all other branches of government although it will as-
sume the status of a state agency. The chairman may
be an ex officio member of the governor’s cabinet. The
status of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs is to be unique
and special. . . . The committee developed this office
based on the model of the University of Hawaii. In par-
ticular, the committee desired to use this model so that
the office could have maximum control over its budget,
assets and personnel. The committee felt that it was
important to arrange a method whereby the assets of
Hawaiians could be kept separate from the rest of the
state treasury.” 1 Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention of Hawaii of 1978, Standing Committee Rep.
No. 59, at 645.
Although it is apparent that OHA has a unique position
under state law, it is just as apparent that it remains an arm
of the State.
The validity of the voting restriction is the only question
before us. As the Court of Appeals did, we assume the va-

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
522 RICE v. CAYETANO
Opinion of the Court
lidity of the underlying administrative structure and trusts,
without intimating any opinion on that point. Nonetheless,
the elections for OHA trustee are elections of the State, not
of a separate quasi sovereign, and they are elections to which
the Fifteenth Amendment applies. To extend Mancari to
this context would be to permit a State, by racial classifica-
tion, to fence out whole classes of its citizens from decision-
making in critical state affairs. The Fifteenth Amendment
forbids this result.
B
Hawaii further contends that the limited voting franchise
is sustainable under a series of cases holding that the rule of
one person, one vote does not pertain to certain special pur-
pose districts such as water or irrigation districts. See Ball
v. James, 451 U. S. 355 (1981); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U. S. 719 (1973). Just
as the Mancari argument would have involved a significant
extension or new application of that case, so too it is far from
clear that the Salyer line of cases would be at all applicable
to statewide elections for an agency with the powers and
responsibilities of OHA.
We would not find those cases dispositive in any event,
however. The question before us is not the one-person,
one-vote requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the
race neutrality command of the Fifteenth Amendment. Our
special purpose district cases have not suggested that com-
pliance with the one-person, one-vote rule of the Fourteenth
Amendment somehow excuses compliance with the Fifteenth
Amendment. We reject that argument here. We held four
decades ago that state authority over the boundaries of polit-
ical subdivisions, “extensive though it is, is met and over-
come by the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution.”
Gomillion, 364 U. S., at 345. The Fifteenth Amendment has
independent meaning and force. A State may not deny or
abridge the right to vote on account of race, and this law
does so.

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
523 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
C
Hawaii’s final argument is that the voting restriction does
no more than ensure an alignment of interests between the
fiduciaries and the beneficiaries of a trust. Thus, the con-
tention goes, the restriction is based on beneficiary status
rather than race.
As an initial matter, the contention founders on its own
terms, for it is not clear that the voting classification is sym-
metric with the beneficiaries of the programs OHA adminis-
ters. Although the bulk of the funds for which OHA is re-
sponsible appears to be earmarked for the benefit of “native
Hawaiians,” the State permits both “native Hawaiians” and
“Hawaiians” to vote for the office of trustee. The classifica-
tion thus appears to create, not eliminate, a differential
alignment between the identity of OHA trustees and what
the State calls beneficiaries.
Hawaii’s argument fails on more essential grounds. The
State’s position rests, in the end, on the demeaning premise
that citizens of a particular race are somehow more qualified
than others to vote on certain matters. That reasoning
attacks the central meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment.
The Amendment applies to “any election in which public
issues are decided or public officials selected.” Terry, 345
U. S., at 468. There is no room under the Amendment for
the concept that the right to vote in a particular election can
be allocated based on race. Race cannot qualify some and
disqualify others from full participation in our democracy.
All citizens, regardless of race, have an interest in selecting
officials who make policies on their behalf, even if those poli-
cies will affect some groups more than others. Under the
Fifteenth Amendment voters are treated not as members of
a distinct race but as members of the whole citizenry.
Hawaii may not assume, based on race, that petitioner or any
other of its citizens will not cast a principled vote. To accept
the position advanced by the State would give rise to the
same indignities, and the same resulting tensions and ani-

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
524 RICE v. CAYETANO
Breyer, J., concurring in result
mosities, the Amendment was designed to eliminate. The
voting restriction under review is prohibited by the Fif-
teenth Amendment.
* * *
When the culture and way of life of a people are all but
engulfed by a history beyond their control, their sense of loss
may extend down through generations; and their dismay may
be shared by many members of the larger community. As
the State of Hawaii attempts to address these realities, it
must, as always, seek the political consensus that begins
with a sense of shared purpose. One of the necessary begin-
ning points is this principle: The Constitution of the United
States, too, has become the heritage of all the citizens of
Hawaii.
In this case the Fifteenth Amendment invalidates the elec-
toral qualification based on ancestry. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Souter joins,
concurring in the result.
I agree with much of what the Court says and with its
result, but I do not agree with the critical rationale that
underlies that result. Hawaii seeks to justify its voting
scheme by drawing an analogy between its Office of Hawai-
ian Affairs (OHA) and a trust for the benefit of an Indian
tribe. The majority does not directly deny the analogy. It
instead at one point assumes, at least for argument’s sake,
that the “revenues and proceeds” at issue are from a “ ‘public
trust.’ ” Ante, at 521. It also assumes without deciding
that the State could “treat Hawaiians or native Hawaiians
as tribes.” Ante, at 519. Leaving these issues undecided,
it holds that the Fifteenth Amendment forbids Hawaii’s vot-
ing scheme, because the “OHA is a state agency,” and thus

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
525 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Breyer, J., concurring in result
election to the OHA board is not “the internal affair of a
quasi sovereign,” such as an Indian tribe. Ante, at 520.
I see no need, however, to decide this case on the basis of
so vague a concept as “quasi sovereign,” and I do not sub-
scribe to the Court’s consequently sweeping prohibition.
Rather, in my view, we should reject Hawaii’s effort to jus-
tify its rules through analogy to a trust for an Indian tribe
because the record makes clear that (1) there is no “trust”
for native Hawaiians here, and (2) OHA’s electorate, as
defined in the statute, does not sufficiently resemble an
Indian tribe.
The majority seems to agree, though it does not decide,
that the OHA bears little resemblance to a trust for native
Hawaiians. It notes that the Hawaii Constitution uses the
word “trust” when referring to the 1.2 million acres of land
granted in the Admission Act. Ante, at 508, 521. But the
Admission Act itself makes clear that the 1.2 million acres is to
benefit all the people of Hawaii. The Act specifies that the
land is to be used for the education of, the developments of
homes and farms for, the making of public improvements for,
and public use by, all of Hawaii’s citizens, as well as for the
betterment of those who are “native.” Admission Act § 5(f).
Moreover, OHA funding comes from several different
sources. See, e. g., OHA Fiscal 1998 Annual Report 38
(hereinafter Annual Report) ($15 million from the 1.2 million
acres of public lands; $11 million from “[d]ividend and in-
terest income”; $3 million from legislative appropriations;
$400,000 from federal and other grants). All of OHA’s fund-
ing is authorized by ordinary state statutes. See, e. g., Haw.
Rev. Stat. §§ 10–4, 10–6, 10–13.5 (1993); see also Annual Re-
port 11 (“OHA’s fiscal 1998–99 legislative budget was passed
as Acts 240 and 115 by the 1997 legislature”). The amounts
of funding and funding sources are thus subject to change by
ordinary legislation. OHA spends most, but not all, of its
money to benefit native Hawaiians in many different ways.
See Annual Report (OHA projects support education, hous-

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
526 RICE v. CAYETANO
Breyer, J., concurring in result
ing, health, culture, economic development, and nonprofit or-
ganizations). As the majority makes clear, OHA is simply
a special purpose department of Hawaii’s state government.
Ante, at 520–521.
As importantly, the statute defines the electorate in a way
that is not analogous to membership in an Indian tribe. Na-
tive Hawaiians, considered as a group, may be analogous to
tribes of other Native Americans. But the statute does not
limit the electorate to native Hawaiians. Rather it adds to
approximately 80,000 native Hawaiians about 130,000 addi-
tional “Hawaiians,” defined as including anyone with one an-
cestor who lived in Hawaii prior to 1778, thereby including
individuals who are less than one five-hundredth original
Hawaiian (assuming nine generations between 1778 and
the present). See Native Hawaiian Data Book 39 (1998).
Approximately 10% to 15% of OHA’s funds are spent specifi-
cally to benefit this latter group, see Annual Report 38,
which now constitutes about 60% of the OHA electorate.
I have been unable to find any Native American tribal
definition that is so broad. The Alaska Native Claims Set-
tlement Act, for example, defines a “Native” as “a person of
one-fourth degree or more Alaska Indian” or one “who is
regarded as an Alaska Native by the Native village or Na-
tive group of which he claims to be a member and whose
father or mother is . . . regarded as Native by any village or
group” (a classification perhaps more likely to reflect real
group membership than any blood quantum requirement).
43 U. S. C. § 1602(b). Many tribal constitutions define mem-
bership in terms of having had an ancestor whose name ap-
peared on a tribal roll—but in the far less distant past. See,
e. g., Constitution of the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, Art.
II (membership consists of persons on final rolls approved in
1906 and their lineal descendants); Constitution of the Sac
and Fox Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma, Art. II (membership
consists of persons on official roll of 1937, children since born
to two members of the Tribe, and children born to one mem-

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
527 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
ber and a nonmember if admitted by the council); Revised
Constitution of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, Art. III (member-
ship consists of persons on official roll of 1968 and children
of one member of the Tribe who are at least three-eighths
Jicarilla Apache Indian blood); Revised Constitution Mesca-
lero Apache Tribe, Art. IV (membership consists of persons
on the official roll of 1936 and children born to at least one
enrolled member who are at least one-fourth degree Mesca-
lero Apache blood).
Of course, a Native American tribe has broad authority
to define its membership. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Mar-
tinez, 436 U. S. 49, 72, n. 32 (1978). There must, however,
be some limit on what is reasonable, at the least when a State
(which is not itself a tribe) creates the definition. And
to define that membership in terms of 1 possible ancestor
out of 500, thereby creating a vast and unknowable body of
potential members—leaving some combination of luck and
interest to determine which potential members become ac-
tual voters—goes well beyond any reasonable limit. It was
not a tribe, but rather the State of Hawaii, that created this
definition; and, as I have pointed out, it is not like any actual
membership classification created by any actual tribe.
These circumstances are sufficient, in my view, to destroy
the analogy on which Hawaii’s justification must depend.
This is not to say that Hawaii’s definitions themselves inde-
pendently violate the Constitution, cf. post, at 535–536, n. 11
(Justice Stevens, dissenting); it is only to say that the
analogies they here offer are too distant to save a race-based
voting definition that in their absence would clearly violate
the Fifteenth Amendment. For that reason I agree with
the majority’s ultimate conclusion.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins
as to Part II, dissenting.
The Court’s holding today rests largely on the repetition
of glittering generalities that have little, if any, application

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
528 RICE v. CAYETANO
Stevens, J., dissenting
to the compelling history of the State of Hawaii. When that
history is held up against the manifest purpose of the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and against two centu-
ries of this Court’s federal Indian law, it is clear to me that
Hawaii’s election scheme should be upheld.
I
According to the terms of the federal Act by which Hawaii
was admitted to the Union, and to the terms of that State’s
Constitution and laws, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA)
is charged with managing vast acres of land held in trust for
the descendants of the Polynesians who occupied the Hawai-
ian Islands before the 1778 arrival of Captain Cook. In ad-
dition to administering the proceeds from these assets, OHA
is responsible for programs providing special benefits for
native Hawaiians. Established in 1978 by an amendment to
the State Constitution, OHA was intended to advance multi-
ple goals: to carry out the duties of the trust relationship
between the islands’ indigenous peoples and the Government
of the United States; to compensate for past wrongs to the
ancestors of these peoples; and to help preserve the distinct,
indigenous culture that existed for centuries before Cook’s
arrival. As explained by the senior Senator from Hawaii,
Senator Inouye, who is not himself a native Hawaiian but
rather (like petitioner) is a member of the majority of Hawai-
ian voters who supported the 1978 amendments, the amend-
ments reflect “an honest and sincere attempt on the part of
the people of Hawai‘i to rectify the wrongs of the past, and
to put into being the mandate [of] our Federal government—
the betterment of the conditions of Native Hawaiians.” 1
1 App. E to Brief for Hawai‘i Congressional Delegation as Amicus Cu-
riae E–3. In a statement explaining the cultural motivation for the
amendments, Senator Akaka pointed out that the “fact that the entire
State of Hawai‘i voted to amend the State Constitution in 1978 to establish
the Office of Hawaiian Affairs is significant because it illustrates the recog-
nition of the importance of Hawaiian culture and traditions as the founda-
tion for the Aloha spirit.” Id., at E–5.

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
529 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
Today the Court concludes that Hawaii’s method of elect-
ing the trustees of OHA violates the Fifteenth Amendment.
In reaching that conclusion, the Court has assumed that the
programs administered by OHA are valid. That assumption
is surely correct. In my judgment, however, the reasons
supporting the legitimacy of OHA and its programs in gen-
eral undermine the basis for the Court’s decision holding
its trustee election provision invalid. The OHA election
provision violates neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor
the Fifteenth.
That conclusion is in keeping with three overlapping prin-
ciples. First, the Federal Government must be, and has
been, afforded wide latitude in carrying out its obligations
arising from the special relationship it has with the aborigi-
nal peoples, a category that includes the native Hawaiians,
whose lands are now a part of the territory of the United
States. In addition, there exists in this case the State’s own
fiduciary responsibility—arising from its establishment of a
public trust—for administering assets granted it by the Fed-
eral Government in part for the benefit of native Hawaiians.
Finally, even if one were to ignore the more than two centu-
ries of Indian law precedent and practice on which this case
follows, there is simply no invidious discrimination present
in this effort to see that indigenous peoples are compensated
for past wrongs, and to preserve a distinct and vibrant cul-
ture that is as much a part of this Nation’s heritage as any.
II
Throughout our Nation’s history, this Court has recog-
nized both the plenary power of Congress over the affairs of
Native Americans 2 and the fiduciary character of the special
2 See, e. g., Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 522
U. S. 520, 531, n. 6 (1998); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313, 319
(1978); United States v. Antelope, 430 U. S. 641, 645 (1977); Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 553,
564–565 (1903); United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375 (1886).

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
530 RICE v. CAYETANO
Stevens, J., dissenting
federal relationship with descendants of those once sov-
ereign peoples.3 The source of the Federal Government’s
responsibility toward the Nation’s native inhabitants, who
were subject to European and then American military con-
quest, has been explained by this Court in the crudest terms,
but they remain instructive nonetheless.
“These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They
are communities dependent on the United States. De-
pendent largely for their daily food. Dependent for
their political rights. . . . From their very weakness and
helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing
of the Federal Government with them and the treaties
in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of
protection, and with it the power. This has always
been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and
by this court, whenever the question has arisen.”
United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 383–384 (1886)
(emphasis in original).
As our cases have consistently recognized, Congress’ ple-
nary power over these peoples has been exercised time and
again to implement a federal duty to provide native peoples
with special “ ‘care and protection.’ ” 4 With respect to the
Pueblos in New Mexico, for example, “public moneys have
been expended in presenting them with farming implements
and utensils, and in their civilization and instruction.”
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U. S. 28, 39–40 (1913).
Today, the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) adminis-
ters countless modern programs responding to comparably
pragmatic concerns, including health, education, housing, and
impoverishment. See Office of the Federal Register, United
States Government Manual 1999/2000, pp. 311–312. Federal
regulation in this area is not limited to the strictly practical
3 See, e. g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U. S. 28 (1913); Kagama, 118
U. S., at 384–385; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1 (1831).
4 Sandoval, 231 U. S., at 45; Kagama, 118 U. S., at 384–385.

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
531 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
but has encompassed as well the protection of cultural val-
ues; for example, the desecration of Native American graves
and other sacred sites led to the passage of the Native Amer-
ican Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U. S. C.
§ 3001 et seq.
Critically, neither the extent of Congress’ sweeping power
nor the character of the trust relationship with indigenous
peoples has depended on the ancient racial origins of the
people, the allotment of tribal lands,5 the coherence or exist-
ence of tribal self-government,6 or the varying definitions of
“Indian” Congress has chosen to adopt.7 Rather, when it
comes to the exercise of Congress’ plenary power in Indian
affairs, this Court has taken account of the “numerous occa-
sions” on which “legislation that singles out Indians for par-
ticular and special treatment” has been upheld, and has con-
cluded that as “long as the special treatment can be tied
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation
5 See, e. g., United States v. Celestine, 215 U. S. 278, 286–287 (1909).
6 See United States v. John, 437 U. S. 634, 653 (1978) (“Neither the fact
that the Choctaws in Mississippi are merely a remnant of a larger group
of Indians, long ago removed from Mississippi, nor the fact that federal
supervision over them has not been continuous, destroys the federal power
to deal with them”); Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U. S.
73, 82, n. 14, 84–85 (1977) (whether or not federal statute providing finan-
cial benefits to descendants of Delaware Tribe included nontribal Indian
beneficiaries, Congress’ choice need only be “ ‘tied rationally to the ful-
fillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians’ ” (quoting Mor-
ton v. Mancari, 417 U. S., at 555)).
7 See generally F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 19–20 (1982).
Compare 25 U. S. C. § 479 (“The term ‘Indian’ as used in this Act shall
include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized
Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are de-
scendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the
present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further include all
other persons of one-half or more Indian blood. For the purposes of this
Act, Eskimos and other aboriginal peoples of Alaska shall be considered
Indians”) with § 1603(c)(3) (Indian is any person “considered by the Secre-
tary of the Interior to be an Indian for any purpose”).

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
532 RICE v. CAYETANO
Stevens, J., dissenting
towards the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be
disturbed.” Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 554–555
(1974).
As the history recited by the majority reveals, the grounds
for recognizing the existence of federal trust power here are
overwhelming. Shortly before its annexation in 1898, the
Republic of Hawaii (installed by United States merchants in
a revolution facilitated by the United States Government)
expropriated some 1.8 million acres of land that it then ceded
to the United States. In the Organic Act establishing the
Territory of Hawaii, Congress provided that those lands
should remain under the control of the territorial govern-
ment “until otherwise provided for by Congress,” Act of Apr.
30, 1900, ch. 339, § 91, 31 Stat. 159. By 1921, Congress rec-
ognized that the influx of foreign infectious diseases, mass
immigration coupled with poor housing and sanitation, hun-
ger, and malnutrition had taken their toll. See ante, at 506.
Confronted with the reality that the Hawaiian people had
been “frozen out of their lands and driven into the cities,”
H. R. Rep. No. 839, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1920), Congress
decided that 27 specific tracts of the lands ceded in 1898,
comprising about 203,500 acres, should be used to provide
farms and residences for native Hawaiians. Act of July 9,
1921, ch. 42, 42 Stat. 108. Relying on the precedent of previ-
ous federal laws granting Indians special rights in public
lands, Congress created the Hawaiian Homes Commission to
implement its goal of rehabilitating the native people and
culture.8 Hawaii was required to adopt this Act as a condi-
8 See H. R. Rep. No. 839, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., 4, 11 (1920). Reflecting a
compromise between the sponsor of the legislation, who supported special
benefits for “all who have Hawaiian blood in their veins,” and plantation
owners who thought that only “Hawaiians of the pure blood” should qual-
ify, Hawaiian Homes Commission Act: Hearings before the Senate Com-
mittee on the Territories, H. R. Rep. No. 13500, 66th Cong., 3d Sess., 14–17
(1920), the statute defined a “native Hawaiian” as “any descendant of not
less than one-half part of the blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian
Islands previous to 1778,” 42 Stat. 108.

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
533 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
tion of statehood in the Hawaii Statehood Admissions Act
(Admissions Act), § 4, 73 Stat. 5. And in an effort to secure
the Government’s duty to the indigenous peoples, § 5 of the
Admissions Act conveyed 1.2 million acres of land to the
State to be held in trust “for the betterment of the conditions
of native Hawaiians” and certain other public purposes.
§ 5(f), id., at 6.
The nature of and motivation for the special relationship
between the indigenous peoples and the United States Gov-
ernment was articulated in explicit detail in 1993, when Con-
gress adopted a Joint Resolution containing a formal “apol-
ogy to Native Hawaiians on behalf of the United States for
the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii.” 107 Stat. 1510.
Among other acknowledgments, the resolution stated that
the 1.8 million acres of ceded lands had been obtained “with-
out the consent of or compensation to the Native Hawaiian
people of Hawaii or their sovereign government.” Id., at
1512.
In the end, however, one need not even rely on this offi-
cial apology to discern a well-established federal trust rela-
tionship with the native Hawaiians. Among the many and
varied laws passed by Congress in carrying out its duty to
indigenous peoples, more than 150 today expressly include
native Hawaiians as part of the class of Native Americans
benefited.9 By classifying native Hawaiians as “Native
Americans” for purposes of these statutes, Congress has
made clear that native Hawaiians enjoy many of “the same
rights and privileges accorded to American Indian, Alaska
9 See Brief for Hawai‘i Congressional Delegation as Amicus Curiae 7,
and App. A; see also, e. g., American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42
U. S. C. § 1996 et seq.; Native American Programs Act of 1974, 42 U. S. C.
§§ 2991–2992; Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, 29 U. S. C.
§ 872; Drug Abuse Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act, 21
U. S. C. § 1177; Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, § 958,
104 Stat. 4422; Indian Health Care Amendments of 1988, 25 U. S. C. § 1601
et seq.

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
534 RICE v. CAYETANO
Stevens, J., dissenting
Native, Eskimo, and Aleut communities. ” 42 U. S. C.
§ 11701(19). See also § 11701(17) (“The authority of the Con-
gress under the United States Constitution to legislate in
matters affecting the aboriginal or indigenous peoples of the
United States includes the authority to legislate in matters
affecting the native peoples of . . . Hawaii”).
While splendidly acknowledging this history—specifically
including the series of agreements and enactments the his-
tory reveals—the majority fails to recognize its import.
The descendants of the native Hawaiians share with the
descendants of the Native Americans on the mainland or in
the Aleutian Islands not only a history of subjugation at the
hands of colonial forces, but also a purposefully created and
specialized “guardian-ward” relationship with the Govern-
ment of the United States. It follows that legislation tar-
geting the native Hawaiians must be evaluated according to
the same understanding of equal protection that this Court
has long applied to the Indians on the continental United
States: that “special treatment . . . be tied rationally to the
fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation” toward the native
peoples. 417 U. S., at 555.
Declining to confront the rather simple logic of the fore-
going, the majority would seemingly reject the OHA voting
scheme for a pair of different reasons. First, Congress’
trust-based power is confined to dealings with tribes, not
with individuals, and no tribe or indigenous sovereign entity
is found among the native Hawaiians. Ante, at 518–520.
Second, the elections are “elections of the State,” not of a
tribe, and upholding this law would be “to permit a State,
by racial classification, to fence out whole classes of citizens
from decisionmaking in critical state affairs.” Ante, at 522.
In my view, neither of these reasons overcomes the other-
wise compelling similarity, fully supported by our prece-
dent, between the once subjugated, indigenous peoples of the
continental United States and the peoples of the Hawaiian

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
535 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
Islands whose historical sufferings and status parallel those
of the continental Native Americans.
Membership in a tribe, the majority suggests, rather than
membership in a race or class of descendants, has been the
sine qua non of governmental power in the realm of Indian
law; Mancari itself, the majority contends, makes this prop-
osition clear. Ante, at 519–520. But as scholars have often
pointed out, tribal membership cannot be seen as the deci-
sive factor in this Court’s opinion upholding the BIA pref-
erences in Mancari; the hiring preference at issue in that
case not only extended to nontribal member Indians, it also
required for eligibility that ethnic Native Americans possess
a certain quantum of Indian blood.10 Indeed, the Federal
Government simply has not been limited in its special deal-
ings with the native peoples to laws affecting tribes or tribal
Indians alone. See nn. 6, 7, supra. In light of this prec-
edent, it is a painful irony indeed to conclude that native
Hawaiians are not entitled to special benefits designed to
restore a measure of native self-governance because they
currently lack any vestigial native government—a possibility
of which history and the actions of this Nation have de-
prived them.11
10 See, e. g., Frickey, Adjudication and its Discontents: Coherence and
Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1754, 1761–1762
(1997). As is aptly explained, the BIA preference in that case was based
on a statute that extended the preference to ethnic Indians—identified by
blood quantum—who were not members of federally recognized tribes.
25 U. S. C. § 479. Only the implementing regulation included a mention
of tribal membership, but even that regulation required that the tribal
member also “ ‘be one-fourth or more degree Indian blood.’ ” Mancari,
417 U. S., at 553, n. 24.
11 Justice Breyer suggests that the OHA definition of native Hawai-
ians (i. e., Hawaiians who may vote under the OHA scheme) is too broad
to be “reasonable.” Ante, at 527 (opinion concurring in result). This sug-
gestion does not identify a constitutional defect. The issue in this case is
Congress’ power to define who counts as an indigenous person, and Con-
gress’ power to delegate to States its special duty to persons so defined.
(Justice Breyer’s interest in tribal definitions of membership—and in

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
536 RICE v. CAYETANO
Stevens, J., dissenting
Of greater concern to the majority is the fact that we are
confronted here with a state constitution and legislative en-
actment—passed by a majority of the entire population of
Hawaii—rather than a law passed by Congress or a tribe
itself. See, e. g., ante, at 519–522. But as our own prece-
dent makes clear, this reality does not alter our analysis.
As I have explained, OHA and its trustee elections can
hardly be characterized simply as an “affair of the State”
alone; they are the instruments for implementing the Fed-
this Court’s holding that tribes’ power to define membership is at the
core of tribal sovereignty and thus “unconstrained by those constitutional
provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority,”
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 56 (1978)—is thus inappo-
site.) Nothing in federal law or in our Indian law jurisprudence suggests
that the OHA definition of native is anything but perfectly within that
power as delegated. See supra, at 531–534, and nn. 6–7. Indeed, the
OHA voters match precisely the set of people to whom the congressional
apology was targeted.
Federal definitions of “Indian” often rely on the ability to trace one’s
ancestry to a particular group at a particular time. See, e. g., 25 CFR, ch.
1, § 5.1 (1999) (extending BIA hiring preference to “persons of Indian de-
scent who are . . . (b) [d]escendants of such [tribal] members who were, on
June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reserva-
tion”); see also n. 7, supra. It can hardly be correct that once 1934 is two
centuries past, rather than merely 66 years past, this classification will
cease to be “reasonable.” The singular federal statute defining “native”
to which Justice Breyer points, 43 U. S. C. § 1602(b) (including those
defined by blood quantum without regard to membership in any group),
serves to underscore the point that membership in a “tribal” structure
per se, see ante, at 525, is not the acid test for the exercise of federal
power in this arena. See R. Clinton, N. Newton, & M. Price, American
Indian Law 1054–1058 (3d ed. 1991) (describing provisions of the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act creating geographic regions of natives with
common heritage and interest, 43 U. S. C. § 1606, requiring those regions
to organize a native corporation in order to qualify for settlement benefits,
§ 1607, and establishing the Alaska Native Fund of federal moneys to be
distributed to “enrolled natives,” §§ 1604–1605); see also supra, at 535, and
n. 10. In the end, what matters is that the determination of indigenous
status or “real group membership,” ante, at 526 (Breyer, J., concurring
in result), is one to be made by Congress—not by this Court.

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
537 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
eral Government’s trust relationship with a once sovereign
indigenous people. This Court has held more than once that
the federal power to pass laws fulfilling the federal trust
relationship with the Indians may be delegated to the States.
Most significant is our opinion in Washington v. Confeder-
ated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U. S. 463,
500–501 (1979), in which we upheld against a Fourteenth
Amendment challenge a state law assuming jurisdiction over
Indian tribes within a State. While we recognized that
States generally do not have the same special relationship
with Indians that the Federal Government has, we concluded
that because the state law was enacted “in response to a
federal measure” intended to achieve the result accomplished
by the challenged state law, the state law itself need only
“ ‘rationally further the purpose identified by the State.’ ”
Id., at 500 (quoting Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Mur-
gia, 427 U. S. 307, 314 (1976) (per curiam)).
The state statutory and constitutional scheme here was
without question intended to implement the express desires
of the Federal Government. The Admissions Act in § 4 man-
dated that the provisions of the Hawaiian Homes Commis-
sion Act “shall be adopted,” with its multiple provisions
expressly benefiting native Hawaiians and not others. 73
Stat. 5. More, the Admissions Act required that the pro-
ceeds from the lands granted to the State “shall be held by
said State as a public trust for . . . the betterment of the
conditions of native Hawaiians,” and that those proceeds
“shall be managed and disposed of . . . in such manner as the
constitution and laws of said State may provide, and their
use for any other object shall constitute a breach of trust for
which suit may be brought by the United States.” § 5, id.,
at 6. The terms of the trust were clear, as was the discre-
tion granted to the State to administer the trust as the
State’s laws “may provide.” And Congress continues to
fund OHA on the understanding that it is thereby furthering
the federal trust obligation.

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
538 RICE v. CAYETANO
Stevens, J., dissenting
The sole remaining question under Mancari and Yakima
is thus whether the State’s scheme “rationally further[s] the
purpose identified by the State.” Under this standard, as
with the BIA preferences in Mancari, the OHA voting re-
quirement is certainly reasonably designed to promote “self-
government” by the descendants of the indigenous Hawai-
ians, and to make OHA “more responsive to the needs of its
constituent groups.” Mancari, 417 U. S., at 554. The OHA
statute provides that the agency is to be held “separate” and
“independent of the [State] executive branch,” Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 10–4 (1993); OHA executes a trust, which, by its very
character, must be administered for the benefit of Hawaiians
and native Hawaiians, §§ 10–2, 10–3(1), 10–13.5; and OHA is
to be governed by a board of trustees that will reflect the
interests of the trust’s native Hawaiian beneficiaries, Haw.
Const., Art. XII, § 5 (1993); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 13D–3(b) (1993).
OHA is thus “directed to participation by the governed in
the governing agency.” Mancari, 417 U. S., at 554. In this
respect among others, the requirement is “reasonably and
directly related to a legitimate, nonracially based goal.”
Ibid.
The foregoing reasons are to me more than sufficient to
justify the OHA trust system and trustee election provision
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
III
Although the Fif teenth Amendment tests the OHA
scheme by a different measure, it is equally clear to me that
the trustee election provision violates neither the letter nor
the spirit of that Amendment.12
12 Just as one cannot divorce the Indian law context of this case from an
analysis of the OHA scheme under the Fourteenth Amendment, neither
can one pretend that this law fits simply within our non-Indian cases under
the Fifteenth Amendment. As the preceding discussion of Mancari and
our other Indian law cases reveals, this Court has never understood laws
relating to indigenous peoples simply as legal classifications defined by

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
539 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides:
“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 15.
As the majority itself must tacitly admit, ante, at 513–514,
the terms of the Amendment itself do not here apply. The
OHA voter qualification speaks in terms of ancestry and cur-
rent residence, not of race or color. OHA trustee voters
must be “Hawaiian,” meaning “any descendant of the aborig-
inal peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands which exercised
sovereignty and subsisted in the Hawaiian Islands in 1778,
and which peoples have thereafter continued to reside in
Hawaii.” Haw. Rev. Stat. § 10–2 (1993). The ability to vote
is a function of the lineal descent of a modern-day resident
of Hawaii, not the blood-based characteristics of that resi-
dent, or of the blood-based proximity of that resident to the
“peoples” from whom that descendant arises.
The distinction between ancestry and race is more than
simply one of plain language. The ability to trace one’s an-
cestry to a particular progenitor at a single distant point in
time may convey no information about one’s own apparent
or acknowledged race today. Neither does it of necessity
imply one’s own identification with a particular race, or the
exclusion of any others “on account of race.” The terms
manifestly carry distinct meanings, and ancestry was not in-
cluded by the Framers in the Amendment’s prohibitions.
Presumably recognizing this distinction, the majority re-
lies on the fact that “[a]ncestry can be a proxy for race.”
Ante, at 514. That is, of course, true, but it by no means
race. Even where, unlike here, blood quantum requirements are express,
this Court has repeatedly acknowledged that an overlapping political in-
terest predominates. It is only by refusing to face this Court’s entire
body of Indian law, see ante, at 511–512, that the majority is able to hold
that the OHA qualification denies non-“Hawaiians” the right to vote “on
account of race.”

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
540 RICE v. CAYETANO
Stevens, J., dissenting
follows that ancestry is always a proxy for race. Cases in
which ancestry served as such a proxy are dramatically dif-
ferent from this one. For example, the literacy requirement
at issue in Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915), relied
on such a proxy. As part of a series of blatant efforts to
exclude blacks from voting, Oklahoma exempted from its lit-
eracy requirement people whose ancestors were entitled to
vote prior to the enactment of the Fifteenth Amendment.
The Guinn scheme patently “served only to perpetuate . . .
old [racially discriminatory voting] laws and to effect a trans-
parent racial exclusion.” Ante, at 513. As in Guinn, the
voting laws held invalid under the Fifteenth Amendment in
all of the cases cited by the majority were fairly and properly
viewed through a specialized lens—a lens honed in specific
detail to reveal the realities of time, place, and history be-
hind the voting restrictions being tested.
That lens not only fails to clarify, it fully obscures the reali-
ties of this case, virtually the polar opposite of the Fifteenth
Amendment cases on which the Court relies. In Terry v.
Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953), for example, the Court held that
the Amendment proscribed the Texas “Jaybird primaries”
that used neutral voting qualifications “with a single pro-
viso—Negroes are excluded,” id., at 469. Similarly, in
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 664 (1944), it was the bla-
tant “discrimination against Negroes” practiced by a political
party that was held to be state action within the meaning of
the Amendment. Cases such as these that “strike down
these voting systems . . . designed to exclude one racial class
(at least) from voting,” ante, at 513–514, have no application
to a system designed to empower politically the remaining
members of a class of once sovereign, indigenous people.
Ancestry surely can be a proxy for race, or a pretext for
invidious racial discrimination. But it is simply neither
proxy nor pretext here. All of the persons who are eligible
to vote for the trustees of OHA share two qualifications that
no other person old enough to vote possesses: They are bene-

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
541 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
ficiaries of the public trust created by the State and adminis-
tered by OHA, and they have at least one ancestor who was
a resident of Hawaii in 1778. A trust whose terms provide
that the trustees shall be elected by a class including bene-
ficiaries is hardly a novel concept. See 2 A. Scott & W.
Fratcher, Law of Trusts § 108.3 (4th ed. 1987). The Commit-
tee that drafted the voting qualification explained that the
trustees here should be elected by the beneficiaries because
“people to whom assets belong should have control over
them . . . . The election of the board will enhance repre-
sentative governance and decision-making accountability
and, as a result, strengthen the fiduciary relationship be-
tween the board member, as trustee, and the native Hawai-
ian, as beneficiary.” 13 The described purpose of this aspect
of the classification thus exists wholly apart from race.
It is directly focused on promoting both the delegated fed-
eral mandate, and the terms of the State’s own trustee
responsibilities.
The majority makes much of the fact that the OHA trust—
which it assumes is legitimate—should be read as principally
intended to benefit the smaller class of “native Hawaiians,”
who are defined as at least one-half descended from a native
islander circa 1778, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 10–2 (1993), not the
larger class of “Hawaiians,” which includes “any descendant”
of those aboriginal people who lived in Hawaii in 1778 and
“which peoples thereafter have continued to reside in
Hawaii,” ibid. See ante, at 523. It is, after all, the major-
ity notes, the larger class of Hawaiians that enjoys the suf-
frage right in OHA elections. There is therefore a mis-
match in interest alignment between the trust beneficiaries
and the trustee electors, the majority contends, and it thus
cannot be said that the class of qualified voters here is de-
fined solely by beneficiary status.
13 1 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of Hawaii of 1978,
Standing Committee Rep. No. 59, p. 644.

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
542 RICE v. CAYETANO
Stevens, J., dissenting
While that may or may not be true depending upon the
construction of the terms of the trust, there is surely nothing
racially invidious about a decision to enlarge the class of eli-
gible voters to include “any descendant” of a 1778 resident
of the Islands. The broader category of eligible voters
serves quite practically to ensure that, regardless how “di-
lute” the race of native Hawaiians becomes—a phenomenon
also described in the majority’s lavish historical summary,
ante, at 506–507—there will remain a voting interest whose
ancestors were a part of a political, cultural community, and
who have inherited through participation and memory the
set of traditions the trust seeks to protect. The putative
mismatch only underscores the reality that it cannot be
purely a racial interest that either the trust or the election
provision seeks to secure; the political and cultural interests
served are—unlike racial survival—shared by both native
Hawaiians and Hawaiians.14
14 Of course, the majority’s concern about the absence of alignment be-
comes salient only if one assumes that something other than a Mancari-
like political classification is at stake. As this Court has approached cases
involving the relationship among the Federal Government, its delegates,
and the indigenous peoples—including countless federal definitions of
“classes” of Indians determined by blood quantum, see n. 7, supra—any
“racial” aspect of the voting qualification here is eclipsed by the political
significance of membership in a once-sovereign indigenous class.
Beyond even this, the majority’s own historical account makes clear that
the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands whose descendants constitute the
instant class are identified and remain significant as much because of cul-
ture as because of race. By the time of Cook’s arrival, “the Hawaiian
people had developed, over the preceding 1,000 years or so, a cultural and
political structure . . . well-established traditions and customs and . . . a
polytheistic religion.” Ante, at 500. Prior to 1778, although there “was
no private ownership of land,” Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,
467 U. S. 229, 232 (1984), the native Hawaiians “lived in a highly orga-
nized, self-sufficient, subsistence social system based on communal land
tenure with a sophisticated language, culture, and religion,” 42 U. S. C.
§ 11701(4). According to Senator Akaka, their society “was steeped in
science [and they] honored their ‘aina (land) and environment, and there-
fore developed methods of irrigation, agriculture, aquaculture, navigation,

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
543 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
Even if one refuses to recognize the beneficiary status of
OHA trustee voters entirely,15 it cannot be said that the
ancestry-based voting qualification here simply stands in the
medicine, fishing and other forms of subsistence whereby the land and sea
were efficiently used without waste or damage. Respect for the environ-
ment and for others formed the basis of their culture and tradition.” App.
E to Brief for Hawai‘i Congressional Delegation as Amicus Curiae E–4.
Legends and oral histories passed from one generation to another are re-
flected in artifacts such as carved images, colorful feathered capes, songs,
and dances that survive today. For some, Pele, the God of Fire, still in-
habits the crater of Kilauea, and the word of the Kahuna is still law. It
is this culture, rather than the Polynesian race, that is uniquely Hawaiian
and in need of protection.
15 Justice Breyer’s even broader contention that “there is no ‘trust’
for native Hawaiians here,” ante, at 525, appears to make the greater
mistake of conflating the public trust established by Hawaii’s Constitution
and laws, see supra, at 537, with the “trust” relationship between the
Federal Government and the indigenous peoples. According to Justice
Breyer, the “analogy on which Hawaii’s justification must depend,” ante,
at 527, is “destroy[ed]” in part by the fact that OHA is not a trust (in the
former sense of a trust) for native Hawaiians alone. Rather than looking
to the terms of the public trust itself for this proposition, Justice Breyer
relies on the terms of the land conveyance to Hawaii in part of the Admis-
sions Act. But the portion of the trust administered by OHA does not
purport to contain in its corpus all 1.2 million acres of federal trust lands
set aside for the benefit of all Hawaiians, including native Hawaiians. By
its terms, only “[t]wenty per cent of all revenue derived from the public
land trust shall be expended by the office for the betterment of the condi-
tions of native Hawaiians.” Haw. Rev. Stat. § 10–13.5 (1993). This por-
tion appears to coincide precisely with the one-fifth described purpose of
the Admissions Act trust lands to better the conditions of native Hawai-
ians. Admissions Act § 5(f), 73 Stat. 6. Neither the fact that native Ha-
waiians have a specific, beneficial interest in only 20% of trust revenues,
nor the fact that the portion of the trust administered by OHA is supple-
mented to varying degrees by nontrust moneys, negates the existence of
the trust itself.
Moreover, neither the particular terms of the State’s public trust nor
the particular source of OHA funding “destroys” the centrally relevant
trust “analogy” on which Hawaii relies—that of the relationship between
the Federal Government and indigenous Indians on this continent, as com-
pared with the relationship between the Federal Government and indige-

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
544 RICE v. CAYETANO
Stevens, J., dissenting
shoes of a classification that would either privilege or penal-
ize “on account of ” race. The OHA voting qualification—
part of a statutory scheme put in place by democratic vote
of a multiracial majority of all state citizens, including those
non-“Hawaiians” who are not entitled to vote in OHA trustee
elections—appropriately includes every resident of Hawaii
having at least one ancestor who lived in the islands in 1778.
That is, among other things, the audience to whom the con-
gressional apology was addressed. Unlike a class including
only full-blooded Polynesians—as one would imagine were
the class strictly defined in terms of race—the OHA election
provision excludes all full-blooded Polynesians currently re-
siding in Hawaii who are not descended from a 1778 resident
of Hawaii. Conversely, unlike many of the old southern vot-
ing schemes in which any potential voter with a “taint” of
non-Hawaiian blood would be excluded, the OHA scheme ex-
cludes no descendant of a 1778 resident because he or she is
also part European, Asian, or African as a matter of race.
The classification here is thus both too inclusive and not in-
clusive enough to fall strictly along racial lines.
At pains then to identify at work here a singularly “racial
purpose,” ante, at 515, 517—whatever that might mean, al-
though one might assume the phrase a “proxy” for “racial
discrimination”—the majority next posits that “[o]ne of the
principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden classification
is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be
judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and
essential qualities.” Ante, at 517. That is, of course, true
when ancestry is the basis for denying or abridging one’s
right to vote or to share the blessings of freedom. But it is
quite wrong to ignore the relevance of ancestry to claims of
nous Hawaiians in the now United States-owned Hawaiian Islands. That
trust relationship—the only trust relevant to the Indian law analogy—
includes the power to delegate authority to the States. As we have ex-
plained, supra, at 531–534, the OHA scheme surely satisfies the estab-
lished standard for testing an exercise of that power.

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
545 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
an interest in trust property, or to a shared interest in a
proud heritage. There would be nothing demeaning in a law
that established a trust to manage Monticello and provided
that the descendants of Thomas Jefferson should elect the
trustees. Such a law would be equally benign, regardless of
whether those descendants happened to be members of the
same race.16
In this light, it is easy to understand why the classification
here is not “demeaning” at all, ante, at 523, for it is simply
not based on the “premise that citizens of a particular race
are somehow more qualified than others to vote on certain
matters,” ibid. It is based on the permissible assumption in
this context that families with “any” ancestor who lived in
Hawaii in 1778, and whose ancestors thereafter continued
to live in Hawaii, have a claim to compensation and self-
determination that others do not. For the multiracial ma-
jority of the citizens of the State of Hawaii to recognize that
deep reality is not to demean their own interests but to
honor those of others.
It thus becomes clear why the majority is likewise wrong
to conclude that the OHA voting scheme is likely to “become
the instrument for generating the prejudice and hostility all
too often directed against persons whose particular ancestry
16 Indeed, “[i]n one form or another, the right to pass on property—to
one’s family in particular—has been part of the Anglo-American legal sys-
tem since feudal times.” Hodel v. Irving, 481 U. S. 704, 716 (1987). Even
the most minute fractional interests that can be identified after allotted
lands are passed through several generations can receive legal recognition
and protection. Thus, we held not long ago that inherited shares of par-
cels allotted to the Sioux in 1889 could not be taken without compensation
even though their value was nominal and it was necessary to use a common
denominator of 3,394,923,840,000 to identify the size of the smallest inter-
est. Id., at 713–717. Whether it is wise to provide recompense for all of
the descendants of an injured class after several generations have come
and gone is a matter of policy, but the fact that their interests were ac-
quired by inheritance rather than by assignment surely has no constitu-
tional significance.

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
546 RICE v. CAYETANO
Stevens, J., dissenting
is disclosed by their ethnic characteristics and cultural tradi-
tions.” Ante, at 517. The political and cultural concerns
that motivated the nonnative majority of Hawaiian voters to
establish OHA reflected an interest in preserving through
the self-determination of a particular people ancient tradi-
tions that they value. The fact that the voting qualification
was established by the entire electorate in the State—the
vast majority of which is not native Hawaiian—testifies to
their judgment concerning the Court’s fear of “prejudice and
hostility” against the majority of state residents who are not
“Hawaiian,” such as petitioner. Our traditional understand-
ing of democracy and voting preferences makes it difficult to
conceive that the majority of the State’s voting population
would have enacted a measure that discriminates against, or
in any way represents prejudice and hostility toward, that
self-same majority. Indeed, the best insurance against that
danger is that the electorate here retains the power to revise
its laws.
IV
The Court today ignores the overwhelming differences be-
tween the Fifteenth Amendment case law on which it relies
and the unique history of the State of Hawaii. The former
recalls an age of abject discrimination against an insular
minority in the old South; the latter at long last yielded the
“political consensus” the majority claims it seeks, ante, at
524—a consensus determined to recognize the special claim
to self-determination of the indigenous peoples of Hawaii.
This was the considered and correct view of the District
Judge for the United States District Court for the District
of Hawaii, as well as the three Circuit Judges on the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 17 As Judge Rymer
explained:
17 Indeed, the record indicates that none of the 20-plus judges on the
Ninth Circuit to whom the petition for rehearing en banc was circulated
even requested a vote on the petition. App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a.

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
547 Cite as: 528 U. S. 495 (2000)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
“The special election for trustees is not equivalent to
a general election, and the vote is not for officials who
will perform general governmental functions in either a
representative or executive capacity. . . . Nor does the
limitation in these circumstances suggest that voting
eligibility was designed to exclude persons who would
otherwise be interested in OHA’s affairs. . . . Rather, it
reflects the fact that the trustees’ fiduciary responsibil-
ities run only to native Hawaiians and Hawaiians and
‘a board of trustees chosen from among those who are
interested parties would be the best way to insure
proper management and adherence to the needed fidu-
ciary principles.’ 18 The challenged part of Hawaii law
was not contrived to keep non-Hawaiians from voting in
general, or in any respect pertinent to their legal inter-
ests. Therefore, we cannot say that [petitioner’s] right
to vote has been denied or abridged in violation of the
Fifteenth Amendment.
“18 1 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of Hawaii of
1978, Standing Comm. Rep. No. 59 at 644. The Committee reporting
on Section 5, establishing OHA, further noted that trustees should
be so elected because ‘people to whom assets belong should have
control over them. . . . The election of the board will enhance repre-
sentative governance and decision-making accountability and, as a
result, strengthen the fiduciary relationship between the board mem-
ber, as trustee, and the native Hawaiian, as beneficiary.’ Id.”
146 F. 3d 1075, 1081–1082 (CA9 1998).
In my judgment, her reasoning is far more persuasive than
the wooden approach adopted by the Court today.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting.
I dissent essentially for the reasons stated by Justice
Stevens in Part II of his dissenting opinion. Ante, at 529–
538 (relying on established federal authority over Native

528US2 Unit: $U29 [06-15-01 20:43:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
548 RICE v. CAYETANO
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
Americans). Congress’ prerogative to enter into special
trust relationships with indigenous peoples, Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U. S. 535 (1974), as Justice Stevens cogently
explains, is not confined to tribal Indians. In particular,
it encompasses native Hawaiians, whom Congress has in
numerous statutes reasonably treated as qualifying for the
special status long recognized for other once-sovereign indig-
enous peoples. See ante, at 533–534, and n. 9 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). That federal trust responsibility, both the
Court and Justice Stevens recognize, has been delegated
by Congress to the State of Hawaii. Both the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs and the voting scheme here at issue are
“tied rationally to the fulfillment” of that obligation. See
Mancari, 417 U. S., at 555. No more is needed to demon-
strate the validity of the Office and the voting provision
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.