ILLINOIS v. WARDLOW

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119 OCTOBER TERM, 1999
Syllabus
ILLINOIS v. WARDLOW
certiorari to the supreme court of illinois
No. 98–1036. Argued November 2, 1999—Decided January 12, 2000
Respondent Wardlow fled upon seeing a caravan of police vehicles con-
verge on an area of Chicago known for heavy narcotics trafficking.
When Officers Nolan and Harvey caught up with him on the street,
Nolan stopped him and conducted a protective patdown search for weap-
ons because in his experience there were usually weapons in the vicinity
of narcotics transactions. Discovering a handgun, the officers arrested
Wardlow. The Illinois trial court denied his motion to suppress, finding
the gun was recovered during a lawful stop and frisk. He was con-
victed of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. In reversing, the State
Appellate Court found that Nolan did not have reasonable suspicion to
make the stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1. The State Supreme
Court affirmed, determining that sudden flight in a high crime area does
not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop because flight
may simply be an exercise of the right to “go on one’s way,” see Florida
v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491.
Held: The officers’ actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment. This
case, involving a brief encounter between a citizen and a police officer
on a public street, is governed by Terry, under which an officer who has
a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot may
conduct a brief, investigatory stop. While “reasonable suspicion” is a
less demanding standard than probable cause, there must be at least
a minimal level of objective justification for the stop. An individual’s
presence in a “high crime area,” standing alone, is not enough to support
a reasonable, particularized suspicion of criminal activity, but a loca-
tion’s characteristics are relevant in determining whether the circum-
stances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation,
Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 144, 147–148. In this case, moreover,
it was also Wardlow’s unprovoked flight that aroused the officers’ suspi-
cion. Nervous, evasive behavior is another pertinent factor in deter-
mining reasonable suspicion, e. g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U. S. 873, 885, and headlong flight is the consummate act of evasion. In
reviewing the propriety of an officer’s conduct, courts do not have avail-
able empirical studies dealing with inferences from suspicious behavior,
and this Court cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty when none
exists. Thus, the reasonable suspicion determination must be based on
commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior. See

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120 ILLINOIS v. WARDLOW
Syllabus
United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418. Officer Nolan was justified
in suspecting that Wardlow was involved in criminal activity, and, there-
fore, in investigating further. Such a holding is consistent with the de-
cision in Florida v. Royer, supra, at 498, that an individual, when ap-
proached, has a right to ignore the police and go about his business.
Unprovoked flight is the exact opposite of “going about one’s business.”
While flight is not necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity,
Terry recognized that officers can detain individuals to resolve ambigu-
ities in their conduct, 392 U. S., at 30, and thus accepts the risk that
officers may stop innocent people. If they do not learn facts rising to
the level of probable cause, an individual must be allowed to go on his
way. But in this case the officers found that Wardlow possessed a hand-
gun and arrested him for violating a state law. The propriety of that
arrest is not before the Court. Pp. 123–126.
183 Ill. 2d 306, 701 N. E. 2d 484, reversed and remanded.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Con-
nor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 126.
Richard A. Devine argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were James E. Ryan, Attorney General
of Illinois, Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, Renee G.
Goldfarb, Theodore Fotios Burtzos, and Veronica Ximena
Calderon.
Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the
brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney
General Robinson, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and
Deborah Watson.
James B. Koch argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were Lynn N. Weisberg and Thomas G.
Gardiner.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Ohio
et al. by Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio, Edward B.
Foley, State Solicitor, Robert C. Maier and Alejandro Almaguer, Assist-
ant Solicitors, and Thomas R. Keller, Acting Attorney General of Hawaii,
and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bill
Pryor of Alabama, Ken Salazar of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware,

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Opinion of the Court
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Respondent Wardlow fled upon seeing police officers pa-
trolling an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking. Two
of the officers caught up with him, stopped him, and con-
ducted a protective patdown search for weapons. Discov-
ering a .38-caliber handgun, the officers arrested Wardlow.
We hold that the officers’ stop did not violate the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
On September 9, 1995, Officers Nolan and Harvey were
working as uniformed officers in the special operations sec-
tion of the Chicago Police Department. The officers were
driving the last car of a four-car caravan converging on an
area known for heavy narcotics trafficking in order to inves-
tigate drug transactions. The officers were traveling to-
gether because they expected to find a crowd of people in
the area, including lookouts and customers.
As the caravan passed 4035 West Van Buren, Officer Nolan
observed respondent Wardlow standing next to the building
Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub
of Louisiana, Mike Hatch of Minnesota, Michael C. Moore of Mississippi,
Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Michael P.
Easley of North Carolina, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Charles
M. Condon of South Carolina, Mark L. Barnett of South Dakota, and Mark
L. Earley of Virginia; for the Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney by
John D. O’Hair, pro se, Timothy A. Baughman, and Jeffrey Caminsky;
for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. by Wayne
W. Schmidt, James P. Manak, and Richard Weintraub; for the Criminal
Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson;
and for the National Association of Police Organizations et al. by Stephen
R. McSpadden.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American
Civil Liberties Union et al. by Tracey Maclin, Steven R. Shapiro, Harvey
Grossman, and Barbara E. Bergman; for the NAACP Legal Defense &
Educational Fund, Inc., by Elaine R. Jones, Theodore M. Shaw, George H.
Kendall, and Laura E. Hankins; and for the Rutherford Institute by John
W. Whitehead and Steven H. Aden.

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holding an opaque bag. Respondent looked in the direction
of the officers and fled. Nolan and Harvey turned their car
southbound, watched him as he ran through the gangway
and an alley, and eventually cornered him on the street.
Nolan then exited his car and stopped respondent. He im-
mediately conducted a protective patdown search for weap-
ons because in his experience it was common for there to be
weapons in the near vicinity of narcotics transactions. Dur-
ing the frisk, Officer Nolan squeezed the bag respondent was
carrying and felt a heavy, hard object similar to the shape of
a gun. The officer then opened the bag and discovered a
.38-caliber handgun with five live rounds of ammunition.
The officers arrested Wardlow.
The Illinois trial court denied respondent’s motion to sup-
press, finding the gun was recovered during a lawful stop
and frisk. App. 14. Following a stipulated bench trial,
Wardlow was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a
felon. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed Wardlow’s con-
viction, concluding that the gun should have been suppressed
because Officer Nolan did not have reasonable suspicion suf-
ficient to justify an investigative stop pursuant to Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). 287 Ill. App. 3d 367, 678 N. E. 2d
65 (1997).
The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. 183 Ill. 2d 306, 701
N. E. 2d 484 (1998). While rejecting the Appellate Court’s
conclusion that Wardlow was not in a high crime area, the
Illinois Supreme Court determined that sudden flight in such
an area does not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a
Terry stop. 183 Ill. 2d, at 310, 701 N. E. 2d, at 486. Relying
on Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491 (1983), the court explained
that although police have the right to approach individuals
and ask questions, the individual has no obligation to re-
spond. The person may decline to answer and simply go on
his or her way, and the refusal to respond, alone, does not
provide a legitimate basis for an investigative stop. 183 Ill.

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2d, at 311–312, 701 N. E. 2d, at 486–487. The court then
determined that flight may simply be an exercise of this
right to “go on one’s way,” and, thus, could not constitute
reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop. 183 Ill. 2d, at
312, 701 N. E. 2d, at 487.
The Illinois Supreme Court also rejected the argument
that flight combined with the fact that it occurred in a high
crime area supported a finding of reasonable suspicion be-
cause the “high crime area” factor was not sufficient stand-
ing alone to justify a Terry stop. Finding no independently
suspicious circumstances to support an investigatory deten-
tion, the court held that the stop and subsequent arrest vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment. We granted certiorari, 526
U. S. 1097 (1999), and now reverse.1
This case, involving a brief encounter between a citizen
and a police officer on a public street, is governed by the
analysis we first applied in Terry. In Terry, we held that
an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, con-
duct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reason-
able, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.
392 U. S., at 30. While “reasonable suspicion” is a less de-
manding standard than probable cause and requires a show-
ing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence,
the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of
objective justification for making the stop. United States
v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 7 (1989). The officer must be able
1 The state courts have differed on whether unprovoked flight is suffi-
cient grounds to constitute reasonable suspicion. See, e. g., State v. An-
derson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 454 N. W. 2d 763 (1990) (flight alone is sufficient);
Platt v. State, 589 N. E. 2d 222 (Ind. 1992) (same); Harris v. State, 205 Ga.
App. 813, 423 S. E. 2d 723 (1992) (flight in high crime area sufficient); State
v. Hicks, 241 Neb. 357, 488 N. W. 2d 359 (1992) (flight is not enough); State
v. Tucker, 136 N. J. 158, 642 A. 2d 401 (1994) (same); People v. Shabaz, 424
Mich. 42, 378 N. W. 2d 451 (1985) (same); People v. Wilson, 784 P. 2d 325
(Colo. 1989) (same).

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to articulate more than an “inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or ‘hunch’ ” of criminal activity. Terry, supra,
at 27.2
Nolan and Harvey were among eight officers in a four-car
caravan that was converging on an area known for heavy
narcotics trafficking, and the officers anticipated encounter-
ing a large number of people in the area, including drug cus-
tomers and individuals serving as lookouts. App. 8. It was
in this context that Officer Nolan decided to investigate
Wardlow after observing him flee. An individual’s presence
in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is
not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion
that the person is committing a crime. Brown v. Texas, 443
U. S. 47 (1979). But officers are not required to ignore the
relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether
the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant fur-
ther investigation. Accordingly, we have previously noted
the fact that the stop occurred in a “high crime area” among
the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.
Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 144, 147–148 (1972).
In this case, moreover, it was not merely respondent’s
presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking that
aroused the officers’ suspicion, but his unprovoked flight upon
noticing the police. Our cases have also recognized that ner-
vous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining
reasonable suspicion. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U. S. 873, 885 (1975); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U. S. 1, 6
(1984) (per curiam); United States v. Sokolow, supra, at 8–9.
Headlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act
of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but
it is certainly suggestive of such. In reviewing the propri-
ety of an officer’s conduct, courts do not have available em-
pirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from suspicious
2 We granted certiorari solely on the question whether the initial stop
was supported by reasonable suspicion. Therefore, we express no opinion
as to the lawfulness of the frisk independently of the stop.

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behavior, and we cannot reasonably demand scientific cer-
tainty from judges or law enforcement officers where none
exists. Thus, the determination of reasonable suspicion
must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences
about human behavior. See United States v. Cortez, 449
U. S. 411, 418 (1981). We conclude Officer Nolan was jus-
tified in suspecting that Wardlow was involved in criminal
activity, and, therefore, in investigating further.
Such a holding is entirely consistent with our decision in
Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491 (1983), where we held that
when an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable
cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a right to
ignore the police and go about his business. Id., at 498.
And any “refusal to cooperate, without more, does not fur-
nish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a
detention or seizure.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 437
(1991). But unprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal
to cooperate. Flight, by its very nature, is not “going about
one’s business”; in fact, it is just the opposite. Allowing of-
ficers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and
investigate further is quite consistent with the individual’s
right to go about his business or to stay put and remain
silent in the face of police questioning.
Respondent and amici also argue that there are innocent
reasons for flight from police and that, therefore, flight is not
necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity. This fact
is undoubtedly true, but does not establish a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Even in Terry, the conduct justifying
the stop was ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent expla-
nation. The officer observed two individuals pacing back
and forth in front of a store, peering into the window and
periodically conferring. 392 U. S., at 5–6. All of this con-
duct was by itself lawful, but it also suggested that the indi-
viduals were casing the store for a planned robbery. Terry
recognized that the officers could detain the individuals to
resolve the ambiguity. Id., at 30.

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In allowing such detentions, Terry accepts the risk that
officers may stop innocent people. Indeed, the Fourth
Amendment accepts that risk in connection with more dras-
tic police action; persons arrested and detained on probable
cause to believe they have committed a crime may turn out
to be innocent. The Terry stop is a far more minimal intru-
sion, simply allowing the officer to briefly investigate fur-
ther. If the officer does not learn facts rising to the level of
probable cause, the individual must be allowed to go on his
way. But in this case the officers found respondent in pos-
session of a handgun, and arrested him for violation of an
Illinois firearms statute. No question of the propriety of the
arrest itself is before us.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is reversed,
and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not incon-
sistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter, Justice
Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
The State of Illinois asks this Court to announce a
“bright-line rule” authorizing the temporary detention of
anyone who flees at the mere sight of a police officer. Brief
for Petitioner 7–36. Respondent counters by asking us to
adopt the opposite per se rule—that the fact that a person
flees upon seeing the police can never, by itself, be sufficient
to justify a temporary investigative stop of the kind author-
ized by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). Brief for Respond-
ent 6–31.
The Court today wisely endorses neither per se rule. In-
stead, it rejects the proposition that “flight is . . . necessarily
indicative of ongoing criminal activity,” ante, at 125, adher-
ing to the view that “[t]he concept of reasonable suspicion
. . . is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set
of legal rules,” but must be determined by looking to “the

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totality of the circumstances—the whole picture,” United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 7–8 (1989) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Abiding by this framework,
the Court concludes that “Officer Nolan was justified in sus-
pecting that Wardlow was involved in criminal activity.”
Ante, at 125.
Although I agree with the Court’s rejection of the per se
rules proffered by the parties, unlike the Court, I am per-
suaded that in this case the brief testimony of the officer who
seized respondent does not justify the conclusion that he had
reasonable suspicion to make the stop. Before discussing
the specific facts of this case, I shall comment on the parties’
requests for a per se rule.
I
In Terry v. Ohio, we first recognized “that a police officer
may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner approach a person for purposes of investigating pos-
sibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable
cause to make an arrest,” 392 U. S., at 22, an authority per-
mitting the officer to “stop and briefly detain a person for
investigative purposes,” Sokolow, 490 U. S., at 7. We ap-
proved as well “a reasonable search for weapons for the pro-
tection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe
that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual,
regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the
individual for a crime.” Terry, 392 U. S., at 27. Cognizant
that such police intrusion had never before received constitu-
tional imprimatur on less than probable cause, id., at 11–12,
20, we reflected upon the magnitude of the departure we
were endorsing. “Even a limited search,” we said, “consti-
tutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished per-
sonal security, and it must be an annoying, frightening, and
perhaps humiliating experience.” Id., at 24–25.1
1 We added that a Terry frisk “is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity
of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resent-
ment, and is not to be undertaken lightly.” 392 U. S., at 17. The resent-

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Accordingly, we recognized only a “narrowly drawn au-
thority” that is “limited to that which is necessary for the
discovery of weapons.” Id., at 27, 26. An officer conduct-
ing an investigatory stop, we further explained, must articu-
late “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the
particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United
States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417–418 (1981). That deter-
mination, we admonished, “becomes meaningful only when it
is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged
with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more de-
tached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of
the particular circumstances.” Terry, 392 U. S., at 21. In
undertaking that neutral scrutiny “based on all of the cir-
cumstances,” a court relies on “certain commonsense conclu-
sions about human behavior.” Cortez, 449 U. S., at 418; see
also ante, at 125. “[T]he relevant inquiry” concerning the
inferences and conclusions a court draws “is not whether
particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty,’ but the degree of
suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal
acts.” Sokolow, 490 U. S., at 10.
The question in this case concerns “the degree of suspicion
that attaches to” a person’s flight—or, more precisely, what
“commonsense conclusions” can be drawn respecting the mo-
tives behind that flight. A pedestrian may break into a run
for a variety of reasons—to catch up with a friend a block or
two away, to seek shelter from an impending storm, to arrive
at a bus stop before the bus leaves, to get home in time for
ment engendered by that intrusion is aggravated, not mitigated, if the
officer’s entire justification for the stop is the belief that the individual is
simply trying to avoid contact with the police or move from one place to
another—as he or she has a right to do (and do rapidly). See Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U. S. 41, 53 (1999) (plurality opinion) (“We have expressly
identified this ‘right to remove from one place to another according to
inclination’ as ‘an attribute of personal liberty’ protected by the Constitu-
tion” (citation omitted)); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 437 (1991); Flor-
ida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 497–498 (1983) (plurality opinion); Terry, 392
U. S., at 32–33 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also ante, at 125.

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dinner, to resume jogging after a pause for rest, to avoid
contact with a bore or a bully, or simply to answer the call
of nature—any of which might coincide with the arrival of
an officer in the vicinity. A pedestrian might also run be-
cause he or she has just sighted one or more police officers.
In the latter instance, the State properly points out “that
the fleeing person may be, inter alia, (1) an escapee from
jail; (2) wanted on a warrant; (3) in possession of contraband,
(i. e. drugs, weapons, stolen goods, etc.); or (4) someone who
has just committed another type of crime.” Brief for Peti-
tioner 9, n. 4.2 In short, there are unquestionably circum-
stances in which a person’s flight is suspicious, and undeni-
ably instances in which a person runs for entirely innocent
reasons.3
Given the diversity and frequency of possible motivations
for flight, it would be profoundly unwise to endorse either
per se rule. The inference we can reasonably draw about
the motivation for a person’s flight, rather, will depend on a
number of different circumstances. Factors such as the
time of day, the number of people in the area, the character
of the neighborhood, whether the officer was in uniform, the
way the runner was dressed, the direction and speed of the
2 If the fleeing person exercises his or her right to remain silent after
being stopped, only in the third of the State’s four hypothetical categories
is the stop likely to lead to probable cause to make an arrest. And even
in the third category, flight does not necessarily indicate that the officer is
“dealing with an armed and dangerous individual.” Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S. 1, 27 (1968).
3 Compare, e. g., Proverbs 28:1 (“The wicked flee when no man pursueth:
but the righteous are as bold as a lion”) with Proverbs 22:3 (“A shrewd
man sees trouble coming and lies low; the simple walk into it and pay
the penalty”).
I have rejected reliance on the former proverb in the past, because
its “ivory-towered analysis of the real world” fails to account for the ex-
periences of many citizens of this country, particularly those who are
minorities. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U. S. 621, 630, n. 4 (1991)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). That this pithy expression fails to capture the
total reality of our world, however, does not mean it is inaccurate in all
instances.

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flight, and whether the person’s behavior was otherwise un-
usual might be relevant in specific cases. This number of
variables is surely sufficient to preclude either a bright-line
rule that always justifies, or that never justifies, an investi-
gative stop based on the sole fact that flight began after a
police officer appeared nearby.4
Still, Illinois presses for a per se rule regarding “unpro-
voked flight upon seeing a clearly identifiable police officer.”
Id., at 7. The phrase “upon seeing,” as used by Illinois, ap-
parently assumes that the flight is motivated by the presence
of the police officer.5 Illinois contends that unprovoked
flight is “an extreme reaction,” id., at 8, because innocent
people simply do not “flee at the mere sight of the police,”
id., at 24. To be sure, Illinois concedes, an innocent per-
son—even one distrustful of the police—might “avoid eye
contact or even sneer at the sight of an officer,” and that
4 Of course, Terry itself recognized that sometimes behavior giving rise
to reasonable suspicion is entirely innocent, but it accepted the risk that
officers may stop innocent people. 392 U. S., at 30. And as the Court
correctly observes, it is “undoubtedly true” that innocent explanations for
flight exist, but they do not “establish a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.” Ante, at 125. It is equally true, however, that the innocent ex-
planations make the single act of flight sufficiently ambiguous to preclude
the adoption of a per se rule.
In Terry, furthermore, reasonable suspicion was supported by a concate-
nation of acts, each innocent when viewed in isolation, that when consid-
ered collectively amounted to extremely suspicious behavior. See 392
U. S., at 5–7, 22–23. Flight alone, however, is not at all like a “series of
acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but which taken together
warran[t] further investigation.” Id., at 22. Nor is flight similar to evi-
dence which in the aggregate provides “fact on fact and clue on clue afford-
[ing] a basis for the deductions and inferences,” supporting reasonable
suspicion. United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 419 (1981).
5 Nowhere in Illinois’ briefs does it specify what it means by “unpro-
voked.” At oral argument, Illinois explained that if officers precipitate a
flight by threats of violence, that flight is “provoked.” But if police offi-
cers in a patrol car—with lights flashing and siren sounding—descend
upon an individual for the sole purpose of seeing if he or she will run, the
ensuing flight is “unprovoked.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 17–18, 20.

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would not justify a Terry stop or any sort of per se inference.
Id., at 8–9. But, Illinois insists, unprovoked flight is alto-
gether different. Such behavior is so “aberrant” and “ab-
normal” that a per se inference is justified. Id., at 8–9, and
n. 4.
Even assuming we know that a person runs because he
sees the police, the inference to be drawn may still vary from
case to case. Flight to escape police detection, we have said,
may have an entirely innocent motivation:
“[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that men who are
entirely innocent do sometimes fly from the scene of a
crime through fear of being apprehended as the guilty
parties, or from an unwillingness to appear as witnesses.
Nor is it true as an accepted axiom of criminal law that
‘the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the right-
eous are as bold as a lion.’ Innocent men sometimes
hesitate to confront a jury—not necessarily because
they fear that the jury will not protect them, but be-
cause they do not wish their names to appear in connec-
tion with criminal acts, are humiliated at being obliged
to incur the popular odium of an arrest and trial, or be-
cause they do not wish to be put to the annoyance or
expense of defending themselves.” Alberty v. United
States, 162 U. S. 499, 511 (1896).
In addition to these concerns, a reasonable person may con-
clude that an officer’s sudden appearance indicates nearby
criminal activity. And where there is criminal activity
there is also a substantial element of danger—either from
the criminal or from a confrontation between the criminal
and the police. These considerations can lead to an inno-
cent and understandable desire to quit the vicinity with all
speed.6
6 Statistical studies of bystander victimization are rare. One study at-
tributes this to incomplete recordkeeping and a lack of officially compiled
data. See Sherman, Steele, Laufersweiler, Hooper, & Julian, Stray Bul-

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Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those re-
siding in high crime areas, there is also the possibility that
the fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or without
justification, believes that contact with the police can itself
be dangerous, apart from any criminal activity associated
with the officer’s sudden presence.7 For such a person,
lets and “Mushrooms”: Random Shootings of Bystanders in Four Cities,
1977–1988, 5 J. of Quantitative Criminology 297, 303 (1989). Nonetheless,
that study, culling data from newspaper reports in four large cities over
an 11-year period, found “substantial increases in reported bystander
killings and woundings in all four cities.” Id., at 306. From 1986 to 1988,
for example, the study identified 250 people who were killed or wounded
in bystander shootings in the four survey cities. Id., at 306–311. Most
significantly for the purposes of the present case, the study found that
such incidents “rank at the top of public outrage.” Id., at 299. The sali-
ency of this phenomenon, in turn, “violate[s] the routine assumptions” of
day-to-day affairs, and, “[w]ith enough frequency . . . it shapes the conduct
of daily life.” Ibid.
7 See Johnson, Americans’ Views on Crime and Law Enforcement: Sur-
vey Findings, Nat. Institute of Justice J. 13 (Sept. 1997) (reporting study
by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies in April 1996, which
found that 43% of African-Americans consider “police brutality and har-
assment of African-Americans a serious problem” in their own commu-
nity); President’s Comm’n on Law Enforcement and Administration of Jus-
tice, Task Force Report: The Police 183–184 (1967) (documenting the belief,
held by many minorities, that field interrogations are conducted “indis-
criminately” and “in an abusive . . . manner,” and labeling this phenom-
enon a “principal problem” causing “friction” between minorities and the
police) (cited in Terry, 392 U. S., at 14, n. 11); see also Casimir, Minority
Men: We Are Frisk Targets, N. Y. Daily News, Mar. 26, 1999, p. 34 (infor-
mal survey of 100 young black and Hispanic men living in New York City;
81 reported having been stopped and frisked by police at least once; none
of the 81 stops resulted in arrests); Brief for NAACP Legal Defense &
Educational Fund as Amicus Curiae 17–19 (reporting figures on dispro-
portionate street stops of minority residents in Pittsburgh and Philadel-
phia, Pennsylvania, and St. Petersburg, Florida); U. S. Dept. of Justice,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, S. Smith, Criminal Victimization and Percep-
tions of Community Safety in 12 Cities 25 (June 1998) (African-American
residents in 12 cities are more than twice as likely to be dissatisfied with
police practices than white residents in same community).

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unprovoked flight is neither “aberrant” nor “abnormal.” 8
Moreover, these concerns and fears are known to the police
officers themselves,9 and are validated by law enforcement
investigations into their own practices.10 Accordingly, the
8 See, e. g., Kotlowitz, Hidden Casualties: Drug War’s Emphasis on Law
Enforcement Takes a Toll on Police, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 11, 1991,
p. A2, col. 1 (“Black leaders complained that innocent people were picked
up in the drug sweeps . . . . Some teen-agers were so scared of the task
force they ran even if they weren’t selling drugs”).
Many stops never lead to an arrest, which further exacerbates the per-
ceptions of discrimination felt by racial minorities and people living in
high crime areas. See Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, N. Y. Times
Magazine, June 20, 1999, p. 85 (reporting that in 2-year period, New York
City Police Department Street Crimes Unit made 45,000 stops, only 9,500,
or 20%, of which resulted in arrest); Casimir, supra n. 7 (reporting that
in 1997, New York City’s Street Crimes Unit conducted 27,061 stop-and-
frisks, only 4,647 of which, 17%, resulted in arrest). Even if these data
were race neutral, they would still indicate that society as a whole is pay-
ing a significant cost in infringement on liberty by these virtually random
stops. See also n. 1, supra.
9 The Chief of the Washington, D. C., Metropolitan Police Department,
for example, confirmed that “sizeable percentages of Americans today—
especially Americans of color—still view policing in the United States to
be discriminatory, if not by policy and definition, certainly in its day-to-day
application.” P. Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey, Interim Re-
port of the State Police Review Team Regarding Allegations of Racial
Profiling 46 (Apr. 20, 1999) (hereinafter Interim Report). And a recent
survey of 650 Los Angeles Police Department officers found that 25% felt
that “ ‘racial bias (prejudice) on the part of officers toward minority citi-
zens currently exists and contributes to a negative interaction between
police and the community.’ ” Report of the Independent Comm’n on the
Los Angeles Police Department 69 (1991); see also 5 United States
Comm’n on Civil Rights, Racial and Ethnic Tensions in American Commu-
nities: Poverty, Inequality and Discrimination, The Los Angeles Report
26 (June 1999).
10 New Jersey’s Attorney General, in a recent investigation into allega-
tions of racial profiling on the New Jersey Turnpike, concluded that “mi-
nority motorists have been treated differently [by New Jersey State
Troopers] than non-minority motorists during the course of traffic stops
on the New Jersey Turnpike.” “[T]he problem of disparate treatment is
real—not imagined,” declared the Attorney General. Not surprisingly,

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evidence supporting the reasonableness of these beliefs is too
pervasive to be dismissed as random or rare, and too persua-
sive to be disparaged as inconclusive or insufficient.11 In
the report concluded that this disparate treatment “engender[s] feelings
of fear, resentment, hostility, and mistrust by minority citizens.” See In-
terim Report 4, 7. Recently, the United States Department of Justice,
citing this very evidence, announced that it would appoint an outside moni-
tor to oversee the actions of the New Jersey State Police and ensure that
it enacts policy changes advocated by the Interim Report, and keeps rec-
ords on racial statistics and traffic stops. See Kocieniewski, U. S. Will
Monitor New Jersey Police on Race Profiling, N. Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1999,
p. A1, col. 6.
Likewise, the Massachusetts Attorney General investigated similar alle-
gations of egregious police conduct toward minorities. The report stated:
“We conclude that Boston police officers engaged in improper, and uncon-
stitutional, conduct in the 1989–90 period with respect to stops and
searches of minority individuals . . . . Although we cannot say with preci-
sion how widespread this illegal conduct was, we believe that it was suffi-
ciently common to justify changes in certain Department practices.
“Perhaps the most disturbing evidence was that the scope of a number
of Terry searches went far beyond anything authorized by that case and
indeed, beyond anything that we believe would be acceptable under the
federal and state constitutions even where probable cause existed to con-
duct a full search incident to an arrest. Forcing young men to lower their
trousers, or otherwise searching inside their underwear, on public streets
or in public hallways, is so demeaning and invasive of fundamental pre-
cepts of privacy that it can only be condemned in the strongest terms.
The fact that not only the young men themselves, but independent wit-
nesses complained of strip searches, should be deeply alarming to all mem-
bers of this community.” J. Shannon, Attorney General of Massachusetts,
Report of the Attorney General’s Civil Rights Division on Boston Police
Department Practices 60–61 (Dec. 18, 1990).
11 Taking into account these and other innocent motivations for unpro-
voked flight leads me to reject Illinois’ requested per se rule in favor of
adhering to a totality-of-the-circumstances test. This conclusion does not,
as Illinois suggests, “establish a separate Terry analysis based on the indi-
vidual characteristics of the person seized.” Reply Brief for Petitioner
14. My rejection of a per se rule, of course, applies to members of all
races.
It is true, as Illinois points out, that Terry approved of the stop and
frisk procedure notwithstanding “[t]he wholesale harassment by certain

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any event, just as we do not require “scientific certainty”
for our commonsense conclusion that unprovoked flight can
sometimes indicate suspicious motives, see ante, at 124–125,
neither do we require scientific certainty to conclude that
unprovoked flight can occur for other, innocent reasons.12
The probative force of the inferences to be drawn from
flight is a function of the varied circumstances in which it
occurs. Sometimes those inferences are entirely consistent
with the presumption of innocence, sometimes they justify
further investigation, and sometimes they justify an immedi-
ate stop and search for weapons. These considerations have
led us to avoid categorical rules concerning a person’s flight
and the presumptions to be drawn therefrom:
“Few things . . . distinguish an enlightened system of
judicature from a rude and barbarous one more than the
manner in which they deal with evidence. The former
weighs testimony, whilst the latter, conscious perhaps of
its inability to do so or careless of the consequences of
error, at times rejects whole portions en masse, and at
others converts pieces of evidence into rules of law by
investing with conclusive effect some whose probative
force has been found to be in general considerable. . . .
Our ancestors, observing that guilty persons usually fled
from justice, adopted the hasty conclusion that it was
only the guilty who did so . . . so that under the old law,
a man who fled to avoid being tried for felony forfeited
elements of the police community, of which minority groups, particularly
Negroes, frequently complain.” 392 U. S., at 14. But in this passage,
Terry simply held that such concerns would not preclude the use of the
stop and frisk procedure altogether. See id., at 17, n. 14. Nowhere did
Terry suggest that such concerns cannot inform a court’s assessment of
whether reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a particular stop existed.
12 As a general matter, local courts often have a keener and more in-
formed sense of local police practices and events that may heighten these
concerns at particular times or locations. Thus, a reviewing court may
accord substantial deference to a local court’s determination that fear of
the police is especially acute in a specific location or at a particular time.

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all his goods even though he were acquitted . . . . In
modern times more correct views have prevailed, and
the evasion of or flight from justice seems now nearly
reduced to its true place in the administration of the
criminal law, namely, that of a circumstance—a fact
which it is always of importance to take into consider-
ation, and combined with others may afford strong evi-
dence of guilt, but which, like any other piece of pre-
sumptive evidence, it is equally absurd and dangerous
to invest with infallibility.” Hickory v. United States,
160 U. S. 408, 419–420 (1896) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
“Unprovoked flight,” in short, describes a category of ac-
tivity too broad and varied to permit a per se reasonable
inference regarding the motivation for the activity. While
the innocent explanations surely do not establish that the
Fourth Amendment is always violated whenever someone is
stopped solely on the basis of an unprovoked flight, neither
do the suspicious motivations establish that the Fourth
Amendment is never violated when a Terry stop is predi-
cated on that fact alone. For these reasons, the Court is
surely correct in refusing to embrace either per se rule advo-
cated by the parties. The totality of the circumstances, as
always, must dictate the result.13
13 Illinois’ reliance on the common law as a conclusive answer to the issue
at hand is mistaken. The sources from which it gleans guidance focus
either on flight following an accusation of criminal activity, see 4 W. Black-
stone, Commentaries *387 (“For flight . . . on an accusation of treason,
felony, or even petit larceny . . . is an offence carrying with it a strong
presumption of guilt” (emphasis added in part)), or are less dogmatic than
Illinois contends, compare Brief for Petitioner 15 (“[A] person’s flight was
considered . . . conclusive proof of guilt”) with A. Burrill, Circumstantial
Evidence 472 (1856) (“So impressed was the old common law with consid-
erations of this kind, that it laid down the rule, which passed into a
maxim,—that flight from justice was equivalent to confession of guilt . . . .
But this maxim . . . was undoubtedly expressed in too general and sweep-
ing terms”).

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II
Guided by that totality-of-the-circumstances test, the
Court concludes that Officer Nolan had reasonable suspicion
to stop respondent. Ante, at 125. In this respect, my view
differs from the Court’s. The entire justification for the stop
is articulated in the brief testimony of Officer Nolan. Some
facts are perfectly clear; others are not. This factual insuf-
ficiency leads me to conclude that the Court’s judgment is
mistaken.
Respondent Wardlow was arrested a few minutes after
noon on September 9, 1995. 183 Ill. 2d 306, 308, n. 1, 701
N. E. 2d 484, 485, n. 1 (1998).14 Nolan was part of an eight-
officer, four-car caravan patrol team. The officers were
headed for “one of the areas in the 11th District [of Chicago]
that’s high [in] narcotics traffic.” App. 8.15 The reason why
four cars were in the caravan was that “[n]ormally in these
different areas there’s an enormous amount of people, some-
times lookouts, customers.” Ibid. Officer Nolan testified
that he was in uniform on that day, but he did not recall
whether he was driving a marked or an unmarked car.
Id., at 4.
Officer Nolan and his partner were in the last of the four
patrol cars that “were all caravaning eastbound down Van
Buren.” Id., at 8. Nolan first observed respondent “in
front of 4035 West Van Buren.” Id., at 7. Wardlow “looked
in our direction and began fleeing.” Id., at 9. Nolan then
“began driving southbound down the street observing [re-
spondent] running through the gangway and the alley south-
bound,” and observed that Wardlow was carrying a white,
14 At the suppression hearing, the State failed to present testimony as
to the time of respondent’s arrest. The Illinois Supreme Court, however,
took notice of the time recorded in Officer Nolan’s arrest report. See 183
Ill. 2d, at 308, n. 1, 701 N. E. 2d, at 485, n. 1.
15 The population of the 11th district is over 98,000 people. See Brief
for the National Association of Police Organizations et al. as Amici
Curiae App. II.

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opaque bag under his arm. Id., at 6, 9. After the car
turned south and intercepted respondent as he “ran right
towards us,” Officer Nolan stopped him and conducted a
“protective search,” which revealed that the bag under re-
spondent’s arm contained a loaded handgun. Id., at 9–11.
This terse testimony is most noticeable for what it fails
to reveal. Though asked whether he was in a marked or
unmarked car, Officer Nolan could not recall the answer.
Id., at 4. He was not asked whether any of the other three
cars in the caravan were marked, or whether any of the other
seven officers were in uniform. Though he explained that
the size of the caravan was because “[n]ormally in these dif-
ferent areas there’s an enormous amount of people, some-
times lookouts, customers,” Officer Nolan did not testify as
to whether anyone besides Wardlow was nearby 4035 West
Van Buren. Nor is it clear that that address was the in-
tended destination of the caravan. As the Appellate Court
of Illinois interpreted the record, “it appears that the officers
were simply driving by, on their way to some unidentified
location, when they noticed defendant standing at 4035 West
Van Buren.” 287 Ill. App. 3d 367, 370–371, 678 N. E. 2d 65,
67 (1997).16 Officer Nolan’s testimony also does not reveal
how fast the officers were driving. It does not indicate
whether he saw respondent notice the other patrol cars.
And it does not say whether the caravan, or any part of it,
had already passed Wardlow by before he began to run.
Indeed, the Appellate Court thought the record was even
“too vague to support the inference that . . . defendant’s
flight was related to his expectation of police focus on him.”
Id., at 371, 678 N. E. 2d, at 67. Presumably, respondent did
not react to the first three cars, and we cannot even be sure
that he recognized the occupants of the fourth as police offi-
cers. The adverse inference is based entirely on the officer’s
16 Of course, it would be a different case if the officers had credible infor-
mation respecting that specific street address which reasonably led them
to believe that criminal activity was afoot in that narrowly defined area.

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statement: “He looked in our direction and began fleeing.”
App. 9.17
No other factors sufficiently support a finding of reason-
able suspicion. Though respondent was carrying a white,
opaque bag under his arm, there is nothing at all suspicious
about that. Certainly the time of day—shortly after noon—
does not support Illinois’ argument. Nor were the officers
“responding to any call or report of suspicious activity in the
area.” 183 Ill. 2d, at 315, 701 N. E. 2d, at 488. Officer
Nolan did testify that he expected to find “an enormous
amount of people,” including drug customers or lookouts,
App. 8, and the Court points out that “[i]t was in this context
that Officer Nolan decided to investigate Wardlow after ob-
serving him flee,” ante, at 124. This observation, in my
view, lends insufficient weight to the reasonable suspicion
analysis; indeed, in light of the absence of testimony that
anyone else was nearby when respondent began to run, this
observation points in the opposite direction.
The State, along with the majority of the Court, relies as
well on the assumption that this flight occurred in a high
crime area. Even if that assumption is accurate, it is insuf-
ficient because even in a high crime neighborhood unpro-
voked flight does not invariably lead to reasonable suspicion.
On the contrary, because many factors providing innocent
motivations for unprovoked flight are concentrated in high
crime areas, the character of the neighborhood arguably
makes an inference of guilt less appropriate, rather than
more so. Like unprovoked flight itself, presence in a high
crime neighborhood is a fact too generic and susceptible to
innocent explanation to satisfy the reasonable suspicion in-
quiry. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52 (1979); see also
n. 15, supra.
17 Officer Nolan also testified that respondent “was looking at us,” App.
5 (emphasis added), though this minor clarification hardly seems sufficient
to support the adverse inference.

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It is the State’s burden to articulate facts sufficient to sup-
port reasonable suspicion. Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S., at 52;
see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality
opinion). In my judgment, Illinois has failed to discharge
that burden. I am not persuaded that the mere fact that
someone standing on a sidewalk looked in the direction of a
passing car before starting to run is sufficient to justify a
forcible stop and frisk.
I therefore respectfully dissent from the Court’s judgment
to reverse the court below.