Doe v. Hochul

1 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
G
ORSUCH, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JOHN DOE, ET AL. v. KATHY HOCHUL, GOVERNOR OF
NEW YORK,
ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
No. 24–1015. Decided June 29, 2026
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
J
USTICE GORSUCH, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS and
J
USTICE ALITO join, dissenting from the denial of certiorari.
Once again, this Court faces a case involving healthcare
workers who “served on the front line of a pandemic” and
were then “fired . . . for adhering to their . . . religious be-
liefs.” Doe v. Mills, 595 U. S. 1029, 1035 (2021) (G
ORSUCH,
J., dissenting from denial of application for injunctive re-
lief ); see also Dr. A. v. Hochul, 595 U. S. ___ (2021) (Dr. A.
I ) (G
ORSUCH, J., dissenting from denial of application for
injunctive relief ); Dr. A. v. Hochul, 597 U. S. ___ (2022) (Dr.
A. II ) (T
HOMAS, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Their case raises an important and recurring question of
federal law that warrants this Court’s attention.
I
The present “chapter in this grim story” involves a law-
suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Dr.
A.I, 595 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14). That statute makes
it unlawful “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any in-
dividual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individ-
ual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 78 Stat. 255, as
amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1). And the law broadly
defines “religion” to “includ[e] all aspects of religious ob-
servance and practice, as well as belief.” §2000e(j).

2 DOE v. HOCHUL
G
ORSUCH, J., dissenting
Under Title VII, an employer may refuse to hire, dis-
charge, or otherwise discriminate against an employee be-
cause of his religion only if the employer can “demonstrat[e]
that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an em-
ployee’s . . . religious observance or practice without undue
hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” Ibid.
To qualify as “undue,” the hardship must be “substantial in
the overall context of [the] employer’s business.” Groff v.
DeJoy, 600 U. S. 447, 468 (2023).
The plaintiffs before us include many New York State
healthcare workers, but for simplicity’s sake consider just
John Doe 2’s story. Doe is a Christian Scientist who worked
for New York-Presbyterian Healthcare System, Inc. (NYP),
for a decade. App. to Pet. for Cert. 90a (App.). Because he
understands his faith to require him to abstain from vac-
cines, he has not received one at any time in his life. Id., at
87a. For years, NYP respected Doe’s sincere religious be-
liefs and afforded him an exception to its internal manda-
tory vaccination policy. Id., at 90a.
Then came COVID–19. When vaccines became available
in late 2020 and early 2021, Doe did not line up to receive
one. Not only did accepting a vaccine conflict with his sin-
cere religious beliefs generally, it also implicated Doe’s
more specific religious belief against benefiting from any
abortion because the vaccines approved at that time “de-
pended upon abortion-derived fetal cell lines in [their] pro-
duction or testing.” Dr. A. I, 595 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2);
App. 80a–86a.
At first, none of this proved a problem. While New York
State announced a statewide COVID–19 vaccination man-
date for healthcare workers, the mandate included two ex-
emptions—one for healthcare workers with medical rea-
sons for declining vaccination, another for those with
sincere religious objections. Id., at 78a–79a. So Doe’s
longstanding vaccination exemption remained intact.

3 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
G
ORSUCH, J., dissenting
But all that changed when state government leadership
changed. A new Governor decided to retain the medical
exemption to the vaccine mandate. But the Governor did
away with the religious exemption, soon declaring that peo-
ple like Doe “[we]ren’t listening to God and what God
wants.” Governor Hochul Attends Service at Christian Cul-
tural Center (Sept. 26, 2021), https://perma.cc/BW3P-3S2U;
see also Dr. A. I, 595 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 3–5).
In light of the new state mandate, NYP insisted that Doe
submit to vaccination, and when he declined, it fired him.
App. 4a, 91a. In doing so, NYP rejected Doe’s proposed ac-
commodation of “weekly testing and 100% Mask compli-
ance.” Complaint in No. 1:21–CV–05067 (EDNY), ECF Doc.
1–11 (Exh. E).
Those decisions, and similar ones made by the other
plaintiffs’ employers, precipitated this lawsuit. Initially,
while still employed, the plaintiffs sought a court order pre-
venting their employers from firing them for adhering to
their religious beliefs. App. 113a–116a. After they failed to
win that relief and lost their jobs, the plaintiffs argued that
their terminations violated Title VII. Id., at 4a, 27a–30a,
52a.
Ultimately, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’
claims, and the Second Circuit affirmed. In doing so, the
Court of Appeals did not assess the reasonableness of the
plaintiffs’ requested accommodations. In fact, the court
took as given that the plaintiffs had “plausibly alleged a
prima facie case of Title VII religious discrimination.” Id.,
at 10a. Still, the court held, the defendants had presented
a successful “undue hardship” defense as a matter of law.
Ibid. More specifically, the court reasoned that granting
the plaintiffs’ requested religious accommodations would
have imposed an “undue hardship” on their employers be-
cause it “would have required the [employers] to violate the
state [vaccine] regulation” and “subjected the [employers]

4 DOE v. HOCHUL
G
ORSUCH, J., dissenting
to financial penalties or a suspension or revocation of their
operating licenses.” Id., at 11a.
Soon after it decided this case, the Second Circuit reiter-
ated its understanding of Title VII’s undue hardship de-
fense, holding that “an accommodation that would require
an employer to violate” a state law necessarily “imposes an
undue hardship”—and does so even when the state law is
“unconstitutional as applied” to the plaintiff. Russo v.
Patchogue-Medford School Dist., 129 F. 4th 182, 186, and
n. 1 (2025) (per curiam).
II
I harbor serious doubts about the Second Circuit’s rule.
True, Title VII permits an employer to avoid liability for re-
ligious discrimination when accommodating an employee
would cause it to suffer an “undue hardship.” 42 U. S. C.
§2000e(j). And, true, when NYP fired Doe, it faced a state
mandate threatening it with liability for extending reli-
gious (but not medical) vaccine exemptions to its employees.
But I fail to see how a state law (especially an unconstitu-
tional state law) prohibiting an accommodation can always
and automatically supply an employer with an “undue
hardship” defense under federal law.
Start with this. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, of which
Title VII is a part, instructs that its provisions should “be
construed as invalidating any provision of State law” that
“is inconsistent with any of the purposes of th[e] Act, or any
provision thereof.” §2000h–4. For good measure, Title VII
explicitly “exempt[s and] relieve[s] any person from any li-
ability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any . . .
law of any State or political subdivision of a State . . . which
purports to require or permit the doing of any act which
would be an unlawful employment practice under” Title
VII. §2000e–7. Far from suggesting absolute deference to
state law, then, these provisions anticipate that federal civil
rights laws will sometimes preempt state law—and, along

5 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
G
ORSUCH, J., dissenting
the way, relieve employers from any liability associated
with state mandates.
Next, consider how federal courts proceed in similar cir-
cumstances. Many federal civil rights statutes require par-
ties to make “reasonable accommodations” or “reasonable
modifications” for individuals’ protected traits. E.g.,
§§12112(b)(5)(A), 12131(2), 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA)); §3604(f )(3) (Fair Housing
Act); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U. S. 287, 301–302, and n. 21
(1985) (Rehabilitation Act of 1973). Sometimes in cases un-
der those provisions employers argue that a requested ac-
commodation or modification is not a “reason-
able” one because state law prohibits it. Routinely, how-
ever, federal courts (including the Second Circuit) reject
those arguments, holding that state law cannot control
what counts as a “reasonable accommodation” under fed-
eral law. Were the rule otherwise, these courts emphasize,
state laws might effectively displace the federal guarantee.
See Mary Jo C. v. New York State and Local Retirement
System, 707 F. 3d 144, 161–164 (CA2 2013); National Fed-
eration of the Blind v. Lamone, 813 F. 3d 494, 508–509 (CA4
2016); cf. T. B. v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 806 F. 3d
451, 468, n. 5 (CA9 2015). Indeed, as some courts have put
it, state laws that foreclose accommodations may some-
times supply less of a “‘defense to liability under federal
law’” than “‘a source of liability under federal law.’” Barber
v. Colorado Dept. of Revenue, 562 F. 3d 1222, 1233 (CA10
2009) (quoting Quinones v. Evanston, 58 F. 3d 275, 277
(CA7 1995)). And if state law does not control what counts
as a “reasonable accommodation” under federal civil rights
statutes, it is unclear how state law might any more control
what qualifies as an “undue hardship.”
Finally, notice what the Eleventh Circuit has said in a
similar ADA case, Campbell v. Universal City Development
Partners, Ltd., 72 F. 4th 1245 (2023). Much as Title VII
permits an employer to deny a reasonable accommodation

6 DOE v. HOCHUL
G
ORSUCH, J., dissenting
to a religious employee when doing so would cause it to suf-
fer an “undue hardship,” Title III of the ADA allows a public
accommodation to apply otherwise forbidden exclusionary
eligibility criteria when they are “necessary for the provi-
sion of ” the public accommodation’s particular offerings.
§12182(b)(2)(A)(i). In Campbell, the Eleventh Circuit faced
a defendant who argued that its exclusionary criteria were
“necessary” because a state law demanded them. Id., at
1256. The case involved a child born with only one hand
who was denied entry to an amusement-park ride. Id., at
1248. In its defense, the park’s operator explained that
state-mandated safety standards required the child’s exclu-
sion and that the State would “subject [the park] to closure
or criminal and civil penalties” for declining to enforce those
rules. Id., at 1256–1258. But just as state law cannot con-
trol what qualifies as a “reasonable accommodation” under
federal law, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, state law can-
not control which exclusionary criteria are and are not “nec-
essary” for purposes of federal law. Id., at 1257–1259. Any
different rule, the court concluded, would effectively allow
a State to “nullify the ADA by enacting a state law requir-
ing discrimination.” Id., at 1258. If there is some sound
reason why state law should be allowed to define the con-
tours of an “undue hardship” defense under one federal civil
rights statute but not a similar “necessity” defense under
another such statute, nobody has identified one.
For all these reasons, it seems to me that state law cannot
control whether an employer faces an “undue hardship” for
purposes of federal antidiscrimination laws, just like it can-
not conclusively resolve what constitutes a “reasonable ac-
commodation” or which criteria are “necessary” for admis-
sion to a public accommodation. To hold otherwise would
appear to leave States free to strip individuals of the pro-
tections guaranteed by so many federal civil rights stat-
utes—Title VII, the ADA, the Fair Housing Act, and the Re-
habilitation Act—all by the simple expedient of proscribing

7 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
G
ORSUCH, J., dissenting
accommodations those statutes promise. Rather than fed-
eral civil rights laws standing supreme over contrary state
law, they would more nearly bow before it.
III
To some, I appreciate, this case might appear of limited
significance. After all, the pandemic is behind us, and New
York did away with its COVID–19 vaccination mandate al-
most three years ago. App. 6a. But not only does this case
remain of obvious importance to healthcare workers who
courageously served on the front line during a pandemic
only then to lose their jobs. The legal issue at the heart of
this case is also an important and recurring one. Left un-
corrected, the Second Circuit’s rule promises to mean that
civil rights protected by federal law will give way whenever
a contrary state law—even an unconstitutional state law—
is in play.
Notably, the federal government agrees that adopting a
rule like that would be deeply mistaken. As the govern-
ment puts it, “Title VII preempts state laws that are incom-
patible with it, and such laws therefore cannot support an
undue-hardship defense.” Brief for United States as Ami-
cus Curiae 11. Even so, the federal government suggests
this case is not worth our time because, “[t]hough the deci-
sion below is no model of clarity,” it did not really say that
an employer has a winning Title VII undue hardship de-
fense whenever accommodating a plaintiff’s religious obli-
gations would require it to violate state law. Id., at 14. But
that is exactly what the Second Circuit said. See App. 10a–
11a (concluding that the employers faced an “undue hard-
ship” for Title VII purposes because accommodating the
plaintiffs “would have required the [employers] to violate
the state [vaccine] regulation”). And any possible room for
doubt about the Second Circuit’s views on the matter is re-
solved by looking to what that court later said in Russo.
Though the federal government does not cite Russo, let

8 DOE v. HOCHUL
G
ORSUCH, J., dissenting
alone grapple with it, the Second Circuit there doubled
down on its mistaken view, concluding once again that ac-
commodating a plaintiff’s religious obligations “would have
caused an undue hardship” to his employer for purposes of
Title VII “because, if granted, the [employer] would have
violated New York law.” 129 F. 4th, at 186. Nor can the
Second Circuit’s rule be dismissed as some outlier, a mis-
take unlikely to be repeated elsewhere, given that various
other circuits have adopted a similar approach. See Bowlin
v. Board of Directors, Judah Christian School, 167 F. 4th
469, 477–478 (CA7 2026); Lowe v. Mills, 68 F. 4th 706, 720–
725 (CA1 2023); United States v. Board of Educ. for School
Dist. of Philadelphia, 911 F. 2d 882, 890–891 (CA3 1990);
Bhatia v. Chevron U. S. A., Inc., 734 F. 2d 1382, 1384 (CA9
1984).
Put simply, addressing this case is well worth our time—
and correcting its error should have been an easy business.
Just months ago, we summarily reversed a similar decision
in which Louisiana courts had held that a state statute
barred a plaintiff’s federal claims. In a short per curiam
without any noted dissent, we explained that “[d]efining the
scope of liability under state law is the State’s prerogative.
But a State has no power to confer immunity from federal
causes of action.” Doe v. Dynamic Physical Therapy, LLC,
607 U. S. 11 (2025). It would have been the simplest thing
to repeat that same message here. Or, if anyone really
thinks the Second Circuit’s rule sufficiently plausible to
warrant it, we could have scheduled this case for argument.
Given the Court’s refusal to follow either of those courses
today, I can only hope that lower courts will more carefully
consider in future cases whether a defendant can success-
fully mount a Title VII undue hardship defense simply by
pointing to a state-law mandate. I hope, too, that one day
soon this Court will choose to settle the question so that
other Americans seeking to vindicate their civil rights do
not suffer the same fate as those now before us.