Castro v. Guevara

1 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Statement of S
OTOMAYOR, J.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
SAMANTHA ESTEFENIA FRANCISCO CASTRO v.
JOSE LEONARDO BRITO GUEVARA
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 25–666. Decided April 20, 2026
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Statement of J
USTICE SOTOMAYOR respecting the denial
of certiorari.
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Interna-
tional Child Abduction was adopted “in response to the
problem of international child abductions during domestic
disputes.” Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U. S. 1, 8 (2010). When one
parent “abducts a child and flees to another country,” the
Convention “generally requires that country to return the
child immediately if the other parent requests return
within one year.” Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U. S. 1,
4 (2014). If, however, the request is filed more than one
year after the abduction, then under the “well-settled de-
fense,” the child may be permitted to remain in the new
country if “‘it is demonstrated that the child is now settled
in [his or her] new environment,’” id., at 5.
This case concerns A. F., a child born in Venezuela to pe-
titioner and respondent. In 2021, when A. F. was three
years old, petitioner took A.F. without respondent’s consent
and left Venezuela for the United States. Respondent im-
mediately sought her return through Venezuelan and U. S.
authorities, but did not file this lawsuit until 2023. The
District Court found that A. F. was well settled in the
United States and should not be returned to Venezuela.
The Fifth Circuit reversed and ordered A. F. to be returned.
Petitioner then sought an emergency stay from this Court
pending disposition of this petition for certiorari, arguing

2 FRANCISCO CASTRO v. BRITO GUEVARA
Statement of S
OTOMAYOR, J.
that a stay was necessary to preserve the status quo to al-
low this Court to review an important issue that has
divided the courts of appeals. The Court denied the appli-
cation in November 2025 over two noted dissents, including
mine. See 607 U. S. ___.
Petitioner now asks this Court to address a narrow ques-
tion: What standard of review should a court of appeals ap-
ply when reviewing a district court’s finding of whether a
child is well settled in a new environment? The Fifth Cir-
cuit held in this case that such findings are primarily legal
in nature, and thus should be reviewed de novo. 155 F. 4th,
at 361–363. As the Fifth Circuit acknowledged, its decision
deepened an entrenched split among the Federal Courts of
Appeals. Id., at 363, n. 40. At least three Circuits agree
with the Fifth Circuit’s position and have applied de novo
review. See Alcala v. Hernandez, 826 F. 3d 161, 171, n. 7
(CA4 2016); In re B. Del C. S. B., 559 F. 3d 999, 1008 (CA9
2009); see also Lomanto v. Agbelusi, 2024 WL 3342415, *2
(CA2, July 9, 2024) (applying de novo review). Two other
Circuits, however, treat these findings as primarily factual,
and thus review them for clear error. See Da Costa v. De
Lima, 94 F. 4th 174, 181 (CA1 2024); Cuenca v. Rojas, 99
F. 4th 1344, 1350 (CA11 2024).
This Circuit split warrants this Court’s attention. When
Congress codified the Hague Convention, it expressly “rec-
ognize[d] . . . the need for uniform international interpreta-
tion of the Convention.” 22 U. S. C. §9001(b)(3)(B). Con-
sistent with this congressional mandate, this Court
regularly grants review in Hague Convention cases to re-
solve Circuit splits. See, e.g., Golan v. Saada, 596 U. S. 666,
676, and n. 6 (2022); Monasky v. Taglieri, 589 U. S. 68, 76
(2020); Lozano, 572 U. S., at 10; Abbott, 560 U. S., at 7.
The Court’s review is also necessary because the decision
below may be erroneous. In Monasky, this Court held that
a District Court’s finding that a child habitually resides in
a country (that is, whether the child is “at home” in that

3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Statement of S
OTOMAYOR, J.
country) is a primarily factual finding that turns on the to-
tality of the circumstances and must be reviewed for clear
error. 589 U. S., at 84. “Clear-error review,” the Court ex-
plained, also “has a particular virtue in Hague Convention
cases” because it “speeds up appeals and thus serves the
Convention’s premium on expedition.” Ibid. Although this
Court has not previously addressed the test for when a child
is settled in a new environment, the lower courts have coa-
lesced around weighing as many as seven nondispositive
factors like the child’s age, the stability and duration of the
child’s residence, the child’s attendance in school, the
child’s friends and family in the area, the child’s immigra-
tion status, and more. 155 F. 4th, at 360–361 (listing seven
factors); accord, Alcala, 826 F. 3d, at 171; Lozano v. Alvarez,
697 F. 3d 41, 57 (CA2 2012), aff ’d on other grounds, 572
U. S. 1; In re B. Del C. S. B., 559 F. 3d, at 1009. This mul-
tifactor test is similar to the totality-of-the-circumstances
test for habitual residence that this Court adopted in
Monasky. See 155 F. 4th, at 369–373 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). Moreover, whether a child is “at home” in one country
is the converse of whether the child has become “well set-
tled” in another country. See In re B. Del C. S. B., 559 F. 3d,
at 1008 (explaining that the two tests are “analogous”). As
a result, Monasky suggests that clear-error review also
should apply to a finding that a child is well settled.
Nevertheless, I concur in the denial of certiorari in this
case because it is not an appropriate vehicle for this Court’s
review. After this Court denied the emergency stay appli-
cation, A. F. returned to Venezuela in January 2026. Even
if this Court were to grant the petition for certiorari now
and rule for petitioner next Term, A. F. likely would not re-
turn to the United States for over a year, if not longer, given
the Court’s typical schedule for deciding cases and the pos-
sible need for further proceedings on remand. By that
point, the well-settled analysis would look very different.
Then, it would not be clear that returning to this country a

4 FRANCISCO CASTRO v. BRITO GUEVARA
Statement of S
OTOMAYOR, J.
year from now would be in A. F.’s best interests. See Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, Mar. 26, 1986, T. I. A. S. No. 11670, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 99–11, p. 7 (placing “paramount importance” on
“the interests of children”). Today, A. F. is eight years old,
and it could greatly disturb her formative years to uproot
her life yet again.
Had the Court granted a stay last fall, it would have pre-
vented all this potential disruption and maintained the pre-
suit status quo because A. F. could have stayed in the
United States pending the disposition of this case. The
Court should have done so: Preserving the presuit status
quo to enable later review by this Court of an issue worthy
of certiorari, after all, is a hallmark reason for this Court to
grant emergency interim relief. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s
Health v. Jackson, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (R
OBERTS, C. J.,
dissenting from denial of application for injunctive relief)
(slip op., at 2) (“I would grant preliminary relief to preserve
the status quo ante”). The Court chose otherwise, and the
predictable consequences have followed. I therefore concur
in the denial of certiorari in light of these changed circum-
stances and the Hague Convention’s central emphasis on
the child’s well-being.