Humphreys v. Emmons

1 Cite as: 607 U.
S. ____ (2025)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
STACEY IAN HUMPHREYS, PETITIONER v.
SHAWN EMMONS, WARDEN
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 24–826. Decided October 14, 2025
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
J
USTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN and
J
USTICE JACKSON join, dissenting from the denial of
certiorari.
In 2007, a Georgia jury convicted Stacey Humphreys of
murder and robbery, and sentenced him to death. It did so
only after one of the jurors, during voir dire, misleadingly
omitted critical details of her own experience as a victim of
a similar crime and then bullied the other jurors into voting
for death based on that prior experience. The extreme juror
misconduct in this case illustrates the harms of an ironclad
no-impeachment rule that prevents consideration of juror
testimony to undermine a death verdict. Because our
review of that question is buried in a procedural thicket
that could be clarified by the Court of Appeals, I would at
the very least vacate and remand for the Eleventh Circuit
to supply the needed clarity on the important issues raised
by this case. I therefore respectfully dissent from the denial
of certiorari.
Humphreys was charged with murdering two women
inside a construction company’s model home, during which
he forced both to undress and robbed them at gun point.
The State of Georgia sought the death penalty. During
voir dire, juror Chancey stated that she had previously been
the victim of an attempted rape and robbery in her home,
by a convicted murderer who had escaped from a mental
institution. She swore under oath, however, that nothing

2 HUMPHREYS v. EMMONS
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
about that prior experience would prevent her from being a
fair juror. She explained that her attacker never physically
harmed her because she had escaped the building before he
entered. She also swore that she would be able to “honestly
consider” all three sentencing options: life with parole, life
without parole, and death. App. to Pet. for Cert. 72a. As
later revealed, these statements directly contradicted what
she told other jurors during deliberations.
During the penalty phase deliberations, she disclosed to
the other jurors that her attacker had in fact assaulted her
while she was naked in her bed. In light of that experience,
the jury foreperson later reported, Chancey “‘had her mind
made up’” from “‘day one’” of trial that Humphreys
“ ‘deserve[d] to die.’” Id., at 71a.
On the second day of deliberations, “even when the other
eleven jurors . . . voted for life without parole” in an internal
poll, “Chancey would not even consider it.” Id., at 71a–72a.
At that point, the foreperson wrote a note to the trial court
explaining that the jurors were “‘unable to come to a
unanimous decision on either death or life imprisonment
without parole as a sentence.’ ” Id., at 9a. Chancey,
believing the note as written would result in a mistrial,
revised the note to say that the jurors were “‘currently
unable to come to a unanimous decision.’” Id., at 9a–10a.
The court instructed the jury to continue deliberating.
Chancey then “snapped.” Humphreys v. Sellers, No.
1:18–cv–02534 (ND Ga., Sept. 19, 2018), ECF Doc. 42–7, p.
443. She yelled, cursed, and screamed that she would “stay
[t]here till forever if ” that is what it took “for [Humphreys]
to get death.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a. She threw the
victims’ photos across the table and demanded, “‘[D]o you
want this to happen to someone you know?’” Ibid. She
reminded the jurors of the similar details of her own attack,
and told them that “‘they had to reach a unanimous
decision or [Humphreys] would be paroled,’” which was not
true under Georgia law. Ibid. She then levied personal

3 Cite as: 607 U.
S. ____ (2025)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
attacks against the jurors and refused to engage in any
debate.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, jury deliberations almost
completely broke down. Screaming could be overheard from
the courtroom. One juror “‘took a swing’” at Chancey and
punched a hole in the wall. Ibid. Jurors were seen crying
on several occasions. A juror later recalled that “it was as
if an evil force took over . . . Chancey.” ECF Doc. 33–12,
p. 13. The foreperson even wrote a note asking to be
removed from the jury because of the “‘hostile nature of one
of the jurors.’” App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a. The court instead
gave an Allen charge and instructed the jury to deliberate
further. See Allen v. United States, 164 U. S. 492 (1896). It
also rejected defense counsel’s renewed motion for a
mistrial. On the third morning of deliberations, the jury
returned a unanimous verdict of death.
The above facts constitute a likely violation of
Humphreys’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.
The problem for Humphreys is that these facts came to light
largely through juror affidavits and juror testimony
obtained after the trial. The Georgia courts held this
evidence inadmissible under Georgia’s no-impeachment
rule, which generally prohibits the use of juror testimony to
impeach a verdict, even in death penalty cases. See App. to
Pet. for Cert. 325a (citing Spencer v. State, 260 Ga. 640, 643,
398 S. E. 2d 179, 184 (1990)). The no-impeachment rule,
however, is not an absolute shield, and in extreme cases it
must give way to constitutional guarantees.
A form of the no-impeachment rule is followed in every
State and in the federal system, and it serves important
purposes. The rule “gives stability and finality to verdicts”
and “promotes full and vigorous discussion by providing
jurors with considerable assurance that after being
discharged they will not be summoned to recount their

4 HUMPHREYS v. EMMONS
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
deliberations.” Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U. S. 206,
218 (2017).
✻
The rule, however, is not without limits. This Court has
long recognized that the rule has exceptions in the “gravest
and most important” cases. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U. S.
264, 268–269 (1915). Indeed, there “may be cases of juror
bias so extreme that, almost by definition, the jury trial
right has been abridged.” Warger v. Shauers, 574 U. S. 40,
51, n. 3 (2014). “If and when such a case arises,” courts
should “consider whether the usual safeguards are or are
not sufficient to protect the integrity of the process.” Ibid.
For example, one such exception to the no-impeachment
rule is in an “egregious cas[e]” in which a “juror makes a
clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial
stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant.”
Pena-Rodriguez, 580 U. S., at 225, 229. In those situations,
“blatant racial prejudice . . . must be confronted . . . despite
the general bar of the no-impeachment rule” because such
prejudice is “antithetical to the functioning of the jury
system.” Id., at 229.
This case illustrates another “extreme” situation in which
the no-impeachment rule likely should have yielded
because the juror’s extreme misconduct threatened
Humphreys’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.
Warger, 574 U. S., at 51, n. 3.
The “usual safeguards” were plainly insufficient “to
protect the integrity of the process.” Ibid. For instance, the
“suitability of an individual for the responsibility of jury
service” is typically “examined during voir dire.” Tanner v.
United States, 483 U. S. 107, 127 (1987). Voir dire,
——————
✻
Pena-Rodriguez involved Colorado’s no-impeachment rule, which
largely tracked the version of the rule set forth in Federal Rule of
Evidence 606(b). See 580 U. S., at 218. Rule 606(b) is analogous in all
relevant respects to Georgia’s no-impeachment rule. See App. to Pet. for
Cert. 36a. In any event, Georgia’s interpretation of its own evidentiary
rules cannot abridge an individual’s federal constitutional rights.

5 Cite as: 607 U.
S. ____ (2025)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
however, cannot meaningfully screen out an individual like
Chancey, who both misleadingly omitted crucial details
about her prior assault when questioned and then
undertook bad-faith tactics in the jury room by leveraging
that experience to coerce her peers. Similarly, jurors’
behavior is normally “observable by the court, by counsel,
and by court personnel” during the trial, and jurors “may
report inappropriate juror behavior to the court before they
render a verdict.” Ibid. Here, the trial court declined to
investigate the possibility of inappropriate behavior despite
hearing screaming and crying from the jurors and receiving
the foreperson’s note reporting the “‘hostile nature of one of
the jurors’” and requesting to be removed from the jury.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a.
Importantly, Chancey’s misconduct appears to have
singlehandedly changed the verdict from life without parole
to death. That places this case squarely among the “gravest
and most important” cases in which the no-impeachment
rule should yield to avoid “‘violating the plainest principles
of justice.’” McDonald, 238 U. S., at 269. Acknowledging
an exception here is essential because there is a heightened
“need for reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case.” Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality
opinion); see California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992, 998–999
(1983) (“The Court . . . has recognized that the qualitative
difference of death from all other punishments requires a
correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital
sentencing determination”). “It is of vital importance to the
defendant and to the community that any decision to
impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on
reason rather than caprice or emotion.” Gardner v. Florida,
430 U. S. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality opinion).
The proper application of the no-impeachment rule to
Humphreys’s underlying juror-misconduct claim, however,
is not directly presented in Humphreys’s petition to this

6 HUMPHREYS v. EMMONS
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Court. That is because, despite learning about Chancey’s
misconduct after the trial, Humphreys’s lawyers failed to
raise a juror-misconduct claim on direct appeal. New post-
conviction counsel eventually raised the claim on state
habeas review. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that
the claim was thus procedurally defaulted and that the
default was not excused by the ineffectiveness of
Humphreys’s appellate counsel on direct appeal. The court
addressed the no-impeachment rule in the context of its
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel analysis by holding that
Humphreys was not prejudiced by his lawyers’ failure to
raise the claim because the underlying evidence was barred
by the rule.
When Humphreys sought review of his juror-misconduct
claim in federal court, his case took a further unexpected
turn. Like the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Eleventh
Circuit rejected the claim as procedurally defaulted. In so
doing, the court seemingly deferred under the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) to the state court’s holding that Humphreys’s
default could not be excused by ineffective assistance of
counsel. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a (suggesting that the
standard of review for the juror-misconduct claim requires
“apply[ing] AEDPA deference on top of Strickland [v.
Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984)] deference”); id., at 74a
(Rosenbaum, J., concurring) (explaining that the panel’s
decision was required by a “faithfu[l] appl[ication of]
AEDPA’s standard of review”).
By its terms, however, AEDPA deference applies only to
a “claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d). AEDPA says nothing
about the cause-and-prejudice inquiry that federal habeas
courts undertake in deciding whether the state prisoner can
“overcome the prohibition on reviewing procedurally
defaulted claims.” Davila v. Davis, 582 U. S. 521, 528
(2017); see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 750 (1991);

7 Cite as: 607 U.
S. ____ (2025)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 90–91 (1977). Nor has
this Court held that AEDPA deference applies when a
federal court considers whether the ineffectiveness of
counsel establishes “cause” to excuse the procedural
default. In fact, most courts of appeals to consider the issue
have found that such deference has no place in the federal
cause-and-prejudice inquiry. See Fischetti v. Johnson, 384
F. 3d 140, 154–155 (CA3 2004); Hall v. Vasbinder, 563 F. 3d
222, 236–237 (CA6 2009); Visciotti v. Martel, 862 F. 3d 749,
769 (CA9 2016); but see Richardson v. Lemke, 745 F. 3d
258, 273 (CA7 2014).
Humphreys seeks review in this Court only on the issue
whether the Eleventh Circuit correctly applied AEDPA
deference to the cause-and-prejudice inquiry, not on the
merits of the underlying juror-misconduct claim. In
response, respondent does not contend that AEDPA
deference should apply. Instead, he points to ambiguities
in the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion and argues that the
Eleventh Circuit never applied AEDPA deference to the
procedural-default question. See Brief in Opposition 13–16.
Under these circumstances, the Court’s reluctance to grant
plenary review is understandable because the decision
below may not be implicated by the question presented.
Nevertheless, the court should vacate and remand and seek
clarification from the Eleventh Circuit about the basis for
its decision.
In a capital case with a potentially meritorious juror-
misconduct claim, mere confusion about a lower court’s
reasoning does not justify closing the door to relief
altogether. Nor is so harsh an outcome necessary here.
Faced with a similarly “unclear” lower court opinion just
last year, this Court remanded a capital case for further
consideration, recognizing that the “ultimate assessment”
of the petition would “depend on the basis for the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision.” Hamm v. Smith, 604 U. S. 1, 2–3 (2024)

8 HUMPHREYS v. EMMONS
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
(per curiam). The Court should have done the same thing
in this case.
Tragically, the Court denies review instead, allowing a
death sentence tainted by a single juror’s extraordinary
misconduct to stand. Because it is at best “unclear”
whether the Eleventh Circuit applied the correct standard
of review in declining to adjudicate Humphreys’s claim on
the merits, I would vacate and remand the case for further
clarification rather than leave Humphreys’s juror-
misconduct claim caught in a web of procedural barriers.
To avoid a similar result in future cases of extreme juror
misconduct, courts considering such claims ab initio should
carefully weigh the aims of the no-impeachment rule
against the constitutional requirement to ensure the
impartiality of a death-empaneled jury. Applying the no-
impeachment rule too reflexively and restrictively risks a
“systemic loss of confidence in jury verdicts, a confidence
that is a central premise of the Sixth Amendment trial
right,” Pena-Rodriguez, 580 U. S., at 225, and that is all the
more imperative when the difference between life and
death is at stake. I respectfully dissent from the denial of
certiorari.