Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D.

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1 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 24A1153
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL. v.
D. V. D.,
ET AL.
ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION
[July 3, 2025]
On April 18, 2025, the District Court for the District of
Massachusetts preliminarily enjoined the Government
from removing “any alien” to a “country not explicitly pro-
vided for on the alien’s order of removal” without following
certain procedures designed to enable the alien to seek re-
lief under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT),
Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100−20, 1465 U. N. T. S.
113. No. 25−cv−10676, ECF Doc. 64, pp. 46−47. The Dis-
trict Court later found that the Government had violated
that injunction by failing to provide six class members a
“meaningful opportunity” to assert CAT claims before such
removal. ECF Doc. 118, p. 1. On May 21, the District Court
issued an “order on remedy,” directing the Government to
follow specified procedures with respect to those individu-
als, tailored to the circumstances. ECF Doc. 119. The Gov-
ernment sought a stay of the April 18 injunction before our
Court.
On June 23, we stayed the April 18 preliminary injunc-
tion pending disposition of any appeal and petition for writ
of certiorari. Later that day, however, the District Court
issued a minute order stating that the May 21 remedial or-
der “remain[ed] in full force and effect,” “notwithstanding”
our stay of the preliminary injunction. ECF Doc. 176. The
only authority it cited was the dissent from the stay order.
The Government has moved for “an order clarifying” our

2 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. D. V. D.
stay. Motion for Clarification. It argues that the stay of the
April 18 preliminary injunction divests the May 21 reme-
dial order of enforceability. Respondents argue that the
District Court correctly understood the May 21 order to re-
main in effect—despite our stay of the preliminary injunc-
tion it purported to enforce—because the May 21 order ef-
fectively operates as a remedy for civil contempt.
The motion for clarification is granted. Our June 23 order
stayed the April 18 preliminary injunction in full. The May
21 remedial order cannot now be used to enforce an injunc-
tion that our stay rendered unenforceable. See Nken v.
Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 428 (2009) (explaining that a review-
ing court’s stay order “divest[s]” the district court “order of
enforceability”). Even if we accepted respondents’ charac-
terization of the May 21 order, such a remedy would serve
to “coerce” the Government into “compliance” and would be
unenforceable given our stay of the underlying injunction.
United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 303 (1947);
see id., at 295 (“The right to remedial relief falls with an
injunction which events prove was erroneously issued and
a fortiori when the injunction or restraining order was be-
yond the jurisdiction of the court.” (citations and footnote
omitted)).
Despite the dissent’s provocative language, see post, at 6
(opinion of S
OTOMAYOR, J.), a claim that a lower court has
failed to give effect to an order of this Court is properly ad-
dressed here. General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 436 U. S. 493,
497 (1978) (per curiam) (“A litigant who . . . has obtained
judgment in this Court after a lengthy process of litigation,
involving several layers of courts, should not be required to
go through that entire process again to obtain execution of
the judgment of this Court.”); see United States v. Fossatt,
21 How. 445, 446 (1859). “Assuming as we do” that the Dis-
trict Court will now conform its order to our previous stay
and cease enforcing the April 18 injunction through the
May 21 remedial order, we have no occasion to reach the

3 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
Government’s other requests for relief. Cf. Deen v. Hick-
man, 358 U. S. 57, 58 (1958) (per curiam). If the Govern-
ment wishes to seek additional relief in aid of the execution
of our mandate, it may do so through mandamus. See In re
Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U. S. 247, 255 (1895) (explain-
ing that any matter “disposed of by” decree of this Court
must be carried “into execution, according to the mandate,”
by the courts below).

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1 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
K
AGAN, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 24A1153
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL. v.
D. V. D.,
ET AL.
ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION
[July 3, 2025]
JUSTICE KAGAN, concurring.
I voted to deny the Government’s previous stay applica-
tion in this case, and I continue to believe that this Court
should not have stayed the District Court’s April 18 order
enjoining the Government from deporting non-citizens to
third countries without notice or a meaningful opportunity
to be heard. See DHS v. D. V. D., 606 U. S. ___, ___–___
(2025) (S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 9–18). But
a majority of this Court saw things differently, and I do not
see how a district court can compel compliance with an or-
der that this Court has stayed. See United States v. Mine
Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 294–295 (1947); Worden v. Searls,
121 U. S. 14, 24–26 (1887). Because continued enforcement
of the District Court’s May 21, 2025 order would do just
that, I vote to grant the Government’s motion for clarifica-
tion.

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1 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 24A1153
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL. v.
D. V. D.,
ET AL.
ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION
[July 3, 2025]
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE JACKSON joins,
dissenting.
The United States may not deport noncitizens to a coun-
try where they are likely to be tortured or killed. Interna-
tional and domestic law guarantee that basic human right.
In this case, the Government seeks to nullify it by deporting
noncitizens to potentially dangerous countries without no-
tice or the opportunity to assert a fear of torture. Because
the Fifth Amendment, immigration law, federal regula-
tions, and this Court’s precedent unambiguously prohibit
such no-notice deportations, see DHS v. D. V. D., 606 U. S.
___, ___–___ (2025) (S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (slip op., at
15–18), a Federal District Court issued a classwide prelim-
inary injunction barring the Government from removing
noncitizens without notice and adequate process.
The Government appealed, and pending its appeal re-
peatedly violated the District Court’s order. See id., at ___–
___ (slip op., at 2–9). Meanwhile, the Government sought
an emergency stay of the injunction from this Court. In its
briefing, the Government took a kitchen-sink approach, ar-
guing that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to grant
classwide injunctive relief, that it also lacked jurisdiction
over individual plaintiffs’ claims under the Due Process
Clause, and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to notice or
a hearing before their removal. Without citing any of these
arguments, or indeed providing any legal justification, this

2 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. D. V. D.
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Court granted the Government its requested stay.
Now, the Government returns for more. At issue in its
latest filing is a month-old remedial order, which the Dis-
trict Court issued after the Government attempted illegally
to deport eight class members to South Sudan. The reme-
dial order required the Government to provide those noncit-
izens, whom it is currently holding in Djibouti, with the pro-
cess to which the Constitution and federal law entitled
them: adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. No.
25–cv–10676 (D Mass., May 21, 2025) ECF Doc. 119. Fol-
lowing this Court’s unreasoned stay of the original prelimi-
nary injunction, the District Court issued a minute order
explaining that its remedial order (which the Government
did not appeal, and whose validity this Court therefore did
not consider) remained in effect. ECF Doc. 176. Rather
than complying with the remedial order, the Government
immediately returned to this Court, purporting to seek
“clarification” of the stay.
What the Government wants to do, concretely, is send the
eight noncitizens it illegally removed from the United
States from Djibouti to South Sudan, where they will be
turned over to the local authorities without regard for the
likelihood that they will face torture or death. Because
“ ‘the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law’
in the context of removal proceedings,” Trump v. J. G. G.,
604 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (per curiam) (slip op., at 3), the
Government’s no-notice removals are undoubtedly illegal,
see D. V. D., 606 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 15–18)
(S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting). In simple terms, the Govern-
ment requests that the Court remove an obstacle to its
achieving those unlawful ends. That obstacle, again, is the
District Court’s remedial order, which it issued to resolve
the Government’s violations of the preliminary injunction
this Court later stayed. The Government now asks this
Court to hold that the stay invalidated the remedial order.
In substance, of course, the Government’s new request for

3 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
relief has nothing to do with clarification, so this Court has
no business considering its merits now. The Court’s Rules
make plain where the Government should have pressed its
argument about the nature and validity of the remedial or-
der: before the lower courts. See this Court’s Rule 23(3)
(“Except in the most extraordinary circumstances, an appli-
cation for a stay will not be entertained unless the relief
requested was first sought in the appropriate court or
courts below”); cf. A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 604 U. S. ___, ___
(2025) (A
LITO, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 3) (emphasizing
need to comply with Rule 23, and criticizing this Court for
granting relief when it was “doubtful” that the applicants’
request to the lower courts had been adequate). The Gov-
ernment undisputedly did not comply with that Rule.
Litigants may alternatively seek an “extraordinary writ,”
such as an injunction, even without complying with Rule
23. See this Court’s Rule 20(1). Yet that relief is available
only if it would “aid . . . the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.”
Ibid. Far from maintaining our jurisdiction, vacating the
District Court’s remedial order risks doing the opposite: de-
stroying jurisdiction over the noncitizens the Government
intends to deport without notice or process. The Govern-
ment thus plainly cannot satisfy Rule 20’s requirements, ei-
ther. Finally, even the majority does not believe that the
Government is entitled to mandamus relief.
Although Members of today’s majority have previously
insisted that “this Court should follow established proce-
dures” when granting emergency relief, A. A. R. P., 604
U. S., at ____ (A
LITO, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 5), the
Court now ignores its Rules to grant the Government its
desired “clarification” immediately. The majority suggests
(relying on an argument the Government did not make)
that a remedy for civil contempt is not enforceable when the

4 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. D. V. D.
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
underlying injunction has been stayed.
1
Ante, at 2. Per-
haps that should be the rule, but the question appears to be
a matter of first impression in this Court. In support of its
view, the majority cites a single line of dictum in United
States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258 (1947), which says
that the right to remedial relief for civil contempt “falls with
an injunction which events prove was erroneously issued.”
Id., at 295. “Preliminary injunctions, however, do not con-
clusively resolve legal disputes,” and neither do temporary
stay orders. See Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U. S. ___, ___ (2025)
(slip op., at 6). Accordingly, this Court’s stay certainly did
not “prove” that the District Court’s injunction was “errone-
ously issued.” Mine Workers, 330 U. S., at 295.
2
Given that the majority can muster no more than a sen-
tence of 80-year-old dictum in support of today’s holding,
the District Court can hardly be faulted for reaching a con-
trary conclusion. The District Court, moreover, had only
moments to decide the question, for (unlike this Court) it
——————
1
To be clear, even the majority today does not dispute that “[v]iolations
of an order are punishable as criminal contempt even though the order
is set aside on appeal, . . . or though the basic action has become moot.”
United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 294 (1947) (citing Worden
v. Searls, 121 U. S. 14 (1887), and Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,
221 U. S. 418 (1911)). Civil contempt orders in turn “may . . . be em-
ployed for either or both of two purposes: to coerce the defendant into
compliance with the court’s order, and to compensate the complainant
for losses sustained.” 330 U. S., at 303–304. The majority appears to
construe the District Court’s order as serving the former purpose. See
ante, at 2.
2
After first adopting the Government’s characterization of its request
as one for “clarification,” see ante, at 1–2, the majority later appears to
justify its premature intervention by treating it as a request for manda-
mus relief, see ante, at 2 (“[A] claim that a lower court has failed to give
effect to an order of this Court is properly addressed here”). Even the
majority, however, does not believe that mandamus relief is warranted.
Its reliance on General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 436 U. S. 493 (1978) explains
why. There, a District Court disobeyed a clear instruction “specifically
addressed” in this Court’s opinion. Id., at 496. Here, this Court did not
see fit to provide the District Court with any instructions.

5 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
realized that the lives and safety of eight noncitizens were
at stake. Any suggestion that the District Court failed to
carry “‘into execution’” this Court’s mandate (which said no
more than that the Government’s application was
“granted”) is patently inappropriate. Cf. ante, at 3. That
the Government accuses the District Court, whose orders it
has consistently ignored, of “unprecedented defiance,” is
more extraordinary still. Motion for Clarification 1. Even
now, the Government seeks to defy this Court’s clear hold-
ings that it must afford noncitizens with due process of law
before removing them.
In the end, the majority ignores the Court’s Rules for
seeking emergency relief and creates new law on civil con-
tempt, all to allow the Government to circumvent the ap-
pellate process with respect to an order it continues to defy.
In so doing, the Court focuses on dictum in Mine Workers at
the cost of discarding that case’s central message: “‘An in-
junction duly issuing out of a court of general jurisdiction
. . . and served upon persons made parties therein . . . must
be obeyed by them however erroneous the action of the
court may be.’” 330 U. S., at 293–294.
For all that, moreover, the majority does not actually
clarify its prior decision. The majority says it expects “that
the District Court will now conform its order to our previous
stay,” ante, at 2, but it refuses to explain what such con-
formity would involve. As a result, today’s order not only
excuses (once again) the Government’s undisguised con-
tempt for the Judiciary; it also leaves the District Court
without any guidance about how this litigation should pro-
ceed. The District Court cannot adjudicate plaintiffs’ seri-
ous due process claims on their merits without ensuring, by
way of injunctive relief, its jurisdiction over the case. Yet
this Court refuses to explain what injunctive relief, if any,
it believes the District Court can issue.
Perhaps the majority hopes that, in light of its content-
less stay order, the District Court will simply give up on

6 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. D. V. D.
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
adjudicating this case. But if this Court wishes to permit
the Government to flout the fundamental rights guaran-
teed by the Due Process Clause, it cannot avoid accounta-
bility for that lawlessness by tasking the lower courts with
inventing a rationale. The Court’s continued refusal to jus-
tify its extraordinary decisions in this case, even as it faults
lower courts for failing properly to divine their import, is
indefensible.
* * *
“In a democracy, power implies responsibility. The
greater the power that defies law the less tolerant can this
Court be of defiance. As the Nation’s ultimate judicial tri-
bunal, this Court, beyond any other organ of society, is the
trustee of law and charged with the duty of securing obedi-
ence to it.” Mine Workers, 330 U. S., at 312 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring in judgment). This Court continues to invert
those principles. Today’s order clarifies only one thing:
Other litigants must follow the rules, but the administra-
tion has the Supreme Court on speed dial. Respectfully,
I dissent.