Harrel v. Raoul

1 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)
Statement of T
HOMAS, J.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
DANE HARREL, ET AL.
23–877 v.
KWAME RAOUL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ILLINOIS,
ET AL.
JAVIER HERRERA
23–878 v.
KWAME RAOUL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ILLINOIS,
ET AL.
CALEB BARNETT,
ET AL.
23–879 v.
KWAME RAOUL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ILLINOIS,
ET AL.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR GUN RIGHTS,
ET AL.
23–880 v.
CITY OF NAPERVILLE, ILLINOIS,
ET AL.
JEREMY W. LANGLEY,
ET AL.
23–944 v.
BRENDAN F. KELLY,
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
DIRECTOR OF THE ILLINOIS STATE POLICE, ET AL.
GUN OWNERS OF AMERICA, INC.,
ET AL.
23–1010 v.
KWAME RAOUL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ILLINOIS,
ET AL.
ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Nos. 23–877, 23–878, 23–879, 23–880, 23–944,

2 HARREL v. RAOUL
Statement of T
HOMAS, J.
and 23–1010. Decided July 2, 2024
The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied. JUSTICE
ALITO would grant the petitions for writs of certiorari.
Statement of J
USTICE THOMAS.
The State of Illinois enacted a law that makes it a felony
to possess what Illinois branded “assault weapons,” a term
defined to include AR–15s. See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720,
§5/24–1.9(a)(1)(J)(ii)(II) (West 2023). “The AR–15 is the
most popular semi-automatic rifle” in America and is there-
fore undeniably “in common use today.” Heller v. District
of Columbia, 670 F. 3d 1244, 1287 (CADC 2011)
(K
AVANAUGH, J., dissenting); see also Garland v. Cargill,
602 U. S. 406, 430–431 (2024) (S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting)
(describing “semiautomatic rifles” such as the AR–15 as
“commonly available”). Petitioners sought a preliminary
injunction against the enforcement of the law, arguing that
the law violates their Second Amendment right to “keep
and bear Arms.” The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit rejected petitioners’ request for a preliminary injunc-
tion, concluding “that the AR–15 . . . is not protected by the
Second Amendment.” Bevis v. Naperville, 85 F. 4th 1175,
1197 (2023). According to the Seventh Circuit, the rifle se-
lected by millions of Americans for self-defense and other
lawful purposes does not even fall within the scope of the
Arms referred to by the Second Amendment. Ibid. This
Court is rightly wary of taking cases in an interlocutory pos-
ture. But, I hope we will consider the important issues pre-
sented by these petitions after the cases reach final judg-
ment.
We have never squarely addressed what types of weapons
are “Arms” protected by the Second Amendment. To be
sure, we explained in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U. S. 570 (2008), that the Second Amendment’s protection
“extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute
bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the

3 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)
Statement of T
HOMAS, J.
time of the founding.” Id., at 582. And, we noted that “the
Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typ-
ically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful pur-
poses,” id., at 625, recognizing “the historical tradition of
prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weap-
ons,” id., at 627 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U. S. 411, 417–419 (2016)
(A
LITO, J., concurring in judgment). But, this minimal
guidance is far from a comprehensive framework for evalu-
ating restrictions on types of weapons, and it leaves open
essential questions such as what makes a weapon “beara-
ble,” “dangerous,” or “unusual.”
The Seventh Circuit’s decision illustrates why this Court
must provide more guidance on which weapons the Second
Amendment covers. By contorting what little guidance our
precedents provide, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the
Second Amendment does not protect “militaristic” weapons.
See 85 F. 4th, at 1199. It then tautologically defined “mili-
taristic” weapons as those “that may be reserved for mili-
tary use.” Id., at 1194. The Seventh Circuit’s contrived
“non-militaristic” limitation on the Arms protected by the
Second Amendment seems unmoored from both text and
history. See Friedman v. Highland Park, 577 U. S. 1039,
1041 (2015) (T
HOMAS, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari). And, even on its own terms, the Seventh Circuit’s ap-
plication of its definition is nonsensical. See 85 F. 4th,
at 1222 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The AR–15 is a civilian,
not military, weapon. No army in the world uses a service
rifle that is only semiautomatic”). In my view, Illinois’ ban
is “highly suspect because it broadly prohibits common sem-
iautomatic firearms used for lawful purposes.” Friedman,
577 U. S., at 1042 (opinion of T
HOMAS, J.). It is difficult to
see how the Seventh Circuit could have concluded that the
most widely owned semiautomatic rifles are not “Arms” pro-
tected by the Second Amendment.
These petitions arise from a preliminary injunction, and

4 HARREL v. RAOUL
Statement of T
HOMAS, J.
the Seventh Circuit stressed that its merits analysis was
merely “a preliminary look at the subject.” 85 F. 4th, at
1197. But, if the Seventh Circuit ultimately allows Illinois
to ban America’s most common civilian rifle, we can—and
should—review that decision once the cases reach a final
judgment. The Court must not permit “the Seventh Circuit
[to] relegat[e] the Second Amendment to a second-class
right.” Friedman, 577 U. S., at 1043 (opinion of T
HOMAS,
J.).