Robinson v. Callais

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1 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)
J
ACKSON, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 23A994
PRESS ROBINSON, ET AL. v. PHILLIP CALLAIS, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
No. 23A1002
NANCY LANDRY, SECRETARY OF STATE OF
LOUISIANA,
ET AL. v. PHILLIP CALLAIS, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
[May 15, 2024]
The applications for stay presented to JUSTICE ALITO
and by him referred to the Court are granted. See Purcell
v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1 (2006). The April 30, 2024 order of
the United States District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana, case No. 3:24–cv–00122, is stayed pending the
timely docketing of the appeal in this Court. Should the
jurisdictional statement be timely filed, this order shall re-
main in effect pending this Court’s action on the appeal. If
the appeal is dismissed, or the judgment affirmed, this or-
der shall terminate automatically. In the event jurisdiction
is noted or postponed, this order will remain in effect pend-
ing the sending down of the judgment of this Court.
J
USTICE SOTOMAYOR and JUSTICE KAGAN would deny the
applications for stay.
J
USTICE JACKSON, dissenting from grant of applications
for stay.
These emergency applications arise from a complex series
of cases about what district lines Louisiana voters should
use to select their Congressional Representatives. Over

2 ROBINSON v. CALLAIS
JACKSON, J., dissenting
more than two years of litigation, separate groups of voters
have challenged Louisiana’s congressional maps, first for
violating §2 of the Voting Rights Act and now for violating
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. The Loui-
siana Legislature, two Governors, civil rights organiza-
tions, voters, and jurists at every level of our federal system
have weighed in on these challenges. That careful scrutiny
is fitting: The question of how to elect representatives con-
sistent with our shared commitment to racial equality is
among the most consequential we face as a democracy.
The question before us today, though, is far more quotid-
ian: When does Louisiana need a new map for the Novem-
ber 2024 election? Redistricting raises unique and unusual
timeliness concerns, with important deadlines weeks and
even months before an election. The three-judge District
Court in this action, after holding a full merits trial and
finding the current map unconstitutional, scheduled the
imposition of a remedial map for no later than June 4. In
doing so, it rejected the State’s argument that the real dead-
line for settling on a map is May 15. The State now renews
those arguments before us, asserting that waiting any
longer will result in irreparable harm, namely, “election
chaos.” Emergency Application in No. 23A1002, p. 19. The
Court appears to credit the State’s arguments, relying on
the so-called Purcell principle that courts making changes
to election procedures close to an election must consider the
possibility of “voter confusion.” Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549
U. S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (per curiam).
In my view, Purcell has no role to play here. There is
little risk of voter confusion from a new map being imposed
this far out from the November election. In fact, we have
often denied stays of redistricting orders issued as close or
closer to an election. See Merrill v. Milligan, 595 U. S. ___,
___–___ (2022) (K
AGAN, J., dissenting from grant of appli-
cations for stays) (slip op., at 10–11) (collecting cases). Of
course, administrative difficulties may occur if a new map

3 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)
J
ACKSON, J., dissenting
is imposed late in an election cycle. But, as the Fifth Circuit
noted in rejecting similar Purcell arguments by the State in
advance of the 2022 election, “‘[ i]f time presses too seri-
ously, the District Court has the power appropriately to ex-
tend’ . . . deadline[s] and other ‘time limitations imposed by
state law.’” Robinson v. Ardoin, 37 F. 4th 208, 230 (2022)
(per curiam) (quoting Sixty-seventh Minnesota State Senate
v. Beens, 406 U. S. 187, 201, n. 11 (1972) (per curiam)).
Rather than wading in now, I would have let the District
Court’s remedial process run its course before considering
whether our emergency intervention was warranted.*
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
——————
*In a separate application, intervenors from the earlier Voting Rights
Act litigation allege that they will face irreparable harm if subjected to
another election under a map that likely violates §2. See Emergency
Application in No. 23A994, p. 40. That harm is serious, but it was, at the
time of these emergency filings, highly contingent. The District Court
has not yet selected a remedial map, and, were it not for this Court’s
intervention, it may have selected a map that complies with both §2 and
the Equal Protection Clause. I would have waited until after the reme-
dial process concluded (when it would have been clearer if the interve-
nors’ faced irreparable harm) to consider their arguments.