Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe

1
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
CISCO SYSTEMS, INC., ET AL. v. DOE ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 24–856. Argued April 28, 2026—Decided June 23, 2026
Plaintiffs contend that the Chinese Government persecuted them be-
cause of their religious beliefs, and that Cisco Systems, Inc. enabled
that persecution by developing surveillance technology that allowed
China to identify and apprehend them. Plaintiffs allege that Cisco and
its executives are liable for aiding and abetting violations of interna-
tional law, citing the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). One plaintiff also seeks
to hold two Cisco executives liable for aiding and abetting violations of
the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA).
The ATS grants federal district courts jurisdiction over “any civil ac-
tion by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §1350. The ATS
lay mostly dormant for two centuries after its enactment. In the last
few decades, however, litigants have urged courts to allow private
rights of action under the ATS for various alleged human rights
abuses. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692, this Court held
that “the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of ac-
tion.” Id., at 724. At the same time—and in considerable tension with
that point—the Court said that the ATS allows for the possibility of
new, judicially created causes of action to enforce norms of interna-
tional law. Id., at 724–725. Though Sosa did not “close the door” on
judicially created rights of action under the ATS, Sosa emphasized the
narrowness of its view and underscored the need for “vigilant door-
keeping.” Id., at 729. Sosa proposed a two-step framework for creating
those causes of action: First, a plaintiff must show that the norm has
a “definite content and acceptance among civilized nations,” id., at 732;
second, a plaintiff must show that it would be prudent for the court to
create the proposed cause of action when the political branches have
not acted, id., at 726, 736, n. 27. Since Sosa, the Court has never

2 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE
Syllabus
created an ATS right of action.
In this case, the District Court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint, but
the Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part. The Ninth Circuit focused
on whether aiding-and-abetting liability may be imposed under the
ATS. 73 F. 4th 700, 716. At Sosa’s first step, the Ninth Circuit found
that “aiding and abetting liability is sufficiently definite and universal
to be a viable form of liability under the ATS.” 73 F.4th, at 718. At
the second step, it concluded that neither “foreign relations concerns”
nor “deference to Congress” supplied a “prudential reason to decline to
recognize aiding or abetting liability.” Id., at 720. The Ninth Circuit
also held that the TVPA “encompasses claims against those who aid
and abet torture.” Id., at 744. The Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether Cisco may be held liable for aiding and abetting offenses
under the ATS, and whether two of its executives may be held liable
under the TVPA for aiding and abetting torture.
Held:
1. Courts may not create new causes of action for violations of inter-
national norms under the ATS. Pp. 7–12.
Two points drive the Court’s decision. First, judicial authority under
Sosa’s second step was “narrow at the outset.” Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe,
593 U. S. 628, 636 (opinion of T
HOMAS, J.). Sosa instructed federal
courts to exercise “great caution in adapting the law of nations to pri-
vate rights,” 542 U. S., at 728, and to assess the “practical conse-
quences” of creating new liability under the ATS, including the “risks
of adverse foreign policy consequences.” Id., at 728, 732–733. Because
ATS cases by their nature implicate foreign policy, it is difficult to
think of a case in which a court “might safely conclude” that a new ATS
cause of action would not have detrimental foreign policy conse-
quences. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U. S. 241, 284 (2018)
(G
ORSUCH, J., concurring). Second, the power to create causes of action
belongs to Congress. See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U. S., at 727; Nestlé, 593 U. S.,
at 634–635 (opinion of T
HOMAS, J.). The Court has “rejected the prac-
tice of fashioning rights of action as [it] see[s] fit,” FS Credit Opportu-
nities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd., 608 U. S. ___, ___–___
(slip op., at 3–4). Congress is better positioned than courts to evaluate
the policy tradeoffs of creating liability. This is especially true in an
area like this one, where the Constitution expressly delegates author-
ity to Congress to “define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of
Nations.” Art. I, §8, cl. 10. For that reason, creating any cause of ac-
tion “is an extraordinary act that places great stress on the separation
of powers.” Nestlé, 593 U. S., at 636 (opinion of T
HOMAS, J.).
Because of these concerns, Sosa consciously designed a test that
would be extremely difficult to meet. But what Sosa made difficult,
subsequent legal developments have made impossible. Since Sosa was

3 Cite as: 609 U. S. ___ (2026)
Syllabus
decided, the Court has firmly committed to the view that judicially cre-
ated causes of action offend the separation of powers in almost every
circumstance. Recent cases emphasize that “‘[i]f there are sound rea-
sons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a dam-
ages remedy, the courts must refrain from creating it.’” Egbert v.
Boule, 596 U. S. 482, 491 (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U. S. 120, 137;
alterations omitted). In the ATS context, there will always be at least
a “single sound reason” to conclude that Congress might not want the
judiciary to take the lead. Sosa itself identified one applicable in every
case: “the possible collateral consequences of making international
rules privately actionable.” 542 U. S., at 727. And Congress has cre-
ated an “alternative remedial structure”—the TVPA—which precludes
the creation of a cause of action. Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 137.
The Court therefore will not continue to “indulge the fiction” that
creating new ATS causes of action is sometimes appropriate. Edwards
v. Vannoy, 593 U. S. 255, 274. Correcting Sosa’s unfulfilled prediction
will not upset reliance interests and will promote stability. Sosa was
overly optimistic in its prediction that there might be a narrow class of
cases in which courts may create ATS actions without infringing on
the prerogatives of the political branches. In truth, this class is a null
set. And because courts cannot create new rights of action to remedy
violations of international law, there is necessarily no liability for aid-
ing and abetting such violations.
2. The TVPA, which contains an express cause of action against
someone who “subjects” another to torture, does not provide for aiding-
and-abetting liability. Pp. 12–14.
In Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N. A., 511 U. S. 164, the Court held that §10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 does not create civil aiding-and-abetting liability
because the statute does not mention “aiding and abetting,” differenti-
ating §10(b) from other civil statutes in which Congress expressly pro-
vided for that specialized form of liability. Id., at 175−177, 182−183.
The TVPA similarly nowhere mentions aiding-and-abetting liability,
and that silence is enough to settle the issue.
Plaintiffs argue that “subjects” in the TVPA is broad enough to in-
clude aiding-and-abetting liability, but it is not. To “subject” another
to torture means “to cause to undergo or submit to,” Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary 2275, signaling a causal connection be-
tween torturer and victim. Aiding-and-abetting liability, by contrast,
encompasses many forms of assistance provided by those who are one
(or more) steps removed from the torturer. See Twitter, Inc. v.
Taamneh, 598 U. S. 471, 497. Central Bank rejected a similar argu-
ment that the phrase “‘directly or indirectly’” authorized aiding-and-
abetting liability, explaining that “aiding and abetting liability

4 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE
Syllabus
extends beyond persons who engage, even indirectly, in a proscribed
activity.” 511 U. S., at 175−176. The same analysis applies here: Aid-
ing-and-abetting liability sweeps more broadly than the language Con-
gress chose.
73 F. 4th 700, reversed and remanded.
B
ARRETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.
J
ACKSON, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part,
in which K
AGAN, J., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined as to Parts I–III and V.

_________________
_________________
1 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 24–856
CISCO SYSTEMS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
DOE I,
ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[June 23, 2026]
JUSTICE BARRETT delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Alien Tort Statute grants federal courts jurisdiction
to hear cases involving violations of the law of nations.
While conceding that the ATS is “strictly jurisdictional,” we
have also said that courts have narrow authority to create
causes of action under it. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U. S. 692, 713, 724–725 (2004). These positions are in ob-
vious tension with one another. More significantly, how-
ever, asserting such authority would intrude on both Con-
gress’s prerogative to provide rights of action and the power
of the political branches to direct the Nation’s foreign pol-
icy. It is therefore unsurprising that this Court has never
created an ATS action. The authority to do so, always de-
scribed as slight, is more accurately described as nonexist-
ent.
Today, we close the door that Sosa cracked and hold that
courts may not create new causes of action for violations of
international norms. We also hold that the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991, which contains an express cause of
action, does not provide for aiding-and-abetting liability.

2 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE
Opinion of the Court
I
A
In the early days of our Nation, two incidents involving
foreign diplomats “caused substantial foreign-relations
problems.” Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U. S. 241, 253
(2018). The French Minister Plenipotentiary complained to
the Continental Congress and threatened to leave the coun-
try after the Secretary of the French Legation was as-
saulted in Philadelphia. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro-
leum Co., 569 U. S. 108, 120 (2013). And a New York
constable caused an “international incident” a few years
later when he entered the house of the Dutch Ambassador
to arrest one of his servants. Jesner, 584 U. S., at 253.
At the time, the Articles of Confederation did not provide
a federal forum to redress injuries like these. True, the
wronged foreign officials could resort to state court. But
Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay cautioned that “the
Federal Government does not appear . . . to be vested with
any judicial powers competent to the cognizance and judg-
ment of such cases.” 3 Dept. of State, The Diplomatic Cor-
respondence of the United States of America 446 (1837).
Other leading figures were similarly troubled that the Ar-
ticles failed to “provi[de] for the case of offenses against the
law of nations” and “consequently le[ft] it in the power of
any indiscreet member to embroil the Confederacy with for-
eign nations.” The Federalist No. 42, p. 265 (C. Rossiter ed.
1961) (J. Madison).
The new Constitution equipped the Federal Government
to deal with this problem. Article III extends the judicial
power to “all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
ministers and Consuls,” and “to Controversies . . . between
a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens
or Subjects.” §2. The First Congress implemented these
provisions through the Judiciary Act of 1789, which estab-
lished lower federal courts and granted them jurisdiction to
hear suits implicating foreign affairs. See, e.g., §9, 1

3 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
Stat. 77 (admiralty and maritime jurisdiction); ibid. (juris-
diction over “suits against consuls or vice-consuls”); §11, id.,
at 78 (jurisdiction over suits where “an alien is a party”).
The Act also included what is now known as the Alien Tort
Statute. §9, id., at 77. The ATS grants federal district
courts jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §1350.
The ATS lay mostly dormant after its enactment. Liti-
gants only occasionally invoked its jurisdictional grant. See
Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (No. 1,607) (SC 1795) (sei-
zure of slaves from a captured ship); Moxon v. The Fanny,
17 F. Cas. 942 (No. 9,895) (Pa. 1793) (seizure of a brig and
cargo by French privateers). And in time, another statute
authorized federal courts to hear claims arising under trea-
ties. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, §1, 18 Stat. 470, as amended,
28 U. S. C. §1331. So for almost 200 years, the ATS did vir-
tually no work.
That changed in 1980. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F. 2d 876, the Second Circuit permitted an ATS suit by for-
eign plaintiffs against a foreign offender for engaging in tor-
ture in violation of international law. The court identified
no express cause of action; instead, it held that the ATS
“open[s] the federal courts for adjudication of the rights al-
ready recognized by international law.” Id., at 887. Taking
note, other plaintiffs urged courts to allow private rights of
action under the ATS for various alleged human rights
abuses. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F. 2d 774 (CADC 1984) (per curiam); Kadic v. Karadžić, 70
F. 3d 232 (CA2 1995); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc.,
197 F. 3d 161 (CA5 1999); In re Estate of Marcos, Human
Rights Litigation, 25 F. 3d 1467 (CA9 1994); Abebe-Jira v.
Negewo, 72 F. 3d 844 (CA11 1996).
While the Courts of Appeals wrestled with novel ATS
suits, Congress enacted a related cause of action. The Tor-
ture Victim Protection Act of 1991 allows certain victims

4 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE
Opinion of the Court
who are tortured or killed to recover damages against the
perpetrators. 106 Stat. 73, note following 28 U. S. C. §1350.
But because many human rights abuses fall outside the
TVPA, plaintiffs continued pressing courts to fashion rights
of action under the ATS.
Over a decade later, this Court interpreted the ATS for
the first time. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, we held that the
ATS does not permit a court to create a cause of action for
arbitrary detention in violation of international law. 542
U. S., at 699, 736–738. In so holding, we stressed that “the
ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of ac-
tion.” Id., at 724. At the same time—and in considerable
tension with the first point—we said that the ATS allows
for the possibility of new, judicially created causes of action
to enforce norms of international law. Id., at 724–725.
To justify this conclusion, Sosa reasoned that the First
Congress would not have expected the ATS to “l[ie] fallow”
until Congress or state legislatures enacted causes of action
for violations of the law of nations. Id., at 719. Law-of-
nations offenses formed part of “the ambient law of the era,”
and some “were understood to be within the common law.”
Id., at 714, 720. William Blackstone’s legal treatise dis-
cussed three: “violation of safe conducts, infringement of
the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.” Id., at 715 (citing 4
Commentaries on the Laws of England 68 (1769)). Given
this history, Sosa “assume[d] that the First Congress un-
derstood that the district courts would recognize private
causes of action for certain torts in violation of the law of
nations.” 542 U. S., at 724. But Sosa “found no basis to
suspect Congress had any examples in mind beyond those
torts corresponding to Blackstone’s three primary offenses.”
Ibid. And it acknowledged that when the ATS was enacted,
no one would have understood the statute as a grant of au-
thority to create causes of action. Id., at 725–726. None-
theless, Sosa asserted that courts have very modest

5 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
authority to create causes of action under the ATS for vio-
lations of international norms. Id., at 724–725.
Recognizing the tension between this interpretation of
the ATS and the limits of the judicial role, Sosa emphasized
the narrowness of its view. Though it did not “close the
door” to “independent judicial recognition of actionable in-
ternational norms,” it underscored the need for “vigilant
doorkeeping.” Id., at 729. To that end, Sosa proposed a
two-step framework. First, a plaintiff must show that the
norm has a “definite content and acceptance among civi-
lized nations.” Id., at 732. (This was an effort to head off
judicial creativity with respect to the norms themselves.)
Second, a plaintiff must show that it would be prudent for
the court to create the proposed cause of action when the
political branches have not acted. Id., at 726, 736, n. 27;
Jesner, 584 U. S., at 257–258 (plurality opinion). (This was
a warning that courts must tread lightly, because creating
rights of action is Congress’s prerogative, and foreign policy
is the political branches’ domain.) In Sosa, the plaintiff’s
claim failed at the first step, so the Court had no occasion
to proceed to the second. 542 U. S., at 736–738.
Since Sosa, we have repeatedly turned away plaintiffs as-
serting claims under the ATS. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Pe-
troleum Co., we held that any ATS claims are subject to the
presumption against extraterritoriality; thus, those “seek-
ing relief for violations of the law of nations occurring out-
side the United States” are “barred.” 569 U. S., at 124. We
reiterated that point in Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, holding that
“allegations of general corporate activity . . . cannot alone
establish domestic application of the ATS.” 593 U. S. 628,
634 (2021). And in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, we refused
to impose ATS liability on foreign corporations. 584 U. S.,
at 272.

6 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE
Opinion of the Court
B
Plaintiffs in today’s case are practitioners of Falun Gong,
a religious movement that originated in China in the 1990s.
They contend that the Chinese Government persecuted
them because of their religious beliefs, and that Cisco Sys-
tems, Inc. enabled that persecution by developing surveil-
lance technology that allowed China to identify and appre-
hend them. By engaging in this conduct, plaintiffs say,
Cisco and its executives aided and abetted violations of in-
ternational law—namely, torture; cruel, inhuman, or de-
grading treatment; forced labor; prolonged and arbitrary
detention; crimes against humanity; extrajudicial killing;
and forced disappearance. One plaintiff also seeks to hold
two Cisco executives liable under the TVPA for aiding and
abetting torture.
After the District Court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint,
66 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1247 (ND Cal. 2014), the Ninth Circuit
reversed in relevant part, 73 F. 4th 700, 746 (2023). It did
not decide whether the underlying violations of interna-
tional law satisfied Sosa’s test. 73 F. 4th, at 716. Instead,
it analyzed only whether aiding-and-abetting liability may
be imposed under the ATS. Ibid. At Sosa’s first step, the
Ninth Circuit found that “aiding and abetting liability is
sufficiently definite and universal to be a viable form of lia-
bility under the ATS.” 73 F. 4th, at 718. And at the second
step, it concluded that neither “foreign relations concerns”
nor “deference to Congress” supplied a “prudential reason
to decline to recognize aiding or abetting liability.” Id., at
720. The Ninth Circuit also held that the TVPA “encom-
passes claims against those who aid and abet torture or ex-
trajudicial killing.” Id., at 744.
Judge Christen dissented in part. She saw “several
sound reasons to decline to recognize a cause of action for
aiding and abetting” the alleged acts. Id., at 748. Notably,
she reasoned that “a finding of liability in this case would
necessarily require a showing that the Chinese Communist

7 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
Party and Ministry of Public Security violated international
law.” Ibid. And such a finding “could have serious ramifi-
cations” for U. S.-China relations, “fraught as they already
are.” Id., at 749. Permitting aiding-and-abetting liability
under the ATS is thus “inconsistent with [the court’s] obli-
gation to exercise ‘great caution in adapting the law of na-
tions to private rights.’” Id., at 751 (quoting Sosa, 542
U. S., at 728).
Six judges dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc.
They reasoned that ATS liability should be restricted “to
causes of action comparable to historically recognized
torts.” 113 F. 4th 1230, 1237 (CA9 2024) (opinion of Buma-
tay, J.). That is so because creating any additional liability
under the ATS violates the separation of powers. Id., at
1245–1247. And the dissenting judges would exercise
greater caution before “intrud[ing] in the delicate relations
with another world superpower.” Id., at 1237, 1247–1248.
We granted certiorari to determine whether Cisco may be
held liable for aiding and abetting offenses under the ATS,
as well as whether two of its executives may be held liable
under the TVPA for aiding and abetting torture. 607 U. S.
1120 (2026).
II
Our starting point is Sosa’s key insight: The ATS “is a
jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action.” 542
U. S., at 724. Put differently, “[a]s enacted in 1789, the ATS
gave the district courts ‘cognizance’ of certain causes of ac-
tion,” which “bespoke a grant of jurisdiction, not power to
mold substantive law.” Id., at 713.
Justice Scalia would have stopped there. Id., at 743–744
(opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
He cited “[t]he general rule” that “‘grants of jurisdiction
alone . . . are not themselves grants of lawmaking author-
ity’” and noted that Sosa had not identified any reason why
the ATS is an exception. Ibid. He then observed that Sosa’s

8 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE
Opinion of the Court
“reasons why courts must be circumspect” in developing law
under the ATS are actually “reasons why courts cannot pos-
sibly be thought to have been given” this power in the first
place. Id., at 747.
These criticisms resonated, and since then, various Mem-
bers of the Court have thoughtfully explained the problems
with Sosa’s openness—no matter how limited—to judicially
created causes of action under the ATS. See Jesner, 584
U. S., at 274 (T
HOMAS, J., concurring); id., at 280–293
(G
ORSUCH, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment); Nestlé, 593 U. S., at 634–640 (opinion of T
HOMAS, J.,
joined by G
ORSUCH and KAVANAUGH, JJ.); see also id.,
at 658 (A
LITO, J., dissenting) (noting the “strong arguments
that federal courts should never recognize new claims un-
der the ATS”). These opinions highlight the great difficulty
of satisfying Sosa’s second step under our modern separa-
tion-of-powers precedent.
Two points drive our decision today. First, judicial au-
thority under Sosa’s second step was “narrow at the outset.”
Nestlé, 593 U. S., at 636 (opinion of T
HOMAS, J.). Indeed,
Sosa instructed federal courts to exercise “great caution in
adapting the law of nations to private rights.” 542 U. S.,
at 728. Before doing so, courts must assess the “practical
consequences” of creating new liability under the ATS, in-
cluding the “risks of adverse foreign policy consequences.”
Id., at 728, 732–733.
But ATS cases by their nature implicate foreign policy.
As we have explained, “the danger of unwarranted judicial
interference in the conduct of foreign policy is magnified in
th[is] context.” Kiobel, 569 U. S., at 116. After all, the
“point of [a new ATS cause of action is] to vindicate ‘a norm
of international character.’” Jesner, 584 U. S., at 284
(G
ORSUCH, J., concurring) (quoting Sosa, 542 U. S., at 725).
It is thus difficult to think of a case in which a court “might
safely conclude” that a new ATS cause of action would not
have detrimental foreign policy consequences. Jesner, 584

9 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
U. S., at 284 (GORSUCH, J., concurring). Even suits against
American defendants (like this one against Cisco) generally
require a court to examine allegations of heinous acts com-
mitted by foreign nations or individuals.
1
The second point is that the power to create causes of ac-
tion belongs to Congress. See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U. S., at 727;
Nestlé, 593 U. S., at 634–635 (opinion of T
HOMAS, J.). For
this reason, Sosa cautioned that the “decision to create a
private right of action is one better left to legislative judg-
ment in the great majority of cases.” 542 U. S., at 727.
This understates the point. While our cases at one time
permitted courts to provide redress if Congress remained
silent, see, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 433
(1964), “we have since rejected the practice of fashioning
rights of action as we see fit,” FS Credit Opportunities Corp.
v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd., 608 U. S. ___, ___–___
(2026) (slip op., at 3–4). That is so because “[h]ome-grown
causes of action are difficult to reconcile with ‘the Constitu-
tion’s separation of legislative and judicial power.’” Id., at
___ (slip op., at 4) (quoting Egbert v. Boule, 596 U. S. 482,
491 (2022)); see also Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U. S. 120, 133
(2017). Congress is better positioned than courts to evalu-
ate the policy tradeoffs of creating liability. See Nestlé, 593
U. S., at 638–639 (opinion of T
HOMAS, J.). This is especially
true in an area like this one, where the Constitution ex-
pressly delegates authority to Congress. Art. I, §8, cl. 10
(Congress may “define and punish . . . Offences against the
Law of Nations”). For that reason, creating any cause of
action “is an extraordinary act that places great stress on
——————
1
The dissent is confident about the ability of federal courts to “improve
foreign relations” and make judgments that are “‘consonant with U. S.
foreign policy interests.’” Post, at 16 (opinion of S
OTOMAYOR, J.). The
Constitution’s allocation of power, however, requires greater judicial hu-
mility.

10 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE
Opinion of the Court
the separation of powers.” Nestlé, 593 U. S., at 636 (opinion
of T
HOMAS, J.).
Sosa acknowledged both these points: that crafting new
causes of action under the ATS “raise[s] risks of adverse
foreign policy consequences,” 542 U. S., at 728, and intrudes
on Congress’s prerogative to create private rights of action,
id., at 727. Because of these concerns, it consciously de-
signed a test that would be extremely difficult to meet. But
what Sosa made difficult, subsequent legal developments
have made impossible.
Since Sosa was decided, we have firmly committed to the
view that judicially created causes of action offend the sep-
aration of powers in almost every circumstance. As a re-
sult, we have virtually eliminated the practice of fashioning
them. Our cases have emphasized that “ ‘[i]f there are
sound reasons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy
or necessity of a damages remedy, the courts must refrain
from creating it.’” Egbert, 596 U. S., at 491 (quoting Ziglar,
582 U. S., at 137; alterations omitted); Jesner, 584 U. S., at
264 (quoting this language). Indeed, “‘[e]ven a single sound
reason to defer to Congress is enough.’” Egbert, 596 U. S.,
at 491 (quoting Nestlé, 593 U. S., at 635 (opinion of
T
HOMAS, J.); emphasis added). In the ATS context, there
will always be at least a “single sound reason” to conclude
that Congress might not want the judiciary to take the lead.
Sosa itself identified one applicable in every case: “the pos-
sible collateral consequences of making international rules
privately actionable.” 542 U. S., at 727. For Sosa, this was
reason “for judicial caution.” Ibid. Under our current prec-
edent, it is reason not to proceed at all. Cf. Kimble v. Marvel
Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 458 (2015) (“‘growth of
judicial doctrine’” is a relevant consideration when recon-
sidering a prior case).
Though one is enough, there is another “sound reason”
staying the judiciary’s hand. Our post-Sosa cases have
stressed that if Congress has created “an alternative

11 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
remedial structure,” then “that alone” precludes the crea-
tion of a cause of action. Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 137 (emphasis
added); see also Egbert, 596 U. S., at 493. Such a structure
exists here: the TVPA, which creates an express cause of
action under the ATS. Sosa acknowledged that Congress
had limited the TVPA “to specific subject matter” and had
taken no subsequent action to expand the covered conduct.
542 U. S., at 728. Again, for Sosa, this was reason to slow
down, ibid.; under our current precedent, it is reason to
stop.
Beyond changes in the law, it is hard to see how correct-
ing Sosa’s unfulfilled prediction would upset reliance inter-
ests. Any such interests would belong to future plaintiffs—
who surely are not relying on the remote possibility that
U. S. courts would create an ATS action if they were some-
day injured and sought one. As for stability, today’s deci-
sion promotes rather than undermines it. We have never—
not once—created an ATS cause of action. Cf. Edwards v.
Vannoy, 593 U. S. 255, 274 (2021) (“No one can reasonably
rely on a supposed exception that has never operated in
practice”). And given the “high bar” that Sosa set, 542
U. S., at 727, it is a stretch to believe that we ever would
have. We thus see no need to “indulge the fiction” that cre-
ating new ATS causes of action is sometimes appropriate.
Edwards, 593 U. S., at 274. Doing so would “mislea[d] liti-
gants” by suggesting that recovery might be available while
“needlessly expend[ing] . . . scarce [judicial] resources.” Id.,
at 275.
2
——————
2
While few plaintiffs have successfully litigated ATS suits to final
judgment, many more have sued and obtained large settlements. See
C. Ewell, O. Hathaway, & E. Nohle, Has the Alien Tort Statute Made a
Difference?: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative Assessment, 107
Cornell L. Rev. 1205, 1251–1252, 1278 (2022) (discussing ATS settle-
ments, some of which resulted in “multimillion-dollar payments to plain-
tiffs”). Shutting off the possibility of additional ATS liability thus also
provides clarity to defendants.

12 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE
Opinion of the Court
In sum, we close the door that Sosa cracked to judicially
created ATS liability. We do not disturb Sosa’s holding that
the ATS is a jurisdictional statute; nor do we revisit its as-
sumption that causes of action are available for torts corre-
sponding to the Blackstone three.
3
We conclude only that
Sosa was overly optimistic in its prediction that there might
be a narrow class of cases in which courts may create ATS
actions without infringing on the prerogatives of the politi-
cal branches. In truth, this class is a null set.
What result for this case? Cisco argues that the Ninth
Circuit erred in holding that aiding-and-abetting liability
exists under the ATS for the torts alleged by the plaintiffs.
Cisco is correct. Courts cannot create new rights of action
to remedy violations of international law, so there is neces-
sarily no liability for aiding and abetting such violations.
Plaintiffs’ ATS claims against Cisco must be dismissed.
III
One of the plaintiffs also sued two Cisco executives under
the TVPA for aiding and abetting torture. Recall that the
TVPA provides a cause of action against someone who
——————
3
The dissent recruits the Blackstone three as support for judicial
power to create ATS actions. If the Blackstone three, the dissent asks,
then why not more? Post, at 12. The Blackstone three do not give the
dissent what it is looking for, because Sosa did not invoke them as evi-
dence that the ATS originally granted courts the authority to create
causes of action. Under the prevailing jurisprudence of the time, Sosa
said, such torts were understood to be “found or discovered” by courts
rather than “made or created.” 542 U. S., at 725. Offering examples,
Sosa stated that offenses against ambassadors “appea[r] to have been”
at top of mind, violations of safe conduct “were probably understood to
be actionable,” and “individual actions arising out of prize captures and
piracy may well have also been contemplated.” Id., at 720. Those are
the only ATS actions this Court has ever specifically mentioned, and to
the extent there has been reliance on the availability of those three ac-
tions, we see no need to revisit them. But while we say “this far and no
further,” the dissent would go very far indeed. In the name of honoring
the expectations of the First Congress, it would leverage the Blackstone
three to justify power that would have confounded the First Congress.

13 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
“subjects” another to torture. 106 Stat. 73, note following
28 U. S. C. §1350.
In Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164 (1994), we held that §10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not create civil
aiding-and-abetting liability. Our analysis was straightfor-
ward: Section 10(b) “‘does not in terms mention aiding and
abetting.’” Id., at 175. That fact differentiates it from other
civil statutes in which Congress expressly provided for that
specialized form of liability. Id., at 176−177, 182−183 (col-
lecting statutes). Because Congress “‘ha[s] little trouble’”
imposing aiding-and-abetting liability “‘expressly,’” its
omission of the phrase in §10(b) was dispositive. Id., at 177
(quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S.
723, 734 (1975)).
Just so here. The TVPA nowhere mentions aiding-and-
abetting liability, and that silence is enough to settle the
issue. As then-Judge Kavanaugh put it, Central Bank
makes it “crystal clear” that no aiding-and-abetting liability
exists under the TVPA because Congress has not expressly
provided for it. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F. 3d 11, 87
(CADC 2011) (dissenting opinion). We agree.
Plaintiffs counter that “subjects” is broad enough to in-
clude aiding-and-abetting liability. It is not. To “subject”
another to torture means “to cause to undergo or submit to.”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2275 (1993);
see also American Heritage Dictionary 1788 (3d ed. 1992)
(“[t]o cause to experience”). The term thus signals a causal
connection between torturer and victim. Aiding-and-abet-
ting liability, by contrast, encompasses many forms of as-
sistance provided by those who are one (or more) steps re-
moved from the torturer. See Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 598
U. S. 471, 497 (2023) (disclaiming a “strict nexus” require-
ment). Central Bank rejected a similar argument—that the
phrase “‘directly or indirectly’” in §10(b) authorized aiding-
and-abetting liability. 511 U. S., at 175−176. The “basic

14 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE
Opinion of the Court
flaw” in that interpretation “is that aiding and abetting li-
ability extends beyond persons who engage, even indirectly,
in a proscribed activity.” Id., at 176. After all, it encom-
passes those “who do not engage in the proscribed activities
at all, but who give a degree of aid to those who do.” Ibid.
The “basic flaw” we identified in Central Bank exists here
too: Aiding-and-abetting liability sweeps more broadly than
the language Congress chose.
4
***
We recognize, as does the dissent, post, at 23–24, that
ATS and TVPA cases frequently involve heinous and inhu-
mane acts. The political branches or other international ac-
tors may well provide redress. But we decline to distort the
statutory text or the Constitution’s allocation of powers to
enlist U. S. courts in that project. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
——————
4
We have noted that the TVPA “contemplates liability” against those
“who do not personally execute the torture”—in particular, those who
“giv[e] an order to torture.” Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 566 U. S.
449, 458 (2012); see also post, at 25 (opinion of S
OTOMAYOR, J.) (relying
on this assertion). Such liability, however, is much more limited than
aiding-and-abetting liability.

_________________
_________________
1 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of J
ACKSON, J.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 24–856
CISCO SYSTEMS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
DOE I,
ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[June 23, 2026]
JUSTICE JACKSON, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN joins, con-
curring in judgment in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with J
USTICE SOTOMAYOR’s discussion of the Al-
ien Tort Statute. See post, at 5–10 (dissenting opinion).
But I think the Court is correct to conclude that the Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) does not encompass
aiding-and-abetting liability. I write separately because,
while my textual analysis of the TVPA tracks the major-
ity’s, see ante, at 12–14, I do not agree with how the major-
ity deploys Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164 (1994), here.
Central Bank is relevant insofar as it instructs that
“there is no general presumption” that a statute imposes
aiding-and-abetting liability; rather, Congress must pro-
vide it. Id., at 182. And here, Congress’s use of the term
“subjects” does not do so. But, as J
USTICE SOTOMAYOR dis-
cusses, post, at 26–27, the majority is wrong to treat Central
Bank as creating a “magic words” test for aiding-and-abet-
ting liability generally. Contra, ante, at 10–11; see Soto v.
United States, 605 U. S. 360, 373 (2025) (“[W]e have so often
denounced” a “‘magic words’ test”). Instead, the absence of
the words “aid” and “abet” in the statute we interpreted in
Central Bank was but one consideration of many. See 511
U. S., at 176–180. I therefore concur only in the judgment
as to the majority’s TVPA holding.

_________________
_________________
1 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 24–856
CISCO SYSTEMS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
DOE I,
ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[June 23, 2026]
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN and
J
USTICE JACKSON join as to Parts I, II, III, and V, dissent-
ing.
Petitioner Cisco Systems, Inc., allegedly knowingly de-
signed and intentionally built a mass-surveillance system
for the Chinese Communist Party to use to identify, track,
arrest, and torture thousands of religious minorities. As all
agree, if respondents’ allegations were to be proved true,
then that would mean Cisco violated universally recognized
norms of international law. Respondents thus sued Cisco
in a federal action under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),
which vests jurisdiction in district courts over “any civil ac-
tion by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations,” 28 U. S. C. §1350. In Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U. S. 692 (2004), this Court held that the ATS
permits federal courts to find implied causes of action au-
thorizing plaintiffs to sue defendants who violated interna-
tional law.
The Court nonetheless closes the courthouse doors not
just to respondents, but to virtually every future litigant
seeking redress for a violation of international law under
the ATS. It thus overrules Sosa, without even acknowledg-
ing that it is doing so. Today’s decision marks yet another
low point in this Court’s esteem for its precedents.

2 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Further, the Court also errs by ignoring the plain mean-
ing of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) and
slamming the door completely shut to claims by U. S. citi-
zens against those who aid and abet torture.
I respectfully dissent from both of the Court’s holdings.
I
A
The following factual allegations are drawn from re-
spondents’ amended complaint and are assumed to be true
because this appeal arises from the grant of a motion to dis-
miss. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. 731, 734 (2011).
Respondents are members of Falun Gong, a Chinese spir-
itual movement. Falun Gong members believe in the three
core tenets of “Truthfulness, Compassion, and Tolerance.”
App. 2. Many of its members have vocally opposed the Chi-
nese Communist Party (CCP).
In 1999, the CCP designated Falun Gong organizations
as illegal and called for violent political crackdowns against
them. During these “violent struggle” campaigns (or
“douzheng”), CCP and Chinese Government officials sub-
jected Falun Gong targets to brutal human-rights abuses,
including torture, arbitrary detention, and reeducation
through labor. Id., at 12; see 73 F. 4th 700, 712 (CA9 2023)
(detailing “beatings with steel rods[,] . . . shocking with elec-
tronic batons, sleep deprivation, . . . violent force-feeding,”
and more). The United States State Department estimates
that hundreds of thousands of Falun Gong believers have
been persecuted, and media sources report that thousands
have been tortured to death.
To target Falun Gong members, the CCP determined that
it needed to develop a sophisticated, nationwide internet-
surveillance tool to track Falun Gong activity online. It
thus devised the anti-Falun Gong “‘Golden Shield’”: a
“ ‘vast and multi-tiered’” bespoke “‘surveillance system’”
that the CCP contemplated would obtain and organize all

3 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
manner of data on the Falun Gong members across China,
including address information, internet history, and finan-
cial and family information. Id., at 710. At the time the
CCP came up with the idea, however, Chinese engineers
lacked the technical expertise to create such technology. As
a result, the CCP turned to American technology companies
and invited them to submit proposals to design its Golden
Shield system.
Petitioner Cisco answered the CCP’s call with an aggres-
sive campaign to secure the Golden Shield contract. Cisco’s
CEO (and other senior executives) personally met with
China’s President and other officials to discuss and “ex-
plicit[ly] support” “the Golden Shield’s douzheng objectives
and goals.” App. 62. Internal files reveal Cisco’s “pledge to
satisfy the repressive anti-Falun Gong purposes of the” pro-
gram, while characterizing Falun Gong and its members as
“ ‘viruses,’” “‘despicable,’” and an “‘evil cul[t]’”—all mirror-
ing CCP propaganda denigrating Falun Gong members as
“subhuman.” Id., at 20–21. Cisco’s public Chinese market-
ing materials also described the company’s “promis[e] to
tailor the apparatus” to meet the CCP’s objectives, includ-
ing “the douzheng of ” Falun Gong. Id., at 22–23; see 73
F. 4th, at 710 (describing Cisco brochures offered at Chi-
nese trade shows marketing its services “as useful to the
‘douzheng’ of Falun Gong”).
Cisco’s push succeeded. In 2001, the CCP selected Cisco
to submit designs for the Golden Shield and later awarded
it contracts to develop the program. Cisco, using engineers
working from the United States, then created a massive
surveillance system that “‘analyzed patterns of Falun Gong
Internet activity to enable the intelligent identification of
individual Falun Gong Internet users,’” while providing
“ ‘real time monitoring’” of “‘Falun Gong Internet traffic
patterns’” and sharing the results with the CCP to “facili-
tate the . . . forced conversion through torture’” of Falun
Gong members. Id., at 711. Over time, Cisco engineers in

4 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
San Jose, California continued to provide support while also
upgrading and expanding the system. For example, Cisco
later created a video-surveillance system that, combined
with facial-recognition technology, has become a “‘primary
means’ of identifying Falun Gong practitioners through
non-internet activities, such as protests or religious prac-
tice.” Ibid.
Armed with the vast suite of technological tools Cisco pro-
vided, the CCP identified, arrested, and tortured thousands
of Falun Gong members. Id., at 712.
B
Respondents in this case are among those victims or are
family members of those who have disappeared and are sus-
pected or confirmed dead. They allege that the CCP used
information collected and stored by the Golden Shield pro-
gram in forced-conversion sessions to which they were sub-
jected. For example, on top of prolonged isolation and phys-
ical torture, Chinese officials leveraged information about
some of respondents’ family members (and employed
threats against those family members) to coerce respond-
ents into renouncing their religious beliefs.
In 2011, respondents filed this action against Cisco and
two of its executives, suing under the ATS and alleging that
Cisco aided and abetted seven international-law violations:
torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; forced la-
bor; prolonged and arbitrary detention; crimes against hu-
manity; extrajudicial killing; and forced disappearance.
One of the respondents, who is a U. S. citizen, also brought
a claim alleging that two individual defendants aided and
abetted his torture in violation of the TVPA.
After the District Court dismissed the action, the Ninth
Circuit reversed, holding that aiding-and-abetting liability
was available under both the ATS and the TVPA. Id., at

5 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
709. This Court then agreed to review the Ninth Circuit’s
judgment. 607 U. S. 1120 (2026).
1
II
A straightforward application of this Court’s settled case
law should have allowed respondents’ ATS claims against
Cisco to proceed.
A
The ATS, enacted in 1789, permits foreign nationals
harmed by violations of international law to obtain compen-
sation for their injuries in U. S. court. See 28 U. S. C. §1350
(“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in viola-
tion of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”).
The statute is limited: As this Court explained in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692, the ATS “is in terms only
jurisdictional,” meaning that it gives courts authority to en-
tertain suits but does not itself create any causes of action
that permit plaintiffs to sue someone. Id., at 712. Even so,
consulting the historical context surrounding the ATS’s
passage, the Court determined that Congress “intended” for
the ATS “to have practical effect the moment it became
law.” Id., at 724. Consistent with that understanding, Sosa
held that, although federal courts should be “restrained” in
doing so, they may find implied private causes of action un-
der the ATS “for violations of any international law norm”
comparable to “the historical paradigms familiar when [the
ATS] was enacted.” Id., at 725, 732. Those paradigms in-
clude three international-law offenses that were well estab-
lished when the ATS was enacted: “violation of safe con-
ducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and
——————
1
Petitioners did not allege a split among the Circuits over whether aid-
ing-and-abetting liability is available under either statute. See Pet. for
Cert. 14–24, 29–33.

6 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
piracy.” Id., at 715. As all agree, the ATS allows implied
private rights of action for at least these three offenses.
To invoke an additional implied cause of action under the
ATS, Sosa explained, the plaintiff must identify a norm of
international law that has sufficiently “definite content”
that has gained “acceptance among civilized nations.” Id.,
at 732. As part of that inquiry, courts must also make a
“judgment about the practical consequences of making that
cause available to litigants in the federal courts.” Id., at
732–733. Applying this test, the Court rejected the arbi-
trary-detention claim that had been raised there. The
plaintiff had not alleged a sufficiently definite norm of in-
ternational law. Recognizing the plaintiff ’s proposed cause
of action would also have “breathtaking” consequences by
permitting “a cause of action in federal court for any arrest,
anywhere in the world,” so long as it is “unauthorized by
the law of the jurisdiction in which it took place.” Id., at
736. The Court thus declined to allow a new cause of action
under the ATS. Ibid.
“In the years since, this Court has read Sosa to announce
a two-step test for recognizing the availability of a cause of
action under the ATS.” Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 593 U. S.
628, 648 (2021) (S
OTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in judgment). At step one, courts ask “‘whether a
plaintiff can demonstrate that the alleged violation is “of a
norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory.”’ ” Ibid. If
the plaintiff makes that required showing, then the court
must determine “‘whether allowing [a] case to proceed un-
der the ATS is a proper exercise of judicial discretion.’”
Ibid. That discretionary inquiry must account for “the po-
tential implications for the foreign relations of the United
States of recognizing such causes [of action],” as courts
must be “particularly wary of impinging on the discretion
of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing for-
eign affairs.” Sosa, 542 U. S., at 727.

7 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
B
This case succeeds at each of Sosa’s steps. At step one,
there is no dispute. Respondents allege that Cisco aided
and abetted the violation of seven international-law norms:
torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; forced la-
bor; prolonged and arbitrary detention; crimes against hu-
manity; extrajudicial killing; and forced disappearance.
See 73 F. 4th, at 713. Before this Court, Cisco does not
make any arguments at all at step one. See Brief for Peti-
tioners 17. It does not dispute that all seven norms are spe-
cific, universal, and obligatory, as required by Sosa. Nor
does it dispute that international law recognizes aiding-
and-abetting liability, either in general or as a substantive
part of each of these seven norms.
Cisco, joined by the United States as amicus curiae, in-
stead exclusively focuses on Sosa’s second step, at which
courts ask “‘if there are sound reasons to think Congress
might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages rem-
edy.’” Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U. S. 241, 264 (2018).
Both fail to demonstrate that it would be improper to allow
this case to proceed.
First, Cisco and the United States argue that an aiding-
and-abetting theory of liability can never satisfy Sosa’s sec-
ond step because such liability will always endanger for-
eign-policy concerns. Those concerns, however, are best ad-
dressed on a case-by-case basis, rather than a categorical
one. See Sosa, 542 U. S., at 733, n. 21 (discussing possibil-
ity of “case-specific deference to the political branches”).
This case disproves the idea that recognizing aiding-and-
abetting liability will necessarily impair U. S. foreign-policy
interests. The political branches have already consistently
condemned China’s treatment of Falun Gong members.
The Solicitor General confirmed in this very case that “the
United States [has] long condemned China’s treatment of
Falun Gong practitioners,” and has sanctioned Chinese of-
ficials for “gross violations of human rights,” including

8 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
“particularly severe violations of religious freedom.” Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae on Pet. for Cert. 9. Sim-
ilarly, in 2020, the Trump administration released a report
on the Government’s strategic approach to China that high-
lighted how the Government had released “statements call-
ing on the [Chinese] government to respect the rights of ”
religious minorities including “Falun Gong adherents, all of
whom face repression and persecution in China”; the report
also announced that the “United States will continue to
take a principled stand against the use of our technology to
support China’s military and its technology-enabled au-
thoritarianism.”
2
In addition, the State Department has
“denounce[d]” China’s “particularly abhorrent behavior” to-
ward Falun Gong. Dept. of State, Annual Report on Inter-
national Religious Freedom 2000, 106th Cong., 2d Sess.,
xxix, xxxii (Joint Comm. Print 2000). So has Congress. See,
e.g., H. Res. 605, 111th Cong., p. 5 (2010) (condemning the
Chinese Government’s “campaign to persecute, intimidate,
imprison, and torture Falun Gong practitioners”); see also
Brief for Members of Congress et al. as Amici Curiae 22–26
(listing other congressional resolutions and actions con-
demning China’s persecution of Falun Gong). Given that
both political branches have so publicly and directly con-
demned China’s persecution of Falun Gong members, it
strains credulity to say that allowing a private suit against
an American company to proceed would meaningfully
change the state of relations between the United States and
China.
In addition, any potential foreign-policy consequences are
further reduced because neither China nor any Chinese in-
strumentality is a party to the case itself. Rather, the suit
——————
2
National Security Council, United States Strategic Approach to the
People’s Republic of China 15 (2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.
gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/U.S.-Strategic-Approach-to-The-Peoples-
Republic-of-China-Report-5.24v1.pdf (archived at https://perma.cc/
2PHC-HLKP).

9 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
is against an American company and focuses primarily on
its conduct in the United States. China also could have ap-
peared in this case if it opposed it. It could have filed a brief
in this case saying so, just as it did in a previous ATS case
that involved China. See Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258,
1264, 1296–1301 (ND Cal. 2004) (noting that, in an ATS
suit against Chinese local-government officials, China,
“through the United States Department of State, submitted
a letter to this Court urging this Court not to assert juris-
diction over the instant cases”). Other foreign states have
filed similar materials in other ATS cases. See, e.g., Jesner,
584 U. S., at 271 (citing brief filed by the Hashemite King-
dom of Jordan in ATS suit against a Jordanian bank). That
China has not done so here is additional evidence that this
case is unlikely to aggravate U. S.–China relations.
Second, Cisco and the United States argue that this
Court’s decision in Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164 (1994), fore-
closes aiding-and-abetting liability here, reading that case
to permit aiding-and-abetting liability only if a statute ex-
pressly so states. Central Bank has minimal bearing here.
It involved the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the text of
which limits liability to those who “‘directly or indirectly’”
engage in certain kinds of conduct. Id., at 171. The Court
there recognized that Congress “has taken a statute-by-
statute approach to civil aiding and abetting.” Id., at 182.
The Court reasoned that the text of that statute did not ex-
tend liability to aiders and abettors because they do not nec-
essarily engage in the underlying activity they facilitate.
Id., at 176–177. That conclusion was buttressed by the fact
that it was “uncertain” whether state common law supplied
“a deeply rooted background of aiding and abetting tort lia-
bility.” Id., at 181–182, 184. Here, by contrast, the ATS
does not limit liability to those who engage in certain acts.
Instead, it authorizes courts to entertain suits involving a
“tort . . . committed in violation of the law of nations.”

10 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
§1350. As noted above, Cisco does not dispute that liability
for aiding and abetting the seven underlying violations is
universally recognized in international law. Central Bank’s
holding about a textually distinct statute rooted in domestic
law thus says little about what the ATS recognizes under
international law.
Because Cisco does not dispute that Sosa’s first step is
satisfied and has not identified a sound reason for this suit
not to proceed at Sosa’s second step, the Court should affirm
the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.
3
III
The majority, however, is in a rush. Not wanting to dally
on niceties like binding precedent, or to confine itself to de-
ciding the case before it, the majority casts aside Sosa’s two-
step framework altogether. It disclaims any future author-
ity by any court to find additional causes of action in all
cases to come, even though it declines to disturb the three
implied causes of action previously recognized under the
ATS. Ante, at 1. In short, it overturns Sosa. In doing so,
the Court brushes past the stare decisis factors that this
——————
3
The Ninth Circuit treated aiding-and-abetting liability as the rele-
vant international-law norm at Sosa’s first step, concluding that “cus-
tomary international law recognizes aiding and abetting liability as a
specific and universal form of liability.” 73 F. 4th 700, 718 (2023). Ar-
guably, however, the relevant norm for the Sosa analysis might be the
underlying offense that Cisco allegedly aided, such as torture. Whether
aiding-and-abetting liability is available would then be assessed simply
by determining the substantive breadth and scope of liability of a norm
that has been sufficiently established. See 113 F. 4th 1230, 1243 (CA9
2024) (Bumatay, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc). For exam-
ple, Blackstone described slightly varying scopes of secondary liability as
to each of the three offenses he identified. See 4 W. Blackstone, Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England 69–73 (1769). If the majority were
inclined to preserve Sosa’s two-step framework, and if the parties dis-
puted Sosa’s first step at all before this Court, the Court could have va-
cated and remanded this case for the Ninth Circuit to reconsider what
the relevant norm is for purposes of Sosa’s first step.

11 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Court considers when deciding whether to overturn prece-
dent. It also slams the door in the faces of victims of horrific
mistreatment without giving any reason to think that Con-
gress, whom the Court purports to respect, would have
wanted to do so. The majority errs at each turn.
A
To begin, the majority fails to demonstrate that Sosa is
wrong, never mind that there is the special justification
needed to overturn it.
Start with the common ground: There is no dispute that
the ATS contains judicially implied causes of action. Spe-
cifically, it contains implied causes of action for “‘violation
of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors,
and piracy.’” Ante, at 4 (quoting Sosa, 542 U. S., at 715).
Those causes of action appear nowhere in the ATS’s text.
They instead come from authoritative accounts of interna-
tional law, most notably the work of 18th century English
jurist William Blackstone. See 4 W. Blackstone, Commen-
taries on the Laws of England 68 (1769). (Hence the moni-
ker “Blackstone three.”) As Sosa explained, suits alleging
violations of safe conducts, infringements on the rights of
ambassadors, and acts of piracy all may proceed under the
ATS because Congress likely had these three offenses “in
mind” when it passed the ATS, even if it did not say so ex-
pressly. 542 U. S., at 724–725.
4
——————
4
The majority attempts to distance itself from the notion that the ATS
contains implied private rights of action for the Blackstone three, saying
that Sosa merely assumed that the Blackstone three would be actionable
under the ATS. See ante, at 12, and n. 3. That is perplexing. Sosa
explained at length that the First Congress did not intend to leave the
ATS “lying fallow” and that Congress instead intended for at least the
Blackstone three to be actionable. See 542 U. S. 692, 712–724. To the
extent the majority is unsure that even the Blackstone three are action-
able under the ATS, it is unclear why the majority is willing to leave the
door ajar for those three causes of action but not for any others that en-
force similarly well-established norms of international law.

12 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
If the ATS allows these three implied causes of action
drawn from international law, then it is hard to see why it
does not allow others similarly drawn from that body of law.
Indeed, this is a key part of Sosa’s reasoning and its central
holding. See Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U. S. 119, 136 (2019)
(“[J]ust as binding as [a case’s] holding is the reasoning un-
derlying it”). When Congress passed the ATS, “the accepted
conception” of the common law was that federal courts,
when adjudicating individual cases, were “discover[ing]” a
pre-existing and “‘transcendental body of law outside of any
particular State’” and applying it. Sosa, 542 U. S., at 725.
Working under that assumption, Congress omitted any spe-
cific causes of action from the ATS, see §1350, and left it to
courts to draw upon the body of international law, which
included the Blackstone three, and apply relevant princi-
ples in other, specific cases. Id., at 724–725, 730.
Ample historical evidence corroborates Sosa’s account of
the ATS. The First Congress passed the ATS after the Con-
tinental Congress (operating under the Articles of Confed-
eration) “was hamstrung by its inability to ‘cause infrac-
tions of treaties, or of the law of nations to be punished.’”
Id., at 716 (quoting J. Madison, Journal of the Constitu-
tional Convention 60 (E. Scott ed. 1893)). For example, on
at least two occasions prior to the Constitution’s ratifica-
tion, foreign diplomats were assaulted on American soil.
542 U. S., at 716–717. The Continental Congress called on
States to pass legislation authorizing their courts to hear
cases involving violations of international law, but just one
answered the call. Id., at 716. Understandably offended,
at least one foreign ambassador lodged a protest that was
discussed during the Constitutional Convention. Id., at
717. As Sosa explained, given the “anxieties of the precon-
stitutional period,” it is unlikely that Congress intended for
the ATS to serve only “as a jurisdictional convenience to be
placed on the shelf for use by a future Congress or state leg-
islature that might, someday, authorize the creation of

13 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
causes of action.” Id., at 719. Rather, Congress intended
for its handiwork to have immediate effect, without further
express creation of causes of action.
Contemporaneous legal sources discussing international
incidents that transpired shortly after Congress passed the
ATS further support Sosa’s holding. In 1792, Secretary of
State Thomas Jefferson and Attorney General Edmund
Randolph each issued an opinion addressing incidents in
which Americans entered Spanish Florida and French
Haiti, abducted slaves, and returned them to the United
States. See T. Jefferson, Opinion on Offenses Against the
Law of Nations (Dec. 3, 1792), in 24 The Papers of Thomas
Jefferson 693–696 (J. Catanzariti ed. 1990) (Jefferson Opin-
ion); E. Randolph, Opinion on Offenses Against the Law of
Nations (Dec. 5, 1792), in 24 id., at 702–703 (Randolph
Opinion). Both agreed that federal courts could hear civil
suits relating to these incidents under the ATS. Jefferson
wrote that the ATS would cover any suit by “an alien . . . for
a tort only,” Jefferson Opinion 694 (emphasis deleted),
while Randolph agreed that “damages may be recovered in
the courts of the United States, under the jurisdictions es-
tablished by the judicial law”—that is, under the ATS, Ran-
dolph Opinion 702. Similarly, in 1795, Attorney General
William Bradford issued an opinion explaining that “Amer-
icans who had taken part in the French plunder of a British
slave colony in Sierra Leone,” and thus arguably breached
a declaration of neutrality, “‘no doubt’” could be held civilly
liable “‘in the courts of the United States; jurisdiction being
expressly given to these courts in all cases where an alien
sues for a tort only, in violation of the laws of nations, or a
treaty of the United States.’” Sosa, 542 U. S., at 721 (quot-
ing 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 57, 59).
Taken together, the opinions of these early American
statesmen confirm that the ATS was understood to allow
civil suits for violations of international law even without
any express causes of action. They also support the

14 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
conclusion that the ATS was not understood to be limited
to the Blackstone three: None of these early incidents in-
volved safe conducts, ambassadors, or piracy at sea. In-
stead, they involved violations of other international-law
principles, including neutrality and prohibitions on “plun-
der” and “robbery.” 2 E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations, ch.
VI §78 (J. Chitty ed., 6th ed. 1844); see Franchise Tax Bd.
of Cal. v. Hyatt, 587 U. S. 230, 239 (2019) (describing de
Vattel as “the founding era’s foremost expert on the law of
nations”). As Sosa did, the founding generation thus un-
derstood the ATS to leave the door open to other causes of
action rooted in the law of nations beyond the Blackstone
three.
The majority does not explain why implied causes of ac-
tion for the Blackstone three are permissible but implied
causes of action for any other norm of international law,
which either existed in 1791 or exist today, are not. The
majority instead turns down a different road, one paved not
with the opinions of the Court, which are the law, but with
the opinions of individual Justices, which are not. Despite
claiming that its “starting point is Sosa’s key insight,” the
majority veers off with its very next paragraph. Ante, at 7.
It observes that Justice Scalia, who concurred in part and
concurred in the judgment in Sosa, “would have stopped”
with just the Blackstone three, ante, at 7, and then in the
next paragraph, cites four more individual opinions ex-
pressing sympathy for that view, but none of which was the
controlling majority opinion. See ante, at 8 (citing Jesner,
584 U. S., at 274 (T
HOMAS, J., concurring); id., at 280–293
(G
ORSUCH, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment); Nestlé, 593 U. S., at 634–640 (opinion of T
HOMAS, J.);
id., at 658 (A
LITO, J., dissenting)).
These five opinions, however, are not, and never have
been, the law. The Sosa majority expressly rejected the call
to stop at the Blackstone three, dismissing Justice Scalia’s
position as “particularly unconvincing in light of what we

15 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
know about congressional understanding bearing on this is-
sue.” 542 U. S., at 729–730. Nor did any of the subsequent
opinions garner a majority, as the Court in each case re-
jected liability under the ATS on narrower grounds than
the separate writings advocated. See Nestlé, 593 U. S., at
634 (rejecting extraterritorial application of the ATS); Jes-
ner, 584 U. S., at 270–272 (holding that Sosa’s second step
counseled against extending ATS liability to foreign corpo-
rations). To say something three times (or five) does not
make it true. See L. Carroll, The Hunting of the Snark
(1876).
Setting that aside, the majority distills two points from
its tour through separate writings: (1) judicial authority to
recognize causes of action is “‘narrow’” because ATS suits
“by their nature implicate foreign policy”; and (2) “the
power to create causes of action belongs to Congress.” Ante,
at 8–9.
Neither point explains why it respects Congress to recog-
nize causes of action for the Blackstone three but not for
other international-law principles that are sufficiently sim-
ilar to those causes of action. To the extent the majority
thinks that the Blackstone three are uniquely supported by
the historical record, that is doubtful for the reasons given
above. See supra, at 13–14. There also is no indication that
Congress intended to “tra[p]” the ATS “in amber.” United
States v. Rahimi, 602 U. S. 680, 691 (2024).
5
In any event, this Court already resolved the majority’s
objections in Sosa itself. First, Sosa explained that foreign-
policy concerns can arise from the failure to provide
——————
5
The majority’s limit is also unfaithful to Blackstone. Blackstone rec-
ognized secondary liability as part of the substantive offenses he identi-
fied. See 4 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, at 69–
72. Thus, even if Blackstone supplied the authoritative account of suits
available under the ATS, that would still permit liability to extend be-
yond just those who principally commit the three offenses Blackstone
identified.

16 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
remedies for international-law violations just as they can
arise from the imposition of liability for such violations.
The founding generation was deeply concerned with foreign
tensions resulting from “the Continental Congress’s inca-
pacity to deal with,” and States’ failures to provide remedies
for, international-law violations, especially when an Amer-
ican defendant was involved. 542 U. S., at 716–718. The
ATS was a direct response to those “anxieties of the precon-
stitutional period.” Id., at 719. Indeed, the incidents dis-
cussed above all came to the Federal Government’s atten-
tion because foreign nations complained to the United
States about them. See, e.g., Jefferson Opinion 693 (noting
complaints from Spanish and French diplomats); 1 Op.
Atty. Gen., at 58 (referring to complaint submitted by Brit-
ish minister).
Today, too, providing an American forum for interna-
tional-law violations can improve foreign relations, as evi-
denced by the fact that foreign sovereigns have sometimes
filed briefs expressing support for ongoing ATS litigation.
See, e.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Hum. Rights Lit-
igation, 94 F. 3d 539, 547 (CA9 1996) (noting that the Phil-
ippines “urged” an ATS “suit to proceed in American courts”
because “‘relations may well be improved if Filipino citizens
see that justice is available in U. S. courts’”); Sarei v. Rio
Tinto, PLC, 671 F. 3d 736, 756 (CA9 2011) (noting that Pa-
pua New Guinea “expressly urged” that an ATS aiding-and-
abetting case “ ‘be heard by courts in the United States’” be-
cause it would not “‘adversely affec[t] any relations between
[Papua New Guinea] and the United States’”), judgt. va-
cated, 569 U. S. 945 (2013). Former United States Ambas-
sadors-at-Large for War Crimes also explain that authoriz-
ing aiding-and-abetting liability under the ATS “is
consonant with U. S. foreign policy interests” in light of the
United States’ “consisten[t] promot[ion of] aiding and abet-
ting as an essential means for holding perpetrators of inter-
national crimes to account.” Brief for Former U. S.

17 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Ambassadors-at-Large for War Crimes Issues/Global Crim-
inal Justice et al. as Amici Curiae 10, 12; see id., at 9, 11–
29 (describing the United States’ role in supporting aiding-
and-abetting liability in proceedings before the Nuremberg
Tribunal and other international criminal courts).
Given that there are strong foreign-policy interests on
both sides of the scale, Sosa correctly rejected the argument
that fear of “adverse foreign policy consequences” should
categorically preclude judicial involvement in this area.
542 U. S., at 728. Instead, although it stressed that courts
must act “with great caution” when finding implied causes
of action, Sosa left the door open to doing so. Id., at 728,
731.
6
Second, Sosa also fully addressed the majority’s charge
that, according to modern legal sensibilities, Congress, not
courts, should create causes of action. Like today’s Court,
the Sosa Court was well aware that “this Court has recently
and repeatedly said that a decision to create a private right
of action is one better left to legislative judgment in the
great majority of cases.” Id., at 727; see ante, at 9. Even so,
Sosa explained that the First Congress, which passed the
ATS, did not see things the same way and that it would be
“particularly unconvincing” to impose present-day legal
theories on a Congress from two centuries ago. 542 U. S.,
at 730. It would be “unreasonable,” Sosa continued, to fault
Congress for failing in 1791 to anticipate the prevailing le-
gal fashion two centuries down the line and to calcify a stat-
ute that Congress intended to be flexible. Ibid.
For all these reasons, Sosa correctly held that courts may
find implied private rights of action cognizable under the
ATS, so long as they proceed with “great caution” and do
not recognize causes of action dissimilar to the Blackstone
——————
6
The majority urges “judicial humility” when it comes to matters of
foreign affairs. Ante, at 9, n. 1. True judicial humility, however, is fol-
lowing precedent and respecting the wisdom of the jurists who precede
us.

18 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
three: that is, those “for violations of any international law
norm with less definite content and acceptance . . . than the
historical paradigms familiar when [the ATS] was enacted.”
Id., at 728, 732.
7
B
Even if Sosa was wrongly decided, that still would not
justify the result the majority reaches today. The rule of
stare decisis, or “[a]dherence to precedent,” this Court has
explained, is “ ‘a “foundation stone of the rule of law,”’ ” Ki-
sor v. Wilkie, 588 U. S. 558, 586 (2019). This “important
doctrine . . . ensure[s] that the law will not merely change
erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible
fashion.” Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265 (1986). It
also “permits society to presume that bedrock principles are
founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individ-
uals, and thereby contributes to the integrity of our consti-
tutional system of government, both in appearance and in
fact.” Id., at 265–266. Overturning a prior decision there-
fore requires “special justification”; “it is not alone sufficient
that we would decide a case differently now than we did
then.” Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S.
446, 455–456 (2015).
The majority, however, nowhere mentions stare decisis.
Indeed, the Court’s opinion does not even state the neces-
sary consequence of what it decides today: that Sosa is over-
ruled. Disturbingly, this is not the first time in recent years
that the Court has been “willing to overrule precedent
——————
7
The majority claims that permitting courts to find implied causes of
action in this way “would have confounded the First Congress.” Ante, at
12, n. 3. Far from it: For all the reasons explained above and in Sosa,
the First Congress expected courts to find causes of action that permit
plaintiffs to recover damages for violations of norms of international law
like the Blackstone three. What would have “confounded the First Con-
gress” instead is today’s decision to override those expectations and en-
graft a modern hostility to implied rights of action totally inconceivable
to the First Congress and the founding generation.

19 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
without even acknowledging it is doing so, much less
providing any special justification.” Jones v. Mississippi,
593 U. S. 98, 144 (2021) (S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (de-
scribing the Court’s implicit overruling of Miller v. Ala-
bama, 567 U. S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana,
577 U. S. 190 (2016)). “How low this Court’s respect for
stare decisis has sunk.” 593 U. S., at 144.
The majority’s apparent disregard for stare decisis is par-
ticularly lamentable here because this Court has long held
that stare decisis has “special force” as to decisions inter-
preting congressional statutes. Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172 (1989). That is because Congress,
not this Court, has the primary responsibility to “correct
any mistake[s]” in this Court’s statutory decisions. Kimble,
576 U. S., at 456. Accordingly, this Court has consistently
required a “superspecial justification to warrant reversing”
a statutory precedent. Id., at 458. This Court has applied
this heightened standard “even when a decision has,” like
Sosa, “announced a ‘judicially created doctrine’ designed to
implement a federal statute.” 576 U. S., at 456.
When deciding whether to overturn a decision like Sosa,
this Court will “most often” consider “subsequent legal de-
velopments—‘either the growth of judicial doctrine or fur-
ther action taken by Congress’—that have removed the ba-
sis for a decision.” 576 U. S., at 458. Here, however, this
“primary reason” for overruling statutory precedents, Pat-
terson, 491 U. S., at 173, is completely absent. As discussed
above, this Court’s modern push to limit implied causes of
action was well underway by the time Sosa was decided.
See supra, at 17.
The majority says that “[s]ince Sosa was decided, we have
firmly committed to the view that judicially created causes
of action offend the separation of powers in almost every
circumstance.’” Ante, at 10. It relies primarily on cases
concerning not implied causes of action under the ATS, but
cases from this Court’s Bivens jurisprudence. See ante, at

20 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
10 (citing, among others, Egbert v. Boule, 596 U. S. 482
(2022); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U. S. 120 (2017)). Those cases
are far afield: They involved implying causes of action un-
der the Constitution, not the ATS. There are, of course,
many differences between the Constitution and the ATS,
chief among which is that Congress passed the ATS specif-
ically to furnish a path for plaintiffs to recover monetary
damages. See Sosa, 542 U. S., at 724. Setting those differ-
ences aside, by the time this Court decided Sosa in 2004, it
was already “firmly committed,” ante, at 10, to limiting im-
plied rights of action. Indeed, years before Sosa, this Court
had already “sworn off ” the habit of implying private causes
of action outside the ATS. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S.
275, 287 (2001); see Sosa, 542 U. S., at 727 (citing Alexan-
der). Even so, Sosa confronted that issue and held that
courts may find implied rights of action under the ATS. The
cases the majority cites from the Bivens context therefore
did not unearth some new objection not considered by the
Sosa Court, “remov[e] the basis for [Sosa],” Kimble, 576
U. S., at 458, or render Sosa “irreconcilable with competing
legal doctrines or policies,” Patterson, 491 U. S., at 173.
Nor has Congress amended the ATS or passed other leg-
islation that undercuts Sosa’s holding. Sosa itself “wel-
come[d] any congressional guidance” over the interpreta-
tion of the ATS and how courts proceed when defining
causes of action. 542 U. S., at 731. It also reiterated that
“Congress may” close the door to new causes of action “at
any time (explicitly, or implicitly by treaties or statutes that
occupy the field), just as it may modify or cancel any judicial
decision so far as it rests on recognizing an international
norm as such.” Ibid. Yet Congress has done none of this in
response to Sosa.
8
——————
8
The majority suggests that the TVPA displaced Sosa. Ante, at 10–11.
Congress, however, passed the TVPA in 1991, 13 years before this Court

21 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
The other circumstance in which this Court will some-
times overturn a statutory precedent is if its standard has
“prove[n] unworkable.” Kimble, 576 U. S., at 459. Here,
there is no reason to think that is true of Sosa’s two-step
framework. No one argues before this Court that Sosa’s
steps are unclear or hard to apply. Instead, Cisco argues
that Sosa and the ATS have allowed causes of action to pro-
liferate, ensnaring defendants and courts in litigation. See
Brief for Petitioners 26.
No evidence supports Cisco’s worries. Federal courts
have been restrained in recognizing new causes of action
under Sosa. One study found that, as of 2022, just 300 ATS
suits had ever been filed in federal courts. C. Ewell, O.
Hathaway, & E. Nohle, Has the Alien Tort Statute Made a
Difference?: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative As-
sessment, 107 Cornell L. Rev. 1205, 1240 (2022) (Ewell).
Fifty-two cases succeeded, and of the 248 cases that were
dismissed, over one-third of them were dismissed at Sosa’s
first step because the plaintiffs had not identified an action-
able violation of international law to begin with. Ewell
1241.
——————
decided Sosa. It is bizarre to say that a statute that predates Sosa now
undercuts Sosa’s holding. In any event, rather than being an “ ‘alterna-
tive remedial structure,’ ” ante, at 10–11, that displaces Sosa, the TVPA
indicates Congress’s approval of implied rights of action under the ATS.
Before Sosa, the Second Circuit had held that courts may imply private
rights of action under the ATS for torture. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F. 2d 876, 877–878 (1980). As I have previously explained, Congress
was well aware of Filartiga and passed the TVPA to “supplement the
ATS” by extending a civil remedy to U. S. citizens who cannot sue under
the ATS. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U. S. 241, 316 (2018) (dissenting
opinion). As the congressional Committee Reports noted, the ATS was
intended to “ ‘remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that
already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary interna-
tional law.’ ” Sosa, 542 U. S., at 728 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 102–367, pt.
1, p. 4 (1991)); see also Jesner, 584 U. S., at 316 (opinion of S
OTOMAYOR,
J.) (discussing this legislative history).

22 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Two observations follow from this study. First, there is
no real reason to think that ATS suits are clogging federal
courts’ dockets, as 300 cases across multiple centuries re-
flect a tiny fraction of the hundreds of thousands of civil
cases that are filed in federal courts each year.
9
Second,
this Court’s cases narrowing ATS liability have had a sig-
nificant, and effective, role in reining in federal courts and
controlling the proliferation of implied causes of action for
violations of international law. For example, the number of
filed ATS cases fell precipitously after this Court held that
the ATS does not apply extraterritorially. Ewell 1237–1238
(discussing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U. S.
108 (2013)). Putting these points together, there is no rea-
son to think that Sosa’s framework has become, or is at risk
of becoming, unmanageable.
10
Again, the majority largely skips over the stare decisis
analysis and prefers instead to decree that Justice Scalia
was right in Sosa after all. Ante, at 7–12. In so doing, the
majority forgets that while creating causes of action may be
a task primarily for Congress, so too is correcting erroneous
interpretations of statutes. See Kimble, 576 U. S., at 460.
In nonetheless reaching out to correct a perceived error in
Sosa, the Court does not honor the constitutional division
of labor between Congress and this Court. Instead, it
——————
9
See United States Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2025
(2025), https://www.uscourts.gov/data-news/reports/statistical-reports/
federal-judicial-caseload-statistics/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2025
(archived at https://perma.cc/MHE5-SXWX) (reporting 271,802 new civil
filings in federal district court in 2025).
10
The majority notes that some ATS suits have resulted in settlements
in which plaintiffs and defendants have agreed to end litigation and com-
pensate the plaintiffs in “ ‘multimillion-dollar’ ” suits. See ante, at 11,
n. 2. The majority seems to suggest that somehow these settlements are
objectionable, but there is no reason to think that voluntary agreements
to compensate victims of heinous conduct are inherently unfair or other-
wise undesirable.

23 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
disrespects it. Proper respect for Congress should have led
to a different outcome today.
Moreover, even if Justice Scalia did get it right in 2004,
“[l]ost arguments are not grounds to overrule a case.” Stu-
dents for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of
Harvard College, 600 U. S. 181, 352 (2023) (S
OTOMAYOR, J.,
dissenting). “When proponents of [previously rejected] ar-
guments, greater now in number on the Court, return to
fight old battles anew, it betrays an unrestrained disregard
for precedent.” Id., at 352–353. That is exactly what the
majority again exhibits today.
C
The majority wraps up its discussion of Sosa by asserting
that “it is hard to see how correcting Sosa’s unfulfilled pre-
diction would upset reliance interests” because “it is a
stretch to believe that we ever would have” found an im-
plied right of action under Sosa. Ante, at 11. The majority,
however, overlooks the 107 other federal courts. Many of
them fulfilled this Court’s prediction by finding implied
causes of action under the ATS in individual cases, just as
the First Congress intended. Those courts were not “‘in-
dulg[ing a] fiction.’” Ibid. Rather, they were dutifully ap-
plying this Court’s decision in Sosa, and their decisions are
proof that Sosa “ ‘operated in practice.’” Ante, at 11. It is
therefore unclear what the majority means when it says
that Sosa’s promise went unfulfilled, or that no one, not
even the plaintiffs who sued under the ATS, was entitled to
rely on it.
What is clear is that the majority today forecloses future
reliance on Sosa and shuts the courthouse doors to almost
any claimed violation of international law under the ATS.
That includes torture. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F. 2d 876, 878 (CA2 1980) (ATS suit brought by plaintiff al-
leging that his son had been kidnapped and tortured to
death in retaliation for the plaintiff ’s political beliefs). It

24 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
includes forced labor. See, e.g., Licea v. Curacao Drydock
Co., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1359 (SD Fla. 2008) (ATS suit
alleging that the defendant trafficked Cubans to Curacao,
held them in captivity, and forced them to work repairing
ships and oil platforms). It also includes perhaps the most
universally condemned crime in the modern era: genocide.
See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F. 3d 232, 236–237 (CA2
1995) (ATS suit alleging “brutal acts of rape, forced prosti-
tution, forced impregnation, torture, and summary execu-
tion, carried out by Bosnian-Serb military forces as part of
a genocidal campaign”). “Like the pirates of the 18th cen-
tury,” whose conduct so concerned Blackstone and the First
Congress, “today’s torturers, slave traders, and perpetra-
tors of genocide are ‘hostis humani generis, an enemy of all
mankind.’” Nestlé, 593 U. S., at 647 (opinion of
S
OTOMAYOR, J.).
As to each of these offenses, as to each of these enemies
of mankind, the majority decides that there is simply no
way that a suit could possibly proceed without offending
Congress. Noticeably absent from the majority’s analysis is
any evidence that Congress would be offended by these
suits. Of course, there may be reasons why allowing an in-
dividual ATS suit to proceed would be unwise. That possi-
bility, however, should be addressed on a case-by-case ba-
sis. Indeed, that option was available in this very case.
Even though the analysis of the dissenting judge below was
mistaken for the reasons given above, see supra, at 5–10, it
at least applied Sosa and concluded that allowing this spe-
cific suit to proceed would not be an appropriate exercise of
judicial discretion, see 73 F. 4th, at 748–751. The possibil-
ity that one case should not be allowed through the door is
no reason to weld the door shut and lock out all others.
IV
The majority also errs by holding that the TVPA does not
allow plaintiffs to sue for the aiding and abetting of torture.

25 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
The TVPA states that “[a]n individual who . . . subjects an
individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for
damages to that individual.” Note following 28 U. S. C.
§1350 (Establishment of Civic Action) (§1350 note). This
Court has already acknowledged that this language ex-
tends beyond those who “personally execute the torture.”
Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 566 U. S. 449, 458
(2012). This Court has also explained that aiding and abet-
ting requires that “the defendant consciously and culpably
‘participate[d]’ in a wrongful act so as to help ‘make it suc-
ceed.’” Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 598 U. S. 471, 493 (2023).
Putting the terms “subjects” and “aiding and abetting” to-
gether yields a simple answer. In ordinary meaning, a per-
son “subjects” another to torture if he “consciously and cul-
pably ‘participate[s]’ in” the torture “so as to help ‘make it
succeed.’” Ibid. Imagine an individual who rounds people
up and delivers them to a black site to be tortured by an-
other person. Or a company that sets up the torture cham-
ber with all the necessary tools. Or an informant who pro-
vides sensitive information about the victim so that another
person can tailor the torture to the victim’s weaknesses.
None of these actors conducted the torture themselves, but
they have all “subjected” those people to torture by “culpa-
bly ‘participat[ing]’ in” it and helping to “‘make it succeed.’”
Ibid.
Dictionary definitions reinforce this understanding. Dic-
tionaries define “subjects” to mean “to cause to undergo or
submit to” or to “expose.” Webster’s Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary 2275 (1993) (capitalization modified); see
American Heritage Dictionary 807 (3d ed. 1992) (“[t]o ex-
pose to something,” “[t]o cause to experience”). A person
plainly causes, exposes, or otherwise makes someone sub-
mit to torture when she “consciously and culpably ‘partici-
pat[es]’ in” it. Twitter, 598 U. S., at 493; see also Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts §876, Comment d (1977) (explaining
that, under the common law, aiding and abetting requires

26 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
proving the “assistance is a substantial factor in causing
the resulting tort”).
The majority’s narrow interpretation of the word “sub-
jects” is also incompatible with another form of secondary
liability that all agree is covered by the TVPA: command
responsibility. See Brief for Petitioners 41; Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 31–32. Command responsibility
holds superior officers vicariously liable for the actions of
their subordinates. It generally requires showing that the
superior “knew, or should have known,” that subordinates
had or were about to commit torture and “failed to take all
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent” it. Chavez
v. Carranza, 559 F. 3d 486, 499 (CA6 2009); see Mohamad,
566 U. S., at 458 (approvingly citing Chavez). It requires
showing neither “proximate cause” nor that the officer par-
ticipated in the torture. See Chavez, 559 F. 3d, at 499. That
the TVPA extends such attenuated liability to someone who
did not participate in torture suggests that it also holds li-
able someone who culpably participates in torture, such as
someone who provides tools to the torturer. Contra, ante,
at 14, n. 4.
Finally, the majority’s reliance on Central Bank is mis-
placed. As discussed above, that case interpreted a statute
imposing liability on someone who “‘directly or indirectly’”
engaged in proscribed acts. 511 U. S., at 176. That lan-
guage is narrower than the TVPA’s operative language that
extends liability to anyone who “subjects” another to tor-
ture. Yet by extending Central Bank in this way, the ma-
jority effectively creates a magic-words test and “impose[s]
a ‘clarity tax’ on Congress by demanding that it speak une-
quivocally if it wants to” impose aiding-and-abetting liabil-
ity. Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477, 508 (2023) (B
ARRETT,
J., concurring) (quoting J. Manning, Clear Statement Rules
and the Constitution, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 399, 403 (2010)).
Even in contexts where this Court requires a clear state-
ment, like waivers of sovereign immunity, this Court has

27 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
emphasized that “‘no magic words are required’” because
the “fact that Congress chose to use certain language” in
one statute “hardly means it was ‘foreclose[d] . . . from us-
ing different language to accomplish th[e] same goal.’” De-
partment of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing
Service v. Kirtz, 601 U. S. 42, 52 (2024); see Sebelius v. Au-
burn Regional Medical Center, 568 U. S. 145, 153 (2013)
(emphasizing Congress need not “incant magic words” to
make clear that a statutory limitation is jurisdictional).
The majority offers no reason why magic words would be
required in this context.
At bottom, the TVPA expressly authorizes victims of tor-
ture to sue any “individual who . . . subjects [them] to tor-
ture.” §1350 note. Because the plain text of this statute
includes individuals who aid and abet the victim’s torture,
I would affirm the Ninth Circuit’s judgment on this score as
well.
V
The Court’s decision today is yet another notch in its belt,
unabashedly remaking the law in its preferred image. The
majority jettisons two decades of settled precedent and
breathes new life into two decades of rejected legal theories.
It does all this in the name of respecting Congress and the
separation of powers. Yet in fixating on the separation of
powers, the majority ignores the foundations of its own and
shakes the public’s confidence in the stable and predictable
development of the law. Because resolving this case did not
require inflicting these wounds, I respectfully dissent.