T. M. v. University of Md. Medical System Corporation

1
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
T.M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND MEDICAL
SYSTEM CORPORATION
ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25–197. Argued April 20, 2026—Decided June 18, 2026
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts from exercising
jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers seeking review
and rejection of state-court judgments rendered before district court
proceedings commenced. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus-
tries Corp., 544 U. S. 280, 284. This case asks whether the doctrine
applies only to final judgments rendered by the highest court of a State
in which a decision could be had, or whether it also bars suit when the
state-court judgment at issue remains subject to further review in
state appellate proceedings.
Petitioner T. M. alleges that she has a medical condition that causes
changes in her mental status, including psychosis, when she ingests
gluten. In March 2023, T. M. accidentally ingested gluten and was
taken to the emergency room at Baltimore Washington Medical Cen-
ter, where, after an administrative hearing and over her and her fa-
ther’s objections, she was involuntarily committed for about three
months. During her stay, T. M.’s treating psychiatrist and the medical
center obtained an order authorizing the facility to forcibly inject T. M.
with antipsychotic medication. These events prompted a flurry of liti-
gation, with T. M. and her parents filing several state and federal law-
suits seeking T. M.’s release and to avoid the forced injections. T. M.
and respondents negotiated a settlement agreement to facilitate
T. M.’s discharge, and the state judge presiding over T. M.’s state ha-
beas petition entered the agreement as a consent order on June 12,
2023. The consent order provided for T. M.’s immediate release subject
to several conditions, including that T. M. obtain a new treating psy-
chiatrist, continue taking her prescribed medications, and dismiss

2 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM
CORPORATION
Syllabus
with prejudice all pending actions against respondents. Ten days after
the state court entered the consent order, T. M. and her parents ob-
tained new counsel and sued respondents in Federal District Court for
the District of Maryland, seeking a declaration that the consent order
violated T. M.’s federal and state due-process rights, a declaration that
the order was obtained under duress, and an injunction preventing its
enforcement. Meanwhile, T. M. appealed the consent order to the Ap-
pellate Court of Maryland and raised similar arguments. T. M. later
successfully moved to stay the state-court appeal to prevent incon-
sistent rulings. The District Court dismissed the complaint sua sponte
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doc-
trine. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, rejecting T. M.’s argument that
Rooker-Feldman applies only to judgments that are final judgments
from the highest court of a State in which the decision could be had.
Held: The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdic-
tion over cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court pro-
ceedings commenced and seeking district court review and rejection of
those judgments, regardless of whether the state-court judgment re-
mains subject to further review in state appellate proceedings. Pp. 5–
18.
(a) Federal district courts generally lack “any power to review di-
rectly cases from state courts.” Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomo-
tive Engineers, 398 U. S. 281, 286. The Supreme Court is the only fed-
eral court with appellate jurisdiction to review state-court judgments,
and that jurisdiction extends only to “[f]inal judgments or decrees ren-
dered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had,”
28 U. S. C. §1257(a). In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413, the
Court held that a Federal District Court lacked jurisdiction to declare
a state-court judgment “null and void” because doing so would be “an
exercise of appellate jurisdiction,” which only the Supreme Court pos-
sesses, and the “jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts is strictly
original.” Id., at 414–416. In District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U. S. 462, the Court held that a Federal District Court
lacked jurisdiction to “review” a final judicial determination of the
D. C. high court because such “[r]eview . . . can be obtained only in [the
Supreme] Court” under §1257. Id., at 476, 482.
Rooker and Feldman rest on two closely related bases of reasoning.
First, when plaintiffs “essentially invit[e] federal courts of first in-
stance to review and reverse unfavorable state-court judgments,” they
are seeking an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Exxon, 544 U. S., at
283–284. Second, such “appellate jurisdiction to reverse or modify a
state-court judgment is lodged, . . . by 28 U. S. C. §1257, exclusively in
[the Supreme] Court.” 544 U. S., at 283. This Court has since refused

3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ___ (2026)
Syllabus
to expand the Rooker-Feldman doctrine but has also reaffirmed its rule
in the narrow ground it occupies. Exxon, 544 U. S., at 284. Pp. 5–8.
(b) T. M.’s case falls within “the narrow ground occupied by Rooker-
Feldman,” Exxon, 544 U. S., at 284, because she is complaining of in-
juries caused by, and seeking relief from, the state-court judgment it-
self, arguing that the consent order violates her federal and state due
process rights and was entered into under duress. The consent order
was rendered 10 days before T. M. commenced this federal lawsuit,
and she plainly seeks “review and rejection” of the “ ‘Consent Order’ ”
by asking the District Court to declare it “unconstitutional, unenforce-
able, and void ab initio” and to enjoin its “enforcement.” 139 F. 4th
344, 347. P. 8.
(c) The Court rejects T. M.’s argument that Rooker-Feldman should
apply only to final judgments rendered by the highest court of a State
in which a decision could be had, i.e., the kinds of judgments that
strictly fall within this Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1257.
Pp. 9–18.
(1)T. M.’s theory cannot be squared with the Court’s precedents.
T. M. reads the Court’s prior Rooker-Feldman cases not to evince any
concern about district courts exercising what amounts to appellate ju-
risdiction over state-court judgments, but instead as relying on a strict
negative inference from §1257: when this Court has jurisdiction over a
state-court judgment, district courts must not. But this Court’s prece-
dents plainly adopted a more functional view of what constitutes orig-
inal and appellate jurisdiction under §1331. In Rooker, nothing in the
Court’s reasoning suggested the outcome would have been different
had the judgment still been on appeal; the Court held that seeking to
“reverse or modify the [state-court] judgment” would be an “exercise of
appellate jurisdiction,” which the District Court lacks because it has
“strictly original” jurisdiction. 263 U. S., at 416. Later cases confirmed
that Rooker-Feldman bars suits in federal district court that “see[k]
what in substance would be appellate review of [a] state judgment,”
regardless of whether the judgment formally falls within this Court’s
§1257 jurisdiction. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997, 1005–1006.
In fact, Feldman explicitly rejected the notion that district courts have
jurisdiction to review state-court judgments so long as the judgments
are not yet within this Court’s §1257 jurisdiction. 460 U. S., at 483–
484, n. 16 (explaining that irrespective of the Court’s “jurisdiction to
review a final state court judgment . . . ‘lower federal courts possess
no power whatever to sit in direct review of state court decisions’ ”).
Pp. 9–13.
(2) If departure from this Court’s precedents alone were not
enough to affirm the dismissal of T. M.’s suit under Rooker-Feldman,
adopting T. M.’s rule would also create anomalous outcomes and

4 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM
CORPORATION
Syllabus
undermine federalism principles. Allowing federal district courts to
review state-court judgments while they are on appeal in the state-
court system would undermine the “[c]ooperation and comity” on
which the Nation’s federal system is built. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon
Oil Co., 526 U. S. 574, 586. T. M.’s rule would also produce arbitrarily
different results depending on when a federal suit seeking review of a
state-court judgment is filed, encouraging parties to file earlier in fed-
eral court while the state appellate proceedings are pending, and to
duplicate their efforts even though the state process may resolve the
dispute in their favor.
T. M.’s contention that abstention and preclusion doctrines can do
nearly all of the work that Rooker-Feldman does is unavailing. It is
unclear if such doctrines even apply in cases where a plaintiff com-
plains of injuries that stem directly from a state-court judgment rather
than attempting to relitigate the same claims. Federalism principles
are thus best served by continuing to apply Rooker-Feldman to federal
plaintiffs seeking review of state-court judgments, regardless of
whether those judgments are final trial-court judgments or those of a
State’s highest court. Pp. 13–16.
(3)T. M. contends that the Court should adopt her position be-
cause it will generally cabin Rooker-Feldman, a doctrine she claims
has caused confusion and is overused as a docket-clearing mechanism
in the lower courts. T. M.’s proposed rule would fail to address the
source of confusion in current Rooker-Feldman doctrine—determining
when a plaintiff is seeking federal review and rejection of a state-court
judgment—and would add a new source of confusion by requiring
courts to determine whether a state-court judgment is a reviewable
final judgment under §1257(a). In any event, the animating force be-
hind T. M.’s arguments is the belief that Rooker and Feldman were
wrongly decided, but this issue is not fairly included in the question
presented. The Court today neither expands nor constrains Rooker-
Feldman but leaves the doctrine as it found it. Pp. 16–18.
139 F. 4th 344, affirmed.
S
OTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS,
A
LITO, KAVANAUGH, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a concur-
ring opinion. BARRETT, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS,
C.J., and K
AGAN and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.

_________________
_________________
1 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 25–197
T.M., PETITIONER v. UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND
MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION,
ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[June 18, 2026]
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under what has become known as the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction over “cases
brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused
by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review
and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U. S. 280, 284 (2005).
This case asks whether this rule bars suit when the state-
court judgment at issue is subject to further review in state
appellate proceedings. A straightforward application of the
logic and reasoning underlying Rooker-Feldman leads to
one conclusion: It does. Because this suit falls within the
narrow doctrine’s limits, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit properly affirmed its dismissal.
I
A
Petitioner T. M. alleges that she has a medical condition
that “‘causes changes in [her] mental status upon ingesting
any amount of gluten’ and can result in ‘episodes of psycho-
sis.’” 139 F. 4th 344, 347 (CA4 2025) (alteration in

2 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM
CORPORATION
Opinion of the Court
original). In March 2023, T. M. accidentally ingested glu-
ten and was taken to the emergency room at Baltimore
Washington Medical Center. After an administrative hear-
ing before a Maryland administrative law judge (ALJ), and
over her and her father’s objection, she was involuntarily
committed to the facility, where she stayed for about three
months. During her stay, T. M.’s treating psychiatrist and
the medical center sought, and were granted by a clinic re-
view panel, an order authorizing the facility forcibly to in-
ject T. M. with antipsychotic medication. That order was
later affirmed by an ALJ.
These events jumpstarted a flurry of litigation, with T. M.
and her parents filing several state and federal lawsuits
seeking to have T. M. released from involuntary commit-
ment and to avoid the forced injections. In state court,
T.M. filed two petitions for judicial review of the ALJ deci-
sions allowing her involuntary admission and upholding
the forced-injection order. She also filed a state habeas pe-
tition and a separate civil action, with several emergency
motions, seeking release from the medical center. In fed-
eral court, T. M. filed a due-process suit seeking damages
and an injunction requiring her discharge. T. M.’s father,
for his part, filed a state-court action against respondents
seeking an order requiring them to recognize T. M.’s pur-
ported advance medical directive listing him as T. M.’s
healthcare agent if she became incompetent to make deci-
sions.
In the midst of those lawsuits, T. M. and respondents ne-
gotiated a settlement agreement to facilitate T. M.’s dis-
charge, and the state judge presiding over the state habeas
petition entered the agreement as a consent order. The con-
sent order provided for T. M.’s immediate release subject to
several conditions, including that T. M. would “(1) obtain a
new treating psychiatrist and continue to take her hospital-
prescribed medications; (2) regularly meet and consult with
a third-party provider regarding her treatment and

3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
medication; (3) accept a referral to [an outpatient clinic] and
follow their recommendations; (4) take all prescribed medi-
cations; and (5) dismiss with prejudice all of her [and her
parents’] pending actions against [respondents].” App. to
Pet. for Cert. 24a. The consent order also required T. M.’s
parents to monitor her use of her medications and report if
she stopped taking them. The state court, counsel for T. M.,
and respondents signed the consent order on June 12, 2023,
and respondents discharged T. M.
B
Unfortunately, the consent order did not end the parties’
dispute in either state or federal court. Ten days after the
state court entered the consent order, T. M. and her parents
obtained new counsel and sued respondents in the District
Court for the District of Maryland. This lawsuit is now be-
fore the Court. The complaint sought a declaration that the
consent order violated T. M.’s federal and state due-process
rights, a declaration that the order was obtained under du-
ress, and an injunction preventing the order’s enforcement.
Meanwhile, back in state court, T. M. appealed the con-
sent order to the Appellate Court of Maryland and raised
similar arguments. About four months later, T. M. moved
to stay the pending appeal in the Appellate Court of Mary-
land, contending that a stay was warranted to “prevent in-
consistent rulings” because both the state appeal and the
pending federal lawsuit were “based on the same facts and
events.” Motion to Stay in No. 1:23–cv–1684, ECF Doc. 81–
1, p. 1. The Appellate Court of Maryland granted the stay,
which remains in effect.
In the federal case, the Maryland District Court dis-
missed the complaint sua sponte for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, holding that T. M.’s claims were barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. That doctrine, addressed in de-
tail below, generally holds that federal courts lack jurisdic-
tion over lawsuits brought by parties who received adverse

4 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM
CORPORATION
Opinion of the Court
judgments in state courts and then turn to federal courts
seeking “review and rejection of ” those judgments. Exxon,
544 U. S., at 284.
1
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The panel observed that in
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413 (1923), this Court
held that a Federal District Court lacked jurisdiction to
“ ‘declar[e]’ that [a] state court’s judgment was ‘null and
void’” under the Federal Constitution because doing so
“ ‘would be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction,’” which only
the Supreme Court possesses. 139 F. 4th, at 348 (quoting
263 U. S., at 414–415, 416). Because T. M. was asking the
District Court here to do precisely that, the Fourth Circuit
reasoned that this “case is too much like Rooker to justify a
different” conclusion and thus required dismissal based on
Rooker-Feldman. 139 F. 4th, at 346. In so holding, the
Fourth Circuit also rejected T. M.’s argument that Rooker-
Feldman applies only to judgments that are “‘final judg-
ment[s] from the highest court of a State in which the deci-
sion could be had,’” reasoning that this Court has never im-
posed such a requirement. 139 F. 4th, at 353–354.
T. M. filed a timely petition for a writ of certiorari seeking
review of the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine can be triggered by a state-court judg-
ment that remains subject to further review in state court.
The Sixth Circuit has taken the same position as the Fourth
Circuit. See RLR Invs., LLC v. Pigeon Forge, 4 F. 4th 380,
389–390, 396 (2021). Other Circuits have held that Rooker-
Feldman applies only if the state-court proceedings have
“ended.” See, e.g., Federación de Maestros de P. R. v. Junta
de Relaciones del Trabajo de P. R., 410 F. 3d 17, 24–25 (CA1
2005) (outlining three-part test to determine whether state
——————
1
The District Court also granted respondents’ motion to dismiss
T.M.’s parents’ claims on the merits.

5 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
proceedings have functionally “ended”).
2
The Court granted
certiorari to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Ap-
peals. 607 U. S. 1079 (2025).
II
A
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and gen-
erally can resolve only the cases that Congress grants them
power to hear.” Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist,
607 U. S. 421, 424 (2026). As relevant here, Congress in 28
U.S. C. §1331 granted federal district courts “original ju-
risdiction of all civil actions” raising federal questions. Dis-
trict courts generally lack “any power to review directly
cases from state courts.” Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Lo-
comotive Engineers, 398 U. S. 281, 286 (1970). Instead, this
Court is the only federal court with appellate jurisdiction to
review state-court judgments, and that jurisdiction extends
only to “[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the high-
est court of a State in which a decision could be had.”
§1257(a). Thus, “from the beginning we have had in this
country two essentially separate legal systems” with “[e]ach
system proceed[ing] independently of the other with ulti-
mate review in this Court of the federal questions raised in
either system.” Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U. S., at 286.
3
The Court delineated some of the bounds that separate
these two systems in Rooker and Feldman. First, in Rooker,
——————
2
See also, e.g., Malhan v. Secretary U. S. Dept. of State, 938 F. 3d 453,
459–460 (CA3 2019); Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F. 3d 1266, 1275–1277, and
n. 9 (CA11 2009); Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F. 3d 1027, 1032, n. 2 (CA10
2006); Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F. 3d 77, 89 (CA2
2005); Mothershed v. Justices of the Sup. Ct., 410 F. 3d 602, 604, n. 1
(CA9 2005).
3
To be sure, “Congress . . . may explicitly empower district courts to
oversee certain state-court judgments and has done so, most notably, in
authorizing federal habeas review of state prisoners’ petitions.” Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U. S. 280, 292, n. 8
(2005) (citing 28 U. S. C. §2254(a)).

6 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM
CORPORATION
Opinion of the Court
the Court held that a Federal District Court lacked juris-
diction to resolve a case that sought “to have a judgment of
a circuit court in Indiana, which was affirmed by the Su-
preme Court of the State, declared null and void” because it
violated the Constitution’s due process, contracts, and
equal protection clauses. 263 U. S., at 414. The Court ex-
plained that “entertain[ing] a proceeding to reverse or mod-
ify [a] judgment for errors of that character” would be “an
exercise of appellate jurisdiction.” Id., at 415–416. As a
result, the suit was “plainly not within the District Court’s
jurisdiction” because the “jurisdiction possessed by the Dis-
trict Courts is strictly original.” Ibid. The Court also laid
out the path to challenging a state-court judgment: “If the
constitutional questions . . . actually arose” in the suit, “it
was the province and duty of the state courts to decide
them” in the first instance. Id., at 415. “If the decision was
wrong, that did not make the judgment void, but merely left
it open to reversal or modification in an appropriate and
timely appellate proceeding,” including through appellate
review in this Court. Ibid.
Second, in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feld-
man, 460 U. S. 462 (1983), the Court held that a Federal
District Court lacked jurisdiction to “review” a final judicial
determination of the D. C. high court because such
“[r]eview . . . can be obtained only in this Court” under
§1257. Id., at 476, 482. The plaintiffs there had challenged
as unconstitutional a court rule requiring D. C. bar appli-
cants to have graduated from an approved law school. They
had also sought a waiver of that rule. This Court held that
the Federal District Court had no jurisdiction to review the
D. C. high court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ waiver petitions,
but possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of the
rule itself because, in the latter situation, the “district court
is not reviewing a state-court judicial decision.” Id., at 486.
Rooker and Feldman are thus built on two closely related
bases of reasoning. The first is that, when plaintiffs

7 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
“essentially invit[e] federal courts of first instance to review
and reverse unfavorable state-court judgments,” they are
seeking an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. See Exxon,
544 U. S., at 283–284 (describing Rooker and Feldman).
The second is that such “appellate jurisdiction to reverse or
modify a state-court judgment is lodged, . . . by 28 U. S. C.
§1257, exclusively in this Court.” 544 U. S., at 283. Federal
district courts, by contrast, are “empowered to exercise
[only] original, not appellate, jurisdiction.” Ibid.
In the years since Rooker and Feldman, this Court has
refused to expand the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
4
In the
“narrow ground occupied by Rooker-Feldman,” however,
the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed its rule. Exxon, 544
U. S., at 284. In Exxon, the Court held that the “Rooker-
Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to cases of the kind from
which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-
court judgments rendered before the district court proceed-
ings commenced and inviting district court review and
——————
4
For instance, this Court has held that Rooker-Feldman does not apply
when the federal plaintiff “was not a party in the state court” because
that plaintiff would not have been in any “position to ask this Court to
review the state court’s judgment.” Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997,
1006 (1994); see Lance v. Dennis, 546 U. S. 459, 466 (2006) (per curiam)
(The “Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar actions by nonparties to the
earlier state-court judgment” even if “they could be considered in privity
with a party to the judgment”). This Court has also held that Rooker-
Feldman does not apply when there is parallel litigation, such as when
a party files a federal action raising the same claim as one in a state court
action that has not yet reached a judgment. Exxon, 544 U. S., at 293–
294. Finally, this Court has held that Rooker-Feldman bars suits “chal-
leng[ing]” an “adverse” state-court decision, but does not bar a suit chal-
lenging a “statute or rule governing th[at] [state-court] decision.” Skin-
ner v. Switzer, 562 U. S. 521, 532 (2011); see also Reed v. Goertz, 598
U. S. 230, 235 (2023).

8 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM
CORPORATION
Opinion of the Court
rejection of those judgments.” 544 U. S., at 284.
5
In those
cases, Rooker-Feldman continues to require “dismiss[al] for
want of subject-matter jurisdiction.” 544 U. S., at 284; see
also Lance v. Dennis, 546 U. S. 459, 466 (2006) (per curiam)
(“The doctrine applies only in ‘limited circumstances’ . . .
where a party in effect seeks to take an appeal of an unfa-
vorable state-court decision to a lower federal court”); Reed
v. Goertz, 598 U. S. 230, 235 (2023) (“Th[e] doctrine prohib-
its federal courts from adjudicating cases brought by state-
court losing parties challenging state-court judgments”).
B
Under these precedents, T. M.’s case falls within “the
narrow ground occupied by Rooker-Feldman.” Exxon, 544
U. S., at 284. T. M. is complaining of injuries caused by,
and is seeking relief from, the state-court judgment itself,
arguing that the consent order violates her federal and
state due process rights and was entered into under duress.
See App. 40–45 (complaint alleging injuries stemming from
the consent order). The consent order was rendered 10 days
before T. M. commenced this federal lawsuit. T. M. plainly
seeks “review and rejection” of the consent order by asking
the District Court to “[d]eclare that the ‘Consent Order’” is
“unconstitutional, unenforceable, and void ab initio” and to
enjoin “enforcement of the ‘Consent Order.’” 139 F. 4th, at
347. Thus, T. M.’s case is the “‘paradigm situation in which
Rooker-Feldman precludes a federal district court from pro-
ceeding’”: She does not like the result reached in state court
——————
5
Exxon elsewhere also noted that in both Rooker and Feldman, the
federal plaintiffs sued “after the state proceedings ended.” 544 U. S., at
291. The dissent argues that this fact was a “key featur[e]” of those cases,
post, at 6–7 (opinion of B
ARRETT, J.), but Exxon never mentioned this fact
in the cited “hold[ing]” when it described the “kind” of cases to which
Rooker-Feldman still applies. See 544 U. S., at 284. Needless to say,
neither Rooker nor Feldman constrained their rules of decision to cases
that perfectly match their facts.

9 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
and “repaired to federal court to undo the [state] judgment
in [her] favor.” Exxon, 544 U. S., at 293.
III
Instead of disputing any of the points discussed above,
6
T. M. asks this Court to add a new requirement to the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In T. M.’s view, endorsed by the
dissent, the Court should adopt a new rule specifying that
Rooker-Feldman bars only federal suits seeking review and
rejection of “[f]inal judgments” that are “rendered by the
highest court of a State in which a decision could be had,”
28 U. S. C. §1257(a). See Brief for Petitioner 19; post, at 6
(opinion of B
ARRETT, J.). Because that rule is inconsistent
with the Court’s precedents, risks producing anomalous re-
sults, and undermines federalism interests, the Court de-
clines to adopt it.
A
T. M.’s theory, echoed by the dissent, fails because it re-
quires a reimagining, rather than an application, of the
Court’s Rooker-Feldman precedents. Taking T. M.’s argu-
ment step-by-step illustrates the point.
In T. M.’s view, Rooker-Feldman has never rested on any
distinction between what, in substance, qualifies as original
and appellate jurisdiction. Instead, on her theory, an action
commenced in federal district court “seeking the adjudica-
tion of a freestanding [federal-question] cause of action” al-
ways technically “invok[es] the district court’s original ju-
risdiction” under 28 U. S. C. §1331 and is akin to a
collateral attack. Brief for Petitioner 32; see post, at 2–3
(opinion of B
ARRETT, J.). Therefore, as T. M. sees things,
——————
6
In the Fourth Circuit, T. M. contended that she was not a “ ‘state-
court loser’ ” and that her suit was “really about injuries inflicted by the
medical center rather than the consent order,” but the Fourth Circuit
rejected those arguments and she has not raised them here. 139 F. 4th,
at 350–352.

10 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM
CORPORATION
Opinion of the Court
the Court’s prior Rooker-Feldman cases should not be read
to evince any concern about district courts exercising what
amounts to appellate jurisdiction over state-court judg-
ments, but instead should be read as relying on a strict neg-
ative inference, from §1257, that when this Court has juris-
diction over a state-court judgment, district courts must
not. In T. M.’s view, it follows from here that, for Rooker-
Feldman to bar a federal suit, it is not enough that a state-
court loser seeks what is effectively appellate review of
prior state-court judgment. For T. M., the judgment under
attack must be a “[f]inal judgmen[t] or decre[e] rendered by
the highest court of a State in which a decision could be
had,” §1257(a), at the time the federal suit is initiated, be-
cause only then does this Court gain jurisdiction over a
state-court judgment.
T. M.’s theory cannot be squared with this Court’s prece-
dents, which plainly adopted a different, more functional
view of original and appellate jurisdiction than what T. M.
advances here. In Rooker, for example, it was true that the
judgment at issue had been affirmed by the state high court
by the time the federal suit was filed, but nothing in this
Court’s reasoning suggested that the outcome would have
been different had the judgment still been on appeal. There
(as here), Rooker’s federal suit sought to “reverse or modify
the [state-court] judgment,” which the Court held would be
an “exercise of appellate jurisdiction,” 263 U. S., at 416, and
not a collateral attack invoking original jurisdiction. There
(as here), the District Court would lack such “appellate” ju-
risdiction because it has “strictly original” jurisdiction.
Ibid. There (as here), it would be the “province and duty of
the state courts to decide” the federal questions first, and
“[i]f the decision was wrong,” Rooker could seek “reversal or
modification in an appropriate and timely appellate pro-
ceeding,” including in this Court under §1257. Id., at 415.
Later cases delineating the bounds of Rooker-Feldman,
see n. 4, supra, confirmed the understanding that Rooker-

11 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
Feldman bars suits in federal district court that “see[k]
what in substance would be appellate review of [a] state
judgment,” regardless of whether the judgment formally
falls within this Court’s §1257 jurisdiction. Johnson v. De
Grandy, 512 U. S. 997, 1005–1006 (1994). As this Court ex-
plained in Exxon, the doctrine “‘recognizes that 28 U. S. C.
§1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction, and does not au-
thorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over
state-court judgments, which Congress has reserved to this
Court, see §1257(a).’” 544 U. S., at 292 (quoting Verizon
Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U. S. 635, 644,
n. 3 (2002)). In Lance, too, this Court emphasized that
“[t]he doctrine applies only in ‘limited circumstances’ where
a party in effect seeks to take an appeal of an unfavorable
state-court decision to a lower federal court.” 546 U. S., at
466 (citation omitted). None of these cases suggests that
district courts have jurisdiction to review state-court judg-
ments, and declare them void, so long as the judgments are
not yet within this Court’s §1257 jurisdiction.
In fact, Feldman explicitly rejected that notion. There,
the Court addressed a Fifth Circuit case holding that
Rooker did not apply because the judgment “‘could not have
been reviewed on a writ of certiorari from the United States
Supreme Court,’” given the plaintiff’s failure to raise the
relevant federal issue in state court. 460 U. S., at 483, n. 16
(quoting Dasher v. Supreme Ct. of Tex., 658 F. 2d 1045,
1051 (1981)). The Court rejected that reasoning as “flawed”
because “the fact that we may not have jurisdiction to re-
view a final state-court judgment . . . does not mean that a
United States district court should have jurisdiction over
the claims.” 460 U. S., at 484, n. 16. After all, the Court
explained, “‘lower federal courts possess no power whatever
to sit in direct review of state court decisions.’” Id., at 483,
n.16; but see id., at 490 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing,
as T. M. and the dissent do here, that the Feldman majority
improperly “fail[ed] to distinguish between . . . appellate

12 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM
CORPORATION
Opinion of the Court
review and collateral attack”). Feldman thus explicitly re-
jected T. M.’s view that Rooker rested solely on a strict neg-
ative inference from §1257.
7
The dissent, for its part, admits that this Court has relied
on both §§1331 and 1257 in justifying Rooker-Feldman, but
contends that Exxon “buried” and “discarded” the §1331 ra-
tionale. Post, at 7–8. Had the Court in Exxon intended to
bury or discard the §1331 rationale, one might have ex-
pected it to say so rather than to quote affirmatively a case
that directly describes the doctrine as resting on both
§§1331 and 1257. See 544 U. S., at 292 (citing Verizon Md.
Inc., 535 U. S., at 644, n. 3). Moreover, Exxon acknowl-
edged, without disapproval, Rooker’s reasoning that
“[f]ederal district courts . . . lacked the requisite appellate
authority, for their jurisdiction was ‘strictly original.’” 544
U. S., at 284. It also summarized Rooker and Feldman as
“essentially invit[ing] federal courts of first instance to re-
view and reverse unfavorable state-court judgments,” 544
U. S., at 283, and it held that Exxon’s federal suit did not
fall within Rooker-Feldman because Exxon did “not repai[r]
to federal court to undo the Delaware judgment in its fa-
vor,” 544 U. S., at 293. All these statements are only con-
sistent with the view that Rooker-Feldman is based on both
§§1331 and 1257, and none even suggests that the state-
——————
7
Indeed, even though the state-court judgment in Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413 (1923), was a final judgment of a state high
court, it did not fall within this Court’s certiorari jurisdiction under
§1257 either because the Court’s jurisdictional deadline for filing the pe-
tition for a writ of certiorari had passed. See id., at 416; this Court’s Rule
13.2(describing civil filing deadline as jurisdictional). Still, the Court
reasoned, “an aggrieved litigant cannot be permitted to do indirectly” in
federal district court “what he no longer can do directly” in this Court.
263 U. S., at 416. True, T. M. seeks federal appellate review of a state-
court judgment prematurely (before receiving a final judgment this
Court can review), whereas Rooker tried to do so belatedly. Either way,
the same principle applies: T. M. “cannot be permitted to do indirectly”
what she cannot yet “do directly.” Ibid.

13 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
court judgment at issue must be a “[f]inal judgmen[t] . . .
rendered by the highest court of a State” under §1257(a).
8
Ultimately, adopting T. M. and the dissent’s rule would
require the Court to abandon a central part of Rooker’s rea-
soning and reinterpret the doctrine to rest solely on a strict
negative inference from §1257. See Brief for Petitioner 33–
34 (acknowledging that the Court’s precedents have rested
in part based on the distinction between original and appel-
late jurisdiction); post, at 3 (acknowledging that Rooker
rested in part on §1331). The Court declines to do so.
B
The fact that T. M. and the dissent’s rule departs from
this Court’s precedents is enough to affirm the dismissal of
T. M.’s suit under Rooker-Feldman. If more is necessary,
however, the Court also declines to distort the Rooker-Feld-
man doctrine in service of a rule that would create anoma-
lous outcomes and undermine the federalism principles
upon which the doctrine rests. The upshot of T. M. and the
dissent’s rule would be that federal district courts could not
exercise jurisdiction if a plaintiff seeks review of a state
high-court judgment, but they could exercise jurisdiction if
——————
8
The dissent also appears to equate Exxon’s reference to the fact that
“ ‘state proceedings [had] ended’” in Rooker and Feldman with a judg-
ment being final under §1257. Post, at 6 (emphasis deleted). Exxon,
however, did not itself draw that connection. Likely as a result, many of
the Circuits that interpreted Exxon to hold that Rooker-Feldman applies
only when state-court proceedings have “ended” have not adopted T. M.
and the dissent’s §1257 finality rule. See, e.g., Federación de Maestros
de P. R. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P. R., 410 F. 3d 17, 24–25
(CA1 2005); Malhan, 938 F. 3d, at 459–460 (collecting cases). They in-
stead reasoned that a state proceeding may “end” even without a final
judgment from a state high court, such as when a state-court loser does
not appeal to the state high court. See Federación de Maestros, 410 F. 3d,
at 24–25. Based on this reasoning, these Circuits created multipart anal-
yses to determine whether state proceedings have functionally “ended”
(and thus Rooker-Feldman may apply), see 410 F. 3d, at 24–25, which
neither the dissent nor T. M. embrace.

14 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM
CORPORATION
Opinion of the Court
the plaintiff seeks the same review of a state lower-court
judgment while that judgment is on appeal in the state-
court system. That makes little sense.
To start, allowing federal district courts to review state-
court judgments while they are on appeal in the state-court
system would undermine the “[c]ooperation and comity” on
which our federal system is built. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon
Oil Co., 526 U. S. 574, 586 (1999). Indeed, that is the reason
why, “ever since 1789, Congress has granted this Court the
power to intervene in State litigation only after ‘the highest
court of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had’
has rendered a ‘final judgment.’” Radio Station WOW, Inc.
v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 124 (1945); see North Dakota Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U. S. 156,
159 (1973) (explaining that one of §1257’s purposes is to
“limi[t] review of state court determinations of federal con-
stitutional issues to leave at a minimum federal intrusion
in state affairs”). It is difficult to see why Congress would
have authorized district courts to review final state-court
judgments pending appeal in state court when it did not au-
thorize this Court to do so.
T. M. and the dissent’s rule also would produce arbitrar-
ily different results depending on when, exactly, a federal
suit seeking review of a state-court judgment is filed. In
their view, a district court can review a state-court judg-
ment so long as it has not been affirmed by the state high
court by the time the federal action is filed. Yet a state high
court may well affirm such a judgment while such a federal
action is still pending. In that event, the plaintiff would be
in the exact same situation Rooker disapproved: seeking to
have declared null and void “a judgment of a [state court],
which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State.”
263 U. S., at 414. Yet, under T. M. and the dissent’s rule, a
district court would have jurisdiction to proceed simply be-
cause the plaintiff filed her federal suit while the state ap-
pellate proceedings were pending, rather than waiting for

15 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
the state high court to act. Such a rule would only encour-
age parties to file earlier in federal court, duplicating their
efforts even though the state process may well resolve the
dispute in their favor.
T. M., her amici, and the dissent respond that federal
courts have at their disposal various abstention and preclu-
sion doctrines, which generally prevent federal courts from
interfering with state proceedings or bar parties from relit-
igating issues already decided. According to T. M., those
doctrines prevent federal-court intervention while state ap-
pellate proceedings are ongoing and thus do “nearly all,”
but apparently not all, “of the work that Rooker-Feldman
does.” Reply Brief 18; see Brief for Federal Courts Scholars
as Amici Curiae 7–16 (listing nine doctrines); see also post,
at 4–5 (opinion of B
ARRETT, J.) (describing preclusion and
abstention doctrines). It is unclear, however, if such doc-
trines even apply in cases, like this one, where a plaintiff
does not attempt to relitigate the same claims in state and
federal forums but rather complains of injuries that stem
directly from a state-court judgment. See Letter Order in
No. 1:23–cv–1684 (D Md.), ECF Doc. 27, pp. 3–5 (holding
that neither abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S.
37 (1971), nor Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U. S. 800 (1976), nor Maryland’s collat-
eral-attack doctrine applied to this case); see also Lucky
Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Group, Inc., 590
U. S. 405, 411 (2020) (explaining that issue preclusion “pre-
cludes a party from relitigating an issue actually decided in
a prior case and necessary to the judgment”). Federalism
principles are thus best served by continuing to apply
Rooker-Feldman to federal cases in which plaintiffs seek re-
view of state-court judgments, regardless of whether those

16 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM
CORPORATION
Opinion of the Court
judgments are final trial-court judgments or those of a
State’s highest court.
9
C
Finally, T. M. contends that the Court should adopt her
position for the more practical reason that it will generally
cabin Rooker-Feldman, a doctrine she claims has caused
confusion and is overused as a docket-clearing mechanism
in the lower courts. See Brief for Petitioner 35. As T. M.
admits, however, most of the confusion in the lower courts
“stems from the need to determine when a plaintiff is seek-
ing federal ‘review and rejection’ of a state-court judgment.”
Id., at 37; see Gilbank v. Wood Cty. Dept. of Human Servs.,
111 F. 4th 754, 792–798 (CA7 2024) (en banc) (majority
opinion of Kirsch, J.); id., at 760, 769–778 (dissenting opin-
ion of Hamilton, J.) (describing the confusion over the “‘re-
view and rejection’” requirement). That “review and rejec-
tion” question is not disputed in this case, so adopting
T. M.’s rule does nothing to ameliorate any confusion over
that distinct issue.
10
——————
9
Strangely, the dissent resists the idea that federalism principles play
any role in Rooker-Feldman at all. Post, at 9–11. It is true that neither
Rooker nor Feldman uses the word “federalism,” but both discuss the ap-
propriate roles of the state and federal courts. See supra, at 5–7. The
dissent’s resistance to acknowledging federalism values here is also in-
consistent with its own interpretation of Rooker-Feldman as a “ ‘§1257
Rule.’ ” Post, at 11. The Court has consistently explained that §1257’s
finality requirement rests in part on principles of federalism. See Penn-
sylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U. S. 39, 48–49, n. 7 (1987) (“[T]he justifications
for the finality doctrine” include “efficiency, judicial restraint, and feder-
alism”); Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 124 (1945)
(similar).
10
Nor did the Fourth Circuit apply an overly broad interpretation of
“review and rejection” in this case. It emphasized that T. M.’s complaint,
which plainly sought to void and enjoin the consent order, sat “[i]n con-
trast” to two other federal actions T. M. filed, neither of which were dis-
missed under Rooker-Feldman. 139 F. 4th, at 352, n. 2. The first was a
due-process suit, which she voluntarily dismissed but which Rooker-

17 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Opinion of the Court
In fact, T. M. and the dissent’s rule would needlessly com-
plicate the Rooker-Feldman analysis. It is not always
straightforward to determine whether a given state-court
judgment is a reviewable final judgment under §1257(a) be-
cause that question requires determining whether the judg-
ment is both “subject to no further review or correction in
any other state tribunal” and also “an effective determina-
tion of the litigation.” Market Street R. Co. v. Railroad
Comm’n of Cal., 324 U. S. 548, 551 (1945). Nor is it neces-
sarily clear when state proceedings have “ended.” See Fed-
eración de Maestros de P. R., 410 F. 3d, at 24–25 (describing
test to determine whether proceedings have functionally
“ended”). For example, in this case, the parties dispute
whether the consent order is appealable under Maryland
law. See Brief in Opposition 23–24; Reply Brief for Peti-
tioner 9–10. If it is not, then the consent order may be final
for §1257 purposes and the “end” of state-court proceedings.
Further, even if a state judgment is technically subject to
further review in state proceedings, it may nevertheless be
reviewable by this Court under §1257 under a limited set of
circumstances. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U. S. 469, 477–486 (1975) (describing four sets of circum-
stances within the Court’s “pragmatic approach” to final-
ity). Thus, T. M. and the dissent’s rule would both fail to
address the source of confusion in the current Rooker-Feld-
man doctrine and add a new source to the mix.
Finally, the animating force behind many of T. M.’s and
the dissent’s arguments appears to be the belief that Rooker
——————
Feldman would not have barred because it was commenced before the
consent order was entered. 139 F. 4th, at 352, n. 2.; see Exxon, 544 U. S.,
at 293–294. The second was a federal discrimination suit, which was
dismissed on the merits and did not implicate Rooker-Feldman because,
though it involved the same parties and facts, the suit did not seek re-
view and rejection of the consent order. 139 F. 4th, at 352, n. 2.; see Doe
v. University of Md. Medical System Corp., 2025 WL 3553026, *1–*2
(CA4, Dec. 11, 2025) (describing T. M.’s claims).

18 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM
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Opinion of the Court
and Feldman were wrongly decided and so should be cab-
ined whenever possible, if not outright overruled. Cf. post,
at 2–5 (raising doubts about Rooker-Feldman’s conceptual
basis). This issue is not fairly included in the question pre-
sented and was not pressed at the certiorari stage. See this
Court’s Rule 14.1(a).
IV
The Court today neither expands nor constrains Rooker-
Feldman. Instead, the Court leaves the doctrine as it found
it: narrowly confined to “cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Exxon, 544 U. S., at 284. Because T. M.’s suit
falls within these strict limits, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.

_________________
_________________
1 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 25–197
T.M., PETITIONER v. UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND
MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION,
ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[June 18, 2026]
JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring.
When you lose in trial court, you go to an appeals court.
The so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine reflects that com-
monsense understanding. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U. S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462 (1983). At its core, the doctrine
says that parties who lose in state trial court do not get to
appeal to a federal trial court. Instead, they may take their
appeal to a state appeals court and, if a federal statute al-
lows, ultimately seek review in this Court. That “basic fact”
has been a part of our law for more than 200 years. Reed v.
Goertz, 598 U. S. 230, 244 (2023) (T
HOMAS, J., dissenting).
The Court’s opinion thus properly rejects petitioner’s quest
to reimagine, artificially cabin, or overrule Rooker-Feld-
man. Ante, at 5–18. I join it in full. I write separately to
explain why Rooker, properly understood, is correct as an
original matter.
I
A unanimous three-page opinion, Rooker was uncontro-
versial in its day. It started as an ordinary lawsuit. Wil-
liam and Dora Rooker sued Fidelity Trust Company in state
court. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 191 Ind. 141, 143,
131 N. E. 769, 770 (1921). The trial court entered judgment
against the Rookers. Id., at 154–155, 131 N. E., at 773. The

2 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM
CORPORATION
T
HOMAS, J., concurring
Rookers sought review in the State Supreme Court and lost.
Id., at 163, 131 N. E., at 776. This Court denied certiorari.
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 259 U. S. 580 (1922). The
Rookers then sought review from this Court on a writ of er-
ror instead. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 261 U. S. 114, 116
(1923). But, the Court declined to grant relief on their
claims of constitutional errors in the state-court judgment
and dismissed the writ. Id., at 116–118.
Unsatisfied, the Rookers filed a bill in equity in Federal
District Court. Rooker, 263 U. S., at 414. They asked the
Federal District Court to declare the state trial court’s judg-
ment “null and void” on the ground that it “was rendered
and affirmed in contravention of the” Constitution. Id., at
414–415. The District Court dismissed the bill for lack of
jurisdiction, and this Court affirmed that “plainly” correct
decree. Id., at 415, 417. “Under the legislation of Con-
gress,” this Court recognized, “no court of the United States
other than this Court could entertain a proceeding to re-
verse or modify the judgment for” constitutional errors. Id.,
at 416. “To do so would be an exercise of appellate jurisdic-
tion.” Ibid. “The jurisdiction possessed by the District
Courts is strictly original.” Ibid. Accordingly, the Court
held that district courts have no jurisdiction to “get rid of ”
state-court judgments even “for alleged errors of law.” Ibid.
Rooker was thus based on two premises. See ante, at 5–
7, 9–10. First, “to reverse or modify the” allegedly errone-
ous judgment of another court is to “exercise . . . appellate
jurisdiction.” Rooker, 263 U. S., at 416. Second, “[t]he ju-
risdiction possessed by the District Courts is strictly origi-
nal”; only “this Court” has “appellate jurisdiction” over
state-court judgments. Ibid. From these two premises, it
follows that district courts lack jurisdiction to reverse or
modify the allegedly erroneous judgments of state courts.
The conclusion follows from the premises, so the only ques-
tion is whether the premises are true.

3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., concurring
II
Rooker’s first premise was recognized long before Rooker,
and its second has been an indubitable “fact of federal stat-
utory law” for more than 200 years. Reed, 598 U. S., at 244
(opinion of T
HOMAS, J.).
A
The power to revise or modify another court’s judgment
or decree has been recognized as an exercise of appellate
jurisdiction from before the ratification of the Constitution.
1
The Constitution vests the “judicial Power” in this Court
and in the “inferior Courts” that Congress creates. Art. III,
§1. The jurisdiction of federal courts to exercise that judi-
cial power is limited to “Cases” and “Controversies.” §2, cl.
1. That jurisdiction, in turn, comes in two types: “original”
and “appellate.” §2, cl. 2. If a court exercises appellate ju-
risdiction, it does not exercise original jurisdiction. Mar-
bury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175 (1803); 3 J. Story, Com-
mentaries on the Constitution of the United States §1698,
p. 574 (1833) (Story).
Original jurisdiction is “[a] court’s power to hear and de-
cide a matter before any other court can review the matter.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 856 (7th ed. 1999). In a typical orig-
inal case, a plaintiff sues a defendant. The plaintiff com-
plains of an injury that the defendant’s allegedly illegal con-
duct caused and “seeks a remedy that runs against the
defendant.” Reed, 598 U. S., at 243 (opinion of T
HOMAS, J.).
The case is “original” inasmuch as there is no earlier pro-
ceeding in which another court had already “determine[d]
that defendant’s duties or liabilities (e.g., a judgment for
money damages or an injunction).” Ibid.
Unlike the plaintiff in a typical original action, the appel-
lant in a typical appeal cannot simply complain of an injury
that the other party caused before a court has spoken.

4 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM
CORPORATION
T
HOMAS, J., concurring
Instead, “the subject matter” under consideration “has al-
ready been instituted in, and acted upon, by some other
court.” 3 Story §1755, at 627. As the party who lost in the
other court, the appellant “complain[s] of an injury caused
by” that court’s allegedly erroneous judgment. Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U. S. 280, 291
(2005). He thus seeks to invoke the court’s jurisdiction to
remedy an injury of that description and, ordinarily, the ap-
pellate court cannot directly redress the injury that caused
the plaintiff to file his original suit. The remedy, instead,
consists in “correcting that judicial action (e.g., reversal or
vacatur of the challenged judgment),” not in awarding dam-
ages. Reed, 598 U. S., at 244 (opinion of T
HOMAS, J.).
When a party asks one court to revise another’s judg-
ment, he invokes what the Constitution calls “appellate Ju-
risdiction.” Art. III, §2, cl. 2. Appellate jurisdiction is a
court’s “power to revise the judgments rendered” by other
courts. 1 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 353
(11th ed. 1867) (Kent); accord, 3 W. Blackstone, Commen-
taries on the Laws of England 56 (1768) (Blackstone) (“re-
verse judgments in certain suits originally begun in [an-
other] court”); ibid. (high court had appellate jurisdiction to
correct “mistake[s] of the law, committed by [other]
courts”); W. Rawle, A View of the Constitution 241 (2d ed.
1829) (Rawle) (“revision of the [decisions] of other courts”);
3 Story 626 (power to “revis[e] and correc[t] the proceedings
in a cause already instituted”); 1 G. Curtis, Commentaries
on the Jurisdiction, Practice, & Peculiar Jurisprudence of
the Courts of the United States §113, p. 131 (1854) (Curtis)
(same); Black’s Law Dictionary 79 (1891) (same); 1 A. Bur-
rill, A New Law Dictionary 79 (1850) (“review the proceed-
ings of another [court]”). For that reason, exercising that
revising power over the judgments of “state tribunals” in

5 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., concurring
cases involving “[federal] questions” is appellate in nature.
1 Kent 353.
1
The Founders accepted this straightforward account of
appellate jurisdiction without reservation. The Articles of
Confederation gave the Confederation Congress authority
to create courts with “appellate power . . . to be exercised in
revising the decisions of state tribunals” in cases of cap-
tures. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 345 (1816)
(Story, J., for the Court); see Art. IX. In 1780, the Confed-
eration Congress created a court under that authority
whose jurisdiction allowed it to “hear new evidence without
deference to state courts’” legal conclusions. W. Pryor, The
Appellate Jurisdiction Clause, in The Heritage Guide to the
Constitution 499 (3d ed. 2025) (Pryor). That power was “ap-
pellate” in nature precisely because it was the “power to re-
vise the decisions of state courts.” Hunter’s Lessee, 1
Wheat., at 345; 3 Story 605–606.
When the Founders deliberated about whether to replace
the Articles with the Constitution, all maintained the same
view about the nature of appellate jurisdiction. At that
time, different “technical sense[s] ha[d] been affixed to the
term ‘appellate’” such that any technical interpretation
would “not be understood in the same sense” in different
jurisdictions. The Federalist No. 81, pp. 488–489 (C. Ros-
siter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). That fact showed “the impro-
priety of a technical interpretation.” Id., at 489; accord,
ante, at 10. Instead, the Federalists thought that the term
“appellate jurisdiction” in the proposed Constitution
——————
1
To “revise” originally meant to “review” for error. 2 N. Webster, An
American Dictionary of the English Language (1828); The Federalist No.
81, p. 489 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). The revising power did
not require literally changing another court’s judgment. See, e.g.,
Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 101 (1807) (“grant[ing]” motion “for a
habeas corpus to the marshal of the district of Columbia,” even though it
did not change the lower court’s order, is an exercise of “appellate” juris-
diction); Black’s Law Dictionary 331 (12th ed. 2024) (“A petition for a
writ of habeas corpus is one type of collateral attack”); infra, at 8–11.

6 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM
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HOMAS, J., concurring
“denotes nothing more than the power of one tribunal to re-
view the proceedings of another, either as to the law or fact,
or both.” The Federalist No. 81, at 489. For their part, the
Anti-Federalists seemed to agree. They worried that “ap-
pellate jurisdiction,” as used in the Constitution, would au-
thorize civil-law “appeals,” which involved the power to “re-
examine the whole merits of ” a previously initiated case,
including review of facts. 2 H. Storing, The Complete Anti-
Federalist 433 (1981); see also United States v. Wonson, 28
F. Cas. 745, 750 (No. 16,750) (CC Mass. 1812) (Story, J.).
All appeared to agree, however, that “the revising power” of
a court is “appellate” in nature. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat.,
at 344.
Traditionally, the “most usual modes of exercising appel-
late jurisdiction” were “by a writ of error, or by an appeal.”
2
3 Story §1756, at 627. But, courts could also exercise appel-
late jurisdiction through writs of habeas corpus or manda-
mus, provided that granting such a writ would involve re-
vising the decision of another court on the merits. Ibid.; 1
Curtis §113, at 131; Marbury, 1 Cranch, at 175. Today, this
Court usually exercises appellate jurisdiction by writs of
certiorari. 28 U. S. C. §§1257(a), 1254(1). But, it also hears
“appeal[s],” in some cases, §1253, applications for stays of
lower court judgments, in others, §2101(f ), and even peti-
tions for mandamus, §1651(a).
——————
2
A writ of error was “a process of common law origin; and it remove[d]
nothing for re-examination, but the law.” 3 Story §1756, at 628. In the
technical sense, an appeal was “a process of civil law origin, and re-
move[d] a cause, entirely subjecting the fact, as well as the law, to review
and a re-trial.” Id., at 627–628. But, “appeal” is also used “in legal lan-
guage to denote the nature of appellate jurisdiction, as distinguished
from original jurisdiction, without regard to the particular mode, by
which a cause is transmitted to a superior jurisdiction.” United States v.
Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 748, 750 (No. 16,750) (CC Mass. 1812) (Story,
J.). In that sense, writs of error were exercises of appellate jurisdiction
at common law; appeals were exercises of appellate jurisdiction in equity.

7 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., concurring
Thus, whether jurisdiction is appellate turns not on the
specific mode of proceeding but on the nature of the relief
sought. See Reed, 598 U. S., at 244 (opinion of T
HOMAS, J.).
Scholars and jurists have long recognized that “any . . .
mode in which the judgment or proceedings of an inferior
tribunal c[ould] be revised” was an exercise of appellate ju-
risdiction. 1 Curtis §113, at 131 (emphasis added). A court
therefore acts as “a court of appeal” whenever it “correct[s]
the errors of other jurisdictions,” 3 Blackstone 55, whatever
the mode “by which a cause is transmitted to” it, Wonson,
28 F. Cas., at 748; accord, 3 Story §1755, at 627 (“[W]here
the object is to revise a judicial proceeding, the mode is
wholly immaterial”).
2
This Court has long understood that to exercise the revis-
ing power is to exercise appellate jurisdiction, regardless of
the form of the exercise.
Most law students learn as much on the first day of con-
stitutional-law class. In Marbury v. Madison, the Court
considered whether it had the jurisdiction “to issue a man-
damus” compelling “an officer for the delivery of ” Mar-
bury’s judicial commission when no other court had before
entertained the cause. 1 Cranch, at 175. Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Marshall held that the Court lacked
such jurisdiction. The Constitution, he said, “define[d] the
jurisdiction of the supreme court by declaring the cases in
which it shall take original jurisdiction, and that in all oth-
ers it shall take appellate jurisdiction.” Ibid. These cate-
gories, he reasoned, are mutually exclusive: “[I]n one class
of cases its jurisdiction is original, and not appellate; in the
other it is appellate, and not original.” Ibid. Because the
Constitution did not give the Court original jurisdiction to
issue mandamus, the Court could do so only if it would “be
an exercise of appellate jurisdiction” in the case before it.
Ibid.

8 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM
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HOMAS, J., concurring
The form of proceeding was not dispositive of the ques-
tion. Even though mandamus was often issued in original
cases, and the case was filed first in the Supreme Court, the
Court agreed that “appellate jurisdiction may be exercised
in a variety of forms, and that if it be the will of the legisla-
ture that a mandamus should be used for that purpose, that
will must be obeyed.” Ibid. Because “a mandamus may be
directed to courts,” the question became whether, in con-
text, granting mandamus relief would be appellate in na-
ture. Ibid.
On the facts of the case, the exercise of jurisdiction was
original in nature. There was no decision of another court
that this Court could revise. Chief Justice Marshall recog-
nized that it “is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdic-
tion, that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause
already instituted.” Ibid. To issue mandamus “to an officer
for the delivery of a paper, is in effect the same as to sustain
an original action for that paper, and therefore seems not
to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction.” Id., at
175–176; accord, ante, at 10.
From Marbury’s holding, then, a clear principle emerged:
When a court “revises” or “corrects the proceedings in a
cause already instituted,” it exercises appellate jurisdic-
tion; when there is no previous “cause” or judicial proceed-
ing to revise, it exercises “original” jurisdiction. 1 Cranch,
at 175. And, from Marbury’s reasoning, another principle
followed: A court can exercise appellate jurisdiction even if
the action is filed outside of the most common appellate
forms, such as a writ of error or a modern appeal, provided
that there is another court’s decision to be revised. Ibid.
Chief Justice Marshall reaffirmed both principles for the
Court just a few years later. See Rawle 227–228. Ex parte
Bollman, 4 Cranch 75 (1807), involved two individuals—
Bollman and Swartwout—who were implicated in the infa-
mous Burr conspiracy. Both had been jailed by the circuit
court for the District of Columbia pending their trial. Id.,

9 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., concurring
at 75–76. And, each sought a writ of habeas corpus from
this Court. Id., at 75. The question, as in Marbury, was
whether this Court had jurisdiction to issue the writs. This
time the Court held that it had such jurisdiction.
The arguments before the Court concerned the nature of
original and appellate jurisdiction. Counsel for Bollman ar-
gued that the Judiciary Act gave “this court the power to
grant writs of habeas corpus,” and that “congress had au-
thority, by the constitution,” to give the Court such power.
4 Cranch, at 84–85. But, this second point, he argued, de-
pended on “whether this power or jurisdiction be in its na-
ture original or appellate.” Id., at 85. He conceded that, if
granting the writ would be an exercise of original jurisdic-
tion, then Congress could not give this Court the power to
issue the writ. Id., at 85–86. “This principle,” he acknowl-
edged, had been “established by the case of Marbury v.
Madison.” Id., at 86. Following Marbury, he argued that
the “criterion which distinguishes appellate from original
jurisdiction, is that it revises and corrects the decisions of
another tribunal.” 4 Cranch, at 86. And, the “object of the
habeas corpus now applied for,” he urged, “is to revise and
correct the proceedings of the Court below . . . so far as re-
spects the legality of such commitment.” Ibid.
Again writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall
agreed with this approach. He began by explaining that
federal courts, as creatures of “written law,” cannot “trans-
cend th[e] jurisdiction” that is “defined by written law.” Id.,
at 93. “[F]or the meaning of the term habeas corpus,” he
said, “resort may unquestionably be had to the common
law; but the power to award the writ by any of the courts of
the United States, must be given by written law.” Id., at
93–94. So, the question was the same as in Marbury:
“whether by any statute, compatible with the constitution
of the United States, the power to award the writ . . . has
been given to this court.” 4 Cranch, at 94.

10 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM
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HOMAS, J., concurring
This time, though, Chief Justice Marshall answered yes.
The Judiciary Act, he concluded, purported to give “the
power to award writs of habeas corpus in order to examine
into the cause of commitment.” Id., at 100. And, he
“acknowledged that the writ was sought in the first in-
stance in the Supreme Court.” Pryor 500. But, the Consti-
tution did not stand in the way of the Court’s issuing the
writ in the case before it. Though “the mandamus case” of
Marbury required that the Court “would not exercise origi-
nal jurisdiction,” he explained, “that which the court is now
asked to exercise is clearly appellate.” 4 Cranch, at 100–
101. He reasoned that the “decision that the individual
shall be imprisoned must always precede the application for
a writ of habeas corpus.” Id., at 101. In other words, a court
had already addressed the issue of the imprisonment, so
there was “a cause already instituted.” Marbury, 1 Cranch,
at 175. Because “this writ must always be for the purpose
of revising that decision,” he concluded that it is “therefore
appellate in its nature.” 4 Cranch, at 101.
***
Thus, both Marbury and Bollman support Rooker’s first
premise that to reverse or modify the allegedly erroneous
judgment of another court is to exercise appellate jurisdic-
tion. Federal courts must inquire into the nature of the ju-
risdiction a party seeks to invoke and whether it takes “an
appellate form,” regardless of the label placed on the paper
filed in the court. Ex parte Watkins, 7 Pet. 568, 573 (1833)
(Story, J., for the Court); accord, ante, at 10. And, they fur-
ther explain that “seek[ing] to revise the acts of ” another
court is “appellate” in nature. Ex parte Watkins, 7 Pet., at
573. Whether the court hears the claim in the form of a
mandamus petition as in Marbury, a habeas petition as in
Bollman, or a bill in equity as in Rooker, if a party asks one
court to revise the judgment of another court for errors of
law, it invokes appellate jurisdiction. The question is then

11 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., concurring
whether the court has revising power to “declar[e]” a state-
court judgment “a nullity [on the merits].” Voorhees v.
Jackson, 10 Pet. 449, 474 (1836).
B
Congress has long given only this Court, and not inferior
courts, appellate jurisdiction to revise state-court judg-
ments.
The Constitution defines the limits of this Court’s juris-
diction. Its “original Jurisdiction” is limited to “Cases af-
fecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
and those in which a State shall be Party.” Art. III, §2, cl. 2.
In “all” other cases, “in Law and Equity,” this Court “shall
have appellate Jurisdiction,” subject to any “Exceptions,
and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”
§2, cls. 1–2. Only this Court “possesses jurisdiction derived
immediately from the constitution.” United States v. Hud-
son, 7 Cranch 32, 33 (1812).
As creatures of statute, inferior federal courts “possess no
jurisdiction but what is given them by the power that cre-
ates them.” Ibid. They have “none” beyond what Congress
“authorize[s].” Ibid. Whether inferior federal courts have
revising power thus depends on whether a statute says that
they do. C. Williams, Jurisdiction and Practice of Federal
Courts 433 (1917) (Williams). Today, statutes say that
courts of appeals have revising power over district-court
judgments, 28 U. S. C. §1291, and that district courts have
revising power over bankruptcy-court judgments,
§158(a)(1).
Since the founding, there has been no doubt that inferior
“federal” courts have the power “to review the proceedings
of ” “State courts” only if Congress, in its “discretion,” has
given them “appellate jurisdiction” to do so.
3
The Federalist
——————
3
In fact, the only dispute was whether such jurisdiction was constitu-
tional even if Congress purported to authorize it. See The Federalist No.
82, at 494–495 (A. Hamilton).

12 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM
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HOMAS, J., concurring
Nos. 81, 82, at 488–490, 493–495 (A. Hamilton); see also
Hudson, 7 Cranch, at 33. Congress “is not limited by the
constitution to any particular mode, or time of exercising
it,” but there must be a statutory grant of revising power
over state-court judgments before inferior courts can revise
them. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat., at 349; accord, 3 Story
§1755, at 627 (“any form, which the legislature may choose
to prescribe”).
Congress has never purported to give inferior federal
courts general revising power over state-court judgments
for errors of federal law. The First Congress declared that,
in federal-question cases, “a final judgment or decree” of
“the highest court of law or equity of a State” “may be re-
examined and reversed or affirmed in” this Court. Judici-
ary Act of 1789, §25, 1 Stat. 85–86. Congress called that
revising power “appellate jurisdiction” and identified the
mode as a writ of error. §§13, 25, id., at 80–81, 85–86. It
gave no other federal court revising power over “courts of
the several states.” §13, id., at 81. And, it gave no other
federal court civil federal-question jurisdiction, either. Cf.
§§9, 11, id., at 75–79. Thus, only state courts could exercise
original jurisdiction in federal-question cases, and only this
federal Court could revise their judgments.
It took Congress 86 years to give federal district courts
federal-question jurisdiction, but it limited that jurisdiction
to original actions. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U. S.
412, 420–421 (1988). In 1875, Congress granted federal
courts “original” jurisdiction, “concurrent with the courts of
the several States,” over federal-question cases. Act of Mar.
3, 1875, ch. 137, §1, 18 Stat. 470. But, that grant of original
jurisdiction was not a grant of revising power. No inferior
federal court was “empowered . . . to enjoin the judgment of
a State court.” D. Chamberlain, The State Judiciary, in
Constitutional History of the United States 254 (1889); id.,
at 253–259. State-court “judgments and decrees” were
“subject in all cases . . . arising under the Constitution,” or

13 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
T
HOMAS, J., concurring
federal law, “to the revising or appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court . . . , but in all other cases controlled only
by the constitutions and laws of the respective States.” Id.,
at 259.
Nothing relevant has changed since 1875.
4
See Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 398 U. S. 281,
286 (1970). Thus was the state of the law before Rooker.
263 U. S., at 416; Act of Mar. 3, 1911, §§24–27, 36 Stat.
1091–1094; Act of Sept. 6, 1916, ch. 448, §2, 39 Stat. 726;
Williams 48–49 (“The appellate jurisdiction [of district
courts] is very slender”). And, it remains true today that
district courts have only “original jurisdiction” in federal-
question cases, 28 U. S. C. §1331, and that only this Court
has appellate jurisdiction over state courts in such cases,
§1257(a). See ante, at 5. Congress specified no mode for
district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction in federal-
question cases, §1331; the only federal court authorized to
do so over state courts is this one—“by writ of certiorari,”
§1257(a).
A district court therefore cannot “act as an appellate
Court” to revise state-court judgments. Smith v. McIver, 9
Wheat. 532, 535 (1824) (Marshall, C. J., for the Court). To
do so by “declar[ing]” a state-court judgment “void” for
——————
4
Arguably, modern federal habeas-corpus practice has drifted in the
direction of appellate review of state-court judgments. See Harrington
v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 97–98, 100–101 (2011). I have my reservations
about this development. See Wright v. West, 505 U. S. 277, 285–293
(1992) (opinion of T
HOMAS, J.). But, it at least has the advantage of some
grounding in statutory language, unlike petitioner’s desired exercise of
appellate jurisdiction here. Compare 28 U. S. C. §2254(a) (federal courts
“shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the
ground that he is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States”) with §1331 (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States”).

14 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM
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T
HOMAS, J., concurring
errors of federal law “usurps the jurisdiction of an appellate
court.” Voorhees, 10 Pet., at 474.
III
As “creatures of a distinct government,” “state courts are
not, in any sense of the word, inferior” to inferior federal
courts. Bollman, 4 Cranch, at 97. From the founding, state
courts have had original jurisdiction in federal-question
cases, and their judgments in such cases could be revised
only in state appellate courts or in this Court. Ante, at 13–
16. Congress did not give federal district courts revising
power over state-court judgments by giving them only orig-
inal jurisdiction in federal-question cases. Grants of “origi-
nal jurisdiction” do “not authorize district courts to exercise
appellate jurisdiction.” Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv.
Comm’n of Md., 535 U. S. 635, 644, n. 3 (2002). Rooker thus
“correctly applied the simple legal proposition that only this
Court may exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court
judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U. S. 459, 467 (2006)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court reaffirms that
longstanding proposition. Ante, at 5–8. I therefore join its
opinion in full.

_________________
_________________
1 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
B
ARRETT, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 25–197
T.M., PETITIONER v. UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND
MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION,
ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[June 18, 2026]
JUSTICE BARRETT, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE,
J
USTICE KAGAN, and JUSTICE GORSUCH join, dissenting.
Twenty years ago, this Court held that the Rooker-Feld-
man doctrine is “confined” to the procedural circumstances
of the two cases from which the doctrine draws its name.
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544
U. S. 280, 284, 291 (2005); see Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U. S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462 (1983). In “both cases,” we em-
phasized, the federal action was brought “after the state
proceedings ended.” Exxon, 544 U. S., at 291. Seven Courts
of Appeals took us at our word, refusing to apply Rooker-
Feldman when the underlying state action remained pend-
ing.
1
They were right to hold the line. Because the Court
has chosen to relax it, I respectfully dissent.
——————
1
See Federación de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Junta de Relaciones del
Trabajo de Puerto Rico, 410 F. 3d 17, 24 (CA1 2005); Hunter v. McMahon,
75 F. 4th 62, 70 (CA2 2023); Malhan v. Secretary United States Dept. of
State, 938 F. 3d 453, 459–460 (CA3 2019); Miller v. Dunn, 35 F. 4th 1007,
1013 (CA5 2022); Parker v. Lyons, 757 F. 3d 701, 705–706 (CA7 2014)
(per curiam), overruled on other grounds by Hadzi-Tanovic v. Johnson,
62 F. 4th 394 (CA7 2023); Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F. 3d 1027, 1032
(CA10 2006); Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F. 3d 1266, 1274–1275 (CA11
2009). Until the Fourth Circuit decided today’s case, only the Sixth Cir-
cuit had gone the other way. See RLR Investments, LLC v. Pigeon Forge,
4 F. 4th 380, 389–390, 396 (CA6 2021).

2 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM
CORPORATION
B
ARRETT, J., dissenting
I
Until today, this Court has applied the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine “only twice.” Exxon, 544 U. S., at 283. That is no
accident: Because Rooker-Feldman stands on shaky
ground, we have consciously kept its footprint small. Its
rationale has gotten no firmer, so we should make the doc-
trine no larger.
Rooker-Feldman is a “maddeningly elusive” doctrine. B.
Friedman & J. Gaylord, Rooker-Feldman, from the Ground
Up, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1129, 1133 (1999). We have
primarily justified it as a negative inference from 28
U. S. C. §1257: Because Congress gave this Court appellate
jurisdiction over certain state-court judgments, district
courts must lack original jurisdiction to entertain a collat-
eral attack against those judgments. See Rooker, 263 U. S.,
at 415–416; Feldman, 460 U. S., at 476. This Court’s exer-
cise of appellate jurisdiction, the argument runs, is “func-
tional[ly]” equivalent to a district court’s exercise of original
jurisdiction over a collateral attack. Ante, at 10. The prob-
lem? A collateral attack is not functionally equivalent to an
appeal.
Consider just a few of the differences. An appeal “re-
moves the record into the supervising tribunal.” Cohens v.
Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 410 (1821). A collateral attack does
not. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 3, 7. On appeal, new evi-
dence is generally unwelcome. See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 10;
United States v. Coe, 155 U. S. 76, 83–84 (1894). In a col-
lateral attack, new evidence is fair game. See, e.g., Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 26. Most obviously, preclusion does not ap-
ply on appeal. This Court is not barred from considering an
issue just because the state high court already decided it—
reconsidering the state court’s judgment is the whole point.
Not so with a collateral attack; preclusion restrains district
courts from simply redoing the state court’s work. See, e.g.,
Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U. S. 518,
523 (1986). Finally, while this Court can vacate or reverse

3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
B
ARRETT, J., dissenting
the judgment of the state high court and remand for further
proceedings, a district court entertaining a collateral attack
cannot. See 7 J. Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶60.36,
pp. 60–365 to 60–371 (2d ed. Cum. Supp. 1996–1997) (ex-
plaining that collateral attacks “d[o] not operate to vacate
or annul the [original] judgment”). Because of the many
differences between appellate jurisdiction and original ju-
risdiction over a collateral attack, it is doubtful that by giv-
ing this Court the former, Congress intended to deprive dis-
trict courts of the latter.
Occasionally, we have also cited 28 U. S. C. §1331 as sup-
port for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, observing that it
gives district courts “original,” not appellate, jurisdiction.
Rooker, 263 U. S., at 416. This observation adds nothing—
as just explained, a collateral attack is not the functional
equivalent of an appeal. Besides, §1331 cannot explain why
Rooker-Feldman has always been limited to collateral at-
tacks on state-court judgments. If entertaining a collateral
attack goes beyond “original jurisdiction,” then it should not
matter whether the underlying judgment is from a state
court or a federal one. Yet it is well settled that district
courts can entertain collateral attacks on federal judg-
ments—for example, an independent action for relief from
a judgment to prevent a “grave miscarriage of justice.”
United States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38, 45–47 (1998); see
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(d) (Rule 60 does not limit a court’s
power to “entertain an independent action to relieve a party
from a judgment, order, or proceeding”). It is little wonder
that (at least until today) we had backed away from the
§1331 rationale.
Beyond the difficulties of finding a statutory basis for
Rooker-Feldman, parts of the United States Code undercut
it. The doctrine is in tension, to say the least, with statutes
granting district courts jurisdiction in categorical terms.
Section 1331 gives district courts “original jurisdiction”
over “all civil actions” presenting a federal question—not

4 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM
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B
ARRETT, J., dissenting
“all civil actions” presenting a federal question “minus
those that attack a state-court judgment.” The other juris-
dictional grants are similar. See, e.g., 28 U. S. C. §1332
(“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions” meeting certain diversity and amount-in-con-
troversy requirements). None has a carveout for collateral
attacks.
More to the point, in trying to read between the lines of
§1257 and §1331, Rooker-Feldman misses what is further
down the page: Congress has told us how to treat state-
court judgments. The Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U. S. C.
§1738, provides that the “judicial proceedings of any court”
of any State “shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States . . . as they have by
law or usage in the courts of such State . . . from which they
are taken.” In other words, federal courts “must give the
same preclusive effect to a state-court judgment as another
court of that State would give.” Parsons Steel, 474 U. S., at
523.
Conceptual problems aside, it is not clear what Rooker-
Feldman brings to the table. Preclusion already bars par-
ties from relitigating issues and claims that were decided
in state court. See, e.g., ibid.
2
And when state litigation is
ongoing, various abstention doctrines prevent federal
courts from getting involved. Younger abstention, for ex-
ample, precludes federal courts from interfering with state
criminal prosecutions and certain state civil proceedings.
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971); Sprint Commu-
nications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U. S. 69, 72–73 (2013); see also
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U. S. 800, 818–821 (1976) (Colorado River abstention);
Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496,
——————
2
To the extent that preclusion would not bar relitigation, using Rooker-
Feldman to do so seems to violate the Full Faith and Credit Act by giving
state judgments more preclusive effect than they would have in the state
courts from which they are taken. See infra, at 9–10.

5 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
B
ARRETT, J., dissenting
500–501 (1941) (Pullman abstention); Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., 319 U. S. 315, 332–334 (1943) (Burford abstention). Fi-
nally, the Anti-Injunction Act generally bars federal courts
from enjoining state proceedings. 28 U. S. C. §2283.
None of this is to say that Rooker-Feldman is inconse-
quential. Crucially, it is jurisdictional—so courts must an-
alyze it, even if no one raises it. And because Rooker-Feld-
man lacks both a clear role and a clear rationale, it is hard
to contain. After Feldman, the doctrine became “perhaps
the primary docket-clearing workhorse for the federal
courts.” S. Bandes, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Evalu-
ating Its Jurisdictional Status, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1175
(1999). “In the process,” Rooker-Feldman “mushroomed
well beyond the §1257 explanation that gave it birth, as the
federal courts found one claim after another closely inter-
twined with claims raised, resolved, sometimes still pend-
ing, in the state courts.” VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. El-
liott, P. C., 951 F. 3d 397, 406 (CA6 2020) (Sutton, J.,
concurring).
II
A
Recognizing that things had gone awry, this Court inter-
vened. In Exxon, we neutralized Rooker-Feldman by con-
fining it to the procedural circumstances of the Rooker and
Feldman cases. 544 U. S., at 284, 291. Our treatment of
the doctrine was so devastating that one scholar penned its
obituary. See S. Bray, Rooker Feldman (1923–2006), 9
Green Bag 2d 317 (2006).
Faithfully read, Exxon requires us to reject the applica-
tion of Rooker-Feldman to T. M.’s case. In Exxon, we la-
mented that lower courts had construed the doctrine “to ex-
tend far beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman
cases.” 544 U. S., at 283. We acknowledged its tension with
both jurisdictional statutes like §1331 and the Full Faith
and Credit Act, observing that the doctrine risks

6 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM
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“overriding Congress’ conferral of federal-court jurisdiction
concurrent with jurisdiction exercised by state courts” and
“superseding the ordinary application of preclusion law
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1738.” Ibid.; see id., at 284. And
we drew a line: Rooker-Feldman “is confined to cases of the
kind from which the doctrine acquired its name.” 544 U. S.,
at 284. We then identified the key features of those cases.
Id., at 291. Among them: In “both” Rooker and Feldman,
the losing party sued in federal court “after the state pro-
ceedings ended.” 544 U. S., at 291 (emphasis added).
This limitation flows directly from Exxon’s logic. Exxon
confines Rooker-Feldman to cases like Rooker and Feldman
for a reason: Those two cases “exhibit the limited circum-
stances in which this Court’s appellate jurisdiction over
state-court judgments” under §1257 “precludes a United
States district court from exercising subject-matter juris-
diction in an action it would otherwise be empowered to ad-
judicate under a congressional grant of authority, e.g.,
§1330 (suits against foreign states), §1331 (federal ques-
tion), and §1332 (diversity).” 544 U. S., at 291. This Court’s
appellate jurisdiction is limited to “final judgments or de-
crees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a
decision could be had.” §1257(a). If there is no final judg-
ment from a state high court, §1257 does not confer juris-
diction in this Court; thus, there is nothing to “preclud[e]”
district courts from exercising the jurisdiction they would
“otherwise” have. Id., at 291.
Here, the state proceedings have not “ended.” T. M.’s
original action is still pending in a Maryland appellate
court. See ante, at 3. So this case falls outside the narrow
confines in which Rooker-Feldman continues to operate,
and the District Court had jurisdiction. See Exxon, 544
U.S., at 291.

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B
Rather than hew to this straightforward analysis, the
Court reshapes Rooker-Feldman. It does so by both retreat-
ing to the old (the §1331 rationale that Exxon discarded)
and inventing the new (a grab bag of policy reasons for dis-
regarding §1257’s finality requirement). This reconception
of Rooker-Feldman leaves the doctrine worse off.
The Court’s first mistake is failing to believe that Exxon
means what it says. The Court acknowledges that Exxon
limits Rooker-Feldman to “‘cases of the kind from which the
doctrine acquired its name.’” Ante, at 7 (quoting Exxon, 544
U. S., at 284). But it ignores that Exxon identifies the de-
fining features of those cases and specifically notes that
“both” had been filed “after the state proceedings ended.”
544 U. S., at 291; see Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U. S. 521, 531
(2011) (reiterating that Rooker and Feldman were filed “af-
ter the state proceedings ended”). Almost every circuit has
recognized the significance of this language. See n. 1, su-
pra. This Court dismisses it in a footnote. Ante, at 8, n. 5.
To justify giving Rooker-Feldman a broader sweep, the
Court resurrects a rationale that Exxon buried: §1331. Be-
fore Exxon, we had cited §1331 as a secondary rationale for
the doctrine, see ante, at 3; according to the Court, Exxon
continues the thread, see ante, at 11. That is a very ambi-
tious reading of Exxon.
3
Rather than describing Rooker-
Feldman as a negative inference from §1331, Exxon por-
trays it as a negative inference from §1257 that overrides
§1331. As Exxon summarizes: Rooker-Feldman describes
when this Court’s appellate jurisdiction “precludes” district
courts from exercising the jurisdiction they would “other-
wise” have. 544 U. S., at 291. The Court protests that if
——————
3
The Court relies on a quotation from a footnote in another case that
Exxon includes in a parenthetical, treating that language as if it were
Exxon’s own explanation of the doctrine. See ante, at 11. Obviously, a
stray citation does not override the thrust of Exxon’s logic.

8 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM
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Exxon had intended to discard the §1331 rationale, it would
have said so. See ante, at 12. But the Court does not even
mention this language—Exxon’s only explanation of the
doctrine’s rationale—much less explain why it does not suf-
fice. And our more recent Rooker-Feldman cases confirm
that Exxon tossed the §1331 justification. These cases pre-
sent Rooker-Feldman as a “strict negative inference from
§1257,” ante, at 13, and do not mention §1331 at all. See
Skinner, 562 U. S., at 531–532 (explaining Rooker-Feldman
solely as an inference from §1257); Lance v. Dennis, 546
U.S. 459, 463 (2006) (per curiam) (same).
Yet even as it resuscitates the §1331 rationale, the Court
acknowledges that §1257 remains in the mix. Ante, at 6
(describing Rooker-Feldman as “built” on both §1331 and
§1257). And by recognizing that the doctrine applies only
to “state-court judgments,” ante, at 1 (emphasis added), the
Court tacitly admits that §1257—not §1331—is what really
determines when Rooker-Feldman kicks in. Still, the
Court’s embrace of §1257 is only partial: It is unwilling to
accept §1257’s requirement of a “[f]inal judgment” from the
“highest court of a State.” The Court’s main reason for dis-
regarding this limit appears to be Exxon, but as explained,
Exxon compels the opposite conclusion.
Perhaps recognizing that its new approach to §1257 re-
quires some other rationale, the Court spends several pages
running through various policy considerations. Applying
§1257’s finality limit, the Court says, would generate
“anomalous outcomes,” disrespect “federalism,” and sow
“confusion.” Ante, at 13, 17. Its theory is an innovation, but
not an improvement.
Take “anomalous outcomes.” The Court reasons that it is
“difficult to see why Congress would have authorized dis-
trict courts to review final state-court judgments pending
appeal in state court when it did not authorize this Court
to do so.” Ante, at 14. But the Court’s approach also yields
“anomalous outcomes.” To give one example: As the Court

9 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
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concedes, the doctrine applies only to “‘state-court judg-
ments’”; it does not bar district courts from reviewing state-
court interlocutory orders. Ante, at 1 (quoting Exxon, 544
U. S., at 284). Yet it is similarly “difficult to see why Con-
gress would have authorized district courts” to review in-
terlocutory orders subject to further review in state court
“when it did not authorize this Court to do so.” Ante, at 14.
The Court’s approach cannot answer this question, but
mine can: Rooker-Feldman allows for this result because it
is rooted in §1257, not in a vague notion of which outcomes
are “anomalous.”
The Court also insists that “[f]ederalism principles are
. . . best served” by applying Rooker-Feldman to dismiss
T. M.’s challenge. Ante, at 15. But the word “federalism”
does not appear in either Rooker or Feldman. And if it were
true that general concerns about federalism animate the
doctrine, Exxon would have come out the opposite way. The
lower court in Exxon applied Rooker-Feldman in part be-
cause the federal suit was “an ‘insurance policy’ against an
adverse result in state court”—a clear affront to federalism.
544 U. S., at 294, n. 9 (quoting 364 F. 3d 102, 105–106 (CA3
2004)). We dismissed that line of reasoning in a footnote,
explaining that there is “nothing necessarily inappropriate”
about “a protective action.” 544 U. S., at 294, n. 9. If feder-
alism drives Rooker-Feldman, the Exxon Court missed the
memo.
Even if federalism were a solid rationale, it is doubtful
that “[f]ederalism principles are . . . best served by” dis-
missing T. M.’s challenge. Ante, at 15. Like other States,
Maryland has adopted preclusion rules to determine when
parties may relitigate issues and claims decided in a prior
case. The District Court determined that T. M.’s lawsuit is
not “precluded” under Maryland law—which means that
T. M. could have filed a suit just like this one in a Maryland
state court. Letter Order in No. 1:23–cv–1684 (D Md.), ECF
Doc. 27, pp. 2–3. Yet the Court maintains that bouncing

10 T. M. v. UNIVERSITY OF MD. MEDICAL SYSTEM
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her suit from federal court best serves federalism. Why?
Wouldn’t Maryland’s interests be best served by affording
its judgments the effect they would have under state law?
In any event, Congress has already made the federalism
calculus, and this Court is not free to override it. As Exxon
recognizes, the Full Faith and Credit Act—which the Court
does not mention—requires federal courts to give state
judgments the effect that they would have in state courts.
544 U. S., at 293; see Lance, 546 U. S., at 466 (“Congress
has directed federal courts to look principally to state law in
deciding what effect to give state-court judgments”). So
even if the Court could otherwise ignore state law in the
name of federalism, Congress has foreclosed that path.
Grounding Rooker-Feldman in federalism is also at odds
with our abstention doctrines, which already account for
friction between state and federal courts but do not apply
here. We have purposefully kept these doctrines narrow,
stressing that district courts have a “virtually unflagging
obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” Col-
orado River, 424 U. S., at 817. “[O]nly exceptional circum-
stances justify a federal court’s refusal to decide a case in
deference to the States.” New Orleans Public Service, Inc.
v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U. S. 350, 368 (1989).
No one argues that T. M.’s challenge fits within those “ex-
ceptional circumstances.” Nonetheless, the Court repack-
ages the same principle—“deference to the States”—as a
reason why the District Court lacked jurisdiction in the first
place. See ante, at 14. It is ironic that in the Court’s view,
federalism concerns that are too weak to trigger abstention
doctrines are strong enough to deprive district courts of ju-
risdiction altogether. Cf. Exxon, 544 U. S., at 284 (outside
the circumstances of Rooker and Feldman, Rooker-Feldman
doctrine “does not . . . augment the circumscribed doctrines
that allow federal courts to stay or dismiss proceedings in
deference to state-court actions”).

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The Court’s reliance on federalism also sits uneasily with
the fact that T. M.’s suit arises under 42 U. S. C. §1983.
Section 1983 was the “product of a vast transformation
from” traditional “concepts of federalism.” Mitchum v. Fos-
ter, 407 U. S. 225, 242 (1972). Its “very purpose” was “to
interpose the federal courts between the States and the peo-
ple, as guardians of the people’s federal rights—to protect
the people from unconstitutional action under color of state
law, ‘whether that action be executive, legislative, or judi-
cial.’” Ibid. (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 346
(1880)). Given our longstanding interpretation of §1983, it
is odd to cite federalism as grounds for dismissing a §1983
suit. Cf. J. Beermann, Comments on Rooker-Feldman or Let
State Law Be Our Guide, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1209,
1230–1231 (1999). Notably, we have construed the Anti-
Injunction Act—which normally bars federal courts from
enjoining state-court proceedings—to contain an exception
for §1983 suits like T. M.’s. See Mitchum, 407 U. S., at 242–
243.
Finally, the Court insists that drawing the line at finality
would “needlessly complicate the Rooker-Feldman analy-
sis” because “[i]t is not always straightforward to determine
whether a given state-court judgment is a reviewable final
judgment under §1257(a).” Ante, at 17. But the line must
be drawn somewhere, and there is no reason to think that
drawing it at “judgment,” as the Court does, is any more
manageable. We apply the finality test with little trouble;
surely lower courts can do the same.
***
The upshot of today’s decision is that the Court has mud-
died waters that were hardly clear to begin with. That is
unfortunate, because there was a better path available:
treating Rooker-Feldman as “the §1257 Rule.” Vander-
Kodde, 951 F. 3d, at 409 (Sutton, J., concurring). Doing so
would have been both clearer and more faithful to Exxon.

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Still, the news is not all bad. Although the Court expands
Rooker-Feldman beyond Exxon’s line, it repeatedly empha-
sizes that the doctrine is “narrow.” See ante, at 1, 7, 8, 18.
Courts should not lose sight of that message. In the end,
Rooker-Feldman has been given an inch—it should not be
allowed to take a mile.