Allen v. Milligan

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1 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Per Curiam
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 25A1314
WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE,
ET AL. v. EVAN MILLIGAN, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
No. 25A1315
WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE,
ET AL. v. BOBBY SINGLETON, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
No. 25A1316
WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE,
ET AL. v. MARCUS CASTER, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
[June 2, 2026]
PER CURIAM.
In Louisiana v. Callais, 608 U. S. ___ (2026), to resolve
the tension between vote-dilution claims under §2 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 and our colorblind Constitution,
we updated the standards for §2 liability established by
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986).
Under Gingles, to prove a §2 violation, a plaintiff must
first establish three preconditions. First, the minority
group must be large and geographically compact enough to
be a majority in a reasonably configured congressional dis-
trict, meaning that the district “comports with traditional
districting criteria.” Callais, 608 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at

2 ALLEN v. MILLIGAN
Per Curiam
8) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the minority
group must be politically cohesive. Third, the majority
group must vote enough as a bloc to defeat the minority
group’s preferred candidate. Ibid. After establishing those
three preconditions, the plaintiff must prove that the polit-
ical process was not equally open to minority voters based
on the totality of the circumstances. Ibid.
Callais updated these standards. As relevant here, we
held that for plaintiffs to satisfy the first Gingles precondi-
tion, a plaintiff ’s alternative map “must meet all the State’s
legitimate districting objectives” “just as well” as the State’s
own map. 608 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 29) (emphasis
added). Those legitimate districting objectives, we held, in-
clude “the State’s specified political goals” and “any other
goal not prohibited by the Constitution.” Ibid. A plaintiff
also “cannot use race as a districting criterion” in preparing
the alternative map. Ibid. To prove the second and third
preconditions, a plaintiff “must provide an analysis that
controls for party affiliation” and “show that voters engage
in racial bloc voting that cannot be explained by partisan
affiliation.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 30). These updates, we
held, were necessary to avoid requiring congressional maps
under §2 that would be unconstitutional racial gerryman-
ders.
After Callais, we vacated District Court injunctions that
prevented the State of Alabama from using a congressional
map that it enacted in 2023. See Allen v. Caster, 608 U. S.
___ (2026). The District Court had held that the State’s
map violated §2 because it had only one district in which
black voters were a majority and did not include an addi-
tional “[b]lack-opportunity” district. Singleton v. Allen, 782
F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1114, 1309 (ND Ala. 2025). The District
Court also concluded that the 2023 map violated the Four-
teenth Amendment because it constituted a deliberate “re-
fus[al] to satisfy the remedial requirements” it previously

3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
Per Curiam
imposed and an attempt to avoid a future judgment requir-
ing the same remedy. Id., at 1355.
Two weeks after we vacated its injunction, the District
Court entered another injunction on largely the same
grounds. State officials immediately applied to this Court
for a stay of this injunction.
At this preliminary stage, the State has shown that it is
entitled to interim relief from the District Court’s injunc-
tion. See Abbott v. League of United Latin American Citi-
zens, 607 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2025) (slip op., at 1–2). The
State is likely to succeed on the merits as to both claims. As
to intentional vote dilution, the District Court did not heed
the presumption of legislative good faith, see Alexander v.
South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, 602 U. S.
1, 10 (2024), because it interpreted the State’s legal disa-
greement with the court’s earlier remedial order as proof of
discriminatory animus. Cf. Abbott v. Perez, 585 U. S. 579,
608–609 (2018). And, as to both claims, the District Court’s
analysis departed from Callais. Under Callais, the District
Court was required to deny relief unless the plaintiffs’ al-
ternative map performed “just as well” with respect to all
of the State’s constitutionally permissible districting crite-
ria. 608 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 29). Yet, the District Court
found a violation even though the plaintiffs’ alternative
map would not perform just as well as to the State’s consti-
tutionally permissible criteria of keeping together the Gulf
Coast community of interest and avoiding the pairing of in-
cumbents. The District Court also failed to follow our in-
struction in Callais that the mere fact that voters of differ-
ent races vote for different parties is not relevant to proving
racially polarized voting patterns. See id., at ___ (slip op.,
at 30).
The State has also made a strong showing of irreparable
harm and that the equities and public interest favor it. We
have repeatedly cautioned that lower federal courts should
not “alter the election rules on the eve of an election.”

4 ALLEN v. MILLIGAN
Per Curiam
Republican National Committee v. Democratic National
Committee, 589 U. S. 423, 424 (2020) (per curiam). Here,
the District Court interposed itself into Alabama’s ongoing
efforts to conduct its imminent 2026 congressional elections
under maps that its elected representatives selected. Its
view that conducting the elections under court-imposed
maps would be more convenient for the State was not a
valid justification for that intervention. While federal
courts should not impose changes close to an election, ibid.,
States are free to decide for themselves whether last-mi-
nute changes to an election are in their best interests.
The applications for stay presented to J
USTICE THOMAS
and by him referred to the Court are granted. The May 26,
2026, order of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama, case Nos. 2:21–cv–1530 and
2:21–cv–1291 is stayed pending the timely docketing of the
appeal in this Court. Should the jurisdictional statement
be timely filed, this order shall remain in effect pending this
Court’s action on the appeal. If the appeal is dismissed, or
the judgment affirmed, this order shall terminate automat-
ically. In the event jurisdiction is noted or postponed, this
order will remain in effect pending the sending down of the
judgment of this Court. The May 26, 2026, order of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Al-
abama, case No. 2:21–cv–1536, is stayed pending the timely
filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari. Should the peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari be denied, this stay shall termi-
nate automatically. In the event the petition for a writ of
certiorari is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the
sending down of the judgment of this Court.
It is so ordered.

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1 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 25A1314
WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE,
ET AL. v. EVAN MILLIGAN, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
No. 25A1315
WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE,
ET AL. v. BOBBY SINGLETON, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
No. 25A1316
WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE,
ET AL. v. MARCUS CASTER, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
[June 2, 2026]
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN and
J
USTICE JACKSON join, dissenting.
Before the Court are two paths. Down one lies an orderly
election, held under a tried-and-tested congressional map
that protects Black Alabamians’ right to vote and with
which all voters, elections officials, and candidates alike are
familiar. Down the other lies a chaotic election, held under
a never-before-used congressional map that intentionally
discriminates against Black Alabamians, that Alabama
adopted in unashamed defiance of a prior court order di-
rectly affirmed by this Court, and that will require officials
to change the voter registrations of hundreds of thousands

2 ALLEN v. MILLIGAN
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
of voters in just days at best, a task that Alabama previ-
ously represented would take months.
The majority chooses the second path and disregards
both democratic values and the rule of law. I respectfully
dissent.
I
This is now the third time these cases have come before
the Court. See Merrill v. Milligan, 595 U. S. ___ (2022); Al-
len v. Milligan, 599 U. S. 1 (2023); Allen v. Caster, 608 U. S.
___ (2026). Each turn reveals just how unconscionable the
Court’s action is today.
This saga began in 2021, after Alabama adopted a new
congressional map following the 2020 census. That map
had only one majority-Black congressional district. Black
Alabamians challenged this first map, alleging that it vio-
lated §2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U. S. C. §10301. A
three-judge District Court agreed, holding that the map
likely had a racially discriminatory effect and violated the
Voting Rights Act by diluting Black Alabamians’ voting
strength. It therefore ordered Alabama to adopt “a congres-
sional redistricting plan that include[d] either an additional
majority-Black congressional district, or an additional dis-
trict in which Black voters otherwise have an opportunity
to elect a representative of their choice.” Singleton v. Mer-
rill, 582 F. Supp. 3d 924, 936 (ND Ala. 2022). The latter is
commonly referred to as an “opportunity district.”
That injunction prompted the first trip to this Court. At
the time, Alabama claimed to be in a predicament. The Dis-
trict Court had issued its injunction in January 2022,
roughly four months ahead of Alabama’s primary election
in May 2022. By Alabama’s telling, four months was not
enough time to change congressional maps, so it sought a
stay of the injunction from this Court, arguing that “this
overhaul of Alabama’s congressional map at this late hour
would require the last-minute reassignment of hundreds of

3 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
thousands of voters to new districts.” Application in Merrill
v. Milligan, O. T. 2021, No. 21A375, p. 38 (Merrill Applica-
tion). This “chaos,” the State argued, would harm “not only
the State,” but also “voters and candidates across the
State.” Ibid.
This Court granted the stay. Merrill, 595 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 1). It also agreed to review the District Court’s
order and remedy. See ibid. Two Members of this Court
expressed concern that “[t]he District Court’s order would
require heroic efforts by . . . state and local authorities in
the next few weeks—and even heroic efforts likely would
not be enough to avoid chaos and confusion.” Id., at ___
(K
AVANAUGH, J., joined by ALITO, J., concurring) (slip op.,
at 3). Thus, this Court allowed the map that the District
Court held unlawful to govern the 2022 election.
Then, 18 months later, after full merits briefing and ar-
gument, this Court affirmed the District Court’s order and
finding of discriminatory effect, concluding that the District
Court had “faithfully applied our precedents and correctly
determined that” Alabama’s congressional map unlawfully
discriminated against Black Alabamians. Allen, 599 U. S.,
at 23. As to the District Court’s ordered remedy, the Court
rejected Alabama’s objections that drawing a second oppor-
tunity district would offend the Constitution, writing that
“a faithful application of our precedents and a fair reading
of the record before” the Court “d[id] not bear . . . out” the
State’s objections. Id., at 42.
On remand, and under the District Court’s order that this
Court had just affirmed, Alabama was given the oppor-
tunity to remedy the Voting Rights Act violation. Alabama
did not rise to the occasion. Rather than adopt a map with
the second district that this Court had just held was re-
quired to remedy unlawful racial discrimination, Alabama
doubled down, adopting the 2023 Redistricting Plan, which
also lacked a second opportunity district. Plaintiffs then
amended their complaints in these cases to challenge the

4 ALLEN v. MILLIGAN
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
2023 Redistricting Plan, and the District Court held an 11-
day trial on the legality of the new map. It heard testimony
from 51 witnesses, received almost 800 exhibits, and con-
sidered many volumes of written submissions. At the end
of that trial, the District Court concluded once again that
Alabama’s failure to draw a second opportunity district had
a discriminatory effect. It then found that Alabama had not
merely “refuse[d] to satisfy” its prior order to remedy ra-
cially discriminatory vote dilution, but in fact had gone out
of its way to make it “mathematically impossible” to do so.
Singleton v. Allen, 782 F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1355 (ND Ala.
2025). “[W]ith great reluctance and dismay and even
greater restraint,” the District Court concluded that Ala-
bama had violated the Fourteenth Amendment by en-
trenching racially discriminatory vote dilution and perma-
nently enjoined Alabama’s 2023 Redistricting Plan. Id., at
1118. The District Court instituted a remedial map drawn
without any reference to race. This map governed the 2024
election.
Alabama then filed its second appeal to this Court. While
that appeal was pending, this Court decided Louisiana v.
Callais, 608 U. S. ___ (2026). Although Callais significantly
changed the test for discriminatory-effect vote-dilution
claims under §2 of the Voting Rights Act, it also purported
not to “overrul[e] Allen.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 36). Nor did
Callais alter the analysis for intentional-discrimination
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Still, the Court
vacated the District Court’s injunction in these cases and
remanded for further consideration in light of Callais.
Caster, 608 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 1–2). That vacatur
restored Alabama’s 2023 Redistricting Plan just one week
before Alabama’s primary election while voting was already
under way. Id., at ___ (S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (slip op.,
at 4).
After this Court’s order, Alabama announced that it in-
tended to use the 2023 Redistricting Plan for the upcoming

5 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
election and took the unusual step of splitting its congres-
sional primary. In the three congressional districts unaf-
fected by the change in congressional map, the May 19 pri-
mary election went ahead as scheduled. In the other four
districts, voters still cast their ballots. Their votes for Con-
gress, however, did not count. Instead, Alabama’s Legisla-
ture passed a law permitting the Governor to call a special
primary election in the four congressional districts whose
lines changed as a result of this Court’s order, and the Gov-
ernor set that election for August 11.
Back in the District Court, plaintiffs immediately sought
an emergency hearing following this Court’s order. The
District Court held one, and less than three weeks later, it
issued a preliminary injunction after “fully revisit[ing] the
merits of each claim” brought by plaintiffs. ___ F. Supp. 3d
___, ___ (2026), 1 App. 28. In a thorough 78-page opinion,
it explained that its prior decision on intentional racial dis-
crimination was “undisturbed by Callais” and that, even af-
ter “draw[ing] every inference . . . in the Legislature’s fa-
vor,” the record compelled the conclusion that the State
intentionally entrenched the racial discrimination that the
District Court previously found and this Court affirmed.
Id., at 29, 31. From here, the District Court reinstated the
remedial map that this Court vacated.
II
Alabama has now returned to this Court again, seeking a
stay of the District Court’s second preliminary injunction in
these cases. The Court should deny Alabama’s request. Al-
abama has not shown that the District Court erred in hold-
ing that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their Four-
teenth Amendment claim. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558
U. S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam). Furthermore, the State
has no legitimate interest in enforcing an unconstitutional
map, while vast harms will likely arise from upending the

6 ALLEN v. MILLIGAN
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
status quo, sowing chaos in Alabama, and rewarding Ala-
bama’s gamesmanship.
A
To prevail on their Fourteenth Amendment challenge,
plaintiffs were required to show that Alabama enacted the
2023 Redistricting Plan “‘as a purposeful device to mini-
mize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic
minorities.’” Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference
of the NAACP, 602 U. S. 1, 38 (2024) (quoting Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 911 (1995)). That claim has two
elements: discriminatory effect and discriminatory pur-
pose. Alexander, 602 U. S., at 39. Alabama has not shown
that the District Court erred on either element.
1
To begin, this Court has already held that the discrimi-
natory-effect element is satisfied in these cases. Again, fol-
lowing the 2020 census, Alabama drew a congressional map
with a single majority-Black district. The District Court
concluded that the map violated §2 of the Voting Rights Act,
and this Court “agree[d].” Allen, 599 U. S., at 19. Callais
later changed the standard for §2 liability, but Callais also
made clear that it did “not overrul[e] Allen.” 608 U. S., at
___, ___ (slip op., at 32, 36). As I have explained, “[t]hese
cases are, of course, Allen,” so if the majority meant what it
said in Callais and “Allen is good law . . . , then it must be
good law here.” Caster, 608 U. S., at ___ (dissenting opin-
ion) (slip op., at 4). “This Court’s finding of racially discrim-
inatory vote dilution is an inextricable, permanent feature
of this case,” id., at ___ (slip op., at 4), and it establishes
that, as a matter of law, Alabama’s failure to draw a second
opportunity district has a discriminatory effect.
——————
1
Because the District Court held that its post-trial finding of inten-
tional discrimination was “undisturbed by Callais,” ___ F. Supp. 3d ___,
___ (2026), 1 App. 29, and made substantially similar findings in its pre-
liminary-injunction opinion, I discuss the District Court’s post-trial and
preliminary-injunction opinions together.

7 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Next, the District Court did not clearly err when conclud-
ing that Alabama acted with discriminatory purpose. The
plaintiffs were required to demonstrate that race was “a
motivating factor” in the adoption of the 2023 Redistricting
Plan; they were not required to prove that it was the
“sol[e],” “‘dominant,’” or even “‘primary’” motivation. Ar-
lington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265–266 (1977); see Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U. S. 55, 66–74 (1980) (applying Arlington Heights to
claim for intentional vote dilution). The District Court’s
finding of discriminatory intent is reviewed for clear error,
meaning that its factual determination “must govern” if it
is “‘plausible’ in light of the full record.” Cooper v. Harris,
581 U. S. 285, 293 (2017)).
The District Court’s account of the evidence here is more
than plausible. The record is bereft of evidence suggesting
that Alabama took seriously this Court’s finding of discrim-
inatory vote dilution in Allen. Speaker of the Alabama
House of Representatives Nathaniel Ledbetter put it
bluntly: “‘If you think about where we were, the Supreme
Court ruling [in Allen] was five to four. So there’s just one
judge that needed to see something different.’” Singleton,
782 F. Supp. 3d, at 1348. That admission, the District
Court observed, suggests “that Speaker Ledbetter was not
focused on trying to remedy likely vote dilution” when the
Alabama Legislature passed the 2023 Redistricting Plan.
Ibid.
The record instead supports the understanding that Ala-
bama was focused on pulling out all the stops to “entrench”
the dilution of Black votes found by the District Court and
affirmed by this Court. Id., at 1345. Most importantly, the
events leading up to the adoption of the 2023 Redistricting
Plan were “replete with sharp departures from (and some
outright conflicts with) Alabama’s traditional districting
guidelines,” as the State fashioned redistricting criteria
from whole cloth that it had never previously employed.

8 ALLEN v. MILLIGAN
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Id., at 1343; see id., at 1343–1344. The State, the District
Court found, also conjured legislative findings out of “thin
air,” id., at 1345, in “the dead of night,” id., at 1117, that
“exalt[ed]” certain White communities while “remaining si-
lent on the heritage of all other communities of interest in
Alabama (including the Black Belt),” id., at 1344. The Dis-
trict Court observed that this “constellation of departures
from the norm,” id., at 1345, created a set of redistricting
rules that made it “mathematically impossible to create
[the] second opportunity district” that Alabama had been
ordered to draw, id., at 1340; see id., at 1356–1357. In
short, the record reflects “that Alabama made an inten-
tional choice to . . . entrench, rather than remedy and up-
root, the racial discrimination that the District Court had
previously found and that this Court had affirmed.” Caster,
608 U. S., at ___ (S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 3).
Furthermore, there is minimal evidence that partisan-
ship entered the calculus. The State’s redistricting criteria
omitted any mention of partisanship. ___ F. Supp. 3d, at
___, 1 App. 45. Neither of the legislators who led the redis-
tricting process testified that they drew the 2023 redistrict-
ing plan for partisan reasons. Ibid. Neither legislator gave
any weight to partisan interests, despite being urged to do
so by former Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy. Ibid.
Moreover, although the State professed to be concerned
with protecting incumbents, the only evidence in the record
on this point shows that this interest was not partisan, but
extended to all incumbents, including Terri Sewell, the
State’s only incumbent Democrat as of 2023. Id., at ___, 1
App. 46. The thin factual record is especially notable given
that this round of redistricting took place four years after
Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U. S. 684 (2019), in which
this Court held that federal courts cannot hear challenges
to partisan gerrymanders. Id., at 718. That means that the
Alabama Legislature had every incentive to dress up its

9 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
redistricting effort in partisan garb. It is telling that it
barely managed a fig leaf.
The District Court also more than adequately accounted
for the presumption of legislative good faith. Contra, ante,
at 3. That principle “directs district courts to draw the in-
ference that cuts in the legislature’s favor when confronted
with evidence that could plausibly support multiple conclu-
sions.” Alexander, 602 U. S., at 10. In its post-trial opinion,
the District Court did just that and more. “[I]n extreme
service of the presumption of . . . good faith,” the District
Court assumed the best of Alabama’s Legislature and “dis-
count[ed] [its] concerns about” the “historical background
and sequence of events” leading up to the adoption of the
2023 Redistricting Plan. Singleton, 782 F. Supp. 3d, at
1346. Similarly, when it reaffirmed its intentional-discrim-
ination holding in its preliminary-injunction order, the Dis-
trict Court “dr[e]w every inference [it could] in the Legisla-
ture’s favor, [made] no effort to read anyone’s mind, and
accuse[d] no legislator of racism.” ___ F. Supp. 3d, at ___, 1
App. 31. Those were not empty promises: The District
Court declined to consider “Alabama’s history of discrimi-
nating against Black Alabamians,” even though it is “well-
documented,” to “give the Legislature every benefit of the
doubt.” Id., at ___, 1 App. 32. It also gave “no weight” to
contemporaneous statements from minority legislators re-
garding the legislature’s intentions. Id., at ___, n. 15, 1
App. 40, n. 15.
The reason the District Court found intentional discrimi-
nation even after affording such deference to the Alabama
Legislature is simple: The record is crystal clear. Even if
Alabama may have unintentionally drawn the first racially
discriminatory map, when it later adopted redistricting cri-
teria that made it mathematically impossible to remedy ra-
cial discrimination, the District Court drew the obvious
(and certainly not implausible) inference that Alabama in-
tended to discriminate. If the District Court clearly erred

10 ALLEN v. MILLIGAN
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
by doing so, then there is no realistic case in which the pre-
sumption of legislative good faith can ever be rebutted.
The majority’s order grapples with virtually none of this.
Indeed, it does not even acknowledge that the District
Court’s discriminatory-intent finding is reviewed for clear
error. Much of its reasoning rests on its assertion that, even
as to the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim, “the Dis-
trict Court’s analysis departed from Callais.” Ante, at 3.
That is wrong twice over. First, Callais “said not a word
about the standard for Fourteenth Amendment intentional-
discrimination claims.” Caster, 608 U. S., at ___
(S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 4). Instead, Callais
was focused on changing the Court’s law on “exactly what
§2 of the Voting Rights Act demands,” not what the Consti-
tution demands. 608 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 19). Second,
Callais said that its newly fashioned test for §2 disparate-
impact claims is not an intent-based test. It acknowledged
that §2 “does not demand a finding of intentional discrimi-
nation.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 23). It also denied J
USTICE
KAGAN’s charge that the majority’s new test was an intent
test in all but name. Id., at ____ (slip op., at 35). It is hard
to see how the District Court’s finding of discriminatory in-
tent under the Fourteenth Amendment could have de-
parted from an opinion that purported to say nothing about
how to find discriminatory intent under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court’s apparently oblivious insistence
to the contrary today cannot be squared with what Callais
said on its face just over one month ago. See id., at ___, n.
5 (K
AGAN, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 25, n. 5) (“[T]he major-
ity closes its opinion by suggesting it is not requiring a vote-
dilution plaintiff to present evidence of ‘discriminatory in-
tent.’ Which, if true, would be welcome news” (citation
omitted)).

11 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
B
In addition to being wrong on the merits, the Court’s de-
cision inflicts two grave harms on the public. It debases the
democratic process by upending Alabama’s entire election
in the name of permitting Alabama to discriminate against
Black Alabamians. It also corrodes the rule of law by re-
warding Alabama’s gamesmanship and outright defiance of
court orders.
1
First, the Court’s decision will cause havoc. The so-called
“Purcell principle” “generally holds that, because late-
breaking changes to election procedures can cause chaos,
federal courts should hesitate before exercising their equi-
table discretion to alter state election laws close to an elec-
tion.” Malliotakis v. Williams, 607 U. S. ___, ___ (2026)
(S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 10). Today’s deci-
sion tramples on that principle of restraint.
As the District Court explained, the path of least change
in Alabama is keeping the District Court’s remedial plan in
place. According to Alabama Director of Elections Jeff El-
rod, all voters in Alabama are currently assigned in county-
level voter rolls to congressional districts based on the re-
medial map that the District Court previously ordered and
that the State used for the 2024 election cycle. 2 App. 135.
To run an election using the remedial map, then, the State
need not make any changes to its voter rolls or change the
status quo.
To switch to the 2023 Redistricting Plan now, however,
county elections officials will have to reassign hundreds of
thousands of voters across the State to new congressional
districts. Three of Alabama’s counties will be particularly
hard hit because they are split across two congressional dis-
tricts. 2 App. 121–122. These counties have about 600,000

12 ALLEN v. MILLIGAN
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
registered voters between them (roughly 15% of the State’s
total number of registered voters).
2
Elrod testified below that county elections officials would
have to reassign those 600,000 voters manually. “The sys-
tem,” he explained, “is not automatic” and “requires manual
input” from elections officials who must “physically manu-
ally interface with the system.” Id., at 146. Reassigning
voters in precincts split across two districts is particularly
complicated, he continued, as it “cannot be done with a sim-
ple click” and instead requires officials to check street-level
data to determine how to assign individual voters. Id., at
156–157. Worse yet, Elrod warned that reassigning voters
requires using complicated computer software that officials
must be trained to use, as “most of the counties’ registrars
are not tech savvy” and “registrars are the only ones who
can make the changes . . . to a voter’s record.” Id., at 147–
148. This process also requires many prechecks and back-
end quality control steps, all of which add to its time-inten-
sive nature. Id., at 140.
Given these complexities, the process for reassigning vot-
ers typically takes months. Alabama knows (or at least
knew) this. In 2021, at the first preliminary-injunction
stage in these cases, Alabama filed a declaration from El-
rod’s predecessor representing that voter reassignment
“can take a county’s Board of Registrars 3 to 4 months to
accomplish.” ECF Doc. 82–7, p. 4.
3
For example, after the
Alabama Legislature redrew its state legislative districts in
2017 following litigation, “local election officials struggled
to complete the district assignment process in up to 4
months.” Ibid.
——————
2
Alabama Secretary of State, Voter Registration Statistics—2026,
https://www.sos.alabama.gov/sites/default/files/election-data/2026-
05/ALVR-2026.xlsx (archived at https://perma.cc/6QHZ-7GFC).
3
ECF citations are to documents filed in the District Court in Milligan
v. Allen, No. 2:21–cv–1530 (ND Ala.).

13 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Here, county officials do not have four months. When Al-
abama filed these applications on May 27, they had just
seven days. Elrod explained that voter rolls were locked
throughout the State following the State’s May 19 primary
election, meaning that county officials could not reassign
any voters to their new congressional districts under the
2023 Redistricting Plan for the August 11 special primary
election. ECF Doc. 530–1, p. 17. The rolls were unlocked
on May 27, but they are set to lock again today, June 2,
ahead of Alabama’s primary runoff election on June 16. As
a result, county officials in the three most heavily impacted
counties in Alabama had at best just seven days to reassign
600,000 voters by hand. The two smaller counties, which
are together responsible for reassigning 100,000 voters,
each have just three elections officials who can make these
changes. 2 App. 122. Mistakes will inevitably occur, as
overworked elections officials sprint around the clock to
make all the necessary changes. Even then, the officials
may fall short. As far as Elrod is aware, no county in Ala-
bama that was split under a redistricting plan has ever
managed to complete voter reassignment in just seven
days. See id., at 181.
4
It now appears that county officials have just hours left,
if that. Because the District Court’s injunction remained in
place while these applications were pending, it is unclear if
county officials began reassigning voters or if they were
awaiting a decision from this Court. Indeed, Alabama,
while conceding “it is true that time is tight,” suggested that
——————
4
Elrod testified that the voter rolls are locked by a third-party vendor
immediately before and during an election. See 2 App. 136–140. The
rolls remain locked until votes are canvassed seven days after the elec-
tion unless there is a challenge to the election results. Id., at 206. As a
result, even if the State can require the vendor to unlock the voter rolls
when they were otherwise set to be locked, it seems likely that would
cause even more confusion and undermine the administration of an ac-
tive, ongoing election.

14 ALLEN v. MILLIGAN
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
voter reassignment has not yet begun. Reply 5; see ibid.
(noting that reassignment “was set to begin on May 27”). If
in fact reassignment has not begun, then elections officials
may have only a few hours to make all the needed changes.
The Court nonetheless stays the District Court’s injunction
and orders the 2023 Redistricting Plan into place, even
though it knows full well that “it will take a chaotic, decen-
tralized, and Herculean effort” to make all the necessary
changes. ___ F. Supp. 3d, at ___, 1 App. 8.
In response, Alabama asserts that it is the lower court
that violated Purcell because it was “the Legislature’s and
the Governor’s choice” to inflict these harms. Application
for Stay 35. Alabama’s weaponization of Purcell ignores
half the story. Until roughly three weeks ago, the District
Court’s remedial plan had governed in Alabama for more
than two years. Then, this Court vacated the District
Court’s injunction and restored the 2023 Redistricting Plan.
Although Alabama chose to use the 2023 Redistricting Plan
for this election following this Court’s decision, the fact re-
mains that this Court allowed this change to go forward.
Now, the Court is being presented with a choice. It can use
its equitable authority to fix the mess it has created, or it
can use that same authority to deepen it further. The an-
swer is clear: No principle of either law or equity requires
the Court to perpetuate disruption instead of preventing it.
2
Second, the Court should not have rewarded Alabama’s
defiance of court orders and blatant gamesmanship
throughout this litigation. It is long established that “‘he
who comes into equity must come with clean hands.’” Pre-
cision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Ma-
chinery Co., 324 U. S. 806, 814 (1945). Under this principle,
to obtain equitable relief like a stay pending appeal, a mo-
vant must “have acted fairly and without fraud or deceit as
to the controversy in issue.” Id., at 814–815; see New

15 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U. S. 742, 749 (2001) (“‘[A]bsent
any good explanation, a party should not be allowed to gain
an advantage by litigation on one theory, and then seek an
inconsistent advantage by pursuing an incompatible the-
ory’”). Alabama’s hands, however, are far from clean. In-
stead, it defied the District Court’s order in these cases even
after this Court affirmed it, and took utterly irreconcilable
positions at different stages in these cases to suit its own
purposes.
First, Alabama intentionally chose to flout a preliminary
injunction that this Court affirmed in Allen. Again, the Dis-
trict Court’s preliminary injunction (affirmed by this Court)
expressly ordered Alabama to draw a second district in
which Black voters would have an opportunity to elect the
candidate of their choice. See Singleton, 782 F. Supp. 3d,
at 1125; supra, at 2. Yet the State staunchly refused to do
so and instead did everything it could to make it impossible
to draw such a district.
Of course, Alabama had every right to raise its “legal dis-
agreement,” ante, at 3, with the District Court’s original
preliminary injunction through the appellate process or
otherwise. The course of action the State chose here, how-
ever, was not the proper way of doing so. Had Alabama
complied with the preliminary injunction and drawn a map
with a second opportunity district, it could have relitigated
the merits in the ordinary course: first at a trial on the mer-
its, and then on appeal. At either stage, it could have raised
the arguments that the litigants in Callais raised and pre-
vailed on, or advanced challenges to the District Court’s re-
medial order. Instead, Alabama willfully drew a map that
flouted the District Court’s preliminary injunction and
hoped that this Court would eventually see things its way.
After today, it is hard to call Alabama’s cynical gambit an-
ything other than a success, and the Court’s rewarding of
Alabama’s behavior anything other than a blow to the rule
of law.

16 ALLEN v. MILLIGAN
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Second, Alabama has taken wildly inconsistent positions
on how much time it needs to implement a new redistricting
plan throughout these cases, which suggests it is attempt-
ing to game this Court’s emergency docket through shifting
positions on the equities. As noted above, Alabama previ-
ously sang a very different tune. In January 2022, it asked
the District Court to stay its initial preliminary injunction
in these cases. See ECF Doc. 110. In its motion, the State
complained that changing its congressional districts four
months before Alabama’s primary election that year
“thr[ew] the [2022] election into chaos” and left “almost no
time for maps to be redrawn, hundreds of thousands of vot-
ers to be reassigned to new districts, and thousands of new
signatures to be obtained by candidates and political organ-
izations seeking ballot access.” Id., at 20. Alabama contin-
ued: “To pull the rug out from . . . candidates and their vot-
ers in the run-up to an election requires extraordinary
justification,” for “‘elections are complex to administer, and
the public interest is not served by a chaotic, last-minute
reordering of districts.’” Id., at 21 (alterations omitted).
The State made similar arguments to this Court when it
successfully sought a stay following the District Court’s de-
nial. See Merrill Application 38 (citing “the last-minute re-
assignment of hundreds of thousands of voters to new dis-
tricts” as imposing significant “harms not only [on] the
State,” but also on “voters and candidates”).
If all the above was true in 2022, then it is also true in
2026. Alabama, however, no longer seems to think so.
What was previously impossible to achieve in four months
is suddenly possible to achieve in less than one week, as
concerns about the administrative burdens associated with
“the last-minute reassignment of hundreds of thousands of
voters to new districts,” ibid., have apparently melted
away. A State that once decried pulling the rug out from
under voters, elections officials, and candidates now seems
determined to do just that. The Court should not reward

17 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)
S
OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
such gamesmanship, especially when it accepted Alabama’s
arguments in granting Alabama a stay in 2022. See Mer-
rill, 595 U. S., at ___ (K
AVANAUGH, J., concurring) (slip op.,
at 3) (noting that “even heroic efforts” by elections officials
“likely would not be enough to avoid chaos and confusion”).
***
Weeks ago, I warned that vacating the District Court’s
injunction in these cases would “unleash chaos and . . . con-
fuse voters.” Caster, 608 U. S., at ___ (dissenting opinion)
(slip op., at 4). Nevertheless, the Court forged ahead. Now
the Court is squarely faced with a record of the turmoil it
has caused and the harm it has wrought. Yet just as Ala-
bama doubled down on racial discrimination, the Court to-
day doubles down on chaos. Because I choose to defend the
rule of law and the right of all Alabamians to participate
equally in democracy, I respectfully dissent.