Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 608 U. S. Part 1
Pages 219–234
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
May 14, 2026
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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219
Syllabus
MONTGOMERY v. CARIBE TRANSPORT II, LLC,
et
al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the seventh circuit
No. 24–1238. Argued March 4, 2026—Decided May 14, 2026
Petitioner Shawn Montgomery sustained severe and permanent injuries
after his tractor trailer was struck by a truck driven by respondent
Yosniel Varela-Mojena. Varela-Mojena was driving a load of plastic
pots through Illinois for respondent Caribe Transport II, LLC, a motor
carrier. Respondent C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.—a transportation
broker—had coordinated the shipment. Montgomery sued all respond-
ents in Federal District Court and alleged, among other things, that
C.H. Robinson was liable for his injuries because it negligently hired
Varela-Mojena and Caribe Transport. Montgomery claimed that C.H.
Robinson knew (or should have known) from Caribe Transport's safety
rating that hiring it to transport goods was reasonably likely to result
in crashes that would injure others. The District Court held that the
Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA)—which
preempts state laws related to the prices, routes, and services of the
trucking industry, 49 U. S. C. § 14501(c)(1)—expressly preempted Mont-
gomery's negligent-hiring claim against C.H. Robinson. The District
Court further held that the claim did not fall within the FAAAA's safety
exception, which provides that the FAAAA's preemption provision
“shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with re-
spect to motor vehicles.” § 14501(c)(2)(A). The Seventh Circuit af-
frmed. The Court granted certiorari to resolve whether the FAAAA's
safety exception permits negligent-hiring claims against brokers like
C.H. Robinson that coordinate shipments in the transportation industry.
Held: A claim that one company negligently hired another to transport
goods is not preempted by the FAAAA because States retain authority
to regulate safety “with respect to motor vehicles” under the Act.
Pp. 225–229.
(a) Even if the FAAAA otherwise preempts Montgomery's negligent-
hiring claim against C.H. Robinson, the safety exception saves it. The
relevant text provides that the FAAAA's preemption provision “shall
not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to
motor vehicles.” § 14501(c)(2)(A). All agree that common-law duties
and standards of care form part of a State's authority to regulate safety.
Negligent-hiring claims impose a duty of reasonable care in employing

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220 MONTGOMER
Y v. CARIBE TRANSPORT II, LLC
Syllabus
a contractor for work carrying a risk of physical harm. The preemption
questi
on thus boils down to whether negligent-hiring claims of the type
Montgomery presses are “with respect to motor vehicles.” Because the
FAAAA supplies no defnition of “with respect to,” the Court gives
the phrase its ordinary meaning. Following dictionary defnitions, the
Court has construed the same phrase in the FAAAA's preemption provi-
sion to mean “concern[s].” Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569
U. S. 251, 261. The FAAAA defnes “motor vehicle” as “a vehicle, ma-
chine, tractor, trailer, or semitrailer propelled or drawn by mechanical
power and used on a highway in transportation.” § 13102(16). Putting
the pieces together, a claim is “with respect to motor vehicles” if it
“concerns” the vehicles used in transportation. Here, requiring C.H.
Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier “concerns”
motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods.
Montgomery's negligent-hiring claim thus falls within the FAAAA's
safety exception, which saves it from preemption. Pp. 225–227.
(b) C.H. Robinson's counterarguments are unpersuasive. Construing
the safety exception as Montgomery requests does not mean that it
saves everything preempted by the FAAAA's express preemption pro-
vision. The safety exception saves only a subset of preempted claims:
those involving regulations concerning motor vehicle safety. State
laws related to motor carrier prices, routes, and services that have no
relationship to safety remain preempted.
C.H. Robinson argues that Montgomery's interpretation of the safety
exception creates surplusage. But surplusage exists however the dis-
puted phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” is defned, because any
overlap comes from the reference to a State's regulatory authority
over “safety.”
Finally, C.H. Robinson asserts that interpreting the safety exception
to cover brokers would create an anomaly with subsection (b) of the
FAAAA, which preempts state regulation of “intrastate” rates, routes,
or services “of any freight forwarder or broker.” § 14501(b)(1). Unlike
subsection (c), subsection (b) does not contain a safety exception. C.H.
Robinson invokes this textual difference as a reason that subsection (c)'s
safety exception should be read to exclude brokers. While it is not
obvious why Congress included a safety exception in (c) but not in (b),
it would be even odder to say that the alleged tort—the negligent hiring
of an unsafe motor carrier whose truck caused injury—is not an exercise
of “the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor
vehicles” under § 14501(c)(2)(A). The text of subsection (c)(2)(A) con-
trols. Pp. 227–229.
124 F. 4th 1053, reversed and remanded.

Cite
as: 608 U. S. 219 (2026)
221
Syllabus
Barrett, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Kava-
na
ugh, J., fled a concurring opinion, in which Alito, J., joined, post,
p. 229.
Paul D. Clement argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were C. Harker Rhodes IV, Camilo Garcia,
Michael J. Leizerman, Rena M. Leizerman, and Alan G.
Pirtle.
Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., argued the cause for respond-
ents. With him on the brief were Warren L. Dean, Jr.,
Kathleen E. Kraft, Dorothy G. Capers, Christopher A.
Ugarte, Thomas H. Dupree, Jr., Lucas C. Townsend, Cam-
eron J. E. Pritchett, Andrew G. Barron, Matthew J. Reh,
Paul L. Brusati, and Julie Fix Meyer.
Sopan Joshi argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging affrmance. With him on the brief were
Solicitor General Sauer, Assistant Attorney General Shu-
mate, Deputy Solicitor General Stewart, Michael S. Raab,
Charles E. Enloe, and Erin D. Hendrixson.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Ohio
et al. by Dave Yost, Attorney General of Ohio, Mathura J. Sridharan,
Solicitor General, Layne H. Tieszen, Deputy Solicitor General, and Jeffrey
S. Hobday, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for
their respective jurisdictions as follows: Kristin K. Mayes of Arizona, Tim
Griffn of Arkansas, Rob Bonta of California, Kathleen Jennings of Dela-
ware, Brian L. Schwalb of the District of Columbia, Raúl R. Labrador of
Idaho, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Theodore E. Rokita of Indiana, Kris Ko-
bach of Kansas, Liz Murrill of Louisiana, Anthony G. Brown of Maryland,
Andrea Joy Campbell of Massachusetts, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Keith
Ellison of Minnesota, Catherine L. Hanaway of Missouri, Austin Knud-
sen of Montana, Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Raúl Torrez of New Mexico,
Letitia James of New York, Jeff Jackson of North Carolina, Gentner
Drummond of Oklahoma, Dan Rayfeld of Oregon, Peter F. Neronha of
Rhode Island, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Jonathan Skrmetti of Ten-
nessee, Ken Paxton of Texas, Charity R. Clark of Vermont, Jason Miy-
ares of Virginia, and John B. McCuskey of West Virginia; for American
Truckers United by Rosalind B. Bienvenu and Justin R. Kaufman; for
the Institute for Safer Trucking by Brian Wol fman; for Preemption
Scholars by Ernest A. Young, pro se; for the Truck Safety Coalition
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222 MONTGOMER
Y v. CARIBE TRANSPORT II, LLC
Opinion of the Court
Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court.
The
Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act
preempts state laws related to the prices, routes, and serv-
ices of the trucking industry. But there is an important ex-
ception: States retain authority to regulate safety “with re-
spect to motor vehicles.” This case presents the question
whether a claim that one company negligently hired another
to transport goods falls within that exception. It does.
I
A
Sellers often use motor carriers to transport products to
their destination. But fnding a carrier can be time consum-
ing, so many sellers rely on brokers to do it for them. Think
of it this way: Brokers are the transportation industry's
et al. by Hyland Hunt, Ruthanne Deutsch, and Jeffrey Burns; and for
Robert Cox by Adina H. Rosenbaum, Allison M. Zieve, and Christopher
T. Saucedo.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of
Nebraska et al. by Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General of Nebraska,
Cody S. Barnett, Solicitor General, and Frederick R. Yarger, Kevin D.
Homiak, and by Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General of Georgia; for
Amazon.com, Inc., by Roman Martinez and Margaret A. Upshaw; for the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Noel J.
Francisco, Kelly Holt Rodriguez, Stephanie A. Maloney, Elizabeth Mil-
ito, and Karen R. Harned; for Interested Freight Brokers by Robert D.
Moseley, Jr., C. Fredric Marcinak III, and Martin E. Cain; for the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers by James H. Burnley IV, Ronald M.
Jacobs, Megan Barbero, and Erica Klenicki; for OurBus, Inc., by Patricia
L. Gatling; for Tokio Marine Houston Casualty Co. by Conte Cicala and
Jovana Crncevic; for the Transportation Intermediaries Association, Inc.,
by Marc S. Blubaugh; for the Washington Legal Foundation by Cory L.
Andrews and Zac Morgan; and for Keith Hylton et al. by Trisha Anderson
and Martin Totaro.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for Airlines for America by Shay Dvor-
etzky, Parker Rider-Longmaid, and Raza Rasheed; and for Gergana
Franco by Jonathan L. Hilton and Geoffrey C. Parker.
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as: 608 U. S. 219 (2026)
223
Opinion of the Court
matchmakers, connecting sellers of goods to the carriers who
move
them.
Today, roughly 28,000 brokers arrange transportation for
about a third of all freight shipped in the United States by
more than 780,000 carriers. Dept. of Transp., Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Admin., 2024 Pocket Guide to Large Truck
and Bus Statistics 9–10; Brief for Truck Safety Coalition
et al. as Amici Curiae 7−8. Brokers net the difference be-
tween the price that a company will pay to move goods and
the cost of hiring a carrier. Id., at 7.
The Federal Government began regulating the trucking
industry in 1935. P. Teske, S. Best, & M. Mintrom, Deregu-
lating Freight Transportation: Delivering the Goods 60
(1995) (Teske). The Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) initially regulated rates and services of motor carriers
“ `in the public interest.' ” 49 Stat. 543. But the ICC's in-
terventions “inhibit[ed] market entry [and] carrier growth,”
creating “some operating ineffciencies and some anticompet-
itive pricing.” 94 Stat. 793. Its regulation also stifed bro-
kers' development. J. Kinsler, Motor Freight Brokers: A
Tale of Federal Regulatory Pandemonium, 14 Nw. J. Int'l
L. & Bus. 289, 290 (1994). So Congress enacted the Motor
Carrier Act of 1980 to deregulate aspects of the industry.
Ibid. The Motor Carrier Act “ease[d] entry requirements,
reduce[d] collective rate making, and encourage[d] greater
fexibility in pricing.” Teske 69.
Even so, state regulation of the industry continued to in-
hibit competition. 108 Stat. 1605 (state regulation “impeded
the free fow of trade, traffc, and transportation of interstate
commerce” and “placed an unreasonable cost” on consumers).
In 1994, Congress addressed that problem by enacting
the Federal Aviati on Administrati on Author ization Act
(FAAAA), which expressly preempts certain state regula-
tions involving motor carriers. Id., at 1605−1607. A year
later, Congress amended the Act to preempt state regula-
tions involving other players in the transportation industry,
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224 MONTGOMER
Y v. CARIBE TRANSPORT II, LLC
Opinion of the Court
including brokers. 109 Stat. 899. Its preemption provision
now
prohibits States from “enact[ing] or enforc[ing] a law,
regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of
law related to a price, route, or service” of any motor carrier
or broker “with respect to the transportation of property.”
49 U. S. C. § 14501(c)(1).
While the FAAAA's preemption provision is broad, it con-
tains exceptions. §§ 14501(c)(2)–(4). One—which we will
call the safety exception—provides that the preemption pro-
vision “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of
a State with respect to motor vehicles.” § 14501(c)(2)(A).
Other exceptions leave room for States “to impose highway
route controls or limitations based on the size or weight of
the motor vehicle or the hazardous nature of the cargo” and
to impose minimum insurance requirements on carriers.
Ibid. Congress designed the safety exception “to ensure
that its preemption of States' economic authority over motor
carriers of property [did] `not restrict' the preexisting and
traditional state police power over safety.” Columbus v.
Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U. S. 424, 439
(2002) (quoting § 14501(c)(2)(A)).
B
While driving a load of plastic pots through Illinois in a
Mack Truck, respondent Yosniel Varela-Mojena veered off
course. He struck petitioner Shawn Montgomery's tractor-
trailer, which was stopped on the side of the road. Mont-
gomery's leg had to be amputated, and he sustained other
severe and permanent injuries from the collision. Varela-
Mojena was driving for respondent Caribe Transport II,
LLC—a motor carrier. Respondent C.H. Robinson World-
wide, Inc.—a broker—had coordinated the shipment.
Montgomery sued Varela-Mojena, Caribe Transport, C.H.
Robinson, and corporate entities associated with them.
Among other claims, he alleged that C.H. Robinson was lia-
ble for his injuries because it negligently hired Varela-
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as: 608 U. S. 219 (2026)
225
Opinion of the Court
Mojena and Caribe Transport. Montgomery claimed that
Car
ibe Transport had a “ `conditional' ” safety rating from
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration when C.H.
Robinson hired it. App. 21. That agency had allegedly
found Caribe Transport to be defcient “with respect to qual-
ifcation of drivers,” “hours of service of drivers,” “inspec-
tion, repair and maintenance,” “recordable crash rate,” and
more. Id., at 20–21 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Based on that safety rating, Montgomery claimed that C.H.
Robinson knew (or should have known) that choosing Caribe
Transport to transport goods was reasonably likely to result
in crashes that would injure others.
Applying Seventh Circuit precedent, see Ye v. Global-
Tranz Enterprises, Inc., 74 F. 4th 453 (2023), the District
Court held that the FAAAA expressly preempts Montgom-
ery's negligent-hiring claim against C.H. Robinson and that
the claim does not fall within the safety exception. No. 19–
cv–1300, App. to Pet. for Cert. 11a–12a (SD Ill., Jan. 11,
2024). The Seventh Circuit affrmed. 124 F. 4th 1053,
1058 (2025).
The Circuits are divided as to whether the FAAAA's
safety exception permits negligent-hiring claims against bro-
kers.
1
We granted certiorari. 606 U. S. 1066 (2025).
II
Montgomery argues that even if the FAAAA otherwise
preempts his negligent-hiring claim against C.H. Robinson,
the safety exception saves it. We agree.
2
1
Compare Ye v. Global-Tranz Enterprises, Inc., 74 F. 4th 453, 456 (CA7
2023), and Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. Landstar Ranger, 65 F. 4th 1261, 1264
(CA11 2023), with Cox v. Total Quality Logistics, Inc., 142 F. 4th 847,
853−858 (CA6 2025), and Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 976
F. 3d 1016, 1020 (CA9 2020).
2
Because we hold that the safety exception applies, we assume without
deciding that 49 U. S. C. § 14501(c)(1) would otherwise preempt Montgom-
ery's negligent-hiring claim.

226 MONTGOMER
Y v. CARIBE TRANSPORT II, LLC
Opinion of the Court
Recall the relevant text: The preemption provision “shall
not
restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with
respect to motor vehicles.” § 14501(c)(2)(A). All agree that
common-law duties and standards of care form part of a
State's authority to regulate safety. Tr. of Oral Arg. 52, 61;
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20–22; see Kurns
v. Railroad Friction Products Corp., 565 U. S. 625, 637 (2012)
(state common-law duties and standards of care are “de-
signed to be . . . a potent method of governing conduct and
controlling policy” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Negligent-hiring claims impose a duty of reasonable care in
employing a contractor for work carrying a risk of physical
harm. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 411 (1964).
The preemption question thus boils down to whether
negligent-hiring claims of the type Montgomery presses are
claims “with respect to motor vehicles.” § 14501(c)(2)(A).
We conclude that they are. The FAAAA supplies no defni-
tion of “with respect to,” so we give the phrase its ordinary
meaning. Dictionaries defne it as “referring to,” “con-
cerning,” or “regarding.” Oxford American Dictionary and
Language Guide 853 (1999); Webster's New Universal Un-
abridged Dictionary 1640 (1996). Following those defni-
tions, we have construed the same phrase in the FAAAA's
preemption provision to mean “concern[s].” Dan's City
Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U. S. 251, 261 (2013) (interpret-
ing “with respect to the transportation of property”).
3
And
the FAAAA defnes “motor vehicle” as “a vehicle, machine,
tractor, trailer, or semitrailer propelled or drawn by mechan-
ical power and used on a highway in transportation.”
§ 13102(16). Putting the pieces together, a claim is “with re-
3
In Dan's City, we explained that the phrase “transportation of prop-
erty” “ `massively limits the scope of preemption' ” in the FAAAA. 569
U. S., at 261 (quoting Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc.,
536 U. S. 424, 449 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). We did not hold or other-
wise suggest that the words “with respect to” greatly limit the scope of
preemption generally. Contra, Brief for Respondents 27.
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227
Opinion of the Court
spect to motor vehicles” if it “concerns” or “regards” the ve-
h
icles used in transportation.
Applying that interpretation here is straightforward.
Montgomery alleges that C.H. Robinson failed to exercise
reasonable care when it hired Caribe Transport, which had
a subpar safety rating from federal regulators, to transport
goods via truck. Based on that safety rating, Montgomery
claims that C.H. Robinson knew (or should have known) that
choosing Caribe Transport to move goods was reasonably
likely to cause an accident. Requiring C.H. Robinson to ex-
ercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “con-
cerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will
transport the goods. So Montgomery's negligent-hiring
claim falls within the FAAAA's safety exception, which
saves it from preemption.
III
C.H. Robinson, joined in part by the United States, raises
various counterarguments. None succeed.
C.H. Robinson and the United States contend that constru-
ing the safety exception as Montgomery requests would
swallow the FAAAA's express preemption provision whole.
In other words, everything that Congress preempted would
also qualify for the safety exception. Not so. Recall that
the express preemption provision applies to laws and regula-
tions “related to a price, route, or service of ” motor carriers
or brokers “with respect to the transportation of property.”
§ 14501(c)(1). The safety exception saves only a subset of
preempted claims: those involving regulations concerning
motor vehicle safety. § 14501(c)(2)(A). One can imagine
many state laws that are related to motor carrier prices,
routes, and services—such as how much a carrier may charge
or which highways it may traverse—that have no relation-
ship to safety.
C.H. Robinson also argues that Montgomery's interpreta-
tion of the safety exception creates surplusage. In addition
to preserving a State's regulatory authority with respect to
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228 MONTGOMER
Y v. CARIBE TRANSPORT II, LLC
Opinion of the Court
motor vehicles, the FAAAA also preserves state authority
to
impose route controls based on the size or weight of the
vehicle or the hazardous nature of the cargo. Ibid. If
Montgomery's interpretation were adopted, the argument
goes, these carveouts would be redundant because they also
speak to safety. But the surplusage exists whether the dis-
puted phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” is defned nar-
rowly or broadly, because any overlap comes from the refer-
ence to a State's regulatory authority over “safety.” In any
event, the provisions can be harmonized: A State's choice to
impose route controls or weight limits may serve ends other
than safety, such as guarding against highway wear and tear.
Finally, C.H. Robinson and the United States assert that
interpreting the safety exception to cover brokers would cre-
ate an anomaly with subsection (b) of the FAAAA. That
section preempts state regulation of “intrastate” rates,
routes, or services “of any freight forwarder or broker.”
§ 14501(b)(1). Unlike subsection (c), subsection (b) does not
contain a safety exception. Why, respondents ask, would
Congress completely preempt state regulation of brokers for
intrastate rates, routes, and services while only partially
preempting state regulation of brokers for interstate rates,
routes, and services?
4
To avoid this anomaly, they argue,
we should interpret subsection (c)'s safety exception to ex-
clude brokers. Then, States could not impose either inter-
state or intrastate safety regulations on them.
We'll grant respondents this: It is not obvious why Con-
gress included a safety exception in (c) but not in (b). But
it would be even odder to say that the alleged tort—the neg-
ligent hiring of an unsafe motor carrier whose truck caused
injury—is not an exercise of “the safety regulatory authority
4
At oral argument, Montgomery's counsel was asked about the source
of Congress's authority to enact subsection (b), given that it purports to
preempt state regulation of purely intrastate activities. Tr. of Oral Arg.
34−35. Because subsection (b) is not before us, we do not address that
issue.
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229
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” § 14501(c)(2)(A).
The
text of subsection (c)(2)(A) controls. Better to live with
the mystery than to rewrite the statute.
***
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kavanaugh, with whom Justice Alito joins,
concurring.
I join the Court's opinion. I agree that the FAA Authori-
zation Act of 1994 does not preempt state tort suits against
brokers who negligently arrange truck transportation with
an unsafe carrier.
In my view, this case is closer than the Court's opinion
perhaps might suggest. The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits
came out the other way, and in doing so, those courts raised
a number of powerful points. See Ye v. GlobalTranz Enter-
prises, Inc., 74 F. 4th 453 (CA7 2023); Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v.
Landstar Ranger, 65 F. 4th 1261 (CA11 2023). In the end,
however, I agree with this Court's decision and will briefy
explain why.
***
Brokers are intermediaries between shippers and trucking
companies. Shippers contract with brokers, and brokers
then select motor carriers (that is, trucking companies) to
transport the shippers' goods. The trucking companies own
or lease the trucks and hire the drivers.
When truck accidents occur, an injured party will some-
times bring a state tort suit against a trucking company that,
for example, maintained an unsafe truck or hired or em-
ployed an at-fault driver. All parties here agree that those
suits against trucking companies are not preempted and thus
are permitted under the FAA Authorization Act. The ques-

230 MONTGOMER
Y v. CARIBE TRANSPORT II, LLC
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
tion is whether state tort suits against the upstream brokers
who
select the trucking companies are also permitted.
Under the text of the Act, that question ultimately boils
down to whether a state tort claim against a broker for negli-
gently arranging unsafe truck transportation is a claim “with
respect to motor vehicles.” 49 U. S. C. § 14501(c)(2)(A). If
yes, state tort suits against brokers are permitted. If no,
state tort suits are preempted.
The answer depends on how expansively to read the key
statutory phrase “with respect to motor vehicles.” That in-
quiry is complicated because the phrase “with respect to”—
like similar statutory phrases such as “related to” or “relat-
ing to”—is a somewhat elastic phrase whose breadth is de-
termined by context. See United States v. Miller, 604 U. S.
518, 532–533 (2025); Dubin v. United States, 599 U. S. 110,
118–119 (2023); Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling,
584 U. S. 709, 717 (2018); California Div. of Labor Standards
Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. A., Inc., 519 U. S.
316, 335 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“But applying the `re-
late to' provision according to its terms was a project doomed
to failure, since, as many a curbstone philosopher has ob-
served, everything is related to everything else”).
Here, the brokers do not own or lease the vehicles or hire
the drivers. But they do select the trucking companies.
Does the statutory phrase “with respect to motor vehicles”
extend so broadly as to encompass the brokers' activities?
To answer that question and draw the appropriate line, we
must examine the relevant statutory context, including sur-
rounding statutory provisions.
The contextual considerations here point in different direc-
tions. In favor of the brokers are two other provisions of
the Act: the mandatory-insurance provision and the intra-
state preemption provision.
First, the Act mandates a minimum level of insurance cov-
erage for trucking companies—but not for brokers. 49
U. S. C. §§ 13906(a)(1), (b)(2)(A). That coverage ensures that
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231
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
trucking companies can pay when they are held liable for
tr
uck accidents. The dichotomy between trucking com-
panies and brokers suggests (at least to some extent) that
Congress did not anticipate state tort suits against brokers
for negligent selection. Otherwise, Congress presumably
would have mandated insurance coverage for brokers as
well.
Second, all agree that the Act as amended does not permit
state tort suits against brokers for arranging intrastate
transportation. But plaintiff here is arguing that the stat-
ute allows state tort suits against brokers for arranging in-
terstate transportation. As a matter of ordinary preemp-
tion doctrine, which is rooted in federalism principles, that
seems exactly backwards: Why would Congress permit state
tort suits against brokers for arranging interstate trips but
preempt state tort suits against brokers for arranging intra-
state trips? Plaintiff has no good answer to that question.
So as plaintiff 's counsel forthrightly acknowledged at oral
argument, a ruling in plaintiff's favor would create a substan-
tial anomaly. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7–8, 25.
For their part, the brokers seize on that rather glaring
hole in plaintiff 's argument. The brokers note that there
would be no anomaly if, as they argue, all state tort suits
against brokers for negligent selection were preempted.
Good point.
So those two contextual considerations favor the brokers
and point toward a narrower construction of “with respect
to motor vehicles” such that state tort suits against brokers
would be preempted. But other contextual points decisively
tilt in the opposite direction and point toward a broader con-
struction of “with respect to motor vehicles” such that state
tort suits against brokers would be permitted.
Most important is the overall structure of the safety re-
gime for the trucking industry. Enacted in 1994, the FAA
Authorization Act pursued economic deregulation of the in-
dustry. But the Act largely left intact the extant system of
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232 MONTGOMER
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Kavanaugh, J., concurring
safety regulation, including state tort suits. See 49 U. S. C.
§
14501(c)(2)(A). The Act did not preempt state tort suits
against trucking companies for truck accidents. And the
negligent-hiring tort against brokers, like the negligence
tort against trucking companies, exists to keep unsafe trucks
and unsafe drivers off America's highways. Given that Con-
gress in the FAA Authorization Act sought economic deregu-
lation—not safety deregulation—it is hard to read the stat-
ute as written and conclude that Congress subtly sliced and
diced state tort law so that trucking companies would be
subject to state tort suits for accidents, but brokers would
operate free of any such tort liability.
The brokers' preemption argument also lies in some ten-
sion with the absence of meaningful safety-related regula-
tion of brokers at the federal level. In particular, federal
law does not require brokers to take substantial steps to en-
sure that they select safe trucking companies. Congress's
“regulation of brokers instead seems to address the fnancial
aspects of broker services, not safety.” Ye, 74 F. 4th, at 463.
And the relevant regulatory agency, the Federal Motor Car-
rier Safety Administration, requires brokers to select a fed-
erally registered carrier but does not otherwise “impos[e]
safety standards on broker hiring.” Ibid. See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 74–75, 90; Brief for Institute for Safer Trucking as Ami-
cus Curiae 14–17.
The lack of meaningful federal safety regulation of bro-
kers' selection of carriers tends to support plaintiff 's argu-
ment here because it is doubtful that Congress, through such
indirect language in an economic-deregulation statute, would
allow brokers to operate in a black hole with no meaningful
safety-related regulation.
And that contextual point matters because, as Congress
well understood, truck safety is a matter of life and death.
In 2022 in the United States, about 500,000 reported truck
accidents resulted in about 5,000 deaths and 114,000 injuries.
U. S. Dept. of Transp., Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin.,
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as: 608 U. S. 219 (2026)
233
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
Large Truck and Bus Crash Facts 2022, p. 45 (2025). Not
a
ll truck accidents can be prevented. But some can. Some
carriers are known to be less safe; some truck drivers are
known to be unft.
It is true, as the brokers emphasize, that trucking compa-
nies are in the best position to monitor their own trucks and
drivers. By contrast, brokers may not always (or even
often) be in a good position to objectively assess the relative
safety of different trucking companies. See Brief for Trans-
portation Intermediaries Association, Inc. as Amicus Curiae
20–28. That said, brokers may sometimes become aware
that a particular carrier operates unsafe trucks or hires unft
drivers. And if brokers can be “held liable for disregarding
poor safety records, they have a strong incentive to do busi-
ness only with safe and reliable motor carriers.” Brief for
the State of Ohio, 28 Other States, and the District of Colum-
bia as Amici Curiae 18.
Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read
to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort
liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff 's
counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully de-
fend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reason-
ably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking
companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27–29. In plaintiff 's counsel's
words, the brokers “just have to hire carriers that actually
have a reasonable policy,” and “the broker is not going to
have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the car-
rier.” Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause re-
quirement in typical state tort law should help protect
brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25.
That said, the brokers rightly caution against naiveté. In
the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort
law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litiga-
tion and insurance may be signifcant even when brokers pre-
vail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insur-
ance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more
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234 MONTGOMER
Y v. CARIBE TRANSPORT II, LLC
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade
through
the economy and be paid in part by American con-
sumers in the form of higher prices. See Brief for Chamber
of Commerce et al. as Amici Curiae 25–34; Brief for Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers as Amicus Curiae 15.
The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and
weighty. But those countervailing points ultimately do not
carry the day in determining how broadly to construe the
vague “with respect to motor vehicles” language in this Act.
***
As I see it, the conficting contextual considerations make
this a close case as we determine how to construe and where
to draw the line on the statutory phrase “with respect to
motor vehicles.” In the end, I do not believe that Congress,
through such oblique language in an economic-deregulation
statute, simultaneously (i) allowed state tort suits against
negligent trucking companies and (ii) categorically pre-
empted state tort suits against upstream brokers who negli-
gently select an unsafe trucking company. The brokers and
their amici raise serious concerns about the repercussions of
state tort liability against brokers, and they may of course
(among other possibilities) ask Congress and the President
to change federal law. But as of now, federal law does not
preempt state tort liability against brokers for negligent se-
lection of trucking companies.
With those additional comments, I join the Court's opinion.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, cap-
tions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional
edits were made:
None