District of Columbia v. R.W.

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 608 U. S. Part 1
Pages 22–30
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
April 20, 2026
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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22 OCTOBER
TERM, 2025
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. R. W.
on
petition for writ of certiorari to the district of
columbia court of appeals
No. 25–248. Decided April 20, 2026
Around 2:00 a.m. on a winter morning, Police Offcer Clifford Vanterpool
responded to a radio dispatch call to check out a suspicious vehicle at
an apartment building. As Offcer Vanterpool turned his marked police
vehicle into the building 's parking lot, he saw two people fee from a
car, leaving at least one of the car doors open. The driver then began
to back out of the parking space. Offcer Vanterpool parked directly
behind the car, left his own vehicle, and ordered the driver, R. W., to put
his hands up. Largely based on evidence found after Offcer Vanterpool
stopped R. W., the District of Columbia charged R. W. (a minor at the
time) with several offenses related to his impermissible use of the car.
R. W. moved to suppress the evidence obtained after he was stopped.
The trial court denied R. W.'s motion, concluding that the offcer had
reasonable suspicion to stop R. W. After a bench trial, the trial court
adjudicated R. W. delinquent on all counts and assigned R. W. to one
year of probation. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals reversed the denial of the motion to suppress and vacated the
delinquency adjudication. The court held that Offcer Vanterpool had
violated the Fourth Amendment by stopping R. W. without reasonable
suspicion. The District of Columbia sought certiorari.
Held: Because Offcer Vanterpool had reasonable suspicion to stop R. W.,
the judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is reversed,
and the case is remanded. When an offcer makes a “brief investigatory
sto[p] of persons or vehicles that fall[s] short of [a] traditional arrest,”
the Fourth Amendment “is satisfed if the offcer's action is supported
by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity ` “may be
afoot.” ' ” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U. S. 266, 273 (quoting United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 7). In assessing whether an offcer had
reasonable suspicion, a reviewing court must “look at the `totality of the
circumstances' of each case”—an analysis that precludes the “evaluation
and rejection” of “factors in isolation from each other.” Arvizu, 534
U. S., at 273–274. Reasonable suspicion “ `depends on the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and pru-
dent men, not legal technicians, act.' ” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U. S. 376,
380 (quoting Prado Navarette v. California, 572 U. S. 393, 402).
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Cite
as: 608 U. S. 22 (2026)
23
Per Curiam
In this case, the information available to the offcer strongly sug-
gested
that R. W. was engaged in unlawful conduct. The appellate
court below reached a different conclusion by “excis[ing]” facts from the
analysis, and considering only “the lateness of the hour and the slight
movement of the car.” In re R. W., 334 A. 3d 593, 597. That approach
is incompatible with the totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry required
by the Court's precedents. Based on everything the offcer observed
on the night in question, he drew the “commonsense inference” that
all three people in the car—including the driver—were trying to hide
wrongdoing from the police. Glover, 589 U. S., at 381.
Certiorari granted; 334 A. 3d 593, reversed and remanded.
Per Curiam.
In the wee hours of a winter morning in Washington, D. C.,
District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Offcer Clifford
Vanterpool received a radio dispatch call directing him to
check out a suspicious vehicle at a specifc address. Offcer
Vanterpool reached the apartment building at that address
around 2:00 a.m. As he turned his marked police vehicle
into the parking lot, he saw two people immediately fee from
a car, “unprovoked,” after “[p]olice had not done anything
other than simply pull up.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 48a. The
runners left open at least one of the car doors. The driver
then began to back out of the parking space, rear door
still open. Offcer Vanterpool decided to investigate. He
parked directly behind the car, left his own vehicle, ordered
the driver, R. W., to put his hands up, and drew his service
weapon.
R. W. raised a “single argument” on appeal—that Offcer
Vanterpool lacked reasonable articulable suspicion suffcient
to justify the seizure. In re R.W., 334 A. 3d 593, 599 (D. C.
2025). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that
Offcer Vanterpool, by stopping R. W. without reasonable
suspicion, violated the Fourth Amendment. We disagree.
When an offcer makes a “brief investigatory sto[p] of per-
sons or vehicles that fall[s] short of [a] traditional arrest,”
the Fourth Amendment “is satisfed if the offcer's action is
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24 DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA v. R.W.
Per Curiam
supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal
ac
tivity ` “may be afoot.” ' ” United States v. Arvizu, 534
U. S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490
U. S. 1, 7 (1989)). In assessing whether an offcer had rea-
sonable suspicion, a reviewing court must “look at the `total-
ity of the circumstances' of each case”—an analysis that pre-
cludes the “evaluation and rejection” of “factors in isolation
from each other.” Arvizu, 534 U. S., at 273–274. Because
the D. C. Court of Appeals departed from these principles—
and because Offcer Vanterpool clearly had reasonable suspi-
cion to stop R. W.—we reverse.
I
Largely based on evidence found after Offcer Vanterpool
told R. W. to put his hands up, the District of Columbia
charged R. W. (a minor at the time) with unauthorized use
of a motor vehicle, felony receipt of stolen property, unlawful
entry of a motor vehicle, and operating a vehicle in the Dis-
trict of Columbia without a permit. Before trial, R. W.
moved to suppress the evidence obtained after he was
stopped. Following a suppression hearing, the trial court
denied R. W.'s motion, relying on four facts to conclude that
the offcer had reasonable suspicion to stop R. W.: (1) the
offcer had received a radio dispatch call regarding a suspi-
cious vehicle at a specifed address, (2) the offcer saw “ `two
persons feeing from a vehicle' ” upon his arrival, (3) “ `[i]t
was almost 2 a.m.,' ” and (4) as the offcer approached the
car, it began “ `backing out of the parking space . . . while
the rear driver's side door [was] still open.' ” 334 A. 3d, at
599. After a bench trial, the trial court adjudicated R. W.
delinquent on all counts and assigned R. W. to one year of
probation with conditions.
On appeal, the D. C. Court of Appeals reversed the denial
of the motion to suppress and vacated the delinquency adju-
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Cite
as: 608 U. S. 22 (2026)
25
Per Curiam
dication.* The court “frst assess[ed] the legitimacy and
weight
of each of the factors bearing on reasonable suspi-
cion” before “weigh[ing] that information all together.” Id.,
at 600 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the frst step
of this analysis, it held that the trial court had erred by con-
sidering two factors: the radio dispatch call and the fight of
R. W.'s companions. It “excis[ed]” those factors from the
analysis. Id., at 597. It then concluded that, without more,
the remaining facts—the late hour and the car's movement—
did not give rise to reasonable suspicion. After the D. C.
Court of Appeals ruled, the District of Columbia sought
certiorari.
II
The question is whether the facts available to Offcer Vant-
erpool—before he ordered R. W. to put his hands up—war-
ranted the stop. In other words, we ask whether Offcer
Vanterpool had a reasonable suspicion that R. W. was en-
gaged in criminal wrongdoing. Sokolow, 490 U. S., at 7–8.
Such reasonable suspicion arises when, based on the “ `total-
ity of the circumstances,' ” the detaining offcer had a “ `par-
ticularized and objective basis' ” for suspecting criminal
wrongdoing. Arvizu, 534 U. S., at 273 (quoting United
States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417 (1981)). Reasonable sus-
picion “ `depends on the factual and practical considerations
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not
legal technicians, act.' ” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U. S. 376, 380
(2020) (quoting Prado Navarette v. California, 572 U. S. 393,
402 (2014)). It permits offcers to make “ `commonsense
judgments and inferences about human behavior.' ” Glover,
*The District of Columbia conceded that “Offcer Vanterpool seized
R. W. when he frst asked R. W. to put his hands up,” so the D. C. Court of
Appeals decided only “whether the facts then known by Offcer Vanterpool
created an objectively reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was
afoot.” 334 A. 3d, at 599 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21 (1968)).
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26 DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA v. R.W.
Per Curiam
589 U. S., at 380–381 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U. S.
119,
125 (2000)).
On the facts of this case, Offcer Vanterpool clearly had
reasonable suspicion to stop R. W. Already on alert from
the late-night dispatch call about a suspicious vehicle, the
offcer observed every person in R. W.'s car respond
strangely to an approaching police car. Two people took off
running. We have observed that “unprovoked fight upon
noticing the police . . . . is certainly suggestive” of wrongdo-
ing. Id., at 124. The driver, R. W., did not run from the
car, but his companions' fight cast his presence in a suspi-
cious light. After all, we have observed that “ `a car passen-
ger . . . will often be engaged in a common enterprise with
the driver, and have the same interest in concealing the
fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing.' ” Maryland v.
Pringle, 540 U. S. 366, 373 (2003) (quoting Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U. S. 295, 304–305 (1999)).
We need not determine whether that connection alone sup-
ported reasonable suspicion because R. W. was in the driver's
seat and—after the passengers fed from the car—began
backing out of the parking space, ignoring the car's open
back door. For most drivers, it would be a surprising event
for their back-seat passengers to exit the car and run head-
long away from them. But we doubt that most would re-
spond by putting their car into reverse and attempting to
drive away without at least checking whether the doors were
closed. R. W.'s own actions—combined with the panicked
fight of his companions—strongly suggested that he was
(like them) engaged in unlawful conduct he wished to hide
from police. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 66 (1968)
(recognizing that “deliberately furtive actions and fight at
the approach of . . . law offcers are strong indicia of mens
rea”).
III
The D. C. Court of Appeals reached a different conclusion
by “excis[ing]” the radio dispatch and the conduct of R. W.'s
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Cite
as: 608 U. S. 22 (2026)
27
Per Curiam
companions from the analysis, and considering only “the late-
ness
of the hour and the slight movement of the car.” 334 A.
3d, at 597. The totality-of-the-circumstances test, however,
“precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis.” Ar-
vizu, 534 U. S., at 274. As our precedents have recognized,
“the whole is often greater than the sum of its parts—espe-
cially when the parts are viewed in isolation.” District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U. S. 48, 60–61 (2018).
Indeed, this case reveals the perils of reviewing facts
piecemeal and without context. Take the passengers' fight
from the car. We have little doubt that, in some circum-
stances, an offcer could not reasonably attribute his suspi-
cion of a feeing individual to bystanders milling nearby. Cf.
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85, 91 (1979) (recognizing that
“a person's mere propinquity to others independently sus-
pected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise
to probable cause to search that person”). But the “whole
picture” here tells a different story. Cortez, 449 U. S., at
417.
After watching two people fee from a suspicious car, a
reasonable offcer surely would question the driver's next
move. Why would the driver hurriedly back up the car
without even closing a car door left open by his feeing com-
panions? Perhaps one could imagine an innocent explana-
tion for such unusual behavior—the court below, for exam-
ple, surmised that R. W. “may not even have noticed that his
companions left the door open.” 334 A. 3d, at 605. “But
we have consistently recognized that reasonable suspicion
`need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.' ” Na-
varette, 572 U. S., at 403 (quoting Arvizu, 534 U. S., at 277).
Based on everything the offcer observed on the night in
question, he drew the “commonsense inference” that all
three people in the car—including the driver—were trying
to hide wrongdoing from the police. Glover, 589 U. S., at 381.
“[T]he Fourth Amendment requires . . . that a court `slosh
[its] way through' a `factbound morass.' ” Barnes v. Felix,
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28 DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA v. R.W.
Jackson, J., dissenting
605 U. S. 73, 80 (2025) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U. S. 372,
383
(2007)). There may be no “ `easy-to-apply legal test' ” or
“ `on/off switch' ” in this context, Barnes, 605 U. S., at 80
(quoting Scott, 550 U. S., at 382–383), but one thing is clear:
“The `totality of the circumstances' requires courts to con-
sider `the whole picture,' ” Wesby, 583 U. S., at 60 (quoting
Cortez, 449 U. S., at 417). The D. C. Court of Appeals ex-
pressly declined to do that. 334 A. 3d, at 599. It instead
considered only the observations that “(1) it was 2:00 a.m.
and (2) R. W. reversed a few feet in a parking spot while
the vehicle's rear door was open.” Id., at 605. Expressly
“excis[ed]” from its analysis was, for example, the compelling
fact that two individuals fed the vehicle as soon as they spot-
ted the police car. Pretending that the most revealing as-
pect of the encounter did not happen is incompatible with
the totality-of-the-circumstances approach required by our
precedents.
***
The petition for certiorari and R. W.'s motion to proceed
in forma pauperis are granted, the judgment of the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Sotomayor would deny the petition for a writ
of certiorari.
Justice Jackson, dissenting.
The Fourth Amendment may require courts to “slosh . . .
through a factbound morass.” Ante, at 27 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). It does not require readers of judicial
opinions to do the same. Any readable analysis will, of ne-
cessity, tick through factors, fnding some weighty, others
less so, and still others not at all, before piling them on a scale
and assessing the result. That is what the court below did
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Cite
as: 608 U. S. 22 (2026)
29
Jackson, J., dissenting
here, and it was right to do so. Announcing a conclusion
w
ithout providing reasoning along the way is not helpful to
the parties, the public, or the development of the law.
To its credit, the Court applies a similar, factor-by-factor
approach here. That the Court's analysis is comprehensible
shows as much. Like the court below, the per curiam takes
account of the facts in turn: a “late-night dispatch call about
a suspicious vehicle”; R. W.'s companions' “unprovoked
fight”; R. W.'s shift into reverse with a car door still ajar.
Ante, at 26 (internal quotation marks omitted). And like
the court below, the per curiam explains how much weight
it assigns to each. Unprovoked fight, the Court says, is
“certainly suggestive” of wrongdoing. Ibid. (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). “[C]ombined” with the fight, the Court
continues, R. W.'s abrupt reversal “strongly suggested”
wrongdoing. Ibid. This is how courts write opinions.
So I am not sure why our Court sees ft to intervene in
this case, let alone to do so summarily. If the intervention
refects a worry that the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals (DCCA) misunderstands the Fourth Amendment's
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, that worry seems un-
founded. The DCCA has grasped the correct inquiry. Its
precedents rightly observe that “[t]he issue is not whether
any one factor individually justifes a stop, but rather
whether `collectively' the totality of the circumstances sup-
ports a determination that the offcers had reasonable suspi-
cion for an investigatory stop.” Parker v. United States, 333
A. 3d 1162, 1175 (2025) (citing Mayo v. United States, 315 A.
3d 606, 637 (2024) (en banc)); see also, e.g., Maye v. United
States, 260 A. 3d 638, 647 (2021); Golden v. United States,
248 A. 3d 925, 941 (2021).
If today's decision instead refects dissatisfaction with the
DCCA's comment that it “ `excis[ed]' ” certain factors from its
analysis, ante, at 26–27, I do not contest that this was poor
word choice, see United States v. Arvizu, 534 U. S. 266, 274
(2002) (rejecting a “divide-and-conquer analysis”). But I do
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30 DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA v. R.W.
Jackson, J., dissenting
not think that word choice refects a methodological error.
Cour
ts excise facts from their analyses every day. Opinion-
writing is an exercise in culling the irrelevant; in application,
no “totality-of-the-circumstances” test really lives up to its
name. Indeed, today's per curiam necessarily omits a num-
ber of facts the Court fnds insignifcant—e. g., the make and
model of the car, the precise location of the stop, the color of
R. W.'s friends' clothing. Though it does not say so, the
Court “excises” those facts, too. It does not thereby misap-
ply the Fourth Amendment.
If, fnally, the Court's decision to intervene refects disap-
proval of the DCCA's assessment of which particular facts to
weigh and to what extent, I cannot fathom why that kind of
factbound determination warranted correction by this Court.
The DCCA assigned no weight to two facts—the dispatch
call and the unprovoked fight. The Court does not seem
to take issue with the frst. For good reason: The DCCA
reasonably applied our decisions explaining that an offcer
may not obtain reasonable suspicion by relying on the unsup-
ported hunch of a fellow offcer. See Whiteley v. Warden,
Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U. S. 560, 568 (1971); United
States v. Hensley, 469 U. S. 221, 232 (1985). The Court may
be right that the second—the unprovoked fight—should
have borne some rather than no weight. But if this context-
specifc adjustment is all the per curiam seeks to achieve, it
does not merit the use of our summary discretion.
Even if I would have assigned more heft to a particular
fact in my own frst-instance assessment, I would not word-
smith a lower court in this fashion. In my view, this is not
a worthy accomplishment for the unusual step of summary
reversal. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
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