Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 607 U. S. Part 2
Pages 229–390
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
February 20, 2026
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

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229
Syllabus
LEARNING RESOURCES, INC., et al. v. TRUMP,
PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES, et al.
certiorari before judgment to the united states court
of appeals for the district of columbia circuit
No. 24–1287. Argued November 5, 2025—Decided February 20, 2026*
The question presented is whether the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA) authorizes the President to impose tariffs. See
91 Stat. 1626. Shortly after taking offce, President Trump sought to
address two foreign threats: the infux of illegal drugs from Canada,
Mexico, and China, Presidential Proclamation No. 10886, 90 Fed. Reg.
8327; Exec. Order No. 14193, 90 Fed. Reg. 9113; Exec. Order No. 14194,
90 Fed. Reg. 9117; Exec. Order No. 14195, 90 Fed. Reg. 9121, and “large
and persistent” trade defcits, Exec. Order No. 14257, 90 Fed. Reg.
15041. The President determined that the drug infux had “created a
public health crisis,” 90 Fed. Reg. 9113, and that the trade defcits had
“led to the hollowing out” of the American manufacturing base and “un-
dermined critical supply chains,” id., at 15041. The President declared
a national emergency as to both threats, deeming them “unusual and
extraordinary,” and invoked his authority under IEEPA to respond.
He imposed tariffs to deal with each threat. As to the drug traffck-
ing tariffs, the President imposed a 25% duty on most Canadian and
Mexican imports and a 10% duty on most Chinese imports. Id., at 9114,
9118, 9122–9123. As to the trade defcit (“reciprocal”) tariffs, the Presi-
dent imposed a duty “on all imports from all trading partners” of at
least 10%, with dozens of nations facing higher rates. Id., at 15045,
15049. Since imposing each set of tariffs, the President has issued sev-
eral increases, reductions, and other modifcations.
Petitioners in Learning Resources and respondents in V.O.S. Selec-
tions fled suit, alleging that IEEPA does not authorize the reciprocal or
drug traffcking tariffs. The Learning Resources plaintiffs—two small
businesses—sued in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. That court denied the Government's motion to transfer the
case to the United States Court of International Trade (CIT) and
granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding
that IEEPA did not grant the President the power to impose tariffs.
*Together with No. 25–250, Trump, President of the United States, et al.
v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., et al., on certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

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230 LEARNING
RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP
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The V.O.S. Selections plaintiffs—fve small businesses and 12 States—
sued
in the CIT. That court granted summary judgment for the plain-
tiffs. And the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, affrmed in relevant
part, concluding that IEEPA's grant of authority to “regulate . . . impor-
tation” did not authorize the challenged tariffs, which “are unbounded
in scope, amount, and duration.” 149 F. 4th 1312, 1338. The Govern-
ment fled a petition for certiorari in V.O.S. Selections, and the Learning
Resources plaintiffs fled a petition for certiorari before judgment. The
Court granted the petitions and consolidated the cases.
Held: IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. The
judgment in No. 24–1287 is vacated, and the case is remanded with in-
structions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; the judgment in No. 25–250
is affrmed.
No. 24–1287, 784 F. Supp. 3d 209, vacated and remanded; No. 25–250, 149
F. 4th 1312, affrmed.
The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the Court with respect
to Parts I and II–A–1:
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution specifes that “The Congress
shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.”
The Framers recognized the unique importance of this taxing power—
a power which “very clear[ ly]” includes the power to impose tariffs.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 201. And they gave Congress “alone . . .
access to the pockets of the people.” The Federalist No. 48, p. 310
(J. Madison). The Framers did not vest any part of the taxing power
in the Executive Branch. See Nicol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 509, 515.
The Government thus concedes that the President enjoys no inherent
authority to impose tariffs during peacetime. It instead relies exclu-
sively on IEEPA to defend the challenged tariffs. It reads the words
“regulate” and “importation” to effect a sweeping delegation of Con-
gress's power to set tariff policy—authorizing the President to impose
tariffs of unlimited amount and duration, on any product from any coun-
try. 50 U. S. C. § 1702(a)(1)(B). Pp. 240–242.
The Chief Justice, joined by Justice Gorsuch and Justice Bar-
rett, concluded in Part II–A–2:
The Court has long expressed “reluctan[ce] to read into ambiguous
statutory text” extraordinary delegations of Congress's powers. West
Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 723 (quoting Utility Air Regulatory
Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. 302, 324). In several cases described as involv-
ing “major questions,” the Court has reasoned that “both separation
of powers principles and a practical understanding of legislative intent”
suggest Congress would not have delegated “highly consequential power”
through ambiguous language. 597 U. S., at 723–724. These consider-

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231
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ations apply with particular force where, as here, the purported delega-
ti
on involves the core congressional power of the purse. Congressional
practice confrms as much. When Congress has delegated its tariff
powers, it has done so in explicit terms and subject to strict limits.
Against that backdrop of clear and limited delegations, the Govern-
ment reads IEEPA to give the President power to unilaterally impose
unbounded tariffs and change them at will. That view would represent
a transformative expansion of the President's authority over tariff pol-
icy. It is also telling that in IEEPA's half century of existence, no Pres-
ident has invoked the statute to impose any tariffs, let alone tariffs of
this magnitude and scope. That “ `lack of historical precedent,' coupled
with the breadth of authority” that the President now claims, suggests
that the tariffs extend beyond the President's “legitimate reach.” Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business v. OSHA, 595 U. S. 109, 119
(quoting Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Over-
sight Bd., 561 U. S. 477, 505). The “ `economic and political signif-
cance' ” of the authority the President has asserted likewise “provide[s]
a `reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress' meant to confer
such authority.” West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 721 (quoting FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 159–160). The
stakes here dwarf those of other major questions cases. And as in
those cases, “a reasonable interpreter would [not] expect” Congress to
“pawn[ ]” such a “big-time policy call[ ] . . . off to another branch.”
Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477, 515 (Barrett, J., concurring).
There is no exception to the major questions doctrine for emergency
statutes. Nor does the fact that tariffs implicate foreign affairs render
the doctrine inapplicable. The Framers gave “Congress alone” the
power to impose tariffs during peacetime. Merritt v. Welsh, 104 U. S.
694, 700. And the foreign affairs implications of tariffs do not make it
any more likely that Congress would relinquish its tariff power through
vague language, or without careful limits. Accordingly, the President
must “point to clear congressional authorization” to justify his extraor-
dinary assertion of that power. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 506 (internal
quotation marks omitted). He cannot. Pp. 242–248.
The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the Court with respect
to Part II–B, concluding:
(a) IEEPA authorizes the President to “investigate, block during the
pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void,
prevent or prohibit . . . importation or exportation.” § 1702(a)(1)(B).
Absent from this lengthy list of specifc powers is any mention of tariffs
or duties. Had Congress intended to convey the distinct and extraordi-
nary power to impose tariffs, it would have done so expressly, as it
consistently has in other tariff statutes.

232 LEARNING
RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP
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The power to “regulate . . . importation” does not fll that void. The
ter
m “regulate,” as ordinarily used, means to “fx, establish, or control;
to adjust by rule, method, or established mode; to direct by rule or
restriction; to subject to governing principles or laws.” Black's Law
Dictionary 1156. The facial breadth of this defnition places in stark
relief what ”regulate” is not usually thought to include: taxation. Many
statutes grant the Executive the power to “regulate.” Yet the Govern-
ment cannot identify any statute in which the power to regulate includes
the power to tax. The Court is therefore skeptical that in IEEPA—
and IEEPA alone—Congress hid a delegation of its birth-right power
to tax within the quotidian power to “regulate.”
While taxes may accomplish regulatory ends, it does not follow that
the power to regulate includes the power to tax as a means of regula-
tion. Indeed, when Congress addresses both the power to regulate and
the power to tax, it does so separately and expressly. That it did not
do so here is strong evidence that “regulate” in IEEPA does not in-
clude taxation.
A contrary reading would render IEEPA partly unconstitutional.
IEEPA authorizes the President to “regulate . . . importation or expor-
tation.” § 1702(a)(1)(B). But taxing exports is expressly forbidden by
the Constitution. Art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
The “neighboring words” with which “regulate” “is associated” also
suggest that Congress did not intend for “regulate” to include the
revenue-raising power. United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 294.
Each of the nine verbs in § 1702(a)(1)(B) authorizes a distinct action a
President might take in sanctioning foreign actors or controlling domes-
tic actors engaged in foreign commerce, as Presidential practice con-
frms. And none of the listed authorities includes the distinct and ex-
traordinary power to raise revenue—a power which no President has
ever found in IEEPA. Pp. 248–251.
(b) Several arguments marshaled in response are unpersuasive.
First, the contention that IEEPA confers the power to impose tariffs
because early commentators and the Court's cases discuss tariffs in the
context of the Commerce Clause answers the wrong question. The
question is not whether tariffs can ever be a means of regulating com-
merce. It is instead whether Congress, when conferring the power to
“regulate . . . importation,” gave the President the power to impose
tariffs at his sole discretion. And Congress's pattern of usage is plain:
When Congress grants the power to impose tariffs, it does so clearly
and with careful constraints. It did neither in IEEPA.
Second, the argument that “regulate” naturally includes tariffs be-
cause the term lies between two poles in IEEPA—“compel” on the af-
frmative end and “prohibit” on the negative end—is unavailing. Al-
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233
Syllabus
though tariffs may be less extreme than an outright compulsion or
proh
ibition, it does not follow that tariffs lie on the spectrum between
those poles; they are different in kind, not degree, from the other au-
thorities in IEEPA. Tariffs operate directly on domestic importers to
raise revenue for the Treasury and are “very clear[ ly] . . . a branch of
the taxing power.” Gibbons, 9 Wheat., at 201. Thus, they fall outside
the spectrum entirely.
Third, the argument based on IEEPA's predecessor, the Trading with
the Enemy Act (TWEA), and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals'
decision in United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F. 2d 560, cannot
bear the weight placed on it. A single, expressly limited opinion from a
specialized intermediate appellate court does not establish a well-settled
meaning that the Court can assume Congress incorporated into
IEEPA.
Fourth, the historical argument based on the Court's wartime prece-
dents fails. Those precedents are facially inapposite, as all agree the
President lacks inherent peacetime authority to impose tariffs. And
the attenuated chain of inferences from wartime precedents through
multiple iterations of TWEA to IEEPA cannot support—much less
clearly support—a reading of IEEPA that includes the distinct power
to impose tariffs.
Finally, arguments relying on this Court's precedents lack merit.
Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U. S. 548,
bears little on the meaning of IEEPA. Section 232(b) of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 contains sweeping, discretion-conferring lan-
guage that IEEPA does not contain, and the explicit reference to duties
in Section 232(a) renders it natural for Section 232(b) itself to authorize
duties. Nor does Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U. S. 654, offer sup-
port because that case was exceedingly narrow, did not address the
President's power to “regulate,” and did not involve tariffs at all.
Pp. 251–255.
Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Sotomayor and Justice Jack-
son, agreed that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose
tariffs, but concluded that the Court need not invoke the major ques-
tions doctrine because the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation
amply support that result. Pp. 304–310.
Justice Jackson would also consult legislative history—in particu-
lar, the House and Senate Reports that accompanied IEEPA and its
predecessor statute, TWEA—to determine that Congress did not intend
for IEEPA to authorize the Executive to impose tariffs. Pp. 310–313.
Roberts, C. J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II–A–1, and II–B, in which
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234 LEARNING
RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP
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Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ., joined, and
an
opinion with respect to Parts II–A–2 and III, in which Gorsuch and
Barrett, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., post, p. 255, and Barrett, J., post, p.
300, fled concurring opinions. Kagan, J., fled an opinion concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment, in which Sotomayor and Jackson,
JJ., joined, post, p. 304. Jackson, J., fled an opinion concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 310. Thomas, J., fled a dissent-
ing opinion, post, p. 313. Kavanaugh, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in
which Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined, post, p. 330.
Solicitor General Sauer argued the cause for the federal
parties in both cases. With him on the briefs were Assist-
ant Attorney General Shumate, Deputy Solicitor General
Harris, Sopan Joshi, Mark R. Freeman, Michael S. Raab,
Brad Hinshelwood, and Daniel Winik.
Neal Kumar Katyal argued the cause for the private par-
ties in both cases. With him on the brief in No. 25–250 were
Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak, Jeffrey M. Schwab, Michael W. Mc-
Connell, Steffen N. Johnson, and Ilya Somin. On the brief
in No. 24–1287 were Pratik A. Shah, James E. Tysse, Mat-
thew R. Nicely, Daniel M. Witkowski, Kristen E. Loveland,
and Margaret O. Rusconi.
Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General of Oregon, argued
the cause for state respondents in No. 25–250. With him
on the brief were Dan Rayfeld, Attorney General, Dustin
Buehler, and Brian Simmonds Marshall, Christopher A.
Perdue, and Leigh Salmon, Senior Assistant Attorneys Gen-
eral, and by the Attorneys General and other offcials for
their respective States as follows: Kristin K. Mayes of Ari-
zona, Joshua D. Bendor, Solicitor General, Alexander W.
Samuels, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and Syreeta A.
Tyrell, Assistant Attorney General, by Philip J. Weiser of
Colorado, and Sarah H. Weiss, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, by William Tong of Connecticut, and Michael K.
Skold, Solicitor General, by Kathleen Jennings of Delaware,
and Ian R. Liston and Vanessa L. Kassab, Deputy Attorneys
General, by Kwame Raoul of Illinois, and Jane Elinor Notz,
Solicitor General, by Aaron M. Frey of Maine, and Vivian
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235
Counsel
A. Mikhail, Deputy Attorney General, by Keith Ellison of
Mi
nnesota, and Pete J. Farrell, Deputy Solicitor General, by
Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, and Heidi Parry Stern, Solicitor
General, by Raúl Torrez of New Mexico, and James W. Gray-
son, by Letitia James of New York, Ester Murdukhayeva,
Deputy Solicitor General, and Rabia Muqaddam, and by
Charity R. Clark of Vermont, and Ryan P. Kane, Deputy
Solicitor General.†
†Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance in both cases were fled for
the State of California et al. by Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California,
Samuel T. Harbourt, Solicitor General, Helen H. Hong, Principal Deputy
Solicitor General, Thomas S. Patterson, Senior Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, and Julie Veroff and Diana L. Kim, Deputy Solicitors General, Lara
Haddad, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Shiwon Choe, Zelda
Vassar, and Carolyn F. Downs, Deputy Attorneys General; for BRB Man-
agement, LLC, by Philip J. De Koster and John G. De Koster; for the
Brennan Center for Justice by Leah J. Tulin and Elizabeth Goitein; for
the Constitutional Accountability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne
J. Gorod, and Brian R. Frazelle; for Economists by Adam G. Unikowsky,
Holger Spamann, and Debbie L. Berman; for Emily Ley Paper, Inc., et al.
by John J. Vecchione, Andrew J. Morris, and Markham S. Chenoweth; for
Former Government Offcials et al. by Matthew A. Seligman, Mark Lem-
ley, William H. Neukom, Norman L. Eisen, and Stephen A. Jonas; for
the Goldwater Institute et al. by Timothy Sandefur and Jonathan Riches;
for National Security Offcials by Meaghan VerGow and Noah B. Bokat-
Lindell; for the Washington Legal Foundation by Cory L. Andrews and
Zac Morgan; for We Pay The Tariffs by Gilbert Lee Sandler and Jason
M. Kenner; for Vikram David Amar et al. by Tadhg Dooley; and for Julian
Arato et al. by Timothy Meyer, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled in both cases for Advancing American
Freedom et al. by J. Marc Wheat; for the America First Policy Institute
by Michael J. Jones and Alan Dershowitz; for the American College of
Tax Counsel by John M. Colvin and Theodore P. Seto; for Consumer
Watchdog by Alan B. Morrison, R. Will Planert, Donald B. Cameron,
Harvey Rosen feld, William Pletcher, and Benjamin Powell; for Former
Senior Military Offcials et al. by Jacob W. Buchdahl; for the Institute for
Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law by Richard L.
Revesz, Donald L. R. Goodson, and Max Sarinsky; for Members of the
U. S. Congress by William Fred Norton, Nathan L. Walker, Josephine K.
Petrick, Celine G. Purcell, Rebecca Kutlow, Jennifer Hillman, and Peter
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236 LEARNING
RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP
Opinion of the Court
Chief Justice Roberts announced the judgment of the
Cour
t and delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to
Parts II–A–2 and III.*
We decide whether the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act (IEEPA) authorizes the President to im-
pose tariffs.
Harrell; for the National Taxpayers Union Foundation by Joseph D.
Henchman; for Professors of Administrative Law et al. by Vincent Levy
and Samuel Estreicher, pro se; for Scholars of the History of Constitu-
tional Law et al. by Paul R. Q. Wol fson, Pooja A. Boisture, and Somil B.
Trivedi; for Tax Law Professors by Steven J. Alagna; for George F. Allen
et al. by Daniel W. Wol ff; for Aditya Bamzai, pro se; for Corey J. Biazzo,
pro se; and for Scott Lincicome et al. by Adam E. Schulman and Theodore
H. Frank.
Briefs of amici curiae urging dismissal in No. 24–1287 and reversal in
No. 25–250 were fled for Rep. Darrell Issa et al. by R. Trent McCotter
and Daniel Z. Epstein; and for Chad Squitieri by R. Trent McCotter.
William J. Olson, Jeremiah L. Morgan, and Patrick M. McSweeney
fled a brief for America's Future as amicus curiae urging vacatur and
remand in No. 24–1287 and reversal in No. 25–250.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 25–250 were fled in both
cases for the American Center for Law and Justice Jay Alan Sekulow,
Benjamin P. Sisney, Jordan A. Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, and Andrew J.
Ekonomou; and for Jill Homan by Brian Kelsey.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance in No. 25–250 were fled for
the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Greg-
ory G. Garre, Roman Martinez, and Daryl Joseffer; for Princess Awe-
some, LLC, et al. by Oliver J. Dun ford, Molly Nixon, Joshua Robbins,
and Ashley Torkelson Levine; for Trade Scholars in Economics et al. by
Erica Hashimoto and John Peng;
for the Washington State Amici by Steven W. Fogg; for Carla Anderson
Hills et al. by Roderick M. Hills, Jr.; and for Peter W. Sage by Thad
M. Guyer.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance in No. 25–250 were fled in
both cases for the American Watch Association et al. by Jeffrey E. Sand-
berg; for the Cato Institute by Thomas A. Berry and Brent Skorup; for
Crutchfeld Corp. by Peter J. Brann and David Swetnam-Burland; for
Professors of U. S. Foreign Relations Law by Paul B. Stephan, pro se; and
for 31 Former Federal Judges by Elkan Abramowitz.
*Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson join only
Parts I, II–A–1, and II–B of this opinion.

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as: 607 U. S. 229 (2026)
237
Opinion of the Court
I
A
Shor
tly after taking offce, President Trump sought to ad-
dress two foreign threats. The frst was the infux of illegal
drugs from Canada, Mexico, and China. Presidential Proc-
lamation No. 10886, 90 Fed. Reg. 8327 (2025); Exec. Order
No. 14193, 90 Fed. Reg. 9113 (2025); Exec. Order No. 14194,
90 Fed. Reg. 9117 (2025); Exec. Order No. 14195, 90 Fed. Reg.
9121 (2025). The second was “large and persistent” trade
defcits. Exec. Order No. 14257, 90 Fed. Reg. 15041 (2025).
The President determined that the frst threat had “created
a public health crisis,” 90 Fed. Reg. 9113, and that the second
had “led to the hollowing out” of the American manufactur-
ing base and “undermined critical supply chains,” id., at
15041. He invoked his authority under IEEPA to respond.
Enacted in 1977, IEEPA gives the President economic
tools to address signifcant foreign threats. 91 Stat. 1626.
When acting under IEEPA, the President must identify an
“unusual and extraordinary threat” to American national se-
curity, foreign policy, or the economy, originating primarily
“outside the United States.” 50 U. S. C. § 1701(a). And he
must “declare[ ] a national emergency” under the National
Emergencies Act. Ibid.; see 90 Stat. 1255. He may then,
“by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise,” take the
following actions to “deal with” the threat: “investigate,
block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, di-
rect and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acqui-
sition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, trans-
portation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or
exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or
transactions involving, any property in which any foreign
country or a national thereof has any interest.” §§ 1701(a),
1702(a)(1)(B).
President Trump declared a national emergency as to both
the drug traffcking and the trade defcits, which he deemed
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238 LEARNING
RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP
Opinion of the Court
“unusual and extraordinary” threats. He then imposed tar-
i
ffs to deal with each threat. As to the drug traffcking tar-
iffs, the President imposed a 25% duty on most Canadian and
Mexican imports and a 10% duty on most Chinese imports.
90 Fed. Reg. 9114, 9118, 9122–9123. As to the trade defcit
(or “reciprocal”) tariffs, the President imposed a duty “on all
imports from all trading partners” of at least 10%. Id., at
15045. Dozens of nations faced higher rates. Id., at 15049.
And these tariffs applied notwithstanding any extant trade
agreements. Id., at 15045.
Since imposing each set of tariffs, the President has issued
several increases, reductions, and other modifcations. One
month after imposing the 10% drug traffcking tariffs on Chi-
nese goods, he increased the rate to 20%. See Exec. Order
No. 14228, 90 Fed. Reg. 11463 (2025). One month later, he
removed a statutory exemption for Chinese goods under
$800. Exec. Order No. 14256, 90 Fed. Reg. 14899 (2025).
Less than a week after imposing the reciprocal tariffs, the
President increased the rate on Chinese goods from 34% to
84%. Exec. Order No. 14259, 90 Fed. Reg. 15509 (2025).
The very next day, he increased the rate further still, to
125%. Exec. Order No. 14266, 90 Fed. Reg. 15625, 15626
(2025). This brought the total effective tariff rate on most
Chinese goods to 145%. The President has also shifted sets
of goods into and out of the reciprocal tariff framework.
See, e. g., Exec. Order No. 14360, 90 Fed. Reg. 54091 (2025)
(exempting from reciprocal tariffs beef, fruits, coffee, tea,
spices, and some fertilizers); Exec. Order No. 14346, 90 Fed.
Reg. 43737 (2025). And he has issued a variety of other ad-
justments. See, e. g., Exec. Order No. 14358, 90 Fed. Reg.
50729, 50730 (2025) (extending “the suspension of heightened
reciprocal tariffs” on Chinese imports).
B
Petitioners in Learning Resources and respondents in
V.O.S. Selections fled suit, alleging that IEEPA does not

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239
Opinion of the Court
authorize the reciprocal or drug traffcking tariffs. The
Lear
ning Resources plaintiffs—two small businesses—sued
in the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia. The V.O.S. Selections plaintiffs—fve small businesses
and 12 States—sued in the United States Court of Interna-
tional Trade (CIT).
The Government moved to transfer the Learning Re-
sources case to the CIT. It argued that the District Court
lacked jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1581(i)(1), which gives
the CIT “exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced
against” the Government “that arises out of any law of the
United States providing for . . . tariffs” or their “administra-
tion and enforcement.” The District Court denied that
motion and granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction, concluding that IEEPA did not grant the Presi-
dent the power to impose tariffs. 784 F. Supp. 3d 209 (DC
2025).
In the V.O.S. Selections case, the CIT granted the plain-
tiffs' motion for summary judgment. 772 F. Supp. 3d 1350
(2025). The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, affrmed in
relevant part. 149 F. 4th 1312 (2025). It frst concluded
that the CIT had exclusive jurisdiction because the plaintiffs'
claims arose out of modifcations to the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule of the United States (HTSUS). Id., at 1329.
On the merits, it agreed with the CIT that IEEPA's grant of
authority to “regulate . . . importation” did not authorize
the challenged tariffs, which “are unbounded in scope,
amount, and duration.” Id., at 1338. Judge Cunning-
ham concurred (for four judges), reasoning that IEEPA did
not authorize the President to impose any tariffs. Id.,
at 1340. Judge Taranto dissented (for four judges), conclud-
ing that IEEPA authorized the challenged tariffs. Id., at
1348.
The Government fled a motion to expedite and a petition
for certiorari in V.O.S. Selections, and the Learning Re-
sources plaintiffs fled a petition for certiorari before judg-

240 LEARNING
RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP
Opinion of the Court
ment. We granted the motion and petitions and consoli-
dated
the cases. 606 U. S. 1050 (2025).
1
II
Based on two words separated by 16 others in Section
1702(a)(1)(B) of IEEPA—“regulate” and “importation”—the
President asserts the independent power to impose tariffs
on imports from any country, of any product, at any rate, for
any amount of time. Those words cannot bear such weight.
A
1
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution sets forth the pow-
ers of the Legislative Branch. The frst Clause of that pro-
vision specifes that “The Congress shall have Power To lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.” It is no
accident that this power appears frst. The power to tax
was, Alexander Hamilton explained, “the most important of
the authorities proposed to be conferred upon the Union.”
The Federalist No. 33, pp. 202–203 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). It
is both a “power to destroy,” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316, 431 (1819), and a power “necessary to the exist-
ence and prosperity of a nation”—“the one great power upon
which the whole national fabric is based.” Nicol v. Ames,
173 U. S. 509, 515 (1899).
The power to impose tariffs is “very clear[ly] . . . a branch
of the taxing power.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 201
1
We agree with the Federal Circuit that the V.O.S. Selections case falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIT. The plaintiffs' challenges
“arise[ ] out of ” modifcations to the HTSUS. 28 U. S. C. § 1581(i)(1).
Where, as here, such modifcations are made under an “Act[ ] affecting
import treatment,” 19 U. S. C. § 2483, they are “considered to be statutory
provisions of law for all purposes,” § 3004(c)(1)(C). Thus, the plaintiffs'
challenges “arise[ ] out of [a] law of the United States providing for . . .
tariffs.” 28 U. S. C. § 1581(i)(1). For the same reasons, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia lacked jurisdiction in the
Learning Resources case.
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(1824). “A tariff,” after all, “is a tax levied on imported
goods
and services.” Congressional Research Service
(CRS), C. Casey, U. S. Tariff Policy: Overview 1 (2025). And
tariffs “raise[ ] revenue,” West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,
512 U. S. 186, 193 (1994)—the defning feature of a tax,
United States v. Kahriger, 345 U. S. 22, 28, and n. 4 (1953);
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U. S. 506, 514 (1937). In-
deed, the Framers expected that the Government would for
“a long time depend . . . chiefy on” tariffs for revenue. The
Federalist No. 12, at 93 (A. Hamilton). Little wonder, then,
that the First Congress's frst exercise of its taxing power
(and its second enacted law, right after the one providing for
the new offcials to take an oath) was a tariff law. See Act
of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24.
Recognizing the taxing power's unique importance, and
having just fought a revolution motivated in large part by
“taxation without representation,” the Framers gave Con-
gress “alone . . . access to the pockets of the people.” The
Federalist No. 48, at 310 (J. Madison); see also Declaration
of Independence ¶19. They required “All Bills for raising
Revenue [to] originate in the House of Representatives.”
U. S. Const., Art. I, § 7, cl. 1. And in doing so, they ensured
that only the House could “propose the supplies requisite for
the support of government,” thereby reducing “all the over-
grown prerogatives of the other branches.” The Federalist
No. 58, at 359 (J. Madison). They did not vest any part of
the taxing power in the Executive Branch. See Nicol, 173
U. S., at 515 (“[T]he whole power of taxation rests with
Congress”).
The Government thus concedes, as it must, that the Presi-
dent enjoys no inherent authority to impose tariffs during
peacetime. Tr. of Oral Arg. 70–71. And it does not defend
the challenged tariffs as an exercise of the President's war-
making powers. The United States, after all, is not at war
with every nation in the world. The Government instead
relies exclusively on IEEPA. It reads the words “regulate”

242 LEARNING
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and “importation” to effect a sweeping delegation of Con-
gress'
s power to set tariff policy—authorizing the President
to impose tariffs of unlimited amount and duration, on any
product from any country. 50 U. S. C. § 1702(a)(1)(B).
2
We have long expressed “reluctan[ce] to read into ambigu-
ous statutory text” extraordinary delegations of Congress's
powers. West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 723 (2022)
(quoting Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U. S.
302, 324 (2014)). In Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477 (2023),
for example, we declined to read authorization to “waive or
modify” statutory or regulatory provisions applicable to f-
nancial assistance programs as a delegation of power to can-
cel $430 billion in student loan debt. Id., at 494 (quoting 20
U. S. C. § 1098bb(a)(1)). In West Virginia v. EPA, we de-
clined to read authorization to determine the “best system
of emission reduction” as a delegation of power to force a
nationwide transition away from the use of coal. 597 U. S.,
at 732 (quoting 42 U. S. C. § 7411(a)(1)). And in National
Federation of Independent Business v. OSHA, 595 U. S. 109
(2022) (per curiam), we declined to read authorization to en-
sure “safe and healthful working conditions” as a delegation
of power to impose a vaccine mandate on 84 million Ameri-
cans. Id., at 114, 117 (quoting 29 U. S. C. § 651(b)); see also,
e. g., Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department of Health
and Human Servs., 594 U. S. 758, 764–765 (2021) (per cu-
riam); King v. Burwell, 576 U. S. 473, 485–486 (2015); Utility
Air, 573 U. S., at 324.
We have described several of these cases as “major ques-
tions” cases. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 505; West Virginia, 597
U. S., at 732; see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 159 (2000) (citing S. Breyer, Judicial Re-
view of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363,
370 (1986)). In each, the Government claimed broad, expan-
sive power on an uncertain statutory basis. And in each,
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the statutory text might “[a]s a matter of defnitional possi-
bi
lities” have been read to delegate the asserted power.
West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 732 (internal quotation marks
omitted). But “context” counseled “skepticism.” Id., at
721, 732. That context included not just other language
within the statute, but “constitutional structure” and “com-
mon sense.” Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 512, 515 (Barrett, J.,
concurring). “[B]oth separation of powers principles and
a practical understanding of legislative intent” suggested
Congress would not have delegated “highly consequential
power” through ambiguous language. West Virginia, 597
U. S., at 723–724.
These considerations apply with particular force where, as
here, the purported delegation involves the core congres-
sional power of the purse. “Congress would likely . . . in-
tend[ ] for itself ” the “basic and consequential tradeoffs,” id.,
at 730, inherent in uses of this “most complete and effectual
weapon,” The Federalist No. 58, at 359. And if Congress
were to relinquish that weapon to another branch, a “reason-
able interpreter” would expect it to do so “ `clearly.' ” Ne-
braska, 600 U. S., at 514–515 (Barrett, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Utility Air, 573 U. S., at 324).
What common sense suggests, congressional practice con-
frms. When Congress has delegated its tariff powers, it
has done so in explicit terms, and subject to strict limits.
Congress has consistently used words like “duty” in statutes
delegating authority to impose tariffs. (A customs “duty”
is simply “the federal tax levied on goods shipped into the
United States. ” Black 's Law D ic ti onary 638 (12th ed.
2024).) See, e. g., 19 U. S. C. § 1338(d) (“rates of duty”);
§ 2132(a) (“temporary import surcharge . . . in the form of
duties”); § 2253(a)(3)(A) (“duty on the imported article”);
§ 2411(c)(1)(B) (“duties or other import restrictions”). It has
capped the amount and durati on of t ar i ffs. See, e. g.,
§ 1338(d) (50% cap); § 2132(a) (15% cap, 150-day time limit);
§ 2253(e) (50% cap, phasedown requirement after one year).
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And it has conditioned exercise of the tariff power on
demandi
ng procedural prerequisites. See, e. g., § 2252 (in-
vestigation by the United States International Trade Com-
mission, public hearings, report of fndings and recommenda-
tion); §§ 2411–2414 (investigation by the United States Trade
Representative, consultation with relevant country and in-
terested parties, publication of fndings).
2
Against this backdrop of clear and limited delegations, the
Government reads IEEPA to give the President power to
unilaterally impose unbounded tariffs. On this reading,
moreover, the President is unconstrained by the signifcant
procedural limitations in other tariff statutes and free to
issue a dizzying array of modifcations at will. See supra,
at 238. All it takes to unlock that extraordinary power is a
Presidential declaration of emergency, which the Govern-
ment asserts is unreviewable. Brief for Federal Parties 42.
And the only way of restraining the exercise of that power
is a veto-proof majority in Congress. See 50 U. S. C.
§ 1622(a)(1) (requiring a “joint resolution” “enacted into law”
to terminate a national emergency). That view, if credited,
would “represent[ ] a `transformative expansion' ” of the
President's authority over tariff policy, West Virginia, 597
U. S., at 724 (quoting Utility Air, 573 U. S., at 324), and in-
deed—as demonstrated by the exercise of that authority in
this case—over the broader economy as well. See Congres-
sional Budget Offce, CBO's Current View of the Economy
From 2025 to 2028, p. 5 (Sept. 2025); Brief for Federal Parties
2
The same is true of Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 76
Stat. 877, which we have held authorizes sector-specifc import “license
fee[s].” Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426
U. S. 548, 571 (1976). Section 232(a) expressly references “duties.” 19
U. S. C. § 1862(a); see in fra, at 254. And Section 232(c) authorizes the
President to “adjust the imports” of an “article,” § 1862(c), but only after
the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense,
conducts an investigation and prepares a report fnding that the “article
is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such
circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security,” § 1862(b).
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2–3. It would replace the longstanding executive-legislative
col
laboration over trade policy with unchecked Presidential
policymaking. See CRS, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)
and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy (2015). Congress
seldom effects such sea changes through “vague language.”
West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 724.
It is also telling that in IEEPA's “half century of exist-
ence,” no President has invoked the statute to impose any
tariffs—let alone tariffs of this magnitude and scope. Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business, 595 U. S., at
119.
3
Presidents have, by contrast, regularly invoked
IEEPA for other purposes. CRS, C. Casey, J. Elsea, & L.
Rosen, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act:
Origins, Evolution, and Use 18–21 (2025). At the same time,
they have invoked other statutes—but never IEEPA—to im-
pose tariffs, on products ranging from car tires to washing
machines. See, e. g., Presidential Proclamation No. 8414, 3
CFR 115 (2009 Comp.); Presidential Proclamation No. 9694,
83 Fed. Reg. 3553 (2018). And those tariffs did not “even
beg[in] to approach the size or scope” of the IEEPA tariffs
at issue here. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 502 (quoting Alabama
Assn., 594 U. S., at 765). The “ `lack of historical prece-
dent' ” for the IEEPA tariffs, “coupled with the breadth of
3
Indeed, even before IEEPA was enacted, only one President relied on
its predecessor, the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), ch. 106, 40
Stat. 411, to impose tariffs—and then only as a post hoc defense to a legal
challenge. See Presidential Proclamation No. 4074, 36 Fed. Reg. 15724
(1971) (initially invoking the Tariff Act of 1930 and Trade Expansion Act
of 1962); United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F. 2d 560, 572 (CCPA
1975). Those tariffs were also of limited amount, duration, and scope.
See id., at 568–569, 577–578 (noting that the 10% surcharge was described
by President Nixon as “ `a temporary measure,' ” was in effect less than
fve months, applied only to “articles which had been the subject of prior
tariff concessions,” and was capped at congressionally authorized rates);
Economic Report of the President 70 (1972) (“When all exceptions to the
10-percent rule were taken into account, the effective rate of surcharge
came down to 4.8 percent”).

246 LEARNING
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authority” that the President now claims, “is a `telling indi-
cati
on' ” that the tariffs extend beyond the President's “legit-
imate reach.” National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness, 595 U. S., at 119 (quoting Free Enterprise Fund v.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477,
505 (2010)).
The “ `economic and political signifcance' ” of the authority
the President has asserted likewise “provide[s] a `reason to
hesitate before concluding that Congress' meant to confer
such authority.” West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 721 (quoting
Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at 159–160). The Presi-
dent's assertion here of broad “statutory power over the na-
tional economy” is “extravagant” by any measure. Utility
Air, 573 U. S., at 324. And as the Government admits—in-
deed, boasts—the economic and political consequences of the
IEEPA tariffs are astonishing. The Government points to
projections that the tariffs will reduce the national defcit
by $4 trillion, and that international agreements reached in
reliance on the tariffs could be worth $15 trillion. Brief for
Federal Parties 3, 11. In the President's view, whether “we
are a rich nation” or a “poor” one hangs in the balance. Id.,
at 2. These stakes dwarf those of other major questions
cases. See, e. g., Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 483 ($430 billion);
Alabama Assn., 594 U. S., at 764 (nearly $50 billion); West
Virginia, 597 U. S., at 714 (“billions of dollars in compliance
costs”). As in those cases, “a reasonable interpreter would
[not] expect” Congress to “pawn[ ]” such a “big-time policy
call[ ] . . . off to another branch.” Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 515
(Barrett, J., concurring).
The Government and the principal dissent attempt to
avoid application of the major questions doctrine on several
grounds. None is convincing.
The Government argues frst that the doctrine should not
apply to emergency statutes. Brief for Federal Parties 35–
36. But this argument is nearly identical to one it already
advanced in Nebraska. There, the Government contended
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that a different emergency statute should be interpreted
broadly
because its “whole point” was to provide “substantial
discretion to . . . respond to unforeseen emergencies.” 600
U. S., at 500 (internal quotation marks omitted). We re-
jected that argument in Nebraska, and we reject it here as
well. “[E]mergency powers,” after all, “tend to kindle
emergencies.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U. S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Dozens of
IEEPA emergencies remain ongoing today, including the
frst—declared over four decades ago in response to the Ira-
nian hostage crisis. CRS, Casey, International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, at 20. And as the Framers under-
stood, emergencies can “afford a ready pretext for usurpa-
tion” of congressional power. Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 650
(Jackson, J., concurring). Where Congress has reason to be
worried about its powers “slipping through its fngers,” id.,
at 654, we in turn have every reason to expect Congress
to use clear language to effectuate unbounded delegations—
particularly of its “one great power,” Nicol, 173 U. S., at 515.
The Government's and the principal dissent's proposed for-
eign affairs exception fares no better. Brief for Federal
Parties 34–35; post, at 373–384 (opinion of Kavanaugh, J.).
As a general matter, the President of course enjoys some
“independent constitutional power[s]” over foreign affairs
“even without congressional authorization.” FCC v. Con-
sumers' Research, 606 U. S. 656, 707 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring). And Congress certainly may intend to “give
the President substantial authority and fexibility” in many
foreign affairs or national security contexts. Post, at 375
(opinion of Kavanaugh, J.) (quoting Consumers' Research,
606 U. S., at 706 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)). But “fip-
[ping]” the “presumption” under the major questions doc-
trine, Brief for Federal Parties 34, makes little sense when
it comes to tariffs. As the Government admits, the Presi-
dent and Congress do not “enjoy concurrent constitutional
authority” to impose tariffs during peacetime. Ibid.; Tr. of
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248 LEARNING
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Oral Arg. 70–71. The Framers gave that power to “Con-
gress
alone”—notwithstanding the obvious foreign affairs
implications of tariffs. Merritt v. Welsh, 104 U. S. 694, 700
(1882). And whatever may be said of other powers that im-
plicate foreign affairs, we would not expect Congress to re-
linquish its tariff power through vague language, or without
careful limits.
The central thrust of the Government's and the principal
dissent's proposed exceptions appears to be that ambiguous
delegations in statutes addressing “the most major of major
questions” should necessarily be construed broadly. Brief
for Federal Parties 35. But it simply does not follow from
the fact that a statute deals with major problems that it
should be read to delegate all major powers for which there
may be a “colorable textual basis.” West Virginia, 597 U. S.,
at 722. It is in precisely such cases that we should be alert
to claims that sweeping delegations—particularly delega-
tions of core congressional powers—“lurk[ ]” in “ambiguous
statutory text.” Id., at 723 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). There is no major questions exception to the major
questions doctrine.
Accordingly, the President must “point to clear congres-
sional authorization” to justify his extraordinary assertion
of the power to impose tariffs. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 506
(internal quotation marks omitted). He cannot.
B
To begin, IEEPA authorizes the President to “investigate,
block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, di-
rect and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit . . . impor-
tation or exportation.” 50 U. S. C. § 1702(a)(1)(B). Absent
from this lengthy list of powers is any mention of tariffs or
duties. That omission is notable in light of the signifcant
but specifc powers Congress did go to the trouble of naming.
It stands to reason that had Congress intended to convey the
distinct and extraordinary power to impose tariffs, it would
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have done so expressly—as it consistently has in other tariff
st
atutes. See supra, at 243; accord, post, at 340, 354–355
(opinion of Kavanaugh, J.).
The power to “regulate . . . importation” does not fll that
void. “Regulate,” as that term is ordinarily used, means to
“fx, establish, or control; to adjust by rule, method, or estab-
lished mode; to direct by rule or restriction; to subject to
governing principles or laws.” Black's Law Dictionary 1156
(5th ed. 1979); see also Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 596
U. S. 685, 697 (2022). This defnition captures much of what
a government does on a day-to-day basis. Indeed, if “regu-
late” is as broad as the principal dissent suggests, post, at
339, then the other eight verbs in § 1702(a)(1)(B) are simply
wasted ink. But the facial breadth of “regulate” places in
stark relief what the term is not usually thought to include:
taxation. The U. S. Code is replete with statutes granting
the Executive the authority to “regulate” someone or some-
thing. Yet the Government cannot identify any statute in
which the power to regulate includes the power to tax. The
Government concedes, for example, that the Securities and
Exchange Commission cannot tax the trading of securities,
even though it is expressly authorized to “regulate the trad-
ing of . . . securities.” 15 U. S. C. § 78i(h)(1); see Brief for
Federal Parties 31–32. We are therefore skeptical that in
IEEPA—and IEEPA alone—Congress hid a delegation of its
birth-right power to tax within the quotidian power to
“regulate.”
Taxes, to be sure, may accomplish regulatory ends. See
Sonzinsky, 300 U. S., at 513; Gibbons, 9 Wheat., at 201–202.
But it does not follow that the power to regulate something
includes the power to tax it as a means of regulation. Con-
gressional practice suggests as much. When Congress ad-
dresses both the power to regulate and the power to tax,
it does so separately and expressly. See, e. g., 16 U. S. C.
§ 460bbb–9(a) (distinguishing between the power to “tax per-
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250 LEARNING
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“to regulate the private lands”); 2 U. S. C. § 622(8)(B)(i)
(
“gover nment-sponsored enterpr ise” does not have the
“power to tax or to regulate interstate commerce”). That
is unsurprising, as the “power to regulate commerce” is “en-
tirely distinct from the right to levy taxes.” Gibbons, 9
Wheat., at 201. That Congress did not grant those authori-
ties separately here is strong evidence that “regulate” in
IEEPA does not include taxation.
A contrary reading would render IEEPA partly unconsti-
tutional. IEEPA authorizes the President to “regulate . . .
importation or exportation.” 50 U. S. C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (em-
phasis added). Taxing exports, however, is expressly for-
bidden by the Constitution. Art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
The “neighboring words” with which “regulate” “is associ-
ated” also suggest that Congress did not intend for “regu-
late” to include the revenue-raising power. United States v.
Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 294 (2008). “Regulate” is one of
nine verbs listed in § 1702(a)(1)(B). Each authorizes a dis-
tinct action a President might take in sanctioning foreign
actors or controlling domestic actors engaged in foreign com-
merce—blocking imports, for example, or prohibiting trans-
actions. Presidential practice under IEEPA demonstrates
as much. See CRS, Casey, International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act, at 79–106 (Table A–3); see, e. g., Exec.
Order No. 13194, 3 CFR 741 (2001 Comp.) (blocking importa-
tion of diamonds from insurgent regime in Sierra Leone);
Exec. Order No. 12947, 3 CFR 319 (1995 Comp.) (prohibiting
transactions with those “who threaten to disrupt the Middle
East peace process”). None of IEEPA's authorities includes
the distinct and extraordinary power to raise revenue. And
the fact that no President has ever found such power in
IEEPA is strong evidence that it does not exist. See supra,
at 245; FTC v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., 312 U. S. 349, 351–352
(1941).
We do not attempt to set forth the metes and bounds of
the President's authority to “regulate . . . importation” under
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IEEPA. That “interpretive question” is “not at issue” in
th
is case, and any answer would be “plain dicta.” West Vir-
ginia, 597 U. S., at 734–735, and n. 5. Our task today is to
decide only whether the power to “regulate . . . importation,”
as granted to the President in IEEPA, embraces the power
to impose tariffs. It does not.
4
The Government, echoed point-for-point by the principal
dissent, marshals several arguments in response. First, it
contends that IEEPA confers the power to impose tariffs
because early commentators and this Court's cases discuss
tariffs in the context of the Constitution's Commerce Clause.
See Brief for Federal Parties 24–25; post, at 340–341 (opinion
of Kavanaugh, J.). But that answers the wrong question.
The question is not, as the Government would have it,
whether tariffs can ever be a means of regulating commerce.
It is instead whether Congress, when conferring the power
to “regulate . . . importation,” gave the President the power
to impose tariffs at his sole discretion. And Congress's pat-
tern of usage is most relevant to answering that question.
That pattern is plain: When Congress grants the power to
impose tariffs, it does so clearly and with careful constraints.
It did neither here.
The Government raises another contextual argument.
Because “regulate” “lies between” two “poles” in IEEPA—
“compel” on the affrmative end and “prohibit” on the nega-
tive end—the term naturally includes the “less extreme,
more fexible” tool of tariffs. Reply Brief 9 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted); see post, at 357–358 (opinion of Kava-
naugh, J.) (making a greater-includes-the-lesser argument).
4
The principal dissent surmises that the President could impose “most
if not all” of the tariffs at issue under statutes other than IEEPA. Post,
at 389 (opinion of Kavanaugh, J.). The cited statutes contain various
combinations of procedural prerequisites, required agency determinations,
and limits on the duration, amount, and scope of the tariffs they authorize.
See supra, at 243–244; post, at 389–390. We do not speculate on hypo-
thetical cases not before us.
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But tariffs, as discussed above, are different in kind, not de-
gree
, from the other authorities in IEEPA. Unlike those
authorities, tariffs operate directly on domestic importers to
raise revenue for the Treasury. See 19 U. S. C. § 1505(a); 19
CFR § 141.1(b) (2025). Even though a tariff is, in some
sense, “less extreme” than an outright compulsion or prohi-
bition, it does not follow that tariffs lie on the spectrum be-
tween those poles. They are instead “very clear[ly] . . . a
branch of the taxing power,” Gibbons, 9 Wheat., at 201, and
fall outside the spectrum entirely.
Finding no support in the statute the President invoked,
the Government turns to one he did not: IEEPA's predeces-
sor, TWEA. Ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411. In 1975, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals held that the authority to “reg-
ulate . . . importation” in TWEA authorized President Nixon
to impose limited tariffs. United States v. Yoshida Int'l,
Inc., 526 F. 2d 560, 572, 577–578. When Congress enacted
IEEPA two years later, the Government contends, it con-
veyed that same authority (except without the limits). See
also post, at 342–345 (opinion of Kavanaugh, J.).
This argument cannot bear the weight the Government
places on it. While this Court sometimes assumes that Con-
gress incorporates judicial defnitions into legislation, we do
so “only when [the] term's meaning was `well-settled' ” before
the adoption. Kemp v. United States, 596 U. S. 528, 539
(2022) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 22 (1999));
see also United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. 402,
412–415 (2015). A single, expressly limited opinion from a
specialized intermediate appellate court does not clear that
hurdle.
5
See BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council of Balti-
5
The Government, citing the IEEPA House Committee Report, con-
tends that Congress “indisputably knew of ” Yoshida's interpretation of
TWEA. Brief for Federal Parties 26; see also post, at 344, and n. 11
(opinion of Kavanaugh, J.). But even taking the Report at face value,
it hardly helps the Government. The Report explains that “[s]uccessive
Presidents have seized upon the open-endedness of [TWEA] section 5(b)

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more, 593 U. S. 230, 244 (2021). The tariff authority as-
ser
ted by President Nixon, moreover, was “far removed”
from TWEA's “original purposes” of sanctioning foreign bel-
ligerents. Cohen, Fundamentals of U. S. Foreign Trade Pol-
icy, at 178–179. We are therefore skeptical that Congress
enacted IEEPA with an eye toward granting that novel
power.
The Government has another historical argument based
on this Court's wartime precedents. See generally Brief for
Professor Aditya Bamzai as Amicus Curiae; Reply Brief 9–
11, 18. According to the Government, those precedents ac-
knowledge an inherent Presidential power to impose tariffs
during armed confict. And, the argument goes, Congress
in TWEA, and then in IEEPA, codifed those precedents.
But this argument fails at both steps. Insofar as the Gov-
ernment relies on our wartime cases themselves, they are
facially inapposite. Regardless of what they might mean for
the President's inherent wartime authority, all agree that
the President has no inherent peacetime authority to im-
pose tariffs.
Nor are we persuaded that the dots connect from our war-
time precedents, through multiple iterations of TWEA, to
IEEPA, such that IEEPA should be interpreted to grant the
President an expansive peacetime tariff power. This argu-
ment relies extensively on a series of inferences drawn from
scant legislative history. Such an attenuated chain cannot
support—much less “clearly” support—a reading of IEEPA
to turn that section, through usage, into something quite different from
what was envisioned in 1917.” H. R. Rep. No. 95–459, pp. 8–9 (1977);
accord, S. Cohen, R. Blecker, & P. Whitney, Fundamentals of U. S. Foreign
Trade Policy 178–179 (2d ed. 2003). That is not exactly a stamp of ap-
proval on the action Yoshida guardedly endorsed. And in any event, the
Government's “knew of ” standard falls well short of the “broad and un-
questioned” “judicial consensus” we have required to conclude that Con-
gress incorporated a judicial defnition into a statutory term. Jama v.
Immigration and Customs En forcement, 543 U. S. 335, 349 (2005).
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254 LEARNING
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that includes the distinct power to impose tariffs. Alabama
Assn.
, 594 U. S., at 764.
Turning to this Court's precedents, the Government frst
relies on Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG,
Inc., 426 U. S. 548 (1976). There, we held that Section 232(b)
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which allows the Presi-
dent to “adjust the imports” of particular goods to protect
national security, includes the power to impose “license
fees.” Id., at 561. But that holding bears little on the
meaning of IEEPA. As a textual matter, Section 232(b) au-
thorizes the President not only to “adjust . . . imports,” but
(as the Government emphasized in Algonquin) to “take such
action . . . as he deems necessary” to adjust the imports of
a good. Brief for Petitioners 26 (emphasis in original) and
Tr. of Oral Arg. 6–7, in Federal Energy Administration v.
Algonquin SNG, Inc., O. T. 1975, No. 75–382. IEEPA does
not contain such sweeping, discretion-conferring language.
As for context, Section 232(a) states that “[n]o action shall
be taken” to “decrease or eliminate” an existing “duty or
other import restriction” if doing so would threaten national
security. 19 U. S. C. § 1862(a) (1970 ed.). This explicit ref-
erence to duties preceding Section 232(b) renders it natural
for Section 232(b) itself to authorize duties. Thus, we de-
cline to extend Algonquin's expressly “limited” holding any
further. 426 U. S., at 571.
Finally, the Government invokes Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U. S. 654 (1981), but that case offers no support.
Dames & Moore was exceedingly narrow,
6
did not address
6
See, e. g., 453 U. S., at 660 (“We are confned to a resolution of the
dispute presented to us”); ibid. (We are “acutely aware of the necessity to
rest decision on the narrowest possible ground capable of deciding the
case”); id., at 661 (“We attempt to lay down no general `guidelines' cover-
ing other situations not involved here, and attempt to confne the opinion
only to the very questions necessary to decision of the case”); ibid. (“[T]he
decisions of the Court in this area have been rare, episodic, and afford
little precedential value for subsequent cases”); id., at 688 (“[W]e re-
emphasize the narrowness of our decision”). This is not quite “no, no, a
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the President's power to “regulate,” and did not involve tar-
i
ffs at all. If anything, that case highlights the importance
of close attention to IEEPA's text. “The terms of . . .
IEEPA,” we held, “do not authorize” the suspension of
claims. Id., at 675. So too here; the terms of IEEPA do
not authorize tariffs.
III
The President asserts the extraordinary power to unilater-
ally impose tariffs of unlimited amount, duration, and scope.
In light of the breadth, history, and constitutional context of
that asserted authority, he must identify clear congressional
authorization to exercise it.
IEEPA's grant of authority to “regulate . . . importation”
falls short. IEEPA contains no reference to tariffs or du-
ties. The Government points to no statute in which Con-
gress used the word “regulate” to authorize taxation. And
until now no President has read IEEPA to confer such power.
We claim no special competence in matters of economics
or foreign affairs. We claim only, as we must, the limited
role assigned to us by Article III of the Constitution. Ful-
flling that role, we hold that IEEPA does not authorize the
President to impose tariffs.
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit in case No. 25–250 is affrmed. The
judgment of the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia in case No. 24–1287 is vacated, and the case
is remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.
It is so ordered.
Justice Gorsuch, concurring.
The President claims that Congress delegated to him an
extraordinary power in the International Emergency Eco-
thousand times no,” but should have suffced to dissuade the principal
dissent from invoking the case, see post, at 382–383, with respect to the
quite distinct legal and factual issues present here.
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nomic Powers Act (IEEPA)—the power to impose tariffs on
prac
tically any products he wants, from any countries he
chooses, in any amounts he selects. Applying the major
questions doctrine, the principal opinion rejects that argu-
ment. I join in full. The Constitution lodges the Nation's
lawmaking powers in Congress alone, and the major ques-
tions doctrine safeguards that assignment against executive
encroachment. Under the doctrine's terms, the President
must identify clear statutory authority for the extraordinary
delegated power he claims. And, as the principal opinion
explains, that is a standard he cannot meet. Whatever else
might be said about Congress's work in IEEPA, it did not
clearly surrender to the President the sweeping tariff power
he seeks to wield.
Not everyone sees it this way. Past critics of the major
questions doctrine do not object to its application in this
case, and they even join much of today's principal opinion.
But, they insist, they can reach the same result by employing
only routine tools of statutory interpretation. Post, at 304
(Kagan, J., joined by Sotomayor and Jackson, JJ., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment). Meanwhile, one
colleague who joins the principal opinion in full suggests the
major questions doctrine is nothing more than routine statu-
tory interpretation. Post, at 300 (Barrett, J., concurring).
Still others who have joined major questions decisions in the
past dissent from today's application of the doctrine. Post,
at 330 (Kavanaugh, J., joined by Thomas and Alito, JJ., dis-
senting). Finally, seeking to sidestep the major questions
doctrine altogether, one colleague submits that Congress
may hand over to the President most of its powers, including
the tariff power, without limit. Post, at 313–314 (Thomas,
J., dissenting). It is an interesting turn of events. Each
camp warrants a visit.
I
Start with the critics. In the past, they have criticized
the major questions doctrine for two main reasons. The

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doctrine, they have suggested, is a novelty without basis in
law
. West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 779 (2022)
(Kagan, J., joined by, inter alios, Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(calling the doctrine a “special cano[n]” that has “magically
appear[ed]”). And, they have argued, the doctrine is rooted
in an “anti-administrative-state stance” that prevents Con-
gress from employing executive agency offcials to “d[o] im-
portant work.” Id., at 780. Today, the critics proceed differ-
ently. They join a section of the principal opinion that applies
the major questions doctrine. Ante, at 248–255. And rather
than critique the doctrine, they say only that it is “unneces-
sary” in this case “because ordinary principles of statutory
interpretation lead to the same result.” Post, at 304–305
(opinion of Kagan, J.).
A
Unpack that last claim frst. My concurring colleagues
contend that, as a matter of “straight-up statutory construc-
tion,” IEEPA does not grant the President the power to im-
pose tariffs. Post, at 310. In doing so, they make thought-
ful points about the statute's text and context. But their
approach today is diffcult to square with how they have in-
terpreted other statutes. Dissenting in past major ques-
tions cases, they have argued that broad statutory language
granting powers to executive offcials should be read for all
it is worth. Yet, now, when it comes to IEEPA's similarly
broad language granting powers to the President, they take
a more constrained approach.
Consider some examples of how they have proceeded in
the past. Dissenting in National Federation of Independ-
ent Business v. OSHA, 595 U. S. 109 (2022) (per curiam)
(NFIB), two of my concurring colleagues confronted a stat-
ute charging the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration with promoting “safe and healthful working condi-
tions.” Id., at 128, 132 ( joint opinion of Breyer, Sotomayor,
and Kagan, JJ.) (internal quotation marks omitted). They
read that language as authorizing the agency to impose a
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vaccine mandate on 84 million Americans. Id., at 132; id.,
at
120 (per curiam). In support of their reading, my col-
leagues stressed the statute's “expansive language,” another
provision authorizing the agency to issue temporary “emer-
gency standards,” and “the scope of the crisis” the agency
was trying to address. Id., at 132, 135 ( joint dissent) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
Dissenting in Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department
of Health and Human Servs., 594 U. S. 758 (2021) (per cu-
riam), my colleagues addressed a statute permitting the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to issue regula-
tions “necessary to prevent the . . . transmission . . . of com-
municable diseases.” Id., at 768 (opinion of Breyer, J., joined
by Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ.) (internal quotation marks
omitted). As they saw it, those terms granted the agency
the power to regulate landlord-tenant relations nationwide
during COVID–19. Ibid. In reaching this conclusion, my
colleagues again highlighted the statute's “broad” language
and suggested that it permitted the agency to impose even
“greater restrictions” than the ones at issue in the case. Id.,
at 769.
Dissenting in West Virginia, my colleagues faced a statute
allowing the Environmental Protection Agency to ensure
power plants employ the “best system of emission reduc-
tion.” 597 U. S., at 758 (opinion of Kagan, J.) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). They read that provision as author-
izing the agency to effectively close many power plants and
transform the electricity industry from coast to coast. See
id., at 754–755. In support, they once more argued that the
statutory language was “broad” and “expansive,” with “no
ifs, ands, or buts.” Id., at 756–758. They stressed, too, that
the relevant statutory terms appeared in “major legislation”
intended to address “big problems,” and that the statute au-
thorized actions in the agency's “traditional lane” or “wheel-
house.” Id., at 756–757, 765.
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Finally, dissenting in Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477
(2023),
my colleagues took up a statute permitting the Secre-
tary of Education to “waive or modify any statutory or regu-
latory provision applying to [a federal] student-loan pro-
gram” during a national emergency. Id., at 533 (opinion of
Kagan, J., joined by Sotomayor and Jackson, JJ.) (internal
quotation marks omitted). They said that language allowed
the Secretary to cancel $430 billion in federal student-loan
debt because of COVID–19. See ibid.; id., at 501 (majority
opinion). Once again, they argued that the statutory terms
were “broad,” “expansive,” “capacious,” and designed to af-
ford the Secretary a “poten[t]” power to respond to “national
emergencies” that were “major in scope.” Id., at 533–542
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
Now compare all that to how my colleagues proceed here.
This case, they say, is “nearly the opposite.” Post, at 305.
While straight-up statutory interpretation granted execu-
tive offcials all the power they sought in all those other
cases, my colleagues insist this one is different because
IEEPA simply does not “give the President the power he
wants.” Post, at 306.
That's a striking turn given the statutory terms before us.
When the President declares a national emergency “to deal
with any unusual and extraordinary threat . . . to the national
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States,”
50 U. S. C. § 1701(a), IEEPA permits him to “regulate . . .
importation . . . of . . . any property in which any for-
eign country or a national thereof has any interest,”
§ 1702(a)(1)(B). Surely, the authority granted here is
“broad” and “expansive.” See West Virginia, 597 U. S., at
758–759 (Kagan, J., dissenting). It has “no ifs, ands, or
buts” either. Id., at 756. As a matter of ordinary meaning,
the term “regulate” means to “fx, establish or control,” “ad-
just by rule, method, or established mode,” “direct by rule
or restriction,” or “subject to governing principles or laws.”
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Black's Law Dictionary 1156 (5th ed. 1979); see also post,
at
306. And tariffs do just that—they fx rules that control,
adjust, or govern imports of “property in which any for-
eign country or a national thereof has any interest.”
§ 1702(a)(1)(B).
Without question IEEPA is also “major legislation” de-
signed to address “big problems” and “crises,” West Vir-
ginia, 597 U. S., at 754, 756–758 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted), along with “emergencies”
that are “major in scope,” Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 542
(Kagan, J., dissenting). By its terms, the statute applies
only dur i ng declared nati ona l emergencies i nvolv i ng
“threat[s]” to the “national security, foreign policy, or econ-
omy of the United States.” § 1701(a). And it tasks the
President personally with responding to those emergencies,
a responsibility surely more in his “lane” or “wheelhouse”
than that of any other executive offcial. See West Virginia,
597 U. S., at 765 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Notably, too,
IEEPA grants the President the power to impose even
“greater restrictions” than tariffs, Alabama Assn. of Real-
tors, 594 U. S., at 769 (Breyer, J., dissenting), because the
statute also permits him to “nullify,” “prevent,” and “void”
imports, § 1702(a)(1)(B); see also Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 539
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
Why do my concurring colleagues read IEEPA so much
more narrowly than they have other broad statutory terms
found in other major legislation addressing other emergen-
cies? They say contextual clues justify a narrowing con-
struction here. See post, at 305–310. But what the concur-
rence calls “context” looks remarkably like the major
questions doctrine's rule that, when executive branch off-
cials claim Congress has granted them an extraordinary
power, they must identify clear statutory authority for it.
See ante, at 248 (reciting the rule).
Take some examples. The concurrence points to the “un-
paralleled authority” the President asserts “to impose a tar-
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iff of any amount, for any time, on only his own say-so.”
P
ost, at 308. In other words, the President claims an “[e]x-
traordinary” power. West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 723 (major-
ity opinion). The concurrence observes that no “President
until now understood IEEPA to authorize imposing tariffs.”
Post, at 308. In other words, the power is an “unheralded”
one. West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 722 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Along the way, the concurrence also adds
“a modicum of common sense about how Congress typically
delegates” and “consideration of whether Congress ever has
before, or likely would, delegate the power the Executive
asserts.” Post, at 305 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In other words, the statutory text must be read in light of
“separation of powers principles.” West Virginia, 597 U. S.,
at 723.
Having borrowed all those concepts from the major ques-
tions doctrine, the concurrence then turns to the key statu-
tory terms before us—“regulate . . . importation”—and ob-
serves that they “sa[y] nothing ” (at least not expressly)
“about imposing tariffs.” Post, at 306. And why is that
fatal to the President's case? Because the President is at-
tempting to exercise the “ `core congressional power' ” over
taxes and tariffs, a power Article I of the Constitution vests in
Congress alone. Post, at 308 (quoting ante, at 243); see also
West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 737 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (ex-
plaining that the major questions doctrine “protect[s] the
Constitution's separation of powers,” and particularly Arti-
cle I, which vests “all federal legislative power[s] in . . . Con-
gress” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)).
If my colleagues all but apply the major questions doctrine
today, maybe they are simply recognizing what they have in
other separation of powers cases involving the delegation of
legislative power: that “[t]he guidance needed is greater”
when the executive branch seeks to take “action[s] [that] will
affect the entire national economy.” FCC v. Consumers'
Research, 606 U. S. 656, 673 (2025) (opinion for the Court by
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Kagan, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Or maybe
my
colleagues believe the power the President asserts here
outstrips even those powers executive offcials asserted in
our past major questions cases. But whatever the case, my
concurring colleagues' course today suggests that skeptics
owe the major questions doctrine a second look.
All of which leads me to take up the challenges they have
posed to it in the past. Is the doctrine really some “special
cano[n]” that has only recently “magically appear[ed]”?
West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 779 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
And is it really grounded in an “anti-administrative-state
stance” that prevents Congress from using executive branch
offcials to perform “important work”? Id., at 780.
B
The major questions doctrine teaches that, to sustain a
claim that Congress has granted them an extraordinary
power, executive offcials must identify clear authority for
that power. Far from a novelty, much the same principle
has long applied to those who claim extraordinary delegated
authority, whether in private or public law.
1
Examples stretch across many felds. Consider frst the
common law of corporations. In early modern England, cor-
porations could be formed only with “an explicit, ex ante and
direct authorization.” R. Harris, Industrializing English
Law: Entrepreneurship and Business Organization, 1720–
1844, p. 17 (2000). That authorization could be given by the
Crown, an Act of Parliament, or a combination of the two.
Ibid.; see also id., at 19. Some of these corporations exer-
cised regulatory functions not unlike those performed by
modern administrative agencies. M. Bilder, The Corporate
Origins of Judicial Review, 116 Yale L. J. 502, 516–517, 519–
520 (2006). Indeed, the “[i]nitial settlements in Virginia and
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Massachusetts Bay, among others, were structured as corpo-
rati
ons.” Id., at 535.
English law treated these corporations as having authority
to issue bylaws. But that authority was subject to restric-
tions, one of which was that corporations could not regulate
on major subjects without express authorization. Take
Kirk v. Nowill, 1 T. R. 118, 99 Eng. Rep. 1006 (K. B. 1786).
That case involved the Company of Cutlers, a corporation for
makers of knives and other cutlery. See id., at 118–119, 99
Eng. Rep., at 1006. An Act of Parliament gave the company
broad authority to regulate its members. Id., at 118–121, 99
Eng. Rep., at 1006–1007. The company used that authority
to adopt a bylaw allowing its offcials to enter its members'
“workshops and warehouses” and search for “deceitful and
unworkmanly” cutlery. Id., at 121–122, 99 Eng. Rep., at
1007. After the company seized supposedly unworkmanly
forks, the aggrieved owner challenged the company's actions
in court, arguing that the bylaw under which it acted was
“bad in point of law” because the power to incur a forfeiture
was not “expressly given to [the company] by Act of Parlia-
ment.” Id., at 118, 122–123, 99 Eng. Rep., at 1008. Apply-
ing a clear-statement rule, the King 's Bench declared the
bylaw, and therefore the seizure, unlawful. Lord Mansfeld
explained that the “power of making bye-laws to incur a for-
feiture” was an “extraordinary power” over and above the
default powers of corporations “created by charter.” Id., at
124, 99 Eng. Rep., at 1009. For this reason, the power
needed to be “expressly given” by the company's progenitor,
Parliament. Ibid. Since no such power had been clearly
conferred, the seizure was unlawful. See ibid.
The same principle applied in American law. In In re
Election of Directors of Long Island R. Co., 19 Wend. 37, 40
(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1837), a New York court addressed a case
involving 2,700 shares of stock in the Long Island Railroad
Company that the company had declared forfeited. Ibid.
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All agreed that the company had broad power to regulate its
shares.
See id., at 41–42. Still, the court called the forfeit-
ure an “extraordinary penalty,” and held that no such power
had been “expressly conferred” on the corporation by its
charter. Ibid. In fact, the court borrowed the clear-state-
ment rule from Nowill: If “extraordinary authority . . . is
intended to be given, it must be by express words to that
effect.” Id., at 43 (describing Nowill in detail).
The court in Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461 (1857), pro-
ceeded similarly. That case involved the incorporated town
of Cahaba, Alabama. See id., at 464. The town set the
price of a liquor license at $1,000, fned James Burnett for
failing to obtain one, and eventually imprisoned him for not
paying the fne. See ibid. Burnett sought a writ of habeas
corpus and argued that Cahaba had acted beyond the scope
of its corporate authority. Ibid.
Without a clear-statement rule, Burnett's argument would
have stood little chance. That's because the town's charter
granted it the authority “to make and establish all such
rules, by-laws, and ordinances, respecting the streets, mar-
kets, buildings, . . . and police of said town, that shall appear
to them requisite and necessary for the security, welfare, and
convenience of said town, or for preserving health, peace,
order, and good government within the same.” Id., at 467
(internal quotation marks omitted). The charter even spe-
cifcally gave the town the “privileg[e] of granting licenses
for retailing of spirituous and other liquors.” Ibid. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Semantically, the town's power
was broad indeed and encompassed liquor licensing. But
the court sided with Burnett anyway. Reasoning that the
town's exorbitant licensing fee effectively banned the sale of
liquor, the court held that Cahaba did not enjoy such extraor-
dinary “prohibitory” power because it was “not authorized
by any express grant of power” in the town's charter. Id.,
at 469; see also id., at 466.

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These cases are not outliers. Treatises confrm that the
extraordi
nary power principle was fundamental to municipal
corporations. A statute could “not by implication invest [a]
body with any extraordinary authority.” J. Willcock, The
Law of Municipal Corporations ¶226, p. 99 (1827). Extraor-
dinary powers required “express words to that effect.”
Ibid. And “[a]ny fair, reasonable doubt concerning the ex-
istence of power [was] resolved by the courts against the
corporation, and the power [was] denied.” 1 J. Dillon, Com-
mentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations 145 (4th
ed. 1890).
The takeaway is simple enough. Early corporations often
functioned much like today's executive branch, exercising
delegated regulatory authority. And, when interpreting
the scope of that authority, the common law had a clear-
statement rule that looked strikingly like the major ques-
tions doctrine.
Historically, a similar precept applied in agency law. As
the leading early American treatise put it, instruments con-
ferring powers of attorney were “ordinarily subjected to a
strict interpretation.” J. Story, Commentaries on the Law
of Agency 80–81 (2d ed. 1844). So, for example, in Attwood
v. Munnings, 7 Barn. & Cress. 278, 108 Eng. Rep. 727 (K. B.
1827), a principal had delegated broad power to an agent to
act “generally for him and in his name,” including in all
things “as should be requisite, expedient, and advisable to
be done in . . . his affairs and concerns, and as he might or
could do if personally acting therein.” Id., at 279–280, 108
Eng. Rep., at 728 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
agent then accepted certain debts on behalf of the principal.
Id., at 280, 108 Eng. Rep., at 728. The question for the court
was whether this action was within the scope of the agent's
authority. Id., at 281, 108 Eng. Rep., at 728. The court said
no. Powers of attorney are “instruments to be construed
strictly.” Id., at 283, 108 Eng. Rep., at 729. And the power
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of attorney contained “no express power” to accept debts, so
no
such power had been given. Ibid.
Other examples abound. A power to sell casks of whiskey
did not include the “unusual and extraordinary” power to
offer a warranty against future seizures of the casks, unless
granted by “express authority.” Palmer v. Hatch, 46 Mo.
585, 587 (1870). Under a power of attorney, authority to
enter contracts for a principal was subject to “strict inter-
pretation” and generally did not authorize “contracts of an
extraordinary character” outside those “connected with [the
principal's] ordinary business.” Reynolds v. Rowley, 4 La.
396, 398–399 (1849). And a power to manage a mine did not
authorize an agent to borrow money for the mine's opera-
tions on the principal's credit because there was no “express
authority” for such a departure from the “usual manner” of
running a mine. Hawtayne v. Bourne, 7 M. & W. 595, 599,
151 Eng. Rep. 905, 906 (Ex. 1841). This was true even “in
cases of necessity,” id., at 599, 151 Eng. Rep., at 907, where
the manager borrowed funds to address an “emergency sud-
denly arising,” id., at 600, 151 Eng. Rep., at 907.
Much the same principle applied to executive offcials.
Often, “the legality of an executive action depended on the
relationship between the size of the asserted power and the
clarity of the underlying legal authority.” T. Arvind & C.
Burset, Partisan Legal Traditions in the Age of Camden and
Mansfeld, 44 Oxford J. Legal Studies 376, 388 (2024). En-
tick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C. P. 1765), offers
an illustration. There, as part of an investigation for sedi-
tious libel, the English Secretary of State claimed authority
to issue a warrant for the seizure of an author's papers.
Lord Camden declared the seizure unlawful, reasoning that
power asserted by the executive “ought to be as clear as it
is extensive.” T. Arvind & C. Burset, A New Report of En-
tick v. Carrington (1765), 110 Ky. L. J. 265, 324 (2022) (Ar-
vind & Burset). Or, as another reporter described Cam-
den's decision, “one should naturally expect that the law to
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warrant [the exercise of power] should be clear in proportion
as
the power is exorbitant.” 19 How. St. Tr., at 1065–1066.
The seizure represented an extraordinary exercise of power,
Lord Camden found, and no legal authority clearly author-
ized it. See Arvind & Burset 324. Accordingly, the war-
rant was unlawful and the seizure could not stand. Id.,
at 332.
2
Perhaps unsurpr ising ly g iven th is h istory, Amer ican
courts applied the extraordinary power principle when Con-
gress and the States started delegating new regulatory pow-
ers to executive agencies in the late 19th century. Take
railroad commissions. After the Civil War, governments
worried about the increasing power of railroad companies
responded by creating new agencies and imbuing them with
broad regulatory authority. These bodies were among the
frst modern administrative agencies. See West Virginia,
597 U. S., at 740 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). And when they
claimed some extraordinary delegated power, both state and
federal courts enforced a clear-statement rule. See, e. g.,
Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 193–194
(1909) (declaring, in the course of interpreting a state stat-
ute, that an “enormous power” “must be conferred in plain
language” “free from doubt”); Board of R. Comm'rs of Ore.
v. Oregon R. & Navigation Co., 17 Ore. 65, 77, 19 P. 702, 707–
708 (1888) (When an agency exercises “powers delegated to
[it] by the legislature” to carry out “important functions,”
the text must “defne and specify the authority given it so
clearly that no doubt can reasonably arise”); ICC v. Cincin-
nati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 167 U. S. 479, 505 (1897) (holding
a delegation of legislative power of “supreme delicacy and
importance” must be “clear and direct”); Gulf & Ship Island
R. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 94 Miss. 124, 134–135, 49 So. 118
(1908) (“It is universally held that a railroad commission . . .
must be able to point to its grant of power . . . in clear and
express terms, and nothing will be had by inference”).
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The railroad commissions may have been the frst, but they
were
not the last. Whether executive offcials claimed the
power to criminally punish noncompliance with regulations,
force employers to retain employees regardless of their un-
lawful conduct, or regulate intrastate candy sales, this Court
held them to much the same standard. Because their
claimed powers were so substantial, executive offcials had
to identify a “distinc[t]” authority for them, United States v.
Eaton, 144 U. S. 677, 688 (1892), a “clear legislative basis,”
United States v. George, 228 U. S. 14, 22 (1913), a “defnite
and unmistakable expression,” NLRB v. Fansteel Metallur-
gical Corp., 306 U. S. 240, 255 (1939), or a “clea[r] mandate,”
FTC v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., 312 U. S. 349, 351, 355 (1941).
Cf. Industrial Union Dept., AFL–CIO v. American Petro-
leum Institute, 448 U. S. 607, 645 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(“In the absence of a clear mandate . . . it is unreasonable to
assume that Congress intended to give the Secretary [of
Labor] the unprecedented power over American industry”
he claimed).
It is no mystery why the Court proceeded this way when
interpreting legislative directions to the executive branch.
Article I of the Constitution vests all federal legislative
power in Congress, and Article II charges the executive
branch with seeing that Congress's laws are faithfully exe-
cuted. In a very real sense, then, when it comes to legisla-
tive power, Congress is the principal and executive offcials
are the agents. See generally G. Lawson & G. Seidman, “A
Great Power of Attorney”: Understanding the Fiduciary
Constitution (2017).
So what is the basis for the charge that the major ques-
tions doctrine represents some “magica[l]” innovation? See
West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 779 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Part of the answer may have to do with the fact that, in the
latter half of the 20th century, this Court began experiment-
ing with a very different approach. The Court pushed aside
its long-held skepticism of claims to extraordinary delegated
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powers and began affrmatively encouraging them. Chev-
ro
n deference is just one example of this phenomenon,
though a stark one. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). That
case established a presumption that was nearly the opposite
of the major questions doctrine: When Congress failed to
speak clearly, courts put a thumb on the scale in favor of
delegated power. Id., at 843–844. Given that development,
the longstanding principles animating the major questions
doctrine may have receded from view for a time. After all,
the two doctrines often applied in the same places and coun-
seled opposite results. But with Chevron gone, so is the
confict. This Court's application of the major questions
doctrine is not invention so much as return to form.
C
Now turn to my concurring colleagues' other charge: that
the major questi ons doc tr i ne is premised on an “anti-
administrative-state stance.” West Virginia, 597 U. S., at
780 (Kagan, J., dissenting). It is important, they argue, to
allow Congress to delegate expansive powers. Members of
Congress unfortunately “often don't know enough—and
know they don't know enough—to regulate sensibly on an
issue.” Id., at 781. Nor can Congress easily “anticipate
changing circumstances.” Ibid. For these reasons, Mem-
bers of Congress must rely on more adept and less con-
strained “people . . . found in agencies.” Ibid. Indeed, my
colleagues say, “administrative delegations . . . have helped
to build a modern Nation.” Id., at 782. And the major
questions doctrine, they worry, could jeopardize all that “as-
tonish[ing] . . . progress.” Ibid.
This policy complaint, of course, is no reason to disregard
our precedents or longstanding legal principles. But, even
taken on its own terms, it is a bit perplexing. The major
questions doctrine is not “anti-administrative state.” It is
pro-Congress. Common-law courts understood that few
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written instruments can anticipate every eventuality, and
that
principals sometimes draft broad delegation language to
account for this. At the same time, courts appreciated the
corresponding risk that delegees could easily exploit loose
language in their commissions for their own beneft and to
the detriment of those they purported to serve. So
common-law courts often strictly construed delegated pow-
ers, not because they were anti-delegee, but because they
were pro-principal.
The major questions doctrine performs a similar function.
Article I vests all federal legislative power in Congress.
But like any written instrument, federal legislation cannot
anticipate every eventuality, a point my concurring col-
leagues have observed in the past. Id., at 781–782. And
highly resourceful members of the executive branch have
strong incentives to exploit any doubt in Congress's past
work to assume new power for themselves. The major
questions doctrine helps prevent that kind of exploitation.
Our founders understood that men are not angels, and we
disregard that insight at our peril when we allow the few (or
the one) to aggrandize their power based on loose or uncer-
tain authority. We delude ourselves, too, if we think that
power will accumulate safely and only in the hands of dispas-
sionate “people . . . found in agencies.” Id., at 781. Even if
unelected agency offcials were uniquely immune to the de-
sire for more power (an unserious assumption), they report
to elected Presidents who can claim no such modesty. See
Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926).
Another feature of our separation of powers makes the
major questions doctrine especially salient. When a private
agent oversteps, a principal may fx that problem prospec-
tively by withdrawing the agent's authority. Under our
Constitution, the remedy is not so simple. Once this Court
reads a doubtful statute as granting the executive branch a
given power, that power may prove almost impossible for
Congress to retrieve. Any President keen on his own au-
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thority (and, again, what President isn't?) will have a strong
i
ncentive to veto legislation aimed at returning the power to
Congress. Perhaps Congress can use other tools, including
its appropriation authority, to infuence how the President
exercises his new power. Maybe Congress can sometimes
even leverage those tools to induce the President to withhold
a veto. But retrieving a lost power is no easy business in
our constitutional order. And without doctrines like major
questions, our system of separated powers and checks-and-
balances threatens to give way to the continual and perma-
nent accretion of power in the hands of one man. That is no
recipe for a republic.
This case offers an example of the problem. Article I
grants Congress, not the President, the power to impose tar-
iffs. Still, the President claims, Congress passed that power
on to him in IEEPA, permitting him to impose tariffs on
nearly any goods he wishes, in any amount he wishes, based
on emergencies he himself has declared. He insists, as well,
that his emergency declarations are unreviewable. A ruling
for him here, the President acknowledges, would afford fu-
ture Presidents the same latitude he asserts for himself.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 69. So another President might impose
tariffs on gas-powered automobiles to respond to climate
change. Ibid. Or, really, on virtually any imports for any
emergency any President might perceive. And all of these
emergency declarations would be unreviewable. Just ask
yourself: What President would willingly give up that kind
of power?
I recognize the concerns about the major questions doc-
trine. But it is not so novel as some have supposed. And
it serves Article I values we all share. My concurring col-
leagues all but endorse it today. I hope past skeptics will
give it another look.
II
Turn now to the second camp. If some have criticized the
major questions doctrine, others have responded by seeking
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to soften its blow. Though joining today's principal opinion
holdi
ng that “clear” statutory authority is required to sus-
tain the exercise of an “extraordinary” power, ante, at 248,
255, Justice Barrett has suggested that the major ques-
tions doctrine might be reconceived. On her view, the doc-
trine need not be understood as a “substantive canon de-
signed to enforce Article I's Vesting Clause”—a “valu[e]
external to a statute.” Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 508, 510 (con-
curring opinion). Instead, the doctrine might be thought of
as a “commonsense principl[e] of communication” that coun-
sels “skepticism” when executive offcials claim extraordi-
nary powers derived from Congress. Id., at 514, 516; see
also post, p. 300 (concurring opinion).
It is a thoughtful effort, but I harbor doubts. For one
thing, there is no need to reconceive our doctrine; past critics
all but apply the doctrine today and their previous criticisms
fall fat. See Part I, supra. For another, this gloss on our
major questions doctrine presents problems. Commonsense
principles of communication do not explain many of our
major questions cases—this one included. And if common
sense really does go so far as to embrace a rule counseling
“skepticism” of claims by executive offcials that Congress
has granted them extraordinary powers, that is common
sense in name only. The reason for such skepticism must be
Article I, a “substantive” source “external” to any statute.
A
Introducing her view that “commonsense principles of
communication” can sometimes help resolve disputes over
the meaning of statutory terms, Justice Barrett points to
an old chestnut. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 512, 514 (concurring
opinion). Suppose a legislature used the phrase “whoever
drew blood in the streets” in a criminal statute imposing
punishment. As a matter of “common sense,” Justice Bar-
rett says, it would “ `g[o] without saying ' ” that the law
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doesn't apply to a surgeon accessing a patient's vein to save
h
is life. Ibid. That is because the phrase “drew blood” is
susceptible to two conventional idiomatic meanings: one “ap-
plicable to violent encounters with man or beast” and the
other “to medical procedures,” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Read-
ing Law 357 (2012) (Scalia & Garner). And any ordinary
person faced with that phrase in a penal law would fnd it
obvious which meaning applies. Ibid.; see also Nebraska,
600 U. S., at 512 (Barrett, J., concurring).
The diffculty is, our major questions cases are different.
Often, little about them “ `goes without saying.' ” Ibid.
Take FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S.
120 (2000). There, the question was whether the FDA could
regulate tobacco products. Id., at 125. Looking only to
common sense, the answer would have been yes. Congress
authorized the FDA to regulate “drugs,” which Congress de-
fned expressly and broadly as “ `articles (other than food)
intended to affect the structure or any function of the body.' ”
Id., at 126. As a matter of common sense, nicotine qualifes
as a “drug ” based on this statutory defnition, as it might
even as a matter of everyday speech. West Virginia, 597
U. S., at 721–722 (noting the “colorable textual basis” for the
executive branch's interpretation in Brown & Williamson).
Still, we held the FDA could not regulate tobacco products.
Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at 159–160.
Other cases follow suit. We have ruled that the term “air
pollutant” does not include greenhouse gases, even though
greenhouse gases pollute the air. Utility Air Regulatory
Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. 302, 316, 323–324 (2014). We have
held that the phrase “ `regulations . . . necessary to prevent
the . . . spread of communicable diseases' ” does not include
eviction moratoriums, even without questioning that eviction
moratoriums were necessary to prevent the spread of
COVID–19, a communicable disease. Alabama Assn. of Re-
altors, 594 U. S., at 761, 764. And we have said that closing
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coal power plants is not the “ `best system of emission reduc-
ti
on,' ” even while acknowledging that closing them would
reduce emissions. West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 721, 732–735.
None of these cases can be readily explained by “common-
sense principles of communication.” Nebraska, 600 U. S., at
514 (Barrett, J., concurring). None involved a phrase like
“drew blood” susceptible to two conventional idiomatic
meanings, one of which any English speaker faced with the
law at issue might quickly rule out. Quite the opposite; in
each case the agency had a strong argument that the statu-
tory language, commonsensically read, granted the power it
claimed. Meanwhile, all our major questions cases can be
easily explained by reference to a rule requiring the execu-
tive branch to identify clear statutory authority when it
claims Congress has granted it an extraordinary power.
And that is a “dice-loading ” rule, plain and simple, one de-
signed to protect Article I, a “[s]ubstantive . . . valu[e] exter-
nal” to the statutory terms at hand. Id., at 508.
Common sense not only fails to explain many of our major
questions cases. It doesn't explain even some of the cases
Justice Barrett has held up as examples of commonsense
cases. In Bond v. United States, 572 U. S. 844 (2014), for
example, the Court confronted a statute that defned “chemi-
cal weapon” to include “ `any chemical which through its
chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.' ”
Id., at 851; see also Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 512–513 (Bar-
rett, J., concurring) (discussing Bond). Despite that broad
defnition, the Court held that “an arsenic-based compound”
didn't ft the bill. Bond, 572 U. S., at 852, 866. To reach
that result, we did not use common sense alone. How could
we have? It hardly goes without saying that arsenic doesn't
qualify as a “chemical” which can cause “ `permanent harm
to humans or animals.' ” Id., at 851; see also id., at 867
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (calling it “beyond doubt”
that the ordinary meaning of the relevant statutory terms
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embraced the chemicals at issue). Instead, we relied on a
clear-st
atement rule grounded in the substance of the Con-
stitution—namely, the federalism canon. Id., at 860 (major-
ity opinion) (“[W]e can insist on a clear indication that Con-
gress meant to reach purely local crimes, before interpreting
the statute's expansive language in a way that intrudes on
the police power of the States”). So Bond may well be like
our major questions cases, but that is only because it applied
a clear-statement rule grounded in another substantive fea-
ture of the Constitution.
Consider as well the babysitter hypothetical Justice Bar-
rett has posed. Imagine a parent of young children who
hands a babysitter a credit card and says, “ `[m]ake sure the
kids have fun.' ” Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 513 (concurring
opinion). Now suppose the babysitter takes the kids on a
road trip to an amusement park, “where they spend two days
on rollercoasters and one night in a hotel.” Ibid. “Was the
babysitter's trip consistent with the parent's instruction?”
Ibid. Justice Barrett believes the answer is likely “no”
as a matter of common sense. See id., at 513–514.
Really, though, unless one is to believe children do not
“have fun” on rollercoasters and at hotels, the babysitter hy-
pothetical can be explained only with reference to some “ex-
ternal” and “substantive” norm. Id., at 508, 513. And, in
fact, just such a norm is baked into the babysitter hypotheti-
cal—one we encountered in Part I–B, supra. The babysit-
ter is exercising authority the parents have delegated to her.
She is acting as their agent. As a result, one might expect
a clear statement from the parents before the babysitter may
do something extraordinary, like take the kids on a road trip.
This substantive norm about delegated powers not only
lurks beneath the surface of the babysitter hypothetical, it
“ `loads the dice' ” against her. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 510
(Barrett, J., concurring). Doubtless, she would see it that
way. The babysitter would argue that a trip to an amuse-
ment park is “fun.” And she would be right under a com-
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monsense understanding of the word. But because the
babysitter
is exercising delegated authority, she cannot exer-
cise such an extraordinary power without clear authorization
for it.
Notice, too, the same outcome is no longer guaranteed
when we remove the delegated power feature. If one par-
ent leaves the children with the other parent, the trip to the
amusement park might well be fne. No other contextual
clues are needed. See id., at 516 (agreeing with this). So
if the answer to the babysitter hypothetical seems a matter
of common sense to many Americans, that is only because
the substantive norms associated with parental delegations
to babysitter agents are so deeply rooted in our society. Say
the same instruction were given to a babysitter in a commu-
nity where children are raised collectively, like a kibbutz.
Same answer? Hardly obvious.
1
B
To be sure, in places Justice Barrett concedes that her
gloss on the major questions doctrine requires resort to
something more than “common sense” instincts about what
would “ `g[o] without saying ' ” to an ordinary English
speaker. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 512 (concurring opinion);
see also post, at 301. Sometimes, she suggests, common sense
doesn't just help illuminate the “most natural” meaning of an
idiomatic term like “drew blood” based on its presence in a
penal law. 600 U. S., at 508. Sometimes, she says, “com-
1
Today, Justice Barrett protests that the foregoing discussion “takes
down a straw man.” Post, at 301 (concurring opinion). But it was Jus-
tice Barrett who previously wrote that the major questions doctrine
“grows out of . . . commonsense principles of communication.” Biden v.
Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477, 514 (2023) (same). And it was Justice Barrett
who used the various illustrations recounted above to suggest that our
major questions decisions can be explained by reference to the kind of
“common sense . . . that `goes without saying.' ” Id., at 512. If Justice
Barrett now means to put all that to the fame, the major questions
doctrine is better for it.
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monsense principles of communication” go much further.
Id
., at 514. So much so that they wind up dictating a rule
counseling “skepticism” of executive claims to extraordinary
delegated powers. Id., at 516. Why? Because, Justice
Barrett says, a “reasonable observer” consults “our consti-
tutional structure.” Id., at 515, 520. But if that's true, this
version of common sense does require us to account for “val-
ues” entirely “external to a statute,” including specifcally
the “substan[ce]” of Article I. Id., at 508. And in so doing,
this expanded version of common sense just becomes the
substantive major questions doctrine by another name.
Today's decision illustrates the point. The principal opin-
ion gestures at “common sense.” Ante, at 243. But
throughout, this “common sense” is linked to “ `constitutional
structure' ” and “ `separation of powers principles.' ” Ibid.
The principal opinion begins with the Constitution, observ-
ing that Article I vests the tariff power in Congress, not the
executive branch. Ante, at 240–241. The principal opinion
recounts the President's claim that Congress has “delegated”
an “extraordinary” amount of its tariff power to him in
IEEPA. Ante, at 243–244. And from there, the principal
opinion proceeds to apply a clear-statement rule. It ac-
knowledges that the ordinary meaning of the key statutory
term in IEEPA—the word “regulate”—is capacious, so much
so that it could be understood to “captur[e] much of what a
government does.” Ante, at 249. Still, the principal opin-
ion reasons, that is not enough to sustain the President's
claim because the statute does not “clear[ly]” grant him the
“extraordinary” delegated power he seeks. Ante, at 248,
255. When it comes down to it, common sense serves as
little more than a segue to Article I's Vesting Clause.
That is as it must be. The statutory terms contain no
ambiguity we could use (or need) “commonsense principles
of communication” to resolve. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 514
(Barrett, J., concurring). This case is nothing like the
“ `drew blood' ” illustration, where it might “ `g[o] without
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saying ' ” that any ordinary person would immediately under-
st
and which of two idiomatic meanings a penal statute em-
ployed. Id., at 512. Indeed, today's principal opinion does
not even “attempt to set forth the metes and bounds” of
IEEPA's key phrase “ `regulate . . . importation,' ” ante, at
250, much less fnd the “best” or “most natural” meaning of
those words, Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 508, 521 (Barrett, J.,
concurring); post, at 300. Instead, we need go no further
than to recognize that IEEPA fails to “clear[ly]” authorize
tariffs. Ante, at 248, 255. And the only reason we can stop
there is because Article I—a “[s]ubstantive . . . valu[e] external
to a statute,” 600 U. S., at 508 (Barrett, J., concurring)—
imposes a clear-statement rule when executive offcials claim
Congress has afforded them an extraordinary authority.
There's another problem too. The equivocati on on
whether “commonsense principles of communication” include
only those things that might “go without saying,” or also
include “external” and “substantive” Article I “values,” leads
to a further equivocation on how much “skepticism” common
sense might dictate when assessing an executive offcial's
claim to an extraordinary delegated power. Common sense,
we are told, does not impose a “ `clarity tax,' ” but it does
add an “expectation of clarity.” Id., at 508, 514. Common
sense does not “ `loa[d] the dice,' ” but it does counsel “skepti-
cism.” Id., at 510–511, 516. Common sense means never
“forgo[ing] the most natural reading of a statute,” post, at
302, but it always means “expect[ing that] Congress [will]
make the big-time policy calls,” post, at 301 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). I am uncertain what to make of this,
except that it seems to toggle between a clear-statement
rule and nothing at all.
2
2
To the extent Justice Barrett suggests any skepticism “common-
sense principles of communication” might (or might not) advise derives
from a “ `practical understanding of legislative intent,' ” rather than “ex-
ternal” and “substantive” Article I “values,” that poses still further (and
familiar) problems. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 508, 515 (concurring opinion)
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I am certain of one thing: Our cases hold a clear statement
is
required to support a claim to an extraordinary delegated
power. We required Congress to “speak clearly” in Utility
Air, 573 U. S., at 324. We demanded “clear congressional
authorization” in NFIB, 595 U. S., at 118. We did the same
in Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 506, and in West Virginia, 597
U. S., at 732, and we do so again today, ante, at 248. Nor do
I see cause for being quite so reluctant about acknowledging
this. The common law recognized many clear-statement
rules. See, e. g., Part I–B, supra. Our own cases have
applied a host of Constitution-enforcing clear-statement
rules as well. We just encountered the federalism clear-
statement rule in Bond. Add to the list clear-statement
rules against laws that might apply retroactively, waive or
abrogate sovereign immunity, or create enforceable rights
under the Taxing Clause—to name just a few. See, e. g.,
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 265–268
(1994); Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for P. R.
v. Centro De Periodismo Investigativo, Inc., 598 U. S. 339,
346–347 (2023); Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlan-
tic, 606 U. S. 357, 383–384, n. 8 (2025). Maybe all these rules
could be recast as “common sense”—at least if common sense
means taking account of the “external” and “substantive”
(quoting West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 723 (2022)). Down that road
lie all the pitfalls associated with reliance on legislative history and those
associated with confating unenacted legislative intent with the law.
Scalia & Garner 397; post, p. 301 (Jackson, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in judgment). Similar problems attend the notion that the appro-
priate degree of skepticism due a delegation might turn on what people
“expect.” Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 514, 520 (Barrett, J., concurring); see
also post, at 301 (same). Justice Barrett has offered no evidence about
what people “expect” when confronted with different congressional dele-
gations. And to the extent she believes their “expectations” would refect
an appropriate consideration of the whole “ `corpus juris,' including the
Constitution,” post, at 301, n. 1, that just circles us right back to the “ex-
ternal” and “substantive” Article I “values” she strives so hard to sideline,
see Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 508 (Barrett, J., concurring).
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“values” found in “our constitutional structure.” Nebraska,
600
U. S., at 508, 515 (Barrett, J., concurring). But what-
ever the label, it hardly requires some “judicial fex,” post,
at 304, to recognize that the “external” constitutional “val-
ues” at stake in our major questions cases are no less
weighty than those at play in other settings where we rou-
tinely apply a clear-statement rule.
3
III
That brings us to the third camp. My dissenting col-
leagues have defended the major questions doctrine in the
past, and they do so again today. Post, at 359–361 (opinion
of Kavanaugh, J.). They agree that the doctrine is
grounded in the Constitution. Post, at 360. They agree that
the doctrine requires us to deviate from “ `routine' ” statutory
interpretation principles and instead place a “thumb on the
scale,” one requiring executive offcials to identify “ `clear' ”
congressional authorization when they seek to exercise some
“major” power. Post, at 361. But, my colleagues say,
IEEPA provides the clear statement needed to sustain the
President's tariffs. Post, at 366–373. Alternatively, they
submit, we shouldn't apply the major questions doctrine to any
statute, like IEEPA, that implicates “foreign affairs.” Post,
at 373–377. And this exception, they add, is particularly war-
ranted here because Congress has historically granted the
President large discretion in setting tariffs. Post, at 377–
3
Notably, past critics of the major questions doctrine have not hesitated
to apply many of these clear-statement rules. See Financial Oversight
and Management Bd. for P. R. v. Centro De Periodismo Investigativo,
Inc., 598 U. S. 339, 346–347 (2023) (opinion for the Court by Kagan, J.);
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369, 455–456, n. 1 (2024)
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (collecting examples); West Virginia, 597 U. S., at
751, n. 7 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (same). Nor have they hesitated to
adopt and apply other clear-statement rules with far less grounding in the
Constitution than the major questions doctrine. See, e. g., Bowe v. United
States, 607 U. S. 13, 26–27 (2026); id., at 57–61 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting);
Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U. S. 199, 208 (2022).
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380. Once again, the points are thoughtful and merit care-
fu
l consideration.
A
My dissenting colleagues begin by taking the major ques-
tions doctrine as they fnd it. They accept that the Presi-
dent's challenged actions are “of major economic and political
signifcance.” Post, at 361. They accept as well that he
must identify “clear” congressional authorization to sustain
those actions. Ibid. Still, the dissent maintains, IEEPA
clearly grants the President the tariff power he asserts.
To arrive at that conclusion, the dissent consults four clues
we have sometimes employed in our major questions cases to
help assess whether a statute clearly authorizes an asserted
power. See West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 746 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring). The dissent formulates these clues largely as
I would. See post, at 363–366. But, to my eyes, the dissent
engages in a little grade infation when applying them.
First, is the President seeking to exercise an “unheralded”
or “newfound” power based on a “long-extant” statute?
Post, at 366 (internal quotation marks omitted). The dis-
sent insists that is not the case here because President Nixon
imposed a 10 percent tariff on most imports in 1971, and then
defended that action in lower courts under a predecessor to
IEEPA, the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA). Post,
367. But the words “regulate . . . importation” were added
to TWEA in 1941. § 301(1)(B), 55 Stat. 839. Congress used
the same language in IEEPA in 1977. § 203(a)(1)(B), 91
Stat. 1626. And in the 85 years of TWEA's existence with
that language (and the 49 years of IEEPA's), that is the only
time either statute has been invoked to impose tariffs.
Ante, at 245–246, 252–253. A single time, and one never tes-
ted in this Court. Nor are these statutes seldom used.
“Each year since 1990, Presidents have issued roughly 4.5 ex-
ecutive orders . . . and declared 1.5 new national emergencies
citing IEEPA.” Congressional Research Service, The Inter-
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tion, and Use 20 (Sept. 1, 2025). That is pretty strong evi-
dence
the President here seeks to “deploy an old statute” in
a novel way. West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 747 (Gorsuch,
J., concurring).
Second, how has the executive branch interpreted IEEPA
in the past? Post, at 367–368. The dissent says Presidents
have long understood IEEPA to permit them to impose tar-
iffs. Ibid. But for support, the dissent again relies on iso-
lated evidence about other statutes. It points to the mone-
tary exactions President Ford ordered under the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962. Post, at 345, 368. And, once more,
it points to President Nixon's invocation of TWEA to support
his 1971 tariffs during lower court proceedings (though the
dissent brushes aside the fact that President Nixon initially
rejected the idea of relying on TWEA, see Brief for Carla
Hills et al. as Amici Curiae 12–14). Whatever one makes
of this history, it hardly reveals the kind of contemporaneous
and consistent executive interpretation that might advance
the dissent's cause. See West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 747
(Gorsuch, J., concurring). To the contrary, the fact that no
President until now has invoked IEEPA to impose a duty—
even one percent on one product from one country—is tell-
ing. Id., at 748.
Third, is there a “mismatch” between the action the execu-
tive offcial seeks to take and his expertise? Post, at 368.
On this one, I agree with the dissent. If tariffs fall in any
executive offcial's “wheelhouse” (and not Congress's), it's the
President's. Ibid.; see also supra, at 260.
Fourth, is the President “relying on oblique, elliptical, or
cryptic language”? Post, at 369. The dissent says no be-
cause “[t]his case does not involve elephants in mouseholes.”
Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Put another way,
the dissent insists, the provisions of IEEPA before us are
not “ancillary” ones, but are designed to convey signifcant
powers. Post, at 370 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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It's a fair enough point as far as it goes. But our cases ask
not
just whether a provision is a “mousehole” or “ancillary.”
They also caution against reading extraordinary powers into
“broad or general” statutory language. West Virginia, 597
U. S., at 746 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U. S. 277,
291 (2011) (“[C]lear statement rules ensure Congress does
not, by broad or general language, legislate on a sensitive
topic inadvertently or without due deliberation” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, and as we have seen,
many of our major questions cases have found broad or gen-
eral terms in signifcant statutes insuffcient to support a
claim to an extraordinary or unusual power. See Part I–A,
supra. And here, the word “regulate” is broad as can be.
So broad that it could be read to “captur[e] much of what a
government does.” Ante, at 249.
As I see it, then, three of the four clues the dissent relies
on cut against it. It is important to add, as well, that as
helpful as these clues can be in helping courts spot when a
claimed power is not supported by clear statutory authority,
they do not represent some exhaustive checklist, nor does
satisfying one guarantee a claim will succeed. So, for exam-
ple, even if an asserted power is in the agency's “wheel-
house,” we might rule (and have ruled) against the agency
if the power is “unheralded” because the statute has stood
for decades without being interpreted to convey the power
claimed. See, e. g., Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at 144,
159–160.
Ultimately, the central question in any major questions
case remains whether the executive branch's claim to an ex-
traordinary power is supported by clear statutory authority.
And, as the principal opinion explains at length, many addi-
tional clues beyond those the dissent addresses confrm that
the President cannot meet that standard in this case. These
additional clues include the way the key statutory term “reg-
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ulate” is used elsewhere in the U. S. Code, how Congress has
delegated
tariff authority in the past, and other neighboring
language in IEEPA itself. Ante, at 249–250.
Contrary to the dissent's charge, too, the principal opin-
ion's application of the major questions doctrine today in no
way amounts to a “magic words test.” Post, at 372. Of
course, if IEEPA included terms like “tariff ” or “duty,” that
would have suffced. But, to borrow a phrase from the dis-
sent, “monetary exactions on foreign imports” would have
worked just as well. Post, at 345. Same goes for “tax on
imported goods.” Or any similarly clear term or phrase.
But IEEPA includes no such language, just a broad term
that could cover almost anything a government does. And
requiring specifc rather than general language is just how
clear-statement rules work. See, e. g., Sossamon, 563 U. S.,
at 291.
B
If the President's claim fails under our usual major ques-
tions test, the dissent says we should respond by carving out
an exception to it for cases (like this one) touching on “for-
eign affairs.” Post, at 373.
On this score, I share a limited point of agreement with
the dissent. Like the nondelegation doctrine, the major
questions doctrine protects Article I's Vesting Clause and,
for that reason, the doctrine does not apply where the Presi-
dent is exercising only his own inherent Article II powers.
Like the nondelegation doctrine, too, the major questions
doctrine may speak with less force where the President and
Congress enjoy “overlap[ping] . . . authority.” See Gundy
v. United States, 588 U. S. 128, 159 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dis-
senting); see also C. Bradley & J. Goldsmith, Foreign Affairs,
Nondelegation, and the Major Questions Doctrine, 172 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1743, 1747 (2024) (Bradley & Goldsmith) (explaining
the “supposed foreign affairs exception” to the nondelegation
doctrine “is better understood as a qualifcation that con-
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cerns situations in which a statutory authorization relates to
an
independent presidential power”).
Doubtless, cases implicating overlapping powers can arise
in the feld of foreign affairs. The Constitution, for example,
vests in Congress the power to raise and regulate armies,
but it also vests in the President the commander-in-chief
power. Compare Art. I, § 8, cls. 12–14, with Art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
Similarly, Congress enjoys the power to regulate foreign
commerce, but the President has power to negotiate treaties
and nominate ambassadors. Compare Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, with
Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The President may even enjoy some “re-
sidual” powers pertaining to foreign affairs under Article II's
Vesting Clause endowing him with the “executive Power.”
See S. Prakash & M. Ramsey, The Executive Power Over
Foreign Affairs, 111 Yale L. J. 231, 234 (2001) (Prakash &
Ramsey); but see C. Bradley & M. Flaherty, Executive
Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 Mich. L. Rev.
545, 551–552 (2004). Given all this, it is easy enough to
imagine statutes and disputes under them that implicate
both congressional and presidential powers where we might
have reason to question whether the major questions doc-
trine applies with its usual force.
The problem for the dissent is that none of this is relevant
here. Before us, the President concedes that he does not
enjoy independent Article II authority to impose tariffs in
peacetime. Ante, at 253. Nor does the President claim
“ `concurrent' ” constitutional authority to issue his tariffs.
Ante, at 247–248 (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. 70–71). Instead, and
to his credit, the President admits the power to authorize
tariffs in peacetime is constitutionally vested in “Congress
alone.” Ante, at 248 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Therefore, the President relies entirely on power derived
from Congress, and that means the major questions doctrine
applies in the normal way. See Bradley & Goldsmith 1796
(“IEEPA [is] not [an] authorizatio[n] that obviously connect[s]
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to independent presidential power in ways that would war-
rant
the independent powers qualifcation”).
Because of this problem, the dissent must argue for a much
broader “foreign affairs” qualifcation to the major questions
doctrine. Rather than ask whether an independent, consti-
tutionally vested presidential power is implicated, the dis-
sent would have us ask instead whether the President seeks
to use the statute in question for a foreign affairs purpose—
for example, as a “too[l]” to “incentivize a change in behavior
by allies . . . or enemies.” Post, at 377. When he does,
the dissent submits, the major questions doctrine should not
apply. And that's true, the dissent continues, even if the
power the President asserts has “signifcant domestic rami-
fcations.” Post, at 379.
This new exception to the major questions doctrine would
have (enormous) consequences hard to reconcile with the
Constitution. Article I, § 8, vests in Congress many powers
that touch on “foreign affairs.” Some of those powers were
expected to be (and are) the “principal objects of federal leg-
islation.” The Federalist No. 53, p. 333 (C. Rossiter ed.
1961) (J. Madison). They include not only the power to im-
pose tariffs, cl. 1, but also the power to establish uniform
rules of naturalization, cl. 4, appropriate money for armies,
cl. 12, and defne and punish offenses against the law of na-
tions, cl. 10. Under the dissent's view, all these legislative
powers and more could be passed wholesale to the executive
branch in a few loose statutory terms, no matter what do-
mestic ramifcations might follow. And, as we have seen,
Congress would often fnd these powers nearly impossible to
retrieve. See Part I–C, supra.
Consider an example. Imagine Congress adopted a law
that arguably could be read to let the President borrow and
spend money during peacetime as he sees ft. A law like
that would represent an extraordinary delegation of Con-
gress's power both to borrow “on the credit of the United
States,” Art. I, § 8, cl. 2, and to spend money in support of
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the “general Welfare,” § 8, cl. 1, and would carry with it “sig-
ni
fcant domestic ramifcations,” post, at 379. But if an en-
terprising executive could also use the law as a “tool” for
affecting the behavior of “allies . . . or enemies,” the dissent
seemingly would have us exempt it from scrutiny under the
major questions doctrine.
The dissent's exception is so broad it's hard not to wonder
how it fts with some of our existing major questions prece-
dents. In West Virginia, the Court applied the major ques-
tions doctrine over a dissent expressing concern that doing
so would deny the EPA (and therefore the President) the
power to respond to “the most pressing environmental chal-
lenge of our time”—“[c]limate chang[e].” 597 U. S., at 753
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A challenge, the dissent continued, that threatened conse-
quences global in scope, including “mass migration events[,]
political crises, civil unrest, and even state failure.” Id., at
754 (internal quotation marks omitted). Was West Virginia
a “foreign affairs” case? How about our major questions
cases addressing efforts to combat the global pandemic that
was COVID–19? See, e. g., NFIB, 595 U. S., at 114.
4
Seeking support for its sweeping new exception, the dissent
points to three main precedents. Post, at 374–376, 381–384.
4
The dissent suggests that trying to identify when an independent Arti-
cle II authority is in play would prove “jurisprudentially chaotic.” Post,
at 380, n. 23. But as the foregoing discussion illustrates, the dissent's
alternative “foreign affairs” test poses its own challenges. And it seems
to me only one is frmly rooted in the text of the Constitution. See Brad-
ley & Goldsmith 1747; see also Prakash & Ramsey 233 (“[O]ne would think
that the Constitution's text ought to play the preeminent role in discerning
the Constitution's allocation of foreign affairs powers”). In this case, too,
only one test promises any manner of “chao[s]” because all parties before
us readily agree that the Constitution affords the President no independ-
ent power to impose peacetime tariffs. See H. Powell, The President's
Authority Over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 67
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 527, 549 (1999) (“The President has no independent
power directly to regulate [or] tax . . . foreign commerce”).
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I do not see how any of them might sustain its view. The
frst,
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507 (2004), concerned the
2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), legis-
lation which authorized the President to use “all necessary
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations,
or persons” responsible for the September 11, 2001, attacks.
Id., at 510 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). The dissent highlights the principal opinion's conclu-
sion that the AUMF allowed the President to detain enemy
combatants even though the law did not mention that power
expressly. Id., at 510, 516–517. And from this, the dissent
draws the inference that any statute addressing foreign af-
fairs should be exempt from scrutiny under the major ques-
tions doctrine. Post, at 381–382. But the dissent overlooks
the fact that the principal opinion reached the conclusion it
did only because it found detention of enemy combatants to
be a traditional “incident to war.” 542 U. S., at 518. And
once Congress declares war (or, likewise, authorizes the use
of military force abroad), that implicates the President's
commander-in-chief powers. Put simply, Hamdi was a case
of overlapping powers. Ours is not.
Second, the dissent invokes Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U. S. 654 (1981). See post, at 382–383. At its heart, that
case involved an executive order by President Reagan sus-
pending certain claims by U. S. citizens against Iran as part
of a settlement involving the release of American hostages
held there. 453 U. S., at 675. Just as we do today, Dames &
Moore held that the “terms of the IEEPA . . . d[id] not au-
thorize” the President's actions. Ibid. Even so, the Court
proceeded to uphold those actions anyway, and did so based
in part on its view (right or wrong) that the President en-
joyed some “ `independent' ” power to “enter into executive
agreements” suspending certain claims. Id., at 678, 682–
683. So unlike our case, Dames & Moore again involved
overlapping powers. Along the way, too, the Court empha-
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sized (repeatedly) the “narrowness” of its decision and that
it
should not be taken to “lay down” any “general `guidelines'
covering other situations not involved here.” Id., at 661; see
also id., at 660, 688. To derive from Dames & Moore a new
general guideline exempting “foreign affairs” cases from the
major questions doctrine's reach would thus require us to
disregard its own cautionary direction.
Third, the dissent cites United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936). See post, at 374–375.
There, the Court did suggest that nondelegation rules in the
feld of “domestic or internal affairs” should differ from those
in the realm of “foreign or external affairs.” Curtiss-
Wright, 299 U. S., at 315. But what should we make of that
language? If it means that the nondelegation doctrine (and
perhaps, by extension, the major questions doctrine) must
account for the President's independent Article II powers,
I agree.
But I would hesitate to read more into the decision than
that. Consider what was really at issue there. A statute
permitted the President to ban the transfer of one class of
goods (armaments). Id., at 312. It did so with respect to
two countries then engaged in a war (Bolivia and Paraguay).
Ibid. The President's authority was conditioned on a fnd-
ing that a ban “ `may contribute to the reestablishment of
peace between those countries.' ” Ibid. Before making
that fnding, too, Congress directed him to consult “ `with
the governments of other American Republics.' ” Ibid. All
told, then, the statute set forth the policy for the President
to pursue. It bounded his authority by limiting his options
with respect to a limited class of goods and countries. The
statute further conditioned his exercise of those options on a
factual fnding reached after consultation with other nations.
So whatever else might be said about Curtiss-Wright, one
thing is apparent: In upholding the President's actions under
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hand off all of its enumerated powers touching on foreign
affairs
to the President, the tariff power included.
5
C
If its effort to secure a broad foreign affairs exception to
the major questions doctrine won't work, the dissent hints
at a more limited one specifc to tariffs. Such an exception
makes sense, the dissent says, because “Presidents have long
been granted substantial discretion over tariffs.” Post, at
379 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the dissent
contends, this tradition traces “back to near the Founding.”
Post, at 386–387. If the dissent were right about that, one
might hesitate before accepting the President's concession
that this case does not implicate any inherent Article II au-
thority. But, at least as I read it, history offers the dissent
little to work with.
Americans fought the Revolution in no small part because
they believed that only their elected representatives (not the
King, not even Parliament) possessed authority to tax them.
Declaration of Independence ¶19. And, they believed, that
held true not just for direct taxes like those in the Stamp
Act, but also for many duties on imports, like those found in
the Sugar Act. E. Morgan & H. Morgan, The Stamp Act
Crisis: Prologue to Revolution 72–74 (1995 ed.); see 1 E.
Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth
Century 60 (1903) (Stanwood); C. Van Tyne, The Causes of
the War of Independence 126–136 (1922); J. Otis, The Rights
of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved (1764), in The
5
In places, the dissent also argues that the President's inherent Article
II authority includes a wartime tariff power. See post, at 351–353; see
also Brief for Professor Aditya Bamzai as Amicus Curiae 3. But this
only highlights the dissent's bind. Whatever the full scope of the Presi-
dent's Article II war powers may be (and the briefs before us reveal a
healthy debate whether they include the power to impose tariffs), those
powers are not implicated here. IEEPA is not a wartime statute, nor
does the President claim we are at war with the countries whose goods
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Collected Political Writings of James Otis 119, 161–162
(2015);
see also id., at xii (Introduction).
Americans later codifed these beliefs in the Constitution.
Under the Articles of Confederation, the national govern-
ment was laden with debt and enjoyed few ways to repay it.
To address that problem, the framers afforded the federal
government new taxing powers in the Constitution. Art.
I, § 8, cl. 1. Many thought these powers among “the most
important” features of the new federal charter. See, e. g.,
The Federalist No. 33, at 202–203 (A. Hamilton). But, con-
sistent with their view that only the people's elected repre-
sentatives could constitutionally tax them, the framers gave
Congress alone “access to the pockets of the people.” Id.,
No. 48, at 310 (J. Madison). And to cement that role, the
Constitution required that “All Bills for raising Revenue
shall originate in the House of Representatives,” the body
most responsive to the people. Art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
For much of the Nation's history, this taxing power was
essentially a tariff power. The framers even considered
(and eventually rejected) the possibility of giving the federal
government the power to tax only through tariffs. The
Federalist No. 35, at 211 (A. Hamilton). No surprise, then,
that Congress's frst exercise of its taxing power was a tariff
law. P. Ashley, Modern Tariff History 170–171 (2d ed. 1910).
And until the 20th century, tariffs “accounted for between
50 and 90 percent” of the federal government's revenue. J.
Dobson, Two Centuries of Tariffs: The Background and
Emergence of the United States International Trade Com-
mission 1 (1976).
How did Congress exercise its all-important tariff power?
It debated every detail of the frst tariff Act. Stanwood 39–
71. Ultimately, Congress said, imported malt would incur a
charge of 10 cents a bushel. Brown sugar one cent. Loaf
sugar three cents. And so on. Id., at 59. The frst tariff
Act was set to last for seven years. Id., at 72. It lasted
barely one. Ibid. Soon, Congress was at it again, laying
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out another exacting schedule of duties. Id., at 75–76.
Throughout
much of the 19th century, Congress proceeded
similarly, enacting highly detailed tariff schedules one after
another. See F. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United
States 68–170 (8th ed. 1931).
An early debate over executive involvement in setting tar-
iffs demonstrates just how strongly Congress felt that tariffs
were a legislative business. In December 1791, President
Washington told Congress that General St. Clair had been
defeated in the Northwest Indian War, and the country
would have to increase the size of the army. Stanwood 104.
That meant the government needed more money. In re-
sponse, a resolution was offered in the House of Representa-
tives to solicit advice from the Secretary of the Treasury,
Alexander Hamilton, on the best way to raise the additional
revenue—including through new tariffs. 3 Annals of Con-
gress 437 (1792); Stanwood 105–106. Ultimately, Hamilton's
advice was sought, but only after a debate over the constitu-
tionality of even asking a member of the executive branch for
advice on raising revenue. Ibid.; 3 Annals of Congress 447.
To be sure, on later occasions Congress turned to the exec-
utive branch for more help still. But it usually did so to
address changing trade practices in foreign countries. And
in doing so, Congress set the important policies, with the
executive branch responsible for fnding facts—like what
other countries' trade policies were at any given moment—
or flling in the details. So, for example, Congress passed a
statute in 1815 to repeal any “discriminating duty of tonnage
. . . whenever the President” was “satisfed” that other coun-
tries' “discriminating or countervailing duties” had “been
abolished.” Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 77, 3 Stat. 224; see also,
e. g., Act of Jan. 7, 1824, 4 Stat. 2–3.
Given this history, it's no surprise that the dissent relies
mostly on statutes and cases after 1890. Post, at 386–387.
But even they do little to support its claim. J. W. Hampton,
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involved a law instructing the President to “investigat[e]”
the
costs of production for American frms and their foreign
counterparts and issue tariffs to “equalize” those costs. Id.,
at 401, 409 (internal quotation marks omitted). The statute
the Court faced in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S.
649, 681 (1892), spoke similarly. Even when Federal Energy
Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U. S. 548, came
along in 1976, the Court upheld President Ford's imposition
of monetary exactions on a single class of products under
a statute that provided at least some guidance about how
he should implement the law. Id., at 559. And whether
correctly decided or not, that case lies a far step from this
one.
Before us, the President insists he may use IEEPA to
equalize foreign and domestic duties—or not. He may use
it to negotiate with foreign countries—or not. He may set
tariffs at 1 percent or 1,000,000 percent. He may target one
nation and one product or every nation and nearly every
product. And he may change his mind at any time for
nearly any reason. At least as I see it, history dating “back
to near the Founding,” post, at 386–387, does not support the
notion that Presidents have traditionally enjoyed so much
power. More nearly, history refutes it.
6
6
Beyond the major questions hurdle, the dissent faces another, related
one: the nondelegation doctrine. There the problems are just as acute.
In recent decades, this Court has employed a relatively lax “intelligible
principle” test to police delegations. See FCC v. Consumers' Research,
606 U. S. 656, 673 (2025); cf. Gundy v. United States, 588 U. S. 128, 157–
159 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing for a more traditional test).
But recognizing that even the intelligible principle test poses challenges
for it, the dissent contends for an even laxer test yet in cases involving
“foreign affairs” and tariffs. Post, at 385–388. It's an effort that fails for
reasons we have just seen. Even if the nondelegation doctrine should
apply differently when congressional legislation and executive actions im-
plicate inherent Article II powers, Gundy, 588 U. S., at 159, none of that
means it should do so where (as here) the President derives whatever
authority he has only from Congress.
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IV
That
leaves one fnal camp to consider. Justice Thomas
suggests that Congress may hand over most of its constitu-
tionally vested powers to the President completely and for-
ever. Post, at 314–315 (dissenting opinion). On his view,
the only powers Congress may not delegate are those that
involve “rules setting the conditions for deprivations of life,
liberty, or property.” Post, at 314. From this rule, it fol-
lows that Congress may give all its tariff powers to the Pres-
ident because “[i]mporting is a matter of privilege.” Post,
at 323. And, as a result, this case does not implicate any
“ ` “separation of powers” ' ” concerns at all. Post, at 315
(quoting ante, at 243).
It's a sweeping theory. One that would require us to re-
imagine much of our case law addressing Article I's Vesting
Clause. And one that presents diffculties of its own.
First, I do not see how Justice Thomas's theory resolves
all “ ` “separation of powers” ' ” concerns in this case. Post,
at 315 (quoting ante, at 243). Suppose for argument's sake
that Congress can delegate its tariff powers to the President
as completely as Justice Thomas suggests. Even then, the
question remains whether Congress has given the President
the tariff authority he claims in this case—or whether the
President is seeking to exploit questionable statutory lan-
guage to aggrandize his own power. See Part I–C, supra.
Put another way, Justice Thomas's nondelegation solution
does not automatically solve the major questions problem.
As we have seen, when an executive offcial claims Congress
has delegated to him some extraordinary power, the major
questions doctrine requires him to identify clear statutory au-
thority for its exercise—a standard he must satisfy even if
Congress is free to pass to him the power he seeks. Post, at
314–315. In fact, this Court has previously applied, with our
colleague's assent, the major questions doctrine in a case that
appears, under his present view, to involve a power that Con-
gress could delegate wholesale to the President. See Ne-
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braska, 600 U. S., at 486–488 (involving the power to cancel
federa
l student loan debts, which on Justice Thomas's ac-
count presumably qualifes as a beneft or privilege, not a
right to life, liberty, or property). And, just as the major
questions doctrine precluded the executive branch's asser-
tion of power in that case, it does so here.
Second, even when it comes to the nondelegation doctrine,
Justice Thomas's theory raises many questions. I appreci-
ate that the doctrine may apply with less force in certain
areas, such as when Congress legislates in a way that impli-
cates one of the President's inherent powers. See Part III–
B, supra; Gundy, 588 U. S., at 159 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
But Justice Thomas would go much further. On his tell-
ing, the doctrine applies only to Congress's true legislative
powers, which he says include only those powers addressing
the deprivation of life, liberty, or property. As it turns out,
only a small subset of Congress's enumerated powers in Arti-
cle I, § 8, ft that bill. See post, at 318 (listing the powers to
punish counterfeiters, tax “internal[ly],” and regulate inter-
state commerce). Only those few powers are exclusively
vested in Congress and subject to review of any kind under
the nondelegation doctrine. All “other kinds of power[s]”
enumerated in Article I, § 8—including the powers to borrow
and spend money, declare war, and regulate foreign trade—
are not truly legislative and may be delegated at will. Post,
at 314. So Congress may hand them off to the President
completely and he has no need to worry about legal chal-
lenges under even this Court's (relatively lax) nondelegation
doctrine. No matter, too, that Congress might fnd itself
permanently unable to retrieve these powers. See Part
I–C, supra.
But if all that's true, what do we make of the Constitution's
text? Section 1 of Article I vests “[a]ll legislative Powers
herein granted” in Congress and no one else. Section 8 pro-
ceeds to list those powers in detail and without differentia-
tion. Neither provision speaks of some divide between true

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legislative powers touching on “life, liberty, or property”
that
are permanently vested in Congress alone and “other
kinds of power[s]” that may be given away and possibly lost
forever to the President. Post, at 314.
What do we make, too, of what the founders said about
Article I both before and after the Constitution's ratifcation?
They regularly referred to powers in Article I, § 8—even
those that do not touch on life, liberty, or property—as legis-
lative in nature. At the Constitutional Convention, early
drafts described the powers to regulate “foreign” commerce,
“raise armies,” “equip Fleets,” “coi[n] . . . money,” and “es-
tablish post-offces” as “legislative powers.” 2 The Records
of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 142–144 (M. Farrand
ed. 1966) (Farrand). James Madison wrote to Congress in
1817 that “[t]he legislative powers vested in Congress are
specifed and enumerated in the eighth section of the frst
article of the Constitution.” 8 The Writings of James Madi-
son 386 (G. Hunt ed. 1908); see also 1 id., at 112, 133, 381
(noting, before the Constitutional Convention, the “legisla-
tive power over captures,” and arguing borrowing money is
an “exclusive power of Legislation”).
Alexander Hamilton spoke similarly. 3 The Works of Al-
exander Hamilton 479 (H. Lodge ed. 1904) (Lodge) (discuss-
ing “[t]he legislative power of borrowing money”); 6 id., at
182 (describing “the legislative power of regulating trade
with foreign nations”); 2 id., at 197, 198 (calling of “the legis-
lative kind” and “of a legislative nature” the powers to raise
money and troops, “establish rules in all cases of capture by
sea or land,” “regulate the alloy and value of coin,” and
“make all laws for the government of the army and navy”).
So did James Wilson. 1 Collected Works of James Wilson
268 (K. Hall & D. Hall eds. 2007) (describing all the Senate's
powers as “legislative powers,” with the exception of the
powers to try impeachments, concur in treaties, and consent
to the appointment of offcers, matters addressed outside
Art. I, § 8).

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What do we make as well of early congressional debates?
In
the Second Congress, for example, the House of Repre-
sentatives rejected on nondelegation grounds a proposal to
give the President a largely unfettered power to establish
postal routes, even though doing so hardly would have
touched on life, liberty, or property. 3 Annals of Congress
229–242. In the Fifth Congress, four Representatives like-
wise objected on nondelegation grounds to a bill that author-
ized the President to raise an army of up to 10,000 men. 8
id., at 1525–1527, 1532, 1535 (remarks of Reps. Nicholas, Gal-
latin, Baldwin, and McDowell). Though the bill ultimately
passed, see Act of May 28, 1798, 1 Stat. 558, it did so appar-
ently because it was deemed not to violate Article I's nondel-
egation principle—no Member of Congress responded that
the principle was wholly inapplicable because the delegated
power was not one that involved setting conditions for depri-
vations of life, liberty, or property. See 8 Annals of Con-
gress 1525–1542.
What are we to do, too, with this Court's nondelegation
precedents, which have never turned on Justice Thomas's
view of life, liberty, or property? See J. W. Hampton, Jr., &
Co., 276 U. S., at 403, 409 (scrutinizing a delegation to execu-
tive offcials to set customs duties); Panama Refning Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 405–406, 422, 433 (1935) (holding uncon-
stitutional a delegation to executive offcials to prohibit the
transportation of petroleum products in interstate and for-
eign commerce); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
319 U. S. 190, 196, 214–215, 225–226 (1943) (scrutinizing the
delegation of authority to regulate the granting of broadcast-
ing licenses); see also Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U. S. 148, 217
(2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[I]mpermissible delegations
of legislative power violate [the nondelegation] principle, not
just delegations that deprive individuals of `life, liberty, or
property' ”).
Third, even if a distinction between true legislative powers
and “other kinds of power[s]” were proper, post, at 314, I do
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not see why the tariff power would fall in the latter category
and
thus be something Congress could delegate away whole-
sale, without scrutiny, and forever. Justice Thomas sug-
gests all that is possible because, at the founding, the tariff
power was considered a “ `prerogative right' ” of the British
King. Post, at 323 (quoting N. Gras, Early English Customs
System 21 (1918)).
That seems doubtful. Tariffs may have been among the
King 's prerogative powers during the reign of Edward I.
See id., at 20–21; see also post, at 323, n. 3 (citing P. Einzig,
The Control of the Purse: Progress and Decline of Parlia-
ment's Financial Control 65 (1959) (discussing the practices
“during the Middle Ages”)). But even before the year 1400,
Parliament had achieved some “victory over the King in the
matter of imposing import duties.” Id., at 108–109. And
after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, as this Court has put
it, Parliament “secured supremacy in fscal matters.” Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Finan-
cial Services Assn. of America, Ltd., 601 U. S. 416, 428
(2024) (citing 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws
of England 306, 333 (1771)). “By the time of the American
Revolution, trade regulation was thus a prime topic of legis-
lative concern” in Britain. M. McConnell, The President
Who Would Not Be King 217 (2020) (emphasis added); see
also J. Chitty, Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown 163
(1820) (“[T]he King does not possess any general common
law prerogative with respect to foreign commerce”).
More importantly still, whatever the views in Britain may
have been, American revolutionaries hardly shared some uni-
versal conviction that all manner of tariffs were a matter of
the King 's prerogative, or even something Parliament, lack-
ing colonial representatives, could freely impose on them.
Though in the mid-1760s some colonists distinguished be-
tween “ `internal' ” and “ `external' taxation” and “conceded
[Parliament's] right to raise revenue through duties on
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trade,” “the inadequacy of [that] much overstrained distinc-
ti
on” soon “became obvious.” B. Bailyn, The Ideological Or-
igins of the American Revolution 212–213, 215 (1967). Illus-
trative of the point, John Dickinson came to “repudiat[e]” the
distinction “fatly and formally” in his Letters from a Farmer
in Pennsylvania, id., at 215, contending instead that laws
aimed at raising revenue, but enacted without representa-
tion, were objectionable without “distinction . . . between
internal and external taxes,” Letters From a Farmer in
Pennsylvania 39 (1774). See also supra, at 290–291 (re-
counting colonial objections to the Sugar Act); H. Unger,
American Tempest 101 (2011) (observing that the “import
duties” in the Townshend Acts helped “incite Americans to
rebel”). And, of course, it was duties on foreign tea that
triggered the Boston Tea Party. J. Ellis, The Cause 17–18
(2021). Are we really to believe that the patriots that night
in Boston Harbor considered the whole of the tariff power
some kingly prerogative?
As we have already seen, too, the growing American con-
viction that the peacetime tariff power is legislative and be-
longs only to the people's elected representatives was later
refected in both the Constitution and early congressional
practice. See Part III–C, supra. To that discussion, I
would add just this. The Articles of Confederation granted
the Confederation Congress authority to make commercial
treaties, but no authority to restrain “the legislative power
of the respective States” to impose “imposts and duties on
foreigners.” Art. IX (emphasis added). At the Constitu-
tional Convention that followed, where the tariff power was
transferred to the federal government, delegates likewise re-
ferred to it as a “legislative power.” See, e. g., 3 Farrand
615; 2 id., at 142–143. And, during debates over the Jay
Treaty, Hamilton explained that he held no doubt that regu-
lating foreign trade and raising money from it was a “legisla-
tive power,” if one that could be constrained by treaty. 6
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Lodge 182, 189–190, 196. Refecting the same sentiment
that
helped fuel the Revolution, he asked: “[W]hat legislative
power can be more sacred?” Id., at 196.
*
For those who think it important for the Nation to impose
more tariffs, I understand that today's decision will be disap-
pointing. All I can offer them is that most major decisions
affecting the rights and responsibilities of the American peo-
ple (including the duty to pay taxes and tariffs) are funneled
through the legislative process for a reason. Yes, legislating
can be hard and take time. And, yes, it can be tempting to
bypass Congress when some pressing problem arises. But
the deliberative nature of the legislative process was the
whole point of its design. Through that process, the Nation
can tap the combined wisdom of the people's elected repre-
sentatives, not just that of one faction or man. There, delib-
eration tempers impulse, and compromise hammers dis-
agreements into workable solutions. And because laws
must earn such broad support to survive the legislative proc-
ess, they tend to endure, allowing ordinary people to plan
their lives in ways they cannot when the rules shift from day
to day. In all, the legislative process helps ensure each of
us has a stake in the laws that govern us and in the Nation's
future. For some today, the weight of those virtues is ap-
parent. For others, it may not seem so obvious. But if his-
tory is any guide, the tables will turn and the day will come
when those disappointed by today's result will appreciate the
legislative process for the bulwark of liberty it is.
Justice Barrett, concurring.
As the principal opinion demonstrates, the most natural
reading of the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act does not encompass the power to impose tariffs. I write
only to address Justice Gorsuch's concurrence regarding
the major questions doctrine.
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Barrett, J., concurring
To the extent that Justice Gorsuch attacks the view that
“common
sense” alone can explain all our major questions
decisions, ante, at 272–276, he takes down a straw man. I
have never espoused that view. Rather, as I explained in
my concurrence in Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477, 507
(2023), the major questions doctrine “situates text in con-
text” and is therefore best understood as an ordinary appli-
cation of textualism. Id., at 511. Textualists—like all
those who use language to communicate—do not interpret
words in a vacuum. Instead, we use context, including
“[b]ackground legal conventions,” “common sense,” and “con-
stitutional structure,” to ascertain a text's “most natural
meaning.” Id., at 511–512, 515, 509.
Part of this context, as I have explained, is Article I of the
Constitution, which vests Congress with “ `[a]ll legislative
Powers.' ” Id., at 515 (quoting Art. I, § 1). Obviously, the
Constitution bears on the meaning of a statute enacted pur-
suant to it. Because Article I grants all legislative powers
to Congress, the reasonable interpreter would expect Con-
gress “to make the big-time policy calls itself, rather than
pawning them off to another branch.” Nebraska, 600 U. S.,
at 515 (Barrett, J., concurring).
1
To the extent that Justice Gorsuch also thinks that
background legal conventions and constitutional structure
inform the most natural reading of a statute, then we may
not be very far apart. See ante, at 262–268 (concurring
opinion). Our only disagreement may be over the level of
clarity required before a particular interpretation can be
deemed the most natural one. I understand Justice Gor-
1
Contrary to Justice Gorsuch's suggestion, this approach to the major
questions doctrine does not risk “confating unenacted legislative intent
with the law.” Ante, at 279, n. 2 (concurring opinion). Rather, like textu-
alism more generally, it looks for “a sort of `objectifed' intent—the intent
that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed
alongside the remainder of the corpus juris,” including the Constitution.
A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 17 (1997).
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such to require Congress always to speak precisely to any
major
power that it intends to give away. See ante, at 267–
269, 279–280 (concurring opinion). As I have said before, I
think that other, “less obvious” clues can do the trick. See
Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 514 (Barrett, J., concurring). I do
not see any such clues here; in fact, as the Court explains,
the clues we have point in the opposite direction. See, e. g.,
ante, at 243–244 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.) (detailing how
Congress has elsewhere delegated the power to impose tar-
iffs); ante, at 249 (majority opinion) (stressing that the Gov-
ernment “cannot identify any statute in which the power to
regulate includes the power to tax”).
At times, though, Justice Gorsuch suggests that the
purpose of the major questions doctrine is something other
than to ascertain the most natural reading of a statute. For
example, he writes that the doctrine serves to prevent
“highly resourceful members of the executive branch” from
“assum[ing] new power for themselves” because “men are
not angels.” Ante, at 270 (concurring opinion); see West Vir-
ginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 735 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concur-
ring) (describing doctrine as a “clear-statement rul[e]” that
“operates to protect foundational constitutional guaran-
tees”); National Federation of Independent Business v.
OSHA, 595 U. S. 109, 124–126 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concur-
ring) (similar). But if the Constitution permits Congress to
give the Executive a particular power, who are we to get in
the way? Does the Judiciary really protect the Constitution
by impeding the constitutional action of another branch? If
Justice Gorsuch thinks that we should forgo the most nat-
ural reading of a statute because it is preferable for Con-
gress, rather than the President, to make big decisions, that
way lies “a lot of trouble” for the textualist. A. Scalia, A
Matter of Interpretation 28 (1997) (Scalia).
Strong-form substantive canons—canons instructing a
judge to adopt “an inferior-but-tenable reading ”—veer be-
yond interpretation and into policymaking. Nebraska, 600

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303
Barrett, J., concurring
U. S., at 509 (Barrett, J., concurring). And while the pol-
icy
may be desirable or even constitutionally inspired, judges
should hesitate to impose disciplining rules on Congress.
See ibid., n. 2 (explaining that such “prophylactic con-
straints” are “in tension with the Constitution's structure”).
As Justice Scalia lamented, “whether these dice-loading
rules are bad or good, there is also the question of where the
courts get the authority to impose them. Can we really just
decree that we will interpret the laws that Congress passes
to mean less or more than what they fairly say?” Scalia
28–29.
Granted, strong-form canons exist elsewhere in the law.
See Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 508–509 (Barrett, J., concur-
ring). I do not propose to abandon these canons, nor have
I taken the position that adopting them necessarily exceeds
the judicial power. Id., at 509, n. 2. But I am skeptical
about adding new ones to the mix. Ibid. And while the
major questions doctrine has an impressive pedigree as an
interpretive principle, this Court has not (yet, anyway) em-
braced it as a strong-form rule that imposes a “ `clarity tax' ”
on Congress. Id., at 508.
Justice Gorsuch seems to disagree, pointing to a few
late 19th- and early 20th-century cases.
2
See ante, at 267–
268 (concurring opinion). But these cases, like our modern
ones, are consistent with my context-based approach: They
focus on ascertaining, not shaping, what the statute in dis-
pute communicates. See, e. g., ICC v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T.
P. R. Co., 167 U. S. 479, 511 (1897) (concluding that Congress
“did not intend” to give interstate commission power to set
railroad rates); Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213
U. S. 175, 196 (1909) (reasoning that “the legislature never in-
2
He also points to state cases and longstanding corporate law principles.
Ante, at 262–267 (concurring opinion). While those sources support the
existence of a background legal convention that informs a statute's most
natural meaning, they are not evidence that this Court—which is bound
by the constraints of Article III—has adopted a true clear-statement rule.
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tended to and did not in fact” give a state commission power
to
set maximum railroad rates). I would not treat this evi-
dence as precedent for a judicial fex. Justice Gorsuch
proposes to do something new. The innovation is in signif-
cant tension with textualism, so I do not support the project.
Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Sotomayor and
Justice Jackson join, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
The Court holds today that the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the Presi-
dent to impose tariffs. I agree with that conclusion, as I
do with the bulk of the principal opinion's reasoning. But
because I think the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation
amply support today's result, I do not join the part of that
opinion invoking the so-called major-questions doctrine.
The question that part asks, similar to the one posed in
other “ `major questions' cases,” is whether the President can
identify “clear congressional authorization” for his action—
here, to impose tariffs under IEEPA. Ante, at 242, 248, 255.
The demand is for a clear statement—something more ex-
plicit or specifc than the statutory basis that would ordi-
narily suffce to support executive action. See, e. g., West
Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 721–724, 732 (2022); Biden v.
Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477, 505–506 (2023). The reason for that
requirement, according to today's opinion, is that the Execu-
tive has claimed an “extraordinary” power—one never as-
serted before and having large-scale “economic and political
signifcance.” Ante, at 242, 246; see ante, at 242–246.
I objected, in the principal cases cited, to the demand for
a special brand of legislative clarity. See West Virginia, 597
U. S., at 764–784 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Nebraska, 600 U. S.,
at 542–550 (Kagan, J., dissenting). In my view, the Court
used its clear-authorization rule in those cases to negate ex-
pansive delegations Congress had approved. I explained
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there that the proper way to interpret a delegation provision
is
through the standard rules of statutory construction. See
West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 765–766 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
That means, most concisely stated, reading text in context.
More expansively put, it means examining a delegation pro-
vision's language, assessing that provision's place in the
broader statutory scheme, and applying a “modicum of com-
mon sense” about how Congress typically delegates. Id., at
764 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see FDA v. Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 133 (2000). The last of
those inquiries includes consideration of whether Congress
ever has before, or likely would, delegate the power the Ex-
ecutive asserts—a matter also of import in applying the
major-questions doctrine. See ante, at 243–245; Nebraska,
600 U. S., at 512–514, 517–519 (Barrett, J., concurring); id.,
at 546, n. 3 (Kagan, J., dissenting). In the past, though, I
have thought that the Court used that doctrine to override—
rather than help discover—the best reading of delegation
statutes. See West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 756 (Kagan, J.,
dissenti ng); Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 543 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
This case presents more nearly the opposite situation: The
use of a clear-statement rule here is unnecessary because
ordinary principles of statutory interpretation lead to the
same result.
1
It is not just that the Government's argu-
1
Justice Gorsuch claims not to understand this statement, insisting
that I now must be applying the major-questions doctrine, and his own ver-
sion of it to boot. See ante, at 271 (concurring opinion) (“My concurring col-
leagues all but endorse it today”); ante, at 256–257, 261–262, 272 (similar).
Given how strong his apparent desire for converts, see ante, at 256–280, I
almost regret to inform him that I am not one. But that is the fact of the
matter. I proceed in this case just as I did in West Virginia and Nebraska:
I consider a delegation provision's language, broaden the scope to take in
the statutory setting, and apply some common sense about how Congress
normally delegates. See West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 756–766
(2022) (Kagan, J., dissenting); Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477, 534–542
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ments fail to satisfy an especially strict test; it is that they
fai
l to satisfy the normal one. Even without a clear-
statement rule in the picture, the conclusion follows: IEEPA
does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. And in-
deed, the principal opinion's reasoning well explains why.
The rest of this opinion draws on that analysis (I hope with-
out too much rehashing) to demonstrate what I view as the
fundamental point: Usual text-in-context interpretation
dooms the tariffs the President has imposed. The crucial
provision of IEEPA, when viewed in light of the broader
statutory scheme and with a practical awareness of how Con-
gress delegates tariff authority, does not give the President
the power he wants.
Most important, IEEPA's key phrase—the one the Gov-
ernment relies on—says nothing about imposing tariffs or
taxes. That text authorizes the President, upon fnding a
foreign threat and declaring an emergency, to “regulate” the
“importation” of foreign goods. 50 U. S. C. § 1702(a)(1)(B).
And the meaning of “regulate,” both in common parlance and
as Congress uses the word, does not encompass taxing. See
ante, at 249–250. To “regulate,” according to the Govern-
ment's preferred defnition, means to “fx, establish or con-
trol; to adjust by rule, method, or established mode; to direct
by rule or restriction; to subject to governing principles or
laws.” Brief for Federal Parties 24 (quoting Black's Law
Dictionary 1156 (5th ed. 1979)). Nothing in that defnition
naturally refers to levying taxes. Nor does Congress ever
use the word “regulate” in that way. Hundreds of provi-
(2023) (Kagan, J., dissenting). Contrary to Justice Gorsuch's sugges-
tion, see ante, at 257–261, that conventional method of interpretation will
not always favor (or always disfavor) executive offcials, given the variety
of delegation schemes Congress adopts. I'll let Justice Gorsuch reliti-
gate on his own our old debates about other statutes, unrelated to the one
before us. What matters here is only that IEEPA's delegation refutes
the Executive's assertion of authority to levy tariffs, without any help
from the major-questions doctrine.
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sions in the U. S. Code give agencies the authority to “regu-
late”
one thing or another. Yet the Government cannot
identify a single one that is understood to grant taxing
power. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 30. When Congress wants to
delegate that power, it uses a whole different vocabulary—
terms like “duty,” “tariff,” or “surcharge,” which do not ap-
pear in IEEPA. See ante, at 243 (citing representative stat-
utes); see also ante, at 254 (discussing, in particular, 19
U. S. C. § 1862 (1970 ed.)). And likewise, when Congress
means to cover both regulatory and taxing powers, it refers
to each separately. See ante, at 249–250 (also citing stat-
utes). Of course, Congress knows that taxes can be used
for regulatory ends: They can be a means of controlling or
adjusting behavior. But Congress still follows the path this
Court long ago marked out, and the one most consonant with
ordinary meaning, of treating the power to “regulate” trade
as “entirely distinct” from the power to “levy taxes.” Gib-
bons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 201–202 (1824); see ante, at 250.
So in granting only the former, IEEPA excludes the latter:
The President has the ability to regulate, but not to impose
taxes on, imports.
The surrounding statutory language confrms the point.
As the principal opinion explains, “regulate” is one of 9 verbs
listed in IEEPA's delegation provision. See ante, at 250.
(The others are “investigate,” “block,” “direct,” “compel,”
“nullify,” “void,” “prevent,” and “prohibit.” § 1702(a)(1)(B).)
Those verbs are followed by 11 objects, each describing a
distinct sort of transaction involving foreign property—not
just “importation,” but also “acquisition,” “use,” “transfer,”
and so forth. Ibid. Combine the verbs and objects in all
possible ways, and the statute authorizes 99 actions a Presi-
dent can take to address a foreign threat. And exactly none
of the other 98 involves raising revenues. Rather, each en-
ables the President to impose penalties, restrictions, or con-
trols on foreign commerce. See ante, at 250. So when the
phrase “regulate . . . importation” is invoked to impose quan-
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308 LEARNING
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Opinion of Kagan, J.
tity or quality limits on bringing foreign goods into the coun-
try—for
example, by setting quotas or requiring quaran-
tines—the phrase fts well with its 98 neighbors. Just like
the rest, it provides a way to constrain or alter various for-
eign transactions. But when that phrase is invoked to impose
tariffs? Then it becomes the odd man out—the only one of 99
permission slips to involve “the core congressional power of
the purse.” Ante, at 243; see ante, at 240–244. So even if
(contra both conventional and congressional usage) the word
“regulate” might refer to taxation in some other (hitherto un-
discovered) statutory context, it would not do so in IEEPA.
2
Likewise, Congress's consistent practice in delegating tar-
iff power refutes the Government's position. As the princi-
pal opinion details, Title 19 of the U. S. Code includes multi-
ple provisions granting the President authority to levy
tariffs. See ante, at 243–244. But in each and every in-
stance, Congress has not only used specifc language (e. g.,
“duty” or “surcharge”), see supra, at 307, but also imposed
tight restraints on the power given. It has capped the tar-
iff 's rate (e. g., 15%); or limited the tariff 's duration (e. g., 150
days); or established strict procedural conditions before the
tariff can take effect (e. g., investigations, public hearings,
and reports); or all of the above. See ante, at 243–244. What
Congress has never done in a tariff provision is what the Gov-
ernment claims it did here—conferred power on the President
to impose a tariff of any amount, for any time, on only his
own say-so. And construing IEEPA to give that unparal-
2
The legislative history of IEEPA offers yet more proof that Congress
did not authorize taxation. The Senate Report, in its description of the
statute, reduces the 99 authorized actions to the following: the power “to
control or freeze property transactions where a foreign interest is in-
volved.” S. Rep. No. 95–466, p. 5 (1977). The House Report similarly
describes the delegation provision as “authoriz[ing] the President” to “reg-
ulate or freeze any property in which any foreign country or a national
thereof has any interest.” H. R. Rep. No. 95–459, p. 15 (1977). Neither
of those descriptions at all suggests that Congress intended to cede its
taxing power.

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309
Opinion of Kagan, J.
leled authority would effectively erase all the carefully con-
f
ned tariff provisions in Title 19. For any President could
then escape the rigors of those laws—could put in place, say,
a non-time-limited 100% tariff on all foreign products—by
the simple expedient of identifying a foreign threat. That
gutting of Title 19's tariff scheme is not what Congress, when
delegating power to “regulate” imports, could have meant
to accomplish.
Nor has any President until now understood IEEPA to
authorize imposing tariffs. Between 1977 (when IEEPA
was enacted) and 2024, eight Presidents had the chance to
make use of IEEPA's delegation of power. And all chose
the same course. They invoked the statute's “regulate im-
portation” provision for a variety of non-tariff purposes.
See ante, at 245. But they looked elsewhere—to Title 19's
provisions—for tariff authority. See ibid. In other words,
each President read the statutes as Congress wrote them,
with IEEPA enabling him to regulate imports and Title 19
enabling him—in confned situations—to tax those foreign
goods. None, as far as anyone has suggested, even consid-
ered doing otherwise.
3
3
Presidents followed the same practice, with one quasi-exception, under
IEEPA's predecessor statute, the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA).
Beginning in 1941, TWEA authorized the President, as IEEPA does now,
to “regulate . . . importation.” 12 U. S. C. § 95a(1)(B) (1940 ed., Supp. I).
During the next three decades, six Presidents used that delegation for
only non-tariff ends, while relying on Title 19 to levy tariffs. In 1971,
when President Nixon i mposed t ar i ffs i n response to a ba lance-of-
payments defcit, he continued in that tradition by invoking two statutes
(the Tariff Act of 1930 and Trade Expansion Act of 1962) found in Title
19. See Presidential Proclamation No. 4074, 3 CFR 60 (1971–1975 Comp.).
But in defending his act against a legal challenge, the Department of Jus-
tice argued that even if the two cited statutes did not authorize the tariffs,
TWEA would do so. That after-the-fact claim of authority was upheld in
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. See United States v. Yoshida
Int'l, Inc., 526 F. 2d 560, 572, 577–578 (CCPA 1975); ante, at 252. The princi-
pal opinion well explains why that single lower court decision about TWEA
has no bearing on IEEPA's meaning. See ante, at 252–253, and n. 5.
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310 LEARNING
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Opinion of Jackson, J.
For all those reasons, straight-up statutory construction
resolves
this case for me; I need no major-questions thumb
on the interpretive scales. IEEPA gives the President sig-
nifcant authority over transactions involving foreign prop-
erty, including the importation of goods. But in that gener-
ous delegati on, one power is conspicuously missi ng.
Nothing in IEEPA's text, nor anything in its context, enables
the President to unilaterally impose tariffs. And needless
to say, without statutory authority, the President's tariffs
cannot stand. See ante, at 240–241.
Justice Jackson, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment.
I agree with the Court's conclusion that the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not provide
the President with the power to tariff. Three of my col-
leagues have reached this result via the major questions doc-
trine, see ante, at 242–248 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.)—a
framing that asks, in essence, whether Congress “would
likely have intended” to delegate the authority to tariff to
the President through IEEPA. West Virginia v. EPA, 597
U. S. 697, 730 (2022) (emphasis added); see also id., at 722–
723. While probing Congress's intent is the right inquiry,
my colleagues speculate needlessly. In my view, the Court
can, and should, consult a statute's legislative history to de-
termine what Congress actually intended the statute to do.
As Congress undertakes the legislative process, congres-
sional committees in the Senate and House often generate
offcial reports that describe Congress's aims for the legisla-
tion. See R. Katzmann, Judging Statutes 19–20 (2014) (Katz-
mann). Indeed, there is evidence that lawmakers them-
selves pay more attention to these reports than a statute's
text to understand the statute's purpose and meaning. A.
Gluck & L. Bressman, Statutory Interpretation From the In-
side—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Dele-
gation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 965–966,
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311
Opinion of Jackson, J.
968–969 (2013); see also Katzmann 37–38. Thus, in contrast
to
the principal dissent's rejection of Committee Reports as
a means of ascertaining a statute's meaning, post, at 344,
n. 11 (opinion of Kavanaugh, J.), I think these Senate and
House Reports are among the best evidence of what Con-
gress sought to accomplish with its enactments. See Gluck,
65 Stan. L. Rev., at 965, 977–978, 989.
In the cases now before us, that evidence shows that Con-
gress did not intend for IEEPA to authorize the Executive
to impose tariffs. Accord, ante, at 308, n. 2 (Kagan, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment). Instead, Con-
gress intended to delegate to the President the power to
freeze and control foreign property transactions.
Four pieces of the relevant legislative record support this
conclusion. The frst two are the House and Senate Reports
that accompanied the 1941 amendment to IEEPA's predeces-
sor statute, the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA).
First enacted in 1917, TWEA authorized the President to
control foreign property during wartime. But some of
TWEA's sections delegating this authority had lapsed, and
“there [was] doubt as to the effectiveness of other sections.”
H. R. Rep. No. 1507, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1941). Accord-
ingly, Congress amended TWEA in 1941, adding the subsec-
tion that includes the “regulate . . . importation” language
on which the President relies today. First War Powers Act,
55 Stat. 839–840. The Reports explained Congress's pri-
mary purpose for the 1941 amendment: shoring up the Presi-
dent's ability to control foreign-owned property by maintain-
ing and strengthening the “existing system of foreign
property control (commonly known as freezing control).”
H. R. Rep. No. 1507, at 2–3; see also S. Rep. No. 911, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1941).
1
1
In addition to maintaining the President's “freezing control” authority,
Congress also sought to authorize the President to seize foreign property
and use it to serve the interests of the United States. H. R. Rep. No.
1507, at 3. To this end, the 1941 amendment provided that foreign-owned
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312 LEARNING
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Opinion of Jackson, J.
When Congress enacted IEEPA in 1977, limiting the cir-
cumst
ances under which the President could exercise his
emergency authorities, it kept the “regulate . . . importation”
language from TWEA. § 203(a)(1)(B), 91 Stat. 1626. The
other two relevant pieces of legislative history—the Senate
and House Reports that accompanied IEEPA—demonstrate
that Congress's intent regarding the scope of this statu-
tory language remained the same. As the Senate Report
explained, Congress's sole objective for the “regulate . . .
importation” subsection was to grant the President the
emergency authority “to control or freeze property transac-
tions where a foreign interest is involved.” S. Rep. No. 95–
466, p. 5 (1977). The House Report likewise described
IEEPA as empowering the President to “regulate or freeze
any property in which any foreign country or a national
thereof has any interest.” H. R. Rep. No. 95–459, p. 15
(1977).
With this evidence of Congress's objective, interpreting
the text of IEEPA becomes an easy task. Each of the listed
verbs—“investigate, block during the pendency of an investi-
gation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or
prohibit,” 50 U. S. C. § 1702(a)(1)(B)—provides a means by
which the President can freeze or control foreign property
transactions. See ante, at 307–308, and n. 2 (opinion of
Kagan, J.). Tariffs are different in kind. They are a tax
on imports; a means of generating revenue from transactions
between private parties. See ante, at 240–241 (majority
opinion). Because tariffs are not a means by which the
President can freeze or control foreign assets, interpreting
IEEPA to authorize tariffs would require the Court to over-
ride Congress's expressed purpose for including the “regu-
late . . . importation” language in the statute.
property “shall vest . . . in such agency or person as may be designated . . .
by the President.” 55 Stat. 840. Congress did not include this vesting
language in IEEPA.
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as: 607 U. S. 229 (2026)
313
Thomas, J., dissenting
***
Like
The Chief Justice's opinion, the principal dissent
declines the help of legislative history. See post, at 344,
n. 11 (opinion of Kavanaugh, J.). The dissent concludes
that IEEPA and TWEA are “best understood” as authoriz-
ing tariffs, and that any other interpretation would “not
make much sense.” Post, at 352–353, 357.
2
But why would
it matter which interpretation we think is “best” when Con-
gress has already told us? The legislative history here
plainly establishes that Congress understood and intended
IEEPA and TWEA to authorize a wholly different type of
power: the power to freeze foreign-owned property. And
the proper role of the Court is to give effect to Congress's
intent, not our own instincts. See United States v. Ameri-
can Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 542 (1940).
In short, in these cases, the legislative history provides
helpful evidence of “what Congress was trying to do” in
IEEPA. Katzmann 38. Given that evidence, we need not
speculate or, worse, step into Congress's shoes and formulate
our own views about what powers would be best to delegate
to the President for use during an emergency. See ibid.; J.
Hurst, Dealing With Statutes 33 (1982). When Congress
tells us why it has included certain language in a statute,
the limited role of the courts in our democratic system of
government—as interpreters, not lawmakers—demands that
we give effect to the will of the people.
Justice Thomas, dissenting.
I join Justice Kavanaugh's principal dissent in full. As
he explains, the Court's decision today cannot be justifed as
a matter of statutory interpretation. Congress authorized
the President to “regulate . . . importation.” 50 U. S. C.
2
This reasoning appears to follow the Court's relatively recent practice
of picking what it deems the best reading of a statute without consider-
ation of Congress's intent. See, e. g., Stanley v. City of San ford, 606 U. S.
46, 51–54 (2025); accord, id., at 96–97, and n. 12 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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314 LEARNING
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Thomas, J., dissenting
§ 1702(a)(1)(B). Throughout American history, the authority
to
“regulate importation” has been understood to include the
authority to impose duties on imports. Post, at 338–342,
350–357 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). The meaning of that
phrase was beyond doubt by the time that Congress enacted
this statute, shortly after President Nixon's highly publi-
cized duties on imports were upheld based on identical lan-
guage. Post, at 342–350. The statute that the President
relied on therefore authorized him to impose the duties on
imports at issue in these cases. Justice Kavanaugh
makes clear that the Court errs in concluding otherwise.
I write separately to explain why the statute at issue here
is consistent with the separation of powers as an original
matter. The Constitution's separation of powers forbids
Congress from delegating core legislative power to the Presi-
dent. This principle, known as the nondelegation doctrine,
is rooted in the Constitution's Legislative Vesting Clause and
Due Process Clause. Art. I, § 1; Amdt. 5. Both Clauses
forbid Congress from delegating core legislative power,
which is the power to make substantive rules setting the
conditions for deprivations of life, liberty, or property. Nei-
ther Clause prohibits Congress from delegating other kinds
of power. Because the Constitution assigns Congress many
powers that do not implicate the nondelegation doctrine,
Congress may delegate the exercise of many powers to the
President. Congress has done so repeatedly since the
founding, with this Court's blessing.
The power to impose duties on imports can be dele-
gated.
1
At the founding, that power was regarded as one of
1
I refer to charges on imported goods as “duties,” not “tariffs” or
“taxes.” When the government charged money for importing goods, that
charge was historically called a custom or impost, each of which was a kind
of “duty.” See N. Webster, A Compendious Dictionary of the English
Language 75, 152 (1806); Art. I, § 10, cl. 2. The word “tariff ” primarily
referred to the schedule or table listing such duties, not the duties them-
selves. Webster, Compendious Dictionary, at 305. The word “tax,” al-
though sometimes used loosely to refer to all kinds of monetary charges,
more often “exclude[d]” duties on imports. R. Natelson, What the Consti-
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as: 607 U. S. 229 (2026)
315
Thomas, J., dissenting
many powers over foreign commerce that could be delegated
to
the President. Power over foreign commerce was not
within the core legislative power, and engaging in foreign
commerce was regarded as a privilege rather than a right.
Early Congresses often delegated to the President power to
regulate foreign commerce, including through duties on im-
ports. As I suggested over a decade ago, the nondelegation
doctrine does not apply to “a delegation of power to make
rules governing private conduct in the area of foreign trade,”
including rules imposing duties on imports. Department of
Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, 575
U. S. 43, 80–81, n. 5 (2015) (opinion concurring in judgment).
Therefore, to the extent that the Court relies on “ `separation
of powers principles' ” to rule against the President, ante, at
243 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.), it is mistaken.
I
The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in both the Legisla-
tive Vesting Clause and the Due Process Clause. The doc-
tution Means by “Duties, Imposts, and Excises”—and “Taxes” (Direct or
Otherwise), 66 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 297, 306 (2015).
In fact, although Colonial Americans “staunchly contested efforts by
Parliament to `tax' them,” they often “conceded the authority of the Brit-
ish government to regulate commerce through fnancial exactions,” includ-
ing “prohibitory tariffs.” Ibid. In the most “widely read” and “univer-
sally approved” response to the Stamp Act, E. Morgan & H. Morgan, The
Stamp Act Crisis 71 (1953), Daniel Dulany wrote: “A Right to impose an
internal Tax on the Colonies, without their Consent for the single Purpose
of Revenue, is denied; a Right to regulate their Trade without their Con-
sent is admitted. The Imposition of a Duty, may, in some Instances, be
the proper Regulation.” Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing
Taxes in the British Colonies 34 (2d ed. 1765) (emphasis deleted). Like-
wise, Benjamin Franklin famously conceded Britain's “right `of laying du-
ties to regulate commerce,' ” but rejected its power to “ `lay internal
taxes.' ” B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution
214 (1967); see also id., at 212 (explaining that colonists denied Britain “all
right to tax the colonies,” but “conceded to it the right to raise revenue
through duties on trade”); E. Nelson, The Royalist Revolution 32 (2014);
C. Becker, The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of
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316 LEARNING
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Thomas, J., dissenting
trine ensures that “[t]he Legislative [Branch] cannot transfer
the
Power of Making Laws to any other hands.” J. Locke,
Two Treatises of Government § 141, p. 380 (P. Laslett ed.
1964) (Locke) (emphasis deleted). Importantly, however,
the nondelegation doctrine applies only to Congress's core
legislative power, not to all of its powers.
A
The Legislative Vesting Clause grants Congress alone the
federal legislative power. It requires that “[a]ll legislative
Powers” granted to the Federal Government “shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States.” Art. I, § 1. It follows
that those federal legislative powers cannot be exercised
by anyone else, including the President. See Association
o f Ame r i can Rai lro ad s, 575 U. S., at 74 (opi ni on of
Thomas, J.).
“Legislative power” for purposes of the Vesting Clause
means the power to make substantive rules setting the con-
ditions for deprivations of life, liberty, or property. I have
described this power as the “core legislative power” to dis-
tinguish it from other powers that the Constitution grants
Congress. Id., at 80. Core legislative power includes only
the power to make “law” in the “Blackstonian sense of gener-
ally applicable rules of private conduct,” the violation of
which results in the deprivation of “core private rights.”
Id., at 73, 76. These core private rights are the natural
rights to life, liberty, and property. See 1 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England 123–136 (1765)
(Blackstone); C. Nelson, Adjudication in the Political
Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 566–567 (2007).
The nondelegation doctrine is also rooted in the Due Proc-
ess Clause. That Clause prohibits the Federal Government
from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law.” Amdt. 5. The Founders modeled
it on chapter 39 of the Magna Carta, which prohibited the
deprivation of a free man's private rights “except by the law-
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as: 607 U. S. 229 (2026)
317
Thomas, J., dissenting
ful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land.” A.
H
oward, Magna Carta: Text and Commentary 45 (rev. ed.
1998); see Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644, 723 (2015)
(Thomas, J., dissenting). By the founding, the Magna Carta
was understood to mean that “no subject would be deprived
of a private right—that is, a right of life, liberty, or prop-
erty—except in accordance with `the law of the land,' which
consisted only of statutory and common law.” Association
of American Railroads, 575 U. S., at 72 (opinion of Thomas,
J.) (citing N. Chapman & M. McConnell, Due Process as Sepa-
ration of Powers, 121 Yale L. J. 1672, 1688 (2012)).
A rule made by someone other than the legislature, such
as the King, was not “ `the law of the land.' ” Association
of American Railroads, 575 U. S., at 72 (opinion of Thomas,
J.). Chief Justice Coke famously held invalid the King 's
proclamation prohibiting new buildings in London because
the King could not “create any offence” “without Parlia-
ment.” Case of Proclamations, 12 Co. Rep. 74, 74–75, 77
Eng. Rep. 1352, 1353 (K. B. 1611); see Association of Ameri-
can Railroads, 575 U. S., at 72 (opinion of Thomas, J.) (ex-
plaining that this principle was associated with chapter 39 of
the Magna Carta). When the Founders transplanted the
same principle into the Due Process Clause, they ensured
that when the government wanted to deprive people of the
familiar core private rights of “life, liberty, and property,” it
could not do so “on the basis of a rule (or a will) not enacted
by the legislature.” Id., at 75–76.
B
Neither the Legislative Vesting Clause nor the Due Proc-
ess Clause forbids Congress from delegating its other pow-
ers. As this Court put it two centuries ago, although
Congress cannot delegate powers that are “strictly and ex-
clusively legislative,” it can “certainly delegate” others.
Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 42–43 (1825) (opinion for
the Court by Marshall, C. J.).
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318 LEARNING
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Thomas, J., dissenting
Many of Congress's powers fall within the core legislative
power
subject to the nondelegation doctrine. For example,
the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate com-
merce among the States. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congress can
thus make substantive rules for interstate trade—such as
by restricting drug shipments across state lines—punishable
with fnes or imprisonment. Cf. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U. S.
1, 58 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Likewise, the Consti-
tution gives Congress many other powers that implicate life,
liberty, and property, including the power to provide for the
punishment of counterfeiting, Art. I, § 8, cl. 6; the power to
provide for the punishment of treason, Art. III, § 3, cl. 2; and
the power to impose internal taxes, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1; Amdt.
16. These powers cannot be delegated, as I have repeatedly
explained. See, e. g., Association of American Railroads,
575 U. S., at 77 (opinion of Thomas, J.); Whitman v. Ameri-
can Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas,
J., concurring). They cannot be delegated even if Congress
delegates them unambiguously. Cf. ante, at 243 (opinion of
Roberts, C. J.).
Congress also has many powers that are not subject to the
nondelegation doctrine. “We now think of the powers listed
in Article I, Section 8 as quintessentially legislative powers,
but many of them were actual, former, or asserted powers
of the Crown, which the drafters decided to allocate to the
legislative branch.” M. McConnell, The President Who
Would Not Be King 274 (2020) (McConnell); accord, Zivotof-
sky v. Kerry, 576 U. S. 1, 36 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring
in judgment in part and dissenting in part). These include
the powers to raise and support armies, to fx the standards
of weights and measures, to grant copyrights, to dispose of
federal property, and, as discussed below, to regulate foreign
commerce. Art. I, § 8; Art. IV, § 3. None of these powers
involves setting the rules for the deprivation of core private
rights. Blackstone called them “prerogative” powers, and
sometimes “executive.” See 1 Blackstone 242, 245, 255–262,
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as: 607 U. S. 229 (2026)
319
Thomas, J., dissenting
264–265, 276, 279; 2 id., at 407, 410 (1766); 1 W. Crosskey,
Pol
itics and the Constitution in the History of the United
States 416, 421–425 (1953); McConnell 274–275. By one
count, 13 of the 29 powers given to Congress in Article I
were powers that “Blackstone described as `executive' pow-
ers.” 1 Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution, at 428.
For most of American history, the nondelegation doctrine
was understood not to apply to these powers. Contra, ante,
at 296–300 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). “The early con-
gresses felt free to delegate certain powers to President
Washington in broad terms.” McConnell 333. Thus, the
Constitution gives Congress the power to support armies,
Art. I, § 8, cl. 12, but Congress in 1789 delegated to the Presi-
dent the power to establish regulations for benefts to veter-
ans wounded in the Revolutionary War. See Act of Sept.
29, 1789, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 95. The Constitution gives Congress
the power to grant patents, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, but Congress in
1790 delegated to executive offcials the power to grant pat-
ents in their discretion. See Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1,
1 Stat. 109–110. The Constitution gives Congress the
power to borrow money, Art. I, § 8, cl. 2, but Congress in
1790 delegated to the President the power to borrow up to
$12 million on behalf of the United States in his discretion.
See Act of Aug. 4, 1790, § 2, 1 Stat. 139. The Constitution
gives Congress the power to raise armies, Art. I, § 8, cl. 12,
but Congress in 1791 delegated to the President the power
to raise an army of 2,000 troops in his discretion. See Act
of Mar. 3, 1791, § 8, 1 Stat. 223. And, as I explain further
below, see infra, at 325–327, the Constitution gives Congress
the power to regulate foreign commerce, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, but
early Congresses often delegated to the President the power
to regulate foreign commerce. See, e. g., Act of July 22,
1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137; Act of June 4, 1794, ch. 41, 1 Stat.
372.
These early delegations had one thing in common: They
did not implicate the Legislative Vesting Clause or the Due

320 LEARNING
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Thomas, J., dissenting
Process Clause. “None of these statutes disturbed natural
r
ights or intruded into the core of the legislative power.”
McConnell 333; cf. A. Bamzai, Comment, Delegation and In-
terpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation and
Future of Administrative Law, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 164, 178
(2019). They therefore did not violate the nondelegation
doctrine.
The Constitutional Convention seemed to agree with this
understanding of delegation. Contra, ante, at 296 (Gor-
such, J., concurring). James Madison proposed an amend-
ment clarifying that the President had the power “ `to exe-
cute such other powers' ” as were “ `delegated by the national
Legislature,' ” so long as the delegated powers were “ ` “not
Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature.” ' ” 1 Records of
the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 67 (M. Farrand ed. 1966).
Thus, in Madison's view, some of Congress's powers were
“not Legislative” and could be “delegated” to the President.
Ibid. Madison's proposal was rejected after others argued
that it was unnecessary. Ibid. Madison agreed that the
purpose of the proposed amendment was only to “prevent
doubts and misconstructions.” Ibid. Nobody disputed that
Madison stated the correct scope of the nondelegation doc-
trine. Ibid.; see also McConnell 332 (“[W]e can infer [from
Madison's motion] that the framers understood that Congress
would be able to delegate its royal prerogative powers back
to the President”).
2
2
Thus, although many used the word “legislative” in the broader sense
to describe powers that should initially belong to the legislature, ante,
at 296–297 (Gorsuch, J., concurring), the Founders likely understood the
Legislative Vesting Clause to refer more narrowly to “core legislative
power,” Department of Transportation v. Association of American Rail-
roads, 575 U. S. 43, 80 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). That
understanding accorded with the views of separation-of-powers theorists
of the time, who distinguished the three core functions of government
from the institutions that would exercise them in any given polity. S.
Prakash & M. Ramsey, Foreign Affairs and the Jeffersonian Executive, 89
Minn. L. Rev 1591, 1612–1617 (2005); see 1 B. de Montesquieu, The Spirit
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321
Thomas, J., dissenting
II
As
a matter of original understanding, historical practice,
and judicial precedent, the power to impose duties on
imports is not within the core legislative power. Congress
can therefore delegate the exercise of this power to the
President.
A
Neither of the two constitutional foundations for the non-
delegation doctrine forbids Congress from delegating to the
President the power to impose duties on imports.
1
The Legislative Vesting Clause provides no basis for
applying the nondelegation doctrine to the power to impose
duties on imports.
“The `power over external affairs [is] in origin and essen-
tial character different from that over internal affairs.' ”
Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U. S. 255, 356 (2023) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 319 (1936)). Although internal affairs
are governed by the domestic law of one sovereign, external
affairs implicate the relationship between sovereigns, which
is subject to the law of nations. See Locke §§ 145–148, at
383–384; 1 Blackstone 264; 4 id., at 66–68 (1769); E. de Vattel,
The Law of Nations 161–163, 281–289 (J. Chitty ed. 1852)
(Vattel). External affairs, then, are not susceptible to being
“directed by antecedent, standing, positive Laws” made by
one nation. Locke § 147, at 384. When a person goes
abroad, he must resort to the political branches (and ulti-
mately the military)—rather than the judiciary—for protec-
tion, can indebt the executive to foreign nations for his per-
of Laws 151–153 (T. Nugent transl., rev. ed. 1899). For nondelegation pur-
poses, therefore, “[t]he key is to distinguish between strictly legislative
authority—the power to make rules binding on persons or property within
the nation—and other powers assigned to Congress.” McConnell 327.
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sonal misconduct, and can trigger a foreign confict. See
V
attel 161–163, 281–289; 2 F. Wharton, Digest of Interna-
tional Law § 222, pp. 575–576 (2d ed. 1887); see also id.,
§§ 189, 213–221, at 432–445, 539–575.
The power to regulate external affairs was accordingly not
viewed as within the core legislative power at the founding.
See Zivotofsky, 576 U. S., at 35–37 (opinion of Thomas, J.).
Blackstone described powers over “intercourse with foreign
nations” as “prerogative” powers naturally belonging to the
King. 1 Blackstone 245; see id., at 232. Locke agreed that
this power “must be lodged” with the “executive.” Zivotof-
sky, 576 U. S., at 35 (opinion of Thomas, J.) (citing Locke
§ 148). Baron de Montesquieu classifed all powers “in re-
spect to things dependent on the law of nations” as part of
“the executive power.” 1 The Spirit of Laws 151 (T. Nugent
transl., rev. ed. 1899). The “legislative” power, by contrast,
“applied only within the realm.” McConnell 214.
The power to regulate external affairs included power
over foreign commerce. At the founding, the “external ex-
ecutive power” included “ `the transactions of the state with
any other independent state.' ” Zivotofsky, 576 U. S., at 36
(opinion of Thomas, J.). In Great Britain, the King had no
unilateral legislative power, McConnell 107, but he had much
unilateral power over foreign commerce. His power over
foreign commerce included the power to “govern foreign
trade,” id., at 216, and to “prohibit any of his subjects from
leaving the realm,” 1 Blackstone 261; accord, East India Co.
v. Sandys, Skin. 223, 223–224, 90 Eng. Rep. 103 (K. B. 1684)
(describing the “inherent prerogative in the Crown, that
none should trade with foreigners without the King 's li-
cence”). Thomas Rutherforth's Institutes of Natural Law—
“a treatise routinely cited by the Founders,” Zivotofsky, 576
U. S., at 36 (opinion of Thomas, J.)—explained that the “ex-
ternal executive power” included “the power of adjusting the
rights of a nation in respect of . . . trade.” 2 Institutes of
Natural Law 55–56 (1756); accord, Locke § 146, at 383. The
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323
Thomas, J., dissenting
power to impose duties on imports was a conventional
method
for governing foreign trade. It originated as a “pre-
rogative right” of the King, N. Gras, Early English Customs
System 21 (1918).
3
2
The Due Process Clause likewise provides no basis for
applying the nondelegation doctrine to the power to impose
duties on imports. The Due Process Clause protects
“rights,” not “privileges.” Gutierrez v. Saenz, 606 U. S. 305,
331 (2025) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Importing is a matter
of privilege.
The government can charge money for privileges without
depriving a person of property for due-process purposes.
The government charges people money every day for a wide
range of activities, such as to enter a government park, mail
an envelope, apply for a copyright, or fle a lawsuit. Because
a person has no core private right to engage in these activi-
ties, the government is not subject to due-process restraints
in setting such charges. The due-process question is not
whether a government action “ `raise[s] revenue,' ” ante, at
241 (majority opinion), but whether it implicates core private
rights. Supra, at 316–317. Thus, when Congress delegates
power to make “regulations” on federal land, the Secretary
of Agriculture can set a “charge” for the “privilege of grazing
sheep” on that land without thereby “exercis[ing] the legisla-
tive power.” United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 522–
523 (1911); see also Bamzai, 133 Harv. L. Rev., at 180–182;
contra, ante, at 243 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.). Congress
has, consistent with due process, delegated the power to set
3
See also P. Einzig, The Control of the Purse: Progress and Decline of
Parliament's Financial Control 65 (1959) (“[T]he origin of the term `cus-
toms' is that it had been the ancient customary practice of the Crown to
levy charges on imports and exports on its own authority”). Parliament
took some of that prerogative power away, but delegated it back in broad
terms to the King, see id., at 65–70, who was still agreed to have no legisla-
tive power, McConnell 107–110.
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charges for a wide range of privileges. See 16 U. S. C.
§
6802 (delegating the power to set fees for entrance to and
use of federal recreation areas); 17 U. S. C. § 1316 (delegating
the power to “by regulation set reasonable fees” for applica-
tions); 39 U. S. C. § 3622 (delegating the power to set postal
rates); 28 U. S. C. § 1911 (“The Supreme Court may fx the
fees to be charged by its clerk”).
A person had no core private right to import goods at the
founding. On the Founders' understanding, statutes allow-
ing “importation of goods from abroad were thought to cre-
ate mere privileges rather than core private rights.” Nel-
son, 107 Colum. L. Rev., at 580. Foreign commerce was
governed by the law of nations, which is a law of “sover-
eigns,” not of “private individuals.” Vattel 285. “[A]ny at-
tempt to introduce foreign goods” without the “expressed
allowances” of the sovereign was “a violation of its sover-
eignty.” Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164, 196 (1854).
“Every state” had “a right to prohibit the entrance of foreign
merchandises,” including through the imposition of duties on
imports. Vattel §§ 90, 99, at 38, 43. Because “no one had a
vested right to import” any “goods from abroad,” the imposi-
tion of “tariffs” as a condition for importing those goods did
not implicate the Due Process Clause any more than when
the government charges money for other privileges. Nel-
son, 107 Colum. L. Rev., at 580.
***
The power to impose duties on imports thus does not im-
plicate either of the constitutional foundations for the nondel-
egation doctrine. Hence, even the strongest critics of dele-
gation, myself included, have recognized that regulations of
foreign commerce might not be subject to ordinary nondele-
gation limitations. See FCC v. Consumers' Research, 606
U. S. 656, 742, n. 19 (2025) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[I]t
may be . . . that tariffs and domestic taxes present different
contexts when it comes to the problem of delegation”); ac-
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325
Thomas, J., dissenting
cord, Association of American Railroads, 575 U. S., at 80,
and
n. 5 (opinion of Thomas, J.). So long as Congress com-
plies with other constitutional limitations, it can delegate
this power.
B
Historical practice and precedent confrm that Congress
can delegate the power to impose duties on imports.
1
Since the 1790s, Congress has consistently delegated to the
President power over foreign commerce, including the power
to impose duties on imports. “ `Practically every volume of
the United States Statutes' ” contains broad delegations to
the President in the area of foreign commerce. Id., at 80,
n. 5 (quoting Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S., at 324).
The First Congress gave the President the power to “pre-
scribe” “rules and regulations” that would “gover[n]” any
person licensed to trade with Indians. 1 Stat. 137. Trade
with Indians was regarded as “a matter of external rela-
tions.” McConnell 333. In delegating this power, Congress
did not specify or limit what kinds of regulations the Presi-
dent could impose. Act of July 22, 1790, 1 Stat. 137–138.
Pursuant to that broad delegation, the President restricted
trading “[d]istilled [s]pirits,” required each trader to “give
intelligence” to the Government, and subdelegated to his
superintendents the power to “assign the limits within which
each trader shall trade.” 61 Timothy Pickering Papers,
Massachusetts Historical Society 4 (Aug. 28, 1790); see also
Letter from G. Washington to H. Knox (Aug. 13, 1790), in 6
Papers of George Washington 244–245 (D. Twohig ed. 1996).
Any person who violated the President's regulations would
owe $1,000 “payable to the President.” 1 Stat. 137.
Succeeding early Congresses delegated many more powers
over foreign commerce to the President. In 1794, Congress
delegated to the President the power to “lay an embargo on
all ships and vessels in the ports of the United States,” in-
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cluding ships belonging to Americans, unless Congress was
i
n session. Act of June 4, 1794, 1 Stat. 372. It authorized
the President to make “such regulations as the circum-
stances of the case may require” in exercising that delegated
power. Ibid. Congress allowed the President to impose
the embargo as “in his opinion, the public safety shall so
require.” Ibid. In 1795, Congress delegated to the Presi-
dent the power to “permit the exportation of arms, cannon
and military stores, the law prohibiting the exportation of
the same to the contrary notwithstanding.” Act of Mar. 3,
1795, ch. 53, 1 Stat. 444. In 1798, Congress delegated to the
President the power to discontinue “prohibitions and re-
straints” on commerce with France. Act of June 13, 1798, 1
Stat. 565–566; see also, e. g., Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 39, 3
Stat. 361–362 (delegating to the President the power to dis-
continue a ban on importation of plaster of Paris). In 1799,
Congress delegated to the President the authority to discon-
tinue and to reimpose “restraints and prohibitions” on com-
merce with France when he “deem[ed] it expedient and con-
sistent with the interest of the United States.” Act of Feb.
9, 1799, 1 Stat. 615. And, in 1800, Congress delegated to the
President the power to remove a ban on trade with France,
and to “re-establish” certain “restraints and prohibitions”
when he “deem[ed] it expedient.” Act of Feb. 27, 1800,
2 Stat. 9–10.
4
Congress likewise delegated to the President the power to
set duties on imports. In 1815, Congress delegated to the
President the power to lower reciprocal duties when he was
“satisfed” that other nations' trade practices no longer oper-
ated “to the disadvantage of the United States.” Act of
Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 77, 3 Stat. 224. In 1824, Congress delegated
to the President the power to lower and to reimpose duties
in response to foreign nations' trade practices. See Act of
4
Justice Gorsuch's interpretation of two “early congressional de-
bates,” ante, at 297 (concurring opinion), is thus diffcult to reconcile with
what early Congresses actually did.
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327
Thomas, J., dissenting
Jan. 7, 1824, 4 Stat. 2–3. Throughout the early decades of
the
Republic, Congress continued to delegate to the Presi-
dent similar powers over duties on imports on a regular
basis. See, e. g., Act of May 24, 1828, ch. 111, 4 Stat. 308;
Act of May 31, 1830, ch. 219, 4 Stat. 425; Act of July 13, 1832,
ch. 207, 4 Stat. 578–579. Presidents frequently changed the
rates of duties on imports as to various foreign nations pur-
suant to these delegations.
5
2
This Court has consistently upheld Congress's delegation
of power over foreign commerce, including the power to im-
pose duties on imports.
The Court has long conveyed to Congress that it may “in-
vest the President with large discretion in matters arising
out of the execution of statutes relating to trade and com-
merce with other nations.” Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark,
143 U. S. 649, 691 (1892). Since shortly after the founding,
the Court has rejected challenges to delegations of power
over foreign commerce. See Cargo of Brig Aurora v.
United States, 7 Cranch 382, 386, 387–389 (1813). Even
when a “challenged delegation, if it were confned to internal
affairs, would be invalid,” the Court has upheld the delega-
5
See, e. g., July 24, 1818, Proclamation of President J. Monroe, in 2 Mes-
sages and Papers of the Presidents 606–607 (J. Richardson ed. 1897) (elimi-
nating duties on “goods, wares, and merchandise imported into the United
States” as to the Free Hanseatic city of Bremen); see also, e. g., Aug. 1,
1818, Proclamation of President J. Monroe, in 2 id., at 607; May 4, 1820,
Proclamation of President J. Monroe, in 2 id., at 642; Aug. 20, 1821, Procla-
mation of President J. Monroe, in 2 id., at 665–666; Nov. 22, 1821, Procla-
mation of President J. Monroe, in 2 id., at 666–667; June 7, 1827, Proclama-
tion of President J. Quincy Adams, in 2 id., at 942–943; July 1, 1828,
Proclamation of President J. Quincy Adams, in 2 id., at 970–971; May 11,
1829, Proclamation of President A. Jackson, in 3 id., at 1003; June 3, 1829,
Proclamation of President A. Jackson, in 3 id., at 1004–1005; Apr. 28, 1835,
Proclamation of President A. Jackson, in 3 id., at 1365–1366; Sept. 1, 1836,
Proclamation of President A. Jackson, in 3 id., at 1452–1453; June 14, 1837,
Proclamation of President M. Van Buren, in 4 id., at 1539.
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328 LEARNING
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Thomas, J., dissenting
tion. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S., at 315, 322.
There
is a “fundamental” difference, the Court has explained,
between “foreign or external affairs” and “domestic or inter-
nal affairs.” Id., at 315. Thus, “Congress may of course
delegate very large grants of its power over foreign com-
merce to the President,” Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc.
v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 109 (1948), including
when it comes to imposing “duties” on imports, Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S., at 325, n. 2.
When Congress has delegated to the President the power
to impose duties on imports, this Court has upheld those del-
egations. In Clark, 143 U. S. 649, the Court upheld Con-
gress's delegation to the President of the power to impose
duties on nations whose importation policies “he may deem
to be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable.” Id., at 680.
It explained that Congress had “frequently, from the organi-
zation of the government to the present time,” conferred
powers over “trade and commerce” to “the President.” Id.,
at 683. In J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276
U. S. 394 (1928), the Court upheld a delegation to the Presi-
dent to impose duties as necessary up to statutorily limited
rates to make them reciprocal. Id., at 401, 409. And, in
Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426
U. S. 548 (1976), the Court upheld a delegation of the power
to impose a universal duty on imported oil. Id., at 555,
558–560.
6
6
The Court has even suggested that the President has inherent peace-
time authority to impose duties on imports. After the Mexican-American
War ended, executive offcials imposed duties on imports at a California
port within the United States before Congress had “passed an act to ex-
tend the collection of tonnage and import duties to the ports of California.”
Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164, 190 (1854); see also id., at 192, 194–196.
The executive offcials unilaterally extended Congress's earlier authorized
duties to new ports. Id., at 193. Although the Court's reasoning was
somewhat opaque, the Court upheld the executive offcials' unilateral
peacetime duties in part because nobody has a right to “introduce foreign
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329
Thomas, J., dissenting
Although these cases involved duties on imports, the
Cour
t nowhere suggested that a different nondelegation rule
applied because the duty was a “tax” or “raise[d] revenue.”
Ante, at 241 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
7
III
Congress's delegation here was constitutional. The stat-
ute at issue in these cases, the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act, delegates to the President a wide range
of powers over foreign commerce. IEEPA gives the Presi-
dent, on conditions satisfed here, the power to “regulate”
foreign commerce, including “importation” of foreign prop-
erty. 50 U. S. C. § 1702(a)(1)(B).
IEEPA's delegation of power to impose duties on imports
complies with the nondelegation doctrine. Congress dele-
gated to the President a version of the same power that it
has delegated to him in many statutes since the early days
of the Republic. See supra, at 325–329. Congress limited
that delegation to foreign commerce. See § 1702(a)(1)(B);
see also § 1701. In delegating the power to impose duties
on imports, it gave the President no core legislative power
to make substantive rules setting the conditions for depriva-
tions of life, liberty, or property. Its delegation therefore
complied with the constitutional separation of powers and is
consistent with centuries of practice and precedent. It did
not need to exercise that power itself and did not need to
delegate it “unambiguously”—even though, as Justice Kav-
anaugh explains, it did. See post, at 366–373 (dissenting
opinion).
goods” except with the sovereign's “expressed allowances.” Id., at
196–197.
7
In fact, less than a year ago, the Court explicitly rejected “a special
nondelegation rule for revenue-raising legislation.” FCC v. Consumers'
Research, 606 U. S. 656, 674 (2025).
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The principal opinion bases its decision on the major ques-
ti
ons doctrine. Ante, at 242–248 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.).
In some cases, the Court has used the major questions doc-
trine as a canon of statutory interpretation because delega-
tions of major powers are unlikely to be subtle. See, e. g.,
Whitman, 531 U. S., at 468; see ante, at 243 (opinion of Rob-
erts, C. J.); see also Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477, 501–
503 (2023). In other cases, the Court has used it to avoid
what would have been originally understood as an unconsti-
tutional delegation of legislative power. See, e. g., West Vir-
ginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 723 (2022); ante, at 243 (opinion
of Roberts, C. J.). In today's cases, neither the statutory
text nor the Constitution provide a basis for ruling against
the President. I respectfully dissent.
Justice Kavanaugh, with whom Justice Thomas and
Justice Alito join, dissenting.
Acting pursuant to his statutory authority to “regulate . . .
importation” under the 1977 International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act, or IEEPA, the President has imposed
tariffs on imports of foreign goods from various countries.
The tariffs have generated vigorous policy debates. Those
policy debates are not for the Federal Judiciary to resolve.
Rather, the Judiciary's more limited role is to neutrally inter-
pret and apply the law. The sole legal question here is
whether, under IEEPA, tariffs are a means to “regulate . . .
importation.” Statutory text, history, and precedent dem-
onstrate that the answer is clearly yes: Like quotas and
embargoes, tariffs are a traditional and common tool to
regulate importation.
Since early in U. S. history, Congress has regularly author-
ized the President to impose tariffs on imports of foreign
goods. Presidents have often used that authority to obtain
leverage with foreign nations, help American manufacturers
and workers compete on a more level playing feld, and gen-
erate revenue for the United States. Numerous laws such
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331
Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
as the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and the Trade Act of
1974
continue to authorize the President to place tariffs on
foreign imports in a variety of circumstances, and Presidents
have often done so. In recent years, Presidents George W.
Bush, Obama, and Biden have all imposed tariffs on foreign
imports under those statutory authorities.
President Trump has similarly imposed tariffs, and has
done so here under IEEPA. During declared national
emergencies, IEEPA broadly authorizes the President to
regulate international economic transactions. Most rele-
vant for this case, during those national emergencies,
IEEPA grants the President the power to “regulate . . . im-
portation” of foreign goods.
In early 2025, President Trump declared two national
emergencies pursuant to the National Emergencies Act.
See 50 U. S. C. § 1621(a). One emergency concerned drug
traffcking into the United States. The other emergency in-
volved trade imbalances with foreign nations that have
harmed American manufacturers and workers.
To help address those emergencies, the President drew
upon his authority in IEEPA to “regulate . . . importation,”
and he imposed tariffs on imports from various countries.
The plaintiffs argue and the Court concludes that the Pres-
ident lacks authority under IEEPA to impose tariffs. I dis-
agree. In accord with Judge Taranto's careful and persua-
sive opinion in the Federal Circuit, I would conclude that the
President's power under IEEPA to “regulate . . . importa-
tion” encompasses tariffs. As a matter of ordinary meaning,
including dictionary defnitions and historical usage, the
broad power to “regulate . . . importation” includes the tradi-
tional and common means to do so—in particular, quotas,
embargoes, and tariffs.
History and precedent confrm that conclusion. In 1971,
President Nixon imposed 10 percent tariffs on almost all for-
eign imports. He levied the tariffs under IEEPA's prede-
cessor statute, the Trading with the Enemy Act, which simi-
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332 LEARNING
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larly authorized the President to “regulate . . . importation.”
The
Nixon tariffs were upheld in court.
Moreover, in 1976, a year before IEEPA was enacted, this
Court unanimously ruled that a similarly worded statute au-
thorizing the President to “adjust the imports” permitted
President Ford to impose monetary exactions on foreign oil
imports. See Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin
SNG, Inc., 426 U. S. 548 (1976) (Algonquin).
For both the Nixon tariffs and the Ford tariffs upheld by
this Court in Algonquin, the relevant statutory provisions
did not specifcally refer to “tariffs” or “duties,” but instead
more broadly authorized the President to “regulate . . . im-
portation” or to “adjust the imports.” Therefore, when
IEEPA was enacted in 1977 in the wake of the Nixon and
Ford tariffs and the Algonquin decision, Congress and the
public plainly would have understood that the power to “reg-
ulate . . . importation” included tariffs. If Congress wanted
to exclude tariffs from IEEPA, it surely would not have
enacted the same broad “regulate . . . importation” language
that had just been used to justify major American tariffs on
foreign imports.
Importantly, IEEPA's authorization for the President to
impose tariffs did not grant the President any new substan-
tive power. Since the Founding, numerous statutes have
authorized—and still do authorize—the President to impose
t ar i ffs and other foreig n impor t restr icti ons. IEEPA
merely allows the President to impose tariffs somewhat
more effciently to deal with foreign threats during national
emergencies.
Context and common sense buttress that interpretation of
IEEPA. The plaintiffs and the Court acknowledge that
IEEPA authorizes the President to impose quotas or embar-
goes on foreign imports—meaning that a President could
completely block some or all imports. But they say that
IEEPA does not authorize the President to employ the lesser
power of tariffs, which simply condition imports on a pay-
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333
Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
ment. As they interpret the statute, the President could,
for
example, block all imports from China but cannot order
even a $1 tariff on goods imported from China.
That approach does not make much sense. Properly read,
IEEPA does not draw such an odd distinction between quo-
tas and embargoes on the one hand and tariffs on the other.
Rather, it empowers the President to regulate imports dur-
ing national emergencies with the tools Presidents have tra-
ditionally and commonly used, including quotas, embargoes,
and tariffs.
The Court today nonetheless concludes otherwise and
holds that IEEPA does not authorize the President to im-
pose tariffs to deal with the declared drug traffcking and
trade defcit emergencies. But the Court's decision is splin-
tered. In today's six-Justice majority, three Justices (Jus-
tice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson)
interpret IEEPA not to authorize tariffs as a matter of ordi-
nary statutory interpretation. I disagree for the reasons
noted above and elaborated on at length in this opinion.
Three other Justices (The Chief Justice, Justice Gor-
such, and Justice Barrett) lean on the major questions
canon of statutory interpretation to resolve this case. That
important canon requires “clear congressional authorization”
for an executive action of major economic and political sig-
nifcance, particularly when the Executive exercises an “un-
heralded” power. West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 722–
723 (2022) (quotation marks omitted).
In my view, as I will explain, the major questions canon
does not control here for two alternative and independent
reasons.
First, the statutory text, history, and precedent constitute
“clear congressional authorization” for the President to im-
pose tariffs under IEEPA. In particular, throughout Amer-
ican history, Presidents have commonly imposed tariffs as a
means to “regulate . . . importation.” So tariffs were not an
“unheralded” power when Congress enacted IEEPA in 1977
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and authorized the President to “regulate . . . importation”
of
foreign goods. Therefore, the major questions doctrine
is satisfed here. Cf. Biden v. Missouri, 595 U. S. 87 (2022)
(per curiam).
Second, in any event, the Court has never before applied
the major questions doctrine in the foreign affairs context,
including foreign trade. Rather, as Justice Robert Jackson
summarized and remains true, this Court has always recog-
nized the “ `unwisdom of requiring Congress in this feld of
governmental power to lay down narrowly defnite standards
by which the President is to be governed.' ” Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 636, n. 2 (1952)
(concurring opinion) (quoting United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 321–322 (1936)). In for-
eign affairs cases, courts read the statute as written and do
not employ the major questions doctrine as a thumb on the
scale against the President.
Although I frmly disagree with the Court's holding today,
the decision might not substantially constrain a President's
ability to order tariffs going forward. That is because nu-
merous other federal statutes authorize the President to im-
pose tariffs and might justify most (if not all) of the tariffs
at issue in this case—albeit perhaps with a few additional
procedural steps that IEEPA, as an emergency statute, does
not require. Those statutes include, for example, the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232); the Trade Act of 1974
(Sections 122, 201, and 301); and the Tariff Act of 1930 (Sec-
tion 338). In essence, the Court today concludes that the
President checked the wrong statutory box by relying on
IEEPA rather than another statute to impose these tariffs.
In the meantime, however, the interim effects of the
Court's decision could be substantial. The United States
may be required to refund billions of dollars to importers
who paid the IEEPA tariffs, even though some importers
may have already passed on costs to consumers or others.
As was acknowledged at oral argument, the refund process
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335
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is likely to be a “mess.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 153–155. In addi-
ti
on, according to the Government, the IEEPA tariffs have
helped facilitate trade deals worth trillions of dollars—
including with foreign nations from China to the United
Kingdom to Japan, and more. The Court's decision could
generate uncertainty regarding those trade arrangements.
In any event, the only issue before the Court today is one
of law. In light of the statutory text, longstanding historical
practice, and relevant Supreme Court precedents, I would
conclude that IEEPA authorizes the President to “regulate
. . . importation” by imposing tariffs on foreign imports dur-
ing declared national emergencies. I therefore respectfully
dissent.
1
I
Before turning to the specifcs of IEEPA's text, history,
and precedent, I briefy review several fundamental constitu-
tional principles about the roles of the three branches of the
U. S. Government with respect to this case.
First, the plaintiffs and their amici, echoed by the Court,
rhetorically emphasize that Article I, Section 8, of the Con-
stitution assigns Congress, not the President, authority over
tariffs. Ante, at 240. That rhetoric is a red herring in this
case because no one disputes the point. Everyone, including
the President, agrees that Congress possesses constitutional
authority over tariffs.
The important principle here, as everyone also acknowl-
edges, is that Congress may in turn authorize the President
to impose tariffs. Cf. FCC v. Consumers' Research, 606
U. S. 656, 673–675 (2025); J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States, 276 U. S. 394, 409–410 (1928). Indeed, since the be-
ginning of the Republic, Congress has regularly empowered
the President to order tariffs and other foreign import re-
1
In this dissent, when I refer to “The Chief Justice's opinion,” I am
referring to the parts of The Chief Justice's opinion that speak for only
three Justices—namely, Parts II–A–2 and III.
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strictions under various circumstances. As noted above,
many
current federal laws continue to grant the President
expansive tariff authority, including the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962 (Section 232); the Trade Act of 1974 (Sections
122, 201, and 301); and the Tariff Act of 1930 (Section 338).
Neither the plaintiffs nor the Court has suggested that the
numerous laws granting tariff power to the President violate
the Constitution's separation of powers.
Second, and relatedly, the President does not claim unilat-
eral authority to impose IEEPA tariffs without congres-
sional authorization or over a congressional prohibition. On
the contrary, the President's argument recognizes that, in
exercising his statutory tariff power under IEEPA, he must
act within the scope of Congress's authorizations and abide
by Congress's limitations. And the Executive has further
acknowledged that the Judiciary maintains the fnal word
in justiciable cases on whether Congress has authorized
the President to impose those tariffs under IEEPA. See
Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U. S. 831, 859–860, n. 18 (2025); cf.
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177–178 (1803).
The President here contends only that Congress, by enact-
ing IEEPA in 1977, authorized the President to impose tar-
iffs on foreign imports in declared national emergencies. To
use the familiar vernacular of Justice Robert Jackson in
Youngstown, the President argues that this case falls into
category one, where the President is acting “pursuant to an
express or implied authorization of Congress.” Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 635 (1952) (concur-
ring opinion). The President has not here asserted author-
ity to impose IEEPA tariffs in a peacetime emergency in a
Youngstown category two or three scenario. Id., at 637–
638.
2
2
Category two applies when “the President acts in absence of either a
congressional grant or denial of authority.” Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 637
(Jackson, J., concurring). Category three occurs when “the President
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337
Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
Third, Congress possesses a variety of tools to limit the
President'
s tariffs—directly via new legislation or, perhaps
more readily, by not approving annual appropriations neces-
sary for the Executive Branch to continue to implement the
tariffs. See Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477, 505 (2023)
(“Among Congress's most important authorities is its control
of the purse”).
Importantly, the House, the Senate, and the President
annually approve most appropriations. As a result, each
House of Congress and the President independently pos-
sesses de facto veto power over particular appropriations.
3
Of course, many different appropriations items are usually
considered and packaged together, so the negotiations can be
complex. But the point stands: Congress is not a helpless
bystander when it comes to the President's exercise of tariff
authority under IEEPA. Cf. Ike Skelton National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, 124 Stat. 4351–4352
(barring Executive from using funds to transfer detainees
from Guantanamo into United States); Boland Amendment,
98 Stat. 1935–1936 (1984) (barring certain Executive Branch
agencies from providing aid to Contras in Nicaragua).
In Congress, moreover, everything is related to every-
thing else, as the saying goes. Members and Committees
of Congress possess substantial tools of leverage over the
Executive Branch. Cf. The Federalist No. 51, p. 322 (C. Ros-
siter ed. 1961) (J. Madison). Congress could, for example,
wield its authority over oversight, legislation, confrmations,
or appropriations to pressure the President to reduce or
eliminate some or all of the IEEPA tariffs.
takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Con-
gress.” Ibid.
3
Two technical points for clarity: Given current Senate flibuster rules,
a determined minority of the Senate could block an appropriation. Also,
even over a Presidential veto, two-thirds of both Houses could together
approve certain appropriations.
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In light of Congress's appropriations authority and its
other
robust powers, it is not correct to suggest—as The
Chief Justice's opinion today elliptically does, ante, at
244—that two-thirds majorities of both Houses of Congress
would need to pass new legislation over a Presidential veto
in order to limit these IEEPA tariffs or, more generally, to
restrict the President's use of IEEPA to impose tariffs.
II
This case presents one straightforward question of statu-
tory interpretation: Does Congress's explicit grant of author-
ity in IEEPA for the President to “regulate . . . importation”
of foreign goods in declared national emergencies authorize
the President to impose tariffs? The answer is a clear yes.
4
A
I begin as always with the statutory text.
In 1941, a few days after Pearl Harbor, Congress frst
enacted the relevant language, “regulate . . . importation,”
in an amendment to the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act,
known as TWEA. 55 Stat. 839; 40 Stat. 411. After that
1941 amendment, TWEA authorized the President to “regu-
late . . . importation” both during wartime and during peace-
time national emergencies.
4
The relevant statutory provision provides in full:
“At the times and to the extent specifed in section 1701 of this title, the
President may, under such regulations as he may prescribe, by means of
instructions, licenses, or otherwise—
.....
“(B) investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate,
direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, hold-
ing, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or
exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege
with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any for-
eign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with
respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”
50 U. S. C. § 1702(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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339
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Then, in 1977, Congress split TWEA into two separate
st
atutes. As relevant here, Congress amended TWEA to
authorize the President to “regulate . . . importation” during
wartime only. 91 Stat. 1625. And Congress enacted a sep-
arate statute, IEEPA, that granted the President the power
to “regulate . . . importation” during peacetime national
emergencies. Id., at 1626.
The relevant IEEPA text authorized the President to
“regulate . . . importation” “by means of instructions, li-
censes, or otherwise.” Ibid.; 50 U. S. C. § 1702(a)(1) (empha-
sis added). As the term “otherwise” indicates, the broadly
worded statute did not exclude tariffs or dictate any specifc
means of regulating importation.
5
At the time of TWEA's amendment in 1941 and IEEPA's
enactment in 1977, the ordinary dictionary meaning of “regu-
late” was to “control,” to “adjust by rule,” or to “subject to
governing principles or laws.” Black's Law Dictionary 1156
(5th ed. 1979); see also Black's Law Dictionary 1519 (3d ed.
1933) (same); Webster's Third New International Dictionary
1913 (1976) (defning “regulate” as “to govern or direct ac-
cording to rule” and “to bring under the control of law or
constituted authority”); American Heritage Dictionary 1096
(1969) (“[t]o control or direct according to a rule”; “[t]o adjust
in conformity to a specifcation or requirement”).
Imposing tariffs on imports is clearly a way of controlling
imports (Black's); governing or directing imports according
to rule (Webster's, American Heritage); adjusting imports
by rule, method, or established mode (Black's, American
Heritage); or more generally subjecting imports to govern-
ing principles or laws (Black's). So the dictionary defni-
5
Congress no doubt appreciated that quotas, embargoes, tariffs, and the
like can be powerful tools for regulating foreign commerce. Congress
calibrated the statute by exempting various categories of goods, meaning
that those categories of goods are not subject to tariffs under IEEPA.
§ 1702(b).
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tions amply demonstrate that tariffs are a means to “regu-
late
. . . importation” of foreign imports.
6
Consistent with those dictionary defnitions and statutory
references, tariffs historically have been—and still are—a
common means for the United States to regulate importation
of foreign goods. See, e. g., Section 338 of the Tariff Act of
1930, 46 Stat. 704–706 (19 U. S. C. § 1338); Section 232 of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 877 (19 U. S. C. § 1862);
Title II of the Trade Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 2011 (19 U. S. C.
§ 2251 et seq.); Title III of the Trade Act of 1974, 88 Stat.
2041 (19 U. S. C. § 2411 et seq.).
7
In determining the ordinary meaning of “regulate . . . im-
portation,” the meaning of the related phrase “regulate com-
merce” is also instructive. That phrase has long been in-
terpreted to encompass tariffs. Since the Founding, the
Constitution's assignment to Congress of the broad power to
“regulate” foreign commerce has been understood to include
tariffs on foreign imports. See Art. I, § 8. As Chief Justice
Marshall explained, the “right to regulate commerce, even by
the imposition of duties, was not controverted.” Gibbons
v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 202 (1824) (emphasis added). So too
Justice Story: The “power to regulate commerce includes the
power of laying duties to countervail the regulations and
restrictions of foreign nations.” 2 J. Story, Commentaries
on the Constitution of the United States 530 (1833) (emphasis
added). And still more Story: To “lay duties” is a “common
means of executing the power” to “regulate commerce.”
Id., at 531 (emphasis added). James Madison likewise stated
6
As other statutory authorities textually confrm, moreover, Congress
has long understood tariffs to be a tool for regulating imports. For exam-
ple, Section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930 refers to “duties and other import
restrictions.” 19 U. S. C. §§ 1351(a)(1)(B), (c). And Section 122 of the
Trade Act of 1974 uses the phrase “restrict imports” to cover duties.
§ 2132(a). Both statutes take it as a given, therefore, that tariffs are a
means of regulating imports.
7
As the parties and the Court use the terms, “tariffs” and “duties” are
synonymous.
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Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
that it cannot “be inferred” that the “power to regulate trade
does
not involve a power to tax it.” Letter from J. Madison
to J. Cabell, Sept. 18, 1828, in 9 Writings of James Madison
326 (G. Hunt ed. 1910) (emphasis added).
Marshall, Story, and Madison make for a formidable trio.
And this Court has long echoed the Marshall-Story-Madison
understanding that tariffs “regulate” foreign commerce.
The “laying of a duty on imports, although an exercise of the
taxing power, is also an exercise of the power to regulate
foreign commerce.” McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309
U. S. 414, 428 (1940) (emphasis added). And again: Even
though “the taxing power is a distinct power and embraces
the power to lay duties, it does not follow that duties may
not be imposed in the exercise of the power to regulate com-
merce. The contrary is well established.” Board of Trust-
ees of Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U. S. 48, 58 (1933)
(emphasis added).
8
The plaintiffs and the Court today seize on the word “regu-
late” in isolation, and say that it does not encompass the
power to tariff. Ante, at 249–251. But the relevant statu-
tory phrase is “regulate . . . importation.” And we must
look to the meaning of the phrase as a whole, as our prece-
dents dictate. See FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U. S. 397, 406
(2011) (“[T]wo words together may assume a more particular
meaning than those words in isolation”). As I have ex-
plained, since the Founding, tariffs on foreign imports have
been a common means of regulating foreign commerce, in-
cluding imports. Notably, under the Court's reading of the
word “regulate,” Marshall, Story, and Madison all erred by
concluding that the power to “regulate” foreign commerce
includes the power to impose tariffs on foreign imports.
That seems dubious.
8
Importantly, those historical sources also fully demonstrate that the
Foreign Commerce Clause, not just the Taxing Clause, authorizes tariffs
on foreign imports. See Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 289 U. S.,
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342 LEARNING
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If the Federal Government's constitutional power to “reg-
u
late” foreign commerce includes tariffs (as this Court has
repeatedly said), and if the power to “regulate . . . importa-
tion” is the power to regulate foreign commerce with respect
to imports (as it plainly is), then IEEPA's authorization for
the President to “regulate . . . importation” clearly encom-
passes tariffs. Historical usage and that textual syllogism
further buttress the dictionary defnitions and help establish
that tariffs are a means to regulate importation.
9
B
Perhaps even more signifcantly, when IEEPA was
enacted in 1977, Congress and the public clearly would have
understood that the phrase “regulate . . . importation” en-
compassed tariffs. We know as much not only because of
the dictionary defnitions and the traditional understanding
of tariffs as a tool to regulate foreign imports. We also
know as much because of tariffs imposed by two Presidents
and approved by federal courts, including the Supreme
Court, in the years shortly before IEEPA's 1977 enactment.
First, in 1971, President Nixon imposed 10 percent tariffs
across the board on virtually all imports from every country
in the world. Presidential Proclamation No. 4074, 3 CFR
9
The plaintiffs and the Court offer a double-bankshot argument that
“regulate . . . importation” cannot include monetary exactions because
IEEPA also authorizes the President to “regulate . . . exportation,” and
imposing duties on exports would violate the Constitution. Ante, at 250.
But as the Government thoroughly explains, when a statute contains a
long string of verbs and nouns, each term should be understood in context.
The relevant section of IEEPA contains 9 verbs and 11 objects, for a total
of 99 combinations. We do not need to construe each word of the statute
to ensure that it is perfectly aligned in all 99 pairings. See Reply Brief
17; Robers v. United States, 572 U. S. 639, 643–644 (2014); Department of
Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz, 601 U. S.
42, 61 (2024) (We may not “disregard the statute's clear terms” simply
because there may be “a va lid constituti ona l defense” to some
applications).
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60–61 (1971–1975 Comp.). Those tariffs were justifed under
IEEP
A's predecessor statute, the Trading with the Enemy
Act, or TWEA.
10
Like IEEPA now, TWEA at that time
authorized the President to “regulate . . . importation” dur-
ing national emergencies, as well as wartime. And like
IEEPA now, TWEA did not specifcally use the words “tar-
iff ” or “duty.”
The Nixon tariffs did not fy below the radar. On the con-
trary, President Nixon announced the worldwide 10 percent
tariffs in a primetime address to the Nation on August 15,
1971. He imposed the tariffs as a tool “to make certain that
American products will not be at a disadvantage” and that
“the product of American labor will be more competitive.”
Public Papers of the Presidents, Richard Nixon, Aug. 15,
1971, p. 889. President Nixon sought to remove “the unfair
edge that some of our foreign competition has,” and he de-
clared that when “the unfair treatment is ended, the import
tax will end.” Ibid.
The Nixon tariffs applied to almost all imports of foreign
goods into the United States. And the tariffs had no time
limit. To be sure, they did not end up lasting forever. But
President Nixon terminated them only because the tariffs
(as intended) induced major American trading partners to
negotiate new agreements. Presidential Proclamation No.
4098, 3 CFR 94 (1971–1975 Comp.).
The Nixon tariffs garnered substantial national and inter-
national attention, and were generally popular in Congress.
Predictably, however, the tariffs sparked litigation chal-
lenges. In 1975, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
10
President Nixon did not explicitly cite the “regulate . . . importation”
language of TWEA when imposing those worldwide tariffs. But that
merely refected a diplomatic nicety given the title of the “Trading with
the Enemy Act” and the desire to avoid publicly suggesting that allies
were enemies. Once in court, the President openly invoked the “regulate
. . . importation” language of TWEA as justifcation for the tariffs. See
United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F. 2d 560, 569–571 (CCPA 1975).
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the predecessor to the Federal Circuit, upheld the Nixon tar-
i
ffs as a lawful exercise of the President's authority to “regu-
late . . . importation” under TWEA. United States v. Yo-
shida Int'l, Inc., 526 F. 2d 560, 576, 583–584. The losing
plaintiffs did not seek further review in this Court.
Two years later in 1977, when Congress divided TWEA
into two, Congress retained that same “regulate . . . importa-
tion” language in both laws—in TWEA for wartime and in
IEEPA for peacetime national emergencies. In doing so,
Members of Congress were plainly aware—after all, how
could they not be—that the “regulate . . . importation” lan-
guage had recently been invoked by the President and inter-
preted by the courts to encompass tariffs. Indeed, the
House Committee Report noted that the relevant “regulate
. . . importation” provision in TWEA “came into play when,
on August 15, 1971, President Nixon declared a national
emergency with respect to the balance-of-payments crisis
and under that emergency imposed a surcharge on imports.”
H. R. Rep. No. 95–459, p. 5 (1977). The Report further ref-
erenced the appeals court's holding in Yoshida that TWEA
“authorized imposition of duties” because of “the existence
of the national emergency.” H. R. Rep. No. 95–459, at 5.
11
The Nixon tariffs persuasively demonstrate that Members
of Congress and the public would have understood the
phrase “regulate . . . importation” to include tariffs when
IEEPA was enacted in 1977. If Congress wanted to exclude
tariffs from IEEPA's scope, why would it enact the exact
statutory language from TWEA that had just been invoked
by the President and interpreted by the courts to cover tar-
iffs? Neither the plaintiffs nor the Court today offers a
11
I cite the Committee Report not for determining the meaning of
IEEPA, but rather to help show as an historical and factual matter that
Members of Congress were aware of both the Nixon tariffs and the ap-
peals court decision upholding those tariffs as a tool to “regulate . . .
importation.”
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good answer to that question. Understandably so, because
there
is no good answer.
The Court tries to dodge the force of the Nixon tariffs by
observing that one appeals court's interpretation of “regu-
late . . . importation” to uphold President Nixon's tariffs does
not suffce to describe that interpretation as “well-settled”
when IEEPA was enacted in 1977. Ante, at 252–253. Fair
enough. But that is not the right question. The question
is what Members of Congress and the public would have un-
derstood “regulate . . . importation” to mean when Congress
enacted IEEPA in 1977. See New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira,
586 U. S. 105, 113 (2019). Given the signifcant and well-
known Nixon tariffs, it is entirely implausible to think that
Congress's 1977 re-enactment of the phrase “regulate . . .
importation” in IEEPA was somehow meant or understood
to exclude tariffs.
12
Second, if one holds any lingering doubts about Congress's
and the public's understanding of the power to “regulate . . .
importation” as of 1977, a second episode shortly before
IEEPA's enactment should answer them.
In 1975, President Ford imposed signifcant monetary ex-
actions on foreign imports of oil. Presidential Proclamation
No. 4341, 3 CFR 433 (1971–1975 Comp.). He acted under
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Like
TWEA and IEEPA, the relevant provision of Section 232
did not use the word “tariff” or “duty.” Rather, Section 232
broadly authorized the President to “adjust the imports” of
a product, 19 U. S. C. § 1862(b) (1970 ed.)—language akin to
12
The Chief Justice's opinion also tries to dismiss President Nixon's
tariffs as being of “limited amount, duration, and scope.” Ante, at 245, n.
3. That claim appears incorrect on all three points, as Judge Taranto
carefully explained in his Federal Circuit opinion. 149 F. 4th 1312, 1367–
1369 (2025) (dissenting opinion). President Nixon imposed 10 percent tar-
iffs on virtually all imports from every country in the world for an unspeci-
fed duration. See Presidential Proclamation No. 4074, 3 CFR 60–61
(1971–1975 Comp.).
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the “regulate . . . importation” language in IEEPA and
TWEA.
In
contrast to the Nixon tariffs, the Ford tariffs on oil im-
ports generated some pushback in Congress. And a group
of utility companies and States quickly sued, arguing that
the relevant statutory phrase “adjust the imports” did not
authorize monetary exactions such as tariffs.
Over a dissent, the D. C. Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs
challenging the Ford tariffs. Much like the Court's decision
today, the D. C. Circuit in the Ford matter concluded that
Congress must explicitly authorize monetary exactions and
that the applicable statutory phrase, “adjust the imports,”
did not do so. Algonquin SNG, Inc. v. Federal Energy
Admin., 518 F. 2d 1051, 1055 (CADC 1975).
In 1976, the Ford tariffs case came to the Supreme Court.
In this Court, the plaintiffs pressed nearly identical argu-
ments (and rhetorical fourishes) as those advanced by the
plaintiffs and repeated by the Court in today's case.
The plaintiffs argued that the Ford-imposed monetary ex-
actions involved “the broadest exercise of the tariff power
in the history of the American Republic,” reminiscent of
“George III's stamp tax.” Tr. of Oral Arg. in Federal En-
ergy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., O. T. 1975, No.
75–382, p. 26. They contended that the statute's authoriza-
tion for the President to “adjust the imports” did not allow
for such monetary exactions because the statute did “not
mention the tariff on its face.” Ibid. They asserted that
this Court had “never implied a tax, never in the history of
this Court from language which does not explicitly provide
for tax, and here there is no such language, there is no lan-
guage that mentions a measure of tax nor a method of calcu-
lation of tax. There is no such thing.” Id., at 33. They
echoed the D. C. Circuit's holding that reading the phrase
“adjust the imports” to encompass tariffs would be “an
anomalous departure” from “the consistently explicit, well-
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defned manner in which Congress has delegated control over
foreig
n trade and tariffs.” Algonquin, 518 F. 2d, at 1055.
And they claimed that interpreting the statute to include
fees “undermines the whole tariff structure of the United
States.” Tr. of Oral Arg. in Algonquin, at 26.
Importantly, the Algonquin plaintiffs acknowledged (as do
the plaintiffs and the Court in today's case) that the statu-
tory language “adjust the imports” would allow the Presi-
dent to impose quotas and embargoes on foreign imports.
See Brief for Respondents in Algonquin, No. 75–382, pp. 26–
27, and n. 30. So a President could completely block all im-
ports or limit their quantity. But according to the plaintiffs,
Congress's “adjust the imports” language precluded the
President from exercising the lesser power of imposing mon-
etary exactions such as tariffs.
The Supreme Court decided the Ford tariffs case in 1976.
The Court unanimously reversed the D. C. Circuit and fatly
rejected the plaintiffs' arguments. The Court held that the
statutory phrase “adjust the imports”—even though it did
not include terms such as “tariff,” “tax,” “duty,” or “fee”—
granted President Ford the authority to impose not only quo-
tas and embargoes, but also monetary exactions on foreign
imports. Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin
SNG, Inc., 426 U. S. 548, 561 (1976).
The Court analyzed the statutory text and found “no sup-
port in the language of the statute” for the plaintiffs' argu-
ment that “adjust the imports” should “be read to encompass
only quantitative methods—i. e., quotas—as opposed to mon-
etary methods—i. e., license fees—of effecting such adjust-
ments.” Ibid. The Court further explained: “Unless one
assumes, and we do not, that quotas will always be a feasible
method of dealing directly with national security threats
posed by the circumstances under which imports are enter-
ing the country, limiting the President to the use of quotas
would effectively and artifcially prohibit him from directly
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dealing with some of the very problems against which
§
232( b) is directed. ” Id., at 561– 562 (quotati on marks
omitted).
In short, according to the unanimous Algonquin Court,
the statutory text, structure, and logic of Section 232 defni-
tively established that the President's authority to “adjust
the imports” encompassed not only quotas and embargoes,
but also monetary exactions such as tariffs and fees.
Today's case should follow a fortiori from Algonquin. No
meaningful daylight exists between the statutory phrase
“adjust the imports” in Section 232 at issue in Algonquin
and the phrase “regulate . . . importation” in IEEPA at issue
here. The plaintiffs and the Court in this case do not even
try to distinguish “adjust the imports” from “regulate . . .
importation.” Nor could they. Recall that the dictionary
defnition of “regulate” includes “adjust by rule.” Black's
Law Dictionary, at 1156 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). To
adjust imports is to regulate imports. Indeed, if anything,
the phrase “regulate . . . importation” is broader in scope
than the phrase “adjust the imports.”
So if Section 232's “adjust the imports” includes tariffs—
as this Court unanimously concluded in Algonquin in 1976
just a year before IEEPA—how can IEEPA's “regulate . . .
importation” not include tariffs?
Algonquin's importance for today's case rests not merely
on its status as a unanimous on-point Supreme Court statu-
tory precedent—although it is surely signifcant for that rea-
son as well. The case is especially consequential for present
purposes because it helps show the ordinary public and con-
gressional understanding of “regulate . . . importation” in
1977 when Congress enacted IEEPA.
To be clear, the question here is not what individual Mem-
bers of Congress might have subjectively intended in 1977.
The question is the ordinary meaning and understanding of
the words that Congress used. Given that the phrase “ad-
just the imports”—again, in a statutory provision that did
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349
Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
not use specifc words such as “tariff ” or “duty”—was unani-
mously
held by this Court in 1976 to include tariffs, and
given that President Nixon had similarly relied on his statu-
tory authority to “regulate . . . importation” to impose 10
percent tariffs on virtually all imports from all countries,
could a rational citizen or Member of Congress in 1977 have
understood “regulate . . . importation” in IEEPA not to en-
compass tariffs? I think not. Any citizens or Members of
Congress in 1977 who somehow thought that the “regulate
. . . importation” language in IEEPA excluded tariffs would
have had their heads in the sand.
The Court today tries its best to distinguish Algonquin on
the ground that Section 232 included “sweeping ” language
authorizing the President to take “such action” that “he
deems necessary,” whereas IEEPA does not. Ante, at 254.
But the Algonquin Court did not rely on that language and
instead focused on whether the phrase “adjust the imports”
included monetary exactions. See 426 U. S., at 561. More-
over, IEEPA itself broadly authorizes the President to “reg-
ulate . . . importation” “by means of instructions, licenses, or
otherwise” in order to “deal with” an “unusual and extraordi-
nary” foreign “threat” to the “national security, foreign pol-
icy, or economy of the United States.” 50 U. S. C. §§ 1701(a),
1702(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). That language is similarly
expansive, authorizing the President to employ various tools
to “regulate . . . importation.” In short, just as the phrase
“adjust the imports” includes tariffs, as Algonquin held, so
too the phrase “regulate . . . importation” includes tariffs.
13
The Court also attempts to brush aside Algonquin by cit-
ing an entirely different provision of the Trade Expansion
Act—one that was not at issue in Algonquin—that expressly
refers to a “duty.” Ante, at 254. But the Algonquin Court
did not rely on—or even mention—that provision when con-
13
In addition, IEEPA expressly authorizes the President to require li-
censes. And to obtain a license, a business may need to pay license fees
that can be equivalent to tariffs. See § 1702(a)(1).
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cluding that the statutory phrase “adjust the imports” in-
cludes
tariffs. For good reason. That provision, which
states that “[n]o action shall be taken” to “decrease or elimi-
nate” an existing “duty or other import restriction,” 19
U. S. C. § 1862(a) (1970 ed.), concerns only the power to re-
duce existing tariffs and plainly does not bear on a Presi-
dent's power to impose tariffs under Section 232.
To sum up on the Nixon and Ford tariffs: When enacting
IEEPA in 1977, Congress employed the exact language re-
cently invoked by President Nixon to justify 10 percent
worldwide tariffs. And IEEPA came fast on the heels of
this Court's unanimous 1976 decision in Algonquin, which
held that substantially similar “adjust the imports” language
authorized President Ford's tariffs on oil imports. Impor-
tantly, moreover, the statutory provisions authorizing the
Nixon and Ford tariffs did not use specifc words such as
“tariff ” or “duty.”
The Nixon and Ford tariffs, this Court's decision in Algon-
quin, and the ordinary and historical understanding of tariffs
as a means of regulating imports together render it all but
impossible to conclude that Congress in 1977 implicitly ex-
cluded tariffs when retaining TWEA's “regulate . . . importa-
tion” language in IEEPA. If Congress in 1977 wanted to
exclude tariffs from the President's IEEPA toolkit, either it
would have not retained the phrase “regulate . . . importa-
tion,” or it would otherwise have made clear in IEEPA that
the power to impose tariffs was excluded. Congress did
neither.
C
Two additional historical points strongly reinforce that
analysis of text and precedent and further demonstrate that
“regulate . . . importation” in IEEPA encompasses tariffs.
First, U. S. history from the 1800s through IEEPA's 1977
enactment illustrates how the statute came to incorporate
the President's long-recognized authority to impose tariffs
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351
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during wartime and then also during peacetime national
emergencies.
Long
before the initial 1917 enactment of the Trading with
the Enemy Act, which was IEEPA's predecessor, the Presi-
dent possessed inherent wartime authority to prohibit com-
mercial relations with enemy nations. That inherent au-
thority included the power to impose tariffs on foreign
imports.
For example, during the Mexican-American War in the
1840s, President Polk permitted only limited trade with Mex-
ico, subject to tariffs. Some Members of Congress publicly
questioned whether the President possessed that tariff au-
thority. In response, President Polk justifed the tariffs on
the ground that “the military right to exclude commerce
altogether from the ports of the enemy in our military occu-
pation included the minor right of admitting it under pre-
scribed conditions.” J. Polk, To the House of Representa-
tives of the United States (Jan. 2, 1849), in 6 Compilation of
the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 2522, 2523
(J. Richardson ed. 1897).
In 1854, the Supreme Court agreed with President Polk's
view, stating: “No one can doubt” that the President, as
“commander-in-chief of our naval force,” possessed the au-
thority to “regulate import duties.” Cross v. Harrison, 16
How. 164, 189–190.
In 1862, President Lincoln partially lifted an existing
blockade against the Confederate States during the Civil
War. Like President Polk, he then permitted limited trade,
subject to a monetary fee. A group of cotton sellers later
sued, arguing that the fee “was essentially a tax and not
authorized by any act of Congress, which alone had the
power to impose taxes.” Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wall. 73,
81 (1875). The Supreme Court rejected that argument,
holding that there was “no question” that requiring a mone-
tary fee to trade with the Confederate States was part of
“the war power of the United States government.” Id., at
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86–87. The existence of war meant “a suspension of com-
mercia
l intercourse between the opposing sections of the
country,” so if “such a course of dealing were to be permitted
at all, it would necessarily be upon such conditions as the
government chose to prescribe.” Id., at 87.
And in 1898, during the Spanish-American War, President
McKinley imposed duties “upon the occupation of any forts
and places in the Philippine Islands.” Lincoln v. United
States, 197 U. S. 419, 428 (1905) (quotation marks omitted).
This Court subsequently recognized those McKinley duties
as a lawful wartime measure. Id., at 427–428.
Why does that wartime history matter? Because when
Congress frst enacted the Trading with the Enemy Act in
1917 during World War I, it statutorily codifed some of the
President's longstanding inherent wartime powers over for-
eign trade, which included the power to tariff. See Trading
with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411; see also Brief for
Professor Aditya Bamzai as Amicus Curiae 16–19, 26–27.
For the duration of World War I, TWEA authorized the
President, when he found “the public safety so requires,” to
make it unlawful “to import into the United States” from
any “named” country certain goods “except at such time or
times, and under such regulations or orders, and subject to
such limitations and exceptions as the President shall pre-
scribe.” § 11, 40 Stat. 422–423.
In 1933, during the Great Depression and fve days after
President Franklin Roosevelt took offce, Congress expanded
TWEA to apply not only in wartime, but also during a “na-
tional emergency” declared by the President. 48 Stat. 1.
Eight years later, in 1941, a few days after Pearl Harbor,
Congress again amended TWEA's language by more suc-
cinctly providing that the President may “regulate” certain
transactions, including “importation,” under TWEA during
war or “any other period of national emergency declared by
the President.” 55 Stat. 839.
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So as of 1941—and from then to 1977—TWEA expressly
author
ized the President to “regulate . . . importation” both
during wartime and during peacetime national emergencies.
Historically, Presidents had regulated importation by impos-
ing tariffs, as the Polk, Lincoln, and McKinley tariffs illus-
trated. So TWEA from 1941 to 1977 was best understood
to authorize tariffs. See Brief for Professor Aditya Bamzai
as Amicus Curiae 27–28.
During that period, as I have discussed at length above,
President Nixon in 1971 imposed 10 percent tariffs on almost
all imports of foreign goods and relied on TWEA's “regulate
. . . importation” language to justify them. Those tariffs
were upheld in court.
Then, in 1977, Congress amended TWEA and divided it
into two statutes. TWEA retained the President's power to
“regulate . . . importation,” but only during wartime. The
newly enacted second law, IEEPA, also retained the power
to “regulate . . . importation,” and it would apply during
periods of declared national emergencies. As this Court has
previously recognized, IEEPA was “directly drawn” from
TWEA, and the relevant authorities are essentially the
same. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U. S. 654, 671, 672–
673 (1981).
Therefore, IEEPA's specifc language—“regulate . . . im-
portation”—was not new statutory text when Congress
enacted IEEPA in 1977. Far from it. Beginning in 1941,
TWEA had already authorized the President to “regulate
. . . importation” of foreign goods in wartime and national
emergencies. And the earlier Polk, Lincoln, and McKinley
examples, as well as the later Nixon example, demonstrated
that the power to “regulate . . . importation” historically en-
compassed tariffs as well as quotas and embargoes.
The plaintiffs and the Court today assert that wartime
precedents do not govern peacetime. But Congress mod-
eled IEEPA on TWEA precisely so that the President could
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continue to exercise certain wartime authorities such as quo-
t
as, embargoes, and tariffs during peacetime national emer-
gencies as well. Congress frst explicitly extended that war-
time power to national emergencies in 1933, during the
Franklin Roosevelt Administration. Cf. New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 306 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(The Great Depression was “an emergency more serious than
war”). And Congress has continued to authorize the Presi-
dent to exercise that power in both wartime and peacetime
emergencies.
In short, Congress in 1977 enacted the same “regulate . . .
importation” language that had long been understood to en-
compass tariffs.
Second, contrary to the tenor of the plaintiffs' and the
Court's arguments here, it would not have been at all un-
usual or surprising for Congress, when enacting IEEPA in
1977, to authorize the President to impose tariffs. Since the
early days of the Republic, Congress has regularly granted
the President the power to regulate foreign trade, including
via tariffs.
A few examples: In 1810, Congress authorized the Presi-
dent to prohibit imports from Great Britain or France if
either nation violated the neutral commerce of the United
States. Cargo of Brig Aurora v. United States, 7 Cranch
382, 382–384, 388 (1813); 2 Stat. 606.
In 1890, Congress granted the President the power to im-
pose import duties in response to duties imposed by other
countries on American exports. Marshall Field & Co. v.
Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 680–681 (1892); 26 Stat. 612.
In 1922, Congress empowered the President to levy import
duties under certain conditions. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co.
v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 400–402 (1928); 42 Stat. 941.
In 1930, Congress enacted Section 338 of the Tariff Act,
which authorizes the President to impose tariffs when he
fnds that “any foreign country places any burden or disad-
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355
Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
vantage upon the commerce of the United States.” 19
U
. S. C. § 1338(d); 46 Stat. 705.
In 1962, Congress authorized the President in Section 232
of the Trade Expansion Act to “adjust the imports” of a
foreign good that threatens to impair national security.
§ 1862(c)(1)(A); 76 Stat. 877.
In 1974, under Section 201 of the Trade Act, Congress
granted the President the power to “take all appropriate and
feasible action within his power,” including imposing a
“duty” on imports that, according to the U. S. International
Trade Commission, have caused or threatened “serious
injury” to a domestic industry. §§ 2251(a), 2253(a)(1)(A),
(3)(A); 88 Stat. 2014–2015.
So too, Section 301 authorizes the President to direct the
U. S. Trade Representative to “impose duties” on countries
engaging in unfair trade practices. §§ 2411(a), (c)(1)(B); 88
Stat. 2041–2042.
And Section 122 of the Act grants the President the power
to impose a “temporary import surcharge” to “deal with
large and serious United States balance-of-payments def-
cits.” § 2132(a)(1)(A); 88 Stat. 1987–1988.
Those many statutes defnitively establish that Congress,
since near the Founding, has delegated to the President
broad power to impose tariffs on foreign imports. See also
ante, at 325–327 (Thomas, J., dissenting). So it would hardly
have been unusual or surprising for Congress to have granted
tariff power to the President during wartime and peacetime
national emergencies, as it did in TWEA and IEEPA.
To be sure, given those other statutes that authorize the
President to impose tariffs on foreign imports, one might
reasonably ask: Why did the President need distinct tariff
authority under IEEPA during peacetime emergencies—or,
for that matter, under TWEA during wartime?
The basic answer is that IEEPA is an emergency statute
that allows the President to impose tariffs somewhat more
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quickly, as would be expected in a declared national emer-
gency
. Similarly, in wartime, TWEA allows the President
to impose tariffs more rapidly.
But critically, TWEA and IEEPA do not authorize the
President to exercise some new substantive power. Rather,
they authorize the President to exercise a commonly granted
power—tariffs—more effciently than under the many ordi-
nary tariff statutes.
The plaintiffs and the Court assert that interpreting
IEEPA to authorize tariffs would in effect evade specifc lim-
its on tariffs in certain other tariff statutes. But as Judge
Taranto explained in the Federal Circuit, Congress in
IEEPA understandably afforded the President more fexi-
bility to act during declared emergencies, just as Congress
had done in TWEA for wartime since 1917. See 149 F. 4th
1312, 1363–1366 (2025) (dissenting opinion).
Moreover, IEEPA is not a blank check. IEEPA contains
its own limits, including the requirement that the tariffs deal
with an unusual and extraordinary foreign threat, 50 U. S. C.
§ 1701(b); a default 1-year limit on emergencies, § 1622(d); an
enumerated list of exceptions, § 1702(b); and comprehensive
congressional reporting requirements, § 1703. And as noted
above, each House of Congress possesses a variety of tools
to revoke, limit, or infuence a President's IEEPA or
TWEA tariffs.
Relatedly, it is also not surprising that the many ordinary
tariff statutes expressly refer to “tariffs,” “duties,” and the
like, while IEEPA and TWEA do not. As Judge Taranto
astutely explained, “Congress in those statutes was over-
whelmingly focused on tariff issues,” whereas “Congress in
IEEPA (as in TWEA) was focused on the subject of emer-
gencies and giving plainly broad emergency authority re-
garding foreign property.” 149 F. 4th, at 1364 (dissenting
opinion).
In sum, in authorizing the President to “regulate . . . im-
portation,” IEEPA embodies an “eyes-open congressional
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Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
grant of broad emergency authority in this foreign-affairs
rea
lm, which unsurprisingly extends beyond authorities
available under non-emergency laws, and Congress con-
frmed the understood breadth by tying IEEPA's authority
to particularly demanding procedural requirements for keep-
ing Congress informed.” Id., at 1348.
D
Finally, all of that text, history, and precedent is further
reinforced by two compelling pieces of context.
First, interpreting IEEPA to exclude tariffs creates non-
sensical textual and practical anomalies. The plaintiffs and
the Court do not dispute that the President can act in declared
emergencies under IEEPA to impose quotas or even total em-
bargoes on all imports from a given country. But the Presi-
dent supposedly cannot take the far more modest step of
conditioning those imports on payment of a tariff or duty.
Textually, however, if quotas and embargoes are a means
to regulate importation, how are tariffs not a means to regu-
late importation? Nothing in the text supports such an il-
logical distinction.
And it does not make much sense to think that IEEPA
allows the President in a declared national emergency to, for
example, shut off all or most imports from China, but not to
impose even a $1 tariff on imports from China. As Judge
Taranto forcefully pointed out in the Federal Circuit, tariffs
are “just a less extreme, more fexible tool for pursuing the
same objective of controlling the amount or price of imports
that, after all, could be barred altogether.” 149 F. 4th, at
1363 (dissenting opinion). All of that explains why this
Court in Algonquin defnitively rejected such a strange
slice-and-dice approach to the President's statutory power to
“adjust” imports. If quotas and embargoes are authorized,
so are tariffs.
In short, whether through prohibiting imports via embar-
goes or regulating the quantity of imports through quotas
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or regulating the price of imports with tariffs, Congress
granted
the President fexibility in declared national emer-
gencies to take various actions affecting imports of foreign
goods. The plaintiffs and the Court have no coherent tex-
tual or commonsensical explanation for why a rational Con-
gress would, in such a momentous and carefully considered
statute as IEEPA, grant the President the power to impose
quotas and embargoes, but not tariffs, on foreign imports
during emergencies.
Second, IEEPA was not debated and passed in a vacuum
in 1977—it was enacted around the same time that Congress
signifcantly constrained executive power in multiple ways
in the wake of Watergate and Vietnam. The list of major
new statutory restrictions on Presidential power enacted in
the 1970s is long and extraordinary, with lasting effects to
the present day.
14
And Congress, during that comprehensive examination
and recalibration of government power, did not overlook
TWEA and the President's emergency authorities. Led by
Senators Church and Mathias, Congress carefully studied the
President's emergency authorities, including TWEA. Then,
in 1976 and 1977, Congress enacted a variety of legislation
to tighten up the President's emergency powers, including
by passing a new National Emergencies Act that cabined the
President's authority to declare emergencies by setting forth
various procedural requirements.
14
See, e. g., Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1824, reenacted
at 5 U. S. C. § 13101 et seq.; Inspector General Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1101,
reenacted at 5 U. S. C. § 401 et seq.; Presidential Records Act of 1978, 92
Stat. 2523, as amended, 44 U. S. C. § 2201 et seq.; Federal Advisory Com-
mittee Act, 86 Stat. 770, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq.; Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1783, as amended, 50 U. S. C.
§ 1801 et seq.; Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974, 88 Stat. 297, as amended, 2 U. S. C. § 621 et seq.; 1974 Amendments
to the Freedom of Information Act, 88 Stat. 1561, as amended, 5 U. S. C.
§ 552; War Powers Resolution, 87 Stat. 555, 50 U. S. C. § 1541 et seq.
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Yet when enacting IEEPA in 1977, Congress continued to
grant
the President the power to “regulate . . . importation”
in declared national emergencies—a power that the Presi-
dent had possessed since 1941 under TWEA and that had
recently been invoked by President Nixon to justify his 1971
tariffs. In IEEPA (and TWEA) in 1977, Congress con-
sciously balanced concerns about expansive exercises of
emergency powers against the necessity of equipping the
President with tools to address exigencies that are diffcult
if not impossible to foresee. That broader congressional
context—general skepticism and scaling back of executive
power combined with re-enactment of the familiar “regulate
. . . importation” language in IEEPA—strongly indicates
that Congress said what it meant and meant what it said
when it enacted IEEPA and continued to authorize the Pres-
ident to “reg u late . . . i mpor t ati on” dur i ng nati onal
emergencies.
III
In an ordinary statutory interpretation case, I am conf-
dent that a majority of this Court would fatly reject the
plaintiffs' exceedingly weak statutory arguments and would
hold that IEEPA's authorization for the President to “regu-
late . . . importation” during national emergencies includes
the power to impose tariffs.
Notably, the Court today does not claim that the phrase
“regulate . . . importation” on its own excludes tariffs as a
matter of ordinary statutory meaning. Only three Members
of the Court, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and
Justice Jackson, do so.
The Chief Justice's opinion in Part II–A–2, which is
joined only by Justice Gorsuch and Justice Barrett, in-
stead relies on the major questions doctrine. The major
questions doctrine is an important canon of statutory inter-
pretation that the Court has applied in a number of signif-
cant cases over the last 45 years. See Industrial Union
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Dept., AFL–CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S.
607,
645 (1980) (plurality opinion).
Justice Scalia articulated the canonical statement of the
major questions doctrine: “We expect Congress to speak
clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast
`economic and political signifcance.' ” Utility Air Regula-
tory Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. 302, 324 (2014) (quoting FDA
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 160
(2000)); see also Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department
of Health and Human Servs., 594 U. S. 758, 764 (2021) (per
curiam); National Federation of Independent Business v.
OSHA, 595 U. S. 109, 117 (2022) (per curiam); Biden v. Ne-
braska, 600 U. S. 477, 507 (2023); cf. West Virginia v. EPA,
597 U. S. 697, 723 (2022).
Stated otherwise, in cases where the Executive Branch
takes an action of major economic and political signifcance,
it must “point to `clear congressional authorization' for the
power it claims.” Ibid. (quoting Utility Air, 573 U. S., at 324).
The requirement of “clear congressional authorization” for
executive actions of major economic and political signifcance
is “grounded in two overlapping and reinforcing presump-
tions: (i) a separation of powers-based presumption against
the delegation of major lawmaking authority from Congress
to the Executive Branch, and (ii) a presumption that Con-
gress intends to make major policy decisions itself, not leave
those decisions to agencies.” United States Telecom Assn.
v. FCC, 855 F. 3d 381, 419 (CADC 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dis-
senting from denial of rehearing en banc) (citation omitted).
As this Court later recounted in West Virginia, “both sepa-
ration of powers principles and a practical understanding of
legislative intent make us reluctant to read into ambiguous
statutory text the delegation claimed to be lurking there.”
597 U. S., at 723 (quotation marks omitted).
15
The doctrine
15
The major questions doctrine has also been analogized to, among other
things, the mischief rule, the absurdity doctrine, common sense, and con-
text. See, e. g., S. Bray, The Mischief Rule, 109 Geo. L. J. 967, 1011 (2021)
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guards “against unintentional, oblique, or otherwise unlikely
delegati
ons of the legislative power.” NFIB, 595 U. S., at
125 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
16
I agree that this case involves an executive action of major
economic and political signifcance—which is typically the
trigger for requiring “clear congressional authorization.”
But in my respectful view, The Chief Justice's opinion's
application of the major questions doctrine in this case is
incorrect for two a lter native and independent reasons.
First, the statutory text, history, and precedent constitute
“clear congressional authorization” for the President to im-
pose tariffs as a means to “regulate . . . importation.” Sec-
ond, and in the alternative, the major questions doctrine
does not apply in the foreign affairs context. In the foreign
affairs realm, courts recognize that Congress often deliber-
ately grants fexibility and discretion to the President to pur-
sue America's interests. In that context, courts therefore
engage in “routine” textualist statutory interpretation—
reading the text as written—and do not employ the major
questions doctrine as a thumb on the scale against the Presi-
dent. West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 724.
A
1
Because the major questions doctrine demands “clear con-
gressional authorization,” this Court has repeatedly recog-
nized that the doctrine is “distinct” from “routine statutory
(doctrine “has an essential similarity with the mischief rule”); Biden v.
Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477, 511 (2023) (Barrett, J., concurring) (context,
common sense).
16
I have long been, and fully remain, a strong proponent of the major
questions doctrine. See United States Telecom, 855 F. 3d, at 418–426
(opinion of Kavanaugh, J.); Loving v. IRS, 742 F. 3d 1013, 1021 (CADC
2014); Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 9–1322
(CADC, Dec. 20, 2012), pp. 9–10 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc).
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interpretation.” West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 724 (quotation
marks
omitted). Importantly, therefore, the doctrine ap-
plies—and makes a meaningful difference—only in cases
where the Executive's “reading of a statute” “would, under
more ordinary circumstances, be upheld.” Ibid. (quotation
marks omitted); see also id., at 740, 742, n. 3 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring); M. Sohoni, The Major Questions Quartet, 136
Harv. L. Rev. 262, 272–276 (2022).
To properly set up the inquiry: A major questions issue
arises when: (i) the Executive relies on the text of a gener-
ally worded statute to exercise a specifc power of major eco-
nomic and political signifcance; (ii) the generally worded
statute does not explicitly mention the specifc major power,
but (iii) the asserted major power falls within the generally
worded text of the statute such that the Executive's asser-
tion of that power “would, under more ordinary circum-
stances, be upheld,” West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 724 (major-
ity opinion) (quotation marks omitted).
17
The question then is whether the generally worded statute
supplies “clear congressional authorization” for the Execu-
tive to exercise that specifc—but not explicitly mentioned—
major power. Here, for example, does the generally worded
statutory authorization for the President to “regulate . . .
importation” clearly authorize the President to impose
tariffs?
The requirement of “clear congressional authorization” is
easy enough to state. But how do we apply it? How do we
decide in a particular case whether a generally worded stat-
ute actually constitutes “clear congressional authorization”
for a major power that otherwise falls within the general
terms?
17
Of course, if the major power does not fall within the generally worded
text as a matter of ordinary statutory interpretation, the major questions
doctrine is not implicated or necessary to apply because the Government's
statutory argument fails to begin with.
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For starters, and critically, the Court has repeatedly em-
phasi
zed that the major questions doctrine is not a magic
words requirement. In other words, the doctrine does not
require an explicit reference to the specifc major power it-
self. As the Court's cases amply demonstrate, the major
questions doctrine does not “forc[e] Congress to delegate in
highly specifc terms.” Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 516
(Barrett, J., concurring) (quotation marks omitted).
Rather than require magic words (such as the words “tar-
iff ” or “duty” here), the Court's cases have focused on four
somewhat overlapping factors or considerations in order to
assess whether a generally worded statute constitutes “clear
congressional authorization” for the specifc major power.
18
First, the major questions doctrine's most prominent work
has been to ensure that the Executive cannot suddenly seize
on an old and generally worded statute to exercise a power
of great economic and political signifcance when that power
would not reasonably have been understood at the time of
enactment to fall within that generally worded statute. See
West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 720–735; Brown & Williamson,
529 U. S., at 159–161. As the Court has said: “When an
agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unher-
alded power to regulate a signifcant portion of the American
economy, we typically greet its announcement with a meas-
ure of skepticism.” Utility Air, 573 U. S., at 324 (citation
and quotation marks omitted); West Virginia, 597 U. S., at
748 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
The doctrine thus precludes an agency's attempt to effec-
tuate “a fundamental revision of the statute.” MCI Tele-
communications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph
18
Both Justice Gorsuch and Justice Barrett have likewise read the
Court's precedents to identify those same four factors, as they explained
in their incisive separate opinions in West Virginia v. EPA and Biden v.
Nebraska, respectively. See 597 U. S. 697, 746–749 (2022) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (referring to the four “telling clues”); 600 U. S., at 517–520
(Barrett, J., concurring); see also ante, at 281 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
Co., 512 U. S. 218, 231 (1994). Stated otherwise, an
“agency'
s attempt to deploy an old statute focused on one
problem to solve a new and different problem” may be “a
warning sign that it is acting without clear congressional au-
thority.” West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 747 (Gorsuch, J., con-
curring). The Court's skepticism about major executive ac-
tion in those scenarios has been heightened when Congress
has “conspicuously and repeatedly declined to enact” legisla-
tion that would have authorized the executive action in ques-
tion. Id., at 724 (majority opinion).
A prototypical example occurred when OSHA, in order to
justify a nationwide COVID–19 vaccine mandate for work-
ers, relied “on a statutory provision that was adopted 40
years before the pandemic and that focused on conditions
specifc to the workplace.” Id., at 747 (Gorsuch, J., concur-
ring). Another example arose when EPA invoked “new-
found authority to regulate” emissions from “millions of
small sources—including retail stores, offces, apartment
buildings, shopping centers, schools, and churches.” Utility
Air, 573 U. S., at 328. Yet another happened when the CDC
tried to impose an eviction moratorium for rental housing
through an “unprecedented” assertion of its authority to reg-
ulate public health. Alabama Assn. of Realtors, 594 U. S.,
at 765.
Second, courts examine the “agency's past interpretations
of the relevant statute.” West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 747
(Gorsuch, J., concurring). The Executive's “track record
can be particularly probative” in the major questions con-
text. Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 519 (Barrett, J.,
concurring).
A “contemporaneous and long-held Executive Branch in-
terpretation of a statute is entitled to some weight.” West
Virginia, 597 U. S., at 747 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (quota-
tion marks omitted). Just “as established practice may shed
light on the extent of power conveyed by general statutory
language, so the want of assertion of power by those who
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presumably would be alert to exercise it, is equally signif-
cant
in determining whether such power was actually con-
ferred.” Id., at 725 (majority opinion) (quotation marks
omitted).
The NFIB Court therefore found it critical that “OSHA,
in its half century of existence, has never before adopted a
broad public health regulation of this kind” under the statute
that the agency sought to invoke as authority for the vaccine
mandate. 595 U. S., at 119. Likewise, in Brown & Wil-
liamson, the FDA had “repeatedly and consistently as-
sert[ed] that it lacks jurisdiction under the FDCA to regu-
late tobacco products.” 529 U. S., at 156. And in West
Virginia, EPA had not “previously interpreted the relevant
provision to confer on it such vast authority” to transform
Amer ican i ndustry. 597 U. S., at 749 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
Third, courts assess whether “there is a mismatch be-
tween an agency's challenged action and its congressionally
assigned mission and expertise,” id., at 748 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring)—in other words, whether an agency is trying to
regulate “outside its wheelhouse,” Biden v. Nebraska, 600
U. S., at 518 (Barrett, J., concurring).
In the NFIB case, OSHA, which is empowered to “set
workplace safety standards, not broad public health meas-
ures,” mandated COVID–19 vaccines. 595 U. S., at 117. In
Alabama Assn. of Realtors, the CDC—a public health
agency—attempted to regulate housing. 594 U. S., at 763–
765. In Gonzales v. Oregon, the Attorney General sought
to assert authority over the drugs used in physician-assisted
suicide. 546 U. S. 243, 267–268 (2006).
All of those cases involved serious mismatches between
the agency's usual regulatory activities and its asserted
major power.
Fourth, the Court looks at whether the relevant statutory
language used to justify the Executive's exercise of a major
power is “oblique,” “elliptical,” or “cryptic.” West Virginia,
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Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
597 U. S., at 746–747 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (alterations
and
quotation marks omitted). As the Court has often said,
Congress does not “hide elephants” in statutory “mouse-
holes.” Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531
U. S. 457, 468 (2001).
In MCI Telecommunications Corp., for example, the
Court refused to allow the FCC to eliminate rate regulation
and fundamentally overhaul the telecommunications indus-
try based on a “subtle” provision that merely permitted the
FCC to “modify” rate-fling requirements. 512 U. S., at 231
(quotation marks omitted). In Brown & Williamson, the
Court rejected the FDA's attempt to regulate the tobacco
industry based on a “cryptic” statutory provision that re-
ferred to “safety.” 529 U. S., at 160 (quotation marks omit-
ted). In Gonzales, the Court said that Congress would not
have granted the Attorney General the power to regulate
physician-assisted suicide through “oblique” statutory lan-
guage. 546 U. S., at 267. And in West Virginia, the Court
found it unlikely that Congress would have granted major
power to reshape the energy industry in a “previously little-
used backwater” of the statute. 597 U. S., at 730.
2
So in this case we must apply those four factors in order
to determine whether Congress, when it afforded the Presi-
dent the power to “regulate . . . importation,” clearly author-
ized the President to impose tariffs. As I see it, those factors
show that Congress clearly authorized tariffs in IEEPA when
it empowered the President to “regulate . . . importation.”
First, unlike the OSHA vaccine mandate in NFIB or the
greenhouse gas regulation in Utility Air, for example, the
President here is not exercising an “unheralded” or “new-
found authority” based on a “long-extant” statute—that is,
exercising a power that was unanticipated or unforeseen
when Congress enacted IEEPA's “regulate . . . importation”
language in 1977.

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On the contrary, as was fully explained above, the tariff
author
ity exercised here is not remotely “unheralded.” To
recap: Any citizen or Member of Congress who paid the least
bit of attention in 1977 would have readily understood that
the President's authority to “regulate . . . importation” en-
compassed the power to tariff. There are the dictionary
defnitions and the historical usage and practice. And
among other things, just a few years before IEEPA, that
“regulate . . . importation” language was invoked by Presi-
dent Nixon and judicially approved to sustain his 10 percent
worldwide tariffs. President Ford then implemented sig-
nifcant tariffs using substantially similar “adjust the im-
ports” statutory language, and this Court unanimously up-
held President Ford's tariffs in Algonquin.
So IEEPA's grant of authority to the President to impose
tariffs in order to regulate importation is not “unheralded”
or “newfound.” That authority was plain as day in 1977.
19
Second, the President is not interpreting the “regulate . . .
importation” language in IEEPA differently from how past
Presidents have interpreted it. At least as far as the
briefng and arguments in this case have disclosed, no Presi-
19
The Court downplays the signifcance of the prominent Nixon and
Ford tariffs. Ante, at 252–254 (majority opinion); ante, at 281–282, 293
(Gorsuch, J., concurring). But the Nixon and Ford examples, as well as
Algonquin, are critical for a proper and full understanding of the meaning
of “regulate . . . importation” when Congress enacted IEEPA in 1977.
We cannot ignore or diminish that history. The Chief Justice's opinion
and Justice Gorsuch's concurrence also say that no President since 1977
has invoked IEEPA to impose tariffs. Ante, at 245 (opinion of Roberts,
C. J.); ante, at 281–282 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). But since 1977, Presi-
dents have imposed numerous tariffs under non-emergency tariff stat-
utes—including Section 232, which like IEEPA also does not explicitly
reference tariffs or taxes. The fact that recent Presidents have not often
had occasion under the National Emergencies Act to declare national
emergencies in which tariffs would help “deal with” the specifc emergency
at issue does not mean that Presidents have now lost the authority exer-
cised by President Nixon to impose tariffs. IEEPA was not designed as
a use-it-or-lose-it source of emergency authority.
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dential Administration since the enactment of the “regulate
.
. . importation” language in TWEA in 1941 or since its
re-enactment in IEEPA in 1977 has interpreted the statute
to exclude the power to impose tariffs. Moreover, before
IEEPA's enactment, President Nixon imposed tariffs based
on the same “regulate . . . importation” language. And in
1975, President Ford invoked authority to “adjust the im-
ports” in order to similarly impose monetary exactions. In
addition—if more is needed—Marshall, Story, Madison, and
this Court have all long recognized that the power to regu-
late foreign commerce includes tariffs.
The current President's reading of IEEPA follows from
and is entirely consistent with those past interpretations—
making his position nothing like, for example, FDA's when it
changed its longstanding position that it lacked the authority
to regulate cigarettes, Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at
159–160, or OSHA's when it implemented a vaccine require-
ment even though it had “never before adopted a broad pub-
lic health regulation of this kind,” NFIB, 595 U. S., at 119.
When, as here, “established practice,” West Virginia, 597
U. S., at 725 (quotation marks omitted), and the Executive's
“track record,” Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 519 (Bar-
rett, J., concurring), convincingly show that the general
statutory language has long been understood to cover the
specifc power asserted by the Executive, that record should
all but resolve the matter for major questions purposes.
Third, there is no mismatch: The power to tariff falls
squarely within the President's wheelhouse. From the
Founding, as The Chief Justice’s opinion today acknowl-
edges, numerous other statutes have afforded—and still do
afford—the President broad power to impose tariffs. Ante,
at 243–244. This case is entirely different, therefore, from
our prior major questions cases, where, for example, the
CDC attempted to impose an eviction moratorium, Alabama
Assn. of Realtors, 594 U. S., at 763–765; OSHA sought to
implement a nationwide vaccine mandate, NFIB, 595 U. S.,

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369
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at 117–120; the FDA tried to regulate cigarettes, Brown &
Wi
lliamson, 529 U. S., at 159–161; and the Attorney General
attempted to regulate physician-assisted suicide, Gonzales,
546 U. S., at 267–268.
Presidents imposing tariffs—whether pursuant to inher-
ent wartime authority, pursuant to TWEA and IEEPA's
“regulate . . . importation” language, pursuant to Section
232's “adjust the imports” text, or pursuant to the many
other tariff statutory authorities—is hardly an unusual oc-
currence in our Nation's history or in recent times. For
example, Presidents George W. Bush, Obama, and Biden all
imposed tariffs pursuant to congressional authorization.
There is no mismatch between the tariff power and the Pres-
ident's “mission and expertise.” West Virginia, 597 U. S., at
748 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Fourth, the President is not relying on oblique, elliptical,
or cryptic language. This case does not involve “elephants
in mouseholes.” Whitman, 531 U. S., at 468. This case in-
stead involves an elephant (tariffs) in a statutory elephant
hole (the power to “regulate . . . importation” to deal with
foreign threats in national emergencies). IEEPA was a
major and thoroughly studied statute carefully crafted to
grant the President a suite of powerful tools, including to
“regulate . . . importation,” and thereby allow him to respond
swiftly to national emergencies and to help America respond
to crises. Since its enactment, Presidents have invoked
IEEPA more than 70 times to deal with emergencies and
threats from the September 11, 2001, al Qaeda attacks to
Iran to North Korea, and many others. See Congressional
Research Service, The International Emergency Economic
Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use 18–32 (2025).
By 1977, moreover, it was well-known that tariffs on for-
eign imports—along with even more powerful tools such as
quotas and embargoes—were a common way to “regulate . . .
importation.” IEEPA thus bears zero resemblance to the
paradigmatic “previously little-used backwater” statutory
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provision that cannot support signifcant executive actions.
W
est Virginia, 597 U. S., at 730.
All of that makes this case dramatically different from—
really, the opposite of—the major questions cases where the
Court has ruled against the Government. The text, the his-
tory, the context, and the precedent all point strongly to the
conclusion that as of 1977, tariffs were a well-recognized
means of regulating importation, like quotas and embargoes.
As Judge Taranto persuasively summarized, this case
bears none of the hallmarks of past major questions cases
where the Court found a lack of clear congressional authori-
zati on for the Gover nment's asser ted major power.
IEEPA's “facial breadth in an emergency context makes the
straightforward application of the statute's words hardly un-
heralded, and if a more specifc herald is needed, it is present
in the [Nixon] 1971 proclamation, Yoshida CCPA, and subse-
quent congressional adoption of the relevant language in
1977.” 149 F. 4th 1312, 1376 (CA Fed. 2025) (dissenting
opinion) (citations omitted). IEEPA seeks “to provide fex-
ibility in the tools available to the President to address the
unusual and extraordinary threats specifed in a declared na-
tional emergency. This is not an `ancillary,' `little used back-
water' provision, or a delegation outside the recipient's
wheelhouse.” Ibid. (citation omitted).
This Court's recent decision in Biden v. Missouri, 595 U. S.
87 (2022) (per curiam), strongly supports the President's po-
sition here. That case involved a challenge to President Bi-
den's COVID–19 vaccine requirement for millions of health-
care workers. The executive action there, too, was
undoubtedly major. But the Court upheld the Govern-
ment's vaccine mandate based on a general statutory au-
thorization for HHS to impose safety requirements for
healthcare facilities—notwithstanding the lack of explicit
statutory reference to vaccines. Id., at 90–96. In doing so,
the Court emphasized that state vaccination requirements

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371
Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
were common for healthcare workers and that the Federal
Gover
nment regularly required healthcare workers to take
various safety precautions. Id., at 94–95. Notably, the
Court upheld the vaccine mandate even though (as the dis-
senters pointed out) the Federal Government had not tradi-
tionally imposed such vaccine requirements on healthcare
workers. See id., at 104 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
The clarity of the congressional authorization in today's
case is far stronger than in Biden v. Missouri. The Nixon
and Ford tariffs, the Algonquin decision, and the Presi-
dent's longstanding authority to regulate trade and impose
tariffs establish—much more comprehensively and clearly
than in Biden v. Missouri—that the President is not claim-
ing some “unheralded power” that represents a “transfor-
mative expansion” of his authority. Utility Air, 573 U. S.,
at 324.
Because the Court upheld the Executive's exercise of a
major power in Biden v. Missouri, it follows that the Court
today should likewise uphold the President's assertion of a
major power here. Like cases should be treated alike.
In response to all of that, The Chief Justice's opinion
clings to its primary argument in this case—that a statute
must use the word “tariff” or “duty” or “tax” or the like
to authorize tariffs on foreign imports. But this Court has
repeatedly emphasized that the major questions doctrine is
not a magic words requirement. The Chief Justice's
opinion identifes no case that has demanded such specifcity.
And in Algonquin, this Court unanimously and squarely re-
jected the same argument that the statutory provision must
specifcally mention “tariffs” or “duties” or “taxes” for the
President to impose tariffs on foreign imports. Under The
Chief Justice's opinion, the Nixon and Ford tariffs would
also have been unlawful. So too might other tariffs imposed
under the longstanding Section 232 tariff statute, which
broadly authorizes the President to “adjust the imports” of
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a foreign good without mentioning “tariffs” or “taxes.”
And
so would tariffs imposed in wartime under TWEA's au-
thority to “regulate . . . importation.”
20
The Chief Justice's opinion's approach to the major
questions doctrine is a magic words test under another
name—in contravention of our precedents that make clear
that Congress need not use magic words or “highly specifc”
terms. Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 516 (Barrett, J.,
concurring) (quotation marks omitted).
21
In previous cases, the Court has looked at the four factors
to determine whether there is “clear congressional authori-
zation” precisely because the major questions canon has no
magic words requirement. If magic words or the equivalent
were necessary, that would be the only factor. And the
Court would not need the four factors that the Court has
consistently applied.
22
20
Under the Court's decision today, the President's authority to impose
tariffs under TWEA during wartime is presumably now gone given that
TWEA has the same “regulate . . . importation” language, 50 U. S. C.
§ 4305(b)(1)(B)—unless the Court thinks that the statutory text somehow
means one thing in TWEA and another in IEEPA, which would be histori-
cally inaccurate and textually unsupportable. One might think that the
Court's opinion would also mean that tariffs cannot be imposed under Sec-
tion 232, which authorizes the President to “adjust the imports.” After
all, that statutory provision likewise does not refer to “tariffs,” duties,”
“taxes,” “fees,” or the like. But in Algonquin, the Court read Section
232 to authorize tariffs. I assume that the Court today does not intend
to overrule Algonquin.
21
Taken at face value, moreover, the Court's major questions analysis
would presumably also preclude Presidents from imposing quotas under
IEEPA. Quotas are justifed under the same “regulate . . . importation”
language. How could the Court distinguish quotas from tariffs for major
questions purposes? After all, quotas can be of even greater economic
and political signifcance than tariffs.
22
In his concurrence, Justice Gorsuch opines that the phrase “mone-
tary exactions on foreign imports” would constitute clear congressional
authorization, but that the phrase “regulate . . . importation” does not.
Ante, at 284. But if the phrase “regulate . . . importation” has historically
and commonly encompassed “monetary exactions on foreign imports”—as

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Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
In sum, under the major questions doctrine as the Court
has
applied it, this should be a straightforward case. Con-
gress supplied clear authorization for the President to im-
pose tariffs under IEEPA.
B
1
Second, there is an alternative and independent reason
why the major questions doctrine does not apply here: This
is a foreign affairs case.
A plethora of statutes in the U. S. Code grant the Execu-
tive the power to act in foreign affairs. And most of the
important actions that “presidents take today, including in
foreign affairs, rest at least in part on statutory authoriza-
tion.” C. Bradley & J. Goldsmith, Foreign Affairs, Nondele-
gation, and the Major Questions Doctrine, 172 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1743, 1745 (2024).
Yet this Court has never before applied the major ques-
tions doctrine—or anything resembling it—to a foreign af-
fairs statute. I would not make this case the frst.
Rather, in the foreign affairs context, this Court has inter-
preted statutes as written, with respect for the primacy of
Congress's and the President's roles in foreign affairs and
without using the major questions doctrine as a thumb on
the scale against the President. See, e. g., Department of
Navy v. Egan, 484 U. S. 518, 529–530 (1988). That deeply
rooted textualist approach to interpreting foreign affairs
statutes is nothing new. What is new and rather extraordi-
nary is the approach embodied in The Chief Justice's opin-
ion for three Justices, which would extend the major ques-
tions doctrine into the foreign affairs realm for the frst time.
Recall that the major questions doctrine is based on two
overlapping foundations: “separation of powers principles
it has—and if the four major questions factors taken together support the
Executive—as they do—then I cannot agree with the line that Justice
Gorsuch is drawing between those two formulations.

374 LEARNING
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Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
and a practical understanding of legislative intent.” West
Virg
inia, 597 U. S., at 723.
With respect to separation of powers, the major questions
doctrine serves to reinforce the nondelegation doctrine.
But in the foreign affairs realm, the Court has recognized
that Congress often broadly delegates authority to the Exec-
utive. From the Founding, numerous foreign affairs stat-
utes “authorizing action by the President in respect of sub-
jects affecting foreign relations” either “leave the exercise
of the power to his unrestricted judgment, or provide a
standard far more general than that which has always been
considered requisite w ith regard to domestic affairs. ”
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304,
324 (1936); Department of Transportation v. Association of
American Railroads, 575 U. S. 43, 80, n. 5 (2015) (Thomas,
J., concurring in judgment). The reason for those broad del-
egations is simple and obvious: If “success” for America's
foreign affairs “aims” is to be “achieved, congressional legis-
lation . . . must often accord to the President a degree of
discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which
would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone in-
volved.” Curtiss-Wright, 299 U. S., at 320. Stated other-
wise, “Congress—in giving the Executive authority over
matters of foreign affairs—must of necessity paint with a
brush broader than that it customarily wields in domestic
areas.” Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 17 (1965).
As Justice Robert Jackson summarized, the Court's non-
delegation cases—consistent with the “unbroken legislative
practice which has prevailed almost from the inception of the
national government,” Curtiss-Wright, 299 U. S., at 322—
have “recognized internal and external affairs as being in
separate categories, and held that the strict limitation upon
congressional delegations of power to the President over in-
ternal affairs does not apply with respect to delegations of
power in external affairs.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 636, n. 2 (1952) (concurring opinion);
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Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
see Curtiss-Wright, 299 U. S., at 319–322; Panama Refning
C
o. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 422 (1935).
As Justice Jackson further noted, the Court's precedents
recognize the “ `unwisdom of requiring Congress in this feld
of governmental power to lay down narrowly defnite stand-
ards by which the President is to be governed.' ” Youngs-
town, 343 U. S., at 636, n. 2 (concurring opinion) (quoting
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U. S., at 321–322).
If the major questions doctrine is designed in part to pro-
tect nondelegation principles, but the nondelegation doctrine
does not play a substantial role in foreign affairs cases (as
the Court has held), then it follows that courts should not
employ the major questions doctrine to put a thumb on the
scale against the President when interpreting foreign affairs
statutes. Rather, as Justice Robert Jackson stated, courts
should interpret those statutes as written.
Relatedly, to the extent that the major questions doctrine
is designed to refect a “practical understanding of legislative
intent,” West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 723, the doctrine appro-
priately plays no role in “national security or foreign policy
contexts, because the canon does not refect ordinary con-
gressional intent in those areas.” FCC v. Consumers' Re-
search, 606 U. S. 656, 706 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
In the foreign affairs realm, Congress “has good reason to—
and intends to—authorize many executive branch actions
related to foreig n affairs i n broad or genera l ter ms. ”
Bradley & Goldsmith, 172 U. Pa. L. Rev., at 1793.
Congress ordinarily seeks “to give the President substan-
tial authority and fexibility to protect America and the
American people.” Consumers' Research, 606 U. S., at 706–
707 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). After all, the President
exercises the “vast share of responsibility for the conduct of
our foreign relations.” American Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi,
539 U. S. 396, 414 (2003) (quotation marks omitted). So Con-
gress “often” gives the President “a degree of discretion.”
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U. S., at 320. That “unbroken legisla-
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tive practice” from the Founding means that courts inter-
preti
ng statutes in the foreign affairs feld should assume
that Congress meant what it said. Id., at 322.
Stated otherwise, “if the major questions doctrine turns
on a contextual inquiry into likely congressional intent, it is
likely for a variety of reasons to have less purchase in the
foreign affairs area.” Bradley & Goldsmith, 172 U. Pa. L.
Rev., at 1790.
To be clear, Congress of course maintains the ultimate
power over how broadly or narrowly to write statutes in the
foreign policy and national security contexts. For example,
Congress can write foreign affairs statutes narrowly. In-
deed, even for wartime powers, Congress rarely gives the
President a “blank check.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S.
507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion). And when Congress
writes a narrow foreign affairs statute, this Court has en-
forced those statutory limits as written. Cf. Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U. S. 557, 593–595 (2006); id., at 638–639 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in part).
Moreover, when it does legislate more broadly, Congress
sometimes claws back the statutory authorization by re-
scinding or amending overbroad statutes, or by restricting
previously granted Presidential power through the leverage
it possesses over appropriations, new legislation, or confr-
mations. See, e. g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978, 92 Stat. 1783; Military Commissions Act of 2006, 120
Stat. 2600, as amended, 10 U. S. C. § 948a et seq.; Case-Church
Amendment, Pub. L. 93–50, § 307, 87 Stat. 129. Either
House of Congress alone, through the appropriations proc-
ess, can insist on certain limits as a condition of approving
funding. At the end of the day, given the appropriations
power, Congress holds the cards.
In short, in the foreign affairs context, this Court has
never before super-imposed the major questions doctrine (or
any similar canon or principle) onto ordinary statutory inter-
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pretation to place a thumb on the scale against the President.
Rather
, the Court interprets the relevant statutes according
to their text, with respect for Congress's and the President's
central roles in the foreign policy and national security felds.
2
This tariffs case plainly falls into the foreign affairs cate-
gory. IEEPA “directly and expressly relate[s] to foreign af-
fairs.” Bradley & Goldsmith, 172 U. Pa. L. Rev., at 1796.
And like quotas and embargoes, tariffs regulate the goods
that are imported into the country from foreign nations.
The tariffs do not apply to goods produced in America.
Moreover, tariffs on foreign imports are signifcant tools of
foreign policy and national security, whether imposed under
IEEPA, TWEA, Section 232, Section 122, Section 201, Sec-
tion 301, or Section 338. They are often used to “advance
foreign policy goals, or as negotiating leverage in trade nego-
tiations.” Congressional Research Service, U. S. Tariff Pol-
icy: Overview 1 (2025). Like other economic tools, tariffs
can “serve as a `bargaining chip' to be used by the President
when dealing with a hostile country,” Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U. S. 654, 673 (1981)—or to incentivize a change
in behavior by allies, partners, or enemies. Cf. Association
of American Railroads, 575 U. S., at 80 (opinion of Thomas,
J.) (embargo statute “involved the external relations of the
United States”); Gundy v. United States, 588 U. S. 128, 170–
171 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
With respect to foreign trade specifcally, Congress often
“invest[s] the President with large discretion in matters aris-
ing out of the execution of statutes relating to trade and
commerce with other nations.” Marshall Field & Co. v.
Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 691 (1892). Since the Founding, that
longstanding practice has included tariff statutes: Congress
has granted the President expansive power over tariffs and
foreign trade. Ante, at 325–329 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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And this Court has uniformly rejected challenges to tariffs
i
mposed by Presidents under those statutory authorities.
E. g., Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG,
Inc., 426 U. S. 548, 558–560 (1976); J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co.
v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 409 (1928); Marshall Field,
143 U. S., at 690–694; Cargo of Brig Aurora v. United States,
7 Cranch 382, 386–388 (1813).
As Professors Bradley and Goldsmith well summarized,
there is a “settled practice of about a century of the execu-
tive branch exercising emergency powers in many important
contexts pursuant to the broadly worded IEEPA and its
predecessor, the Trading with the Enemy Act. And there is
an even longer practice, dating to the Founding, of presidents
exercising trade-related sanctions authority pursuant to
broadly worded statutes. Notably, the Court has already
suggested in both of these contexts that one should expect
Congress to, in effect, paint with a broad brush.” 172 U. Pa.
L. Rev., at 1796–1797.
As with tariffs on foreign imports historically, the IEEPA
tariffs on foreign imports at issue in this case implicate for-
eign affairs. According to the Government, the President
has leveraged the IEEPA tariffs into trade deals with major
trading partners including China, the United Kingdom, and
Japan, among other countries. The Government says that
the tariffs have helped make certain foreign markets more
accessible to American businesses and have contributed to
trade deals with foreign nations worth trillions of dollars.
Moreover, consistent with history and the traditional uses
of tariffs, the President “is exercising his IEEPA authority
in connection with highly sensitive negotiations he is con-
ducting to end the confict between the Russian Federation
and Ukraine.” Decl. of M. Rubio in No. 25–1812 (CA Fed.,
Aug. 29, 2025), p. 3. To that end, on August 6, 2025, the
President imposed tariffs on India for “directly or indirectly
importing Russian Federation oil.” Exec. Order No. 14329,
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90 Fed. Reg. 38701 (2025). And on February 6, 2026, the
President
reduced the tariffs on India because, according to
the Government, India had “committed to stop directly or
indirectly importing Russian Federation oil.” Exec. Order
No. 14384, 91 Fed. Reg. 6501 (2026).
To be sure, most foreign affairs and national security ac-
tions—whether war, international agreements, trade deals,
or tariffs—lead to signifcant domestic ramifcations within
the United States. And this case is no exception. None-
theless, in the foreign affairs feld, courts interpret statutes
as written, with appropriate respect to Congress and the
President and without a major questions doctrine weight on
the scale against the President. See Youngstown, 343 U. S.,
at 636, n. 2 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Lest there be any remaining doubt that the major ques-
tions doctrine does not apply to tariffs on foreign imports,
recall again this Court's decision in Algonquin. That case
involved signifcant tariffs imposed by President Ford on oil
imports. The relevant statute granted the President the au-
thority to “adjust the imports.” 19 U. S. C. § 1862(b) (1970
ed.). The Court upheld the tariffs by interpreting the stat-
ute as written. Neither the major questions doctrine—nor
anything resembling that doctrine—played a role in that
case.
In short, “Presidential actions pursuant to broad congres-
sional authorizations related to foreign affairs often have
long historical pedigrees that can in various ways inform
congressional intent to approve the actions in question. To
the extent that this is so in particular instances, the major
questions doctrine's clear authorization requirement does
not apply.” Bradley & Goldsmith, 172 U. Pa. L. Rev., at
1794 (emphasis added).
So it is here: Presidents “have long been granted substan-
tial discretion over tariffs.” Id., at 1759, n. 90. This Court
has never before applied the major questions doctrine to a
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statute authorizing the President to take action with respect
to
foreign affairs in general or tariffs in particular. And it
should not do so today.
The Chief Justice's opinion's reliance on the major ques-
tions doctrine in this foreign affairs case is a frst—a novel
and unprecedented use of the major questions doctrine to
invalidate Presidential action taken pursuant to congres-
sional authorization in the foreign affairs area. I frmly dis-
agree with that use of the major questions doctrine here.
In the foreign affairs context, including tariffs, the long-
standing rule is simple: Interpret the statute as written, not
with a thumb on the scale against the President.
23
23
In his thoughtful concurrence, Justice Gorsuch agrees that the
major questions doctrine often does not apply to foreign affairs statutes,
but in his view it does not apply only when the President also has inherent
or independent Article II power. Ante, at 284–285. The Chief Jus-
tice's opinion for three Justices also gestures at that position. See ante, at
247–248. I see some analytical and practical problems with that approach.
First, as Justice Gorsuch elsewhere notes, the major questions doc-
trine serves in part to reinforce nondelegation principles. Yet as I have
explained, the Court's nondelegation cases from the Founding to the pres-
ent—including numerous cases involving tariffs—have “recognized inter-
nal and external affairs as being in separate categories, and held that the
strict limitation upon congressional delegations of power to the President
over internal affairs does not apply with respect to delegations of power
in external affairs.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S.
579, 636, n. 2 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 319–322 (1936); Panama Re-
fning Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 422 (1935). In those cases, the Court
has not further subdivided the foreign affairs power in the manner that
Justice Gorsuch now suggests.
Second, terms such as “inherent” or “independent” in this context con-
tinue to be “used, often interchangeably and without fxed or ascertainable
meanings.” Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 647 (Jackson, J., concurring);
see also id., at 637. So it would be both novel and jurisprudentially cha-
otic to try to now create a new approach tying the applicability of the
major questions canon in the foreign affairs context to such uncertain
triggers.

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3
Related
precedent further demonstrates that the major
questions doctrine has not traditionally applied in the na-
tional security or foreign policy contexts. Consider two
prominent examples.
First, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507, this Court con-
sidered the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force,
which Congress passed and President George W. Bush
signed on September 18, 2001, in the wake of the al Qaeda
attacks on the United States. The law broadly empowered
the President to use “all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he deter-
mines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks” that occurred on September 11, 2001. Authoriza-
tion for Use of Military Force, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001).
In Hamdi, the Government militarily detained in the
United States an American citizen who had taken up arms
with the Taliban. 542 U. S., at 510–511. The plaintiff
Hamdi argued, among other things, that the AUMF gener-
ally authorized the use of force but did not specifcally au-
thorize military detention, at least detention of American-
citizen enemy combatants in the United States. See id., at
515–517. He contended that his military detention was
therefore illegal.
In the principal opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court
rejected Hamdi's statutory argument, explaining that it was
“of no moment that the AUMF does not use specifc language
of detention.” Id., at 519. Rather, because “detention to
prevent a combatant's return to the battlefeld is a fundamen-
tal incident of waging war, in permitting the use of `neces-
sary and appropriate force,' Congress has clearly and unmis-
takably authorized detention in the narrow circumstances
considered here.” Ibid.
Consider the similarities between Hamdi and this case.
Both involve major questions of foreign affairs. Hamdi in-
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volved U. S. military detention of an American citizen in
Amer
ica, pursuant to a generally worded authorization for
use of military force. This case involves tariffs on foreign
goods imported into America pursuant to a generally worded
authorization to regulate importation. Detention is a tradi-
tional incident of the President's delegated power to wage
war. See id., at 518. Tariffs are a traditional incident of
the President's delegated power to regulate imports and for-
eign commerce. In Hamdi, the Court said that as a matter
of history, practice, and precedent, the AUMF's general au-
thorization for the use of military force clearly encompassed
detention of enemy combatants. Id., at 518–522. Here, as
a matter of history, practice, and precedent, IEEPA's general
authorization for regulation of importation likewise clearly
encompasses tariffs on foreign imports.
Second, in 1981 in Dames & Moore, 453 U. S. 654, the
Court did not apply the major questions doctrine, even
though the Court had recently applied that principle in a
signifcant domestic policy case. Cf. Industrial Union
Dept., AFL–CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S.
607 (1980) (plurality opinion).
The Dames & Moore case arose in the wake of the Iran
hostage crisis where Iran held more than 50 American hos-
tages at the U. S. Embassy in Iran for more than 14 months.
As one part of the ultimate settlement of the hostage crisis
with Iran, President Reagan suspended claims by U. S. na-
tionals against Iran that were pending in American courts.
Dames & Moore, 453 U. S., at 666. The President did so
under IEEPA and the Hostage Act. Id., at 675.
There can be little doubt that the question of suspending
American citizens' claims against Iran was one of major eco-
nomic and political signifcance. And the Court further rec-
ognized that the case touched “fundamentally upon the man-
ner in which our Republic is to be governed.” Id., at 659.
Yet the Court did not require “clear congressional authoriza-
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383
Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
tion” for the President's exercise of that authority to suspend
the
Americans' claims against Iran.
On the contrary, the Court openly acknowledged that the
relevant statutes—IEEPA and the Hostage Act—did not
provide clear or “specifc authorization” for the President to
suspend those claims. Id., at 677. The Court nonetheless
concluded that the “general tenor of Congress' legislation in
this area”—combined with Congress's longstanding acquies-
cence to the President's practice of settling claims—sup-
ported the President's suspension of those claims. Id., at
678. Congress's “general tenor” and acquiescence are of
course far less than the “clear congressional authorization”
that The Chief Justice's opinion today newly demands for
the President's tariffs.
Again, consider the similarities between Dames & Moore
and this case. Dames & Moore involved complicated ques-
tions of foreign policy and national security. The statutes
in Dames & Moore were generally worded and did not spe-
cifcally authorize suspension of claims. But Presidents had
historically exercised a similar power. See id., at 677–682.
Here, we likewise have a generally worded statutory au-
thorization to “regulate . . . importation.” And Presidents
have historically imposed tariffs.
If IEEPA permitted the President to lawfully suspend
claims in Dames & Moore—despite the Court's transparent
acknowledgment that the actual statutory text did not
clear ly author i ze the President's ac ti ons—then surely
IEEPA's authorization to “regulate . . . importation” easily
justifes these tariffs.
The Chief Justice's opinion would chart a new course
for the major questions doctrine, extending it for the frst
time deep into the foreign affairs sphere. If the Court had
applied the major questions doctrine in Hamdi and Dames &
Moore, those two landmark cases almost certainly would
have been decided differently. So today's opinion marks a
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signifcant change. Will the Court apply the major ques-
ti
ons doctrine in the foreign affairs context again in the fu-
ture? Or is this a ticket good for one day and one train
only? Time will tell. But in the meantime, the decision
could engender signifcant uncertainty over the Executive's
exercise of statutory authority in the foreign affairs realm.
As the Hamdi and Dames & Moore examples demon-
strate, applying the major questions doctrine in the foreign
policy and national security contexts in the past would have
seriously hindered the President's ability to exercise power
granted by Congress to achieve important foreign policy and
national security objectives for America. And if applied in
the foreign affairs context in the future, it could impair Pres-
idents' vital statutory authorities with respect to foreign pol-
icy and national security.
24
***
Having said all of that on foreign affairs, I reiterate that
the major questions doctrine—even if it applies in this for-
eign affairs context—does not defeat major executive actions
that are clearly authorized by Congress. See Bradley &
Goldsmith, 172 U. Pa. L. Rev., at 1790–1791. And as ex-
24
What is the status going forward of the major questions doctrine in
foreign affairs cases? Only three Justices (at most) today suggest that
the major questions doctrine should apply in the foreign affairs context—
The Chief Justice, Justice Gorsuch, and Justice Barrett. I doubt
that the major questions doctrine analysis in The Chief Justice's opinion
for those three Justices is controlling for future cases as a matter of prece-
dent under the Marks rule. See Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 188,
193 (1977). That is because three Justices (Justice Sotomayor, Justice
Kagan, and Justice Jackson) do not recognize the major questions doc-
trine at all. Ante, at 304–305 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment). And this dissent would not apply it in the foreign
affairs context. So it appears that six Justices would not apply it in the
foreign affairs context. In my view, the question of whether or how the
major questions doctrine applies in foreign affairs cases remains at least
an open question.
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Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
plained in Part III–A above, in IEEPA Congress clearly au-
thor
ized the President to impose tariffs to “regulate . . . im-
portation” in national emergencies. In other words, even if
the major questions doctrine applies in the foreign affairs
context exactly as it does in domestic affairs, the President
should still prevail in this case.
IV
Finally, no Member of the Court today relies on the non-
delegation doctrine. But the plaintiffs briefy raise such an
argument, and I will therefore briefy address it. The argu-
ment is unavailing for many of the reasons already noted in
the major questions analysis above. This Court has repeat-
edly rejected constitutional challenges to congressional dele-
gations to the President in the foreign affairs area, including
delegations of tariff authority.
For matters of foreign affairs and national security, the
Court has traditionally recognized that Congress “must of
necessity paint with a brush broader than that it customarily
wields in domestic areas.” Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 17
(1965). And to reiterate, numerous statutes “ `authorizing
action by the President in respect of subjects affecting for-
eign relations' ” “ `either leave the exercise of the power to
his unrestricted judgment, or provide a standard far more
general than that which has always been considered requi-
site with regard to domestic affairs.' ” Department of
Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, 575
U. S. 43, 80, n. 5 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment)
(quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U. S. 304, 324 (1936)). Therefore, as Justice Thomas has
explained, the Court's precedents establish that “the Consti-
tution grants the President a greater measure of discretion
in the realm of foreign relations.” Association of American
Railroads, 575 U. S., at 80, n. 5; see Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U. S., at 319–322; Panama Refning Co. v. Ryan,
293 U. S. 388, 422 (1935).
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Justice Robert Jackson likewise noted the “ `unwisdom of
requir
ing Congress in this feld of governmental power to
lay down narrowly defnite standards by which the President
is to be governed.' ” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer, 343 U. S. 579, 636, n. 2 (1952) (concurring opinion) (quot-
ing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U. S., at 321–322). As such, the
“strict limitation upon congressional delegations of power to
the President over internal affairs does not apply with re-
spect to delegations of power in external affairs.” Youngs-
town, 343 U. S., at 636, n. 2 (concurring opinion).
Because statutes that “involv[e] the external relations of
the United States” do not trigger the same kind of delegation
concerns as purely domestic ones, Association of American
Railroads, 575 U. S., at 80 (opinion of Thomas, J.), the Court
has regularly upheld delegations of power to the President
in the national security and foreign policy realms. See, e. g.,
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U. S., at 319–322; Loving v. United
States, 517 U. S. 748, 771–774 (1996). Indeed, if a strict non-
delegation doctrine applied in those areas, numerous stat-
utes—including many authorizations for use of military force
in the Nation's history—would have been unconstitutional
delegations of authority to the President. See Authoriza-
tion for Use of Military Force, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001)
(“[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and ap-
propriate force against those nations, organizations, or per-
sons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001”).
As to tariffs in particular: Broad delegations of tariff au-
thority to the President have been in the heartland of per-
missible delegations upheld by this Court. Congress may,
without running afoul of the Constitution, “invest the Presi-
dent with large discretion in matters arising out of the exe-
cution of statutes relating to trade and commerce with other
nations.” Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 691
(1892). Congressional delegations of tariffs and other for-
eign trade authorities to the President date back to near the
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Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
Founding. And this Court has uniformly rejected nondele-
gati
on challenges to statutes delegating that authority to the
President. E. g., Federal Energy Administration v. Algon-
quin SNG, Inc., 426 U. S. 548, 558–560 (1976); J. W. Hampton,
Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 409 (1928); Marshall
Field, 143 U. S., at 690–694; Cargo of Brig Aurora v. United
States, 7 Cranch 382, 386–388 (1813).
This Court's decision in Algonquin is again instructive.
There, the Court held that Section 232 did not constitute
an unconstitutional delegation. 426 U. S., at 558–560. The
Court found it suffcient that the President could act “only”
to the extent “he deems necessary to adjust the imports” of
an article such that it “will not threaten to impair the na-
tional security.” Id., at 559 (quotation marks omitted).
To be clear, I am not suggesting that there is no nondele-
gation doctrine in the foreign affairs realm. But the Court
has consistently recognized that the doctrine affords more
fexibility to Congress and the President in that area to deal
with the complex foreign relations issues and national secu-
rity threats facing America. See Association of American
Railroads, 575 U. S., at 80, n. 5 (opinion of Thomas, J.);
Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 636, n. 2 (Jackson, J., concurring);
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U. S., at 319–322; Panama Refning, 293
U. S., at 422.
In all events, for purposes of this Court's nondelegation
precedents, IEEPA suffciently constrains the President's
authority to declare an emergency and impose tariffs. See
J. W. Hampton, 276 U. S., at 409; FCC v. Consumers' Re-
search, 606 U. S. 656, 673–675, 681–691 (2025). The Presi-
dent may exercise the authorities in IEEPA “only” “to deal
with an unusual and extraordinary threat” that “has its
source in whole or substantial part outside the United
States” and “with respect to which a national emergency has
been declared.” 50 U. S. C. § 1701. Congress placed nu-
merous limits on IEEPA, including a default 1-year time
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388 LEARNING
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congressi ona l repor ting requirements. See §§ 1622(d),
1702(
b), 1703.
It is also useful to underscore the extraordinary nature of
the plaintiffs' nondelegation argument here. The plaintiffs'
submission would mean that these tariffs would be unlawful
even if IEEPA explicitly authorized tariffs. Unlike their
statutory and major questions doctrine arguments, their
nondelegation argument is not based on a lack of an explicit
reference to “tariffs” or “duties” or the like. Their nondele-
gation argument instead goes much further and would re-
quire very specifc congressional directions to the President
on when and under what circumstances he could impose tar-
iffs and how high those tariffs could be. The plaintiffs' the-
ory would have dramatic consequences and likely wipe out
many of the existing tariff statutes that have long been up-
held by this Court, as well as TWEA. And if the tariff au-
thority here is unlawful, so too are most if not all IEEPA
authorities such as asset freezes, embargoes, and quotas.
And it would not stop there. The plaintiffs' nondelegation
theory would threaten various other national security and
foreign affairs statutes that similarly grant substantial dis-
cretion to the President. The Court today thankfully does
not go down that road.
25
V
The overarching theme of the Court's opinion is that tar-
iffs are not a clear means to “regulate . . . importation” and
25
Some last points for completeness: The plaintiffs also raise two other
arguments that the Court today does not address or rely on. First, they
argue that Section 122, a non-emergency tariff statute that addresses
trade defcits, implicitly displaces IEEPA's tariff authority. Second, they
argue that the tariffs here do not deal with an “unusual and extraordinary
threat” as to which a national emergency has been declared. In my view,
those arguments are insubstantial, as Judge Taranto persuasively ex-
plained in the Federal Circuit. See 149 F. 4th 1312, 1359–1361, 1371–1375
(2025) (dissenting opinion). Because the Court today does not address or
rely on them, I will not discuss them further here. Finally, I agree with
footnote 1 of the Court's opinion regarding jurisdiction. Ante, at 240, n. 1.
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that Congress was therefore required to use the word “tar-
i
ff,” “duty,” or the like in IEEPA in 1977 if it wanted to
authorize tariffs on foreign imports. But that conclusion
contravenes text, history, and precedent. To summarize:
Algonquin in 1976 unanimously held the opposite. The
Nixon and Ford tariffs were based on statutory provisions
that did not use the word “tariff” or “duty.” There is a long
tradition of Presidents imposing tariffs as a means of regu-
lating importation and commerce. The predecessor Trading
with the Enemy Act has long been understood to authorize
tariffs during wartime as a means to “regulate . . . importa-
tion,” even though it does not use the word “tariff ” or
“duty.” The history of the Polk, Lincoln, and McKinley tar-
iffs shows that tariffs are a means of regulating importation.
Marshall, Story, and Madison stated that tariffs are a means
of regulating foreign commerce. The dictionary defnitions
and ordinary usage establish that tariffs are a means of regu-
lating importation.
All of that and much more, in my view, overwhelmingly
establish that IEEPA clearly authorizes the President to im-
pose tariffs.
That said, with respect to tariffs in particular, the Court's
decision might not prevent Presidents from imposing most if
not all of these same sorts of tariffs under other statutory
authorities. For example, Section 122 of the Trade Act of
1974 permits the President to impose a “temporary import
surcharge” to “deal with large and serious United States
balance-of-payments defcits.” 19 U. S. C. § 2132(a). Sec-
tion 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides that, if the Inter-
national Trade Commission determines an article is being
imported in such quantities that it is “a substantial cause of
serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic industry
producing an article like or directly competitive with the im-
ported article,” the President may take “appropriate and
feasible action,” including imposing a “duty.” §§ 2251(a),
2253(a)(3)(A). Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 author-
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izes the President through a subordinate offcer to “impose
duties”
if he determines that “an act, policy, or practice of a
foreign country” is “unjustifable and burdens or restricts
United States commerce.” §§ 2411(a)–(c). Section 338 of
the Tariff Act of 1930 permits the President to impose tariffs
when he fnds that “any foreign country places any burden
or disadvantage upon the commerce of the United States.”
§ 1338(d). And Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962 authorizes the President to, after receiving a report
from the Secretary of Commerce, “adjust the imports of [an]
article and its derivatives so that such imports will not
threaten to impair the national security.” § 1862(c)(1)(A).
So the Court's decision is not likely to greatly restrict
Presidential tariff authority going forward. But the Court's
decision is likely to generate other serious practical conse-
quences in the near term. One issue will be refunds. Re-
funds of billions of dollars would have signifcant conse-
quences for the U. S. Treasury. The Court says nothing
today about whether, and if so how, the Government should
go about returning the billions of dollars that it has collected
from importers. But that process is likely to be a “mess,”
as was acknowledged at oral argument. Tr. of Oral Arg.
153–155. A second issue is the decision's effect on the cur-
rent trade deals. Because IEEPA tariffs have helped facili-
tate trade deals worth trillions of dollars—including with
foreign nations from China to the United Kingdom to Japan,
the Court's decision could generate uncertainty regarding
various trade agreements. That process, too, could be
diffcult.
***
The tariffs at issue here may or may not be wise policy.
But as a matter of text, history, and precedent, they are
clearly lawful. I respectfully dissent.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
p. 279, n. 2, line 2: “lies” is changed to “lie”
p. 288, line 7: “(plurality opinion)” is inserted after “510”
p. 288, line 11: “(opinion of O'Connor, J.)” is deleted
p. 284, line 3 from bottom: “2004” is changed to “2024”