Bost v. Illinois Bd. of Elections

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 607 U. S. Part 1
Pages 71–106
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
January 14, 2026
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
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pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

OCTOBER
TERM, 2025
71
Syllabus
BOST et al. v. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF
ELECTIONS
et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the seventh circuit
No. 24–568. Argued October 8, 2025—Decided January 14, 2026
Illinois law requires election offcials to count mail-in ballots postmarked
or certifed no later than election day and received within two weeks of
election day. Congressman Michael Bost and two other political candi-
dates fled a lawsuit claiming that counting ballots received after elec-
tion day violates federal law. They principally contended that doing so
conficts with 2 U. S. C. § 7 and 3 U. S. C. § 1, which set election day as
the Tuesday following the frst Monday in November. The district
court dismissed the case, and the Seventh Circuit affrmed on the ground
that petitioners lacked standing.
Held: As a candidate for offce, Congressman Bost has standing to chal-
lenge the rules that govern the counting of votes in his election.
Pp. 76–83.
(a) Under Article III of the Constitution, plaintiffs must have a “per-
sonal stake” in a case to have standing to sue. FDA v. Alliance for
Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S. 367, 379. An unlawful election rule
can injure a candidate in several ways: It might cause him to lose the
election, require him to expend additional resources, or decrease his
vote share and damage his reputation. But winning, and doing so as
inexpensively and decisively as possible, are not a candidate's only inter-
ests in an election.
Candidates also have an interest in a fair process. Candidates seek
to represent the people, and their interest in that prize cannot be sev-
ered from their interest in the electoral process. Win or lose, candi-
dates suffer when the process departs from the law. The harm to candi-
dates from an unfair and inaccurate election is not common to all.
While voters also have a general interest in an accurate vote tally, a
candidate's interest differs in kind. Those who spend time and re-
sources seeking to claim the right to voice the will of the people have
“an undeniably different—and more particularized—interest” in know-
ing what that will is. Hotze v. Hudspeth, 16 F. 4th 1121, 1126 (Oldham,
J., dissenting).
Rules that undermine the integrity of the electoral process also un-
dermine the winner's political legitimacy. The counting of unlawful
votes—or discarding of lawful ones—erodes public confdence in election
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72 BOST
v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS
Syllabus
results and the elected representative. “[R]eputational harms” are
classic
Article III injuries. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. 413,
425. And they are particularly concrete for those whose very jobs de-
pend on the support of the people. Pp. 76–79.
(b) Candidates do not need to show a substantial risk that a rule will
cause them to lose the election or prevent them from achieving a legally
signifcant vote threshold in order to have standing. Requiring such a
showing could channel many election disputes to shortly before election
day or after. Only then will many candidates be able to predict with
any certainty that a rule will be outcome determinative. Yet the Court
has repeatedly emphasized that lower federal courts should ordinarily
not alter the election rules on the eve of an election. Such late-
breaking, court-ordered rule changes can result in voter confusion and
undermine confdence in the integrity of electoral processes. The dem-
ocratic consequences can be worse if courts intervene only after votes
have been counted. Counting frst and ruling upon legality afterwards
is not a recipe for producing election results that have the public accept-
ance democratic stability requires.
Premising standing on a candidate's risk of election loss or failure to
achieve a certain vote threshold would also convert Article III judges
into political prognosticators and “invite[ ] fndings on matters as to
which neither judges nor anyone else can have any confdence.” Rucho
v. Common Cause, 588 U. S. 684, 711 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[A]ccurately predicting electoral outcomes is not” a “simple” endeavor.
Id., at 712. And the limits of federal courts' jurisdiction do not rest
upon such “unstable ground outside judicial expertise.” Id., at 713.
Nor would requiring candidates to plead a substantial risk of harm to
their vote share leave courts on any surer footing. Such an approach
would force judges to assess whether an election rule is likely to disad-
vantage a particular candidate—determinations judges are no better
qualifed to make than assessing a candidate's likelihood of winning or
losing. Candidates would also have to plead and prove that voters who
take advantage of the challenged rule will favor their rivals, which may
require divulging information about political vulnerabilities. Faced
with that prospect, many candidates are sure to wait until after votes
are counted to sue.
Article III does not require this result. Candidates have a concrete
and particularized interest in the rules that govern the counting of votes
in their elections, regardless whether those rules harm their electoral
prospects or increase the cost of their campaigns. Their interest ex-
tends to the integrity of the election—and the democratic process by
which they earn or lose the support of the people they seek to represent.
Pp. 79–82.

Cite
as: 607 U. S. 71 (2026)
73
Syllabus
114 F. 4th 634, reversed and remanded.
Roberts
, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Thomas,
Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined. Barrett, J., fled an
opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Kagan, J., joined, post, p. 83.
Jackson, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor, J., joined,
post, p. 87.
Paul D. Clement argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were James Y. Xi, T. Russell Nobile, and
Robert D. Popper.
Michael E. Talent argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae in support of petitioners. With him on
the brief were Solicitor General Sauer, Assistant Attorney
General Dhillon, Deputy Solicitor General Mooppan, Dep-
uty Assistant Attorney General Osete, and Andrew G.
Braniff.
Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General of Illinois, argued the
cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Kwame
Raoul, Attorney General of Illinois, Alex Hemmer, Deputy
Solicitor General, and Carson R. Griffs, R. Sam Horan, and
Samantha Sherman, Assistant Attorneys General.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of West
Virginia et al. by John B. McCuskey, Attorney General of West Virginia, and
Michael R. Williams, Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for
their respective States as follows: Tim Griffn of Arkansas, James Uth-
meier of Florida, Chris Carr of Georgia, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Liz Murrill
of Louisiana, Andrew Bailey of Missouri, Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska,
Gentner Drummond of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, and
Marty Jackley of South Dakota; for the American Center for Law and
Justice by Jay Alan Sekulow, Walter M. Weber, Benjamin P. Sisney, Jor-
dan A. Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, and Andrew J. Ekonomou; for America's
Future et al. by William J. Olson, Jeremiah L. Morgan, Michael Boos,
and Patrick M. McSweeney; for the Center for Election Confdence by
Bradley A. Benbrook and Stephen M. Duvernay; for the Election Integ-
rity Project California, Inc., by Michael J. O'Neill, Matthew C. Forys, and
Richard P. Hutchison; for the Honest Elections Project by Jason B. Tor-
chinsky, Jonathan P. Lienhard, and Andrew D. Watkins; for the League
of Women Voters et al. by Ari Savitzky, Sophia Lin Lakin, Davin Rosbor-
ough, Theresa Lee, Cecillia D. Wang, Evelyn Dan forth-Scott, Scott Mi-
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74 BOST
v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS
Opinion of the Court
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the
Cour
t.
Three political candidates challenged Illinois's procedure
for counting mail-in ballots received after election day. We
consider whether the candidates have standing to maintain
their suit.
I
Illinois law requires election offcials to count mail-in bal-
lots postmarked or certifed no later than election day and
received within two weeks of election day. Ill. Comp. Stat.,
ch. 10, §§ 5/18A–15(a), 5/19–8(c) (West 2022). In May 2022,
Congressman Michael Bost and Presidential elector nomi-
nees Laura Pollastrini and Susan Sweeney (petitioners) sued
the Illinois State Board of Elections and its executive direc-
chelman, and John W. Whitehead; for the NRCC et al. by Michael E.
Toner, Jeremy J. Broggi, Brandis L. Zehr, Blake D. Murphy, and Ryan G.
Dollar; for the Phyllis Schlafy Eagles et al. by Andrew L. Schlafy; for
the Public Interest Legal Foundation by J. Christian Adams; for the Re-
publican National Committee by Thomas R. McCarthy and Gilbert C.
Dickey; for Restoring Integrity and Trust in Elections et al. by Christo-
pher O. Murray, Julian R. Ellis, Jr., and Michael L. Francisco; and for
Michael T. Morley et al. by Michael T. Morley, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the District of
Columbia et al. by Brian L. Schwalb, Attorney General of the District
of Columbia, Caroline S. Van Zile, Solicitor General, Ashwin P. Phatak,
Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and Chloe Q. Pan, Assistant Attorney
General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as fol-
lows: Kris Mayes of Arizona, Rob Bonta of California, Philip J. Weiser of
Colorado, William Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings of Delaware,
Anne E. Lopez of Hawaii, Anthony G. Brown of Maryland, Dana Nessel
of Michigan, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Mat-
thew J. Platkin of New Jersey, Raúl Torrez of New Mexico, Letitia James
of New York, Dan Rayfeld of Oregon, Peter F. Neronha of Rhode Island,
Charity R. Clark of Vermont, and Nicholas W. Brown of Washington; for
Bipartisan Former State Secretaries of State by Donald K. Sherman and
John B. Hill; and for the Democratic Party of Illinois by David R. Fox
and Richard A. Medina.
Erick G. Kaardal fled a brief for PA Fair Elections et al. as amici
curiae.

Cite
as: 607 U. S. 71 (2026)
75
Opinion of the Court
tor (respondents), claiming that counting ballots received
af
ter election day violates federal law. They principally
contended that doing so conficts with 2 U. S. C. § 7 and 3
U. S. C. § 1, which set election day as the Tuesday following
the frst Monday in November.
In their complaint and declarations, petitioners asserted
several bases for standing as candidates.
1
They frst argued
that they were “entitled to have their election[ ] results certi-
fed with votes received in compliance with the federal Elec-
tion Day statutes.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 87a. And they
alleged that they “rely on provisions of federal and state law
in conducting their campaigns including, in particular, re-
sources allocated to the post-election certifcation process.”
Id., at 87a–88a. Congressman Bost further explained that
the late counting of ballots would require him to “organize,
fundraise, and run [his] campaign for fourteen additional
days.” Id., at 66a. This, in turn, would “cost [his] cam-
paign time, money, volunteers and other resources” by, for
example, requiring the campaign to send poll watchers to
“monitor late arriving ballots.” Id., at 67a. He also alleged
that he “risk[ed] injury if untimely and illegal ballots cause[d
him] to lose [his] election,” and “because [his] margin of vic-
tory . . . may be reduced.” Id., at 68a. “A diminished mar-
gin of victory [would] lead to the public perception that [his]
constituents have concerns about [his] job performance,”
which would “infuence . . . future voters, Congressional lead-
ership, donors, and potential political opponents.” Id., at
68a–69a.
2
1
At the time, Congressman Bost was a candidate in the 2022 election,
and Pollastrini and Sweeney planned to seek reappointment as Presiden-
tial electors in the 2024 election. Congressman Bost has served as the
United States Representative for Illinois's 12th Congressional District
since he was frst elected in 2014. And he was previously a member of
the Illinois House of Representatives, to which he was frst elected in 1994.
2
Petitioners also alleged that Illinois's ballot receipt deadline injured
them as voters by “dilut[ing] the weight of [their] votes.” App. to Pet.
for Cert. 88a. They have not advanced that argument before this Court.
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76 BOST
v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS
Opinion of the Court
The District Court held that petitioners lacked standing
and
dismissed the suit. 684 F. Supp. 3d 720 (ND Ill. 2023).
Petitioners appealed, and the Seventh Circuit affrmed. 114
F. 4th 634 (2024). The court concluded that the costs to
monitor vote counting after election day could not support
standing, because those costs would have been voluntarily
incurred “to avoid a hypothetical future harm—an election
defeat.” Id., at 642. In doing so, the court noted that Con-
gressman Bost had won the last election with 75% of the
vote. Ibid. It also rejected petitioners' asserted “ `compet-
itive injury,' ” reasoning that they “do not (and cannot) allege
that the majority of the votes that will be received and
counted after Election Day will break against them.” Id.,
at 643. Finally, it dismissed petitioners' asserted injury
based on an inaccurate vote tally as unduly “speculative,”
because “the election is months away and the voting process
has not even started.” Id., at 644. Judge Scudder dis-
sented in part. In his view, Congressman Bost had standing
based on the extra costs his campaign would incur to monitor
the counting of late arriving ballots. We granted certiorari.
605 U. S. 968 (2025).
II
Under Article III of the Constitution, plaintiffs must have
a “personal stake” in a case to have standing to sue. FDA v.
Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S. 367, 379 (2024).
They must, in other words, be able to answer a basic ques-
tion: “ `What's it to you?' ” A. Scalia, The Doctrine of Stand-
ing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17
Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 882 (1983). Congressman Bost has
an obvious answer: He is a candidate for offce. And a candi-
date has a personal stake in the rules that govern the count-
ing of votes in his election.
3
3
Because only one plaintiff needs standing for a suit to proceed, we
do not address whether Pollastrini and Sweeney have standing to sue as
prospective Presidential electors. See Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477,
489 (2023).

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as: 607 U. S. 71 (2026)
77
Opinion of the Court
A
An
unlawful election rule can injure a candidate in several
ways. It might cause him to lose the election. It might
require him to expend additional resources. Or it might de-
crease his vote share and damage his reputation. Respond-
ents concede that each of these harms can be legally cogniza-
ble. But they contend that Congressman Bost failed to
adequately plead any such harm here. We need not resolve
whether respondents are right, because winning, and doing
so as inexpensively and decisively as possible, are not a can-
didate's only interests in an election.
4
To start, candidates also have an interest in a fair process.
Candidates are not common competitors in the economic
marketplace. They seek to represent the people. And
their interest in that prize cannot be severed from their in-
terest in the electoral process—a process “of the most funda-
mental signifcance under our constitutional structure.” Il-
linois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U. S.
173, 184 (1979). Win or lose, candidates suffer when the
process departs from the law. Thus, the long-shot and shoo-
in alike would suffer harm if a State chose to conduct its
election by, say, fipping a coin. The result of such an elec-
tion would not refect the will of the people, and the candi-
dates would lose the opportunity to compete for the people's
support. So too, similar harms would result from less dra-
matic departures—for example, if a State decided to discard
a random 10% of cast votes. Whether these decisions help,
hurt, or have no effect on a candidate's electoral prospects,
they deprive the candidate of a fair process and an accurate
result.
4
Respondents do not dispute that Congressman Bost pleaded a distinct
interest in the “election[ ] results [being] certifed with [ lawful] votes.”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 87a. They argue only that this interest is not le-
gally cognizable. Because we disagree, we need not resolve the parties'
pleading dispute.
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78 BOST
v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS
Opinion of the Court
Such harm to candidates is in no sense “common to all
members
of the public.” Lance v. Coffman, 549 U. S. 437,
440 (2007) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Voters, to be sure, also have a “general interest” in an accu-
rate vote tally. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).
But a candidate's interest differs in kind. An unfair and in-
accurate election plainly affects those who compete for the
support of the people in a different way than it affects the
people who lend their support. We have no occasion to theo-
rize about the “signifcance of the[se] relative interests,” con-
tra, post, at 89 (Jackson, J., dissenting), or the “sincer[ity]”
with which they are held, Carney v. Adams, 592 U. S. 53, 59
(2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). What matters is
that the harm candidates suffer is distinct from that suffered
by the “people generally.” Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U. S. 447, 488 (1923). Those who spend untold time and re-
sources seeking to claim the right to voice the will of the
people have “an undeniably different—and more particular-
ized—interest” in knowing what that will is. Hotze v. Huds-
peth, 16 F. 4th 1121, 1126 (CA5 2021) (Oldham, J., dissenting).
Rules that undermine the “integrity of the electoral proc-
ess” also undermine the winner's political legitimacy.
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U. S. 181, 197
(2008) (opinion of Stevens, J.). The counting of unlawful
votes—or discarding of lawful ones—erodes public conf-
dence that the election results refect the people's will. And
when public confdence in the election results falters, public
confdence in the elected representative follows. To the rep-
resentative, that loss of legitimacy—or its diminution—is a
concrete harm. “[R]eputational harms,” as a general mat-
ter, are classic Article III injuries. TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez, 594 U. S. 413, 425 (2021) (citing Meese v. Keene, 481
U. S. 465, 473 (1987)). But they are particularly concrete for
those whose very jobs depend on the support of the people.
Candidates, in short, are not “mere bystanders” in their
own elections. Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA,
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as: 607 U. S. 71 (2026)
79
Opinion of the Court
606 U. S. 100, 110 (2025). They have an obvious personal
st
ake in how the result is determined and regarded. Depar-
tures from the preordained rules cause them particularized
and concrete harm.
5
The same is true of competitors in
other contests. Each runner in a 100-meter dash, for exam-
ple, would suffer if the race were unexpectedly extended to
105 meters. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 90. Whether a particular
runner expects to fnish strong or fall off the pace in the fnal
fve meters, all would be deprived of the chance to compete
for the prize that the rules defne. The fastest to run 105
meters has not won the 100-meter dash. And in much the
same way, an unlawful extension of vote counting deprives
candidates of the opportunity to compete for election under
the Constitution and laws of the United States.
B
Respondents and the dissent dismiss these harms, which
plainly affect candidates in a “personal and individual way,”
as generalized grievances. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578
U. S. 330, 339 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).
And they suggest that in order to have standing, plaintiff-
candidates must show some substantial risk that a rule will
cause them to lose the election, prevent them from achieving
a legally signifcant vote threshold, or damage their reputa-
tion or fnances. Brief for Respondents 25–26; post, at 95.
That approach fnds no support in Article III's case or con-
troversy requirement or our case law interpreting that
requirement. And it is as practically untenable as it is
undemocratic.
5
Contrary to the concurrence's suggestion, post, at 86 (Barrett, J., con-
curring in judgment), such harm is far “more particularized and more con-
crete than the mere assertion that something unlawful benefted [a] com-
petitor.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U. S. 85, 99 (2013). And it
bears little resemblance to the specifc injury alleged in Already: a risk of
being sued by a company that had issued an “unconditional and irrevoca-
ble” covenant not to sue. Id., at 93.
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80 BOST
v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS
Opinion of the Court
Premising standing on a candidate's risk of election loss or
fai
lure to achieve a certain vote threshold could channel
many election disputes to shortly before election day—or
worse, after. Only then will many candidates be able to pre-
dict with any certainty that a rule will be outcome determi-
native. And only then will they be able to produce the
“manner and degree of evidence required,” particularly at
later “stages of the litigation,” to establish standing. Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 561 (1992).
Yet “[t]his Court has repeatedly emphasized that lower
federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules
on the eve of an election.” Republican National Committee
v. Democratic National Committee, 589 U. S. 423, 424 (2020)
(per curiam). Such late-breaking, court-ordered rule
changes can “result in voter confusion and consequent incen-
tive to remain away from the polls,” and thus undermine the
“[c]onfdence in the integrity of our electoral processes . . .
essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy.”
Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (per curiam); see
also Republican Party of Pennsylvania v. Degraffenreid,
592 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). The democratic consequences can be
even more dire if courts intervene only after votes have been
counted. “Count frst, and rule upon legality afterwards, is
not a recipe for producing election results that have the pub-
lic acceptance democratic stability requires.” Bush v. Gore,
531 U. S. 1046, 1047 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in grant
of stay).
Even if some candidates could muster evidence well before
election day that a rule will likely be outcome determinative,
respondents' and the dissent's approach would convert Arti-
cle III judges into political prognosticators and “invite[ ]
fndings on matters as to which neither judges nor anyone
else can have any confdence.” Rucho v. Common Cause,
588 U. S. 684, 711 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As a number of prominent historical fgures can attest, not
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as: 607 U. S. 71 (2026)
81
Opinion of the Court
least among them Charles Evans Hughes and Thomas
D
ewey, “accurately predicting electoral outcomes is not” a
“simple” endeavor. Id., at 712. And if the prognosticators
themselves lack the “political clairvoyance” to predict the
winner after all votes have been cast, then surely judges are
poorly positioned to assess whether a candidate's risk of loss,
months earlier, is substantial. Diamond Alternative En-
ergy, 606 U. S., at 123; see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U. S.
267, 287, n. 8 (2004) (plurality opinion). The limits of federal
courts' jurisdiction do not rest upon such “unstable ground
outside judicial expertise.” Rucho, 588 U. S., at 713.
Nor would requiring candidates to plead a substantial risk
of harm to their vote share leave courts on any surer footing.
Such an approach would force judges to assess whether an
election rule is likely to disadvantage a particular candidate.
And at least as respondents suggest, judges must then also
ensure that any disadvantage is linked to reputational or f-
nancial harm.
6
Judges are no better qualifed to make such determina-
tions than they are to assess a candidate's likelihood of win-
ning or losing. Even if they could do so, this approach would
still channel many disputes into postelection litigation. To
bring a preelection suit, a candidate would have to plead and
prove that voters who take advantage of the challenged rule
will favor his rivals. Doing so while campaigning for those
same voters' support is not just awkward, but politically dan-
6
Respondents at times appear to suggest that “[a] candidate may have
standing if she demonstrates that an election rule disadvantages her rela-
tive to a competitor,” even absent proof of reputational or fnancial harm
or a risk that she will lose the election. Brief for Respondents 26; see
also Tr. of Oral Arg. 94. Yet it is far from clear why a slight but certain
competitive disadvantage would qualify as an injury in fact but requiring
a candidate to compete in an unfair election would not. Indeed, the harm
a candidate would suffer from winning 60% of the vote, instead of 61%,
seems less salient than the harm she would suffer if she instead won 62%
because of an unlawful rule, and the public believed she had received an
unfair advantage.
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82 BOST
v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS
Opinion of the Court
gerous. Particularly for new election rules, it may require
divu
lging information about vulnerabilities that rival candi-
dates could exploit. Faced with that prospect, many candi-
dates are sure to wait until after votes are counted to sue.
Adding monetary harm to the equation, as the concurrence
proposes, would change none of this. Post, at 84–85 (Bar-
rett, J., concurring in judgment). Plaintiffs cannot “manu-
facture standing by voluntarily” incurring costs. Federal
Election Comm'n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S. 289, 297
(2022). They must incur those costs to “mitigate or avoid”
a “ `substantial risk' ” of some independent harm. Clapper
v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U. S. 398, 414, n. 5 (2013). Ac-
knowledging as much, the concurrence ultimately speculates
that it is “reasonably probable” Congressman Bost's election
will be at risk because of discrepancies in late-arriving bal-
lots. Post, at 85. Such conjecture—beyond fnding little
support in the pleadings—carries all the concerns we have
explained. And the concurrence's approach introduces a
new one: Apparently, a candidate who pays poll watchers a
penny would have standing, while one who relies on volun-
teers would not.
Nothing about Article III requires this result. Candi-
dates have a concrete and particularized interest in the rules
that govern the counting of votes in their elections, regard-
less whether those rules harm their electoral prospects or
increase the cost of their campaigns. Their interest extends
to the integrity of the election—and the democratic process
by which they earn or lose the support of the people they
seek to represent.
7
7
We do not share the dissent's concern that our recognition of this com-
monsense reality will “open[ ] the foodgates” to candidate-led challenges
to ballot “format.” Post, at 97–98. Indeed, the dissent itself sug-
gests that courts already “ `often decide ballot-design cases,' ” pointing to
a case in which a court concluded that candidates did have standing to
challenge “ `the form of election ballots.' ” Post, at 98, n. 5 (quoting Kim
v. Hanlon, 99 F. 4th 140, 147, 153 (CA3 2024)). To the extent the dissent's
concern is that federal courts will be inundated with more trivial “format”
challenges, post, at 98, to things like “ballot font and typeface,” Brief for
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as: 607 U. S. 71 (2026)
83
Barrett, J., concurring in judgment
***
“Cour
ts sometimes make standing law more complicated
than it needs to be.” Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A., 590 U. S.
538, 547 (2020). We decline respondents' invitation to do so
here. As a candidate for offce, Congressman Bost has
standing to challenge the rules that govern the counting of
votes in his election.
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Barrett, with whom Justice Kagan joins, con-
curring in the judgment.
While I agree with the Court that Congressman Bost has
standing, I disagree with its reasoning. In my view, Con-
gressman Bost has standing because he has suffered a tradi-
tional pocketbook injury, not because of his status as a
candidate.
I
The Constitution limits federal courts to deciding “Cases”
and “Controversies.” Art. III, § 2. To satisfy this require-
ment, a plaintiff must show (among other things) that he has
suffered an actual injury—put colloquially, he must be able
to answer the basic question “ `What's it to you?' ” Ante, at
76. We give content to that maxim by requiring a plaintiff
to show a “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent”
injury. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U. S. 398, 409
(2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). A “particular-
ized” injury is a harm affecting a plaintiff “in a personal and
individual way,” not a “generalized grievance” shared by the
District of Columbia et al. as Amici Curiae 20, it is neither clear why
candidates would waste their resources in this way nor on what basis in
federal law such suits could be brought. In any event, we address today
only candidates' standing to challenge rules that, like Illinois's, govern the
counting of votes in their elections.
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Barrett, J., concurring in judgment
public. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330, 339, and n. 7
(2016)
(internal quotation marks omitted). A “concrete” in-
jury is a nonabstract harm of the type “that has traditionally
been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English
or American courts.” Id., at 340–341. And an “actual or
imminent” injury is one that is “certainly impending ” rather
than “speculative.” Clapper, 568 U. S., at 401.
A plaintiff must establish standing at the time of fling and
maintain it throughout litigation. Carney v. Adams, 592
U. S. 53, 59 (2020). He must support each element of stand-
ing “with the manner and degree of evidence required at the
successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 561 (1992). At the pleading stage,
“general factual allegations of injury resulting from the de-
fendant's conduct may suffce.” Ibid.; see Spokeo, 578 U. S.,
at 338 (a complaint must “ `clearly . . . allege facts demon-
strating ' ” standing).
Pocketbook harm is a traditional Article III injury. Tyler
v. Hennepin County, 598 U. S. 631, 636 (2023). That is so
not only when a law directly imposes costs on a plaintiff, see,
e. g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 430–431 (1961)
(profts lost from Sunday-closing law), but also when a plain-
tiff “reasonably incur[s] costs to mitigate or avoid” the “ `sub-
stantial risk' ” of a harm caused by a statute, Clapper, 568
U. S., at 414, n. 5 (collecting cases). For instance, in Mon-
santo Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, farmers of conventional
alfalfa sought injunctive relief against a rule deregulating
(and thus permitting) the planting of genetically modifed al-
falfa. 561 U. S. 139, 153–154 (2010). The farmers “estab-
lished a reasonable probability that their organic and conven-
tional alfalfa crops will be infected with the engineered
gene” through cross-contamination. Id., at 153 (internal
quotation marks omitted). And because the farmers took
costly preventative measures to “minimize the likelihood of
potential contamination,” they suffered an Article III injury.
Id., at 154–155; see also Virginia v. American Booksellers
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85
Barrett, J., concurring in judgment
Assn., Inc., 484 U. S. 383, 392 (1988) (fnding standing where
reg
ulated booksellers must incur compliance costs or risk
prosecution).
Like the farmers in Monsanto, Congressman Bost alleges
that he will “reasonably incur costs to mitigate or avoid” the
“ `substantial risk' ” of harm caused by the challenged stat-
ute. Clapper, 568 U. S., at 414, n. 5. He claims that Illi-
nois's ballot-receipt deadline will increase the number of
late-arriving ballots, which often “have discrepancies (e. g.,
insuffcient information, missing signatures, dates, or post-
marks) that need to be resolved.” App. to Pet. for Cert.
66a. Invalid ballots, he says, will put his election at risk and
damage his reputation. To avoid these reasonably probable
harms, his campaign “has spent, and will spend, money, time,
and resources to monitor and respond as needed to ballots
received by state election offcials after the national Election
Day.” Id., at 65a. If poll watchers are not present to moni-
tor ballot counting, county offcials could “accep[t] possibly
defcient ballots in bulk.” Id., at 67a. Accordingly, it is
standard practice for campaigns to send poll watchers to
monitor ballot counting to ensure that any discrepancies are
resolved appropriately. See Brief for League of Women
Voters et al. as Amici Curiae 20 (calling it “political malprac-
tice” for candidates not to monitor ballot counting in their
races). Because Congressman Bost's expenditures mitigate
a substantial risk of harm, he has pleaded Article III injury.*
II
Rather than take this straightforward path, the Court
charts a novel one: To challenge “the rules that govern the
counting of votes in his election,” a candidate need only al-
*Justice Jackson says it is not reasonably probable that Congressman
Bost will suffer any injury, post at 100 (dissenting opinion), implicitly re-
jecting the view that it is reasonable to employ poll watchers to monitor
for discrepancies. But on a motion to dismiss, we credit Congressman
Bost's factual allegations and draw all inferences in his favor.
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v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS
Barrett, J., concurring in judgment
lege that he is in fact a candidate in that election. Ante, at
76.
The Court makes no attempt to demonstrate that the
bare fact of facing changed vote-counting rules is a tradition-
ally recognized harm. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,
594 U. S. 413, 424–425 (2021). Nor does it grapple with Al-
ready, LLC v. Nike, Inc., which holds that a plaintiff cannot
show an Article III injury by claiming only that an allegedly
unlawful practice benefts a competitor without any showing
of harm to himself. 568 U. S. 85, 99 (2013). By holding that
a candidate a lways has an interest in challeng ing vote-
counting rules, even if those rules do not impose a competi-
tive disadvantage on him, the Court today relieves candi-
dates of having to show any real harm. See ante, at 77.
Candidates are apparently entitled to this extraordinarily
forgiving rule because they are “not common competitors in
the economic marketplace.” Ibid.
I cannot join the Court's creation of a bespoke standing
rule for candidates. Elections are important, but so are
many things in life. We have always held candidates to the
same standards as any other litigant. See, e. g., Davis v.
Federal Election Comm'n, 554 U. S. 724, 733–734 (2008)
(applying ordinary standing analysis to candidate challeng-
ing fnancial disclosure requirements); Wittman v. Personhu-
ballah, 578 U. S. 539, 545 (2016) (applying ordinary standing
analysis to legislators running for reelection who challenged
redistricting plan); Carney, 592 U. S., at 59–60 (requiring a
would-be candidate to show concrete intention to seek offce
to challenge partisan-balance rule). And we have repeat-
edly rejected requests to create special standing rules for
particular litigants. See, e. g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811,
821, 830 (1997) (legislator standing); Arizona Christian
School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 563 U. S. 125, 134
(2011) (taxpayer standing); Lujan, 504 U. S., at 566–567
(animal-enthusiast standing); FDA v. Alliance for Hippo-
cratic Medicine, 602 U. S. 367, 392–393 (2024) (doctor stand-
ing). I see no reason to afford candidates favored status.
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87
Jackson, J., dissenting
Nor do the practical realities of running for offce warrant
specia
l treatment for candidates. As Congressman Bost
concedes, “candidates could probably articulate their injury
in terms of a pocketbook injury” “in many election law
cases.” Brief for Petitioners 21. So in addition to being
unmoored from precedent, the Court's broader rule is unnec-
essary on Congressman Bost's own telling.
***
We need not deviate from established standing principles
to resolve this case in Congressman Bost's favor. I respect-
fully concur only in the judgment.
Justice Jackson, with whom Justice Sotomayor joins,
dissenting.
Under our standing precedents, this is an easy case. Arti-
cle III requires plaintiffs to assert and establish an “injury
in fact”—i. e., the “invasion of a legally protected interest”
that is both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or im-
minent.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560
(1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Congressman
Bost has failed to allege that the election-related law he
seeks to challenge has caused him to suffer any injury that
satisfes those requirements.
A majority of the Court nevertheless concludes that Bost
has standing to sue based solely on his status as a candidate
for offce. The Court thereby subtly shifts from our long-
standing actual-injury rule to a presumption that certain
kinds of plaintiffs are suffciently aggrieved to satisfy Article
III standing, regardless of whether they will experience any
particularized harm. In my view, this dubious departure
from settled law disregards both the equal treatment of liti-
gants and judicial restraint.
Justice Barret t r ightly re jec ts today's bespoke
candidate-standing rule. See ante, at 86 (opinion concurring
in judgment). Yet her pocketbook theory would allow polit-
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v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS
Jackson, J., dissenting
ical candidates to spend their way past Article III's injury-
i
n-fact requirement, despite our clear admonition that plain-
tiffs “cannot manufacture standing by choosing to make
expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is not
certainly impending.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568
U. S. 398, 402 (2013).
In the end, I would not allow Bost's suit to move forward
on grounds that we have deemed insuffcient to establish Ar-
ticle III standing for other plaintiffs. Because I believe that
political candidates can and should be held to the same
actual-injury requirements as other litigants, I respectfully
dissent.
I
Any litigant who invokes the judicial power of the federal
courts under Article III “must establish that he has a `per-
sonal stake' in the alleged dispute, and that the alleged in-
jury suffered is particularized as to him.” Raines v. Byrd,
521 U. S. 811, 819 (1997). Today, however, the Court essen-
tially pronounces that this foundational principle no longer
applies to candidates for elected offce. It declares that all
candidates have standing to challenge election regulations in
light of their interest in a “fair process.” Ante, at 77. No
matter that, in a democratic society like ours, the interest in
a fair electoral process is common to all members of the vot-
ing public. The Court thus ignores a core constitutional re-
quirement while unnecessarily thrusting the Judiciary into
the political arena.
A
The majority's primary failing is its refusal to recognize
that the alleged injury it identifes—the suffering that re-
sults from an unfair electoral process—is not particular to
candidate-plaintiffs. The importance of the particularity re-
quirement cannot be overstated, for it is this requirement
that “prevents the judicial process from becoming no more
than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of
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89
Jackson, J., dissenting
concerned bystanders.” United States v. Students Chal-
l
enging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U. S.
669, 687 (1973). Such a result is incompatible with our con-
stitutional design, which recognizes that “ `abstract ques-
tions of wide public signifcance' ” are “most appropriately
addressed in the representative branches.” Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 475 (1982) (quoting
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 500 (1975)). In other words,
the particularity requirement ensures that the Judiciary
stays in its proper lane, leaving to the people's representa-
tives the prerogative to decide questions of broad impor-
tance in the absence of a litigant with a “direct stake in the
outcome.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740 (1972).
As such, litigants without a direct stake—i. e., those who as-
sert no more than “generalized grievances about the conduct
of government”—cannot satisfy the “case or controversy as-
pect of standing.” Valley Forge, 454 U. S., at 479 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Today's decision all but ignores the particularity require-
ment and the democracy-preserving function that it serves.
This case, the Court says, involves “[a]n unlawful election
rule,” which necessarily injures candidates' “interest in a fair
process.” Ante, at 77. But, even assuming that Illinois's
rule is unlawful (as we must for standing purposes), the
Court makes no real attempt to explain how that injury is
particular to candidates; to the contrary, it acknowledges
that voters, too, have a stake in a fair electoral process. See
ante, at 78. Yet the Court insists that a candidate's interest
is “undeniably different” from that of a voter's, because it is
the candidate—and not the voter—who “compete[s]” in an
election. Ibid.
That assessment gets the signifcance of the relative inter-
ests exactly backward. A public offce is a public trust, and
an election for that offce is the ultimate expression of the
will of the people, not a mere competition to be won or lost.
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v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS
Jackson, J., dissenting
In the Court's telling, though, elections are a glorifed na-
ti
onal pastime—the competitors' success is the main objec-
tive, and voters are mere bystanders who simply “lend their
support.” Ibid. This depiction drastically devalues the role
elections play in a democratic society.
1
The Court similarly misrepresents the harm that occurs
when unlawful election rules “erod[e] public confdence [in]
the election results.” Ibid. To be sure, a tainted election
can hurt a candidate if it undermines the public's perception
of that offceholder's legitimacy and harms his reputation in
the process (assuming he makes that allegation).
2
But vot-
ers suffer too—and arguably even more so—when their fel-
low citizens lose confdence in the results of an election. In-
deed, the same loss of faith the majority counts as injurious
to candidates could be a fatal blow to the public's interest in
democratic governance.
3
Batting away these foundational truths, the Court fnds
“no occasion to theorize” about the relative signifcance of
voters' and candidates' shared interest in free and fair elec-
1
Lest we forget: In a democracy, elections are not mere candidate-
centered bouts; rather, they determine the fate of the community. Elec-
tions, after all, are the mechanism through which We the People (exercis-
ing our collective will) decide who gets to represent us. In a government
of the people, by the people, and for the people, “those who compete” in
an election, ante, at 78, are ultimately vying to become public servants—
not simply winners of a game. Thus, it is misleading to suggest that those
who “claim the right to voice the will of the people,” ibid., have an exclu-
sive interest in electoral fairness. To the contrary, those “who lend their
support” as voters, ibid., are the primary stakeholders.
2
Here, Congressman Bost has not alleged that Illinois's ballot-receipt
deadline will undermine the public's perception of the legitimacy of any
future win.
3
“[I]f a State chose to conduct its election by, say, fipping a coin,” what
is lost is not just a candidate's “opportunity to compete for the people's
support.” Ante, at 77. Another injurious consequence would be the lack
of any incentive to vote, leading to both the elimination of democratic
participation and the election of candidates who have no reason to operate
for the public good—in short, the destruction of democracy.
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91
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tions. Ibid. But it is the Court's own analysis—i. e., its
pur
ported distinction between the interests of candidates
and voters in fair election outcomes—that raises the compar-
ative question, not mine.
In any event, I agree that we need not “theorize” about
the signifcance of these interests, for one thing is indisput-
ably clear: Our democracy was founded on the “self-evident”
truth that a government is legitimate only insofar as it de-
rives its “just powers from the consent of the governed.”
Declaration of Independence ¶2. Candidates come and go,
but the voters' collective interest in the “right to elect legis-
lators in a free and unimpaired fashion” is enduring and in-
dispensable. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 562 (1964).
Against this backdrop, the Court's effort to isolate and ele-
vate a candidate's “distinct” interest in electoral integrity,
ante, at 78, falls fat.
For today's standing purposes, the key realization is that,
in a democracy, the (existential) interest in fair and accurate
elections is common to all members of the voting public. I
acknowledge that “[t]hose who spend untold time and re-
sources seeking to claim the right to voice the will of the
people,” ibid.—candidates—have a particularized interest in
getting the job. That is precisely why candidates do have
Article III standing if an unlawful election rule creates a
substantial risk of harm to that interest (the risk of an elec-
tion loss). But when what is at stake is the overall fairness
of the electoral process, it is the people's shared interest in
democracy itself (and not just the candidate's job prospects)
that hangs in the balance.
B
The Court's standing analysis elides all this by employing
the commonsense intuition that, “[w]in or lose, candidates
suffer when the process departs from the law.” Ante, at
77. But how is that a particularized injury? Anyone and
everyone who is governed by law is similarly harmed by any
departure from the law's requirements. Moreover, this
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Jackson, J., dissenting
Court has repeatedly instructed that litigants “may not sue
based
only on an `asserted right to have the Government act
in accordance with law.' ” FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic
Medicine, 602 U. S. 367, 381 (2024) (quoting Allen v. Wright,
468 U. S. 737, 754 (1984)); see also Massachusetts v. Mellon,
262 U. S. 447, 488 (1923) (rejecting theory that taxpayers
have standing to challenge an allegedly unlawful government
action requiring the use of public funds because “[t]he party
who invokes the [ judicial] power must be able to show . . .
that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustain-
ing some direct injury . . . , and not merely that he suffers
in some indefnite way in common with people generally”).
Here, the generalized nature of the “fair process” harm
is indisputable: If Illinois's vote-count rule is unlawful, all
participants in the electoral process—not only candidates for
offce but also every voter who has cast a ballot in the elec-
tion—would be deprived “of a fair process and an accurate
result.” Ante, at 77. But, as this Court has time and again
explained, such an assertion of injury “amount[s] to little
more than [an] attemp[t] `to employ a federal court as a
forum in which to air . . . generalized grievances about the
conduct of government.” Valley Forge, 454 U. S., at 483
(omission in original) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83,
106 (1968)).
Indeed, our standing precedents make crystal clear that,
absent a showing of particularized harm, these sorts of fair-
process grievances must be resolved through the political
branches. For it is in those branches “where democratic de-
bate can occur and a wide variety of interests and views can
be weighed.” Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S.,
at 380. By contrast, the exercise of judicial power, “which
can so profoundly affect the lives, liberty, and property of
those to whom it extends,” is a “tool of last resort,” to be
invoked only “when the question is raised by a party whose
interests entitle him to raise it.” Valley Forge, 454 U. S., at
473–474 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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93
Jackson, J., dissenting
Finding no support for a nonparticularized “fair process”
har
m in either our precedents or the practices of the lower
courts, the Court pivots to an analogy. It suggests that, as
a candidate running for offce who has been told that votes
will continue to be counted after election day, Bost is no dif-
ferent from a competitor in a 100-meter dash whose race is
“unexpectedly extended to 105 meters.” Ante, at 79. Ac-
cording to the majority, each runner in the newly announced
105-meter race would obviously suffer, regardless of whether
he “expects to fnish strong.” Ibid. But whether any given
runner is harmed by this rule change depends on a number
of factors particular to each competitor, none of which the
majority deigns to identify. And, indeed, it is far from obvi-
ous that a runner with a track record like Bost's—who ex-
pects to win both races based on sound statistical analyses
of his current and past performance—would have the injury
that begets Article III standing to involve the Judiciary in
this rule-change dispute.
Despite the imprecision of its analysis, the Court is clear
about one thing today: Pinpointing the actual harm to candi-
dates for elected offce is no longer necessary for standing
purposes. Its remarkable holding jettisons the injury-in-
fact requirement entirely. Forget injury; political candi-
dates need only have “a concrete and particularized interest
in the rules that govern the counting of votes in their elec-
tions, regardless whether those rules harm their electoral
prospects or increase the cost of their campaigns.” Ante,
at 82 (emphasis added). As Justice Barrett explains, see
ante, at 86 (opinion concurring in judgment), this harm-free
Article III standing rule fnds no support in our precedents.
4
4
The Government, participating as an amicus in support of petitioners,
also suggests that our typical Article III standing requirements do not
apply here, though for a different reason than the Court. In its view, we
can presume that Bost has identifed an injury in fact because he is the
“direct object” of Illinois's ballot-receipt deadline. Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 21. To be sure, when a plaintiff is the direct
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Jackson, J., dissenting
C
P
erhaps sensing the weakness of its novel, harm-free
standing analysis, the Court resorts to policy arguments to
bolster it. It worries that requiring candidates to establish
that they might lose the election will “channel” lawsuits “to
shortly before election day—or worse, after.” Ante,
at 80. “Only then,” the Court says, will a candidate really
know whether an election regulation has impacted his race.
Ibid. And, worse still, a candidate trying to make such a
showing could fnd himself in the “awkward” position of
having to “plead and prove that voters who take advan-
tage of the challenged rule will favor his rivals.” Ante,
at 81–82.
The relevance of these practical concerns is unclear. We
have traditionally viewed Article III standing as an “irre-
ducible” constitutional minimum, “not merely a troublesome
hurdle to be overcome.” Valley Forge, 454 U. S., at 472, 476.
As such, Article III's “essential and unchanging ” constitu-
tional mandates do not ordinarily yield to our policy judg-
ment about when it would be most convenient for courts to
hear particular kinds of suits. Alliance for Hippocratic
Medicine, 602 U. S., at 380 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
“object” of “government action or inaction,” there “is ordinarily little
question that the action or inaction has caused him injury.” Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 561–562 (1992). But Bost is not a
direct object of the Illinois rule at issue. The rule regulates the conduct
of voters and election offcials, dictating how and when ballots are cast
and counted. See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 10, § 5/19–8(c) (West 2022) (“Each
vote by mail voter's ballot that is mailed to an election authority and
postmarked no later than election day, but that is received . . . before the
close of the period for counting provisional ballots cast at that election,
. . . shall be counted”). And we have recently reaffrmed that, “when (as
here) a plaintiff challenges the government's `unlawful regulation (or lack
of regulation) of someone else,' ” standing “ `is ordinarily substantially
more diffcult to establish.' ” FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine,
602 U. S. 367, 382 (2024) (quoting Lujan, 504 U. S., at 562).
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95
Jackson, J., dissenting
In any event, under our usual standing rules, a candidate
(
and our democracy) need not be put in the awkward position
of waiting until the eve of an election or predicting an elec-
toral loss with 100% accuracy. Our cases recognize that a
litigant who bases standing on “[a]n allegation of future in-
jury” need only assert a “substantial risk that the harm will
occur.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149,
158 (2014) (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omit-
ted). The substantial-risk standard is not especially exact-
ing; it demands more than mere conjecture, but it does not
require plaintiffs to prove that the alleged future harm is
“literally certain” to occur. Clapper, 568 U. S., at 414, n. 5.
Accordingly, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, a candidate
need only plausibly allege that the challenged regulation cre-
ates a substantial risk of an election loss—he need not pre-
dict with certainty that the rule will cause him to lose. See,
e. g., Texas Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F. 3d 582, 587
(CA5 2006) (concluding that a candidate who alleged that
governmental action “threaten[ed] his election prospects”
had established standing). Alternatively, a candidate whose
win is more secure could allege a substantial risk of some
other concrete and particularized harm stemming from the
challenged rule's application, such as an existing or imminent
fi nancia l or reput ati ona l i n jury. Cf. Fede ral El ec t io n
Comm'n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S. 289, 296 (2022)
(recognizing a winning candidate's $10,000 expenditure as a
“pocketbook harm” that “constitute[d] an injury in fact”);
Meese v. Keene, 481 U. S. 465, 473–474 (1987) (fnding stand-
ing where a candidate had “alleged and demonstrated” that
a challenged disclosure rule would, among other harms, “ad-
versely affect his reputation in the community”).
Though it may be more diffcult for candidates to satisfy
the “substantial risk” standard at later stages of litigation,
it is nowhere near impossible. It does not require a candi-
date to prove that the challenged rule guarantees his loss; it
simply requires him to marshal enough evidence from which
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v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS
Jackson, J., dissenting
a court could conclude that the challenged rule presents a
sig
nifcant threat to his victory, his pocketbook, or his
reputation.
As we have recognized in other contexts, that sort of evi-
dence may include an evaluation of the facts on the ground
and statistical analyses. See, e. g., Department of Com-
merce v. New York, 588 U. S. 752, 767–768 (2019) (concluding
that States had standing to challenge the inclusion of a citi-
zenship question on the census, in light of statistical evidence
“establish[ing] that noncitizen households have historically
responded to the census at lower rates” and “that if nonciti-
zen households [were] undercounted by as little as 2%” those
States would “lose out on federal funds”). In the electoral
arena, preelection polling will often provide a relevant data
set. Candidates could also rely on historical data about how
a particular rule has affected those who have run similar
campaigns in the past. And the relative advantages or dis-
advantages of various electoral processes can be scrutinized
by the kinds of experts who are routinely hired to make
these sorts of assessments. See, e. g., Meese, 481 U. S., at
473–474 (fnding standing where a candidate submitted “de-
tailed affdavits, including one describing the results of an
opinion poll and another containing the views of an experi-
enced political analyst” to show that a challenged disclosure
requirement “would substantially harm his chances for re-
election” (footnote omitted)).
The Court's suggestion that it is beyond a judge's compe-
tency to evaluate whether an election rule causes a substan-
tial risk of electoral loss, ante, at 80–82, is therefore both
puzzling and unfounded. A “substantial risk” of future
harm has been the Article III imminent-injury standard for
decades. See Clapper, 568 U. S., at 414–415, n. 5 (collecting
cases applying this standard). And federal courts, including
this one, have routinely applied that standard in a variety
of circumstances—essentially whenever a plaintiff maintains
that state action is likely to harm him in the future. See,
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e. g., Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U. S. 43, 57–58 (2024) (First
Amendment
challenge related to social media content moder-
ation); Department of Commerce, 588 U. S., at 766–767 (Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act challenge to changes to the cen-
sus); Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U. S. 139,
153–155 (2010) (environmental challenge to regulations of ge-
netically modifed crops).
In short, our precedents establish that certainty of future
harm is not the benchmark, as the majority suggests. Ante,
at 80. Rather, all that is required is a plausible allegation
(eventually followed by proof ) of a substantial risk of fu-
ture injury.
Bost fails to clear even that low bar. At most, he alleges
that he “risk[s] injury if untimely and illegal ballots cause
[him] to lose [his] election” or “reduc[e]” his “margin of vic-
tory” in a way that harms his reputation. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 68a–69a (emphasis added). But his complaint and sup-
plemental declaration include no—zero—allegations to sup-
port an inference that such risk exists, or is at all substantial,
in his own case; for example, he never alleges that untimely
ballots are more likely to break against him and in favor of
his opponent. Indeed, Bost appears to have disclaimed the
need to include any such allegations before the Court of Ap-
peals, where he argued that his “stated injury is not based
on a risk of losing the election” and that “[n]either a change
to his electoral fortunes nor any other effect is necessary to
afford him standing.” Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants in No.
23–2644 (CA7), p. 19. The Court today accepts that unprec-
edented contention, which fies in the face of both the partic-
ularity requirement and the substantial-risk standard.
Alarmingly, today's ruling also has far-reaching implica-
tions beyond Bost's election, since dispensing with our usual
standing requirements opens the foodgates to exactly the
type of troubling election-related litigation the Court pur-
portedly wants to avoid. For example, under the Court's
new harm-free candidate-standing rule, an electoral candi-
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98 BOST
v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS
Jackson, J., dissenting
date who loses in a landslide can apparently still fle a disrup-
tive
legal action in federal court after the election is over.
All he must do is assert that an election rule somehow de-
prived him of a fair process—even if that rule played no role
in the election's outcome or otherwise caused him harm.
That possibility is especially concerning given the host of
election-related regulations that States must promulgate
when exercising their constitutional duty to set the “Times,
Places, and Manner of holding Elections.” Art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
States regulate everything from a ballot's chain of custody
to its format—all of which the majority would permit candi-
dates to challenge in court without offering any theory of
how such rules harm them personally. See Brief for Dis-
trict of Columbia et al. as Amici Curiae 16–22 (describing
the myriad state regulations at risk under Bost's broad the-
ory of standing).
5
It is impossible to square this outcome with the practical
concerns the Court identifes. See, e. g., ante, at 80 (empha-
sizing that “ `federal courts should ordinarily not alter the
election rules on the eve of an election' ” (quoting Republican
National Committee v. Democratic National Committee,
589 U. S. 423, 424 (2020) (per curiam))). Ironically, then, it
is the Court's new and generous candidate-standing rule that
invites late-breaking judicial intervention into the political
process in a manner that is “as practically untenable as it is
undemocratic.” Ante, at 79.
5
The Court's suggestion that these sorts of challenges are unlikely, ante,
at 82, n. 7, is belied by recent experience. See, e. g., League of Women
Voters of Fla. Inc. v. Florida Secretary of State, 66 F. 4th 905, 929 (CA11
2023) (considering a challenge to a “drop-box provision” that governed
“the chain of custody of the ballot” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Kim v. Hanlon, 99 F. 4th 140, 147, 153 (CA3 2024) (noting that “[c]ourts
often decide ballot-design cases” in considering a challenge to “the form
of election ballots” in the State of New Jersey). Without a harm-based
standing rule for candidates, these kinds of challenges will undoubtedly
become even more common.
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as: 607 U. S. 71 (2026)
99
Jackson, J., dissenting
II
W
hile more tethered to our standing precedents, Justice
Barrett’s pocketbook-injury theory is also insuffcient to
support Bost's standing. This is because it is well settled—
in light of our decision in Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568
U. S. 398—that plaintiffs “cannot manufacture standing by
choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical future
harm that is not certainly impending.” Id., at 402. Bost's
allegations establish only a hypothetical future harm, even
when crediting them as true and drawing all reasonable in-
ferences in his favor.
In Clapper, we held that a group of attorneys and human-
rights organizations lacked standing to challenge a provision
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) “author-
izing the surveillance of individuals who are not `United
States persons' and are reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States.” Id., at 401 (footnote omitted)
(quoting 50 U. S. C. § 1881a). The attorneys and organiza-
tions premised their standing argument on the possibility
that their clients would be surveilled under FISA. 568
U. S., at 406. That possibility, they said, required them to
take “costly and burdensome measures” to protect their pri-
vacy, including avoiding “certain e-mail and phone conversa-
tions” and traveling to their clients “so that they [could] have
in-person conversations.” Id., at 415. Yet the attorneys
and organizations “ha[d] no actual knowledge” of the Govern-
ment's surveillance practices under FISA. Id., at 411.
They “merely speculate[d] and ma[de] assumptions about
whether their communications” would be targeted. Ibid.
As a result, the measures they took to avoid surveillance
could not satisfy Article III's requirements. Id., at 416.
Or, put differently, they could not “manufacture standing
merely by inficting harm on themselves based on their fears
of hypothetical future harm that [was] not certainly impend-
ing.” Ibid.
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100 BOST
v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS
Jackson, J., dissenting
Bost's alleged pocketbook injury is no different. He fears
that
Illinois's ballot-receipt deadline will allow the State to
count illegal votes, which in turn might injure him by costing
him an election or at least resulting in a diminished margin
of victory that somehow damages his reputation. Brief for
Petitioners 18. He has therefore hired poll watchers to
monitor the State's vote counting for an additional two
weeks. But, in the absence of any allegation establishing
that he actually faces a substantial risk of losing the election
or having his margin of victory diminished in a meaningful
way, Bost has taken those precautions based on the mere
(and by all accounts remote) possibility that such harms will
otherwise materialize. At bottom, then, Bost fears a “hypo-
thetical future harm that is not certainly impending.” 568
U. S., at 416. So any additional expenses Bost incurs to
ward off that harm is not a proper basis for standing. Ibid.
Bost nevertheless insists that his case is distinct from
Clapper because he knows that the State will apply its 14-
day ballot-receipt deadline in his next election. That fact,
he says, sets him apart from the attorneys and human-rights
organizations in Clapper, who could not prove that the Fed-
eral Government would invoke FISA against them or their
clients. Stated differently, Bost is certain that the State
will apply the ballot-receipt deadline, whereas the Clapper
plai nti ffs cou ld only specu late as to FISA's future
application.
This contention misunderstands Clapper's standing rule
and how it applied in that case. In Clapper, the harm the
plaintiffs feared (unlawful surveillance) would occur at the
precise moment that FISA was invoked against them or
their clients. And because the asserted injury stemmed di-
rectly from the application of the challenged regulation, the
risk of future harm was tied directly to the risk of FISA's
future application to the plaintiffs. It mattered, then, that
the possibility of FISA's application was only speculative.

Cite
as: 607 U. S. 71 (2026)
101
Jackson, J., dissenting
Bost's feared injury—the one he seeks to spend his way
out
of—is different in this respect, but it is no less specula-
tive. The harm Bost fears does not stem from the mere
(certain) application of the State's 14-day ballot-receipt dead-
line. Rather, what triggers Bost's spending is fear of a lost
election or the diminution of his reputation—i. e., the possi-
ble downstream effects of the challenged election rule.
Thus, even though the rule's application is certain, the feared
harm is not; Bost has only speculated as to the possibility
that this future, downstream harm will occur.
This means that Bost's pocketbook injury is similar in all
relevant respects to that presented by the plaintiffs in Clap-
per: He is spending money to ward off speculative future
injury. His case differs from Clapper only insofar as the
source of the harm he is seeking to alleviate is not the (uncer-
tain) application of the regulation itself, but the (uncertain)
effects of that regulation. In other words, both Bost and
the plaintiffs in Clapper spent money to mitigate a risk of
injury that was only theoretical, not substantial. And nei-
ther can leverage unnecessary expenditures into Article III
standing.
Our decision in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561
U. S. 139, is not to the contrary. There, we held that farm-
ers who “established a reasonable probability” that geneti-
cally modifed alfalfa seeds would cross-contaminate their or-
ganic alfalfa had standing based on the costly measures they
had taken to protect their crops. Id., at 153–155 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The key phrase from our Monsanto opinion is “reasonable
probability.” The farmers did not simply point to a hypo-
thetical possibility of cross-contamination. Instead, their al-
legations established that their fear of future harm was rea-
sonable. In particular, the farmers explained that modifed
alfalfa seeds were actually “ `being planted in all the major
alfalfa seed production areas with little regard to contamina-
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102 BOST
v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS
Jackson, J., dissenting
tion to non-GMO seed production felds.' ” Id., at 154, n. 3.
The
farmers also emphasized “ `the compact geographic area
of the prime alfalfa seed producing areas and the fact that
pollen is distributed by bees that have large natural range
of activity.' ” Ibid. Accordingly, they reasonably predicted
that “ `the genetic contamination of the [modifed] seed
[would] rapidly spread through the seed growing regions.' ”
Ibid.
Bost's allegations, by comparison, fall well short of demon-
strating a reasonable probability of future harm absent
costly mitigation efforts. He alleges only that he “risk[s] in-
jury if untimely and illegal ballots cause [him] to lose” or
diminish his “margin of victory,” leading “to the public per-
ception that [his] constituents have concerns about [his] job
performance.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 68a–69a. Examined
closely, Bost's averment is that, if the vote counting contin-
ues, he could receive fewer votes, which could cause him to
lose the election or could damage his reputation among vot-
ers and donors. No other allegations make this harmful out-
come likely or otherwise substantiate the risk that any of
these potential problems might actually occur.
Justice Barrett nevertheless suggests that the forgiv-
ing standard for motions to dismiss is enough to get Bost
over the line. See ante, at 85, n. (opinion concurring in judg-
ment). But that standard cannot beneft a plaintiff like
Bost, who is “armed with nothing more than conclusions.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 678–679 (2009).
6
Bost's com-
6
I do not reject the view that it is reasonable to employ poll watchers
to monitor discrepancies in the vote count as a general matter. See ante,
at 85, n. (Barrett, J., concurring in judgment). But a proper Article
III standing analysis requires us to answer a different question: whether
it was reasonable for this particular plaintiff to voluntarily incur such
costs under the circumstances presented in his case. At the motion-to-
dismiss stage, we are only obligated to credit the plausible assertions of
fact the plaintiff makes to support that inference. We do not have to
accept Bost's bald contention that he has to hire poll watchers in light of
Illinois's rule (or make the inference that it is reasonable for him to do so

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as: 607 U. S. 71 (2026)
103
Jackson, J., dissenting
plaint identifes only a “speculative chain of possibilities,”
and,
as such, his allegations are insuffcient to establish a
reasonable probability of future harm. Clapper, 568 U. S.,
at 414.
7
In an ironic twist, the majority correctly rejects Justice
Barrett's pocketbook-injury theory analysis due to its
speculative nature. It rightly acknowledges that a plaintiff
who relies on costs to establish standing “must incur those
costs to `mitigate or avoid' a `substantial risk' of some inde-
pendent harm.” Ante, at 82 (quoting Clapper, 568 U. S., at
414, n. 5). And it recognizes that the independent harm
Bost asserts—“discrepancies in late-arriving ballots”—
amounts to “conjecture,” with “little support in the plead-
ings.” Ante, at 82. But rather than follow that observation
where it leads, the majority crafts a new candidate-only
standing rule, ignoring the patently speculative nature of
Bost's harm based on Bost's more generalized “interest in a
fair process.” Ante, at 77.
With respect to the majority's harm-free, fair-process
standing theory, Justice Barrett has the better of that
argument. She correctly observes that the majority's con-
clusion relieves Bost “of having to show any real harm” and
fails to hold him to the same standards that we apply to all
during the upcoming election); indeed, in my view, accepting that conclu-
sory contention abdicates our responsibility to actually evaluate the suff-
ciency of the plaintiff's allegations.
7
Bost's concern that his reputation might be damaged even if he wins—
due to a diminished margin of victory, see Brief for Petitioners 18—is
especially diffcult to fathom, much less designate as plausible. I suppose
it is possible that voters and donors will think less of Bost as an offcial if
he wins by 74% of the vote instead of 75%, regardless of his performance
while in offce. See 114 F. 4th 634, 642 (CA7 2024) (case below) (observing
that Bost won the 2022 election with 75% of the vote). But that result is
neither obvious nor intuitive. In fact, without more specifc allegations,
one might just as easily speculate that a closer race would beneft Bost, as
it could generate more donations and enthusiasm among his core
supporters.
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v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS
Jackson, J., dissenting
other litigants. Ante, at 86 (opinion concurring in judg-
ment).
But, given the weaknesses of Bost's allegations,
Justice Barrett’s standing theory would also unjustly
beneft Bost, by permitting him to voluntarily spend his way
into a federal forum absent any reasonable assertion that the
challenged rule (as opposed to his own unsubstantiated fears
and spending proclivities) has caused him to suffer an injury
in fact.
III
Forty-some years ago, in Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S.
95 (1983), this Court considered whether a plaintiff had
standing to challenge the Los Angeles Police Department's
repeated use of life-threatening chokeholds on civilians who
posed no threat of violence. Id., at 105. The plaintiff in
that case, Adolph Lyons, suffered such a chokehold at the
hands of police, “rendering him unconscious and causing
damage to his larynx.” Id., at 97–98. Fearing that he
would again be subjected to a life-threatening chokehold,
Lyons fled a lawsuit seeking an injunction that would bar
the future use of that technique against civilians who posed
no risk to offcer safety. Id., at 98.
We rejected Lyons's legal action on standing grounds,
holding that he had failed to establish a “real and immediate
threat” of future harm. Id., at 105. None of Lyons's ap-
peals to fairness or common sense suffced to persuade a ma-
jority of this Court that he had Article III standing. It did
not matter, for instance, that Lyons had almost died from an
illegal chokehold only fve months prior to fling his com-
plaint. See ibid. Nor did it matter that “no less than 16
persons ha[d] died following the use of a chokehold by an
LAPD police offcer” in the preceding decade. Id., at 115–
116 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Because those “odds” did not
suggest a substantial risk of harm to Lyons in the future, we
said, he was not entitled to sue for injunctive relief. Id., at
108 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
So, despite the grievous wrong and physical harm that Lyons
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as: 607 U. S. 71 (2026)
105
Jackson, J., dissenting
(and others like him) had suffered, we “decline[d] the invita-
ti
on to slight the preconditions” of Article III. Id., at 112.
8
If only the Lyons Court had seen ft to create the sort of
harm-free, status-based standing rule that the majority
adopts today. The majority's reasoning—leading to today's
holding that “[c]andidates have a concrete and particularized
interest in the rules that govern the counting of votes in
their elections, regardless whether those rules harm their
electoral prospects or increase the cost of their campaigns,”
ante, at 82—would have been useful to Lyons. Lyons was
a Los Angeles resident who had been unfairly targeted by
police violence in the past and who wished to move freely
about in the community. Armed with today's decision,
Lyons might have successfully relied upon that status to
claim a “concrete and particularized interest” in the rules
that governed police offcers' encounters with certain com-
munity residents, regardless of whether such police practices
would have harmed him in the future.
But the Lyons standing rule focused on actual injury: We
emphasized that a plaintiff must assert (and, ultimately,
prove) that the allegedly unlawful practice risks injuring him
in a concrete and particularized manner in the future. The
bare assertion of an interest in general fairness, absent the
8
Contemporary commentators predicted that our decision in Lyons
would close the door to “a broad range of analogous lawsuits” aimed at
systemic misconduct and abuse on the part of law enforcement. R. Fallon,
Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Juris-
prudence of Lyons, 59 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1, 71–72 (1984). That prediction
proved accurate. Today, courts routinely rely on Lyons to deny plaintiffs
standing to seek injunctions against future police behavior. See, e. g.,
J. W. ex rel. Tammy Williams v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 904 F. 3d 1248,
1267 (CA11 2018) (per curiam); Shain v. Ellison, 356 F. 3d 211, 216 (CA2
2004); Whitfeld v. Ridgeland, 876 F. Supp. 2d 779, 787–788 (SD Miss. 2012);
see also Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo, 606 U. S. –––, ––– (2025) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring) (concluding that, under Lyons, Latino plaintiffs who were
“stopped for immigration questioning allegedly without reasonable suspi-
cion of unlawful presence” lacked standing to seek an injunction).
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106 BOST
v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS
Jackson, J., dissenting
showing of any real and immediate harm, is apparently cog-
ni
zable only if asserted by candidates for offce.
***
I am all for simplifying our standing law. See ante, at
83. But I am against doing so selectively; either Article III
standing requires an actual or imminent injury in fact that
is particularized to the plaintiff, or it does not. Bost has
plainly failed to allege facts that support an inference of
standing under our established precedents. By carving out
a bespoke rule for candidate-plaintiffs—granting them stand-
ing “to challenge the rules that govern the counting of
votes,” simply and solely because they are “candidate[s]” for
offce, ibid.—the Court now complicates and destabilizes
both our standing law and America's electoral processes.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, cap-
tions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional
edits were made:
None