Pitts v. Mississippi

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 607 U. S. Part 1
Pages 1–6
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
November 24, 2025
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
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pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

CASES ADJUDGED
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AT
OCTOBER TERM, 2025
PITTS v. MISSISSIPPI
on petition for writ of certiorari to the supreme
court of mississippi
No. 24–1159. Decided November 24, 2025
The State of Mississippi charged Jeffrey Pitts with sexually abusing his
daughter, A. G. C. When A. G. C. testifed at trial, the court granted
the State's motion to place a screen between A. G. C. and Pitts pursuant
to a Mississippi statute which provides that child witnesses “shall have
the . . . righ[t]” to “a properly constructed screen that would permit the
judge and jury in the courtroom . . . to see the child but would obscure
the child's view of the defendant.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99–43–101(2)(g).
A jury convicted Pitts. On appeal, Pitts argued that the screen vio-
lated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser face to face.
A divided Mississippi Supreme Court rejected Pitts's arguments and
held that Mississippi's mandatory statute provided suffcient justifcation
for the screening in this case.
Held: Under Coy v. Iowa, 487 U. S. 1012, and Maryland v. Craig, 497 U. S.
836, the Sixth Amendment tolerates screening in child-abuse cases only
if a court “hear[s] evidence” and issues a “case-specifc” fnding of “[t]he
requisite . . . necessity.” See id., at 855. Simply pointing to a statute
that authorizes screening, even one premised on “generalized fnding[s]”
of necessity, will not suffce. Coy, 487 U. S., at 1021. The Mississippi
Supreme Court's reliance on the State's mandatory right-to-screening
statute, without case-specifc fndings, falls well short of these require-
ments, and its judgment is therefore reversed. On remand the State
remains free to argue, and the Mississippi Supreme Court remains free
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2 PITTS
v. MISSISSIPPI
Per Curiam
to consider, whether the error in this case warrants a new trial under
the
harmless-error standard. Ibid.
Certiorari granted; 405 So. 3d 1238, reversed and remanded.
Per Curiam.
Ordinarily, the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause
“guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with wit-
nesses appearing before the trier of fact.” Coy v. Iowa, 487
U. S. 1012, 1016 (1988). In child-abuse cases, however, that
r u le someti mes g ives way. Consistent w ith the Sixth
Amendment, a court may screen a child witness from the
defendant when “necessary to protect [the child] from
trauma that would be caused by testifying in the physical
presence of the defendant, at least where such trauma would
impair the child's ability to communicate.” Maryland v.
Craig, 497 U. S. 836, 857 (1990).
Still, before invoking this procedure, a court must proceed
with care. It must “hear evidence” and make a “case-
specifc” fnding of “[t]he requisite . . . necessity.” Id., at
855. Simply pointing to a state statute that authorizes
screening, even one premised on “generalized fnding[s]” of
necessity, will not suffce. Coy, 487 U. S., at 1021. Because
the Mississippi Supreme Court departed from these princi-
ples, we reverse.
I
In May 2020, A. G. C. spent a weekend visiting her father,
Jeffrey Pitts. After returning home, A. G. C. told her
mother that she had been sexually abused. Eventually, that
report led to criminal charges against Pitts.
At trial, the State moved for permission to place a screen
between A. G. C. and Pitts when she took the witness stand.
In support of its motion, the State pointed to a Mississippi
statute providing that child witnesses “shall have the . . .
righ[t]” to “a properly constructed screen that would permit
the judge and jury in the courtroom . . . to see the child but
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Cite
as: 607 U. S. 1 (2025)
3
Per Curiam
would obscure the child's view of the defendant.” Miss.
Code
Ann. § 99–43–101(2)(g) (2020).
Pitts objected. He did not question the statute's manda-
tory terms. But, he said, those terms had to give way to
the Sixth Amendment's demands. 405 So. 3d 20, 31 (Miss.
App. 2023). And, he submitted, the State had not attempted
to meet, and could not meet, its Sixth Amendment burden
of showing that screening was necessary in the particular
circumstances of his case. 405 So. 3d 1238, 1243 (Miss. 2025).
The trial judge granted the State's motion. In doing so,
the judge reasoned that the “statute . . . appears to be man-
datory,” and expressed “concerns about [his] ability to de-
clare the statute unconstitutional and fail to follow it.” App.
to Pet. for Cert. 36a (App.).
After a jury convicted him, Pitts appealed. 405 So. 3d, at
31. Invoking Coy and Craig, he argued that the trial court
had failed to make the case-specifc fnding of necessity the
Sixth Amendment requires and, as remedy, sought a new
trial. 405 So. 3d, at 31–35.
Ultimately, a divided Mississippi Supreme Court rejected
Pitts's arguments. The court did not dispute that the trial
court failed to make a case-specifc fnding of necessity. See
405 So. 3d, at 1246. Instead, the court sought to distinguish
Coy and Craig on various grounds. 405 So. 3d, at 1248–1252.
With those distinctions in hand, the court then proceeded to
hold that Mississippi's mandatory statute provided suffcient
authority for the screening in this case. Id., at 1254–1255.
Unpersuaded, the dissent argued that Coy and Craig con-
trolled this case and that the trial court failed to comply with
their terms. 405 So. 3d, at 1255 (King, J., dissenting).
After the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled, Pitts sought
certiorari.
II
Under Coy and Craig, a trial court may not deny a defend-
ant his Sixth Amendment right to meet his accusers face to
face simply because a state statute permits screening. Nor
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4 PITTS
v. MISSISSIPPI
Per Curiam
may a court authorize screening based on “generalized fnd-
i
ng[s]” of necessity underlying such a statute. Coy, 487
U. S., at 1021. Instead, the Sixth Amendment tolerates
screening in child-abuse cases only if a court “hear[s] evi-
dence” and issues a “case-specifc” fnding of “[t]he requisite
. . . necessity.” See Craig, 497 U. S., at 855. The Missis-
sippi Supreme Court attempted to avoid these constraints by
distinguishing Coy and Craig in various ways. But none of
the court's distinctions persuades. Consider the most sa-
lient theories it pressed:
First, the court pointed to a victims' rights provision in
Mississippi's State Constitution. 405 So. 3d, at 1246–1249.
That provision affords the state legislature the power “to
enact . . . laws to . . . protect the rights guaranteed to vic-
tims.” Art. 3, § 26A(3). And, the court observed, the state
legislature exercised this power when it adopted the manda-
tory screening law the trial court applied in this case. 405
So. 3d, at 1249. But, true as all that may be, it is also irrele-
vant. When state law conficts with the Federal Constitu-
tion, the latter controls. Art. VI, cl. 2. And under the
Sixth Amendment, neither state screening statutes, nor the
“generalized fnding[s]” on which they are premised, are
enough to overcome a defendant's right to face-to-face con-
frontation. Coy, 487 U. S., at 1021.
Second, the court stressed that Mississippi's statute man-
dates screening in child-abuse cases while the Iowa statute
in Coy only afforded trial courts discretion to screen. 405
So. 3d, at 1249–1250. But, if anything, the fact that Missis-
sippi's statute is mandatory—and thus never requires a case-
specifc fnding of necessity—renders it “more constitution-
ally problematic than the statute at issue in Coy, not less so.”
Id., at 1258 (King, J., dissenting).
Third, the court emphasized that A. G. C. was four years
old at the time of trial. Id., at 1250 (majority opinion). But
Craig involved a 6-year-old witness. 497 U. S., at 840. And
though a witness's age is a relevant consideration, Craig

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Cite
as: 607 U. S. 1 (2025)
5
Per Curiam
made plain that a court must “hear evidence” and make a
“case-speci
fc” “fnding of necessity” before denying a de-
fendant the right to face-to-face confrontation in a child-
abuse case. See id., at 855.
Fourth, the court observed that in Coy the government
and the defendant disputed who committed the alleged as-
sault, while in this case the identity of the alleged perpetra-
tor was not in question. 405 So. 3d, at 1250. But the Sixth
Amendment right to confront one's accusers face to face does
not only apply in cases where identity is at issue. See Craig,
497 U. S., at 840 (involving a known perpetrator). Nor does
Craig's exception for child-abuse cases automatically apply
just because identity happens to be uncontested. See id., at
855–856.
Finally, the court noted that the child witness and lawyers
in Craig were placed in a different room from the defendant,
with cross-examination conducted over closed-circuit televi-
sion. 405 So. 3d, at 1251. In this case, by contrast, every-
one remained in the courtroom, the witness and defendant
separated only by a screen. Id., at 1244, 1251. But both
approaches deviate from the Sixth Amendment's usual rule
that a defendant is entitled to meet his accusers “face to
face.” See Coy, 487 U. S., at 1016; Craig, 497 U. S., at 844.
And both thus require a case-specifc fnding of necessity.
Id., at 855.
Before this Court, the State does not so much defend the
Mississippi Supreme Court's various efforts to distinguish
Coy and Craig as press a different argument still. As the
State sees it, the trial court did “hear evidence” and make a
“case-specifc” “fnding of necessity.” See Craig, 497 U. S.,
at 855.
We disagree. At trial, to be sure, the prosecution repre-
sented that A. G. C.'s guardian believed it would be diffcult
for her to testify face to face with her father. App. 6a. But
the prosecution expressly rejected the notion that it had “to
put on any proof,” choosing to rely instead on Mississippi's

6 PITTS
v. MISSISSIPPI
Per Curiam
mandatory “right” to screening. Id., at 6a–7a. And the
tr
ial judge proceeded to rule that the “statute . . . appears
to be mandatory” and expressed concerns about “fail[ing] to
follow it.” Id., at 36a. Those arguments and conclusions
fall well short of the procedures and fndings Coy and
Craig require.
III
Having resolved that much, we pause to underscore what
we leave unresolved. Just because a constitutional error
took place at trial does not necessarily mean a new one must
be held. Even constitutional errors are sometimes subject
to a “harmless-error” rule and do not require a new trial if
the prosecution can show “beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict ob-
tained.” Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 23–24 (1967).
This Court has held that the denial of the right to face-to-
face confrontation is among those errors “subject to that
harmless-error analysis.” Coy, 487 U. S., at 1021. Accord-
ingly, on remand the State remains free to argue, and the
Mississippi Supreme Court remains free to consider, whether
the error in this case warrants a new trial under the
harmless-error standard.
The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the
Mississippi Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is re-
manded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, cap-
tions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional
edits were made:
p. 1, line after the case name: “on petition for writ of” is inserted
before “certiorari”
p. 3, line 9 from bottom: “a” is changed to “the”