Commissioner v. Zuch

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 605 U. S. Part 2
Pages 422–442
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 12, 2025
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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422 OCTOBER
TERM, 2024
Syllabus
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. ZUCH
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the third circuit
No. 24–416. Argued April 22, 2025—Decided June 12, 2025
This case involves the jurisdiction of the United States Tax Court over
appeals from collection due process hearings when there is no longer an
ongoing levy. The dispute here began in 2012, when Jennifer Zuch and
her then-husband Patrick Gennardo each fled an untimely 2010 federal
tax return. Gennardo subsequently submitted an offer in compromise
to resolve outstanding tax liabilities. This offer implicated $50,000 in
estimated tax payments that the couple had previously sent to the IRS;
following the offer, the IRS applied these payments to Gennardo's ac-
count. For her part, Zuch later amended her 2010 tax return to report
additional income, which resulted in an additional $28,000 in taxes due.
But Zuch maintained that the IRS should have credited the couple's
$50,000 payment to her account, entitling her to a $22,000 refund. The
IRS disagreed and sought to collect her unpaid taxes by placing a levy
on her property pursuant to its authority under 26 U. S. C. § 6331(a).
Zuch requested a collection due process hearing to contest the levy.
The appeals offcer rejected Zuch's argument about the misapplied
$50,000 tax payment and issued a Notice of Determination sustaining
the levy action under § 6330(c)(3). Zuch then appealed to the Tax Court
under § 6330(d)(1). During the multi-year proceedings before the
agency and the Tax Court that followed, Zuch fled several annual tax
returns showing overpayments. Each time, the IRS applied these
overpayments to her outstanding 2010 tax liability rather than issuing
refunds. Once Zuch's liability reached zero, the IRS moved to dismiss
the Tax Court proceeding as moot, arguing that the Tax Court lacked
jurisdiction because the IRS no longer had a basis to levy on Zuch's
property. The Tax Court agreed. But on appeal, the Third Circuit
vacated the dismissal, holding that the IRS's abandonment of the levy
did not moot the Tax Court proceedings.
Held: The Tax Court lacks jurisdiction under § 6330 to resolve disputes
between a taxpayer and the IRS when the IRS is no longer pursuing a
levy. Pp. 428–432.
(a) “The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction.” Commissioner
v. McCoy, 484 U. S. 3, 7 (per curiam). Section 6330(d)(1) grants the Tax
Court jurisdiction to “review” an appeals offcer's “determination” in a
collection due process hearing. The scope of the “determination” deter-
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423
Syllabus
mines what the Tax Court has jurisdiction to review. The Court agrees
w
ith the Government that “determination” refers to the binary decision
whether a levy may proceed. Section 6330(c)(3) requires the appeals
offcer to consider three things when making this “determination,” in-
cluding “issues raised” by the taxpayer. The statute thus distinguishes
between “consideration[s]” that inform the “determination” and the “de-
termination” itself. Here, Zuch's dispute about estimated tax payments
was an input into the “determination”—an “issu[e] raised” that the ap-
peals offcer was required to consider under § 6330(c)(3)(B). The “deter-
mination,” by contrast, was just the appeals offcer's decision to sustain
the levy.
Statutory context also supports the Government's position on the lim-
ited scope of the Tax Court's jurisdiction under § 6330(d)(1). When a
taxpayer wants to contest tax liability, the default rule requires taxpay-
ers to frst pay the disputed tax before pursuing a challenge. § 7421(a).
Had the IRS simply offset Zuch's overpayments without pursuing a levy,
her only recourse would have been a refund suit in line with the default
rule. The IRS's proposed levy triggered Zuch's right to a collection
due process hearing under § 6330(a)(1), but § 6330—titled “Notice and
opportunity for hearing before levy”—focuses just on the proposed levy.
The hearing 's scope tracks its purpose: taxpayers may raise only levy-
related issues. See § 6330(c)(2)(A) (“any relevant issue relating to the
unpaid tax or the proposed levy”); § 6330(c)(2)(B) (“challenges to the ex-
istence or amount of the underlying tax liability” (emphasis added)).
Given § 6330's unwavering focus on levies and the default rule requiring
postpayment suits, it would be strange if a taxpayer could use a § 6330
appeal to resolve tax disputes that no longer have any connection to an
ongoing levy.
Finally, the Court doubts the Tax Court has authority under § 6330(e)
to provide relief beyond enjoining a levy. Nothing in § 6330(e)(1) au-
thorizes the Tax Court to order refunds or to issue declaratory judg-
ments resolving tax liability disputes. While Zuch argues that author-
ity to enjoin a levy necessarily includes the ability to declare the validity
of underlying tax obligations, the Tax Court's authority to render such
conclusions depends on the levy's existence. Pp. 428–431.
(b) The Tax Court properly dismissed Zuch's appeal. The appeals
offcer issued a “determination” that the IRS's proposed levy could pro-
ceed. The Tax Court had jurisdiction to review that determination—
to decide whether the levy could (or could not) go forward. As part of
that review, the Tax Court initially had authority to determine whether
the appeals offcer's predicate conclusions—like whether the $50,000
should have been credited exclusively to Gennardo—were correct. But
once Zuch no longer owed unpaid taxes, there was no basis for a levy

424 COMMISSIONER
v. ZUCH
Opinion of the Court
and thus no relevant “determination” to review. The Tax Court lacked
jur
isdiction to opine on disputed tax liability independent of any ongoing
collection effort. Zuch's recourse for alleged tax overpayments is to
fle a refund suit, see 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(a)(1), 1491(a)(1), which she has
already done. Pp. 431–432.
97 F. 4th 81, reversed and remanded.
Barrett, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jack-
son, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 432.
Erica L. Ross argued the cause for petitioner. With her
on the briefs were Solicitor General Sauer, Acting Solicitor
General Harris, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Hub-
bert, Deputy Solicitor General Gannon, Francesca Ugolini,
Jennifer M. Rubin, and Julie Ciamporcero Avetta.
Shay Dvoretzky argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were Parker Rider-Longmaid, Armando
Gomez, Sylvia O. Tsakos, Hanaa Khan, Raza Rasheed, and
Frank Agostino.*
Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Tax Code authorizes the Internal Revenue Service
to levy on—in other words, to seize and sell—a taxpayer's
property to collect unpaid taxes. 26 U. S. C. § 6331(a). Be-
fore a levy goes forward, however, the taxpayer has the right
to a hearing at which she can dispute issues relating to the
levy. §§ 6330(a)–(b). At the hearing, an appeals offcer con-
siders the taxpayer's arguments and renders a “determina-
tion” about whether the levy can proceed. § 6330(c)(3). If
the appeals offcer sustains the levy, the taxpayer can seek
review in the United States Tax Court. § 6330(d)(1).
*Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Center for
Taxpayer Rights by Audrey Patten; for the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America by Lauren Willard Zehmer; for the National
Taxpayers Union Foundation et al. by Joseph D. Henchman; and for A.
Lavar Taylor, pro se.
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Opinion of the Court
This case presents a procedural twist. While Jennifer
Zuch'
s appeal was pending before the Tax Court, she over-
paid her taxes—and the IRS applied those overpayments
against her alleged tax liability, thereby eliminating any jus-
tifcation for a levy. Yet Zuch wanted the appeal to con-
tinue. She still disputed the debt that prompted the levy,
and she hoped that a victory before the Tax Court would
force the IRS to refund her overpayments. We must decide
whether the Tax Court had jurisdiction to hear Zuch's appeal
once the possibility of a levy was off the table. It did not.
I
A
The typical way to dispute a tax liability is to pay frst
and then seek a refund. 26 U. S. C. § 7421(a) (barring most
“suit[s] for the purpose of restraining the assessment or col-
lection of any tax”); see also 28 U. S. C. § 2201(a) (barring
declaratory judgments in actions “with respect to Federal
taxes”). In certain circumstances, however, Congress has
given taxpayers the option of prepayment judicial review.
A levy is one such exception. When a taxpayer who is “lia-
ble to pay [a] tax neglects or refuses to pay the same,” the
IRS may “levy upon all property and rights to property”
belonging to the taxpayer. 26 U. S. C. § 6331(a). But be-
cause the seizure and sale of property has serious conse-
quences for the taxpayer, see § 6331(b), Congress requires
the IRS to give the taxpayer an opportunity to request a
hearing before the levy is made, §§ 6330(a)–(b), (e)(1). In the
tax world, this is called a “collection due process hearing.”
An appeals offcer in the IRS Independent Offce of Ap-
pea ls conduc ts the col lec ti on due process hear i ng.
§ 6330(b)(3). At it, the taxpayer “may raise . . . any relevant
issue relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed levy,” such
as “appropriate spousal defenses,” “challenges to the appro-
priateness of collection actions,” or “offers of collection alter-
natives.” § 6330(c)(2)(A). The taxpayer “may also raise at
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426 COMMISSIONER
v. ZUCH
Opinion of the Court
the hearing challenges to the existence or amount of the un-
der
lying tax liability” if the taxpayer did not previously have
an opportunity to dispute the tax liability. § 6330(c)(2)(B).
The appeals offcer then makes a “determination,” which
“shall take into consideration” various factors, including “the
issues raised” by the taxpayer. § 6330(c)(3).
Within 30 days of the appeals offcer's determination, the
taxpayer may “petition the Tax Court for review of such de-
termination.” § 6330(d)(1). The decision of the Tax Court
is reviewable in the federal courts of appeals. § 7482(a).
B
In the fall of 2012, Jennifer Zuch and her then-husband
Patrick Gennardo separately fled untimely 2010 federal in-
come tax returns. Zuch's return reported no outstanding
tax obligations, but Gennardo's refected a substantial bal-
ance due. To resolve this balance, as well as other outstand-
ing tax liabilities, Gennardo submitted an offer in com-
promise to the IRS. See § 7122(a). This offer implicated
estimated tax payments—totaling $50,000—that the couple
had already sent to the IRS. After Gennardo submitted his
offer, the IRS applied these payments to his account as a
married-fling-separate taxpayer, thereby settling his debt.
A few weeks later, Zuch fled an amended 2010 tax return
that reported an additional $71,000 in income from a retire-
ment distribution, generating almost $28,000 in tax liability.
But Zuch also claimed that the $50,000 in estimated tax pay-
ments should be credited to her account, entitling her to a
net refund of about $22,000.
The IRS disagreed. Because it had already allocated the
$50,000 to Gennardo, it refused to apply the estimated pay-
ments to Zuch. Instead, the IRS informed her that it in-
tended to levy on her property to collect what it deemed to
be unpaid taxes. Zuch requested a collection due process
hearing, at which she asserted that the IRS should have
credited the estimated tax payments to her account. The
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Opinion of the Court
appeals offcer rejected her argument and sent Zuch a Notice
of
Determination sustaining the levy action. Zuch then ap-
pealed to the Tax Court, which remanded the case back to
the Offce of Appeals for further factual development. The
Offce sustained the levy, and proceedings resumed in the
Tax Court.
The process spanned several years, and on multiple occa-
sions during this period, Zuch fled an income tax return
reporting an overpayment that entitled her to a refund.
But each time, instead of issuing a refund, the IRS credited
the overpayment against Zuch's supposedly outstanding 2010
tax liability. See § 6402(a) (authorizing the Secretary to
“credit the amount of [any] overpayment . . . against any
liability in respect of an internal revenue tax on the part of
the person who made the overpayment”). As these credits
accumulated, Zuch gradually paid down the balance, and
when it hit zero, the IRS moved to dismiss the Tax Court
proceeding as moot. Because Zuch no longer owed any
money, there was no longer any justifcation for a levy on
her property. Thus, the IRS argued, the Tax Court lacked
jurisdiction over the appeal from the collection due process
hearing. (After all, the proposed levy was the hearing 's rai-
son d'être.) The Tax Court agreed, concluding that it had
no freestanding “jurisdiction to determine an overpayment
or to order a refund or credit of tax paid in a section 6330
proceeding.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a. So if Zuch wanted
to recover her overpayments—which would require her to
prevail in her long-running dispute with the IRS about her
2010 tax liability—she would have to initiate a refund action.
In short, she would have to start over.
Frustrated, Zuch appealed to the Third Circuit, which va-
cated the Tax Court's dismissal and held that the IRS's deci-
sion not to pursue the levy did not moot the Tax Court
proceedings. 97 F. 4th 81, 86 (2024). The Third Circuit
reasoned that § 6330(c)(2)(B) authorizes Zuch to raise “ `chal-
lenges to the existence or amount of the underlying tax lia-
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428 COMMISSIONER
v. ZUCH
Opinion of the Court
bility,' ” and Zuch still disputed the IRS's allocation of the
$50,000
in estimated tax payments to her ex-husband. Id.,
at 97–98. And in the Third Circuit's view, a declaration by
the Tax Court in Zuch's favor would not be a dead letter
because a declaration might be preclusive in a future refund
proceeding by Zuch against the IRS. Id., at 103–104.
1
So
while the Tax Court could not itself order the IRS to give
Zuch a refund, it could enter a declaration that Zuch might
be able to use to secure one.
In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit acknowl-
edged that it was “part[ing] ways” with the Fourth and D. C.
Circuits, which have held that the Tax Court lacks jurisdic-
tion over a collection due process proceeding when there is
no longer an underlying levy. Id., at 98; see McLane v.
Commissioner, 24 F. 4th 316, 319 (CA4 2022); Willson v.
Commissioner, 805 F. 3d 316, 321 (CADC 2015). We
granted certiorari to resolve the split. 604 U. S. 1074 (2025).
II
A
“The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction.” Com-
missioner v. McCoy, 484 U. S. 3, 7 (1987) (per curiam); see
also § 7442. The parties agree that the only jurisdiction-
conferring provision applicable here is § 6330(d)(1), which
states that the Tax Court “shall have jurisdiction” to “re-
view” a “determination” made by an appeals offcer in a col-
lection due process hearing.
What matters, then, is the scope of a “determination”
under § 6330(d)(1). As the Government sees it, a “determi-
nation” is simply a decision as to whether a levy may go
forward; if there is no longer a proposed levy, there is no
1
The Third Circuit also held that Zuch's claim was not moot on the
theory that the IRS had unlawfully withheld her refunds and used them
to offset her tax liability. See 97 F. 4th, at 94–97. Zuch has not defended
this portion of the Third Circuit's reasoning, so we decline to consider it
as an alternative ground for affrmance.
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Opinion of the Court
adverse determination of which the taxpayer may seek re-
v
iew in the Tax Court. By contrast, Zuch argues that a
“determination” encompasses the appeals offcer's resolution
of all the issues raised by the taxpayer at the collection due
process hearing. Here, the appeals offcer concluded that
the $50,000 in estimated tax payments should be credited to
Gennardo. The Tax Court can still review that conclusion,
Zuch insists, even though the IRS abandoned the possible
levy. And Zuch contends that if the Tax Court agrees with
her, the IRS would then refund her the amount it had
withheld.
We agree with the Government: The “determination” in
§ 6330(d)(1) refers to the binary decision whether a levy may
proceed. Section 6330(c)(3), which sets forth the basis for
an appeals offcer's “determination,” states that it “shall take
into consideration” three things: (A) a verifcation that the
IRS has complied with “any applicable law”; (B) the “issues
raised” by the taxpayer; and (C) whether the levy “balances
the need for the effcient collection of taxes” against concerns
that a levy “be no more intrusive than necessary.” The stat-
ute thus distinguishes between “consideration[s]” that in-
form the appeals offcer's “determination” and the “determi-
nation” itself. In other words, the statute speaks in terms
of inputs (the three considerations articulated in §§ 6330(c)
(3)(A)–(C)) and an output (the appeals offcer's ultimate “de-
termination”). Here, the dispute about Zuch's estimated tax
payments was an input into the “determination”: an “issu[e]
raised” by Zuch that the appeals offcer was required to
consider. § 6330(c)(3)(B). The “determination” was the ap-
peals offcer's decision upholding the IRS's decision to issue
a levy.
2
App. to Pet. for Cert. 63a.
2
The dissent suggests that the Tax Court “may review the full scope of
a `determination,' including its resolution of a taxpayer's `unpaid tax' or
her `underlying tax liability.' ” Post, at 438 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.). In
our view, however, this begs the key question: What is a determination?
The dissent simply assumes that a determination incorporates the consid-

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430 COMMISSIONER
v. ZUCH
Opinion of the Court
Statutory context also supports the Government's inter-
pret
ation. Recall the default rule: Taxpayers cannot chal-
lenge disputes about tax liability without frst paying the
disputed taxes. § 7421(a). Had the IRS offset Zuch's over-
payments against her tax bill without pursuing a levy, Zuch's
only option would have been to sue for a refund. She was
able to depart from the ordinary course only because the IRS
proposed a levy, which triggered her right to a collection due
process hearing. See § 6330(a)(1) (“No levy may be made on
any property or right to property of any person unless the
Secretary has notifed such person in writing of their right
to a hearing under this section before such levy is made”).
So, as one might expect, § 6330 focuses on a proposed levy.
The provision is titled “Notice and opportunity for hearing
before levy.” The notice must occur “not less than 30 days
before the day of the frst levy,” § 6330(a)(2), and must in-
clude information about the levy, such as the statutory provi-
sions “relating to levy and sale of property,” “the procedures
applicable to the levy and sale of property,” and the “proce-
dures relating to redemption of property and release of liens
on property,” § 6330(a)(3)(C). The scope of the hearing
tracks its purpose: The taxpayer may raise only issues that
pertain to the levy. See § 6330(c)(2)(A) (“any relevant issue
relati ng to the unpaid t ax or the proposed levy”);
§ 6330(c)(2)(B) (“challenges to the existence or amount of the
underlying tax liability” (emphasis added)). Given § 6330's
unwavering focus on levies and the default rule requiring
postpayment suits, it would be strange if a taxpayer could
use a § 6330 appeal to resolve tax disputes that no longer
have any connection to an ongoing levy.
Finally, we are skeptical that the Tax Court has authority
to provide any relief under § 6330(e) that goes beyond an
order enjoining a levy. Section 6330(e)(1) authorizes the
Tax Court to “enjoi[n]” “the beginning of a levy or proceed-
erations that inform it. But for the reasons we provide, that view is
mistaken.

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Opinion of the Court
ing,” but it may do so “only in respect of the unpaid tax
or
proposed levy to which the determination being appealed
relates.” The provision does not authorize the Tax Court to
order a refund or to issue a declaratory judgment that re-
solves disputes about tax liability. Of course, as Zuch notes,
the authority to issue injunctive relief against a levy neces-
sarily includes the ability to make declarations about the va-
lidity of the tax obligations underlying it. But not when
there is no levy. Without a levy, the Tax Court has no au-
thority to render such conclusions.
3
B
Given these statutory constraints, the Tax Court properly
dismissed Zuch's appeal. The appeals offcer issued a “de-
termination” that the IRS's proposed levy on Zuch's prop-
erty could go forward. The Tax Court had jurisdiction to
review that determination—that is, to decide whether the
levy could (or could not) go forward. As part of that review,
the Tax Court initially had authority to determine whether
the appeals offcer's predicate conclusions—like whether the
$50,000 should have been credited exclusively to Gennardo—
were correct.
Once the IRS used Zuch's overpayments to zero out the
balance she allegedly owed, there was no longer any basis
for a levy—thus, there was no relevant “determination” for
the Tax Court to review. At this point, Zuch's appeal
amounted to a request that the Tax Court issue an opinion
on a disputed question of tax liability independent of any
3
The dissent suggests that the Tax Court “could enjoin the IRS from
pursuing `any action' to seek or retain money from [Zuch] for [the 2010]
tax year or from making any contrary decision about the matter.” Post,
at 439 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.). But there is nothing to enjoin, nor could
there be. Because Zuch satisfed her outstanding tax liability, the IRS
has no reason to try to “seek” money from Zuch. Ibid. In fact, that is
the entire reason the IRS dropped its proposed levy. So the dissent's
suggestion simply underscores why the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to
provide Zuch any further relief.

432 COMMISSIONER
v. ZUCH
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
ongoing collection effort. Because the Tax Court lacked ju-
r
isdiction to do so, it was right to dismiss the case.
4
Of course, none of this means that Zuch lacks recourse
against the IRS. Like any taxpayer, she may fle a postdep-
rivation suit for a refund, see 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(a)(1),
1491(a)(1), which she has in fact already done, see Complaint
in Zuch v. United States, No. 2:25–cv–01900 (D NJ, Mar. 14,
2025).
***
Because there was no longer a proposed levy, the Tax
Court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to re-
solve questions about Zuch's disputed tax liability. The
judgment of the Third Circuit is reversed, and the case is
remanded for fur ther proceedings consistent w ith th is
opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Gorsuch, dissenting.
Like many Americans, Jennifer Zuch wound up owing
money on her taxes. When the Internal Revenue Service
told her that she had failed to pay all she owed for 2010, her
(then) husband responded by paying the bill. But instead
of applying that payment to resolve her liability, the agency
used the money to satisfy her husband's separate tax debt.
The agency did so even after Ms. Zuch's husband insisted
the money was meant for her tab, not his. Then, because it
4
The parties have briefed the issues here primarily in terms of moot-
ness. It is indeed possible that the IRS's decision not to proceed with a
levy mooted the proceedings in the Tax Court: If the Tax Court lacks the
authority to issue the sort of preclusive declaratory judgment that Zuch
seeks, then Zuch is effectively asking the court for an advisory opinion.
And because the Tax Court applies principles of Article III jurisdiction
to itself, this conclusion would have separately warranted dismissal. See
Battat v. Commissioner, 148 T. C. 32, 46 (2017). We view our decision,
however, as resting not on mootness but instead on the limits of the Tax
Court's statutory jurisdiction under 26 U. S. C. § 6330.
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433
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
deemed Ms. Zuch's liability still outstanding, the agency
sought
to seize and sell her property in a levy.
Ms. Zuch spent more than a decade challenging the IRS's
moves before the agency and, later, the Tax Court. Finally,
just as the Tax Court was poised to rule, the IRS moved to
dismiss Ms. Zuch's case. It did not do so because it admitted
its mistake in crediting her husband's payment to the wrong
account. Instead, the agency told the court, it had deter-
mined that Ms. Zuch overpaid her taxes in later years, and
it had decided to keep (rather than refund) those overpay-
ments to satisfy her (disputed) 2010 debt. So, the IRS con-
tinued, a levy was no longer needed and the court should
therefore dismiss the case. The Tax Court agreed, reason-
ing that the IRS's decision to drop the levy deprived it of
jurisdiction over the dispute. See 97 F. 4th 81, 88–91 (CA3
2024).
The Court endorses that decision. I would not. Ms.
Zuch still had a live claim pending before the Tax Court.
She argued that the IRS erred by failing to credit her hus-
band's payment to her tax debt, so she owed the agency noth-
ing for 2010. Had she prevailed on that claim, the IRS
would have had no basis for keeping her overpayments in
later years. Nothing prevented the Tax Court from say-
ing as much. Today's decision holding otherwise leaves
Ms. Zuch with no meaningful way to pursue her argument
that the IRS erred or to recoup the overpayments she be-
lieves the IRS has wrongly retained. Along the way, the
Court's decision hands the IRS a powerful new tool to avoid
accountability for its mistakes in future cases like this one.
I
To see where the Court and I differ, a little background
helps. As many taxpayers know, the IRS can collect unpaid
taxes by seizing and selling a taxpayer's property in a levy.
But, before the agency can take that step, it must afford the
taxpayer an opportunity to request a hearing before the

434 COMMISSIONER
v. ZUCH
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
IRS's in-house Offce of Appeals. 26 U. S. C. § 6330(b). At
the
hearing, the taxpayer may raise “any relevant issue re-
lating to the unpaid tax or the proposed levy” and (if she
hasn't previously had the chance to do so) challenge “the
existence or amount of [her] underlying tax liability.”
§ 6330(c)(2).
After the hearing, the Offce of Appeals issues a “determi-
nation.” § 6330(c)(3). By statute, a “determination by an
appeals offcer . . . shall take into consideration” various mat-
ters. Ibid. They include whether the IRS has followed all
“applicable” legal rules, whether a levy is “no more intrusive
than necessary,” and whether the IRS has explained away
the “issues raised” by the taxpayer—which, remember, may
include a challenge to the “unpaid tax” or to the “underlying
tax liability.” §§ 6330(c)(1)–(3).
Once the Offce of Appeals issues a “determination,” the
taxpayer can seek review in the Tax Court—another admin-
istrative tribunal within the Executive Branch. See Part
III, infra. Section 6330(d)(1) provides that a taxpayer
“may, within 30 days of a determination under this section,
petition the Tax Court for review of such determination (and
the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such
matter).” (Emphasis added.) If the Tax Court concludes
that the Offce of Appeals erred, it may “enjoin any action
or proceeding . . . in respect of the unpaid tax or proposed
levy to which the determination being appealed relates,”
§ 6330(e)(1), or else “remand [the] case” to the Offce of Ap-
peals for further proceedings, Internal Revenue Manual
§ 8.22.9.16(1) (Nov. 13, 2013); see also, e. g., Drake v. Commis-
sioner, 92 TCM 37, 44 (2006).
II
Where should all this leave Ms. Zuch? As the above sketch
illustrates, the Tax Court's jurisdiction over her case hinged
on the presence of a timely appealed “determination” by the
Offce of Appeals. Ante, at 426–427, 431. Everyone agrees
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Gorsuch, J., dissenting
we have that here. As we have seen, too, a “determination”
may
address whether a taxpayer actually owes any “unpaid
tax” or has any “underlying tax liability.” §§ 6330(c)(1)–(3).
Everyone agrees we have that here too, for the “determina-
tion” in Ms. Zuch's case both approved a levy and rejected
her argument that she had already fully satisfed her 2010
tax bill thanks to her husband's payment. Brief for Peti-
tioner 9; ante, at 431.
Those undisputed facts should lead to a straightforward
conclusion: Because the Tax Court had before it a valid de-
termination, it had jurisdiction to review all the issues ad-
dressed in that determination, including whether the IRS
was wrong to say Ms. Zuch owed money for 2010. Had the
Tax Court ruled for Ms. Zuch on that issue, its decision
would have had other important consequences too, for it
would have deprived the IRS of its sole justifcation for keep-
ing, rather than refunding, Ms. Zuch's later overpayments.
The fact that the IRS announced its intention to drop its
levy is immaterial. Nothing in the statute before us sug-
gests that the IRS can deprive the Tax Court of jurisdiction
simply by withdrawing a levy. To the contrary, three key
features of the statutory scheme we have already encoun-
tered preclude that conclusion.
First, § 6330(d)(1) governs the Tax Court's jurisdiction. It
provides that the Tax Court “shall have jurisdiction” over
“such matter”—a phrase that refers back to the Offce of
Appeals's “determination” in the taxpayer 's case under
§ 6330(c)(3). See Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U. S. 199,
204–205 (2022); accord, ante, at 428. That command is manda-
tory, and it nowhere uses the word “levy.” The absence of
that term is telling, too, given that Congress used it almost
30 times elsewhere in § 6330. Had Congress wished the Tax
Court's jurisdiction to rise and fall with a levy, it obviously
knew how to say so. Congress's decision instead to link ju-
risdiction to a “determination” is one we must respect, not
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allow the IRS to rewrite as it pleases. See Feliciano v. De-
par
tment of Transportation, 605 U. S. 38, 46 (2025).
Second, § 6330(c)(2) provides that a “determination” may
address not just an up-or-down decision on a levy but also
other matters raised before the Offce of Appeals, including
a taxpayer's claim that she has no “unpaid tax” or “under-
lying tax liability.” And, the statute tells us, resolution
of those issues forms the “[b]asis” for the determination,
§ 6330(c), supplying textual evidence that “a determination
incorporates the considerations that inform it,” contra, ante,
at 429–430, n. 2. Confrming as much, the Tax Court itself
has observed that its “jurisdiction is defned by the scope of
the determination” and, as a result, it may consider “chal-
lenges to the existence or amount of the underlying tax lia-
bility” if “raised by the taxpayer” and resolved by the Offce
of Appeals. Freije v. Commissioner, 125 T. C. 14, 25 (2005);
accord, Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T. C. 604, 610 (2000); 26
CFR § 301.6330–1, A–F3 (2024). As we have seen, the Offce
of Appeals's determination in this case expressly addressed
Ms. Zuch's claim that she had no unpaid taxes or underlying
liability for 2010.
Third, § 6330(e)(1) grants the Tax Court the power to issue
injunctions against “any action or proceeding . . . in respect
of the unpaid tax or proposed levy to which the determina-
tion being appealed relates.” (Emphasis added.) That dis-
junctive phrasing suggests the Tax Court may enjoin “any”
IRS “action” relating to the “unpaid tax”—even if the action
is not a “proposed levy.” § 6330(e)(1); see Encino Motor-
cars, LLC v. Navarro, 584 U. S. 79, 87 (2018). Potential IRS
actions relating to an “unpaid tax” include various “collection
alternatives,” § 6330(c)(2)(A), and decisions about “whether
[a tax] liability remains unpaid,” Brief for Petitioner 25, n. 3
(internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis deleted); see 97
F. 4th, at 88. Accordingly, had the Tax Court found that Ms.
Zuch owed nothing for 2010, it could have wielded its reme-
dial authority under § 6330(e)(1) to enjoin the IRS from en-
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Gorsuch, J., dissenting
gaging in “any action” to collect that debt. An injunction
cou
ld stop the IRS from asserting its entitlement to retain
Ms. Zuch's later overpayments. See Part IV, infra.
1
Until recently, even the IRS would have agreed with all
this. As the IRS once put it, a “motion to dismiss” is “inap-
propriate” in the Tax Court proceedings as long as a tax-
payer (as here) still contests “the existence or amount” of her
tax liability. Dept. of Treasury, IRS Offce of Chief Counsel,
Notice CC–2003–016 (May 29, 2003). Nor would it matter,
the IRS continued, if the taxpayer had already “paid” the
disputed tax—a development that, pretty plainly, would
avoid any need for a levy. Ibid.; accord, IRS Notice CC–
2005–008 (May 19, 2005); 97 F. 4th, at 100–101, and n. 36.
Now, of course, the IRS has changed its mind and taken just
the opposite view. But, when the government switches po-
sition and advances a new statutory construction that tilts
the playing feld in its favor, “no one should be surprised if
its latest utterance isn't the most convincing one.” Bittner
v. United States, 598 U. S. 85, 98, n. 5 (2023).
III
At the IRS's urging, the Court today upholds the Tax
Court's dismissal of Ms. Zuch's claims. In doing so, the
Court embraces the agency's (present) view that the Tax
Court is powerless to resolve a § 6330 case once the IRS
abandons a levy. But the three arguments the IRS ad-
vances (and the Court adopts) in support of that conclusion
do not come close to proving it.
1
The Court says there is no action left to enjoin in Ms. Zuch's case
because the IRS already has her money. Ante, at 431, n. 3. But every-
one agrees that Ms. Zuch may still seek a refund for at least some (but
not all) of the overpayments in later years. Ante, at 432; Part IV, in fra.
And an injunction here could prevent the IRS from taking actions in those
proceedings asserting its entitlement to the money. Even beyond that,
there is the possibility that the IRS would heed the Tax Court's view of
Ms. Zuch's case and refund all her later overpayments. Part III, in fra.
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The IRS frst posits that the word “determination” in
§
6330(d)(1) “refers to the binary decision whether a levy may
proceed.” Ante, at 429; Brief for Petitioner 19. So when
the Offce of Appeals issues a “determination,” the IRS says,
that offce simply decides whether a levy is appropriate.
And given that, the IRS extrapolates, the Tax Court's juris-
diction must also be limited to assessing the propriety of a
levy. See id., at 19–21.
The statute the IRS imagines is not the statute we have.
Congress did not say that a “determination” refers to a bi-
nary decision whether a levy may proceed. Instead, Con-
gress said that the Tax Court may review the full scope of
a “determination,” including its resolution of a taxpayer's
“unpaid tax” or her “underlying tax liability.” §§ 6330(c)(2),
(d)(1). Congress discussed levies in many other places in
§ 6330 and it easily could have said that the Tax Court may
review only a “determination whether the levy may go for-
ward.” Yet nothing like that italicized condition appears in
Congress's work.
2
Next, the IRS suggests that the Tax Court's jurisdiction
must be limited to assessing levies because the only remedy
it can issue is an order directing the government “not to
pursue a levy.” Brief for Petitioner 20. Along similar but
more restrained lines, the Court expresses “skeptic[ism]”
2
Seeking a textual hook for its view that a “determination” really means
a “levy,” the Court observes that a “determination” must be something
separate from the “considerations” that inform it, like the taxpayer's un-
derlying liability. Ante, at 429. That hardly helps. Of course, a “deter-
mination” is not the same as the issues it resolves. But that does not
mean the Tax Court is powerless to review the considerations that inform
a “determination.” Indeed, the Court admits that the Tax Court can at-
tend to such “predicate conclusions” while a levy is ongoing. Ante, at 431.
So why would things play out differently once the IRS no longer intends
a levy? As even the government concedes, abandoning a levy does not
withdraw or vacate an adverse IRS “determination.” Tr. of Oral Arg.
11–12.
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Gorsuch, J., dissenting
that the Tax Court's remedial authority extends beyond en-
joi
ning a levy. Ante, at 430–431.
Whether full-throated or half-hearted, that argument, too,
disregards the statute's terms. Remember, § 6330(e)(1) per-
mits the Tax Court to enjoin “any action” by the IRS relat-
ing to the “unpaid tax or the proposed levy.” See Part I,
supra; cf. ante, at 430–431. So, if the Tax Court were to
conclude that Ms. Zuch is right—that her husband paid her
bill and she owes nothing for 2010—then it could enjoin the
IRS from pursuing “any action” to seek or retain money from
her for that tax year or from making any contrary decision
about the matter. And, as we have seen, that relief would
effectively foreclose the agency from asserting any lawful
entitlement to Ms. Zuch's overpayments in later years.
The IRS's remedia l theory suffers another flaw, too.
Sometimes, of course, developments during litigation that
leave an Article III court powerless to issue any binding
relief can present a jurisdictional problem. The Constitu-
tion, after all, authorizes federal courts to entertain only live
cases and controversies, not moot ones where it is no longer
possible “to grant any effectual relief ” to the parties.
Chafn v. Chafn, 568 U. S. 165, 172 (2013). But, as the Court
seems to recognize, ante, at 432, n. 4, that constitutional con-
straint does not apply to the Tax Court. Name notwith-
standing, that body is not part of the Judicial Branch. In-
stead, it exercises Article II “[e]xecutive authority as part of
the Executive Branch.” Kuretski v. Commissioner, 755
F. 3d 929, 932 (CADC 2014).
3
So when the Tax Court ad-
dresses a tax dispute and returns it to the Offce of Appeals,
3
See also Crim v. Commissioner, 66 F. 4th 999, 1000 (CADC 2023) (hold-
ing that the Tax Court remains “part of the Executive Branch” notwith-
standing a statutory amendment, § 7441, confrming its “indepeden[ce]”);
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868, 912 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment) (“It seems to me entirely obvious that
the Tax Court, like the Internal Revenue Service, . . . exercises execu-
tive power”).
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it is just one executive agency advising another about how
to
enforce federal law in a particular setting. And even
without an injunction compelling it to do so, the Offce of
Appeals may choose to follow the Tax Court's views when
carrying out its duty to resolve “tax controversies . . . to the
maximum extent possible through an administrative settle-
ment.” Internal Revenue Manual § 8.1.1.1.1 (Jan. 9, 2024).
For taxpayers like Ms. Zuch, that may be all the relief they
need.
Without statutory text on its side, the IRS resorts to legis-
lative history. Citing a committee report, the agency con-
tends that Congress meant for § 6330 proceedings in the Tax
Court to be rare and few, and for most “[c]hallenges to the
assessment of a tax” to be brought in “post-payment refund
suits” or “pre-payment defciency actions” in federal district
court. Brief for Petitioner 23 (citing S. Rep. No. 105–174
(1998)); see ante, at 430. That background rule, the IRS
says, counsels against reading § 6330 to allow the Tax Court
to enter tain disputes af ter the gover nment abandons a
levy.
But even if refund suits and defciency actions were once
the usual ways for individuals to contest their tax liabilities,
nobody disputes that Congress afforded taxpayers a new
way of doing so when it adopted § 6330. And taxpayers are
entitled to expect that provision will be applied as written,
not whittled down to a nub to suit the IRS. See Feliciano,
605 U. S., at 54; Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. 497,
525 (2018).
IV
Recognizing that today's decision leaves Ms. Zuch, after a
decade of litigation, without resolution of her straightfor-
ward argument that the IRS erred when it concluded she
had not paid her 2010 tax bill, the agency invites her to “start
over.” Ante, at 427. All she has to do, the IRS says, is fle
a new refund suit in federal district court. There, she can
make all the arguments she sought to press in the Tax Court.
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441
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
And, if she prevails, she can secure a refund of the overpay-
ments
the agency kept to satisfy her (disputed) 2010 debt.
See Brief for Petitioner 15, 34; ante, at 432. But that is no
answer. More nearly, it is a trap for the unwary.
The reason has to do with a statutory deadline. Taxpay-
ers may not pursue refund suits until they have fled admin-
istrative claims with the IRS, something they must accom-
plish “within 3 years from the time the return was fled or 2
years from the time the tax was paid,” whichever period
ends later. § 6511(a). Yet a taxpayer who chooses to con-
test her tax liability in § 6330 proceedings may not know that
she needs to fle such an administrative claim until the time
for doing so has passed. See Brief for Center for Taxpayer
Rights as Amicus Curiae 19–21.
4
Ms. Zuch's case illustrates the problem. The government
deemed her 2010 tax debt “paid” when it kept overpayments
she made in 2013–2016 and 2019. 97 F. 4th, at 91. To seek
the return of those overpayments, Ms. Zuch needed to sub-
mit an administrative claim with the IRS within two years
of when the agency kept each payment. § 6511(a). Yet for
a couple reasons, she did not know that she had any need to
fle a claim. See 97 F. 4th, at 91. For one, she was actively
litigating § 6330 proceedings and understandably thought
that was suffcient unto the day. For another, it appears the
government did not tell her that she had overpaid her taxes
in 2013–2016 and 2019, or that it intended to use those over-
payments to satisfy her (disputed) 2010 tax liability, until it
moved to dismiss her case in the Tax Court. 97 F. 4th, at
91, n. 19. Consequently, Ms. Zuch had no reason to think
administrative refund claims might be necessary, or even
available, until that point. And by the time she fled a re-
4
Though § 6330(e)(1) automatically suspends the limitations period for
fling a refund suit in district court during the pendency of Tax Court
proceedings, the government contends that it does not automatically sus-
pend the period for fling an administrative claim. See Tr. of Oral Arg.
24–25, 28; accord, id., at 44–45.

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fund suit in district court, it was too late for her to submit
prerequisite
administrative claims for some (but not all) of
the years in question and thus too late for the court to adju-
dicate her entitlement to refunds for those years. See Tr.
of Oral Arg. 28, 44–45. So the IRS's invitation for Ms. Zuch
to “start over” really turns out to be little more than an
effort to deprive her of complete relief.
*
The short of it all is this. The IRS seeks, and the Court
endorses, a view of the law that gives that agency a roadmap
for evading Tax Court review and never having to answer a
taxpayer's complaint that it has made a mistake. After
today, § 6330 proceedings are essentially risk-free for the
IRS. It may pursue a levy and argue its case to the Tax
Court. Then, if the Tax Court seems likely to side with the
taxpayer, the IRS can drop the levy and avoid an unfavorable
ruling on the taxpayer's underlying tax liability. Doing so
will often prove only a small setback for the IRS because the
agency remains free to pursue other collection methods—
including keeping, rather than refunding, a taxpayer's later
overpayments. And the taxpayer will often fnd herself
without any way to challenge the IRS's error or prevent the
agency from keeping more of her money than it is lawfully
due. Seeing nothing in the law compelling any of those re-
sults, I respectfully dissent.

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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None