Parrish v. United States

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 605 U. S. Part 2
Pages 376–394
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 12, 2025
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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376 OCTOBER
TERM, 2024
Syllabus
PARRISH v. UNITED STATES
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit
No. 24–275. Argued April 21, 2025—Decided June 12, 2025
Federal inmate Donte Parrish alleges that he was placed in restrictive
segregated confnement for 23 months based on his suspected involve-
ment in another inmate's death. After a hearing offcer cleared him of
wrongdoing, Parrish fled suit in Federal District Court seeking dam-
ages for his time in segregated confnement. The District Court dis-
missed his case on March 23, 2020, holding that some claims were un-
timely and others unexhausted. When the court's order reached the
federal prison two weeks later, Parrish was no longer there, having been
transferred to a different facility. Parrish received the dismissal order
three months after it was issued and promptly fled a notice of appeal,
explaining his delayed receipt. The Fourth Circuit recognized that
Parrish's notice of appeal came well after the 60-day appeal period for
suits against the United States, so it construed Parrish's fling as a mo-
tion to reopen the time to appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 2107(c). On re-
mand, the District Court granted reopening for 14 days. Parrish did
not fle a second notice of appeal. Although both Parrish and the
United States argued that the original notice of appeal was suffcient,
the Fourth Circuit held that Parrish's failure to fle a new notice of
appeal within the reopened appeal period deprived the court of
jurisdiction.
Held: A litigant who fles a notice of appeal after the original appeal dead-
line but before the court grants reopening need not fle a second notice
after reopening. The original notice relates forward to the date re-
opening is granted. Pp. 381–391.
(a) Civil litigants must ordinarily fle a notice of appeal within 30 days
after entry of judgment, or 60 days when the United States is a party.
§§ 2107(a), (b). In civil cases, the requirement to fle a timely notice is
jurisdictional. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 214. Congress created
two exceptions: Courts may extend the appeal time upon a showing of
excusable neglect or good cause, and courts may reopen the time for
appeal when a party entitled to notice does not receive it within 21 days
of entry. § 2107(c). Here, there is no dispute that the District Court
properly reopened Parrish's time to appeal. Pp. 381–382.
(b) Section 2107(c) establishes that a reopened appeal period runs for
14 days from “the date of entry of the order reopening the time for

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Syllabus
appeal.” A notice fled after that 14-day period is late, meaning it can
no
longer serve its purpose. Bowles, 551 U. S., at 214. A notice fled
before reopening is granted, however, is merely early. While the stat-
ute's text does not address the jurisdictional consequences of a prema-
ture fling, Congress legislates against the background of common-law
principles, which apply unless a contrary statutory purpose is evident.
See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U. S. 104, 108.
This Court has long held that premature but adequate notices of appeal
should relate forward to the entry of the document that makes an appeal
possible. For over a century, the Court has consistently applied this
principle to avoid dismissing appeals based on mere technicalities when
“no genuine doubt exists about who is appealing, from what judgment,
to which appellate court.” Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U. S. 757, 767–
768.
The practice with regard to premature notices did not change when
Congress passed the frst version of what is now 28 U. S. C. § 2107 in
1948, or when the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure were subse-
quently promulgated. The text of § 2107(c) itself provides no indication
that Congress sought to “terminate” the longstanding relation-forward
rule “or disturb its development.” Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic,
Inc., 594 U. S. 559, 572. Applying the relation-forward rule, Parrish's
notice related forward to the date of the District Court's reopening
order. Pp. 382–386.
(c) Counterarguments are unpersuasive. While the word “reopen”
presumes the appeal period has closed, this merely confrms that Par-
rish's notice was premature with respect to the reopened period—it does
not resolve whether the notice should relate forward. The character-
ization of the notice as “late” rather than “premature” fails to recognize
that there were two proper times to appeal: the original 60-day period
and the 14-day reopening period. The Fourth Circuit's concern that a
single fling cannot serve dual purposes is contradicted by precedent
recognizing that one document can simultaneously function as both a
notice of appeal and other required flings. See, e. g., Smith v. Barry,
502 U. S. 244, 245. Pp. 386–387.
(d) The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure support this result.
Rules 4(a)(2) and 4(a)(4) codify the principle that premature notices
should relate forward when they do not prejudice opposing parties.
The 1993 amendment eliminating restrictions on relation-forward was
specifcally designed to avoid creating “a trap for an unsuspecting liti-
gant” and to address the problem that “[m]any litigants, especially pro
se litigants, fail[ed] to fle the second notice of appeal.” Fed. Rule App.
Proc. 4, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 11. Rule 4(a)(6)'s silence on relation-forward
does not create a negative implication prohibiting it, particularly given

378 P
ARRISH v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
the Rules' emphasis on securing “just, speedy, and inexpensive determi-
nati
on” of every action or proceeding and disregarding “errors and de-
fects that do not affect any party's substantial rights.” Fed. Rules Civ.
Proc. 1, 61. So long as Rule 4(a)(6) does not speak to relation forward,
the default rule applies. That means Parrish's appeal can go forward
under the Federal Rules as well as the statute. Pp. 387–390.
74 F. 4th 160, reversed and remanded.
Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Jack-
son, J., fled an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J.,
joined, post, p. 391. Gorsuch, J., fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 393.
Amanda K. Rice argued the cause for petitioner. With
her on the briefs were Amanda R. Parker, Sarah Welch, and
Samuel V. Lioi.
Aimee W. Brown argued the cause for the United States in
support of petitioner. With her on the briefs were Solicitor
General Sauer, Acting Solicitor General Harris, Deputy As-
sistant Attorney General McArthur, Deputy Solicitor Gen-
eral Kneedler, and Steven A. Myers.
M i chael R. Hu st o n, by i nv it ati on of the Cour t, 604
U. S. 1115, argued the cause and fled a brief as amicus cu-
riae in support of the judgment below. With him on the
brief were Karl J. Worsham, Addison W. Bennett, Jordan
M. Buckwald, Victoria L. Romine, and Jacob J. Taber.*
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court.
In civil litigation, fling your notice of appeal too late de-
prives the court of appeals of jurisdiction over the appeal.
Litigants who miss the appeal deadline because they do not
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Center for
Constitutional Rights et al. by Jaqueline Aranda Osorno, Lucia Goin, and
Jim Davy; for the Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center et al.
by Aram A. Gavoor; and for the University of Illinois Chicago School of
Law—Pro Bono Litigation Clinic by Yelena Duterte and J. Damian Ortiz.
Bryan Lammon, pro se, and Jennifer Franklin fled a brief for Bryan
Lammon as amicus curiae.
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timely receive the district court's decision, however, are not
w
ithout recourse. In such circumstances, Congress has au-
thorized courts to reopen the time to appeal. The question
in this case is whether a litigant who fles a notice of appeal
before the court grants reopening must fle a second notice
after reopening.
The answer is no. A notice of appeal fled after the origi-
nal deadline but before reopening is late with respect to the
original appeal period, but merely early with respect to the
reopened one. Precedent teaches that a premature notice of
appeal, if otherwise adequate, relates forward to the date
of the order making the appeal possible. So a notice fled
before reopening relates forward to the date reopening is
granted, making a second notice unnecessary. Because the
Fourth Circuit held otherwise, this Court now reverses.
I
A
In the winter of 2009, while petitioner Donte Parrish was
incarcerated at the federal prison in Hazelton, West Virginia,
a group of inmates attacked and killed Jimmy Lee Wilson.
An incident report found Parrish partly responsible. Not
long thereafter, Parrish was placed in restrictive, segregated
confnement, where he remained for 23 months. The reason,
Parrish says, was his alleged involvement in Wilson's death.
Yet Parrish did not receive a hearing to contest his guilt
until August 2015, long after his segregated confnement had
ended. Eventually, following a second hearing and an ap-
peal, a discipline hearing offcer expunged Parrish's discipli-
nary record and concluded he had committed “[n]o prohibited
act” during the incident. App. in No. 20–1766 (CA4), p. 77.
Parrish fled two administrative tort claims, alleging due
process violations and wrongful confnement. When the
Government rejected those claims, Parrish fled this suit in
Federal District Court, seeking damages for his time in seg-
regated custody. The District Court dismissed the case,
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380 P
ARRISH v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
holdi ng that some clai ms were unti mely and others
unexhausted.
B
The
important part, for present purposes, is what hap-
pened next. The District Court entered its judgment dis-
missing the case on March 23, 2020. The next day, Parrish
was released from federal custody and transferred to a state
penitentiary. So when the District Court's order fnally
made it to the federal prison two weeks later, Parrish was
no longer there.
Parrish ultimately received the opinion and judgment dis-
missing his lawsuit three months after the District Court
had issued it. He promptly sent a letter to the court, ex-
plaining that “[d]ue to my being transferred from Federal to
State custody I did not receive this order until June 25, 2020.
It is now 7/8/20 and I'm fling this notice of appeal.” App.
to Pet. for Cert. 71a. The Fourth Circuit recognized that
Parrish's notice of appeal came well after the 60-day appeal
period for suits against the United States, but construed it
as a motion to reopen the time to fle an appeal under 28
U. S. C. § 2107(c). 827 Fed. Appx. 327 (2020). On remand,
the District Court granted reopening “for fourteen (14) days
following the entry of this Order” and transmitted the record
back to the Fourth Circuit. App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a–62a.
Parrish did not fle a second notice of appeal.
Back at the Court of Appeals, the United States indicated
that Parrish's initial notice of appeal had adequately commu-
nicated his “intent to seek appellate review,” meaning (in
the Government's view) that he was “not required to fle a
second notice.” Brief for United States in No. 20–1766
(CA4), pp. 10–11 (capitalization and boldface omitted). Par-
rish agreed.
The Fourth Circuit did not. In the Fourth Circuit's view,
Parrish should have fled a new notice of appeal after the
District Court reopened the appeal window. Unlike an ex-
tension of the original appeal period, the Fourth Circuit rea-
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soned, reopening under § 2107(c) “provides for a new 14-day
w
indow for fling a notice of appeal, running from the date
of the district court's order granting the reopening.” 74
F. 4th 160, 165 (2023). Parrish's frst notice was untimely
with respect to the original appeal period and he failed to
fle an appeal within the reopened period, so, the court held,
it lacked jurisdiction to hear his case. In dissent, then-Chief
Judge Gregory argued that the reopening order had “vali-
dated [Parrish's] earlier notice of appeal,” such that no
second notice was required. Id., at 168. The full Circuit
denied rehearing en banc by a vote of 9 to 6.
Because the Fourth Circuit's holding created a split with
at least two other Courts of Appeals,
1
this Court granted
certiorari, 604 U. S. 1096 (2025), to decide whether a litigant
who fles a notice of appeal after the ordinary appeal period
expires must fle a second notice after the appeal period is
reopened, Pet. for Cert. i. Parrish and the United States
agree the answer to that question is no, so the Court ap-
pointed Michael Huston as amicus curiae to defend the judg-
ment below. 604 U. S. 1115 (2025). He has ably discharged
his responsibilities.
II
A
Litigants must ordinarily fle a notice of appeal within 30
days “after the entry of ” the relevant “judgment, order[,]
or decree” to secure their right to an appeal. 28 U. S. C.
§ 2107(a). When the United States is involved as a party, as
it is here, that period is extended to 60 days. § 2107(b). In
1
See Winters v. Taskila, 88 F. 4th 665, 671 (CA6 2023), and United
States v. Withers, 638 F. 3d 1055, 1061–1062 (CA9 2011), both holding that
a post-reopening notice of appeal is not required to confer appellate juris-
diction under 28 U. S. C. § 2107(c). Other Circuits have adopted the same
approach in unpublished opinions. See Holden v. Attorney Gen. of N. J.,
2023 WL 8798084, *1, n. 4 (CA3, Dec. 20, 2023); Norwood v. East Allen
Cty. Schools, 825 Fed. Appx. 383, 386–387 (CA7 2020); United States v.
Marshall, 1998 WL 864012, *2 (CA10, Dec. 14, 1998).

382 P
ARRISH v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
a civil case, the requirement to fle a timely notice of appeal
is
jurisdictional. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 214
(2007).
Recognizing that harsh consequences would result from
unyielding application of these deadlines, Congress crafted
two exceptions. First, any time during the appeal period,
or within 30 days after its expiration, the district court may
“extend the time for appeal upon a showing of excusable ne-
glect or good cause.” § 2107(c). Second, when “a party
entitled to notice” of a decision “d[oes] not receive such notice
. . . within 21 days of [the decision's] entry,” the district court
may “reopen the time for appeal for a period of 14 days from
the date of entry of the [reopening] order,” if no party would
be prejudiced by the reopening. Ibid. To take advantage
of the latter provision, a litigant must fle a motion to reopen
“within 180 days after entry of the judgment or order or
within 14 days after” receiving it, “whichever is earlier.”
Ibid.
Here, all agree, the District Court properly reopened Par-
rish's time to appeal because Parrish fled his notice within
14 days of receiving the judgment dismissing his case, and
no prejudice would result from reopening. The question is
whether Parrish's subsequent failure to fle a second notice of
appeal deprived the Fourth Circuit of appellate jurisdiction.
B
Because § 2107(c) sets the jurisdictional requirements re-
lated to reopening, the analysis begins there. The statute's
text makes clear that a reopened appeal period does not
begin until “the date of entry of the order reopening the time
for appeal,” and that it thereafter runs “for a period of 14
days.” A notice fled after that 14-day period is late, mean-
ing, this Court has held, that it can no longer serve its pur-
pose. Bowles, 551 U. S., at 214. A notice fled before re-
opening is granted, however, is merely early. And while the
statute's text makes clear that a pre-reopening notice would
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be early, it says nothing about whether such prematurity
shou
ld be given jurisdictional consequences.
Congress legislates, however, “against a background of
common-law adjudicatory principles,” and it expects those
principles to apply “except `when a statutory purpose to the
contrary is evident.' ” Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v.
Solimino, 501 U. S. 104, 108 (1991) (quoting Isbrandtsen Co.
v. Johnson, 343 U. S. 779, 783 (1952)). When Congress
passed the provision allowing reopening of the appeal period
in 1991, then, it would have expected background rules gov-
erning early notices of appeal to continue to apply. 501
U. S., at 108. Here, those rules make clear that Parrish
should have been able to proceed with his appeal.
This Court has long emphasized that “ `the purpose of
pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.' ”
Foman v. Davis, 371 U. S. 178, 182 (1962). Accordingly, “im-
perfections in noticing an appeal should not be fatal where
no genuine doubt exists about who is appealing, from what
judgment, to which appellate court.” Becker v. Montgom-
ery, 532 U. S. 757, 767–768 (2001) (citing Smith v. Barry,
502 U. S. 244, 248–249 (1992)). Consistent with that core
principle, “the technical defect of prematurity . . . should
not be allowed to extinguish an otherwise proper appeal.”
FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Ins. Co., 498
U. S. 269, 273 (1991). Instead, an adequate but premature
notice of appeal “relates forward to the entry of the docu-
ment that renders an appeal possible.” 16A C. Wright, A.
Miller, E. Cooper, & C. Struve, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure § 3950.5, p. 453 (5th ed. 2019) (reviewing the Circuits'
application of that rule).
This Court has adhered to that principle for well over a
century. In Ex parte Roberts, 15 Wall. 384 (1873), the Court
held that a defendant who fled near-simultaneous motions
for a new trial and “for the allowance of an appeal” could
have his appeal heard after the district court ruled on the
new trial motion. Id., at 385–386. The Court reaffrmed
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ARRISH v. UNITED STATES
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that holding in Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. United States, 272
U
. S. 533 (1926), explaining that a notice of appeal fled before
disposition of a new-trial motion was “premature” but “not
a nullity.” Id., at 535. More than two decades later, a
unanimous Court summarily reversed the Ninth Circuit for
dismissing an appeal in a criminal case where the defendant
had fled his notice after the court announced his sentence
but before the entry of judgment. Lemke v. United States,
346 U. S. 325 (1953) (per curiam).
Congress passed the frst version of what is now 28 U. S. C.
§ 2107 in 1948, setting the 30- and 60-day timelines for civil
appeals that still exist today. See 62 Stat. 963. That enact-
ment did not change the practice with regard to premature
notices. In Foman, this Court held (again unanimously)
that the combination of a timely but incomplete notice of ap-
peal and a premature but complete notice suffced to convey
appellate jurisdiction. 371 U. S., at 181. In the process, the
Court emphasized that “decisions on the merits” ought not
be “avoided on the basis of . . . mere technicalities.” Ibid.
More recently, after promulgation of the frst Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure, we held that an appeal fled after a
ruling from the bench but before the entry of judgment was
effective, notwithstanding its prematurity. FirsTier, 498
U. S., at 274. That holding, the Court explained, refected
the “general practice in the courts of appeals of deeming cer-
tain premature notices of appeal effective.” Id., at 273, 275–
276 (citing as examples Ruby v. Secretary of Navy, 365 F. 2d
385 (CA9 1966), and Firchau v. Diamond Nat. Corp., 345
F. 2d 269 (CA9 1965)); see generally 16A Wright, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 3950.5 (collecting cases).
The text of § 2107(c), enacted on the heels of FirsTier, pro-
vides no indication that Congress sought to “terminate” the
longstanding relation-forward rule “or disturb its develop-
ment.” Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., 594 U. S.
559, 572 (2021). It simply does not speak to the issue. The
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natural inference, therefore, is that Congress expected the
relati
on-forward principle to apply. Ibid.
A contrary result would not only “subvert congressional
design,” ibid., it would also make little sense. The purpose
of a notice of appeal (as its moniker suggests) is to provide
opposing parties and the court with notice of one's intent to
appeal. That is why “the notice afforded by a document . . .
determines the document's suffciency as a notice of appeal.”
Smith, 502 U. S., at 248. So long as “no genuine doubt exists
about who is appealing, from what judgment, to which appel-
late court,” Becker, 532 U. S., at 767–768, there is little value
and signifcant harm in dismissing appeals on the basis of
prematurity alone.
This case illustrates the point. As the Government ad-
mits, it was perfectly clear after Parrish's frst notice that
he intended to appeal his case's dismissal. Sending another
notice would amount to nothing more than “ `empty paper
shuffing.' ” Hinton v. Elwood, 997 F. 2d 774, 778 (CA10
1993). Yet on account of that procedural nicety, the Fourth
Circuit would have deprived Parrish of his right to an ap-
peal. Absent clear congressional direction to the contrary,
“[i]t is too late in the day . . . for decisions on the merits
to be avoided on the basis of such mere technicalities” as
prematurity. Foman, 371 U. S., at 181.
2
Applying the default relation-forward rule, Parrish's sin-
gle notice of appeal conveyed appellate jurisdiction to the
2
In the context of reopening, requiring pro se litigants to refle their
appeal after the district court has told them their delay in appealing has
been excused is especially likely to lead to confusion. Given the brevity of
the reopening period, moreover, this rule would leave many incarcerated
litigants without any means to take advantage of reopening. District
court decisions are slow to reach inmates at the best of times. In this
case, the judgment sent by certifed mail to the federal prison where Par-
rish had been incarcerated took 15 days to arrive there. Had the reopen-
ing order been delivered at the same speed, the reopened appeal period
would have been over before the order granting it arrived.
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ARRISH v. UNITED STATES
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Fourth Circuit. True, with respect to the original appeal
w
indow, the notice came too late. With respect to the 14-
day reopening period, however, Parrish's notice was merely
premature. Parrish's fling otherwise provided ample notice
to all involved. Accordingly, his notice related forward to
the date of the District Court's reopening order.
C
Amicus's counterarguments do not persuade. The word
“reopen,” he argues, “presumes that the period to appeal has
already closed before the motion is fled.” Brief for Court-
Appointed Amicus Curiae 14. It follows that the 14-day
appeals period following reopening “is the only time during
which an appeal can be commenced.” Ibid. Because Par-
rish's notice came before that time, the argument goes, it
should be given no effect.
The problem with this argument is that it establishes only
that Parrish's notice of appeal came too early with respect
to the reopened appeals period. Yet that much was never
in dispute. The question, rather, is whether Parrish's pre-
mature notice related forward to the entry of the reopening
order. Simply showing that the notice came too early
merely restates the question; it does not answer it.
Perhaps sensing this problem, amicus attempts to charac-
terize Parrish's notice as tardy rather than premature. Ac-
cording to amicus, “premature” means “ `done before the
usual, proper, or appointed time,' ” and (he says) here the
appointed time for appealing “was within 60 days after the
judgment.” Id., at 26 (quoting 12 Oxford English Dictionary
362 (2d ed. 1989)). Because Parrish “fled his only notice of
appeal after that window closed,” amicus argues, the notice
was late, not early. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Cu-
riae 26. That argument simply elides that there were two
“proper” times to appeal here, not one: The original 60-day
period, and the 14-day reopening. Parrish's notice was late
only with respect to the former.
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Driving the Fourth Circuit's analysis, meanwhile, was the
idea
that, once Parrish's fling had been construed as a mo-
tion to reopen, it could not simultaneously retain its function
as a notice of appeal. 74 F. 4th, at 163 (“[B]ecause Parrish's
earlier fling has already been construed” as a motion to re-
open, “we cannot now reconstrue it to be simultaneously
both the motion that must precede a district court's reopen-
ing order and the notice that must follow after the order is
granted”). This Court has repeatedly emphasized, however,
that a single fling can serve multiple purposes in just such
fashion. For example, one fling can serve simultaneously
as the principal merits brief and the notice of appeal that
would ordinarily precede it. Smith, 502 U. S., at 245. Simi-
larly, one fling can serve as a notice of appeal as well as an
antecedent request for certifcate of appealability. See
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473, 483 (2000). There is no
reason why Parrish's fling could not similarly serve as both
a notice of appeal and a request for reopening.
In sum, § 2107(c) did not deprive the Fourth Circuit of ap-
pellate jurisdiction over Parrish's appeal.
3
III
The Rules of Appellate Procedure do not bar Parrish's ap-
peal, either. To the contrary, they are entirely consistent
with the relation-forward principle.
As this Court has recognized, Rules 4(a)(2) and 4(a)(4)
“codify” the general understanding that “certain premature
notices do not prejudice the appellee and that the technical
defect of prematurity therefore should not be allowed to ex-
3
The dissent would have dismissed this case as improvidently granted
because, in its view, the Rules Committee could have resolved the question
presented. Post, at 393 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.). Yet “ `[it] is axiomatic
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create or withdraw fed-
eral jurisdiction.' ” Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of Chicago,
583 U. S. 17, 19 (2017). Accordingly, the Rules Committee could not
change the Fourth Circuit's jurisdictional holding about § 2107(c).
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ARRISH v. UNITED STATES
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tinguish an otherwise proper appeal.” FirsTier, 498 U. S.,
at
273. Thus, Rule 4(a)(2) explains that a notice fled “after
the court announces a decision or order,” but “before the
entry of the judgment or order,” relates forward to the date
the judgment is entered.
4
And Rule 4(a)(4) explains that, if
a notice of appeal is fled before the district court has dis-
posed of certain specifed post-trial motions, the notice of
appeal will relate forward to the date of the “order disposing
of the last such” motion.
A prior iteration of Rule 4(a)(4) prohibited relation for-
ward in certain limited contexts, requiring duplicative no-
tices of appeal. The resu lt: “Many litigants, especially
pro se litigants, fail[ed] to fle the second notice of appeal.”
Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 11 (citing Aver-
hart v. Arrendondo, 773 F. 2d 919 (CA7 1985), and Harcon
Barge Co. v. D & G Boat Rentals, Inc., 746 F. 2d 278 (CA5
1984)). So in 1993, the Rules Committee amended Rule 4
to delete its restrictions on the relation-forward principle,
concluding they “created a trap for an unsuspecting litigant
who fles a notice of appeal before a posttrial motion, or while
a posttrial motion is pending.” 28 U. S. C. App., at 11.
Today, nothing in the Rules suggests any intent to abro-
gate the relation forward of premature notices of appeal.
To the contrary, “the spirit of the Federal Rules” is that “de-
cisions on the merits [should not] be avoided on the basis of
. . . mere technicalities.” Foman, 371 U. S., at 181. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 1 provides that the Rules “should be
construed, administered, and employed by the court and the
parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determi-
nation of every action and proceeding.” Thus, courts are
directed to “disregard all errors and defects that do not af-
4
The same rule applies in criminal appeals. Rule 4(b)(2), which codifes
this Court's holding in Lemke v. United States, 346 U. S. 325 (1953) (per cu-
riam), provides that “[a] notice of appeal fled after the court announces a
decision, sentence, or order—but before the entry of the judgment or
order—is treated as fled on the date of and after the entry”).
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389
Opinion of the Court
fect any party's substantial rights.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
61.
When a premature notice of appeal makes clear “who is
appealing, from what judgment, to which appellate court,”
Becker, 532 U. S., at 767–768, its relation forward to entry
of the document formally enabling the appeal does not
affect substantial rights.
5
By contrast, as the Commit-
tee's prior experiment with a contrary Rule illustrated,
see supra, at 388, requiring a second notice of appeal
substantially undermines the rights of unsophisticated
litigants.
Amicus points out that Rules 4(a)(2) and 4(a)(4) expressly
permit relation forward, while Rule 4(a)(6), governing re-
opening, is silent on the issue. By way of negative implica-
tion, amicus says, it follows that relation forward is not per-
mitted in the context of reopening. “ `The force of any
negative i mpl icati on, however, depends on context. ' ”
NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 580 U. S. 288, 302 (2017) (quoting
Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U. S. 371, 381 (2013)).
Here that context includes not only the background relation-
forward principle but also the Rules' own emphasis on func-
tion over form. Foman, 371 U. S., at 181. Against that
backdrop it is unlikely that the Rules Committee sought im-
pliedly to prohibit relation forward in Rule 4(a)(6) by allow-
ing it in Rules 4(a)(2) and 4(a)(4), neither of which have any-
th i ng to do w ith reopeni ng.
6
Indeed, th is Cour t has
5
That principle explains as well why the Rules do not permit “a notice
of appeal from a clearly interlocutory decision—such as a discovery ruling
or a sanction order under Rule 11 . . .—to serve as a notice of appeal from
the fnal judgment.” FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Ins.
Co., 498 U. S. 269, 276 (1991). A notice so far removed from the relevant
appealable decision would not make clear “from what judgment” the appel-
lant intends to seek relief. Becker, 532 U. S., at 767.
6
To be sure, that Rule 4(a)(4) specifcally enumerates certain specifed
post-trial motions may raise a negative inference that relation forward is
not permitted, under the Rules, with respect to other post-trial motions.
But any such inference does not extend to the entirely distinct context of
Rule 4(a)(6) reopening.

390 P
ARRISH v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
previously recognized that the Rules' codifcation of a pre-
existi
ng practice in one context need not imply that all other
applications are foreclosed. See Scarborough v. Principi,
541 U. S. 401, 417–418 (2004).
Amicus's reading is made particularly implausible by the
fact that relation forward of a postjudgment notice preced-
ing a reopening order could not prejudice the other parties.
To reopen the appeals period, a would-be appellant must fle
either a request to reopen, or (as here) a notice of appeal
that is construed as such a request. Assuming the flings
are otherwise adequate, either one would put the other side
on notice of the fler's intent to appeal. Other parties thus
have nothing to gain from being served a second notice after
reopening is granted.
Finally, the Rules Committee knows how to restrict rela-
tion forward when it wants to do so. Recall that Rule
4(a)(4) codifes this Court's holdings that a notice of appeal
fled alongside a post-trial motion will relate forward to the
entry of an order disposing of the post-trial motion. See
supra, at 387–388. Rule 4(a)(4)(B)(ii) carves out a narrow
exception: Someone who wishes to appeal not only the origi-
nal judgment, but also the substance of an order resolving
the post-trial motion, “must fle a notice of appeal, or an
amended notice of appeal,” after “the entry of the order dis-
posing ” of that motion. That makes sense. An amended
notice of appeal in those circumstances informs the opposing
party that the appeal will cover more than just the original
judgment. So in the limited circumstance where the Rules
require it, the second notice serves a real purpose.
If the Rules Committee believes a second notice could be
similarly useful in the context of reopening, it remains free to
recommend a change. Indeed, the Committee is apparently
considering that issue presently. So long as Rule 4(a)(6)
does not speak to relation forward, however, the default rule
applies. That means Parrish's appeal can go forward under
the Rules as well as the statute.
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391
Jackson, J., concurring in judgment
***
W
hen a district court grants reopening to a litigant who
has already fled a notice making his intent to appeal clear,
no second notice of appeal is required. Instead, the original
notice relates forward to the date reopening is granted.
Donte Parrish's notice of appeal thus did all that was re-
quired of it. The judgment of the Fourth Circuit is re-
versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Jackson, with whom Justice Thomas joins, con-
curring in the judgment.
As the Court explains, Donte Parrish submitted a late no-
tice of appeal, which the Fourth Circuit construed as a “mo-
tion to reopen” the time to appeal and the District Court
subsequently granted. I agree with the Court's conclusion
that Parrish did not need to do anything more in order for
his notice of appeal to be treated as timely. I write sepa-
rately to explain why, in my view, it is unnecessary to resort
to ripening or relation-forward principles to reach that
result.
All parties agree that the statutory deadline for fling a
notice of appeal had passed when Parrish's notice arrived at
the courthouse. There is also no dispute that, because the
deadline to fle a notice of appeal is jurisdictional, Parrish's
tardiness could not have been waived or excused unless a
provision of law extended the period during which he could
fle the notice. Luckily for Parrish, the relevant statute in
this case contains such a provision: Section 2107(c) of Title
28 permits a district court to “reopen the time for appeal for
a period of 14 days from the date of entry of the [reopening]
order” if certain conditions are met. See § 2107(c) (allowing
reopening if the movant did not receive notice of the judg-
ment within 21 days of its issuance; he sought reopening
within 14 days of notice or 180 days of judgment, whichever
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392 P
ARRISH v. UNITED STATES
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is earlier; and no party would be prejudiced by reopening);
see
also ante, at 382. After the Fourth Circuit construed
Parrish's notice as a motion to reopen under this provision,
the District Court properly concluded that Parrish met the
statutory criteria and reopened the window in which Parrish
could fle.
As a practical matter, litigants fle motions like this one—
seeking to reopen or extend a deadline—every day in federal
district court. When they do so, they often attach to their
motion the (late) document they hope to receive permission
to fle. For example, when a party has missed a fling dead-
line, they frequently ask for an extension of time to fle the
substantive document they had hoped to submit. The mo-
tion they submit usually explains or seeks to justify the
delay, and a proposed order extending the relevant deadline
(ready for the court's signature) is often included. The pro-
posed substantive fling is also appended to that packet—
which the district court then dockets, if it grants the
extension.
Because Parrish's fling was effectively submitted in this
manner, to me, the court that received it should have handled
it in that way. Having construed Parrish's notice of appeal
as a motion to reopen, the court should have done what dis-
trict courts do every day in our federal system when such a
motion is granted: docket the proposed substantive fling—
here, the notice of appeal. With the notice of appeal thus
docketed, the court should have then transferred the case to
the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
This way of conceptualizing Parrish's fling does not re-
quire reliance on principles of ripening or relation forward.
It also makes sense, because Parrish fled what the court
construed as a “motion to reopen” for the purpose of allowing
that very document (the notice of appeal) to be fled. It
would indeed be strange to reopen a case because the litigant
has fled a proposed notice of appeal, but then fail to treat
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393
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
that fling as what the movant proposes it to be: a notice of
appea
l accepted by the court as timely fled.
In short, when a late litigant submits a proposed fling
along with a motion that asks the court to accept it, the sub-
stantive document does not come “too early.” Ante, at 386.
Rather, it comes contingent upon the court's granting the
accompanying motion, with an understanding that, if the mo-
tion is granted, the fling will be docketed.
This reasoning, of course, might not apply in other factual
circumstances, such as when a would-be appellant fles a no-
tice of appeal late and then, days later, submits a separate
motion to reopen; in that case, a court may well need to es-
tablish whether the earlier fled notice of appeal “relates for-
ward” upon the granting of the separate motion to reopen.
But, here, the “motion to reopen” and the notice of appeal
were one and the same, making the factual basis for our rule
of decision much simpler. Parrish's proposed notice of ap-
peal should have been docketed as timely fled upon the Dis-
trict Court's granting of his “motion to reopen.”
Justice Gorsuch, dissenting.
Respectfully, I would have dismissed this case as improvi-
dently granted. The Advisory Committee on Appellate
Rules has already launched a study to consider whether
changes to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) may
be warranted to treat premature notices of appeal as relating
forward to the frst day of the 14-day window 28 U. S. C.
§ 2107(c) prescribes. Brief in Opposition 16; see also Win-
ters v. Taskila, 88 F. 4th 665, 671–672 (CA6 2023). Surely,
too, a change to the rules could have solved the problem pre-
sented by this case. Contra, ante, at 387, n. 3. Even if
§ 2107(c) requires a notice to be fled during a certain win-
dow, the Rules Committee could provide that a premature
notice shall be treated as fled at a later date. Already, the
Committee has done exactly that in other appellate rules,
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Gorsuch, J., dissenting
including Rules 4(a)(2) and 4(a)(4). See Advisory Commit-
tee'
s Notes on 1979 Amendments, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 10.
Rather than take up problems the Rules Committee can
solve and has announced its interest in solving—and, in doing
so, risk the possibility that the Committee (understandably)
may suspend its own activities and delay their resolution—I
believe the wiser and more effcient course is to let the Com-
mittee get on with its work. That body is charged with “re-
view[ing] issues of precisely this sort.” Winters, 88 F. 4th,
at 672; see also Kemp v. United States, 596 U. S. 528, 540–
542 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None