Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services

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Syllabus
AMES v. OHIO DEPT. OF YOUTH SERVICES
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 23–1039. Argued February 26, 2025—Decided June 5, 2025
Petitioner Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, has worked for the Ohio
Department of Youth Services in various roles since 2004. In 2019, the
agency interviewed Ames for a new management position but ultimately
hired another candidate—a lesbian woman. The agency subsequently
demoted Ames from her role as a program administrator and later hired
a gay man to fll that role. Ames then fled this lawsuit against the
agency under Title VII, alleging that she was denied the management
promotion and demoted because of her sexual orientation. The District
Court granted summary judgment to the agency, and the Sixth Circuit
affrmed. The courts below analyzed Ames's claims under McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, which sets forth the traditional
framework for evaluating disparate-treatment claims that rest on cir-
cumstantial evidence. At the frst step of that framework, the plaintiff
must make a prima facie showing that the defendant acted with a dis-
criminatory motive. Like the District Court, the Sixth Circuit held
that Ames had failed to meet her prima facie burden because she had
not shown “ `background circumstances to support the suspicion that
the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the
majority.' ” 87 F. 4th 822, 825. The court reasoned that Ames, as a
straight woman, was required to make this showing “in addition to the
usual ones for establishing a prima-facie case.” Ibid.
Held: The Sixth Circuit's “background circumstances” rule—which re-
quires members of a majority group to satisfy a heightened evidentiary
standard to prevail on a Title VII claim—cannot be squared with the
text of Title VII or the Court's precedents. Pp. 308–313.
(a) Title VII's disparate-treatment provision bars employers from in-
tentionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). For
most plaintiffs, the frst step of the McDonnell Douglas framework—
stating a prima facie case of discrimination—is “not onerous.” Texas
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 253. The Sixth
Circuit's “background circumstances” rule requires plaintiffs who are
members of a majority group to bear an additional burden at step one.
But the text of Title VII's disparate-treatment provision draws no dis-
tinctions between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plain-

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Syllabus
tiffs. The provision focuses on individuals rather than groups, barring
discr
imination against “any individual” because of protected character-
istics. Congress left no room for courts to impose special requirements
on majority-group plaintiffs alone.
This Court's precedents reinforce that understanding of the statute,
and make clear that the standard for proving disparate treatment under
Title VII does not vary based on whether or not the plaintiff is a mem-
ber of a majority group. See, e. g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S.
424, 431 (“[d]iscriminatory preference for any group, minority or major-
ity, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed” in Title VII).
Moreover, the “background circumstances” rule—which subjects all
majority-group plaintiffs to the same, highly specifc evidentiary stand-
ard in every case—ignores the Court's instruction to avoid infexible
applications of the prima facie standard. Teamsters v. United States,
431 U. S. 324, 358. Pp. 308–311.
(b) Ohio argues that the “background circumstances” rule does not
subject majority-group plaintiffs to a heightened evidentiary standard
but rather is “just another way of asking whether the circumstances
surrounding an employment decision, if otherwise unexplained, suggest
that the decision was because of a protected characteristic.” Brief for
Respondent 10. Ohio's recasting is directly at odds with the Sixth Cir-
cuit's description of the “background circumstances” rule and its applica-
tion of that rule in this case. Ohio's alternative argument that Ames's
Title VII claims would fail even absent the “background circumstances”
rule is for the courts below to consider in the frst instance on remand.
Pp. 311–313.
87 F. 4th 822, vacated and remanded.
Jackson, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Thomas, J.,
fled a concurring opinion, in which Gorsuch, J., joined, post, p. 313.
Xiao Wang argued the cause for petitioner. With him on
the briefs was Edward L. Gilbert.
Ashley Robertson argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae in support of vacatur. With her on the
brief were Solicitor General Prelogar, Assistant Attorney
General Clarke, Deputy Solicitor General Fletcher, Bonnie
I. Robin-Vergeer, Karla Gilbride, Jennifer S. Goldstein,
Anne Noel Occhialino, and Julie L. Gantz.
T. Elliot Gaiser, Solicitor General of Ohio, argued the
cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Dave

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Opinion of the Court
Yost, Attorney General, Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Dep-
uty
Solicitor General, and Samuel C. Peterson, Deputy Solic-
itor General.*
Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against
employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin. Under our Title VII precedents, a plaintiff
may make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment by
showing “that she applied for an available position for which
she was qualifed, but was rejected under circumstances
which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.”
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248,
253 (1981).
The question in this case is whether, to satisfy that prima
facie burden, a plaintiff who is a member of a majority group
must also show “ `background circumstances to support the
suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who
discriminates against the majority.' ” 87 F. 4th 822, 825
(CA6 2023) (per curiam). We hold that this additional
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the America First
Legal Foundation by Christopher E. Mills; for the American Alliance for
Equal Rights by Thomas R. McCarthy and Cameron T. Norris; for the
Equal Protection Project by William A. Jacobson and James R. Nault;
for the National Employment Lawyers Association by Eric Schnapper;
and for the Pacifc Legal Foundation by Jeffrey D. Jennings.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Local Gov-
ernment Legal Center et al. by Nadia A. Sarkis and Kelly Shea Delvac;
and for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., et al. by
Janai S. Nelson, Samuel Spital, Alexsis M. Johnson, Avatara A. Smith-
Car r ing t o n, M o lly M. Cain, Jenn i fe r A. Ho lmes, and M i chael e N.
Turnage-Young.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the Massachusetts Chapter of the
National Organization for Women by Robert S. Mantell; for Katie Eyer
et al. by Zachary D. Tripp, Robert B. Niles-Weed, Katie Eyer, pro se,
Sandra F. Sperino, and Deborah A. Widiss; and for Josh Young by Wil-
liam E. Trachman.

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Opinion of the Court
“background circumstances” requirement is not consistent
w
ith Title VII's text or our case law construing the statute.
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment below and remand for
application of the proper prima facie standard.
I
The Ohio Department of Youth Services operates the
State's juvenile correctional system. In 2004, the agency
hired petitioner Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, to
serve as an executive secretary. Ames was eventually pro-
moted to program administrator and, in 2019, applied for
a newly created management position in the agency's Offce
of Quality and Improvement. Although the agency inter-
viewed her for the position, it ultimately hired a different
candidate—a lesbian woman—to fll the role.
A few days after Ames interviewed for the management
position, her supervisors removed her from her role as pro-
gram administrator. She accepted a demotion to the secre-
tarial role she had held when she frst joined the agency—a
move that resulted in a signifcant pay cut. The agency then
hired a gay man to fll the vacant program-administrator po-
sition. Ames subsequently fled this lawsuit against the
agency under Title VII, alleging that she was denied the
management promotion and demoted because of her sexual
orientation.
The District Court granted summary judgment to the
agency. 2023 WL 2539214, *12 (SD Ohio, Mar. 16, 2023).
The court analyzed Ames's claims under McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), which establishes the
traditional framework for evaluating disparate-treatment
claims that rest on circumstantial evidence. At the frst
step of that framework, the plaintiff must make a prima facie
showing that the defendant acted with a discriminatory mo-
tive. Relying on Circuit precedent, the District Court con-
cluded that Ames had failed to make that showing because

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she had not presented evidence of “ `background circum-
st
ances' ” suggesting that the agency was the rare employer
who discriminates against members of a majority group.
2023 WL 2539214, *7. Without that evidence, the court
held, plaintiffs who are members of majority groups—includ-
ing heterosexual plaintiffs, like Ames—could not discharge
their evidentiary burden at the frst step of the McDonnell
Douglas inquiry. 2023 WL 2539214, *8–*9.
The Sixth Circuit affrmed. Like the District Court, the
Sixth Circuit held that Ames had failed to meet her prima
facie burden because she had not shown “ `background cir-
cumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is
that unusual employer who discriminates against the major-
ity.' ” 87 F. 4th, at 825. The court reasoned that Ames, as
a straight woman, was required to make this showing “in
addition to the usual ones for establishing a prima-facie
case.” Ibid. And it explained that plaintiffs can typically
satisfy this burden, where applicable, by presenting “evi-
dence that a member of the relevant minority group (here,
gay people) made the employment decision at issue, or with
statistical evidence showing a pattern of discrimination . . .
against members of the majority group.” Ibid. The panel
concluded that the agency was entitled to summary judg-
ment because Ames had failed to present either type of evi-
dence. Ibid.
Judge Kethledge concurred in the court's decision but
wrote separately to express his disagreement with the
“background circumstances” rule. In his view, the require-
ment was not only unworkable—in that it required an assess-
ment of evidence presented by different plaintiffs under dif-
ferent standards—but also diverged substantially from Title
VII's text. Id., at 827–828.
The Sixth Circuit's decision reinforced a Circuit split as to
whether majority-group plaintiffs are subject to a different
evidentiary burden than minority-group plaintiffs at McDon-

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nell Douglas's frst step.
1
W
e granted certiorari to resolve
that split. See 603 U. S. 948 (2024).
II
Title VII's disparate-treatment provision bars employers
from intentionally discriminating against their employees on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 78
Stat. 255, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). In McDonnell Doug-
las, this Court laid out a three-step burden-shifting frame-
work for evaluating claims arising under that provision. 411
U. S., at 802–804. The McDonnell Douglas framework aims
to “bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly
to th[e] ultimate question” in a disparate-treatment case—
namely, whether “the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff.” Burdine, 450 U. S., at 253.
2
At the frst step of the familiar three-step inquiry, the
plaintiff bears the “initial burden” of “establishing a prima
facie case” by producing enough evidence to support an infer-
ence of discriminatory motive. McDonnell Douglas, 411
U. S., at 802. If the plaintiff clears that hurdle, the burden
1
In addition to the Sixth Circuit, four other Circuits have held or sug-
gested that majority-group plaintiffs must satisfy a heightened burden to
make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title VII. See
Hammer v. Ashcroft, 383 F. 3d 722, 724 (CA8 2004); Mills v. Health Care
Serv. Corp., 171 F. 3d 450, 457 (CA7 1999); Harding v. Gray, 9 F. 3d 150,
153 (CADC 1993); Notari v. Denver Water Dept., 971 F. 2d 585, 589 (CA10
1992). Other Circuits do not impose any heightened burden on majority-
group plaintiffs.
2
Although our cases have sometimes described the McDonnell Douglas
inquiry as a “burden-shifting ” framework, the “ultimate burden of per-
suading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Burdine, 450
U. S., at 253. McDonnell Douglas merely aims to provide “ `a sensible,
orderly way to evaluate the evidence' ” that “ `bears on the critical ques-
tion of discrimination.' ” Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460
U. S. 711, 715 (1983). For purposes of this case, we assume without de-
ciding that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies at the summary-
judgment stage of litigation.

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then “shift[s] to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscr
iminatory reason for the employee's rejection.”
Ibid. Finally, if the employer articulates such a justifca-
tion, the plaintiff must then have a “fair opportunity” to
show that the stated justifcation “was in fact pretext” for
discrimination. Id., at 804. A plaintiff “may succeed
[under the McDonnell Douglas framework] either directly
by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more
likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that
the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of cre-
dence.” Burdine, 450 U. S., at 256.
For most plaintiffs, the frst step of the McDonnell Doug-
las framework—the prima facie burden—is “not onerous.”
Burdine, 450 U. S., at 253. A plaintiff may satisfy it simply
by presenting evidence “that she applied for an available po-
sition for which she was qualifed, but was rejected under
circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination.” Ibid. But, under Sixth Circuit precedent,
plaintiffs who are members of a majority group bear an addi-
tional burden at step one: They must also establish “ `back-
ground circumstances to support the suspicion that the de-
fendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against
the majority.' ” 87 F. 4th, at 825.
As outlined below, the Sixth Circuit's “background circum-
stances” rule cannot be squared with the text of Title VII or
our longstanding precedents. And nothing Ohio has said, in
its brief or at oral argument, persuades us otherwise.
A
As a textual matter, Title VII's disparate-treatment provi-
sion draws no distinctions between majority-group plaintiffs
and minority-group plaintiffs. Rather, the provision makes
it unlawful “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any indi-
vidual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,

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religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)
(
emphasis added). The “law's focus on individuals rather
than groups [is] anything but academic.” Bostock v. Clay-
ton County, 590 U. S. 644, 659 (2020). By establishing the
same protections for every “individual”—without regard to
that individual's membership in a minority or majority
group—Congress left no room for courts to impose special
requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone.
Our precedents reinforce that understanding of the stat-
ute. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971), for
instance, we said that “[d]iscriminatory preference for any
group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Con-
gress has proscribed” in Title VII. Id., at 431 (emphasis
added). We made the same point even more explicitly in
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U. S.
273 (1976), a few years later. The employer in that case had
argued that certain forms of discrimination against White
employees fell outside the reach of Title VII. Id., at 280,
n. 8. But we rejected that argument, holding that “Title
VII prohibit[ed] racial discrimination against the white peti-
tioners in th[at] case upon the same standards as would
be applicable were they Negroes.” Id., at 280 (emphasis
added); see also id., at 279 (citing favorably the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission's view that Title VII bars
discrimination “against whites on the same terms as racial
discrimination against nonwhites”).
Our case law thus makes clear that the standard for prov-
ing disparate treatment under Title VII does not vary based
on whether or not the plaintiff is a member of a majority
group. Accord, Bostock, 590 U. S., at 659 (“This statute
works to protect individuals of both sexes from discrim-
ination, and does so equally”). The “background circum-
stances” rule fouts that basic principle.
The “background circumstances” rule also ignores our
instruction to avoid infexible applications of McDonnell
Douglas's frst prong. This Court has repeatedly explained

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that the “precise requirements of a prima facie case can vary
dependi
ng on the context and were `never intended to be
rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.' ” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N. A., 534 U. S. 506, 512 (2002) (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp.
v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 (1978)). In McDonnell Douglas
itself, we observed that the “facts necessarily will vary in
Title VII cases,” and that “the prima facie proof required”
can therefore differ from case to case. 411 U. S., at 802,
n. 13.
The “background circumstances” rule disregards this ad-
monition by uniformly subjecting all majority-group plain-
tiffs to the same, highly specifc evidentiary standard in
every case. As the Sixth Circuit observed, the rule effec-
tively requires majority-group plaintiffs (and only majority-
group plaintiffs) to produce certain types of evidence—such
as statistical proof or information about the relevant deci-
sionmaker's protected traits—that would not otherwise be
required to make out a prima facie case. 87 F. 4th, at 825.
This Court has long rejected such “infexible formula-
tion[s]” of the prima facie standard in disparate-treatment
cases. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 358 (1977).
We do so again today.
B
Ohio barely contests any of the above. At oral argument,
the St ate repeatedly acknowledged that T itle VII's
disparate-treatment provision imposes the same prima facie
burden on major ity-group plainti ffs that it i mposes on
minority-group plaintiffs.
3
Its brief likewise offers no justi-
fcation for imposing a heightened evidentiary standard on
majority-group plaintiffs. Instead, Ohio tries to attack the
3
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 39 (“Ohio agrees it is wrong to hold some litigants
to a higher standard because of their protected characteristics”); id., at 44
(endorsing the Solicitor General's position that Title VII imposes the same
standards on majority-group and minority-group plaintiffs); id., at 49–51
(confir mi ng that Ames “shou ld have the same burden” as other
plaintiffs).

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premise of the question presented by arguing that the “back-
ground
circumstances” rule does not operate to subject
majority-group plaintiffs to a heightened evidentiary stand-
ard at all. Under Ohio's view, the “background circum-
stances” requirement “is not an additional prima facie ele-
ment” but, rather, “just another way of asking whether the
circumstances surrounding an employment decision, if other-
wise unexplained, suggest that the decision was because of
a protected characteristic.” Brief for Respondent 10.
This contention is directly at odds with the Court of Ap-
peals' description of the “background circumstances” rule
and its application of that requirement in this case. The
Court of Appeals explicitly held that “Ames is heterosexual
. . . which means she must make a showing in addition to the
usual ones for establishing a prima-facie case.” 87 F. 4th,
at 825 (emphasis added). And the ensuing passage of the
court's opinion confrmed that a higher evidentiary standard
was being imposed on Ames because of her sexual orienta-
tion. The court stated: “Whether Ames made the necessary
showing of `background circumstances' is the principal issue
here” because “otherwise Ames's prima-facie case was easy
to make.” Ibid. The court then recounted how Ames was
qualifed, had been denied a promotion in favor of a gay
candidate, and was later demoted in favor of another gay
candidate—evidence that would ordinarily satisfy her prima
facie burden—before it specifcally faulted Ames for failing
to make the “requisite show i ng of ` background cir-
cumstances.' ” Ibid.
In short, the Sixth Circuit expressly based its holding af-
frming summary judgment in favor of the agency on Ames's
failure to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard. Ohio's
attempt to recast the “background circumstances” rule as an
application of the ordinary prima facie standard thus misses
the mark by a mile.
Ohio also urges this Court to affrm the judgment below
on alternative grounds, arguing that Ames's Title VII claims

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313
Thomas, J., concurring
would fail even absent the “background circumstances” rule.
But
those alternative arguments would require us to resolve
issues that the Court of Appeals did not address in the frst
instance and that fall beyond the scope of the question pre-
sented. We granted review to consider the validity of the
“background circumstances” rule, and we reject that rule for
the reasons set forth above. We leave it to the courts below
to address any of Ohio's remaining arguments on remand.
***
The Sixth Circuit has implemented a rule that requires
certain Title VII plaintiffs—those who are members of ma-
jority groups—to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard
in order to carry their burden under the frst step of the
McDonnell Douglas framework. We conclude that Title
VII does not impose such a heightened standard on majority-
group plaintiffs. Therefore, the judgment below is vacated,
and the case is remanded for application of the proper prima
facie standard.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Gorsuch joins,
concurring.
I join the Court's opinion in full. I write separately to
highlight the problems that arise when judges create atex-
tual legal rules and frameworks. Judge-made doctrines
have a tendency to distort the underlying statutory text, im-
pose unnecessary burdens on litigants, and cause confusion
for courts. The “background circumstances” rule—cor-
rectly rejected by the Court today—is one example of this
phenomenon. And, the decision below involves another ex-
ample: The Sixth Circuit analyzed Ames's Title VII claim
under the three-step framework developed by this Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973). As
with the “background circumstances” rule, the McDonnell
Douglas framework lacks any basis in the text of Title VII

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Thomas, J., concurring
and has proved diffcult for courts to apply. In a case where
the
parties ask us to do so, I would be willing to consider
whether the McDonnell Douglas framework is a workable
and useful evidentiary tool.
I
The Sixth Circuit's “background circumstances” rule im-
poses a heightened burden on Title VII plaintiffs who belong
to so-called “majority groups.” See 87 F. 4th 822, 825 (2023).
The rule requires a majority-group plaintiff to prove, in addi-
tion to the standard elements of a Title VII claim, that back-
ground circumstances “ `support the suspicion that the de-
fendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against
the majority.' ” Ibid. This additional requirement is a par-
adigmatic example of how judge-made doctrines can distort
the underlying statutory text.
As the Court's opinion explains, the “background circum-
stances” rule lacks any basis in the text of Title VII. Ante,
at 310. Title VII bars employment discrimination against
“any individual” “because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).
“Thus, to state the obvious, the statute bars discrimination
against `any individual' on the grounds specifed therein.”
87 F. 4th, at 827 (Kethledge, J., concurring). The “back-
ground circumstances” rule plainly contravenes that statu-
tory command by imposing a higher burden on some individ-
uals based solely on their membership in a particular
demographic group.
1
This rule is a product of improper judicial lawmaking.
See Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U. S. 22,
38 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile interpreting and
applying substantive law is the essence of the `judicial
1
The “background circumstances” rule is also plainly at odds with the
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection. That guarantee “ `cannot
mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when
applied to [another].' ” Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President
and Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U. S. 181, 206 (2023).

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Power' created under Article III of the Constitution, that
power
does not encompass the making of substantive law”).
The rule was created by D. C. Circuit judges in Parker v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 652 F. 2d 1012 (1981). Applying
their own “common sense,” these judges determined that
extra evidence is required to prove discrimination when a
Title VII plaintiff is white. Id., at 1017. In support of this
proposition, the court cited only its mistaken understanding
of the McDonnell Douglas framework, another judge-made
construct, see Part II, infra. 652 F. 2d, at 1017. At no
point in its development of this new rule did the court refer
to the text of Title VII.
The “background circumstances” rule also highlights how
judge-made doctrines can be diffcult for courts to apply.
Because courts lack an underlying legal authority on which
to ground their analysis, there is no principled way to resolve
doctrinal ambiguities. The “background circumstances”
rule suffers from this faw. A number of courts have de-
scribed the rule as “vague and ill-defned.” E. g., Iadimarco
v. Runyon, 190 F. 3d 151, 161 (CA3 1999); see also Stock v.
Universal Foods Corp., 817 F. Supp. 1300, 1306 (Md. 1993)
(describing the rule as “vague and diffcult to apply”). Most
notably, the “ background circumstances” r u le requires
courts to perform the diffcult—if not impossible—task of
deciding whether a particular plaintiff qualifes as a member
of the so-called “majority.” See Smyer v. Kroger Ltd. Part-
nership 1, 2024 WL 1007116, *7 (CA6, Mar. 8, 2024) (Boggs,
J., concurring) (explaining that we live “[i]n a world where it
has become increasingly diffcult to determine who belongs
in the majority”).
How a court defnes the boundaries of a population can
affect whether a particular person falls into a majority or
minority group. Women, for example, make up the majority
in the United States as a whole, but not in some States and
counties. See Dept. of Commerce, Census Bureau, L.
Blakeslee, Z. Caplan, J. Meyer, M. Rabe, & A. Roberts, Age

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Thomas, J., concurring
and Sex Composition: 2020, pp. 2, 8, 14–15 (C2020BR–06,
2023)
(Census Bureau). Similarly, women make up the ma-
jority of employees in certain industries, such as teaching
and nursing, but the minority in other industries, such as
construction. Brief for America First Legal Foundation as
Amicus Curiae 13 (citing Dept. of Labor, Occupations With
the Largest Share of Women Workers (Apr. 2025), https://
www.dol.gov/agencies/wb/data /occupations/ largest-share-
women-workers; Dept. of Labor, Occupati ons With the
Smallest Share of Women Workers (Apr. 2025), https://www
.dol.gov/agencies/wb/data /occupations/occupations-smallest-
share-women-workers).
Defning the “majority” is even more diffcult in the con-
text of race, as racial categories tend to be “overbroad” and
“imprecise in many ways.” Students for Fair Admissions,
Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U. S.
181, 216 (2023).
2
“American families have become increas-
ingly multicultural,” and “attempts to divide us all up into a
handful of groups have become only more incoherent with
time.” Id., at 293 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). And, even if
courts could identify all the relevant racial groups and their
boundaries, courts would still struggle to determine which
racial groups make up a majority. Black employees in De-
troit, for example, make up a majority in their city, but not in
Michigan or the United States at large. See Census Bureau,
2
“The term `Asian,' ” for example, “is extremely broad and masks impor-
tant variations by country of origin.” R. Bhopal, Migration, Ethnicity,
Race, and Health in Multicultural Societies 18 (2d ed. 2014). Courts have
also struggled to determine what it means to be “Hispanic.” See, e. g.,
Major Concrete Constr., Inc. v. Erie Cty., 134 App. Div. 2d 872, 873–874,
521 N. Y. S. 2d 959, 960 (1987) (upholding an administrative determination
that a person with one Mexican grandparent did not qualify as Hispanic);
see also M. Lopez, J. Krogstad, & J. Passel, Pew Research Center, Who Is
Hispanic? (Sept. 15, 2022), https://web.archive.org/web/20220930084123/
https://www.pewresearch.org/fac t-t ank/2022/09/15/who-is-h ispanic/
(describing “evolving cultural norms about what it means to be Hispanic
or Latino in the U. S. today”).

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Quick Facts: Detroit City, Michigan (July 2024), https://www
.
census.gov / quickfac ts/fac t/ t able/detroitcitymich igan/
PST045224; Census Bureau, Quick Facts: Michigan (July
2024), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/ table/ MI/
PST045224.
Similar problems arise with religion. As with sex and
race, a particular religion could make up the majority or the
minority, depending on how the population is defned. And,
in the context of religion, the “background circumstances”
rule requires courts to decide both the plaintiff 's religion and
how the plaintiff 's religion compares with the religion of ev-
eryone else in the relevant population. Those tasks are for-
midable, as Americans hold a wide range of religious beliefs,
as well as a wide range of views about the proper way to
categorize other religions. Americans have different views,
for example, on whether Catholics are Christians. The “ju-
dicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve” these
kinds of faith-based “differences.” Thomas v. Review Bd.
of Ind. Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707, 715 (1981);
see also Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru,
591 U. S. 732, 761 (2020) (“[D]etermining whether a person is
a `co-religionist' will not always be easy”).
Courts that have adopted the “background circumstances”
rule have offered no guidance on how to decide whether a
particular person is a member of the “majority.” See Bish-
opp v. District of Columbia, 788 F. 2d 781, 786, n. 5 (CADC
1986) (“[N]either this court nor the Supreme Court has
squarely addressed the issue whether minority status for
purposes of a prima facie case could have a regional or local
meaning ”). Instead, judges have been left to their own de-
vices to make these challenging determinations.
Most courts appear to have sidestepped these diffculties
by abandoning the search for neutral principles and instead
assuming that the “background circumstances” rule applies
only to white and male plaintiffs. The Tenth Circuit, for
example, assumed that the rule applies to “white plaintiff[s]”

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on the ground that white individuals are “members of a
h
istorically favored group.” Taken v. Oklahoma Corp.
Comm'n, 125 F. 3d 1366, 1369 (1997). Similarly, the D. C.
Circuit applied the rule to a white plaintiff while acknowl-
edging that “[o]f course whites are in the minority in the
District of Columbia.” Bishopp, 788 F. 2d, at 786, and n. 5.
In other words, courts with this rule have enshrined into
Title VII's antidiscrimination law an explicitly race-based
preference: White plaintiffs must prove the existence of
background circumstances, while nonwhite plaintiffs need
not do so. Such a rule is undoubtedly contrary to Title VII,
and likely violates the Constitution, under which “there can
be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race.” Ada-
rand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 239 (1995)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment);
see n. 1, supra.
Thankfully, today's decision obviates the need for courts to
engage in the “sordid business” of “divvying us up by race”
or any other protected trait. League of United Latin Amer-
ican Citizens v. Perry, 548 U. S. 399, 511 (2006) (Roberts,
C. J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and
dissenting in part). I simply observe that the “background
circumstances” rule is emblematic of the serious challenges
that can arise when judges invent atextual requirements.
3
3
The “ `background circumstances' ” rule is nonsensical for an additional
reason: It requires courts to assume that only an “ `unusual employer' ”
would discriminate against those it perceives to be in the majority. 87
F. 4th 822, 825 (CA6 2023). But, a number of this Nation's largest and
most prestigious employers have overtly discriminated against those they
deem members of so-called majority groups. American employers have
long been “obsessed” with “diversity, equity, and inclusion” initiatives and
affrmative action plans. Brief for America First Legal Foundation as
Amicus Curiae 8. Initiatives of this kind have often led to overt discrim-
ination against those perceived to be in the majority. Harvard College,
600 U. S., at 258 (Thomas, J., concurring); Preston v. Wisconsin Health
Fund, 397 F. 3d 539, 542 (CA7 2005) (Posner, J., for the court) (explaining

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Thomas, J., concurring
For too long, that rule put “a deep scratch across [the] sur-
face”
of Title VII. 87 F. 4th, at 827 (Kethledge, J., concur-
ring). I am pleased that the Court rejects it in full today.
II
This case involves a second judge-made rule. Relying on
Circuit precedent, the Sixth Circuit applied the three-step
framework developed by this Court in McDonnell Douglas
to determine whether Ames's Title VII claim should survive
summary judgment. The Court today assumes without de-
ciding that the McDonnell Douglas framework is an appro-
priate tool for making that determination. Ante, at 308, n. 2.
But, the judge-made McDonnell Douglas framework has no
basis in the text of Title VII. And, as I have previously
explained, lower courts' extension of this doctrine into the
summary-judgment context has caused “signifcant confu-
sion” and “troubling outcomes on the ground.” Hittle v.
City of Stockton, 604 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2025) (opinion dis-
senting from denial of certiorari). In an appropriate case,
this Court should consider whether the McDonnell Douglas
framework is an appropriate tool to evaluate Title VII claims
at summary judgment.
A
The McDonnell Douglas framework is a judge-made evi-
dentiary “tool.” Comcast Corp. v. National Assn. of Afri-
can American-Owned Media, 589 U. S. 327, 340 (2020). It
was originally developed for courts to use in a bench trial.
Hittle, 604 U. S., at ––– (opinion of Thomas, J.). Its in-
tended purpose was to help “bring the litigants and the court
expeditiously and fairly to th[e] ultimate question” in a Title
VII case—that is, whether “the defendant intentionally dis-
criminated against the plaintiff.” Texas Dept. of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 253 (1981).
that companies are “under pressure from affrmative action plans” to dis-
criminate in favor of members of so-called minority groups).

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The framework has three steps, which this Court has sum-
mar
ized as follows: “First, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie
case of discrimination.” Id., at 252–253. “Second, if the
plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the defendant `to articulate some legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the employee's rejection.' ” Id., at
253 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U. S., at 802). “Third,
should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must
then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defend-
ant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrim-
ination.” 450 U. S., at 253.
The McDonnell Douglas framework was made “out of
whole cloth.” Hittle, 604 U. S., at ––– (opinion of Thomas,
J.). Its contours have no basis in the text of Title VII or
any other source of law. And, as far as I can tell, this Court
has never attempted to justify it on textual grounds. Ibid.;
see Tynes v. Florida Dept. of Juvenile Justice, 88 F. 4th 939,
952 (CA11 2023) (Newsom, J., concurring) (“There's certainly
no textual warrant in Title VII or the Federal Rules for so
elaborate a scheme, and so far as I know, no one has ever
even sought to justify it as rooted in either”); Griffth v. Des
Moines, 387 F. 3d 733, 740 (CA8 2004) (Magnuson, J., concur-
ring specially) (“Absent from th[e] opinion was any justifca-
tion or authority for this scheme”).
B
The M cDo nnell Do ugl as framework exemplifies how
judge-made doctrines can have amorphous bounds. Al-
though originally designed for the bench-trial context, the
McDonnell Douglas framework has over the years “taken
on a life of its own.” Tynes, 88 F. 4th, at 952 (Newsom, J.,
concurring). It is today “the presumptive means of resolv-
ing Title VII cases at summary judgment.” Ibid. And,
that development has come without this Court ever consider-

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ing—much less holding—that the framework is an appro-
pr
iate tool for the summary-judgment task.
Far from extending the framework to new contexts, this
Court has taken steps to “limi[t] the relevancy and applicabil-
ity of the McDonnell Douglas framework.” T. Tymkovich,
The Problem With Pretext, 85 Denver U. L. Rev. 503, 507
(2008) (Tymkovich). For example, this Court has held that
McDonnell Douglas is “inapplicable” when the plaintiff re-
lies on direct evidence to prove his claim. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U. S. 111, 121 (1985). The Court
has also held that the framework does not apply in Title VII
mixed-motive cases. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U. S. 228, 258 (1989) (plurality opinion). We have said that
the framework is inapplicable at the pleading stage, Swier-
kiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U. S. 506, 508 (2002), and in
deciding post-trial motions, Postal Service Bd. of Governors
v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711, 715 (1983). This Court has further
explained that a plaintiff need not satisfy the frst step of the
framework at trial. Ibid. And, we have strongly sug-
gested that the framework should not be referenced in jury
instructions because it is too confusing. Vance v. Ball State
Univ., 570 U. S. 421, 444–445, and n. 13 (2013).
Notwithstanding this Court's steps to limit McDonnell
Douglas, it is now the framework that “courts typically
apply” “to determine whether the plaintiff has proffered suf-
fcient evidence to survive summary judgment.” Jackson v.
VHS Detroit Receiving Hospital, Inc., 814 F. 3d 769, 776
(CA6 2016). The reason for this expansion is unclear. This
Court has only once addressed the application of McDonnell
Douglas to Title VII cases at summary judgment, and it held
that the framework did not apply. See Trans World Air-
lines, 469 U. S., at 121.
4
But, however we got here, McDon-
4
To be sure, this Court has assumed without deciding that the McDon-
nell Douglas framework applies at summary judgment in contexts outside
of Title VII. See, e. g., O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,
517 U. S. 308, 311 (1996) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act). But,

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nell Douglas now undeniably plays a prominent role in Title
VII
cases at summary judgment.
C
I seriously doubt that the McDonnell Douglas framework
is a suitable tool for evaluating Title VII claims at summary
judgment. In my view, the framework is incompatible with
the summary-judgment standard; it fails to encompass the
various ways in which a plaintiff could prove his claim; it
requires courts to maintain artifcial distinctions between di-
rect and circumstantial evidence; and it has created outsized
judicial confusion.
1
My frst concern is that the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work is incompatible with the summary-judgment standard
set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
Rule 56(a) requires a court to grant summary judgment
when the movant establishes that there is “no genuine dis-
pute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” But, “the language this
Court has used to describe the [McDonnell Douglas] frame-
work does not neatly track” that rule. Hittle, 604 U. S.,
at ––– (opinion of Thomas, J.). Namely, the framework does
not speak in terms of “genuine dispute[s]” regarding the
facts. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(a). Instead, it speaks in
terms of “proving ” facts “by the preponderance of the evi-
dence.” Burdine, 450 U. S., at 252–253. That difference is
signifcant because “a plaintiff need not establish or prove
any elements—by a preponderance or otherwise—to survive
summary judgment.” Hittle, 604 U. S., at ––– (opinion of
Thomas, J.). In my view, requiring a plaintiff to satisfy the
McDonnell Douglas framework—as this Court has de-
as far as I can tell, this Court has never had occasion to decide whether
the McDonnell Douglas framework is a useful or appropriate tool for eval-
uating any kind of claim at summary judgment.

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scribed it—requires a plaintiff to prove too much at sum-
mary
judgment.
If courts are to apply McDonnell Douglas at summary
judgment, they must modify the framework to match the ap-
plicable legal standard. For example, at the third step, the
question for the court cannot be whether the plaintiff has
“prove[d] by a preponderance of the evidence that the legiti-
mate reasons offered by the defendant . . . were a pretext
for discrimination.” Burdine, 450 U. S., at 253. Instead,
the plaintiff need only present suffcient evidence to create a
“genuine dispute as to” whether the employer's stated rea-
son was pretextual. Rule 56(a).
2
A second problem with the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work is that it fails to capture all the ways in which a plain-
tiff can prove a Title VII claim. See Hittle, 604 U. S., at –––
(opinion of Thomas, J.). McDonnell Douglas “sets forth cri-
teria that, if satisfed, will allow a plaintiff to prove a Title
VII violation.” 604 U. S., at –––. But, satisfying McDon-
nell Douglas is “not the only way” to prevail under Title
VII. 604 U. S., at –––.
For example, the text of Title VII provides that “an unlaw-
ful employment practice is established when the complaining
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42
U. S. C. § 2000e–2(m) (emphasis added). In other words, a
plaintiff may establish a Title VII violation by proving that
an employer took an employment action in part because of
an unlawful motive.
Yet, the McDonnell Douglas framework requires a plain-
tiff to prove that “the legitimate reasons offered by the de-
fendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination.” Burdine, 450 U. S., at 253. That require-
ment demands more than the text of Title VII: Under the

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statute, a plaintiff need not establish that the employer's
st
ated reason for its action was wholly pretextual. A plain-
tiff could prevail even if the employer's stated reason was
part of the reason for the employer's action. It follows that
a plaintiff 's inability to satisfy McDonnell Douglas's third
step does not necessarily mean that the plaintiff 's claim
should fail. In view of that problem, this Court has held
that the McDonnell Douglas framework should not be used
in cases where the plaintiff argues that the employer oper-
ated with mixed motives. Price Waterhouse, 490 U. S., at
258 (plurality opinion). Instead, the framework appears to
be limited to cases where the plaintiff argues that discrimi-
nation was the sole factor infuencing the employer's deci-
sion. But, “[n]othing in the text of [Title VII] indicates that
Congress intended courts to maintain this dichotomy.”
Tymkovich 522.
And, even in so-called single-motive cases, McDonnell
Douglas fails to capture all the ways in which a plaintiff
could prevail. See Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84
F. 4th 1300, 1310 (CA11 2023) (observing that a plaintiff can
prove a Title VII claim without satisfying McDonnell Doug-
las's three steps). A plaintiff who cannot establish a prima
facie case at the frst step or pretext at the third step can
still prevail under Title VII so long as his evidence raises a
reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination. The “ulti-
mate question” is simply whether “the defendant intention-
ally discriminated against the plaintiff.” Burdine, 450 U. S.,
at 253.
3
Another problem with the McDonnell Douglas framework
is that it requires courts to draw and maintain an artifcial
distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence.
This Court has held that “the McDonnell Douglas test is
inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of
discrimination.” Trans World Airlines, 469 U. S., at 121.
Our precedent therefore requires courts to “make the often

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Thomas, J., concurring
subtle and diffcult distinction between `direct' and `indirect'
or
`circumstantial' evidence.” Price Waterhouse, 490 U. S.,
at 291 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
In most civil litigation contexts, courts have no occasion
to distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence.
“[I]n any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct
or circumstantial evidence,” or some combination thereof.
Aikens, 460 U. S., at 714, n. 3. And, the law makes no dis-
tinction regarding the weight or value assigned to either
kind of evidence. “The reason for treating circumstantial
and direct evidence alike,” we have explained, “is both clear
and deep rooted: `Circumstantial evidence is not only suff-
cient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persua-
sive than direct evidence.' ” Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,
539 U. S. 90, 100 (2003).
That “ `[c]onventional rul[e] of civil litigation' ”—that a
plaintiff can proceed with direct or circumstantial evidence—
applies with full force to Title VII cases. Id., at 99. Yet,
McDonnell Douglas requires courts to determine at the out-
set the nature of the evidence before it, which often prolongs
litigation instead of streamlining it. See, e. g., Othman v.
Country Club Hills, 671 F. 3d 672, 675 (CA8 2012). Because
a Title VII plaintiff can prove his claim with either direct or
circumstantial evidence, I am skeptical of a framework that
requires courts to perform the “diffcult” task of characteriz-
ing each piece of evidence. Price Waterhouse, 490 U. S., at
291 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
4
That the McDonnell Douglas framework “has befuddled”
courts “[s]ince its inception” is yet another reason to question
it. Griffth, 387 F. 3d, at 746 (Magnuson, J., concurring spe-
cially). Six years after this Court created the framework,
the First Circuit observed that “the subtleties of McDonnell
Douglas are confusing ” and “have caused considerable diff-
culty for judges of all levels.” Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600

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F. 2d 1003, 1016 (CA1 1979). That early confusion never dis-
sipated.
A decade later, Justice Kennedy made the same
observation, explaining that “[l]ower courts long have had
difficulty applying McDonnell Douglas. ” Pr ice Wa ter-
house, 490 U. S., at 291 (dissenting opinion). About 20 years
after that, Judge Tymkovich too observed that “[l]ower
courts have struggled to implement the burden-shifting
framework for over thirty years.” Tymkovich 529. The
McDonnell Douglas framework has been on the books for
over 50 years now, and courts still report “continuing confu-
sion.” Tynes, 88 F. 4th, at 945; see also Hittle, 604 U. S.,
at ––– (opinion of Thomas, J.) (collecting examples). That
those who have carefully grappled with the framework for
decades cannot make sense of it suggests that the framework
is unworkable.
D
This case did not present the question whether the Mc-
Donnell Douglas framework is an appropriate tool for evalu-
ating Title VII claims at summary judgment. In a case
where that issue is squarely before us, I would consider
whether the framework should be used for that purpose.
In the meantime, litigants and lower courts are free to
proceed without the McDonnell Douglas framework. This
Court has never required anyone to use it. And, district
courts are well equipped to resolve summary judgment mo-
tions without it. Every day—and in almost every context
except the Title VII context—district courts across the
country resolve summary judgment motions by applying the
straightforward text of Rule 56. In my view, it might be-
hoove courts and litigants to take that same approach in Title
VII cases.
***
Atextual, judge-created legal rules have a tendency to
generate complexity, confusion, and erroneous results. I am
pleased that the Court correctly rejects the atextual “back-
ground circumstances” rule today.

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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None