Delligatti v. United States

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 604 U. S. Part 2
Pages 423–457
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T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
March 21, 2025
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
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OCTOBER
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423
Syllabus
DELLIGATTI v. UNITED STATES
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit
No. 23–825. Argued November 12, 2024—Decided March 21, 2025
Title 18 U. S. C. § 924(c) subjects a person who uses or carries a frearm
during a “crime of violence” to a mandatory minimum sentence of fve
years. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and (D)(ii). Section 924(c)(3)(A) defines a
“crime of violence” as a felony that “has as an element the use, at-
tempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another.” To determine whether an offense falls within
§ 924(c)(3)(A)'s “elements clause,” the Court applies the categorical ap-
proach, asking whether the offense in question always involves the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of force. Here, Salvatore Delligatti
was convicted of violating § 924(c) after he recruited gang members to
kill a suspected police informant and gave them a loaded revolver to
carry out the job.
Before trial, Delligatti moved to dismiss his § 924(c) charge on the
ground that the charge lacked the required predicate crime of violence,
but the District Court denied his motion. Delligatti's indictment
charged him with attempted murder under the violent-crimes-in-aid-of-
racketeering (VICAR) statute, § 1959(a)(5), which required proof that
Delligatti had attempted second-degree murder under New York law.
Delligatti argued that a VICAR offense predicated on New York second-
degree murder is not a crime of violence under § 924(c)'s elements clause
because homicide under New York law can be committed by omission,
defned as the failure to perform a legal duty. The Second Circuit af-
frmed the District Court's conclusion that New York attempted second-
degree murder is a crime of violence for purposes of § 924(c)(3)(A).
Held: The knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by
act or omission, necessarily involves the “use” of “physical force” against
another person within the meaning of § 924(c)(3)(A). Pp. 429–439.
(a) It is impossible to deliberately cause physical harm without the
use of physical force under § 924(c). In United States v. Castleman, 572
U. S. 157, this Court held that under § 922(g)(9)—which prohibits anyone
convicted of “a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” from owning a
frearm—“the knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury neces-
sarily involves the use of physical force,” id., at 169. The Court's rea-
soning proceeded in two steps. First, the Court found it “impossible to
cause bodily injury without applying [the] force” needed to commit

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Syllabus
common-law battery. Id., at 170 (emphasis added). Second, the Court
held
that “the knowing or intentional application of force is a `use' of
force” in that sense. Ibid. (emphasis added).
The logic of Castleman extends to § 924(c). Although the parties
stipulate that § 922(g)(9) and § 924(c) require different levels of force—
battery-level force versus violent force—that difference is immaterial
here. As the Court held in Stokeling v. United States, 586 U. S. 73, 80,
violent force encompasses “the `force' required for common-law rob-
bery.” Although a mere touch is not suffcient force for common-law
robbery, any force that actually causes injury or death is. Id., at 83.
Further, common-law robbery, like battery, can be committed through
the indirect use of force. Thus, the “knowing or intentional causation
of bodily injury necessarily involves the use of physical force” under
§ 924(c) just as it does under § 922(g)(9). Castleman, 572 U. S., at 169.
Pp. 429–433.
(b) Castleman's logic forecloses Delligatti's challenge. Because New
York second-degree murder requires proof that the defendant intention-
ally caused the death of another person, it necessarily involves the use
of physical force under § 924(c).
Delligatti contends that an offender can commit New York second-
degree murder without being the actual cause of the victim's death
because the offender can do so through omission of a legal duty. But
the test for “actual causality” is whether the victim's death “would not
have occurred in the absence of—that is, but for—the defendant's con-
duct.” Burrage v. United States, 571 U. S. 204, 211 (internal quotation
marks omitted). When a child starves to death after the parents refuse
to provide food, the parents' conduct is no less a cause of death than if
the parents had poisoned the child.
Delligatti also argues that an offender who causes harm by omission
does not make “use” of physical force “against the person . . . of an-
other.” § 924(c)(3)(A). But it is natural to say that a person makes
“use” of something by deliberate inaction. A mother who purposely
kills her child by declining to intervene when the child drinks bleach
makes “use” of the bleach's poisonous properties.
Similarly, the phrase “against the person or property of another” in
§ 924(c)(3)(A) does not exclude crimes of omission. That phrase at most
requires that another person be “the conscious object” of the force.
Borden v. United States, 593 U. S. 420, 430 (plurality opinion). When-
ever an offender deliberately causes bodily harm by omission, another
person is necessarily the conscious object of physical force.
The ordinary meaning of the term “crime of violence” confrms that
Congress meant for the elements clause to cover crimes of omission.
Intentional murder is the prototypical “crime of violence,” and it has

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425
Opinion of the Court
long been understood to incorporate liability for both act and omission.
In
1986, when the elements clause was enacted, at least 33 States gener-
ally defned criminally culpable acts to include omission of a legal duty,
and leading criminal-law treatises equated act and omission. If the ele-
ments clause is to have a reasonable relationship to the term it defnes,
it must encompass cases where the offender makes use of physical force
by deliberate inaction. Pp. 433–438.
83 F. 4th 113, affrmed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined.
Gorsuch, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Jackson, J., joined, post,
p. 439.
Allon Kedem argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs were Matthew L. Farley, Dana Or, Dana
Kagan McGinley, Charles Birkel, Lucas Anderson, and Ni-
cole L. Masiello.
Deputy Solicitor General Feigin argued the cause for the
United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor Gen-
eral Prelogar, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Argentieri, Aimee W. Brown, and Sonja M. Ralston.*
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(3)(A) defnes a “crime of violence”
to include a felony that involves the “use of physical force”
against another person. In the context of a closely related
statute, we have held that “the knowing or intentional causa-
tion of bodily injury necessarily involves the use of physi-
cal force.” United States v. Castleman, 572 U. S. 157, 169
(2014). This case asks whether that principle extends to
§ 924(c)(3)(A) and, if so, whether the principle holds in cases
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Federal Public
Defender Offces in the Second Circuit by Matthew B. Larsen and Ginger
D. Anders; for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al.
by Alan Schoen feld, Joshua L. Dratel, and Mary Price; and for the Na-
tional Association for Public Defense by Daniel Woofter and Emily
Hughes.
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where an offender causes bodily injury by omission rather
than
action. We answer both questions in the affrmative.
I
A
Section 924(c) subjects any person who uses or carries a
frearm during or in relation to a “crime of violence” to a
mandatory minimum sentence of fve years, to be served con-
secutively with any other term of imprisonment. §§ 924(c)
(1)(A)(i) and (D)(ii). By the terms of the statute, a federal
felony qualifes as a predicate crime of violence if it falls
within either of two provisions. Under the frst provision,
known as the elements clause, an offense qualifes if it “has
as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person or property of another.”
§ 924(c)(3)(A). Under the second provision, known as the re-
sidual clause, an offense qualifes if it, “by its nature, involves
a substantial risk that physical force against the person or
property of another may be used in the course of committing
the offense.” § 924(c)(3)(B). In United States v. Davis, 588
U. S. 445 (2019), this Court held that the residual clause is
unconstitutionally vague. Id., at 470.
This Court applies a “categorical approach” to determine
whether an offense falls within the elements clause. United
States v. Taylor, 596 U. S. 845, 850 (2022). Under that ap-
proach, we do not examine the defendant's actual conduct.
Instead, we ask whether the offense in question “always”
involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force.
Ibid. If the offense can be committed without the use, at-
tempted use, or threatened use of force, it is not a crime of
violence under the elements clause.
B
Salvatore Delligatti is an associate of the Genovese crime
family, one of the New York Mafa's so-called Five Families.
In 2014, a local gas station owner hired Delligatti to kill Jo-
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427
Opinion of the Court
seph Bonelli, a “neighborhood bully” and suspected police
i
nformant. United States v. Pastore, 83 F. 4th 113, 117 (CA2
2023). Delligatti recruited several members of a street gang
to carry out the job and provided them with a car and a
loaded revolver. The gang members drove to Bonelli's
house while he was out, intending to shoot him when he re-
turned. They abandoned this plan, however, after seeing
too many potential witnesses. At Delligatti's urging, the
gang members returned the following day to try again.
But, by this time, the police had discovered the plot and ar-
rested the gang members on their way to carry out the hit.
The Government charged Delligatti with several offenses,
including one count of using or carrying a frearm during
or in relation to a “crime of violence” under § 924(c). The
indictment charged as a predicate crime of violence at-
tempted murder under the violent-crimes-in-aid-of-rack-
eteering (VICAR) statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1959(a)(5). VICAR
attempted murder requires proof that the defendant com-
mitted an underlying state or federal offense that constitutes
attempted “murder.” Ibid. The Government alleged that
Delligatti met this requirement by attempting second-degree
murder under New York law. A person commits second-de-
gree murder when, “[w]ith intent to cause the death of an-
other person, he causes the death of such person or of a third
person.” N. Y. Penal Law Ann. § 125.25(1) (West 2009).
Before trial, Delligatti moved to dismiss his § 924(c) charge
on the ground that the Government had not alleged a valid
predicate crime of violence. The District Court denied the
motion, holding that there “can be no serious argument” that
VICAR attempted murder is not a crime of violence. App.
to Pet. for Cert. 40a–41a. A jury convicted Delligatti on all
counts, and the District Court sentenced him to 25 years'
imprisonment.
On appeal to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, Delligatti argued that a VICAR offense predicated
on New York second-degree murder falls outside § 924(c)'s
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LIGATTI v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
elements clause. Homicide under New York law can be com-
mitted
by act or omission, with the latter defned as a failure
to perform a legally imposed duty. N. Y. Penal Law Ann.
§§ 15.00(3), 15.10 (West 2009); People v. Steinberg, 79 N. Y.
2d 673, 680, 595 N. E. 2d 845, 847 (1992). Thus, for example,
a parent who intentionally causes his child's death by with-
holding food or medical care commits second-degree murder
under New York law. See People v. Best, 202 App. Div. 2d
1015, 1015–1016, 609 N. Y. S. 2d 478, 479 (1994). Delligatti
argued that omission-based crimes like these do not involve
the “use of force.”
While Delligatti's appeal was pending, the Second Circuit
rejected his position in a different case. Relying on our de-
cision in Castleman, it held that the “ `knowing or intentional
causation of bodily injury necessarily involves the use of
physical force,' ” even when the defendant causes harm “by
omission.” United States v. Scott, 990 F. 3d 94, 111, 114
(2021) (en banc) (quoting 572 U. S., at 169, and adding empha-
sis). Applying Scott, the Second Circuit held in Delligatti's
case that New York attempted second-degree murder—and,
by extension, a VICAR offense predicated on it—is a crime
of violence because it necessarily involves at least the at-
tempted use of force. 83 F. 4th, at 121–122.
1
We granted certiorari to decide whether an individual who
knowingly or intentionally causes bodily injury or death by
failing to take action uses physical force within the meaning
of the elements clause. 602 U. S. 1013 (2024).
2
1
The Second Circuit assumed that the status of Delligatti's VICAR of-
fense turns on whether the underlying state offense is a crime of violence.
83 F. 4th, at 119–120. However, at least one Court of Appeals has held
that a VICAR offense can be a crime of violence even if its underlying
predicate offense is not. United States v. Thomas, 87 F. 4th 267, 274–275
(CA4 2023). We express no view on that issue.
2
Before this Court, Delligatti does not dispute the Second Circuit's hold-
ing that New York attempted second-degree murder is a crime of violence
if the completed offense is a crime of violence. See Pet. for Cert. 28. We
decide this case on that assumption.

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Opinion of the Court
II
The
Second Circuit correctly held that causing bodily harm
by omission requires the use of force. As in Castleman, the
“use” of “physical force” in § 924(c) encompasses the knowing
or intentional causation of bodily injury. There is no excep-
tion to this principle when an offender causes bodily injury
by omission rather than affrmative act. Delligatti's § 924(c)
challenge therefore fails.
A
Castleman establishes that under statutes like the one at
issue here it is impossible to deliberately cause physical harm
without the use of physical force. Although Castleman ad-
dressed a different statute, we conclude that its holding ex-
tends to § 924(c).
1
Section 922(g)(9), the statute at issue in Castleman, pro-
hibits anyone convicted of “a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence” from owning a frearm. As under § 924(c)'s ele-
ments clause, an offense qualifes under this provision if,
along with other criteria, it “has, as an element, the use . . .
of physical force.” § 921(a)(33)(A). The question presented
in Castleman was whether an offense for “ `intentionally or
knowingly caus[ing] bodily injury' ” met that description.
572 U. S., at 161. The District Court had held that it was
possible to commit the offense without the use of force, be-
cause the offense encompassed deceiving someone “ `into
drinking a poisoned beverage.' ” Id., at 170. We disagreed.
Our reasoning proceeded in two steps.
First, we found it “impossible to cause bodily injury with-
out applying force” in the sense relevant here. Ibid. (em-
phasis added). Section 922(g)(9), we held, encompasses the
kind and “degree of force that supports a common-law bat-
tery conviction.” Id., at 168. That “concept of `force' ” in-
cludes causing bodily harm indirectly, such as “ `by adminis-
tering a poison or by infecting with a disease, or even by
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LIGATTI v. UNITED STATES
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resort to some intangible substance,' such as a laser beam.”
Id
., at 170 (quoting 2 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law
§ 16.2(b) (2d ed. 2003)).
Second, we held that “the knowing or intentional applica-
tion of force is a `use' of force” under the provision in ques-
tion. 572 U. S., at 170 (emphasis added). A person uses
force in that sense when he makes force his “instrument,”
whether directly or indirectly. Id., at 170–171 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). So, for example, when a person
“sprinkles poison in a victim's drink,” he uses force by “em-
ploying poison knowingly as a device to cause physical
harm,” even though “the act of sprinkling ” does not it-
self involve force. Id., at 171 (alteration and internal quota-
tion marks omitted). Thus, whenever someone knowingly
causes physical harm, he uses force within the meaning of
§ 922(g)(9).
2
The log ic of Cast l em an extends to § 924(c). Both
§ 922(g)(9) and § 924(c) cover offenses involving the “use” of
“physical force.” To be sure, these two provisions arguably
use the term “physical force” to require different levels of
force—battery-level force for § 922(g)(9) and violent force for
§ 924(c).
3
But, because both battery-level force and violent
force may be applied indirectly, that difference is immate-
rial here.
In Castleman, Justice Scalia wrote an opinion concurring
in the judgment observing that deliberately causing injury
necessarily involves the use of both battery-level and vio-
lent force. The Castleman majority held that because of
§ 922(g)(9)'s particular focus on misdemeanor crimes of do-
3
We have never addressed the meaning of “physical force” in § 924(c)'s
elements clause. The parties, however, agree that the term refers to “vio-
lent force” as defned by Johnson v. United States, 559 U. S. 133, 140
(2010), rather than the battery-level force at issue in Castleman. See
Brief for Petitioner 19; Brief for United States 10. We assume without
deciding that interpretation.
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431
Opinion of the Court
mestic violence, the phrase “use of physical force” in that
st
atute requires only battery-level force, which can be satis-
fed by “ `even the slightest offensive touching.' ” Id., at
160–168. The majority thereby distinguished Johnson v.
United States, 559 U. S. 133 (2010), where this Court had
held that the same phrase in the elements clause of the
Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) required a higher
showing of “violent force—that is, the force capable of caus-
ing physical pain or injury to another person.” Id., at 140;
see 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Justice Scalia disagreed,
concluding that § 922(g)(9) requires violent force. Castle-
man, 572 U. S., at 175 (opinion concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment). But, he made clear that this point of
disagreement did not affect the outcome of that case. He
explained that intentionally or knowingly causing bodily in-
jury “categorically involves the use of `force capable of caus-
ing physical pain or injury to another person.' ” Ibid. (quot-
ing Johnson, 559 U. S., at 140). And, “for the reasons given
by the Court,” that is so even when the defendant “cause[s]
bodily injury through deceit or other nonviolent means.”
572 U. S., at 175, n. 1 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
4
Justice Scalia's view of violent force eventually garnered
a majority. In Stokeling v. United States, 586 U. S. 73
(2019), we held that violent force encompasses “the `force'
required for common-law robbery,” which is “the quintessen-
tial ACCA-predicate crime.” Id., at 80. Common-law rob-
bery requires only the force needed to overcome the victim's
4
In the course of explaining why he thought that § 922(g)(9) required
the use of violent force, Justice Scalia objected to the majority's reliance
on advocacy groups that broadly defned “domestic violence” to include,
among other things, acts that “humiliate,” “isolate,” “frighten,” or “blame”
someone, and acts “of omission.” Castleman, 572 U. S., at 181 (internal
quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). In this context, the phrase
“acts of omission” plainly is not limited to causing injury or death by
deliberate inaction. Justice Scalia's rejection of that defnition thus sheds
no light on the question presented in this case. Contra, post, at 449–450
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

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LIGATTI v. UNITED STATES
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slightest physical resistance, even if it results in “minimal
pai
n or injury.” Id., at 78, 83–84. Thus, although “ `the
merest touching ' ” is not violent force, any force that actually
causes injury or death is. Id., at 83 (quoting Johnson, 559
U. S., at 139). We therefore concluded in Stokeling that Jus-
tice Scalia's “understanding of `physical force' ” in Castleman
was “consistent with our holding.” 586 U. S., at 85.
By pegging “physical force” to robbery, Stokeling makes
clear that even the indirect causation of bodily harm requires
the use of violent force. This principle was well established
when Congress enacted § 924(c)'s elements clause in 1986.
100 Stat. 456–457. As one contemporaneous treatise put it,
“[ j]ust as battery may be committed by the administration
of poison, so the force used to obtain property from a person
against his will may be applied internally.” R. Perkins & R.
Boyce, Criminal Law 348 (3d ed. 1982) (footnote deleted); see
also People v. Dreas, 153 Cal. App. 3d 623, 627–629, 200 Cal.
Rptr. 586, 589 (1984); Carroll v. State, 440 So. 2d 343, 344–
345 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983); People v. Berryman, 43 Mich.
App. 366, 367–368, 204 N. W. 2d 238, 239 (1972); State v. Skil-
lings, 98 N. H. 203, 207, 97 A. 2d 202, 205 (1953); State v.
Snyder, 41 Nev. 453, 456–459, 172 P. 364, 364–365 (1918);
2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law
§ 8.11(d)(1), p. 447 (1986) (LaFave & Scott); 4 C. Torcia, Whar-
ton's Criminal Law § 479, p. 67 (14th ed. 1981) (Wharton).
Delligatti resists extending Castleman's logic to § 924(c).
He argues there cannot be an “automatic connection” be-
tween injury and the violent force § 924(c) requires because
even a small degree of force might injure an “eggshell” vic-
tim. Brief for Petitioner 37–38. But, as we held in Stoke-
ling, the minimal force needed to overcome the resistance of
“a feeble or weak-willed victim” still qualifes as suffciently
“violent” to fall within the statute's ambit. 586 U. S., at 83.
Delligatti also concedes that it is possible to use violent force
“indirectly,” Brief for Petitioner 7, as when a person tricks
another into eating food that has aged to the point of becom-

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Opinion of the Court
ing toxic, Tr. of Oral Arg. 17. Thus, the “knowing or inten-
ti
onal causation of bodily injury necessarily involves the use
of physical force” under § 924(c) just as it does under
§ 922(g)(9). Castleman, 572 U. S., at 169.
B
Castleman's logic forecloses Delligatti's challenge. Delib-
erately causing injury necessarily involves the use of force
in the sense relevant here. Under New York law, second-
degree murder requires proof that the defendant intention-
ally “cause[d] the death of another person.” N. Y. Penal
Law Ann. § 125.25(1). And, it should go without saying, in-
tentionally causing death counts as deliberately causing in-
jury. Thus, second-degree murder in New York—and, by
extension, Delligatti's VICAR offense premised on it—is a
crime of violence under § 924(c)'s elements clause.
Delligatti disagrees. He insists that New York second-
degree murder falls outside Castleman's rule because a per-
son can commit the offense through omission of a legal duty.
Steinberg, 79 N. Y. 2d, at 680, 595 N. E. 2d, at 847; supra, at
428. In such cases, Delligatti contends, the law may deem
the offender the cause of the victim's death through “legal
fction,” but that fction is not enough to make the person the
“actual cause.” Reply Brief 7. That is incorrect. We have
explained that the test for “actual causality” is whether the
victim's death “would not have occurred in the absence of—
that is, but for—the defendant's conduct.” Burrage v.
United States, 571 U. S. 204, 211 (2014) (internal quotation
marks omitted). When a young child starves to death after
his parents refuse to give him food, that harm would not
have occurred but for the parents' choice. Both in the eyes
of the law and as a practical matter, the parents' conduct is
no less a cause of the child's death than if the parents had
poisoned him.
Unable to escape Castleman's reach, Delligatti argues in
the alternative that its rule is unsound as applied to omis-
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sions. An offender who causes harm by omission, the the-
ory
goes, does not make “use” of physical force “against the
person . . . of another.” § 924(c)(3)(A). Again, we disagree.
It is perfectly natural to say that a person makes “use” of
something by deliberate inaction. A car owner, for exam-
ple, can “use” the rain to wash his vehicle simply by leaving
it parked on the street. And, a fugitive can “use” the cover
of darkness to hide by lying still at night. In the same way,
a mother who purposely kills her child by declining to inter-
vene when the child fnds bleach and starts drinking it makes
“use” of the bleach's poisonous properties to accomplish her
unlawful end. And, a husband who deliberately abandons
his wife to die in the cold “use[s] th[e] forces” of “the ele-
ments” to cause her death. Territory v. Manton, 7 Mont.
162, 168, 14 P. 637, 638–639 (1887). Delligatti's proposed
action-inaction distinction has no basis in ordinary meaning.
Similarly, we reject the argument that the phrase “against
another” excludes crimes of omission. At most, that phrase
requires that another person be “the conscious object” of the
force the offender uses. Borden v. United States, 593 U. S.
420, 430 (2021) (plurality opinion). Put differently, the lan-
guage “against another” specifes the required object of the
force (another person, rather than, say, an animal), and possi-
bly also the mens rea with which the object must be targeted
(knowingly or intentionally, rather than negligently or reck-
lessly). Id., at 430–434.
5
Whenever an offender deliber-
5
In Borden, this Court split evenly on the meaning of “against another”
in ACCA's elements clause. The four-Justice plurality held that the
phrase identifes the object of the force and limits the elements clause
to knowing or intentional wrongdoing. 593 U. S., at 430–434. The four-
Justice dissent held that the phrase only identifes the object. Id., at 454–
461 (opinion of Kavanaugh, J.). The author of this opinion supplied the
ffth vote for the holding that the elements clause requires at least know-
ing conduct, but did so for reasons unrelated to the meaning of “against
another.” Id., at 446 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). We express
no view on whether the phrase “against another” imports a mens rea
requirement, which is not necessary to resolve this case.
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435
Opinion of the Court
ately causes bodily harm by omission, he necessarily makes
another
person the conscious object of physical force. In the
bleach example, the mother's refusal to take away the bleach
is not an accident, but rather a deliberate effort to make the
child suffer the bleach's poisonous effects. The mother thus
uses force against her child. It would be passing strange
to say the mother used force to cause the child's death, but
did not use force against anyone.
Context also confrms that crimes of omission fall within
the elements clause. The elements clause is a defnition of
the term “crime of violence.” § 924(c)(3). When choosing
among interpretations of a statutory defnition, the “ordinary
meaning ” of the “defned term” is an important contex-
tual clue. Bond v. United States, 572 U. S. 844, 861 (2014).
Thus, we prefer interpretations of the elements clause
that encompass prototypical “crimes of violence” over those
that do not. See Stokeling, 586 U. S., at 81–82; Voisine v.
United States, 579 U. S. 686, 696 (2016); Castleman, 572 U. S.,
at 167.
Intentional murder is the prototypical “crime of violence,”
and it has long been understood to incorporate liability for
both act and omission. At the time of the elements clause's
enactment, it was widely accepted that one could commit
murder by refusing to perform a legal duty, like feeding one's
child. See, e. g., Lackey v. State, 246 Ga. 331, 331–332, 336,
271 S. E. 2d 478, 480–481, 483 (1980); State v. Nicholson, 585
P. 2d 60, 61–63 (Utah 1978) (per curiam); People v. Burden,
72 Cal. App. 3d 603, 616–619, 140 Cal. Rptr. 282, 289–291
(1977); Biddle v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 14, 20–21, 141 S. E.
2d 710, 714–715 (1965); State v. Shephard, 255 Iowa 1218,
1232–1235, 124 N. W. 2d 712, 720–722 (1963); 1 LaFave &
Scott § 3.3, at 282–283. As the Government notes, this view
had deep roots in the common law. See Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U. S. 261, 297 (1990) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (collecting authorities); Commonwealth v. Hall, 322
Mass. 523, 527–528, 78 N. E. 2d 644, 647 (1948) (same); 1 W.
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Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown § 8, p. 79 (1716); Brief for
U
nited States 23–26.
Moreover, murder was not the only violent crime that
States recognized could arise from omission. Knowingly
causing nonlethal injury to one's child by neglect, for exam-
ple, could amount to common-law battery. See, e. g., People
v. Bernard, 149 Ill. App. 3d 684, 693–695, 500 N. E. 2d 1074,
1079–1080 (1986); State v. Walden, 306 N. C. 466, 476, 293
S. E. 2d 780, 786–787 (1982); 1 LaFave & Scott § 3.3(e), at 294.
In 1986, at least 33 States had statutes generally defning
criminally culpable acts to include omission of a legal duty.
See Brief for United States 27–28, n. 3. Leading criminal-
law treatises similarly equated act and omission. 1 La-
Fave & Scott § 3.3, at 282–283; 1 Wharton § 25, at 116–120
(1978); see also ALI, Model Penal Code § 1.13(7), p. 209 (1985)
(“acted” “includes, where relevant, `omitted to act' ”).
Thus, we cannot adopt Delligatti's interpretation without
excluding traditional and widely accepted defnitions of mur-
der and other prototypical violent crimes from the elements
clause's reach. If the elements clause is to have a reasonable
relationship to the term it defnes, it must encompass cases
where the offender makes use of physical force by deliberate
inaction. To the extent any doubt remains that Congress
meant for the elements clause to cover crimes of omission,
the ordinary meaning of “crime of violence” resolves it.
Delligatti insists that his position—that murder is not a
crime of violence—is not as outlandish as it sounds. Con-
gress, he tells us, expected crimes like his to fall within the
now-defunct residual clause. See § 924(c)(3)(B) (covering of-
fenses that involve “a substantial risk that physical force . . .
may be used”). But, to say that killing someone involves a
“risk” of force is a gross understatement in ordinary speech,
rendering the residual clause at best an awkward ft. The
elements clause is thus the natural home for murder and
other prototypical violent crimes, and the unreasonableness
of excluding such crimes from the elements clause is an “ad-
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Opinion of the Court
ditional reason to read the statute as we do.” Castleman,
572
U. S., at 167.
C
The dissent's arguments fare no better than Delligatti's.
The dissent asserts that the use of physical force requires “a
violent or extreme physical act” rather than “mere touching
or pre-existing natural forces.” Post, at 442 (opinion of Gor-
such, J.). In other words, disagreeing with Justice Scalia,
the dissent maintains that many ways of causing bodily harm
indirectly, such as deceiving the victim or slipping poison
into his drink, do not involve the use of violent force. Ibid.,
n. 1; see Castleman, 572 U. S., at 175, n. 1 (opinion of Scalia,
J.). This view runs headlong into Stokeling's hold-
ing that violent force encompasses “the `force' required for
common-law robbery.” 586 U. S., at 80. Common-law rob-
bery is a crime that may be committed indirectly, supra, at
432, such as by slipping a sedative into the victim's coffee,
Dreas, 153 Cal. App. 3d, at 627, 200 Cal. Rptr., at 589. Thus,
no violent or extreme physical act is needed to use force
within the meaning of the elements clause. Not even Del-
ligatti disagrees with that basic proposition. See supra,
at 432–433.
The dissent suggests that, in any event, criminal statutes
do not cover omissions absent express language to that ef-
fect. Post, at 444–445. No such clear-statement rule ex-
ists. Many crimes “may be committed either by affrmative
action or by failure to act” even though they are not “specif-
cally so defned.” 1 LaFave & Scott § 3.3, at 282; see supra,
at 435–436. New York's second-degree murder statute is a
prime example. It prohibits intentionally “caus[ing] the
death of another person” without explicitly mentioning omis-
sions. N. Y. Penal Law Ann. § 125.25(1). But, because one
can cause death by omission, the statute covers omissions.
Supra, at 428. So too here, because one can make “use of
physical force” against another by omission, § 924(c)(3)(A),
the elements clause covers omissions.
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Nor do any of our precedents establish that, in the context
of
the elements clause, it is impossible to “use” force by omis-
sion. Contra, post, at 447. In Bailey v. United States, 516
U. S. 137 (1995), this Court explained that the word “use”
means “ `[t]o convert to one's service,' `to employ,' `to avail
oneself of,' and `to carry out a purpose or action by means
of.' ” Id., at 145. Thus, the “mere possession of a frearm”
during a crime does not amount to a “use” of the frearm
under § 924(c) if the wrongdoer does not employ the frearm
to accomplish his criminal end. Id., at 143; see also Voisine,
579 U. S., at 692–693, and n. 3 (reiterating Bailey's interpre-
tation of “use”); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 9 (2004)
(same). In contrast, a mother who lets her child drink
bleach because she wants him to die uses the force of the
bleach within the meaning of the elements clause because
she accomplishes her purpose by means of the bleach's harm-
ful effects. And, by targeting a particular individual, the
mother has taken a “specifc actio[n] against [a] specifc per-
so[n],” not merely “pose[d] an abstract risk to community
peace and order.” Taylor, 596 U. S., at 856. As a matter of
both text and precedent, deliberately causing injury or death
by omission is a use of physical force.
Finally, the dissent takes issue with our reliance on the
ordinary meaning of “crime of violence,” branding it an im-
permissible “resort to unexpressed legislative intentions.”
Post, at 452. To the contrary, we engage in the standard
task of reading a statutory defnition in light of the conven-
tional meaning of the term it defnes. “Since on this side of
the looking-glass an entirely artifcial defnition is rare, the
meaning of the defnition is almost always closely related to
the ordinary meaning of the word being defned.” A.
Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 228 (2012). Thus, when
the meaning of the elements clause “is not clear,” the ordi-
nary meaning of the term “crime of violence” is one of “the
most important” factors we can consider. Ibid.
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439
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
***
The
knowing or intentional causation of injury or death,
whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the use of
physical force against another person. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is affrmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Jackson joins,
dissenting.
Imagine a lifeguard perched on his chair at the beach who
spots a swimmer struggling against the waves. Instead of
leaping into action, the lifeguard chooses to settle back in his
chair, twirl his whistle, and watch the swimmer slip away.
The lifeguard may know that his inaction will cause death.
Perhaps the swimmer is the lifeguard's enemy and the life-
guard even wishes to see him die. Either way, the lifeguard
is a bad man. In many States, he may be guilty of a serious
crime for failing to fulfll his legal duty to help the swimmer.
But does the lifeguard's offense also qualify under 18 U. S. C.
§ 924(c)(3)(A) as a “crime of violence” involving the “use . . .
of physical force against the person . . . of another”? The
Court thinks so. I do not. Section 924(c)(3)(A) may reach
many crimes, but it does not reach crimes of omission.
I
A
As I see it, the Court reaches the wrong destination be-
cause it takes a wrong turn at the start. Our cases are re-
plete with reminders that, when faced with a question of
statutory interpretation, the text is where we must begin
(and often end). Today, however, the Court whistles past
the terms Congress gave us in § 924(c)(3)(A). Instead, it
chooses to begin (and largely end) its analysis of this case
with an examination of precedent and assumptions about

440 DEL
LIGATTI v. UNITED STATES
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
congressional purposes. Ante, at 429–437. I will get to
those
matters later. But frst, let's do what the Court does
not and look to the text.
Section 924(c)(1) imposes a sentencing enhancement on in-
dividuals who “us[e],” “carr[y],” or “posses[s]” frearms “dur-
ing and in relation to” a “crime of violence.” See ante, at
426. Section 924(c)(3)(A) then proceeds to defne the phrase
“crime of violence” as “an offense that is a felony and . . . has
as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person or property of another.”
Today, the Court reworks that defnition at the govern-
ment's request. Now, the Court says, a “crime of violence”
includes “the knowing or intentional causation of bodily in-
jury . . . by omission.” Ante, at 429. Under that approach,
the government admits, even our lifeguard, whose offense
stems from inaction, is guilty of a “crime of violence.” Tr.
of Oral Arg. 51. The only trouble is, nothing like the rule
the government proposes and the Court adopts appears any-
where in § 924(c).
To appreciate how unlikely the Court's new rule is, just
walk through the statute's key defnitional terms, beginning
with the word “use.” When Congress adopted the current
version of § 924(c) in 1984, the word “use” meant, as it does
today, “to employ,” “to convert to one's service,” or “to avail
one's self of.” Black's Law Dictionary 1381 (def. 1) (5th ed.
1979); see also Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dic-
tionary 2012 (def. 1) (2d ed. 1983) (similar). As this Court
has long recognized, “[t]hese various defnitions of `use' imply
action.” Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137, 145 (1995);
see also Voisine v. United States, 579 U. S. 686, 692–693, and
n. 3 (2016) (collecting cases). And because “use” has an “ac-
tive meaning,” one does not “use” something through mere
“inacti[on],” “inert[ia],” or “nonactiv[ity].” Bailey, 516 U. S.,
at 148–149.
What must a person actively employ to commit a crime
of v i olence? The st atute tel ls us: “physica l force. ”
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441
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
§ 924(c)(3)(A). That is, “[f]orce applied to the body; actual
v
iolence.” Black's Law Dictionary, at 1032. This Court ex-
plained as much in Johnson v. United States, 559 U. S. 133
(2010). There, the Court addressed the meaning of the
phrase “physical force” in the defnition of the term “violent
felony” in § 924(e). “[P]hysical force,” the Court held, does
not reach “emotional” or “intellectual” force. Id., at 138.
Nor does it carry its “specialized meaning in the feld of phys-
ics: a cause of the acceleration of mass.” Id., at 138–139.
So letting a pre-existing force of nature run its course does
not suffce. Instead, an individual must employ “[f]orce con-
sisting in a physical act.” Id., at 139.
The “physical act” must also be a violent one. Again, con-
sider Johnson. Because § 924(e) uses the phrase “physical
force” to defne what qualifes as a “violent felony,” the Court
in Johnson rejected the government's effort to equate the
“physical act” required by the statute with the kind of
“mer[e] touching ” suffcient to establish the common-law
crime of battery. Id., at 139. Resort to common-law bat-
tery principles in this statutory scheme, the Court reasoned,
would produce “a comical misft.” Id., at 145. Instead, the
Court ruled, the requisite “physical act” must be “violent,”
which is to say “extreme” and “severe.” Id., at 140. And
if that much follows when the phrase “physical force” is used
to defne a “violent felony” in § 924(e), surely the same must
hold true when the same phrase is used in the same section
of the U. S. Code to defne a “felony” “crime of violence.”
§ 924(c); see Azar v. Allina Health Services, 587 U. S. 566,
574 (2019).
Finally, the statute requires the use of force “against the
person or property of another.” Again addressing § 924(e),
a plurality of this Court has recognized that similar language
modifes the “volitional conduct (i. e., the use of force)” dis-
cussed in the statute, and in doing so identifes the “conscious
object” of a defendant's “use of physical force.” Borden v.
United States, 593 U. S. 420, 431 (2021). All of which sug-
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LIGATTI v. UNITED STATES
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
gests that the statute before us captures only active violent
force
when it is knowingly or intentionally applied against
the person or property of another. See id., at 431–432.
Putting these pieces together reveals the implausibility of
the Court's new rule. To commit a “crime of violence,” an
individual must (1) actively (not just through inertia) employ
(2) a violent or extreme physical act (not a mere touching or
pre-existing natural forces) (3) knowingly or intentionally to
harm another person or his property. An individual who, as
the Court puts it, “causes bodily injury by omission” does
not begin to meet these criteria. Ante, at 429. Someone
like our lifeguard may knowingly or intentionally cause an-
other's death by refusing to fulfll his legal duty to act. Ma-
liciously, he may choose to allow natural forces to take their
toll. But by remaining in his chair, he does not actively em-
ploy even the merest touching, let alone violent physical
force. Of course, crimes of omission like our lifeguard's are
serious ones that can invite serious punishments under vari-
ous state and federal laws. But § 924(c)(3)(A) was not writ-
ten to reach every felony found in our Nation's many criminal
codes. And the statute's terms simply cannot be stretched
to cover crimes of “inact[ion],” “inert[ia],” or “nonacti[vity].”
Bailey, 516 U. S., at 149.
1
1
Admittedly, trying to distinguish between acts and omissions can some-
time prove a tricky business. See, e. g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Co-
lumbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. 449, 469 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., concurring
in part); 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 3.2, p. 273
(1986) (LaFave & Scott). But as I read this statute, that is a distinction
Congress tasked us with drawing here. Nor is that the only line this
statute requires us to respect, for even when it comes to active crimes
§ 924(c)(3)(A) reaches only a subset of them. So imagine, for example, our
lifeguard, aware of deadly currents in the area, tricks a beachgoer into
the water with a promise about its safety. The lifeguard's deceit might
be an act rather than an omission, but his crime does not involve even a
mere touching, let alone the use of violent physical force this statute
demands.

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B
N
ot only does the Court fail to grapple with the statutory
text, it breezes past the next best evidence of statutory
meaning: context. As it turns out, several pieces of con-
textual evidence, all unmentioned by the Court, weigh
against the notion that a § 924(c)(3)(A) “crime of violence”
can include a crime of omission.
First, consider how informed readers understood the
phrase in 1981. When Congress frst considered defning
“crime of violence” to require the “use of physical force
against the person or property of another,” legislators recog-
nized that those terms would not reach omissions. S. Rep.
No. 97–307, p. 591 (1981). A Senate report explained that
the “operator of a dam [who] refuse[d] to open the foodgates
during a food, thereby placing the residents of an upstream
area in jeopardy of their lives” would not commit a “crime
of violence” since “he did not . . . use physical force.” Ibid.
Of course, “legislative history is not the law” and should not
be confused for it. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S.
497, 523 (2018). But the report supplies at least some evi-
dence that ordinary speakers at the time of § 924(c)(3)(A)'s
enactment understood the phrase “use . . . of physical force”
to exclude crimes of omission. See A. Scalia & B. Garner,
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 388 (2012)
(Scalia & Garner) (recognizing that courts may use legis-
lative history “for the purpose of establishing linguistic
usage”).
Second, analyzing “how particular combinations of words
are used in a vast database of English prose” can shed light
on how ordinary people understand statutory terms. See
Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 592 U. S. 395, 412 (2021) (Alito,
J., concurring in judgment). Just such a database—the Cor-
pus of Contemporary American English—contains “forty-
seven non-specialist instances of `use of physical force.' ”
United States v. Scott, 990 F. 3d 94, 129, n. 8 (CA2 2021)
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Gorsuch, J., dissenting
(en banc) (Menashi, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judg
ment). Of those references, “all refer to physical con-
tact; none plausibly refer to `deriv[ing] service from' a preex-
isting physical force.” Ibid. Thus the phrase “prototypi-
cally refers to assertive physical contact—`punches, kicks,
slaps[,] and body slams.' ” Id., at 129.
Third, any other interpretation introduces redundancy
into the statutory scheme. Section 924(c)(3) details two sep-
arate ways in which an offense may qualify as a “crime of
violence.” The frst, the focus of our attention, is found in
§ 924(c)(3)(A), or what is sometimes called the elements
clause. That provision addresses those felony offenses that
have “as an element the use . . . of physical force against
the person or property of another.” The second, found in
§ 924(c)(3)(B), or what is sometimes called the residual clause,
speaks to felony offenses that “by [their] nature, involv[e] a
substantial risk [of] physical force.” To the extent § 924(c)
might address omission offenses, the residual clause is their
natural home. It requires no active employment of physical
force, only a risk some such force might be deployed. Ex-
panding the elements clause to reach omission offenses, as
the Court does today, goes a long way toward rendering the
residual clause pointless. Perhaps the Court considers that
outcome a virtue, given that we have held the residual clause
unconstitutionally vague and thus unenforceable. United
States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445, 470 (2019). But conscripting
one subsection to do the work no longer performed by an-
other makes a hash of the separate and discrete provisions
that Congress enacted.
Finally, a look to the broader federal criminal code rein-
forces what the statutory text suggests. Congress has ex-
hibited no diffculty addressing omission crimes elsewhere,
mentioning them explicitly in dozens of provisions up and
down the U. S. Code. E. g., 18 U. S. C. § 13(a) (“act or omis-
sion” is punishable); § 542 (similar); § 1166(b) (similar); 28
U. S. C. § 1346( b)(1) (si mi lar). The fac t that Congress
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Gorsuch, J., dissenting
“knows exactly” how to reach omission offenses “when it
w
ishes” to do so, yet declined to mention them in 18 U. S. C.
§ 924(c)(3)(A), stands as one more piece of evidence yet that
the statute covers only offenses involving the active use of
force. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 596 U. S. 685, 704
(2022).
2
C
Where does (or should) all this leave us? To determine
whether a state offense qualifes as a crime of violence under
the elements clause, a court must assess whether the offense
“has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force” against another. § 924(c)(3)(A). That
assessment “does not require—in fact, it precludes—an in-
quiry into how any particular defendant may commit the
crime.” United States v. Taylor, 596 U. S. 845, 850 (2022).
Were it otherwise and a sentencing judge could fnd facts
about the defendant's underlying conduct, serious Sixth
Amendment questions might follow. See Erlinger v. United
States, 602 U. S. 821, 833 (2024).
Now apply the elements clause's test to the New York stat-
ute at issue before us. That law makes it a crime intention-
ally “to cause the death of another.” N. Y. Penal Law Ann.
§ 125.25(1) (West 2009); see also ante, at 428, and n. 2. Doubt-
less, New York's offense can be (and usually is) committed
by affrmative actions involving the use of violent physical
force. But, the parties agree, New York's offense can also
be committed by someone, like our lifeguard, who intention-
ally causes death by failing to fulfll a legal duty requiring
him to act. Brief for Petitioner 18; Brief for United States
8. In cases like that, prosecutors can prevail simply by
showing that a defendant did nothing when he had a legal
2
In recognizing that Congress's choice of words in other statutes might
inform the best reading of this one, I hew to familiar interpretive princi-
ples. See, e. g., Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U. S. 586, 595 (2010) (majority
opinion of Thomas, J.) (same reasoning). I do not, as the Court charges,
invent a “clear-statement rule” for crimes of omission. Ante, at 437.
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duty to do something. And because a defendant can be con-
v
icted of the crime without proof that he used, attempted to
use, or threatened to use physical force against anyone or
anything at all, New York's offense cannot qualify as a crime
of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A).
II
The Court chafes at this conclusion. It emphasizes that
Mr. Delligatti committed no mere crime of omission but in-
stead plotted to use active force against his victim. Ante, at
426–428. On that much, there is no room for dispute. But
neither is there room to dispute that § 924(c)(3)(A) focuses on
the elements of New York's offense, not the particulars of
Mr. Delligatti's crime. Some have criticized this feature of
the elements clause, and their voices “could hardly be
louder.” United States v. Harris, 87 F. 4th 195, 212, and
n. 25 (CA3 2023) (Jordan, J., concurring in denial of rehearing
en banc) (collecting criticisms). But no amount of wishful
thinking can change the nature of the inquiry that § 924(c)
(3)(A) demands. See Taylor, 596 U. S., at 850.
Ultimately, the Court acknowledges as much. For New
York's offense to qualify as a “crime of violence,” the Court
concedes, it must fnd some way to explain how committing
that offense by omission requires the government to prove,
as an element, the “use . . . of physical force.” Ante, at 428,
433. To get there, the Court appeals to precedent, ante, at
429–433, and implicit congressional purposes, ante, at 436.
But, unsurprisingly, our precedents do not require us to ig-
nore the statute's terms. And no amount of conjecture
about implicit congressional purposes can substitute for stat-
utory text.
Start with the Court's argument from precedent. The
Court asks us to believe that its hands are tied by United
States v. Castleman, 572 U. S. 157 (2014), and Stokeling v.
United States, 586 U. S. 73 (2019). Those two cases, the
Court insists, require us to conclude that knowingly or inten-
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tionally causing bodily injury by omission always “requires
the
use of force.” Ante, at 429. So, as the Court tells it,
even if the statute's terms might suggest a different result,
respect for stare decisis compels the conclusion that New
York's statute satisfes the elements clause. Ibid.
Notice, though, what's missing from the Court's account of
precedent. While training its attention on Castleman and
Stokeling, the Court neglects so many other relevant cases,
relegating them to little more than an afterthought. Ante,
at 438. Where is Bailey, and its holding that the term “use”
in § 924(c)(1) carries an “active meaning,” implying “action
and implementation,” not mere “inacti[on],” “inert[ia],” or
“nonactivit[y]”? 516 U. S., at 145–149. Where is our prece-
dent holding that the same word in the same law normally
carries the same meaning—indicating that the term “use” in
§ 924(c)(3)(A) should be read the same way? See Azar, 587
U. S., at 574. Where are our decisions in Leocal and Voi-
sine, interpreting “use” in other analogous contexts to mean
“active employment,” Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 9 (2004),
or “volitional conduct,” Voisine, 579 U. S., at 693? Where is
Johnson's conclusion that the term “physical force” in
§ 924(e) excludes “its specialized meaning in . . . physics,”
requires more than “the merest touching,” and cannot be
equated with the common law of battery? 559 U. S., at 138–
139. And where is Taylor's admission that a “crime of vio-
lence” under § 924(c) “[p]lainly . . . requires the government
to prove that the defendant took specifc actions against spe-
cifc persons or their property”? 596 U. S., at 856. Viewing
our precedents as a whole leaves little question about how
this case should come out. But, rather than engage with so
many inconvenient cases, the Court largely ignores them.
Even examined in isolation, the two decisions the Court
plucks out of the stack cannot begin to do the work the Court
seeks to impress upon them. Take Castleman frst. It in-
volved § 922(g), which prohibits anyone convicted of a “mis-
demeanor crime of domestic violence” from owning a frearm.
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By statute, Congress has defned the phrase “misdemeanor
cr
ime[s] of domestic violence” to reach certain offenses that
have “as an element, the . . . use of physical force.” § 921(a)
(33)(A)(ii). The question for the Court was whether a state
domestic-assault statute making it a crime to “intentionally
or knowingly caus[e] bodily injury” satisfed that defnition.
572 U. S., at 161. The Court held it did. Because § 922(g)(9)
focuses on misdemeanor crimes of violence, the Court rea-
soned, it requires no more “physical force” than that required
to establish a battery at common law—so “even the slightest
offensive touching ” will do. Ante, at 430–431 (quoting Cas-
tleman, 572 U. S., at 160–168). And, the Court held, the
state offense at issue met that standard because it required
proof of “force in the common-law sense.” Id., at 170.
Nothing in Castleman compels the conclusion that omis-
sion crimes involve “the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force” suffcient to implicate § 924(c)(3)(A).
Cf. ante, at 429–430. In fact, Castleman did not even dis-
cuss crimes of omission. And when the Court spoke of what
it means to “use physical force,” the Court spoke in active
terms, stressing that the “knowing or intentional applica-
tion of force is a `use' of force.” 572 U. S., at 170 (emphasis
added). To be sure, the Court observed that a defendant
may use physical force “indirectly, rather than directly.”
Id., at 170–171. So, the Court explained, when a defendant
“pull[s] the trigger on a gun,” the defendant uses physical
force even though the “bullet, not the trigger, . . . strikes
the victim.” Ibid. But from that, it does not follow that a
defendant “uses physical force” when he does nothing. Cf.
ante, at 429–433. Someone like our lifeguard stands worlds
away from a shooter who indirectly “uses” a frearm's explo-
sive force when he pulls the trigger.
To the extent Castleman has anything to say about our
case, it does more to hurt than to help the Court's cause. To
reach its holding that common-law battery informs the de-
gree of physical force required by § 922(g)(9), Castleman had

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449
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
to distinguish Johnson, where the Court held that the degree
of
force associated with common-law battery does not qualify
as the kind of “physical force” necessary to satisfy § 924(e).
559 U. S., at 140; see Part I–A, supra. To distinguish John-
son, Castleman stressed that § 922(g)(9) addresses “misde-
meanor crime[s] of domestic violence,” while § 924(e) focuses
on “violent felon[ies].” 572 U. S., at 163–164 (emphasis
added). That difference, the Court reasoned, indicates the
two statutes demand different degrees of force. Id., at 164.
Here, of course, we face a statute like § 924(e), one addressing
felony crimes of violence, not mere misdemeanors. And if,
as Johnson held and Castleman recognized, a mere touching
is insuffcient to satisfy § 924(e)'s “physical force” require-
ment, it is hard to imagine how complete inaction might ft
the bill under § 924(c)(3)(A).
With nothing in the Castleman majority opinion to help it,
the Court eventually turns to Justice Scalia's solo concur-
rence. Ante, at 430–432. There, he rejected the majority's
suggestion that a slight touching qualifes as the “use of
physical force” even under § 922(g). 572 U. S., at 173–175
(opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
The common-law battery standard, he said, plays no role in
a statute that does not reference it. Id., at 176. Instead,
the author of Johnson explained that he read the phrase
“physical force” in both § 922(g) and § 924(e) to mean what
Johnson said it means: “violent force—that is, force capable
of causing physical pain or injury.” 572 U. S., at 174 (quot-
ing Johnson, 559 U. S., at 140; emphasis deleted). Even so,
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment because the state
statute at issue in Castleman required proof that the defend-
ant “cause[d] bodily injury,” and, in his view, “it is impossible
to cause bodily injury” without employing the kind of violent
force Johnson discussed. 572 U. S., at 174.
That syllogism is of no use to the Court here. Justice
Scalia may have claimed that a defendant whose actions
cause bodily injury necessarily uses violent physical force.
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Gorsuch, J., dissenting
Ibid. But he did not claim that a defendant whose failure to
ac
t causes bodily injury also necessarily uses violent physical
force. Quite the opposite. “[N]onphysical conduct” like
“acts of omission,” Justice Scalia said, cannot “possibly be
relevant to the meaning of a statute requiring `physical
force.' ” Id., at 181 (emphasis deleted; some internal quota-
tion marks omitted). By rejecting the notion that omissions
resulting in bodily injury can give rise to liability under stat-
utes like the one before us, Justice Scalia stuck to his view
in Johnson that the phrase “use . . . of physical force” cap-
tures only “ `a category of violent, active crimes.' ” 559
U. S., at 140 (quoting Leocal, 543 U. S., at 11; emphasis
added). And it is a view directly at odds with the Court's
decision today.
Finding Castleman a dry hole, the Court prospects Stoke-
ling. Ante, at 431–432. But the Court does so only briefy,
and understandably so. Stokeling held that the phrase
“physical force” in § 924(e) “includes the amount of force nec-
essary to overcome a [robbery] victim's resistance.” 586
U. S., at 87. That amount of force, the Court explained, does
not encompass “the merest touching,” id., at 83, or simply
“snatching of property from another,” id., at 86, but requires
more “physical contact,” id., at 83. How any of that helps
the Court today mystifes. Our case does not present a
question about robbery or purse snatching, and nothing in
Stokeling begins to address the question whether a crime of
omission entails the “use . . . of physical force.” More than
that, Stokeling's statements about the degree of force re-
quired to satisfy § 924(e) indicate that something beyond
mere inaction is required.
3
3
Later in its opinion, the Court returns to Stokeling and suggests it
means that any force actively but “indirectly” applied to another—such
as robbing an individual after “slipping a sedative into [his] coffee”—
qualifes as the use of violent physical force if it results in some bodily
injury. Ante, at 437. But Stokeling said nothing of the kind. It did not
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451
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
III
U
nable to ground its decision in precedent, the Court re-
treats, at the tail end of its opinion, to an argument about
statutory purpose. Ante, at 435–436. The argument runs
this way. The Court observes that some notable crimes at
common law, including murder and battery, required prose-
cutors to prove only that the defendant, with a particular
mens rea, caused a particular result (e. g., death or bodily
injury), whether by affrmative action or by failing to fulfll
a legal duty that required him to act. Offenses like that are
sometimes called “cause and result” crimes. See 1 La-
Fave & Scott § 3.3, at 283, 293–294. Many contemporary
statutes, the New York murder statute before us among
them, follow this common-law pattern. And, on the Court's
theory, if § 924(c)(3)(A) failed to reach signifcant cause-and-
result crimes like murder and battery simply because they
can be committed by omission as well as by act, the statute
wou ld not adequately serve its pur pose of addressi ng
“crimes of violence.” Ante, at 435–436. I am not blind to
the appeal of the argument, but I fnd it unpersuasive for a
couple reasons.
discuss “indirect” applications of force, sedatives—or coffee. Instead,
that decision addressed a state robbery statute demanding proof, as an
element, that the offender's “physical force” overcame “resistance by the
victim.” 586 U. S., at 76 (internal quotation marks omitted). And that
offense, the Court held, falls within the “category of violent, active crimes”
embraced by § 924(e). Id., at 83. Nor could Stokeling have sensibly said
what the Court now supposes. The truth is that some acts involve the
use of violent physical force and others do not, regardless whether those
acts directly or indirectly cause bodily injury. So, as we have seen, pull-
ing the trigger of a gun involves the indirect application of violent physical
force. Supra, at 448. But that hardly means pulling the trigger of a nerf
gun, using the force of the coiled spring to expel a projectile, does too—
even if striking someone with it causes a bodily injury. In any event,
whatever Stokeling did (or did not) say about crimes involving the active
but indirect application of force, it said precisely nothing about crimes of
omission where the defendant does nothing at all.
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A
F
or one thing, there can be little doubt about what the
argument is: a resort to unexpressed legislative intentions.
Congress, the Court insists, could not possibly have used the
phrase “crime of violence” in § 924(c)(3)(A) without intending
to capture “prototypical” cause-and-result crimes, like mur-
der and battery, long recognized at common law. See ante,
at 436.
We have no business entertaining an argument like that.
In § 924(c)(3)(A), Congress did not ask us to plumb the legis-
lative mind or to do whatever it takes to ensure the statute
reaches certain cause-and-result crimes familiar to the com-
mon law. Instead, Congress told us exactly what qualifes
as a “crime of violence” for purposes of this law: an offense
that has “as an element” the “use, attempted use, or threat-
ened use of physical force.” § 924(c)(3)(A). And, as this
Court has often explained, when Congress takes the trouble
to supply an express defnition, we are obliged to treat it
as “virtually conclusive,” even—and perhaps especially—if it
“varies” from what we might otherwise understand (or wish)
the defnition to be. See Department of Agriculture Rural
Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz, 601 U. S. 42,
59 (2024); Scalia & Garner 228 (“It is very rare that a defned
meaning can be replaced with another permissible meaning
of the word . . . ”).
The Court offers no persuasive answer to any of this. To
be sure, the Court protests that it merely seeks to give voice
to the “conventional meaning ” of the phrase “crime of
violence.” Ante, at 438. But the Court's focus on that
phrase in isolation, followed by an insistence that it must
capture common-law cause-and-result crimes like murder
and battery—all without any serious attention to the express
defnition Congress gave us or so much contextual evidence
about its meaning—leaves little room for doubt that purpose,
not text, is in the driver's seat today.
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as: 604 U. S. 423 (2025)
453
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
In saying that much, I do not mean to suggest courts may
ne
ver look to the common law to inform statutory text.
Sometimes, courts properly consider the common law when
interpreting a term of art Congress has adapted from that
“old soil.” See, e. g., Sekhar v. United States, 570 U. S. 729,
733 (2013). And, yes, we may sometimes resort to the com-
mon law when a statute leaves a gap (say, by failing to supply
a burden of proof or the requisite mens rea). See, e. g., Mor-
issette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 262 (1952).
The trouble is, we have nothing like that here. Before us
is an express statutory defnition that bears no resemblance
to traditional common-law terms and leaves no gap to fll.
The Court does not claim otherwise. Nor could it, for we
have been down this road before. In Johnson, the govern-
ment asked this Court to draw from common-law liability
principles to inform parallel statutory language in § 924(e).
The Court refused that request because it threatened to gen-
erate only a “comical misft.” 559 U. S., at 145; see also Cas-
tleman, 572 U. S., at 175 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (“expansive
common-law” principles cannot displace the “statutory text”
of § 924(e)).
The same holds true here. By looking to the common law
today, the Court produces a serious misft. At common law,
an omission could give rise to liability for a cause-and-result
crime only if the defendant had a well-defned legal duty to
act (think of a doctor's duty to his patient, or a father's duty
to his child). See 1 LaFave & Scott § 3.3, at 283. Yet the
Court's reading of § 924(c)(3)(A) renders the presence of a
legal duty irrelevant—as the Court sees it, knowingly or in-
tentionally causing bodily injury by failing to act is always
a “crime of violence.” Ante, at 429. In the name of revis-
ing this statute to better track common-law cause-and-result
crimes, then, the Court (ironically) expands the frontiers of
criminal liability in ways utterly unknown to the common
law.

454 DEL
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Gorsuch, J., dissenting
Along the way, the Court hands us another misft, too, this
one
having to do with our own precedents. In Johnson, the
government asked the Court to read the phrase “physical
force” in a statute addressing “violent felon[ies]” to reach
mere touchings consistent with the common law of battery.
See 559 U. S., at 140. Here, the government goes a step
further, asking us to read the phrase “physical force” in a
statute addressing “felony” “crimes of violence” to embrace
common-law cause-and-result crimes (including battery)
where not even a mere touching is required. How the Court
might reject the frst request and indulge the second poses
quite the puzzle. If there is some way to reconcile today's
decision with Johnson, the Court never explains what it
might be.
B
Not only do we have no business guessing about unex-
pressed legislative intentions. Even were we to play that
game, the Court's intuition that Congress must have wanted
§ 924(c)(3)(A) to reach “prototypical” cause-and-result crimes
might well be wrong.
Consider a little more closely the concern the Court asks
us to ascribe to Congress. The Court cannot really suppose
that Congress wanted us to ensure that cause-and-result
crimes committed by omission qualify as “crimes of violence”
under § 924(c)(3)(A). After all, omission offenses would trig-
ger a sentencing enhancement under § 924(c)(1) only in the
most unusual circumstances. Just ask yourself: How would
our spiteful lifeguard “us[e],” “carr[y],” or “posses[s]” a fre-
ar m dur i ng and i n relati on to h is cr i me of i nac ti on?
§ 924(c)(1)(A).
Really, the Court's argument must rest on a different as-
sumption. It must rest on a view that Congress implicitly
wanted § 924(c)(1)'s sentencing enhancements to apply to
cause-and-effect crimes, like Mr. Delligatti's, where an indi-
vidual uses, carries, or possesses a gun to commit a violent
act that causes bodily injury. Ante, at 435–436. To ensure
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455
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
that § 924(c)(1) does its intended job of reaching those “proto-
ty
pical” crimes of violence, the Court goes big. It asks us to
accept the (implausible) notion that cause-and-result crimes
resulting in bodily injury always, even when committed by
omission, require the government to prove as an element “the
use . . . of physical force.” § 924(c)(3)(A); ante, at 435–436.
But even if Congress implicitly wanted § 924(c)(1)'s sen-
tencing enhancements to reach cause-and-result crimes that
are committed by act and cause bodily harm, there is no rea-
son to suppose Congress wanted us to mangle § 924(c)(3)(A)
to get the job done. Recall that § 924(c)(1)'s sentencing
enhancements apply to a “crime of violence” as that phrase
is defi ned e i th e r i n the elements clause before us
(§ 924(c)(3)(A)) or in the residual clause (§ 924(c)(3)(B)). See
Part I–C, supra. By its terms, the latter clause “sweeps
more broadly.” Davis, 588 U. S., at 467 (internal quotation
marks omitted). It does not require an examination of the
elements the government must prove to secure a conviction,
let alone demand that those elements require proof of the
use of physical force. Instead, the residual clause reaches
offenses that, in “ordinary” cases, pose a “risk of physical
injury.” Id., at 452 (quoting § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)). And Con-
gress might well have thought the residual clause the more
natural home for cause-and-result crimes like murder and
battery, for even if those offenses do not require the govern-
ment to prove as an element the use of physical force, as
committed those offenses typically involve physical force
(and certainly the risk of it).
Equally, Congress might have had another idea in mind.
Maybe Congress did not mean for § 924(c)(1) to reach all
murder and battery offenses. Maybe Congress wanted
§ 924(c)(1) to reach only those murder and battery offenses
that require the government to prove, as an element, the use
of physical force—or that, by their nature, involve a substan-
tial risk of such force. After all, States write their criminal
laws in different ways. And, doubtless, some states draft
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456 DEL
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some murder and battery statutes to focus on the degree of
force
a defendant uses, not just the result he brings about.
Maybe Congress homed in on offenses like that, not all mur-
der and battery crimes, because it thought those offenses
especially deserving of additional punishment. See, e. g., 18
U. S. C. § 1111(a) (murder involving the torture of a child).
That possibi l ity seems a l l the more l ikely because
§ 924(c)(1)'s enhancements are not the be-all and end-all of
federal sentencing. Even when § 924(c)(1)'s enhancements
do not apply, sentencing courts enjoy ample tools to ensure
a defendant's punishment fts his crime. And that's nowhere
truer than when it comes to those who commit serious
crimes like murder and battery. In this respect, Mr. Delli-
gatti's case is illustrative. The district court sentenced him
to 25 years in prison—20 years for his offenses related to
attempted murder, plus 5 additional years under § 924(c).
See Judgment in No. 15–491 (SDNY, Aug. 20, 2018), ECF
Doc. 729, p. 3. But even without a § 924(c) enhancement,
the advisory guidelines suggested, and the judge was free to
impose, a sentence of up to 28 years. See Sentencing Sub-
mission for United States, ECF Doc. 712, at 10–14; accord,
App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. The judge, too, was free to
depart or vary from the recommended guidelines range to
impose an even harsher sentence had she deemed it appro-
priate. See 18 U. S. C. § 3553(b).
Nor would recognizing that § 924(c)(3)(A) fails to reach
Mr. Delligatti's offense guarantee him some windfall. Doing
so would leave the district court free, on remand, to impose
exactly the same sentence it did the frst time around, or
maybe even a harsher one yet. See Dean v. United States,
581 U. S. 62, 69 (2017). Nothing about Mr. Delligatti's case
is unique either. With or without a § 924(c)(1) enhancement,
those convicted of serious offenses in our federal criminal
justice system routinely face serious sentences and judges
amply equipped with the means to issue them.
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457
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
*
In
the end, the Court's decision today comes up short on
every count. It neglects § 924(c)(3)(A)'s defnitional terms
and their ordinary meaning. It ignores important contex-
tual clues. It leans heavily on only two, ultimately unhelp-
ful, precedents without addressing others. And it resorts
to conjecture about implicit congressional purposes that is
unconvincing on its own terms. To my mind, none of the
Court's arguments can overcome the hard fact that crimes of
omission do not involve the “use . . . of physical force against
another.” Individuals like our lifeguard who commit of-
fenses by omission may face punishment under many other
criminal laws, but § 924(c)(3)(A) does not reach them. Even
if a reasonable doubt remained about that common-sense
conclusion (I confess I harbor none), the rule of lenity would
require us to reach the same result anyway. See Bittner v.
United States, 598 U. S. 85, 101 (2023) (opinion of Gor-
such, J.). For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
p. 456, line 3: “honed” is changed to “homed”
p. 457, line 2 from bottom: “(opinion of Gorsuch, J.)” is inserted after
“(2023)”