Williams v. Reed

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 604 U. S. Part 1
Pages 168–191
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
February 21, 2025
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
Page Proof Pending Publication
N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

Page Proof Pending Publication
168 OCTOBER
TERM, 2024
Syllabus
WILLIAMS et al. v. REED, ALABAMA SECRETARY
OF
WORKFORCE
certiorari to the supreme court of alabama
No. 23–191. Argued October 7, 2024—Decided February 21, 2025
Petitioners are unemployed workers who contend that the Alabama De-
partment of Labor unlawfully delayed processing their state unemploy-
ment benefts claims. They sued the Alabama Secretary of Labor in
state court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, raising due process and federal stat-
utory arguments and seeking a court order requiring the Department
to process their claims more quickly. The Secretary moved to dismiss
on several grounds, including that the state trial court lacked juris-
diction because the claimants had not satisfed the relevant statute's
strict administrative-exhaustion requirement. See Ala. Code § 25–4–95.
The state trial court granted the Secretary's motion and dismissed the
complaint, leaving the claimants in a catch-22—unable to sue to obtain
an order expediting the administrative process because they had not yet
completed the process allegedly being delayed. The Alabama Supreme
Court affrmed on failure-to-exhaust grounds, concluding that § 1983 did
not preempt the State's administrative-exhaustion requirement.
Held: Where a state court's application of a state exhaustion requirement
in effect immunizes state offcials from § 1983 claims challenging delays
in the administrative process, state courts may not deny those § 1983
claims on failure-to-exhaust grounds. Pp. 173–179.
(a) “[A] state law that immunizes government conduct otherwise sub-
ject to suit under § 1983 is pre-empted, even where the federal civil
rights litigation takes place in state court.” Felder v. Casey, 487 U. S.
131, 139. Thus, in Howlett v. Rose, this Court held that § 1983 pre-
empted a Florida rule extending the State's sovereign immunity from
§ 1983 suits “to municipalities, counties, and school districts” because it
in effect afforded immunity from certain § 1983 claims. 496 U. S. 356,
366. And in Haywood v. Drown, the Court held that a New York stat-
ute designed to shield correction offcers from damages claims by prison-
ers was preempted by § 1983. 556 U. S. 729. Pp. 174–175.
(b) Under Alabama's exhaustion requirement, state courts cannot
review claims of unlawful delays under § 1983 unless and until the claim-
ants frst complete the administrative process and receive a fnal decision
on their claims. Such a requirement operates to immunize state offcials
from a narrow class of claims brought under § 1983. Under this Court's
precedents, Alabama cannot apply such an immunity rule. Pp. 175–176.

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 168 (2025)
169
Syllabus
(c) According to the Secretary, the jurisdictional nature of Alabama's
exhausti
on provision distinguishes it from the state rules at issue in
Haywood and Howlett. But this Court's precedents have not treated
the jurisdictional label of state rules as dispositive when state rules
functionally immunize defendants from a class of § 1983 claims in state
court. In Haywood, for example, the Court stated that the jurisdic-
tional status of New York's rule did not insulate it from preemption.
556 U. S., at 739–742.
Next, the Secretary suggests that any delays in the state administra-
tive process can be cured by claimants' seeking a writ of mandamus
from the state courts to compel the Department to act more quickly. It
is not evident, however, that mandamus is available to the claimants
here. In any event, the Secretary's argument is simply another way of
saying that the claimant must go through the state process before suing
under § 1983 to challenge any delays in that process. Just as Alabama
may not force plaintiffs to complete the state administrative process
before plaintiffs may sue under § 1983 to challenge allegedly unlawful
delays, the State may not force plaintiffs to seek mandamus before
bringing those claims. Pp. 176–178.
387 So. 3d 138, reversed and remanded.
Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., fled
a dissenting opinion, in which Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett, JJ., joined
as to Part II, post, p. 179.
Adam G. Unikowsky argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the briefs were Arjun R. Ramamurti, Michael
Forton, Lawrence Gardella, Farah Majid, Chisolm Allen-
lundy, David A. Strauss, and Sarah M. Konsky
Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., Solicitor General of Alabama, ar-
gued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were
Steve Marshall, Attorney General, Robert M. Overing, Dep-
uty Solicitor General, Dylan Mauldin, Assistant Solicitor
General, and Brenton M. Smith, Assistant Attorney
General.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America by Steven A. Engel, Michael
H. McGinley, Brian A. Kulp, and Jonathan D. Urick; for the Constitu-
tional Accountability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod,
Page Proof Pending Publication

170 WIL
LIAMS v. REED
Opinion of the Court
Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court.
S
evera l unemployed workers i n Alabama appl ied for
unemployment benefts from the State. In their view, the
Alabama Department of Labor has unlawfully delayed the
processing of their benefts claims. So the claimants sued
the Alabama Secretary of Labor in state court under 42
U. S. C. § 1983, raising due process and federal statutory ar-
guments and seeking a court order requiring the Depart-
ment to process their claims more quickly. The Alabama
Supreme Court ruled that the claimants could not sue under
§ 1983 to challenge delays in the administrative process until
the claimants completed that process. But that ruling cre-
ated a catch-22: Because the claimants cannot sue until they
complete the administrative process, they can never sue
under § 1983 to obtain an order expediting the administrative
process. This Court's precedents do not permit States to
immunize state offcials from § 1983 suits in that way. See
Haywood v. Drown, 556 U. S. 729 (2009); Howlett v. Rose, 496
U. S. 356 (1990). On that narrow ground, we reverse.
I
A
The State of Alabama grants monetary benefts to unem-
ployed claimants who meet certain eligibility criteria. See
and Brian R. Frazelle; for the Islam and Religious Freedom Action Team
et al. by Brian P. Morrissey and Nicholas R. Reaves; for the National
Health Law Program et al. by Theresa M. Sprain; and for Public Citizen
et al. by Wendy Liu, Allison M. Zieve, and David D. Cole.
A brief of amici curiae urging affrmance was fled for the State of
Tennessee et al. by Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General of Tennessee, J.
Matthew Rice, Solicitor General, and Gabriel Krimm, Assistant Solicitor
General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as fol-
lows: Raúl R. Labrador of Idaho, Theodore E. Rokita of Indiana, Brenna
Bird of Iowa, Kris W. Kobach of Kansas, Liz Murrill of Louisiana, Lynn
Fitch of Mississippi, Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, Drew H. Wrigley of
North Dakota, Dave Yost of Ohio, Michelle A. Henry of Pennsylvania;
Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Marty J. Jackley of South Dakota, Ken
Paxton of Texas, Sean D. Reyes of Utah, and Patrick Morrisey of West
Virginia.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 604 U. S. 168 (2025)
171
Opinion of the Court
Ala. Code § 25–4–90 et seq. (2016); Ala. Admin. Code, ch. 480–
4
–3 (Supp. 2019). To obtain unemployment benefts, a
claimant frst must apply to the Alabama Department of
Labor “in accordance with such general rules as the secre-
tary may prescribe.” Ala. Code § 25–4–90.
1
After receiv-
ing an application, the Department, through an examiner
designated by the Secretary, must “promptly” make a “de-
termination” on the claim. § 25–4–91(a). The Department
also must “promptly” notify the claimant of the determina-
tion, generally by mailing a notice to his or her last known
address. § 25–4–91(c)(1). The relevant statutory provi-
sions do not defne “promptly.”
A claimant who wants to appeal an adverse determination
must, within 7 days of the delivery of the notice or 15 days of
the mailing of the notice, seek review by an appeals tribunal.
§ 25–4–91(d). That tribunal consists of a Department em-
ployee who is appointed by the Secretary. § 25–4–92(a).
The tribunal must “hear and decide disputed claims and
other due process cases” related to benefts claims. Ibid.
And the tribunal must “promptly” hold a hearing. Ala.
Admin. Code Rule 480–1–4–.09(2). The tribunal must then
decide the appeal “within 30 days” of the hearing. Ala.
Admin. Code Rule 480–1–4–.11(1).
A claimant who loses before the appeals tribunal may seek
discretionary review before the Department's Board of Ap-
peals, which is composed of three members appointed by the
Governor. Ala. Code § 25–2–12. A claimant must seek re-
view within 15 days from the date when the appeals tribu-
nal's decision was mailed to the claimant. § 25–4–92(c). If
the Board of Appeals does not grant review within 10 days of
the claimant's fling, then the decision of the appeals tribunal
becomes fnal. § 25–4–94(b).
1
During this litigation, Alabama changed the name of its Department of
Labor to the Department of Workforce, and Greg Reed, Alabama's frst
Secretary of Workforce, was substituted as the respondent. See 2024 Ala.
Acts no. 2024–115. Like the parties' briefng, we refer to the Secretary
and the Department by their titles when this suit was fled.

172 WIL
LIAMS v. REED
Opinion of the Court
After the Board of Appeals denies review, fails to grant
re
view within the 10-day period, or grants review and issues
an adverse decision, the claimant may then challenge the de-
nial of benefts in Alabama state court. § 25–4–95. But not
until then. The Alabama law setting forth these procedures
includes a strict exhaustion requirement, which provides:
“No circuit court shall permit an appeal from a decision
allowing or disallowing a claim for benefts unless the
decision sought to be reviewed is that of an appeals tri-
bunal or of the board of appeals and unless the person
fling such appeal has exhausted his administrative rem-
edies as provided by this chapter.” Ibid.
That statutory procedure “shall be exclusive.” § 25–4–96.
On its face, the State's exhaustion requirement prevents
claimants from challenging adverse benefts determinations
in state court, including in suits brought under § 1983, until
the Board of Appeals has completed or denied review.
B
In this case, 21 Alabama claimants applied for unemploy-
ment benefts. They contend that the Department, in vari-
ous ways, has unlawfully delayed the processing of their ben-
efts claims. For example, plaintiff Derek Bateman alleges
that he attempted to appeal his claim to an appeals tribunal.
But according to Bateman, the Department never scheduled
a hearing or otherwise acted on his appeal, even after he
attempted to follow up by email and phone calls numerous
times.
The 21 claimants sued the Secretary of Labor in his offcial
capacity in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Ala-
bama. Invoking 42 U. S. C. § 1983, they asserted among
other things that the Department's delays in processing their
benefts claims violated the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and the Social Security Act of 1935.
The claimants did not ask the court to rule that they were
entitled to unemployment benefts. Rather, they simply
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 168 (2025)
173
Opinion of the Court
asked the court to order the Department to promptly ad-
dress
their benefts claims. As relevant here, the claimants
sought a court order requiring the Department to: (1) “issue
an initial nonmonetary decision within the next ten days to
every plaintiff who has not yet received a decision”; (2) “pro-
vide within ten days a hearing date for each of the plaintiffs
who [has] requested a hearing ”; (3) schedule such hearings
for a date not later than 90 days after the request for the
hearing; and (4) pay every approved claim within two days
of the date of approval. App. 42–43.
The Secretary moved to dismiss the complaint on several
grounds. The Secretary argued, among other things, that
the state trial court lacked jurisdiction because the claimants
had not satisfed the administrative-exhaustion requirement
in Alabama Code § 25–4–95. The court granted the Secre-
tary's motion and dismissed the complaint.
The claimants appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court.
That court affrmed on failure-to-exhaust grounds. Johnson
v. Washington, 387 So. 3d 138, 144 (Ala. 2023). The court
concluded that under this Court's precedents, § 1983 did not
preempt the State's administrative-exhaustion requirement.
Id., at 143–144.
Justice Cook dissented. He reasoned that under this
Court's § 1983 precedents, the State could not bar a suit chal-
lenging the Department's delays in making a determination
on a benefts claim. Id., at 146–150.
This Court granted certiorari. 601 U. S. 994 (2024).
II
The Secretary argues that Alabama's exhaustion require-
ment constitutes a “neutral rule of judicial administration”
and that the Alabama Supreme Court permissibly applied
that statutory rule to bar the claimants' § 1983 suit in state
court. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U. S. 729, 738 (2009). The
claimants respond that Alabama may not preclude § 1983
suits on failure-to-exhaust grounds when, as here, plaintiffs
Page Proof Pending Publication

174 WIL
LIAMS v. REED
Opinion of the Court
challenge the Department's delays in processing their claims.
Other
wise, they say, Alabama's rule would create a catch-22
preventing adjudication of, and in effect immunizing state
offcials from, this narrow category of § 1983 claims about
delays in the administrative process.
2
In light of this Court's precedents, we agree with the
claimants. In the unusual circumstances presented here—
where a state court's application of a state exhaustion re-
quirement in effect immunizes state offcials from § 1983
claims challenging delays in the administrative process—
state courts may not deny those § 1983 claims on failure-to-
exhaust grounds.
A
This Court has long held that “a state law that immunizes
government conduct otherwise subject to suit under § 1983
is pre-empted, even where the federal civil rights litigation
takes place in state court.” Felder v. Casey, 487 U. S. 131,
139 (1988). As the Court has explained, States possess “no
authority to override” Congress's “decision to subject state”
offcials “to liability for violations of federal rights.” Id., at
143. That principle bars any state rule immunizing state
offcials from a “particular species” of federal claims, even if
the immunity rule is “cloaked in jurisdictional garb.” Hay-
wood, 556 U. S., at 739, 742.
In Howlett v. Rose, for example, the Court analyzed a Flor-
ida rule extending the State's sovereign immunity from
§ 1983 suits “not only to the State and its arms but also to
municipalities, counties, and school districts that might oth-
erwise be subject to suit under § 1983.” 496 U. S. 356, 365–
366 (1990). This Court held that § 1983 preempted Florida's
rule because the rule in effect afforded immunity from cer-
tain § 1983 claims. Id., at 375–378.
2
The claimants also contend, more broadly, that this Court's § 1983 prec-
edents—especially Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U. S. 496 (1982),
and Felder v. Casey, 487 U. S. 131 (1988)—categorically bar both federal
and state courts from applying state administrative-exhaustion require-
ments to § 1983 claims. We need not address that broader argument.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 168 (2025)
175
Opinion of the Court
And in Haywood v. Drown, the Court addressed a New
Y
ork statute depriving state courts of jurisdiction over
claims by prisoners seeking damages against state correc-
tional offcers. See 556 U. S., at 733–734. The Court reiter-
ated that States “lack authority to nullify a federal right or
cause of action they believe is inconsistent with their local
policies.” Id., at 736. In violation of that principle, New
York in essence had created “an immunity defense” for cor-
rectional offcers when those offcers were sued under § 1983
in state court. Id., at 736–737, n. 5, 742. The Haywood
Court held that “the unique scheme adopted by the State
of New York—a law designed to shield a particular class of
defendants (correction offcers) from a particular type of lia-
bility (damages) brought by a particular class of plaintiffs
(prisoners)”—was preempted by § 1983. Id., at 741–742.
3
B
Here, the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the State's
exhaustion requirement applies to “procedural challenges re-
lated to the administration of unemployment-compensation
benefts in addition to substantive challenges regarding the
decision to award (or not award) those benefts.” Johnson
v. Washington, 387 So. 3d 138, 143 (2023). And it concluded
that the universe of “procedural challenges” requiring ex-
haustion includes § 1983 suits alleging that the Department
is unlawfully delaying the processing of benefts claims.
Alabama's exhaustion requirement operates to immunize
state offcials from a narrow class of claims brought under
§ 1983—namely, claims of unlawful delay in the administra-
tive process. Under Alabama's exhaustion requirement,
state courts cannot review claims of unlawful delays under
3
In Haywood, the Court declined to address “whether Congress may
compel a State to offer a forum, otherwise unavailable under state law, to
hear suits brought pursuant to § 1983.” 556 U. S., at 739. This case simi-
larly does not require us to address that underlying question: Alabama
“has made this inquiry unnecessary by creating courts of general jurisdic-
tion that routinely sit to hear analogous § 1983 actions.” Ibid.
Page Proof Pending Publication

176 WIL
LIAMS v. REED
Opinion of the Court
§ 1983 unless and until the claimants frst complete the ad-
mi
nistrative process and receive a fnal decision on their
claims. In essence, Alabama has said that to challenge de-
lays in the administrative process under § 1983, you frst
have to exhaust the administrative process. Of course, that
means that you can never challenge delays in the administra-
tive process. That catch-22 prevents the claimants here
from obtaining a merits resolution of their § 1983 claims in
state court and in effect immunizes state offcials from those
kinds of § 1983 suits for injunctive relief.
Under this Court's precedents, however, Alabama cannot
maintain such an immunity rule. As this Court's cases have
repeatedly held, “a state law that immunizes government
conduct otherwise subject to suit under § 1983 is pre-empted,
even where the federal civil rights litigation takes place in
state court.” Felder, 487 U. S., at 139; see also Howlett, 496
U. S., at 375–378.
4
C
In response, the Secretary advances two primary points.
First, the Secretary argues that the “jurisdictional nature
of Alabama's exhaustion provision sets it apart from proce-
4
Importantly, the Court's holding today does not mean that premature
procedural due process claims will necessarily prevail. As this Court has
stated, “a procedural due process claim is not complete when the depriva-
tion occurs. Rather, the claim is complete only when the State fails to
provide due process.” Reed v. Goertz, 598 U. S. 230, 236 (2023) (quotation
marks and citation omitted); see Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F. 3d 107, 116 (CA3
2000). Therefore, as counsel for the claimants rightly acknowledged at
oral argument, a plaintiff who asserts a “due process claim without ex-
hausting ” will “usually lose” because of the requirement that the chal-
lenged procedural deprivation must have already occurred, except “in an
unusual case” where “you're actually challenging the inability to exhaust.”
Tr. of Oral Arg. 36.
Here, the claimants allege that the State's delays in completing the ad-
ministrative process violated their due process and statutory rights. We
take no position on the merits of those claims.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 168 (2025)
177
Opinion of the Court
dural rules that may be more readily preempted by § 1983.”
Br
ief for Respondent 25. In particular, according to the
Secretary, the jurisdictional status of Alabama's exhaustion
requirement distinguishes it from the state rules at issue in
Haywood and Howlett.
States “retain substantial leeway to establish the contours
of their judicial systems” and are free to enforce “neutral”
jurisdictional rules. Haywood, 556 U. S., at 735–736. The
Secretary's argument fails, however, because this Court's
precedents have not treated the jurisdictional label of state
rules as dispositive when state rules functionally immunize
defendants from a class of § 1983 claims in state court. In
Haywood, for example, a New York law withdrew the state
courts' jurisdiction over a class of § 1983 claims against cor-
rectional offcers. The Court stated that the jurisdictional
status of New York's rule did not insulate the rule from pre-
emption. Id., at 739–742. As the Court explained, New
York's law operated as “an immunity statute cloaked in juris-
dictional garb.” Id., at 742. To treat the jurisdictional
label as dispositive would allow the Supremacy Clause to be
“evaded.” Ibid.; see also Howlett, 496 U. S., at 383.
Second, the Secretary suggests that the claimants could
seek a writ of mandamus from the state courts to compel
the Department to act more quickly. For that reason, the
Secretary says that any delays in the state administrative
process can be cured within the state judicial system.
To begin with, it is not evident that mandamus is available
to the claimants here. The Secretary cites a lone decades-
old case from an Alabama intermediate appellate court sug-
gesting in dicta that mandamus would be “appropriate” in a
case where a state agency intentionally delayed its decision
on a couple's application to become adoptive parents. Vance
v. Montgomery Cty. Dept. of Human Resources, 693 So. 2d
493, 495 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997). If mandamus relief were
available in these unemployment benefts cases, one would
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
178 WIL
LIAMS v. REED
Opinion of the Court
have expected the Alabama Supreme Court to say so in its
opi
nion here. Yet the court did not say or suggest that man-
damus relief would be available.
In any event, the Secretary's argument based on the sup-
posed availability of mandamus is simply another way of say-
ing that the claimant must go through the process provided
by the State before suing under § 1983 to challenge delays in
the state process. To be sure, the availability of mandamus
relief in state court might be relevant to the merits of a due
process or federal statutory claim challenging delays in the
state process. But just as Alabama may not force plaintiffs
to complete the state administrative process before plaintiffs
may sue under § 1983 to challenge allegedly unlawful delays,
Alabama may not force plaintiffs to seek mandamus before
bringing those § 1983 claims. Otherwise, by the time the
plaintiffs could sue for injunctive relief under § 1983, their
claims would be moot.
For its part, the dissent largely discusses issues that we
do not address in this opinion. In Part II–C–2, when the
dissent eventually turns to the merits of our legal analysis,
the dissent argues that Haywood's reasoning about immunity
rules applies only where a “focus on statutory purpose” re-
veals that a state rule refects “ `policy disagreement' ” with
federal law. Post, at 189 (opinion of Thomas, J.) (quoting
Haywood, 556 U. S., at 737–738). We respectfully disagree
with the dissent's reading of Haywood. That decision did
not endorse a freewheeling inquiry into whether a state
rule's “purpose” or “policy” (however assessed) is at odds
with federal law. Rather, a state rule runs afoul of Hay-
wood if it operates as an “immunity statute cloaked in juris-
dictional garb” by wholly barring a “particular species” of
§ 1983 suits in state court. Id., at 739, 742.
The dissent also suggests that the claimants forfeited their
argument based on Haywood and Howlett in the Alabama
Supreme Cour t. In that cour t, however, the claimants
clearly raised the argument that under § 1983 the State could

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 168 (2025)
179
Thomas, J., dissenting
not apply an administrative-exhaustion requirement to their
clai
ms challenging delays in the administrative process.
Reply Brief for Appellant in Johnson v. Washington, No.
SC–2022–0897 (Ala. Sup. Ct.), pp. 16–17.
The dissent further says that our opinion may have “ripple
effects.” Post, at 190. But as we have emphasized, our
opinion today is narrow; it resolves this dispute but is care-
ful not to go beyond this Court's existing precedents. See
n. 2, supra.
***
The Alabama Supreme Court interpreted the State's
administrative-exhaustion requirement for unemployment
benefts claims to in effect immunize the Alabama Secretary
of Labor from § 1983 due process suits alleging that the De-
partment has unlawfully delayed in processing benefts
claims. By affording immunity from those claims, the Ala-
bama ruling contravenes this Court's § 1983 precedents. We
therefore reverse the judgment of the Alabama Supreme
Court and remand the case for further proceedings not in-
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Alito, Justice
Gorsuch, and Justice Barret t joi n as to Par t II,
dissenting.
Alabama law requires claimants seeking unemployment
benefts to exhaust their administrative remedies before
suing over those benefts in state court. Petitioners, the
claimants here, failed to complete that process before they
sued under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The Ala-
bama Supreme Court accordingly held that it lacked jurisdic-
tion over the suit. That holding was plainly permissible.
As a matter of frst principles, States have unfettered discre-
tion over whether to provide a forum for § 1983 claims in
their courts. And, Alabama's exhaustion rule does not
transgress the limitations that our precedents have recog-
Page Proof Pending Publication

180 WIL
LIAMS v. REED
Thomas, J., dissenting
nized. The Court concludes otherwise by endorsing an as-
appl
ied theory of futility that is both forfeited and meritless,
moving our jurisprudence even further off course. I re-
spectfully dissent.
I
This case is straightforward under frst principles. Our
federal system gives States “plenary authority to decide
whether their local courts will have subject-matter jurisdic-
tion over federal causes of action.” Haywood v. Drown, 556
U. S. 729, 743 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Constitu-
tion allows States to hear federal claims in their courts, but
it does “not impose a duty on state courts to do so.” Id., at
747. Thus, “[o]nce a State exercises its sovereign preroga-
tive to deprive its courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over
a federal cause of action, it is the end of the matter as far as
the Constitution is concerned.” Id., at 749.
The only potential constraint that the Constitution places
on a State's jurisdictional discretion is the possibility that a
federal statute may preempt state law. The Supremacy
Clause makes the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . the
supreme Law of the Land.” Art. VI, cl. 2. Accordingly,
“[f]ederal law must prevail when Congress validly enacts a
statute that expressly supersedes state law, or when the
state law conficts with a federal statute.” Haywood, 556
U. S., at 764 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
This preemption rule raises the “diffcult question” whether
Congress can “require state courts to entertain a federal
cause of action.” Ibid., n. 8.
We need not answer that question here because § 1983
does not raise any preemption issue. By its text, the provi-
sion does not “command” States to provide a forum for § 1983
plaintiffs. Id., at 765. Instead, it merely “addresses who
may sue and be sued for violations of federal law.” Ibid.;
see § 1983 (deeming “liable” state offcials who deny “any citi-
zen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof . . . any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 168 (2025)
181
Thomas, J., dissenting
by the Constitution and laws”). Nor does Alabama's ex-
hausti
on bar, which regulates state-court litigation, create
any implicit confict with § 1983. Plaintiffs who do not ex-
haust state remedies are always free to bring their claims in
a federal forum. Id., at 766; see also Felder v. Casey, 487
U. S. 131, 160 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (“Every
[§ 1983] plaintiff has the option of proceeding in federal court,
and the [state] statute has not the slightest effect on that
right”). Preemption analysis requires nothing further.
This Court's precedents err to the extent they recognize a
broader form of confict preemption for “state-court proce-
dural rules that are perceived to `burde[n] the exercise of the
federal right' in state court.” Haywood, 556 U. S., at 766
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Felder, 487 U. S., at 141).
This form of confict preemption targets state-law rules that
constitute an obstacle to the “goals” embodied in federal law.
Id., at 138. But, only federal law itself can support pre-
emption under the Supremacy Clause. Extratextual specu-
lation about Congress's purposes cannot. See Wyeth v. Le-
vine, 555 U. S. 555, 603–604 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring
in judgment).
Our precedents also err in establishing the requirement at
issue here—that state jurisdictional rules be “neutral,” even
in the absence of a directly conficting federal law. See in-
fra, at 183. The Supremacy Clause does not of its own force
“constrai[n] the States' authority to defne the subject-matter
jurisdiction of their own courts.” Haywood, 556 U. S., at 750
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Rather, in making the Constitu-
tion and federal law supreme, “it provides only a rule of deci-
sion that the state court must follow if it adjudicates the
claim.” Id., at 751. I would therefore disregard our fur-
ther limitation as “demonstrably erroneous.” See Gamble
v. United States, 587 U. S. 678, 717–718 (2019) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).*
*Petitioners' suit implicates other precedents that may not withstand
scrutiny. I doubt that petitioners have a true due process interest in
“mere Government benefts and entitlements.” Axon Enterprise, Inc. v.
Page Proof Pending Publication

182 WIL
LIAMS v. REED
Thomas, J., dissenting
Taken together, this case should begin and end with Ala-
bama'
s plenary authority to decide which federal matters its
state courts will have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear.
Alabama exercised that authority to create an exhaustion
requirement, and we should respect its decision.
II
This Court should affrm even under existing precedents.
Alabama's exhaustion requirement does not run afoul of the
limitations that this Court has identifed on a State's author-
ity to restrict federal causes of action from proceeding in
state court. Petitioners misread our precedents in arguing
otherwise, and the majority's theory likewise cannot pass
muster.
A
Although this Court has held that there are limits on a
State's discretion in regulating state-court jurisdiction over
federal causes of action, our precedents emphasize that state
author ity predominates. “ The genera l r u le ` bottomed
deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state
FTC, 598 U. S. 175, 201, n. 3 (2023) (Thomas, J., concurring). Tellingly,
the Court's original expansion of the Due Process Clause into this context
came without meaningful legal analysis. The Court simply highlighted
the social importance of “entitlements,” which had come to make up
“[m]uch of the existing wealth in this country,” and which only the poor
had been theretofore unable to effectively enforce. See Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U. S. 254, 262, and n. 8 (1970) (citing C. Reich, Individual Rights and
Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 Yale L. J. 1245, 1255 (1965);
C. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L. J. 733 (1964)). As Justice Black
recognized at the time, it “strains credulity” as a textual matter “to say
that the government's promise of charity to an individual is property”
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 397 U. S., at 275 (dissenting
opinion). Moreover, further examination may be required as to whether
§ 1983 can provide petitioners a cause of action in any event. Cf. T. Lind-
ley, Anachronistic Readings of Section 1983, 75 Ala. L. Rev. 897, 900–901
(2024) (contending that, as originally understood, § 1983 did not provide a
freestanding cause of action).
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 168 (2025)
183
Thomas, J., dissenting
judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts
as
it fnds them.' ” Howlett v. Rose, 496 U. S. 356, 372 (1990)
(quoting H. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal
Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 508 (1954)). Each State thus
has “great latitude to establish the structure and jurisdiction
of [its] own courts.” Howlett, 496 U. S., at 372. This lati-
tude allows States to decide which federal claims their courts
can hear. Ibid.
As relevant here, our precedents establish that States
must exercise this jurisdictional latitude only through “neu-
tral” rules that do not embody any “policy disagree-
ment” with federal law. Haywood, 556 U. S., at 735–737.
Based on this principle, we have identifed two narrow
exceptions to a State's ordinary discretion. First, a State
may not refuse to hear a federal claim “solely because [it]
is brought under a federal law.” McKnett v. St. Louis &
San Francisco R. Co., 292 U. S. 230, 233–234 (1934). Second,
a State may not deprive its courts of jurisdiction over a
“disfavored” federal claim, even if it simultaneously denies
jurisdiction to an “identical state claim,” where doing so
would “undermine federal law.” Haywood, 556 U. S., at
737–739.
For good reason, no one suggests that the frst exception
applies. Alabama's exhaustion requirement by its terms
does “not discriminate against rights arising under federal
laws.” See McKnett, 292 U. S., at 234. Instead, it imposes
a generally applicable exhaustion process “for the making
of determinations with respect to claims for unemployment
compensation benefts.” Ala. Code § 25–4–96 (2016). State
and federal claims regarding unemployment benefts are
equally subject to this process, including as to “procedural”
challenges like the one here. Johnson v. Washington, 387
So. 3d 138, 143 (Ala. 2023).
The second exception does not apply either. Alabama's
exhaustion requirement is nothing like the statute in Hay-
wood that this Court viewed as “disfavor[ing]” federal law.
Page Proof Pending Publication

184 WIL
LIAMS v. REED
Thomas, J., dissenting
556 U. S., at 738. That statute deprived New York courts
of
jurisdiction over “damages suits fled by prisoners against
state correction offcers,” based on the State's belief that
they were “by and large frivolous and vexatious.” Id., at
733 (discussing N. Y. Correc. Law Ann. § 24 (West 1987)).
This Court deemed New York's rule “effectively an immu-
nity statute cloaked in jurisdictional garb,” which protected
correction offcers from a subset of disfavored § 1983 claims
even as New York courts continued to hear most § 1983
acti ons. 556 U. S., at 741–742. According to the Hay-
wood majority, that policy-driven denial could not be squared
with the supremacy of § 1983's countervailing policy. Id.,
at 740.
Alabama's decision to create an exhaustion requirement
for all unemployment-benefts-related claims does not em-
body any comparable policy judgment. Rather, this re-
quirement, which has existed since 1939, is an ordinary juris-
dictional rule refecting the Alabama Department of Labor's
comparative “competence over the subject matter” of un-
employment benefts. Howlett, 496 U. S., at 381; see 1939
Ala. Acts no. 497, pp. 737–741. The exhaustion process
serves all the useful functions that this Court has recognized:
It allows the agency with subject-matter expertise to retain
primary responsibility over the area; it avoids unnecessary
litigation; and it creates a record in case judicial review is
necessary. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U. S. 140, 145 (1992).
In short, Alabama's exhaustion requirement is a procedural
step that “promotes judicial effciency,” ibid., in contrast to
the statute in Haywood, which created a de facto “immunity”
shielding a class of claims from judicial review, 556 U. S., at
742. We have no authority to interfere with Alabama's
choice.
B
Petitioners try to evade Alabama's exhaustion require-
ment by arguing for a different exception. On their view,
our decisions in Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U. S.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 168 (2025)
185
Thomas, J., dissenting
496 (1982), and Felder establish that States are categorically
precluded
from imposing exhaustion requirements in the
§ 1983 context. But, petiti oners badly misread both
decisions.
Patsy addressed whether federal courts can impose an ex-
haustion requirement for § 1983 cases in the absence of a con-
gressional directive to do so. See 457 U. S., at 501. The
Court held that they cannot, reasoning that federal courts
may create exhaustion requirements only where doing so is
consistent with congressional intent, because “Congress is
vested with the power to prescribe the basic procedural
scheme under which claims may be heard in federal courts.”
Id., at 501–502, 516. That analysis has no relevance to the
question here: whether States have authority “to establish
the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts.” How-
lett, 496 U. S., at 372.
Felder too is inapposite. That decision held that § 1983
preempted a Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute that effec-
tively altered the scope of § 1983 liability on the merits. See
487 U. S., at 153. That is, the statute subjected state-court
plaintiffs to a dismissal with prejudice if they did not frst
submit their claims against the State or its offcers to the
government for an advance merits determination. Id., at
136–137, and n. 2; see Haywood, 556 U. S., at 773–774, n. 11
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Failure to exhaust under that
statute operated as a state-created merits defense to § 1983
liability. But, the impermissibility of such a merits defense
says nothing about a State's discretion to create true juris-
dictional rules, which speak only to the judiciary's “ `power' ”
to “ `proceed at all.' ” Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Envi-
ronment, 523 U. S. 83, 94 (1998) (quoting Ex parte McCardle,
7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869)).
Felder would remain inapposite even if it had involved a
purportedly jurisdictional rule compelling dismissal without
prejudice. In that event, the Wisconsin statute would sim-
ply have raised the problem that this Court later confronted
Page Proof Pending Publication

186 WIL
LIAMS v. REED
Thomas, J., dissenting
in Haywood, where the State singled out a “disfavored” cate-
gory
of claims for second-class treatment. 556 U. S., at 738.
The notice-of-claim statute in Felder existed to “further the
State's interest in minimizing liability and the expenses asso-
ciated with it.” 487 U. S., at 143. And, although Felder
noted that the statute “impose[d] an exhaustion require-
ment,” it treated that fact as one of multiple “interrelated”
factors that caused the Wisconsin statute to “burden” § 1983
claimants. Id., at 141, 146. The exhaustion requirement
was not an independently fatal problem, so Felder's language
on exhaustion should not be overread. See Cohens v. Vir-
ginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399 (1821) (“[G]eneral expressions, in
every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in
which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the
case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the
judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is pre-
sented for decision”).
C
The majority rules for petitioners on narrower grounds,
but its holding is equally unpersuasive. The majority does
not dispute that, as a general matter, Alabama is entitled to
apply its exhaustion requirement to § 1983 claims. See ante,
at 174, n. 2. It instead holds that, under Haywood, Alabama's
discretion cannot extend to the specifc claims here, which
challenge delays in the exhaustion process itself. Ante, at
173–174. On the majority's view, maintaining the exhaus-
tion requirement for such claims would mean that petitioners
will never be able to advance to state court, leaving the State
essentially “immun[e]” from challenges to its exhaustion
process. Ante, at 175–176. This theory of futility is both
forfeited and meritless.
1
“[T]his Court has almost unfailingly refused to consider
any federal-law challenge to a state-court decision unless the
federal claim `was either addressed by or properly presented
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 168 (2025)
187
Thomas, J., dissenting
to the state court that rendered the decision we have been
asked
to review.' ” Howell v. Mississippi, 543 U. S. 440, 443
(2005) (per curiam) (quoting Adams v. Robertson, 520 U. S.
83, 86 (1997) (per curiam)). In fact, the Court's historical
practice has generally been to treat this preservation re-
quirement as jurisdictional, although our more recent cases
have expressed uncertainty on this issue. Howell, 543 U. S.,
at 445–446. In view of petitioners' preservation obligation,
we should reject as forfeited their newfound theory of futil-
ity, which was neither presented nor addressed below.
Until seeking certiorari, petitioners litigated this case as
a facial challenge, arguing solely that § 1983 “categorically”
preempted States from applying exhaustion requirements in
the § 1983 context. Reply Brief for Appellant in Johnson v.
Washington, No. SC–2022–0897 (Ala. Sup. Ct.), p. 16. The
Alabama Supreme Court accordingly understood that this
facial challenge was petitioners' “only” argument for federal
preemption. 387 So. 3d, at 143–144. Petitioners belatedly
contend that they also raised a futility-based argument, but
the briefng they cite merely addressed how the futility of
waiting for exhaustion affected the proper timing of their
facial challenge. See Reply Brief 24, n. 3 (citing Reply Brief
for Appellant in No. SC–2022–0897, at 16–17).
Because petitioners raised only a facial challenge below,
they cannot press an as-applied challenge here. “[F]acial”
and “as-applied” claims are distinct and must be individually
preserved. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 473,
n. 3 (2010); see also, e.g., Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U. S.
707, 723 (2024) (“NetChoice chose to litigate these cases as
facial challenges, and that decision comes at a cost”). So,
petitioners cannot now argue that Alabama's exhaustion re-
quirement is impermissible in the specific circumstance
where exhaustion would be futile.
There is no reason to treat this case as the “very rare
exceptio[n]” in which petitioners' forfeiture might be over-
looked. Adams, 520 U. S., at 86 (internal quotation marks
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
188 WIL
LIAMS v. REED
Thomas, J., dissenting
omitted). The majority, which ig nores that petitioners
needed
to raise their as-applied objection specifcally, cer-
tainly provides no justifcation. See ante, at 178–179. In-
stead, its analysis only highlights why we should not decide
petitioners' as-applied challenge in the frst instance.
The majority's futility theory depends on the assumption
that petitioners will never have their day in court if we leave
Alabama's exhaustion requirement intact. See ante, at 175–
176. But, petitioners' failure to raise their as-applied claim
below means that we have no way of knowing whether this
assumption is true. It may be the case that the exhaustion
requirement here contains an implicit futility exception. Cf.
Graysville v. Glenn, 46 So. 3d 925, 929 (Ala. 2010) (identify-
ing futility as a “recognized exceptio[n]” to the “exhaustion-
of-administrative-remedies doctrine” generally). Or, it may
be the case that petitioners may obtain mandamus relief, as
the dissent below suggested and the State underscored.
See 387 So. 3d, at 146 (Cook, J., dissenting); Tr. of Oral Arg.
54–56. As a federal court assessing petitioners' objection in
the frst instance, we have no way to assess the viability of
these or any other mechanisms.
The majority's attempts to disregard this uncertainty are
unpersuasive. The majority concludes that the uncertainty
should count against the State, and expresses doubt about
the availability of mandamus based on the Alabama Supreme
Court's failure to address that form of relief. Ante, at 177–
178. But, that court had no reason to opine on the alterna-
tive pathways available to petitioners, given that petitioners
failed to raise an as-applied challenge. We should not re-
ward petitioners for their own mistake. Likewise, the ma-
jority's assertion that mandamus would be irrelevant even if
it were available is puzzling. Ante, at 178. If petitioners
can secure completion of the exhaustion process through
mandamus, then by defnition they will not be in a “catch-
22” that “prevents [them] from obtaining a merits resolution
of their § 1983 claims in state court.” Ante, at 176.

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 168 (2025)
189
Thomas, J., dissenting
2
In
any event, petitioners' as-applied challenge fails on the
merits. Unlike the New York statute in Haywood, Ala-
bama's exhaustion requirement is not “ `an immunity statute
cloaked in jurisdictional garb.' ” Contra, ante, at 177 (quot-
ing Haywood, 556 U. S., at 742).
Properly understood, Haywood directs our focus to the
challenged statute's purpose. The Court there viewed the
New York statute as an immunity statute because it was
“designed to shield” correction offcers from damages claims
brought by prisoners, “[b]ased on the belief ” that these
claims tended to be “frivolous and vexatious.” Id., at 741–
742. In other words, States cannot implicitly reject the su-
premacy of federal law by basing a jurisdictional limitation—
even one that also applies to state claims—on “policy
disagreement” with federal law. Id., at 737–738.
A focus on statutory purpose makes clear that Alabama's
exhaustion requirement raises no Haywood problem. There
is no credible argument that Alabama adopted its exhaustion
requirement in order to defeat challenges to the exhaustion
process itself. Alabama created its exhaustion scheme in
1939, decades before the understanding that public benefts
give rise to a due process interest emerged. See supra, at
181–182, n. And, the Alabama exhaustion process is by all
accounts an ordinary exhaustion requirement common
among public-benefts schemes, which in the mine-run case
serves to facilitate the adjudication of benefts determina-
tions on the merits. There is no reason to think that Ala-
bama intended to cause mischief in the rare context of a
§ 1983 challenge to its procedures.
At most, this case presents a circumstance in which Ala-
bama's “neutral jurisdictional rule” has the effect of defeat-
ing a federal claim. See Haywood, 556 U. S., at 735. But,
again, our precedents disallow a State's jurisdictional rule
only if it is in fact not “neutral”—that is, if it is “based on a
policy disagreement,” and so is intended to “shut the court-
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
190 WIL
LIAMS v. REED
Thomas, J., dissenting
house door to federal claims that it considers at odds with
its
local policy.” Id., at 737–738, 740.
The majority's contrary conclusion misunderstands Hay-
wood. Ignoring that decision's purpose-focused language,
the majority asserts that it disallows any state rule that “op-
erates as an `immunity statute' . . . by wholly barring a `par-
ticular species' of § 1983 suits in state court.” Ante, at 178
(quoting 556 U. S., at 739, 742). But, in context, that quoted
language only reinforces the majority's error. Those lines
in Haywood reiterate that what mattered there was New
York's illicit purpose: A State may not “dee[m]” “a particular
species of suits . . . inappropriate for its trial courts.” Id., at
739–740. Nor may a State effectively create an “immunity
statute” “[b]ased on the belief that [certain claims] are frivo-
lous and vexatious.” Id., at 742. Nothing in Haywood sug-
gests that a state rule could be impermissible just because it
has the incidental effect of disallowing certain federal claims.
The majority also does not grapple with the possible ripple
effects of its reading of Haywood. It professes only that its
opinion is “narrow” and does nothing more than “resolv[e]
this dispute.” Ante, at 179. But, the majority's protesta-
tions do not make it so.
A constraint based on incidental effects is notably more
amorphous than our prior focus on statutory purpose. After
all, to the extent the Supremacy Clause bars States from
enacting nominally jurisdictional rules that “registe[r their]
dissent” from federal policy, States may craft their laws with
an eye toward avoiding confict. Haywood, 556 U. S., at 737–
738. But, the same is not true for incidental effects. No
statute can be perfectly drafted to anticipate every applica-
tion that ultimately arises, so it is inevitable that exhaustion
requirements will occasionally slow or defeat claims that we
might think, as a policy matter, ought to go forward. That
happenstance is not a reason for suspicion, just as we do not
malign the many federal statutes with similarly categorical
exhaustion requirements. See, e. g., Booth v. Churner, 532

Cite
as: 604 U. S. 168 (2025)
191
Thomas, J., dissenting
U. S. 731, 733–734 (2001) (applying the Prison Litigation Re-
for
m Act's exhaustion requirement even where the exhaus-
tion process could not provide the prisoner's requested re-
lief ). Here too, the Court should not encroach on Alabama's
“latitude to establish the structure and jurisdiction of [its]
own courts.” Howlett, 496 U. S., at 372.
III
The Court's decision is irreconcilable with both frst princi-
ples and precedent. I respectfully dissent.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None