Sheetz v. El Dorado County

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 601 U. S. Part 2
Pages 267–284
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
April 12, 2024
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

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OCTOBER
TERM, 2023
267
Syllabus
SHEETZ v. COUNTY OF EL DORADO, CALIFORNIA
certiorari
to the court of appeal of california,
third appellate district
No. 22–1074. Argued January 9, 2024—Decided April 12, 2024
As a condition of receiving a residential building permit, petitioner George
Sheetz was required by the County of El Dorado to pay a $23,420 traffc
impact fee. The fee was part of a “General Plan” enacted by the Coun-
ty's Board of Supervisors to address increasing demand for public serv-
ices spurred by new development. The fee amount was not based on
the costs of traffc impacts specifcally attributable to Sheetz's particular
project, but rather was assessed according to a rate schedule that took
into account the type of development and its location within the County.
Sheetz paid the fee under protest and obtained the permit. He later
sought relief in state court, claiming that conditioning the building per-
mit on the payment of a traffc impact fee constituted an unlawful “exac-
tion” of money in violation of the Takings Clause. In Sheetz's view, the
Court's decisions in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U. S.
825, and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374, required the County to
make an individualized determination that the fee imposed on him was
necessary to offset traffc congestion attributable to his project. The
courts below ruled against Sheetz based on their view that Nollan and
Dolan apply only to permit conditions imposed on an ad hoc basis by
administrators, not to a fee like this one imposed on a class of property
owners by Board-enacted legislation. 84 Cal. App. 5th 394, 402, 300
Cal. Rptr. 3d 308, 312.
Held: The Takings Clause does not distinguish between legislative and
administrative land-use permit conditions. Pp. 273–280.
(a) When the government wants to take private property for a public
purpose, the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause requires the govern-
ment to provide the owner “just compensation.” The Takings Clause
saves individual property owners from bearing “public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49. Even so, the States have
substantial authority to regulate land use, see Village of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, and a state law that merely restricts land
use in a way “reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial
government purpose” is not a taking unless it saps too much of the
property's value or frustrates the owner's investment-backed expecta-
tions. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 123,

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268 SHEETZ
v. COUNTY OF EL DORADO
Syllabus
127. Similarly, when the government can deny a building permit to
fur
ther a “legitimate police-power purpose,” it can also place conditions
on the permit that serve the same end. Nollan, 483 U. S., at 836. For
example, if a proposed development will “substantially increase traffc
congestion,” the government may condition the building permit on the
owner's willingness “to deed over the land needed to widen a public
road.” Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist., 570 U. S.
595, 605. But when the government withholds or conditions a building
permit for reasons unrelated to its legitimate land-use interests, those
actions amount to extortion. See Nollan, 483 U. S., at 837.
The Court's decisions in Nollan and Dolan address the potential
abuse of the permitting process by setting out a two-part test modeled
on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. See Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U. S. 593, 597. First, permit conditions must have an “essential
nexus” to the government's land-use interest, ensuring that the govern-
ment is acting to further its stated purpose, not leveraging its permit-
ting monopoly to exact private property without paying for it. See
Nollan, 483 U. S., at 837, 841. Second, permit conditions must have
“rough proportionality” to the development's impact on the land-use in-
terest and may not require a landowner to give up (or pay) more than
is necessary to mitigate harms resulting from new development. See
Dolan, 512 U. S., at 391, 393; Koontz, 570 U. S., at 612–615. Pp. 273–276.
(b) The County's traffc impact fee was upheld below based on the
view that the Nollan/Dolan test does not apply to monetary fees im-
posed by a legislature, but nothing in constitutional text, history, or
precedent supports exempting legislatures from ordinary takings rules.
The Constitution provides “no textual justifcation for saying that the
existence or the scope of a State's power to expropriate private property
without just compensation varies according to the branch of government
effecting the expropriation.” Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v.
Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection, 560 U. S. 702, 714 (plurality
opinion). Historical practice similarly shows that legislation was the
conventional way that governments at the state and national levels ex-
ercised their eminent domain power to obtain land for various govern-
mental purposes, and to provide compensation to dispossessed landown-
ers. The Fifth Amendment enshrined this longstanding practice.
Precedent points the same way as text and history. A legislative ex-
ception to the Nollan/Dolan test “conficts with the rest of [the Court's]
takings jurisprudence,” which does not otherwise distinguish between
legislation and other offcial acts. Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U. S.
180, 185. That is true of precedents involving physical takings, regula-
tory takings, and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine which under-
lies the Nollan/Dolan test. Pp. 276–279.

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as: 601 U. S. 267 (2024)
269
Syllabus
(c) As the parties now agree, conditions on building permits are not
exempt
from scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan just because a legislative
body imposed them. Whether a permit condition imposed on a class of
properties must be tailored with the same degree of specifcity as a
permit condition that targets a particular development is an issue for
the state courts to consider in the frst instance, as are issues concerning
whether the parties' other arguments are preserved and how those ar-
guments bear on Sheetz's legal challenge. Pp. 279–280.
84 Cal. App. 5th 394, 300 Cal. Rptr. 3d 308, vacated and remanded.
Barret t, J., delivered the opi ni on for a unani mous Cour t.
Sotomayor, J., fled a concurring opinion, in which Jackson, J., joined,
post, p. 280. Gorsuch, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 281. Kava-
naugh, J., fled a concurring opinion, in which Kagan and Jackson, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 284.
Paul J. Beard II argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Brian T. Hodges, Lawrence G. Salz-
man, and Damien M. Schiff.
Aileen M. McGrath argued the cause for respondent.
With her on the brief were Zach ZhenHe Tan, Michael Weis-
buch, Pratik A. Shah, Z. W. Julius Chen, and Glen C.
Hansen.
Erica L. Ross argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging affrmance. With her on the brief
were Solicitor General Prelogar, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Kim, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, and William
B. Lazarus.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Atlantic Legal
Foundation by Lawrence S. Ebner and Nancie G. Marzulla; for Bay Area
Council by Katharine T. Van Dusen and Sarah E. Peterson; for The Buck-
eye Institute et al. by Dave C. Tryon, Jay R. Carson, and Elizabeth Mil-
ito; for the California Building Industry Association et al. by David
P. Lan ferman, Douglas J. Dennington, and Jayson A. Parsons; for the
California Housing Defense Fund et al. by Darren Teshima; for the Cato
Institute by Anastasia P. Boden and Matthew P. Cavedon; for the Cham-
ber of Commerce of the United States of America by Jeremy C. Marwell,
Andrew R. Varcoe, and Jonathan D. Urick; for the Citizen Action Defense
Fund et al. by Jackson Maynard and Sam Spiegelman; for Hotel Des
Arts, LLC, et al. by Andrew M. Zacks and Emily L. Brough; for the

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270 SHEETZ
v. COUNTY OF EL DORADO
Opinion of the Court
Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court.
George
Sheetz wanted to build a small, prefabricated home
on his residential parcel of land. To obtain a permit, though,
he had to pay a substantial fee to mitigate local traffc con-
gestion. Relying on this Court's decisions in Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Comm'n, 483 U. S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374 (1994), Sheetz challenged the
fee as an unlawful “exaction” of money under the Takings
Southeastern Legal Foundation et al. by Kimberly S. Hermann, Braden
H. Boucek, Celia Howard O'Leary, and Wencong Fa; and for Charles Gard-
ner et al. by Blaine I. Green. Briefs of amici curiae urging vacatur were
fled for the Building Industry Association of the Greater Valley by Brett
S. Jolley; and for the National Association of Realtors
®
et al. by Brett A.
Shumate and Robert Luther III.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of
California et al. by Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California, Michael J.
Mongan, Solicitor General, Daniel A. Olivas, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Joshua Patashnik, Deputy Solicitor General, Jamee Jordan Pat-
terson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Andrew R. Contreiras
and Nicole U. Rinke, Deputy Attorneys General, and Cara M. Newlon,
Associate Deputy Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their
respective jurisdictions as follows: Kristin K. Mayes of Arizona, Kathleen
Jennings of Delaware, Brian L. Schwalb of the District of Columbia, Anne
E. Lopez of Hawaii, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Aaron M. Frey of Maine,
Anthony G. Brown of Maryland, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Keith Ellison
of Minnesota, Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Matthew J. Platkin of New Jer-
sey, Letitia James of New York, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Michelle
A. Henry of Pennsylvania, Peter F. Neronha of Rhode Island, Marty J.
Jackley of South Dakota, Charity R. Clark of Vermont, and Robert W.
Ferguson of Washington; for the California State Association of Counties
et al. by Andrew W. Schwartz and Matthew D. Zinn; for the City and
County of San Francisco et al. by Kristen A. Jensen; for the Constitutional
Accountability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra and Brianne J. Gorod; for
the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Damon
Hewitt, Jon Greenbaum, and Thomas Silverstein; and for the National
Association of Clean Water Agencies et al. by Alexandra Dapolito Dunn,
Stephanie F. Cagniart, and Christopher E. Tutunjian.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the American Planning Association
by Brian J. Connolly, John M. Baker, and Katherine M. Swenson; and for
the Claremont Institute's Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence by John
C. Eastman and Anthony T. Caso.

Cite
as: 601 U. S. 267 (2024)
271
Opinion of the Court
Clause. The California Court of Appeal rejected that argu-
ment
because the traffc impact fee was imposed by legisla-
tion, and, according to the court, Nollan and Dolan apply
only to permit conditions imposed on an ad hoc basis by ad-
ministrators. That is incorrect. The Takings Clause does
not distinguish between legislative and administrative per-
mit conditions.
I
A
El Dorado County, California is a rural jurisdiction that
lies east of Sacramento and extends to the Nevada border.
Much of the County's 1,700 square miles is backcountry. It
is home to the Sierra Nevada mountain range and the Eldor-
ado National Forest. Those areas, composed mainly of pub-
lic lands, are sparsely populated. Visitors from around the
world use the natural areas for fshing, backpacking, and
other recreational activities.
Most of the County's residents are concentrated in the
west and east regions. In the west, the towns of El Dorado
Hills, Cameron Park, and Shingle Springs form the outer
reaches of Sacramento's suburbs. Placerville, the county
seat, lies just beyond them. In the east, residents live along
the south shores of Lake Tahoe. Highway 50 connects these
population centers and divides the County into north and
south portions.
In recent decades, the County has experienced signifcant
population growth, and with it an increase in new develop-
ment. To account for the new demand on public services,
the County's Board of Supervisors adopted a planning docu-
ment, which it calls the General Plan, to address issues rang-
ing from wastewater collection to land-use restrictions.
1
The Board of Supervisors is a legislative body under state
law, and the adoption of its General Plan is a legislative act.
See Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 65300 et seq. (West 2024).
1
See County of El Dorado Adopted General Plan, https://edcgov.us/
Government/planning/Pages/adopted_general_plan.aspx.
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272 SHEETZ
v. COUNTY OF EL DORADO
Opinion of the Court
To address traffc congestion, the General Plan requires
de
velopers to pay a traffc impact fee as a condition of receiv-
ing a building permit. The County uses proceeds from these
fees to fund improvements to its road system. The fee
amount is determined by a rate schedule, which takes into
account the type of development (commercial, residential,
and so on) and its location within the County. The amount
is not based on “the cost specifcally attributable to the par-
ticular project on which the fee is imposed.” 84 Cal. App.
5th 394, 402, 300 Cal. Rptr. 3d 308, 312 (2022).
B
George Sheetz owns property in the center of the County
near Highway 50, which the General Plan classifes as “Low
Density Residential.”
2
Sheetz and his wife applied for a
permit to build a modest prefabricated house on the parcel,
with plans to raise their grandson there. As a condition of
receiving the permit, the County required Sheetz to pay a
traffc impact fee of $23,420, as dictated by the General Plan's
rate schedule. Sheetz paid the fee under protest and ob-
tained the permit. The County did not respond to his re-
quest for a refund.
Sheetz sought relief in state court. He claimed, among
other things, that conditioning the building permit on the
payment of a traffc impact fee constituted an unlawful “exac-
tion” of money in violation of the Takings Clause. In
Sheetz's view, our decisions in Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U. S. 825, and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U. S. 374, required the County to make an individualized de-
termination that the fee amount was necessary to offset traf-
fc congestion attributable to his specifc development. The
County's predetermined fee schedule, Sheetz argued, failed
to meet that requirement.
2
See Figure LU–1: Land Use Diagram, https://edcgov.us/government/
planning/adoptedgeneralplan/fgures/documents/LU-1.pdf.
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as: 601 U. S. 267 (2024)
273
Opinion of the Court
The trial court rejected Sheetz's claim and the California
Cour
t of Appeal affrmed. Relying on precedent from the
California Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal asserted that
the Nollan/Dolan test applies only to permit conditions im-
posed “ `on an individual and discretionary basis.' ” 84 Cal.
App. 5th, at 406, 300 Cal. Rptr. 3d, at 316 (quoting San Remo
Hotel L. P. v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 27 Cal. 4th
643, 666–670, 41 P. 3d 87, 102–105 (2002)). Fees imposed on
“a broad class of property owners through legislative ac-
tion,” it said, need not satisfy that test. 84 Cal. App. 5th, at
407, 300 Cal. Rptr. 3d, at 316. The California Supreme
Court denied review.
State courts have reached different conclusions on the
question whether the Takings Clause recognizes a distinc-
tion between legislative and administrative conditions on
land-use permits.
3
We granted certiorari to resolve the
split. 600 U. S. ––– (2023).
II
A
When the government wants to take private property to
build roads, courthouses, or other public projects, it must
compensate the owner at fair market value. The just com-
pensation requirement comes from the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause, which provides: “nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.” By re-
quiring the government to pay for what it takes, the Takings
Clause saves individual property owners from bearing “pub-
3
Compare, e.g., Home Builders Assn. of Dayton and Miami Valley v.
Beavercreek, 89 Ohio St. 3d 121, 128, 729 N. E. 2d 349, 356 (2000); Northern
Ill. Home Builders Assn. v. County of Du Page, 165 Ill. 2d 25, 32–33, 649
N. E. 2d 384, 389 (1995) (applying the Nollan/Dolan test to legislative
permit conditions), with, e.g., St. Clair Cty. Home Builders Assn. v. Pell
City, 61 So. 3d 992, 1007 (Ala. 2010); Home Builders Assn. of Central
Ariz. v. Scottsdale, 187 Ariz. 479, 486, 930 P. 2d 993, 1000 (1997) (following
California's approach).
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v. COUNTY OF EL DORADO
Opinion of the Court
lic burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by
the public as a whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364
U. S. 40, 49 (1960).
The Takings Clause's right to just compensation coexists
with the States' police power to engage in land-use planning.
(Though at times the two seem more like in-laws than soul-
mates.) While States have substantial authority to regulate
land use, see Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U. S. 365 (1926), the right to compensation is triggered if
they “physically appropriat[e]” property or otherwise inter-
fere with the owner's right to exclude others from it, Cedar
Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U. S. 139, 149–152 (2021).
That sort of intrusion on property rights is a per se taking.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S.
419, 426 (1982). Different rules apply to state laws that
merely restrict how land is used. A use restriction that is
“reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial
government purpose” is not a taking unless it saps too much
of the property's value or frustrates the owner's investment-
backed expectations. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U. S. 104, 123, 127 (1978); see also Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1016 (1992)
(“[T]he Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use regula-
tion does not substantially advance legitimate state interests
or denies an owner economically viable use of his land”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Permit conditions are more complicated. If the govern-
ment can deny a building permit to further a “legitimate
police-power purpose,” then it can also place conditions on
the permit that serve the same end. Nollan, 483 U. S., at
836. Such conditions do not entitle the landowner to com-
pensation even if they require her to convey a portion of
her property to the government. Ibid. Thus, if a proposed
development will “substantially increase traffc congestion,”
the government may condition the building permit on the
owner's willingness “to deed over the land needed to widen
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275
Opinion of the Court
a public road.” Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Manage-
men
t Dist., 570 U. S. 595, 605 (2013). We have described
permit conditions of this nature as “a hallmark of responsi-
ble land-use policy.” Ibid. The government is entitled to
put the landowner to the choice of accepting the bargain or
abandoning the proposed development. See R. Epstein,
Bargaining With the State 188 (1993).
The bargain takes on a different character when the gov-
ernment withholds or conditions a building permit for rea-
sons unrelated to its land-use interests. Imagine that a
local planning commission denies the owner of a vacant lot a
building permit unless she allows the commission to host its
annual holiday party in her backyard (in propertyspeak,
granting it a limited-access easement). The landowner is
“likely to accede to the government's demand, no matter how
unreasonable,” so long as she values the building permit
more. Koontz, 570 U. S., at 605. So too if the commission
gives the landowner the option of bankrolling the party at a
local pub instead of hosting it on her land. See id., at 612–
615. Because such conditions lack a suffcient connection to
a legitimate land-use interest, they amount to “an out-and-
out plan of extortion.” Nollan, 483 U. S., at 837 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Our decisions in Nollan and Dolan address this potential
abuse of the permitting process. There, we set out a two-
part test modeled on the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 597 (1972)
(government “may not deny a beneft to a person on a basis
that infringes his constitutionally protected interests”).
First, permit conditions must have an “essential nexus” to
the government's land-use interest. Nollan, 483 U. S., at
837. The nexus requirement ensures that the government
is acting to further its stated purpose, not leveraging its per-
mitting monopoly to exact private property without paying
for it. See id., at 841. Second, permit conditions must have
“ `rough proportionality' ” to the development's impact on the

276 SHEETZ
v. COUNTY OF EL DORADO
Opinion of the Court
land-use interest. Dolan, 512 U. S., at 391. A permit con-
diti
on that requires a landowner to give up more than is nec-
essary to mitigate harms resulting from new development
has the same potential for abuse as a condition that is unre-
lated to that purpose. See id., at 393. This test applies re-
gardless of whether the condition requires the landowner to
relinquish property or requires her to pay a “monetary exac-
tio[n]” instead of relinquishing the property. Koontz, 570
U. S., at 612–615.
B
The California Court of Appeal declined to assess the
County's traffc impact fee for an essential nexus and rough
proportionality based on its view that the Nollan/Dolan test
does not apply to “legislatively prescribed monetary fees.”
84 Cal. App. 5th, at 407, 300 Cal. Rptr. 3d, at 316 (internal
quotation marks omitted). That was error. Nothing in
constitutional text, history, or precedent supports exempting
legislatures from ordinary takings rules.
The Constitution's text does not limit the Takings Clause
to a particular branch of government. The Clause itself,
which speaks in the passive voice, “focuses on (and prohibits)
a certain `act': the taking of private property without just
compensation.” Knight v. Metropolitan Govt. of Nash-
ville & Davidson Cty., 67 F. 4th 816, 829 (CA6 2023). It
does not single out legislative acts for special treatment.
Nor does the Fourteenth Amendment, which incorporates
the Takings Clause against the States. On the contrary, the
Amendment constrains the power of each “State” as an undi-
vided whole. § 1. Thus, there is “no textual justifcation
for saying that the existence or the scope of a State's power
to expropriate private property without just compensation
varies according to the branch of government effecting the
expropriation.” Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v.
Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection, 560 U. S. 702,
714 (2010) (plurality opinion). Just as the Takings Clause
“protects `private property' without any distinction between
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as: 601 U. S. 267 (2024)
277
Opinion of the Court
different types,” Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 576
U
. S. 351, 358 (2015), it constrains the government without
any distinction between legislation and other offcial acts.
So far as the Constitution's text is concerned, permit condi-
tions imposed by the legislature and other branches stand on
equal footing.
The same goes for history. In fact, special deference for
legislative takings would have made little sense historically,
because legislation was the conventional way that govern-
ments exercised their eminent domain power. Before the
founding, colonial governments passed statutes to secure
land for courthouses, prisons, and other public buildings.
See, e.g., 4 Statutes at Large of South Carolina 319 (T.
Cooper ed. 1838) (Act of 1770) (Cooper); 6 Statutes at Large,
Laws of Virginia 283 (W. Hening ed. 1819) (Act of 1752) (Hen-
ing). These statutes “invariably required the award of com-
pensation to the owners when land was taken.” J. Ely,
“That Due Satisfaction May Be Made:” the Fifth Amend-
ment and the Origins of the Compensation Principle, 36 Am.
J. Legal Hist. 1, 5 (1992). Colonial practice thus echoed
English law, which vested Parliament alone with the eminent
domain power and required that property owners receive
“full indemnifcation . . . for a reasonable price.” 1 W. Black-
stone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 139 (1768).
During and after the Revolution, governments continued
to exercise their eminent domain power through legislation.
States passed statutes to obtain private land for their new
capitals and provided compensation to the landowners. See,
e.g., 4 Cooper 751–752 (Act of 1786); 10 Hening 85–87 (1822
ed.) (Act of 1779). At the national level, Congress passed
legislation to settle the Northwest Territory, which likewise
required the payment of compensation to dispossessed prop-
erty owners. Northwest Ordinance of 1789, 1 Stat. 52.
Two years later, the Fifth Amendment enshrined this long-
standing practice. Against this background, it is little sur-
prise that early constitutional theorists understood the Tak-
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278 SHEETZ
v. COUNTY OF EL DORADO
Opinion of the Court
ings Clause to bind the legislature specifcally. See, e. g., 3
J
. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States § 1784, p. 661 (1833); 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on
American Law 275–276 (1827). Far from supporting a def-
erential view, history shows that legislation was a prime tar-
get for scrutiny under the Takings Clause.
Precedent points the same way as text and history. A
legislative exception to the Nollan/Dolan test “conficts with
the rest of our takings jurisprudence,” which does not other-
wise distinguish between legislation and other offcial acts.
Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U. S. 180, 185 (2019). That
is true of physical takings, regulatory takings, and the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine in which the Nollan/Dolan
test is rooted.
Start with our physical takings cases. We have applied
the per se rule requiring just compensation to both legisla-
tion and administrative action. In Loretto, we held that a
state statute effected a taking because it authorized cable
companies to install equipment on private property without
the owner's consent. 458 U. S., at 438. In Horne, we held
that an administrative order effected a taking because it re-
quired farmers to give the Federal Government a portion of
their crop to stabilize market prices. 576 U. S., at 361. The
branch of government that authorized the appropriation did
not matter to the analysis in either case. Nor should it have.
As we have explained: “The essential question is not . . .
whether the government action at issue comes garbed as a
regulation (or statute, or ordinance, or miscellaneous decree).
It is whether the government has physically taken property
for itself or someone else.” Cedar Point, 594 U. S., at 149.
This principle is evident in our regulatory takings cases
too. We have examined land-use restrictions imposed by
both legislatures and administrative agencies to determine
whether the restriction amounted to a taking. In Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon, we held a state statute effected a
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as: 601 U. S. 267 (2024)
279
Opinion of the Court
taking because it prohibited the owner of mineral rights
from
mining coal beneath the surface estate, thus depriving
the mineral rights of practically all economic value. 260
U. S. 393, 414 (1922). And in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, we
remanded for the lower courts to determine whether an
agency decision effected a taking when it denied the owner
permission to build a beach club on the wetland portion of
his property but allowed him to build a home on the upland
portion. 533 U. S. 606, 631 (2001). Here again, our deci-
sions did not suggest that the outcome turned on which
branch of government imposed the restrictions.
Excusing legislation from the Nollan/Dolan test would
also confict with precedent applying the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine in other contexts. We have applied that
doctrine to scrutinize legislation that placed conditions on
the right to free speech, Agency for Int'l Development v.
Alliance for Open Society Int'l, Inc., 570 U. S. 205 (2013),
free exercise of religion, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398
(1963), and access to federal courts, Terral v. Burke Constr.
Co., 257 U. S. 529 (1922), among others, e.g., Memorial Hospi-
tal v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974) (right to travel).
Failing to give like treatment to legislative conditions on
building permits would thus “relegat[e the just compensation
requirement] to the status of a poor relation” to other consti-
tutional rights. Dolan, 512 U. S., at 392.
In sum, there is no basis for affording property rights less
protection in the hands of legislators than administrators.
The Takings Clause applies equally to both—which means
that it prohibits legislatures and agencies alike from impos-
ing unconstitutional conditions on land-use permits.
III
The County no longer contends otherwise. In fact, at oral
argument, the parties expressed “radical agreement” that
conditions on building permits are not exempt from scrutiny
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280 SHEETZ
v. EL DORADO COUNTY
Sotomayor, J., concurring
under Nollan and Dolan just because a legislature imposed
them.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, 73–74. The County was wise to
distance itself from the rule applied by the California Court
of Appeal, because, as we have explained, a legislative excep-
tion to the ordinary takings rules fnds no support in consti-
tutional text, history, or precedent.
We do not address the parties' other disputes over the va-
lidity of the traffc impact fee, including whether a permit
condition imposed on a class of properties must be tailored
with the same degree of specifcity as a permit condition that
targets a particular development. The California Court of
Appeal did not consider this point—or any of the parties'
other nuanced arguments—because it proceeded from the
erroneous premise that legislative permit conditions are cat-
egorically exempt from the requirements of Nollan and
Dolan. Whether the parties' other arguments are pre-
served and how they bear on Sheetz's legal challenge are for
the state courts to consider in the frst instance.
***
The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is vacated,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings not incon-
sistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Jackson joins,
concurring.
I join the Court's resolution of the limited question pre-
sented in this case, that conditions on building permits are “not
exempt from scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan just because a
legislature imposed them.” Ante, at 279–280; see Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U. S. 825 (1987); Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374 (1994). There is, however, an
important threshold question to any application of Nollan/
Dolan scrutiny: whether the permit condition would be
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281
Gorsuch, J., concurring
a compensable taking if imposed outside the permitting
context.
“
A predicate for any unconstitutional conditions claim is
that the government could not have constitutionally ordered
the person asserting the claim to do what it attempted to
pressure that person into doing.” Koontz v. St. Johns River
Water Management Dist., 570 U. S. 595, 612 (2013). In the
takings context, Nollan/Dolan scrutiny therefore applies
only when the condition at issue would have been a compen-
sable taking if imposed outside the permitting process. See
Koontz, 570 U. S., at 612 (“[W]e began our analysis in both
Nollan and Dolan by observing that if the government had
directly seized the easements it sought to obtain through
the permitting process, it would have committed a per se
taking ”).
The question presented in this case did not include that
antecedent question: whether the traffc impact fee would be
a compensable taking if imposed outside the permitting con-
text and therefore could trigger Nollan/Dolan scrutiny.
The California Court of Appeal did not consider that ques-
tion and the Court does not resolve it. See ante, at 279–
280. With this understanding, I join the Court's opinion.
Justice Gorsuch, concurring.
George Sheetz sued El Dorado County, alleging that the
county's actions violated the Takings Clause under the test
this Court set forth in Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U. S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U. S. 374 (1994). State courts dismissed Mr. Sheetz's
suit, holding that the Nollan/Dolan test applies only in chal-
lenges to administrative, not legislative, actions. Today, the
county essentially confesses error, and the Court corrects
the state courts' mistake. It does so because our Constitu-
tion deals in substance, not form. However the government
chooses to act, whether by way of regulation “ `or statute, or
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282 SHEETZ
v. COUNTY OF EL DORADO
Gorsuch, J., concurring
ordinance, or miscellaneous decree,' ” it must follow the same
constituti
onal rules. Ante, at 278 (quoting Cedar Point
Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U. S. 139, 149 (2021)).
The Court notes but does not address a separate question:
whether the Nollan/Dolan test operates differently when an
alleged taking affects a “class of properties” rather than “a
particular development.” Ante, at 280. But how could it?
To assess whether a government has engaged in a taking by
imposing a condition on the development of land, the Nollan/
Dolan test asks whether the condition in question bears an
“ `essential nexus' ” to the government's land-use interest and
has “ `rough proportionality' ” to a property's impact on that
interest. Ante, at 275. Nothing about that test depends on
whether the government imposes the challenged condition
on a large class of properties or a single tract or something
in between. Once more, how the government acts may vary
but the Constitution's standard for assessing those actions
does not.
Our precedents confrm as much. In Nollan, the Califor-
nia Coastal Commission told the plaintiffs that they could
build a home on their land only if they accepted an easement
allowing public access across their property along the beach.
The plaintiffs argued that the commission's demand
amounted to a taking without just compensation, and the
Court agreed. In doing so, the Court acknowledged that the
commission hadn't singled out the plaintiffs' particular prop-
erty for special treatment but “had similarly conditioned”
dozens of other building projects. 483 U. S., at 829. It ac-
knowledged, too, that the commission's demand of the plain-
tiffs came about only because of a “ `comprehensive pro-
gram' ” demanding similar public access easements up and
down the California coast. Id., at 841. But none of that
made any difference in the Court's analysis, the test it ap-
plied, or the conclusion it reached. All that mattered was
whether the government's action amounted to an uncompen-
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283
Gorsuch, J., concurring
sated taking of the property of the plaintiffs whose case was
ac
tually before the Court. Id., at 838.
In Dolan, the Court faced a similar situation and reached
a similar conclusion. There, an Oregon municipality condi-
tioned a building permit on the plaintiff 's agreement to dedi-
cate part of her land to “food control and traffc improve-
ments.” 512 U. S., at 377. No one suggested that the city
had targeted the plaintiff's development for special treat-
ment; everyone agreed that the city's challenged action was
the result of a “comprehensive land use pla[n],” one devel-
oped to meet “statewide planning goals.” Ibid. Even so,
the Court held an “individualized determination” necessary
to determine whether an unconstitutional taking had oc-
curred under the same test the Court applied in Nollan.
512 U. S., at 393.
The logic of today's decision is entirely consistent with
these conclusions. The Takings Clause, the Court stresses,
is no “ `poor relation' to other constitutional rights.” Ante,
at 279 (quoting Dolan, 512 U. S., at 392). And the govern-
ment rarely mitigates a constitutional problem by multiply-
ing it. A governmentally imposed condition on the free-
dom of speech, the right to assemble, or the right to confront
one's accuser, for example, is no more permissible when en-
forced against a large “class” of persons than it is when en-
forced against a “particular” group. If takings claims must
receive “like treatment,” ante, at 279, whether the govern-
ment owes just compensation for taking your property can-
not depend on whether it has taken your neighbors' prop-
erty too.
In short, nothing in Nollan, Dolan, or today's decision
supports distinguishing between government actions against
the many and the few any more than it supports distinguish-
ing between legislative and administrative actions. In all
these settings, the same constitutional rules apply. With
that understanding, I am pleased to join the Court's opinion.
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284 SHEETZ
v. COUNTY OF EL DORADO
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
Justice Kavanaugh, with whom Justice Kagan and
Justice
Jackson join, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion. I write separately to under-
score that the Court has not previously decided—and today
explicitly declines to decide—whether “a permit condition
imposed on a class of properties must be tailored with the
same degree of specifcity as a permit condition that targets
a particular development.” Ante, at 280. Importantly,
therefore, today's decision does not address or prohibit the
common government practice of imposing permit conditions,
such as impact fees, on new developments through reason-
able formulas or schedules that assess the impact of classes
of development rather than the impact of specifc parcels of
property. Moreover, as is apparent from the fact that to-
day's decision expressly leaves the question open, no prior
decision of this Court has addressed or prohibited that long-
standing government practice. Both Nollan and Dolan con-
sidered permit conditions tailored to specifc parcels of prop-
erty. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374, 379–381,
393 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U. S.
825, 828–829 (1987). Those decisions had no occasion to ad-
dress permit conditions, such as impact fees, that are im-
posed on permit applicants based on reasonable formulas or
schedules that assess the impact of classes of development.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None