Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 599 U. S. Part 1
Pages 382–418
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 15, 2023
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
Page Proof Pending Publication
N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

382 OCTOBER
TERM, 2022
Syllabus
LAC du FLAMBEAU BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR
CHIPPEW
A INDIANS et al. v. COUGHLIN
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the rst circuit
No. 22–227. Argued April 24, 2023—Decided June 15, 2023
Petitioner Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians
(the Band) is a federally recognized Indian tribe. One of the Band's
businesses, Lendgreen, extended respondent Brian Coughlin a payday
loan. Shortly after receiving the loan, Coughlin fled for Chapter 13
bankruptcy, triggering an automatic stay under the Bankruptcy Code
against further collection efforts by his creditors. But Lendgreen al-
legedly continued attempting to collect Coughlin's debt. Coughlin fled
a motion in Bankruptcy Court to enforce the automatic stay and recover
damages. The Bankruptcy Court dismissed the suit on tribal sovereign
immunity grounds. The First Circuit reversed, concluding that the
Code “unequivocally strips tribes of their immunity.” 33 F. 4th 600,
603.
Held: The Bankruptcy Code unambiguously abrogates the sovereign im-
munity of all governments, including federally recognized Indian tribes.
Pp. 386–399.
(a) Two provisions of the Bankruptcy Code lie at the heart of this
case. The frst, 11 U. S. C. § 106(a), expressly abrogates the sovereign
immunity of “governmental unit[s]” for enumerated purposes. The sec-
ond, § 101(27), defnes “governmental unit” as “United States; State;
Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipality; foreign state; depart-
ment, agency, or instrumentality of the United States . . . , a State, a
Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state;
or other foreign or domestic government.” In order for these provi-
sions to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity, Congress “must [have
made] its intent . . . `unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.' ”
Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for P. R. v. Centro De Peri-
odismo Investigativo, Inc., 598 U. S. 339, 346. If the statute can plausi-
bly be read to preserve sovereign immunity, Congress has not unambig-
uously expressed the requisite intent. FAA v. Cooper, 566 U. S. 284,
290. But Congress need not use any particular words to pass this clear-
statement test. Pp. 386–388.
(b) The Bankruptcy Code unequivocally abrogates the sovereign im-
munity of any and every government with the power to assert such
immunity. Because federally recognized tribes unquestionably ft that
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 599 U. S. 382 (2023)
383
Syllabus
description, the Code's abrogation provision plainly applies to them as
wel
l. Pp. 388–399.
(1) Several features of the statute's text and structure point the
way. To start, the defnition of “governmental unit” exudes comprehen-
siveness. It begins with a long list of governments, varying in location,
nature, and size. It then proceeds to capture subdivisions and compo-
nents of every government in that list. And it concludes with a broad
catchall phrase, sweeping in “other foreign or domestic government[s].”
§ 101(27). Moreover, the catchall phrase's pairing of extremes—i.e.,
“foreign or domestic”—appearing at the end of an extensive list unam-
biguously indicates Congress's intent to cover all governments in
§ 101(27)'s defnition. The abrogation provision in § 106(a) in turn ap-
plies to every “governmental unit” in § 101(27). It does not cherry-pick
certain types of governments from that capacious list. Pp. 388–390.
(2) Other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code reinforce § 106(a)'s and
§ 101(27)'s plain text. To facilitate an “orderly and centralized” debt-
resolution process, 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶1.01 (16th ed. 2023), the
Code includes a number of requirements, like the automatic stay provi-
sion, that generally apply to all creditors. These basic requirements
can be enforced against all kinds of creditors, whether the creditor is
a governmental unit or not. At the same time, the Code contains lim-
ited exceptions to avoid impeding the functioning of governmental enti-
ties when they act as creditors. See, e. g., § 362(b)(4). Reading the
statute to carve out certain governments from the defnition of “gov-
er nment a l unit”—as petiti oners wou ld have the Cour t do —r isks
upending the policy choices that the Code embodies. And there is no
indication that Congress meant to categorically exclude certain govern-
ments from these provisions' enforcement mechanisms and exceptions.
Pp. 390–392.
(3) Federally recog nized tribes are indisputably governments.
They exercise uniquely governmental functions, and both Congress and
this Court have repeatedly characterized them as governments. Ac-
cordingly, because the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally abrogates the
sovereign immunity of all governments, and tribes undoubtedly count
as governments, the Code unmistakably abrogates tribal sovereign im-
munity. Pp. 392–393.
(c) Petitioners fail to sow doubt into these clear statutory provisions.
Pp. 393–399.
(1) Petitioners insist that neither § 101(27) nor § 106(a) mentions
tribes by name. But Congress need not use any particular words to
make its abrogation intent clear. Cooper, 566 U. S., at 291. And the
fact that Congress has referenced tribes specifcally in other statutes

Page Proof Pending Publication
384 LA
C du FLAMBEAU BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR
CHIPPEWA INDIANS v. COUGHLIN
Syllabus
abrogating tribal sovereign immunity does not foreclose it from using
di
fferent language to accomplish that same goal in other statutory con-
texts. Pp. 393–395.
(2) Petitioners also contend that the catchall phrase “other foreign
or domestic government” can plausibly be read to include only entities
that are purely foreign “or” purely domestic. In petitioners' view, the
catchall phrase would thus exclude tribes or other governments that
have foreign and domestic features. But Congress has expressly in-
structed that the word “or,” as used in the Code, “is not exclusive.”
§ 102(5). In any event, petitioners do not explain why the Bankruptcy
Code would draw such a line in the sand.
Finally, petitioners suggest that Congress has historically treated
various types of governments differently for purposes of bankruptcy
law, relying on provisions preceding the Bankruptcy Code's enactment.
Yet petitioners fail to demonstrate that the Code—which comprehen-
sively revised bankruptcy practice—carried forward any such differen-
tial treatment. Pp. 395–399.
33 F. 4th 600, affrmed.
Jackson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ.,
joined. Thomas, J., fled an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p.
399. Gorsuch, J., fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 402.
Pratik A. Shah argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Z. W. Julius Chen, Lide E. Paterno,
Andrew Adams III, Patrick McAndrews, Zachary R. G.
Fairlie, and Andrew W. Lester.
Gregory G. Rapawy argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Matthew N. Drecun, Terrie L.
Harman, and Richard N. Gottlieb.
Austin L. Raynor argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging affrmance. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Prelogar, Principal Deputy Assist-
ant Attorney General Boynton, Deputy Solicitor General
Kneedler, Mark B. Stern, and Martin Totaro.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for Indian Law Pro-
fessors by April Youpee-Roll, Matthew L. M. Fletcher, pro se, and Kaighn
Smith, Jr.; and for the Navajo Nation et al. by Naomi J. Barnes, Paul

Cite
as: 599 U. S. 382 (2023)
385
Opinion of the Court
Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court.
The
Bankruptcy Code expressly abrogates the sovereign
immunity of “governmental unit[s]” for specifed purposes.
11 U. S. C. § 106(a). The question presented in this case is
whether that express abrogation extends to federally recog-
nized Indian tribes. Under our precedents, we will not fnd
an abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity unless Congress
has conveyed its intent to abrogate in unequivocal terms.
That is a high bar. But for the reasons explained below, we
fnd it has been satisfed here.
I
Petitioner Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chip-
pewa Indians (the Band) is a federally recognized Tribe that
wholly owns several business entities. In 2019, one of the
Band's businesses, Lendgreen, allowed respondent Brian
Coughlin to borrow $1,100 in the form of a high-interest,
short-term loan. But Coughlin fled for Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy before he fully repaid the loan.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, Coughlin's fling of the bank-
ruptcy petition triggered an automatic stay against further
collection efforts by creditors, including Lendgreen. See
§ 362(a). Yet, according to Coughlin, Lendgreen continued
its efforts to collect on his debt, even after it was reminded
of the pending bankruptcy petition. Coughlin alleges that
Lendgreen was so aggressive in its efforts to contact him and
collect the money that he suffered substantial emotional dis-
tress, and at one point, even attempted to take his own life.
Spruhan, Louis Mallette, Sage Metoxen, John T. Plata, Joseph H. Webster,
Kaitlyn E. Klass, and Gregory A. Smith.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Citizens
Equal Rights Foundation by Lawrence A. Kogan; for NACBA et al. by G.
Eric Brunstad, Jr., David A. Herman, and Daniel J. Bussel; for Public
Citizen et al. by Allison M. Zieve and Scott L. Nelson; and for the Separa-
tion of Powers Clinic by R. Trent McCotter.
Page Proof Pending Publication

386 LA
C du FLAMBEAU BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR
CHIPPEWA INDIANS v. COUGHLIN
Opinion of the Court
Coughlin eventually fled a motion in Bankruptcy Court,
seek
ing to have the stay enforced against Lendgreen, its par-
ent corporations, and the Band (collectively, petitioners).
Coughlin also sought damages for emotional distress, along
with costs and attorney's fees. See § 362(k) (providing a
damages award to individuals injured by willful violations of
the automatic stay).
Petitioners moved to dismiss. They argued that the
Bankruptcy Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over
Coughlin's enforcement proceeding, as the Band and its sub-
sidiaries enjoyed tribal sovereign immunity from suit.
1
The
Bankruptcy Court agreed; it held that the suit had to be
dismissed because the Bankruptcy Code did not clearly
express Congress's intent to abrogate tr iba l sovereig n
immunity.
In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit reversed, concluding that the Bankruptcy Code “un-
equivocally strips tribes of their immunity.” In re Cough-
lin, 33 F. 4th 600, 603–604 (2022). In so holding, the First
Circuit deepened a split among the Courts of Appeals on this
question. Compare Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation,
357 F. 3d 1055, 1061 (CA9 2004) (holding that the Bankruptcy
Code abrogates tribal sovereign immunity), with In re
Greektown Holdings, LLC, 917 F. 3d 451, 460–461 (CA6 2019)
(concluding the reverse). We granted certiorari to address
the lower courts' inconsistent holdings. 598 U. S. ––– (2023).
II
A
Two provisions of the Bankruptcy Code lie at the crux
of this case. The frst—11 U. S. C. § 106(a)—abrogates the
1
It is undisputed in this case, and we assume herein, that the Band's
subsidiaries are arms of the Tribe and enjoy the Band's sovereign immu-
nity. In re Coughlin, 33 F. 4th 600, 604, n. 1 (CA1 2022); In re Coughlin,
622 B. R. 491, 493 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Mass. 2020).
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 599 U. S. 382 (2023)
387
Opinion of the Court
sovereign immunity of “governmental unit[s].” It provides:
“N
otwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sover-
eign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the
extent set forth in this section.” Section 106(a) goes on to
enumerate a list of Code provisions to which the abrogation
applies, including the provision governing automatic stays.
The second relevant provision is § 101(27). That provision
defnes “governmental unit” for purposes of the Code. It
states that that term
“means United States; State; Commonwealth; District;
Terr itory; municipa lity; foreig n state; depar tment,
agency, or instrumentality of the United States (but not
a United States trustee while serving as a trustee in a
case under this title), a State, a Commonwealth, a Dis-
trict, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state; or
other foreign or domestic government.”
The central question before us is whether the abrogation
provision in § 106(a) and the defnition of “governmental
unit” in § 101(27), taken together, unambiguously abrogate
the sovereign immunity of federally recognized tribes.
B
To “abrogate sovereign immunity,” Congress “must make
its intent . . . `unmistakably clear in the language of the stat-
ute.' ” Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for P. R.
v. Cen tro De Pe r iod ismo Inv est i ga t i vo, Inc., 598 U. S.
339, 346 (2023). This well-settled rule applies to federally
recognized tribes no less than other defendants with sover-
eign immunity. Ibid. We have held that tribes possess the
“common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by
sovereign powers.” Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U. S. 49, 58 (1978). Our cases have thus repeatedly empha-
sized that tribal sovereign immunity, absent a clear state-
ment of congressional intent to the contrary, is the “baseline
position.” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572
U. S. 782, 790 (2014).
Page Proof Pending Publication

388 LA
C du FLAMBEAU BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR
CHIPPEWA INDIANS v. COUGHLIN
Opinion of the Court
This clear-statement rule is a demanding standard. If
“
there is a plausible interpretation of the statute” that pre-
serves sovereign immunity, Congress has not unambiguously
expressed the requisite intent. FAA v. Cooper, 566 U. S.
284, 290 (2012); accord, United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.,
503 U. S. 30, 37 (1992).
The rule is not a magic-words requirement, however. To
abrogate sovereign immunity unambiguously, “Congress
need not state its intent in any particular way.” Cooper, 566
U. S., at 291. Nor need Congress “make its clear statement
in a single [statutory] section.” Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Re-
gents, 528 U. S. 62, 76 (2000). The clear-statement question
is simply whether, upon applying “traditional” tools of statu-
tory interpretation, Congress's abrogation of tribal sover-
eign immunity is “clearly discernable” from the statute itself.
Cooper, 566 U. S., at 291.
III
We conclude that the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally ab-
rogates the sovereign immunity of any and every govern-
ment that possesses the power to assert such immunity.
Federally recognized tribes undeniably ft that description;
therefore, the Code's abrogation provision plainly applies to
them as well.
A
Several features of the provisions' text and structure com-
pel this conclusion.
As an initial matter, the defnition of “governmental unit”
exudes comprehensiveness from beginning to end. Con-
gress has rattled off a long list of governments that vary
in geographic location, size, and nature. § 101(27) (including
municipa l ities, distr icts, Terr itor ies, Commonwea lths,
States, the United States, and foreign states). The provi-
sion then proceeds to capture subdivisions and components
of every government within that list. Ibid. (accounting for
any “department, agency, or instrumentality of the United
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 599 U. S. 382 (2023)
389
Opinion of the Court
States . . . , a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a Territory,
a
municipality, or a foreign state”). And it concludes with a
broad catchall phrase, sweeping in “other foreign or domestic
government[s].” Ibid.
When faced with analogously structured provisions in
other contexts, we have noted their all-encompassing scope.
See, e. g., Taylor v. United States, 579 U. S. 301, 305–306
(2016) (characterizing as “unmistakably broad” a criminal
statute defning “commerce” to include a list of specifc in-
stances in which the Federal Government would have juris-
diction, followed by a broad residual phrase); see also Mari-
etta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Beneft Plan v.
DaVita Inc., 596 U. S. –––, –––, n. 1 (2022) (similar). We fnd
the strikingly broad scope of § 101(27)'s defnition of “govern-
mental unit” to be signifcant in this context as well.
The catchall phrase Congress used in § 101(27) is also nota-
ble in and of itself. Few phrases in the English language
express all-inclusiveness more than the pairing of two ex-
tremes. “Rain or shine” is a classic example: If an event is
scheduled to occur rain or shine, it will take place whatever
the weather that day might be. Same with the phrase “near
and far”: If people are traveling from near and far, they are
coming from all over the map, regardless of the particular
distance from point A to point B.
The pairing of “foreign” with “domestic” is of a piece with
those other common expressions. For instance, if someone
asks you to identify car manufacturers, “foreign or domes-
tic,” your task is to name any and all manufacturers that
come to mind, without particular regard to where exactly the
cars are made or the location of the companies' headquarters.
Similarly, at the start of each Congress, a cadre of newly
elected offcials “ `solemnly swear' ” to “ `support and defend
the Constitution of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic.' ” 5 U. S. C. § 3331. That oath—
which each Member of Congress who enacted the Bank-
ruptcy Code took—indisputably pertains to enemies any-
Page Proof Pending Publication

390 LA
C du FLAMBEAU BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR
CHIPPEWA INDIANS v. COUGHLIN
Opinion of the Court
where in the world. Accordingly, we fnd that, by coupling
foreig
n and domestic together, and placing the pair at the
end of an extensive list, Congress unmistakably intended to
cover all governments in § 101(27)'s defnition, whatever
their location, nature, or type.
It is also signifcant that the abrogation of sovereign im-
munity in § 106(a) plainly applies to all “governmental
unit[s]” as defned by § 101(27). Congress did not cherry-
pick certain governments from § 101(27)'s capacious list and
only abrogate immunity with respect to those it had so se-
lected. Nor did Congress suggest that, for purposes of
§ 106(a)'s abrogation of sovereign immunity, some types
of governments should be treated differently than others.
Instead, Congress categorically abrogated the sovereign im-
munity of any governmental unit that might attempt to as-
sert it.
B
Other aspects of the Bankruptcy Code reinforce what
§ 106(a)'s and § 101(27)'s plain text conveys.
Through various provisions, the Bankruptcy Code offers
debtors a fresh start by discharging and restructuring their
debts in an “orderly and centralized” fashion. See, e. g., 1
Collier on Bankruptcy ¶1.01 (16th ed. 2023); Lamar, Ar-
cher & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 584 U. S. –––, ––– (2018).
The automatic-stay requirement, for example, keeps credi-
tors from “dismember[ing]” the estate while the bankruptcy
case proceeds. Chicago v. Fulton, 592 U. S. –––, ––– (2021);
11 U. S. C. § 362. The Code's discharge provision enjoins
creditors from try i ng to col lec t debts that have been
discharged in a bankruptcy case. § 524(a). And its plan-
confrmation provisions, as relevant here, “bind . . . each
creditor” to whatever repayment plan the bankruptcy court
approves, “whether or not the claim of such creditor is
provided for by the plan, and whether or not such creditor
has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan.”
§ 1327(a); see also, e. g., §§ 1141(a), 1227(a).
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 599 U. S. 382 (2023)
391
Opinion of the Court
These protections sweep broadly, by their own terms. To
faci
litate the Code's “orderly and centralized” debt-resolution
process, Collier on Bankruptcy ¶1.01, these provisions' basic
requirements generally apply to all creditors.
2
Courts can
also enforce these requirements against any kind of noncom-
pliant creditor—whether or not the creditor is a “govern-
mental unit”—by virtue of § 106(a)'s abrogation of sovereign
immunity. §§ 106(a)(1)–(3).
At the same time, so as to avoid impeding the functioning
of governmental entities when they act as creditors, the
Code contains a number of limited exceptions. For instance,
the automatic-stay requirement does not preclude “govern-
mental unit[s]” from enforcing their “police and regulatory
power[s]” in certain proceedings, § 362(b)(4), or from pur-
suing specifc tax-related activities, §§ 362(b)(9), (18), (26).
The Code additionally exempts from discharge certain debts
for a “fne, penalty, or forfeiture” owed to a “governmental
unit.” § 523(a)(7).
Reading the statute to carve out a subset of governments
from the defnition of “governmental unit,” as petitioners'
view of the statute would require, risks upending the policy
choices that the Code embodies in this regard. That is, de-
spite the fact that the Code generally subjects all creditors
(including governmental units) to certain overarching re-
quirements, under petitioners' reading, some government
creditors would be immune from key enforcement proceed-
ings while others would face penalties for their noncompli-
ance. And while the Code is fnely tuned to accommodate
2
11 U. S. C. § 362(a) (the fling of a bankruptcy petition “operates as a
stay, applicable to all entities” (emphasis added)); § 362(b) (providing lim-
ited exceptions to the automatic-stay provision, none of which categori-
cally exclude a certain type of creditor for all purposes); § 524(a)(2) (the
discharge of a debt “operates as an injunction against the commencement
or continuation of an action . . . to collect, recover or offset any [dis-
charged] debt as a personal liability of the debtor” (emphasis added));
§ 1327(a) (“The provisions of a confrmed plan bind the debtor and each
creditor” (emphasis added)).
Page Proof Pending Publication

392 LA
C du FLAMBEAU BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR
CHIPPEWA INDIANS v. COUGHLIN
Opinion of the Court
essential governmental functions (like tax administration
and
regulation) as a general matter, petitioners would have
us fnd that certain governments are excluded from those
provisions' reach, notwithstanding the fact that they engage
in tax and regulatory activities too. There is no indication
that Congress meant to categorically exclude certain govern-
ments from these provisions' enforcement mechanisms and
exceptions, let alone in such an anomalous manner. Cf. Law
v. Siegel, 571 U. S. 415, 424 (2014) (declining to read into the
Code an exception Congress did not include in its “meticu-
lous” and “carefully calibrated” scheme).
C
Our conclusion that all government creditors are subject
to abrogation under § 106(a) brings one remaining question
to the fore—whether federally recognized tribes qualify as
governments. Petitioners do not seriously dispute that fed-
erally recognized tribes are governments, and for good rea-
son. Federally recognized tribes exercise uniquely govern-
mental functions: “They have power to make their own
substantive law in internal matters, and to enforce that law
in their own forums.” Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U. S., at
55–56 (citations omitted). They can also “tax activities on
the reservation.” Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family
Land & Cattle Co., 554 U. S. 316, 327 (2008).
It is thus no surprise that Congress has repeatedly charac-
terized tribes as governments.
3
And this Court has long
3
See, e. g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act,
§ 104(a)(1), 88 Stat. 2207 (referring to “the strengthening or improvement
of tribal government”); Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994, §§ 202(2),
(5)(A), 108 Stat. 4271 (“recogniz[ing] a special government-to-government
relationship with Indian tribes,” and “transferring control to tribal gov-
ernments . . . over funding and decisionmaking for Federal programs”);
Compact of Self-Governance Between the Duckwater Shoshone Tribe and
the United States of America, Art. I, § 2(c) (1995) (explaining that the
Compact would allow the Tribe to “take its rightful place in the family of
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 599 U. S. 382 (2023)
393
Opinion of the Court
recognized tribes' governmental status as well. See, e. g.,
Bay
Mills, 572 U. S., at 788–789; Santa Clara Pueblo, 436
U. S., at 57–58. We have done so generally and also in the
specifc context of tribal sovereign immunity. Tribal sover-
eign immunity, “we have explained, is `a necessary corollary
to Indian sovereignty and self-governance.' ” Bay Mills, 572
U. S., at 788; see also id., at 789 (discussing immunity as an
example of tribes' “governmental powers and attributes”).
Putting the pieces together, our analysis of the question
whether the Code abrogates the sovereign immunity of fed-
erally recognized tribes is remarkably straightforward.
The Code unequivocally abrogates the sovereign immunity
of all governments, categorically. Tribes are indisputably
governments. Therefore, § 106(a) unmistakably abrogates
their sovereign immunity too.
4
IV
Petitioners raise two main arguments in an attempt to sow
doubt into these clear statutory provisions. Neither creates
the ambiguity petitioners seek.
A
For their opening salvo, petitioners try to make hay out of
the simple fact that neither § 101(27) nor § 106(a) mentions
Indian tribes by name. Had Congress wanted to abrogate
tribal sovereign immunity, petitioners claim, the most natu-
ral and obvious way to have expressed that intent would
have been to reference Indian tribes specifcally, rather than
smuggle them into a broadly worded catchall phrase.
governments in the federal constitutional system,” and “reorganize tribal
government programs and services”).
4
Given this holding, we need not decide whether tribes qualify as purely
“domestic” governments. Compare Brief for Petitioners 33 (insisting
tribes are not clearly domestic governments), and post, at 406–412 (Gor-
such, J., dissenting) (similar), with Brief for Respondent 40–41 (contend-
ing that they are). See also in fra, at 395–397.
Page Proof Pending Publication

394 LA
C du FLAMBEAU BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR
CHIPPEWA INDIANS v. COUGHLIN
Opinion of the Court
But, as explained at the outset, supra, at 388, the clear-
st
atement rule is not a magic-words requirement. Thus,
Congress did not have to include a specifc reference to feder-
ally recognized tribes in order to make clear that it intended
for tribes to be covered by the abrogation provision. As
long as Congress speaks unequivocally, it passes the clear-
statement test—regardless of whether it articulated its intent
in the most straightforward way. Cooper, 566 U. S., at 291.
Trying a different tack, petitioners point to historical prac-
tice. In statute after statute, they say, Congress has spe-
cifcally mentioned Indian tribes when abrogating their sov-
ereign immunity. And in no case has this Court ever found
an abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity where the stat-
ute did not reference Indian tribes explicitly. See Brief for
Petitioners 24–26.
These statistics sound quite noteworthy at frst glance.
But they do not move the needle in this case. For one thing,
none of petitioners' cited examples involved a statutory pro-
vision that was worded analogously to, and structured like,
the ones at issue here.
5
Moreover, the universe of cases in
which we have addressed federal statutes abrogating tribal
sovereign immunity is exceedingly slim.
6
5
Petitioners rely, for instance, on the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act of 1976, which authorizes a “person” to “commence a civil action.”
42 U. S. C. § 6972(a). “Person” is defned under that statute to include a
“municipality,” which is in turn defned to encompass “a city, town, bor-
ough, county, parish, district, or other public body created by or pursuant
to State law . . . or an Indian tribe or authorized tribal organization.”
§§ 6903(13), (15); see also Brief for Petitioners 25 (citing similar provisions).
The fact that Congress mentioned Indian tribes specifcally when including
them in the category of a “person” or “municipality” says little about Con-
gress's purported need to name Indian tribes when referring to them as a
“governmental unit” or “other foreign or domestic government.”
6
The parties' briefng identifes only two cases. See Michigan v. Bay
Mills Indian Community, 572 U. S. 782, 791 (2014) (recognizing partial
abrogation); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309
U. S. 506, 513 (1940).
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 599 U. S. 382 (2023)
395
Opinion of the Court
In any event, the fact that Congress has referenced tribes
speci
fcally in some statutes abrogating tribal sovereign im-
munity does not foreclose it from using different language
to accomplish that same goal in other statutory contexts.
Even petitioners appear to concede this basic point. They
agree that Congress could have used a phrase like “every
government” or “any government with sovereign immunity”
to express unambiguously the requisite intent to abrogate
the sovereign immunity of tribes. Id., at 27 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). For the reasons discussed above, we
believe Congress did just that.
B
Petitioners further contend that even if the relevant provi-
sions could theoretically cover tribes, the statute can plausi-
bly be read in a way that preserves their immunity.
1
According to petitioners, the catchall phrase “other foreign
or domestic government” might simply capture entities cre-
ated through “interstate compacts,” which cannot neatly be
characterized as a State or an instrumentality of a State
under § 101(27)'s enumerated list. Id., at 40–41 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Interpreted in that fashion, peti-
tioners maintain, the catchall phrase would exclude govern-
mental entities that are not purely foreign or purely domes-
tic—like tribes or the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Tr. of Oral Arg. 8–9.
If this interpretation of the statute sounds far-fetched,
that is because it is. To fnd petitioners' construction plausi-
ble, we would have to interpret “other foreign or domestic
government” to impose a rigid division between foreign
governments on the one hand and domestic governments on
the other, leaving out any governmental entity that may
have both foreign and domestic characteristics (like tribes or
the IMF). But Congress has expressly instructed that the
Page Proof Pending Publication

396 LA
C du FLAMBEAU BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR
CHIPPEWA INDIANS v. COUGHLIN
Opinion of the Court
word “or,” as used in the Code, “is not exclusive.” 11
U
. S. C. § 102(5). As a result, we have serious doubts that
Congress meant for § 101(27) to elicit the laser focus on “or”
that petitioners' reading of “foreign or domestic” would
entail.
7
The dissent's own arguments undermine any suggestion
that Congress adopted such a siloed view. For instance, the
dissent repeatedly paints tribes as occupying a hybrid posi-
tion between foreign and domestic, post, at 407, 409–410
(opinion of Gorsuch, J.), and posits that Territories histori-
cally share this hybrid status as well, post, at 411 (describing
Territories as tribes' “close comparator”). Yet, as the dis-
sent readily acknowledges, Congress expressly included Ter-
ritories within § 101(27)'s defnition of “governmental unit.”
If, on the dissent's own account, Territories are “neither for-
eign nor domestic,” ibid.—and fall within § 101(27)'s purview
nevertheless—it is hard to see how § 101(27)'s catchall phrase
would simultaneously exclude other entities that share that
same feature. § 101(27) (“ `governmental unit' means United
States; State; . . . Territory; . . . foreign state; or other foreign
or domestic government” (emphasis added)).
7
Our dissenting colleague puts forth two hypotheticals that supposedly
cast doubt on this conclusion. See post, at 414–415 (opinion of Gorsuch,
J.). The frst involves choosing a pet that is “ `small or a dog,' ” while the
second concerns an offer to have “chocolate or vanilla” ice cream. Ibid.
But these hypotheticals are not remotely analogous to “foreign or domes-
tic.” For one thing, the terms “foreign” and “domestic” are two poles
on a spectrum. See supra, at 389–390. Neither “small” and “dog ” nor
“chocolate” and “vanilla” ft that bill. For another, whereas the pairing
of “foreign” and “domestic” often covers the waterfront, see ibid., the
dissent's hypothetical pairings do not have that same effect. And unlike
animals (which need not be small or doglike) or ice creams (which need
not be chocolate or vanilla), every government must be foreign or domestic
to some degree; the question is just where on the spectrum it falls. See
post, at 407 (observing that the Constitution “appear[s] to `place Indian
[T]r ibes i n an i nter mediate category between foreig n and domestic
states' ”); post, at 409 (tribes occupy a “ `hybrid position' between `foreign
and domestic states' ”).
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 599 U. S. 382 (2023)
397
Opinion of the Court
In any case, neither petitioners nor the dissent explain
why
the Code would draw such a line in the sand. None of
the carefully calibrated exceptions noted in Part III–B,
supra, for governmental units performing regulatory and
tax-related functions turn on whether a government is
purely foreign or domestic. Likewise, it is hard to see why
the Code would subject purely foreign or domestic govern-
ments to enforcement proceedings while at the same time
immunizing government creditors that have both foreign and
domestic attributes. Considering that the one thing every
entity in § 101(27)'s enumerated list has in common is its gov-
ernmental nature—and that is the same characteristic that
matters when the Code addresses “governmental unit[s]”
from one provision to the next
8
—we are highly skeptical that
Congress distinguished between governments in the way
petitioners suggest.
2
Undaunted, petitioners note that Congress has historically
treated various types of governments differently for pur-
poses of bankruptcy law. Tr. of Oral Arg. 14–15; Reply
Brief 21. They assert that, in the decades leading up to the
Bankruptcy Code's enactment, bankruptcy law afforded cer-
tain benefts to “ `the United States or any State or any sub-
division thereof,' ” leaving out entities that did not fall into
one of those enumerated categories. Reply Brief 21 (quot-
ing § 64(a)(4), 52 Stat. 874).
Even if petitioners' understanding of this history is cor-
rect, they have failed to demonstrate that the Code carried
8
For example, the Code defnes “domestic support obligation” to include
debts “owed to or recoverable by” spouses as well as “governmental
unit[s].” § 101(14A). And the term “person” covers an “individual, part-
nership, and corporation,” as well as a “governmental unit that . . . ac-
quires an asset from a person . . . as a result of the operation of a loan
guarantee agreement” or “as receiver or liquidating agent of a person.”
§ 101(41). The main feature that sets “governmental unit[s]” apart from
other entities mentioned in these defnitions is their governmental nature.
Page Proof Pending Publication

398 LA
C du FLAMBEAU BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR
CHIPPEWA INDIANS v. COUGHLIN
Opinion of the Court
forward any such differential treatment. Congress ushered
i
n “a new, unprecedented era in bankruptcy practice” when
it enacted the Code in 1978. 1 W. Norton, Bankruptcy Law
and Practice § 1:9, p. 1-17 (3d ed. 2023); Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50, 52–53
(1982) (plurality opinion) (describing the Code as “a compre-
hensive revision of the bankruptcy laws”). Both § 101(27)'s
defnition of “governmental unit” and § 106(a)'s abrogation of
sovereign immunity were some of the many changes Con-
gress made. The prior statute did not provide a general
defnition for governmental entities, much less include any
provision expressly abrogating governments' sovereign im-
munity. Instead, it set forth a general defnition for
“States,” which encompassed Territories, possessions, and
the District of Columbia. 52 Stat. 842. Then, in each provi-
sion where governmental entities were relevant, Congress
specifed the particular governmental entities to which that
provision pertained. See, e. g., § 17(1), id., at 851 (exempting
from discharge debts “due as a tax levied by the United
States, or any State, county, district, or municipality”); id.,
at 874 (providing priority status to “the United States or
any State or any subdivision thereof ”).
Section 101(27)'s defnition of “governmental unit” has an
undeniably broader reach than the statutory provisions that
preceded it. Section 101(27)'s defnition includes, for in-
stance, foreign countries and instrumentalities, when such
entities had generally been previously absent. And the ex-
pansive defnition of “governmental unit” in § 101(27) applies
throughout the Bankruptcy Code. In addition, for those
who fnd legislative history useful, the Senate and House Re-
ports that accompanied the Code indicate that “governmen-
tal unit” was intended to be defned “in the broadest sense.”
S. Rep. No. 95–989, p. 24 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95–595, p. 311
(1977). When Congress later added § 106(a)'s abrogation
provision, it was that comprehensive defnition of govern-
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 599 U. S. 382 (2023)
399
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
mental unit that Congress used to specify the scope of the
abrogati
on's sweep.
Thus, however Congress may have treated governmental
entities in bankruptcy law prior to 1978, it had clearly al-
tered its view about the scope of coverage relative to govern-
ments by the time it enacted § 101(27) and § 106(a). Those
provisions unequivocally extend to all governments, for the
reasons already discussed, and we decline to read ambiguity
into the statute where none exists.
***
We fnd that the First Circuit correctly concluded that the
Bankruptcy Code unambiguously abrogates tribal sovereign
immunity. Therefore, the decision below is affrmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment.
As I have explained, to the extent that tribes possess sov-
ereign immunity at all, that immunity does not extend to
“suits arising out of a tribe's commercial activities conducted
beyond its territory.” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Com-
munity, 572 U. S. 782, 815 (2014) (dissenting opinion). Be-
cause respondent's stay-enforcement motion arose from peti-
tioners' off-reservation commercial conduct, petitioners lack
sovereign immunity regardless of the Bankruptcy Code's
abrogation provision. I therefore concur in the Court's
judgment.
“Tribal immunity is a judicial doctrine that is not man-
dated by the Constitution, . . . developed almost by accident,
was reiterated with little analysis, and does not refect the
realities of modern-day Indian tribes.” Upper Skagit Tribe
v. Lundgren, 584 U. S. –––, ––– (2018) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (internal quotation marks omitted). To the extent that
tribes have any sovereign immunity at all, it is a common-
Page Proof Pending Publication

400 LA
C du FLAMBEAU BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR
CHIPPEWA INDIANS v. COUGHLIN
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
law immunity. Bay Mills, 572 U. S., at 816–817. Unlike
the
sovereign immunity enjoyed by the States under the
Constitution, common-law immunity “is not a freestanding
right that applies of its own force when a sovereign faces
suit in the courts of another.” Id., at 816 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Rather, it “normally depends on the sec-
ond sovereign's law” as a matter of comity. Ibid. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Because no federal law accords
tribes sovereign immunity in federal court, petitioners lack
immunity in this federal case.
Moreover, even if federal courts could afford immunity to
tribes as a matter of comity, comity considerations would not
help petitioners. “Even with respect to fully sovereign for-
eign nations, comity has long been discarded as a suffcient
reason to grant immunity for commercial acts”—like those
at issue here. Id., at 817 (emphasis added). And, far from
furthering comity principles, recognizing immunity for off-
reservation commercial acts “represents a substantial affront
to a different set of sovereigns—the States.” Ibid. When
a tribe engages in off-reservation commercial activity, “it
necessarily acts within the territory of a sovereign State.”
Id., at 818. Thus, to grant tribes a unique and unjustifed
immunity from both federal and state jurisdiction for com-
mercial acts committed on a State's territory “aggravate[s]
relationships between States and tribes throughout the
country.” Id., at 818–819. Accordingly, any common-law
immunity that petitioners possess cannot support their claim
to immunity in federal court for their off-reservation com-
mercial conduct.
The Court's tribal immunity doctrine is also out of step
with more recent decisions. In Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal.
v. Hyatt, 587 U. S. ––– (2019), the Court recognized that the
50 States possess a unique form of immunity that applies of
its own force in the courts of sister States, id., at ––– – –––,
as well as those of the Federal Government, id., at ––– (col-
lecting cases). This immunity stems from the Constitution
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite
as: 599 U. S. 382 (2023)
401
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
itself and belongs only to the 50 States through their ratif-
cati
on of the Constitution or admission to the Union on an
equal footing with the original States. See Alden v. Maine,
527 U. S. 706, 713 (1999). As a result, it is distinct from
common-law immunity, which depends upon the forum
court's sovereign for recognition. Bay Mills, 572 U. S., at
816. By treating tribal immunity like state immunity, the
Court's tribal immunity case law has afforded tribes, by judi-
cial fat, a form of immunity that the Constitution accords to
the 50 States, and only the 50 States.
Finally, this Court's tribal immunity doctrine continues to
artifcially exempt tribes from generally applicable laws. I
warned nearly a decade ago that tribal immunity “will con-
tinue to invite problems, including de facto deregulation of
highly regulated activities; unfairness to tort victims; and
increasingly fractious relations with States and individuals
alike.” Id., at 825. This is a case in point. In order to
avoid state payday loan regulation, “payday lenders . . . often
arrange to share fees or profts with tribes so they can use
tribal immunity as a shield for conduct of questionable legal-
ity.” Ibid. Petitioners here rely on tribal immunity to
avoid not only state but also federal payday loan regulation.
They further seek to leverage this immunity to pursue re-
spondent on his debt while other creditors' collection efforts
are stayed. Tribal immunity thus creates a pathway to cir-
cumvent vast swaths of both state and federal laws.
The consequences of the Court's erroneous tribal immu-
nity precedents have only gotten worse over the years. See
id., at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I am now convinced that
[Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.,
523 U. S. 751 (1998)] was wrongly decided; that, in the inter-
vening 16 years, its error has grown more glaringly obvious;
and that stare decisis does not recommend its retention”);
id., at 831 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court's declara-
tion of an immunity thus absolute was and remains exorbi-
tant”). Further, the doctrine simply cannot be reconciled

402 LA
C du FLAMBEAU BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR
CHIPPEWA INDIANS v. COUGHLIN
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
with the Court's precedents affrming “that the States have
leg
islative jurisdiction over the off-reservation conduct of In-
dian tribes, and even over some on-reservation activities.”
Kiowa, 523 U. S., at 762 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing
the Court's prior cases). Rather than accepting the fawed
premise of tribal immunity and deciding the abrogation ques-
tion beyond the looking glass, the Court should simply aban-
don its judicially created tribal sovereign immunity doctrine.
Justice Gorsuch, dissenting.
Until today, there was “not one example in all of history
where [this] Court ha[d] found that Congress intended to ab-
rogate tribal sovereign immunity without expressly men-
tioning Indian tribes somewhere in the statute.” In re
Greektown Holdings, LLC, 917 F. 3d 451, 460 (CA6 2019)
(internal quotation marks omitted). No longer. The Court
reads the phrase “other foreign or domestic government,” 11
U. S. C. § 101(27), as synonymous with “any and every gov-
ernment,” ante, at 388—all for the purpose of holding that
§ 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code abrogates tribal sovereign
immunity. It is a plausible interpretation. But plausible is
not the standard our tribal immunity jurisprudence de-
mands. Before holding that Congress has vitiated tribal im-
munity, the Legislature must “unequivocally express” its in-
tent to achieve that result. C & L Enterprises, Inc. v.
Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 532 U. S. 411, 418
(2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Respectfully, I do not think the language here does the
trick. The phrase “other foreign or domestic government”
could mean what the Court suggests: every government, ev-
erywhere. But it could also mean what it says: every “other
foreign . . . government”; every “other . . . domestic govern-
ment.” And properly understood, Tribes are neither of
those things. Instead, the Constitution's text—and two cen-
turies of history and precedent—establish that Tribes enjoy
a unique status in our law. Because this reading of the stat-
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 599 U. S. 382 (2023)
403
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
ute is itself (at worst) a plausible one, I would hold that the
Bankr
uptcy Code funks this Court's clear-statement rule
and reverse.
I
As the Court reaffrms today, “the doctrine of tribal immu-
nity is settled law.” Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing
Technologies, Inc., 523 U. S. 751, 756 (1998); see ante, at 387–
388. Nor should that fact come as a surprise. From the
founding to the present, this Court has recognized the
Tribes' continued existence as “independent sovereigns.”
Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2023) (Gor-
such, J., concurring); see, e. g., United States v. Wheeler, 435
U. S. 313, 322 (1978); Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 559
(1832) (Marshall, C. J., for the Court).
A “necessary corollary to [that] Indian sovereignty” is im-
munity from private suit. Three Affliated Tribes of Fort
Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P. C., 476 U. S.
877, 890 (1986). It is, after all, “inherent in the nature of
sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual
without its consent.” The Federalist No. 81, p. 487 (C. Ros-
siter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). That understanding, derived
from both “common law sovereign immunity” and “law-of-
nations sovereign immunity,” is a background principle on
which the Constitution itself rests. See Franchise Tax Bd.
of Cal. v. Hyatt, 587 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2019) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted) (citing authorities). And it applies to
Tribes no less than foreign nations, Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 58 (1978), a tradition that traces back
over 170 years, see Parks v. Ross, 11 How. 362, 374 (1851).
See also W. Wood, It Wasn't an Accident: The Tribal Sover-
eign Immunity Story, 62 Am. U. L. Rev. 1587, 1640 (2013)
(Wood).
While venerable, tribal immunity—like its state and for-
eign counterparts—is not immutable. The federal govern-
ment can abrogate it, at least as far as its fonts of power let
it. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U. S., at 58–59; cf. Brack-
Page Proof Pending Publication

404 LA
C du FLAMBEAU BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR
CHIPPEWA INDIANS v. COUGHLIN
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
een, 599 U. S., at ––– (opinion of Gorsuch, J.). But the
choice
to abrogate tribal immunity is fundamentally political
in nature. It is a choice that therefore belongs to Congress,
the “department which can modify [the law] at will,” and not
the Judiciary, the “department which can pursue only the
law as it is written.” Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch 110,
129 (1814) (Marshall, C. J., for the Court). Recognizing the
Constitution's division of responsibility, this Court has long
left all decisions about tribal and other sorts of sovereign
immunity “in Congress's hands.” Michigan v. Bay Mills
Indian Community, 572 U. S. 782, 789 (2014).
Because “erroneous abrogation[s]” of immunity risk inter-
sovereign conficts and reprisals, this Court employs an addi-
tional interpretive guardrail—“a clear statement require-
ment designed to ensure that the political branches acted
knowingly and intentionally” in divesting sovereigns of their
legal entitlements. A. Bellia & B. Clark, The Law of Na-
tions as Constitutional Law, 98 Va. L. Rev. 729, 792–793
(2012). Under this approach, we will not read a statute to
abrogate immunity “if any other possible construction re-
mains.” Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64,
118 (1804); see also, e. g., Financial Oversight and Manage-
ment Bd. for P. R. v. Centro De Periodismo Investigativo,
Inc., 598 U. S. 339, 342 (2023). That goes for Tribes just as
it goes for other sovereigns; it is an “enduring principle of
Indian law” that we “will not lightly assume that Congress
in fact intends to undermine Indian” sovereignty absent pel-
lucid evidence to the contrary. Bay Mills, 572 U. S., at 790.
All this explains the now-familiar clear-statement rule
that this Court has endorsed on countless occasions. If Con-
gress wishes to abrogate tribal immunity, its “decision must
be clear.” Ibid. And the Legislature must “unequivocally
express” its decision in the text of a statute. C & L Enter-
prises, 532 U. S., at 418 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under that rule, “[a]ny ambiguities in the statutory language
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 599 U. S. 382 (2023)
405
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
are to be construed in favor of immunity.” FAA v. Cooper,
566
U. S. 284, 290 (2012). Keep that hard-to-meet standard
in mind. We will return to it as we make our way through
the statutory text driving today's dispute.
II
The Bankruptcy Code stipulates that, “[n]otwithstanding
an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign immunity is
abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set forth
in this section.” § 106(a). That language, this Court has
previously held, signals a clear intent to abrogate sovereign
immunity. See Central Va. Community College v. Katz, 546
U. S. 356, 379 (2006). But as to which sovereigns? The an-
swer to that question lies elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code.
“The term `governmental unit,' ” it says, “means United
States; State; Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipal-
ity; foreign state; department, agency, or instrumentality of
the United States (but not a United States trustee while
serving as a trustee in a case under this title), a State, a
Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a
foreign state; or other foreign or domestic government.”
§ 101(27).
That is a lot of words. For present purposes, however,
only the last fve matter: “other foreign or domestic govern-
ment.” No one argues any of the other clauses could poten-
tially refer to Tribes. We can further winnow down the
options from there. No one thinks Tribes qualify as “for-
eign . . . government[s].” That leaves only two possibilities.
Tribes could qualify as “ `domestic governments' ”—respond-
ent's lead argument. Tr. of Oral Arg. 41. Or the phrase
“other foreign or domestic government,” read as a whole,
could mean “any and every government”—respondent's
backup argument and the one the Court adopts today.
Ante, at 388. Neither possibility is the slam dunk our famil-
iar clear-statement rule requires. Consider each in turn.
Page Proof Pending Publication

406 LA
C du FLAMBEAU BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR
CHIPPEWA INDIANS v. COUGHLIN
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
A
St
art with the “domestic government” possibility. At the
time Congress adopted the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code at issue before us, the word “domestic” carried only
two potentially relevant meanings. It could mean spatially
domestic—i. e., within the territorial confnes of the United
States. Or it could mean politically domestic—i. e., a sub-
part of the United States. Contemporary defnitions sup-
port each of those possibilities and only those possibilities.
See, e. g., Random House Dictionary of the English Language
581 (2d ed. 1987) (“of or pertaining to one's own or a particu-
lar country as apart from other countries”); American Heri-
tage Dictionary 416 (2d College ed. 1982) (“[o]f or pertaining
to a country's internal affairs”).
If we were to read the term only in its spatial sense, as
the First Circuit did below and respondent urges us to do, it
makes some sense to speak of Tribes as “domestic.” See
In re Coughlin, 33 F. 4th 600, 606 (2022). These days, tribal
jurisdiction usually falls within the United States' territorial
bounds—although that was not true for most of the Nation's
history, and became so only after the West was won. M.
Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 Stan. J. Civ. Rights & Civ. Lib.
45, 55, n. 63 (2012). Of course, usually does not mean al-
ways. Even to this day, all three branches of government
struggle to address the status of Tribes that straddle our
Nation's borders. See, e. g., 8 U. S. C. § 1359 (setting special
immigration rules for “American Indians born in Canada”);
22 CFR § 42.1(f ) (2022) (similar); Matter of Yellowquill, 16
I. & N. Dec. 576, 577–578 (BIA 1978) (interpreting other pro-
visions to not apply to Canada-born “American” Indians);
Akins v. Saxbe, 380 F. Supp. 1210, 1218–1222 (Me. 1974) (sim-
ilar). Evidently, our neighbor to the north has encountered
similar diffculties. See R. v. Desautel, 2021 SCC 17 (analyz-
ing traditional cross-border hunting rights).
Focusing only on the spatial meaning of “domestic,” how-
ever, would miss an obvious point. When it comes to the
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 599 U. S. 382 (2023)
407
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
status of governments, this Court has long recognized that
geography
takes a backseat. Whether a government quali-
fes as “domestic” instead usually depends on “the political
relation in which one government or country stands to an-
other”; the term has “no relation to local, geographical, or
territorial position.” Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1,
55 (1831) (Thompson, J., dissenting); see also id., at 16–20
(Marshall, C. J., for the Court). At minimum, this line of
thinking leaves open a reasonable possibility that Congress
in § 101(27) meant the term “domestic” in its political (not
geographic) sense. Accordingly, for respondent's primary
argument to succeed, he must show that the political rela-
tionship between Indian Tribes and the United States is such
that the term “domestic government” clearly covers them.
That is a burden respondent cannot carry. Properly un-
derstood, Indian Tribes “occupy a unique status” that is nei-
ther politically foreign nor domestic. National Farmers
Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U. S. 845, 851 (1985).
Signifcant evidence supports this understanding. Start
with the text of the Constitution. Its terms appear to
“place Indian [T]ribes in an intermediate category between
foreign and domestic states.” Z. Price, Dividing Sover-
eignty in Tribal and Territorial Criminal Jurisdiction, 113
Colum. L. Rev. 657, 670 (2013) (Price). At least two provi-
sions illustrate as much. One is the Commerce Clause,
which gives Congress the power to regulate “Commerce”
“with foreign Nations,” “among the several States,” and
“with the Indian Tribes.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The inclusion of
that third Commerce Clause power suggests that Tribes
were not reachable either by Congress's foreign commerce
power or by its domestic (interstate) commerce power.
More obscure but no less probative is the Constitution's ex-
emption from the apportionment formula of all “Indians not
taxed.” Art. I, § 2, cl. 3; Amdt. 14, § 2. That choice recog-
nizes that Tribes are not fully “domestic” to the United States,
and instead stand “separate from the polity.” Price 670.
Page Proof Pending Publication

408 LA
C du FLAMBEAU BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR
CHIPPEWA INDIANS v. COUGHLIN
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
These provisions, too, refected a widely shared under-
st
anding about the sovereign status of Tribes at the found-
ing. As Secretary of War Henry Knox put it in a letter to
President Washington, the Tribes were in many ways akin
to “foreign nations,” and not part “of any particular [S]tate.”
Letter to G. Washington (July 7, 1789), in 3 Papers of George
Washington: Presidential Series 134, 138 (D. Twohig ed.
1989). Consistent with this understanding, before 1871 the
United States (and, prior to that, Great Britain) chiefy man-
aged tribal relations by way of treaty. Entering into those
treaties “admit[ted]” that the Tribes “rank among those pow-
ers who are capable of making treaties.” Worcester, 6 Pet.,
at 559. Governments do not normally deal with politically
“domestic” authorities in that manner. See, e. g., Ex parte
Crow Dog, 109 U. S. 556, 572 (1883) (linking Tribes' “ `ca-
pacity to make treaties' ” w ith their unique “ `semi-
independent' ” status, allowing them to control “ `their do-
mestic government' ” (quoting United States v. Joseph, 94
U. S. 614, 617 (1877))); The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616,
622 (1871) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (similar).
This Court's earliest Indian-law jurisprudence offers more
evidence along the same lines. In Cherokee Nation v. Geor-
gia, “three distinct views of tribal sovereignty emerged” on
the question whether, “for purposes of Article III,” the
Cherokee Nation was a “foreign nation.” R. Tsosie, Tribal-
ism, Constitutionalism, and Cultural Pluralism: Where Do
Indigenous Peoples Fit Within Civil Society?, 5 U. Pa. J.
Const. L. 357, 360–361 (2003). In the lead opinion for the
Court, Chief Justice Marshall emphasized that “[t]he condi-
tion of the Indians in relation to the United States is perhaps
unlike that of any other two people in existence.” 5 Pet., at
16. For the limited purposes of Article III, Chief Justice
Marshall rejected the view that the Tribes could, “with strict
accuracy, be denominated foreign nations.” Id., at 17 (em-
phasis added). Instead, he suggested, “[t]hey may, more
correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent na-
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 599 U. S. 382 (2023)
409
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
tions.” Ibid. (emphasis added). But notably, he did not de-
scr
ibe the Tribes as “domestic” for all purposes. To the con-
trary, he deliberately chose the term nations, stressing also
that “[i]n the general, nations not owing a common allegiance
are foreign to each other.” Id., at 16. In that way, he said,
“the relation of the Indians to the United States is marked
by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist no where
else.” Ibid. Read in context, the term “domestic depend-
ent nations” is really a term of art meant to capture Tribes'
“hybrid position” between “foreign and domestic states.”
Price 670.
The remaining opinions in Cherokee Nation underscore
this message. Justice Johnson, concurring, rejected the
moniker “foreign state.” 5 Pet., at 27. But he also thought
it “very clear that the [C]onstitution neither speaks of ”
Tribes “as [S]tates or foreign states, but as just what they
were, Indian [T]ribes; an anomaly unknown to the books.”
Ibid. Justice Baldwin, also concurring, rejected the idea
that Tribes were “states, foreign or domestic.” Id., at 43
(emphasis added). And Justice Thompson, joined by Justice
Story, dissented on the grounds that he thought the Chero-
kee had a chiefy “foreign character,” all things considered.
Id., at 55. All told, this Court split sharply as to the best
way to characterize the legal status of Tribes in relation to
the United States. But if there is one thing all Members of
the Court could have agreed on, perhaps it would be this:
Neither the term “foreign government” nor the term “do-
mestic government” adequately captures the Tribes' unique
legal and political status.
This Court's later decisions only give further reason to
doubt that Tribes are clearly “domestic government[s].” No
less than this Court's frst case analyzing tribal sovereign
immunity, Parks v. Ross, rested on the view that each Tribe
remains “in many respects” (but not all) “a foreign and inde-
pendent nation.” 11 How., at 374 (emphasis added); see
Wood 1640 (describing Parks as “the frst case of record in-
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
410 LA
C du FLAMBEAU BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR
CHIPPEWA INDIANS v. COUGHLIN
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
volving tribal immunity”). That language not only weighs
agai
nst treating Tribes as domestic governments. It does
so in precisely the context at issue here—sovereign immu-
nity. If we can assume that Congress “is aware of this
Court's relevant precedents,” the notion that the Bankruptcy
Code abrogates tribal sovereign immunity is sunk. Ysleta
del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 596 U. S. –––, ––– (2022). That
seems like an especially safe assumption here, given that
Congress adopted its most recent version of § 106 after this
Court—twice—held that the provision failed our clear-
statement rule as to other sovereigns. See United States v.
Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 33–39 (1992); Hoffman v.
Connecticut Dept. of Income Maintenance, 492 U. S. 96, 98–
104 (1989) (plurality opinion). That the respondent in this
case nowhere discussed Parks in his briefng (and had noth-
ing to say about it at argument, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 43)
speaks volumes.
Of course, respondent has bigger problems than just the
words this Court has used. He must contend with the real-
ity of this Court's Indian-law jurisprudence, which in prac-
tice has consistently treated Tribes as a “constitutional hy-
brid, resembling [S]tates in certain respects and foreign
nations in others.” Price 670–671; see generally G. Ablav-
sky, Sovereign Metaphors in Indian Law, 80 Mont. L. Rev. 11
(2019). For example, while Congress has certain legislative
authority over tribal lands, the Tribes themselves need not
abide by the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, 194, n. 3
(1978) (citing Talton v. Mayes, 163 U. S. 376 (1896)). In-
stead, they are governed by unique regimes of civil and crim-
inal jurisdiction involving overlapping “federal, tribal, and
state authorities” unlike those employed anywhere else.
Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U. S. –––, –––, and n. 3
(2022) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). And their unique charac-
ter makes their brand of sovereign immunity “not congru-

Cite
as: 599 U. S. 382 (2023)
411
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
ent” with the immunity other sovereigns enjoy. Three Af-
f
liated Tribes, 476 U. S., at 890.
Nor are Tribes alone in standing outside the foreign/
domestic dichotomy. Take the Court's treatment of the so-
called Insular Territories. It depends entirely on the idea
that those Territories are neither foreign nor domestic, but
instead unique entities “foreign to the United States in a
domestic sense.” Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 341
(1901) (White, J., concurring); see also C. Burnett & B. Mar-
shall, Between the Foreign and the Domestic: The Doctrine
of Territorial Incorporation, Invented and Reinvented 30,
n. 3, in Foreign in a Domestic Sense: Puerto Rico, American
Expansion, and the Constitution (2001) (noting that the
Court has “unanimously and expressly adopted” that view).
No one could accuse me of having fondness for the Insular
Cases. See United States v. Vaello Madero, 596 U. S.
–––, ––– (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). But their exist-
ence is fatal for respondent's theory. After all, the Insular
Territories are a close comparator to Tribes and many have
considered “both [T]ribes and [T]erritories [to] share the
same status as ` “foreign to the United States, in a domestic
sense.” ' ” H. Babcock, A Possible Solution to the Problem
of Diminishing Tribal Sovereignty, 90 N. D. L. Rev. 13, 57
(2014). Tellingly, too, Congress expressly abrogated any im-
munity Territories may enjoy under the Bankruptcy Code.
§ 101(27). Yet it did no such thing when it came to the
Tribes.
Respondent has no real answer to any of this. He cites
some cases in which this Court reprised the “domestic
dependent nations” language from Cherokee Nation. See
Brief for Respondent 21 (citing cases). But as we have seen,
that language actually stands for a view of Tribes fatly in-
consistent with the “domestic government” characterization.
Taking away those examples leaves respondent with thin
gruel. He directs us to United States v. Coxe, 18 How. 100,
Page Proof Pending Publication

412 LA
C du FLAMBEAU BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR
CHIPPEWA INDIANS v. COUGHLIN
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
103 (1856). But that case observed only that “Cherokee ter-
r
itory” counts as “domestic territory.” Ibid. (emphases
added). The decision thus plainly used the term “domestic”
only in its spatial sense. The same goes for Blatchford v.
Native Village of Noatak, 501 U. S. 775 (1991). There, this
Court recognized that Tribes are only “in some respects”
“more like States than foreign sovereigns.” Id., at 782.
Read with this context in mind, its statement that “[t]hey
are, for example, domestic,” referred only to their spatial
location. Ibid. Confrming this point, the rest of the
paragraph contrasted the Tribes' physical “domesticity” with
features of their political relationship with the United
States. Ibid.
More fundamentally, even granting respondent these ex-
amples would not do him any good. Just think of the balanc-
ing task we would face. On one side of the scale, we would
have a couple of scattered quotes (cherry-picked from over
two centuries of Indian-law jurisprudence) bandying about
the word “domestic” when describing certain features of
Tribes. On the other side of the scale, we would have the
text and history of the Constitution, supported by more (and
better) examples of this Court's jurisprudence fashioning
rules of law treating Tribes as sui generis. Faced with all
that countervailing authority, the best respondent could real-
istically hope for is that we declare § 101(27) a jump ball.
And under our clear-statement rule, a jump ball is as good
as a possession arrow favoring the party opposing the abro-
gation of sovereign immunity.
B
Taking the “domestic government” possibility off the table
leaves only one other. Respondent falls back on the idea
that “foreign or domestic” is really just shorthand for “every
government under the Sun.” The Court relies solely on this
reading, holding that § 102(27) “unequivocally abrogates the
sovereign immunity of any and every government that pos-
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 599 U. S. 382 (2023)
413
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
sesses the power to assert such immunity.” Ante, at 388.
Getti
ng to that conclusion from the statutory text requires
two interpretive moves. First, the reader must treat the
words “foreign or domestic” as a single, undifferentiated
clause (rather than as a disjunctive grouping of descriptors).
Second, the reader must take that undifferentiated clause to
mean “anywhere and everywhere.” Each move is plausible;
neither is “clear.” And a problem with either is game over.
Start with the frst move. Respondent would have us
read “foreign or domestic” as a unitary clause expressing
a single, shared idea. This is what linguists might call a
hendiadys—“two terms separated by a conjunction [that]
work together as a single complex expression.” S. Bray,
“Necessary and Proper” and “Cruel and Unusual”: Hendia-
dys in the Constitution, 102 Va. L. Rev. 687, 688 (2016). On
occasion, English employs that sort of construct. But those
occasions are the exceptions, not the rule. Nor is it clear
that is what we have here. As even respondent concedes,
“or” in “its ordinary use” instead indicates that “ `the words
it connects are to “be given separate meanings.” ' ” Brief
for Respondent 23 (quoting United States v. Woods, 571 U. S.
31, 45–46 (2013)). A perfectly natural reading, then, would
ask whether Tribes clearly qualify as “foreign . . . govern-
ment[s]” or as “domestic government[s].” And because the
answer is “no” on both scores (for the reasons already laid
out above) the language funks the clear-statement rule.
The second move has issues too. The case for treating
“foreign or domestic government” as synonymous with “any
government anywhere” rests on the premise that the terms
are “two extremes,” so that—by invoking both—Congress
meant to cover every part of an all-inclusive spectrum.
Ante, at 389. The Court analogizes to the phrase “near and
far,” which it argues sometimes means “all over the map.”
Ibid. But the premise here is faulty and the analogy inapt.
“Near” and “far” may well be “two extremes”—one would
not speak of a location being both near and far at the same
Page Proof Pending Publication

414 LA
C du FLAMBEAU BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR
CHIPPEWA INDIANS v. COUGHLIN
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
time, for example. When it comes to sovereigns, however,
the
terms “foreign” and “domestic” do not share that same
quality. Rather, as we have seen, an extensive tradition
supports treating certain sovereigns—Tribes among them—
as sui generis entities falling outside the foreign/domestic
dichotomy. That tradition is fatal under the clear-statement
rule.
How does respondent contend with this problem? At ar-
gument, he retreated from his briefng and relied instead on
a provision of the Bankruptcy Code stating that, for pur-
poses of that Code, “ `or' is not exclusive.” Tr. of Oral Arg.
41 (citing § 102(5)). From this, respondent reasoned, the
Bankruptcy Code abrogates tribal immunity because every-
one can agree at least that Tribes bear some qualities of both
foreign and domestic governments.
The provision respondent cites simply does not do what he
seems to think it does. In common usage, the term “or” can
carry two meanings. The frst is exclusive. It requires full
satisfaction of one—and exactly one—listed condition. The
second is inclusive. It requires full satisfaction of at least
one listed condition. All § 102(5) does is favor the latter
meaning for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. Sound com-
plicated? Just look at an example. Suppose you tell your
child that he can get a pet so long as it is “small or a dog.”
The child can choose a small animal (like a hamster) or a
large dog (like a mastiff ). But can the child also choose a
small dog? If the “or” is inclusive (as respondent argues it
is here), the answer is “yes.” If it is exclusive, the answer is
“no.” Critically, however, neither reading covers a medium-
sized aardvark. Such an animal may be somewhat small and
somewhat doglike, but two near misses do not add up to a
hit. This is a simple point but an important one. Regard-
less of whether “or” is used inclusively or exclusively, one of
the input conditions must be satisfed.
With this point in mind, respondent's reading collapses.
To see why, consider another example. Suppose you are a
Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite
as: 599 U. S. 382 (2023)
415
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
houseguest, and your host invites you to “help yourself to
the
chocolate or vanilla ice cream in the freezer.” Upon
opening the freezer, you fnd three tubs—vanilla, chocolate,
and Neapolitan. For argument's sake, too, let's say the last
tub also has a sticky note: “Do not eat without clear permis-
sion.” Which ice cream can you take? If the host meant
“or” exclusively, you may take either chocolate or vanilla, not
both. If the host meant it inclusively, you may scoop some
of each. In neither event, however, would you have permis-
sion to take the Neapolitan ice cream—especially given the
cautionary note. As a unique composite, it does not clearly
satisfy either of the necessary conditions. So too here.
Tribes may have some features of both domestic and foreign
governments, but they do not clearly qualify as either, and
they have some features found in neither. Accordingly,
§ 102(5) does nothing to rescue respondent's cause.
If anything, § 102(5) only sheds light on what the catchall
term “other foreign or domestic government” does cover.
That phrase sweeps up, as Chief Judge Barron explained in
dissent below, certain “otherwise excluded, half-fsh, half-
fowl governmental entities like authorities or commissions
that are created through interstate compacts” (“ `other . . .
domestic government[s]' ”) and “the joint products of inter-
national agreements” (“ `other foreign . . . government[s]' ”).
33 F. 4th, at 615. Without the catchall, entities of these
sorts could potentially fall through the cracks. Tribes, by
contrast, are among the most signifcant entities wielding
sovereign immunity. They are a unique form of govern-
ment—and they alone are nowhere mentioned.
The Court offers two responses. Above the line, it
asks why Territories are encompassed within § 101(27)'s
immunity-abrogation provision if they share the same status
of Tribes—neither foreign nor domestic. Ante, at 396. The
answer, of course, is that Congress expressly listed Territo-
ries; it did not do the same for Tribes. Nor do I see how
Congress's choice to include Territories supports the Court's
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
416 LA
C du FLAMBEAU BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR
CHIPPEWA INDIANS v. COUGHLIN
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
suggestion that the term “other foreign or domestic govern-
ment”
clearly covers all governments. To the contrary,
under the Court's interpretation of that term, the express
inclusion of Territories becomes curious surplusage. And to
the extent the Court thinks Congress mentioned Territories
just to be doubly clear that the term “other foreign or domes-
tic government” really does cover all governments—adopt-
ing a kind of belt-and-suspenders approach—isn't it odd that
Congress left one of the most notable types of sovereigns (a
key part of its “belt”) at home?
Below the line, the Court simply asserts (without analysis
or support) that “the terms `foreign' and `domestic' are two
poles on a spectrum.” Ante, at 396, n. 7. It does not grap-
ple, however, with the many decisions of this Court discussed
above that contradict that premise—and that do so in the
precise context of Indian law (in general) and sovereign im-
munity (in particular). See supra, at 406–411. Nor does it
grapple with the reality that, even if the terms were two
poles on a spectrum, many Justices of this Court have sug-
gested that Indian Tribes do not fall along that continuum
at all and are instead “just what they [are], Indian [T]ribes.”
Cherokee Nation, 5 Pet., at 27 (Johnson, J., concurring).
Others of course have disagreed. But that disagreement is
no help to the Court under our clear-statement rule. It is
dispositive the other way.
III
Unable to demonstrate that the statute's terms clearly ab-
rogate tribal immunity, respondent and the Court stress that
§ 101(27) as a whole “exudes comprehensiveness.” Ante, at
388. That is obviously true but not obviously helpful.
Really, the express inclusion of so many other types of sover-
eigns in the Bankruptcy Code's abrogation provision only
deepens the mystery why Tribes are nowhere mentioned.
Normally, after all, when Congress includes so many items
within “ `[an] associated group,' ” we assume the omission of
another means that it has been deliberately “ `exclude[d].' ”

Cite
as: 599 U. S. 382 (2023)
417
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U. S. 73, 80 (2002).
N
or, for that matter, has this Court ever held that a statute's
general atmospherics can satisfy the clear-statement rule
when the text itself comes up short.
The Court also invokes the Bankruptcy Code's purposes.
It contends that Congress designed the Code in part to
“offe[r] debtors a fresh start,” that its provisions were in-
tended to “sweep broadly,” and that petitioners' view of the
statute could “upen[d] the policy choices that the Code em-
bodies.” Ante, at 390–392. In a similar vein, the Court won-
ders what reason Congress possibly could have had for ex-
cluding Tribes from its abrogation provision. Ibid. These
are fair questions and concerns. Some of them I share.
But they, too, have no place in a case like this one. For
purposes of satisfying a clear-statement rule, attempts to
“construe” § 106 “in light of the policies underlying the Bank-
ruptcy Code are unavailing.” Hoffman, 492 U. S., at 104
(plurality opinion). Perhaps Members of Congress had good
reasons for failing to include Tribes in § 101(27). Perhaps
their decision refected a measured political compromise.
Or perhaps the issue of tribal immunity simply never came
up. In all events, the result is the same. Absent some
clear textual indication, there can be no abrogation.
Setting aside those policy concerns leaves the Court with
a methodological one. It fears adopting my approach could
transmute our clear-statement rule into some sort of magic-
words test. Ante, at 394. I do not see how it could. Con-
gress could identify Tribes in any number of unmistakable
ways—“Indians,” “Native Americans,” “Indigenous Peo-
ples,” or even (as we have seen) “domestic dependent na-
tions.” Congress has had no trouble using language like
that in plenty of other statutory contexts. See, e. g., 7
U. S. C. § 8310; 42 U. S. C. § 8802(17); 49 U. S. C. § 5121(g).
Alternatively, Congress could identify Tribes by descrip-
tion—for instance, “any other government that operates, in
whole or in part, within the territorial bounds of the United
Page Proof Pending Publication

418 LA
C du FLAMBEAU BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR
CHIPPEWA INDIANS v. COUGHLIN
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
States.” See 33 F. 4th, at 622 (Barron, C. J., dissenting).
Alter
natively still, Congress could abrogate all sovereign
immunity through some unequivocal statement to that ef-
fect—using, for example, the Court's own formulation, “any
and every government.” Ante, at 388. The only thing Con-
gress cannot do is use “oblique or elliptical language” to
“supply a clear statement.” West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S.
–––, ––– (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (internal quotation
marks and alterations omitted). Because that is—at best—
what the Bankruptcy Code provides, I respectfully dissent.
Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None