Boechler v. Commissioner

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 596 U. S. Part 1
Pages 199–211
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
April 21, 2022
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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OCTOBER
TERM, 2021
199
Syllabus
BOECHLER, P.C. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
RE
VENUE
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eighth circuit
No. 20–1472. Argued January 12, 2022—Decided April 21, 2022
In 2015, the Internal Revenue Service notifed Boechler, P.C., a North
Dakota law frm, of a discrepancy in its tax flings. When Boechler did
not respond, the IRS assessed an “intentional disregard” penalty and
notifed Boechler of its intent to levy Boechler's property to satisfy the
penalty. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 6330(a), 6721(a)(2), (e)(2)(A). Boechler re-
quested and received a “collection due process hearing ” before the IRS's
Independent Offce of Appeals pursuant to § 6330(b), but the Offce sus-
tained the proposed levy. Under § 6330(d)(1), Boechler had 30 days to
petition the Tax Court for review. Boechler fled its petition one day
late. The Tax Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction and
the Eighth Circuit affrmed, agreeing that § 6330(d)(1)'s 30-day fling
deadline is jurisdictional and thus cannot be equitably tolled.
Held: Section 6330(d)(1)'s 30-day time limit to fle a petition for review of
a collection due process determination is a nonjurisdictional deadline
subject to equitable tolling. Pp. 203–211.
(a) Not all procedural requirements are jurisdictional. Many simply
instruct “parties [to] take certain procedural steps at certain specifed
times” without conditioning a court's authority to hear the case on com-
pliance with those steps. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435.
The distinction matters, as jurisdictional requirements cannot be waived
or forfeited, must be raised by courts sue sponte, and do not allow for
equitable exceptions. Id., at 434–435; Sebelius v. Auburn Regional
Medical Center, 568 U. S 145, 154. As such, a procedural requirement
is jurisdictional only if Congress “clearly states” that it is. Arbaugh v.
Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 515. This case therefore turns on whether
Congress has clearly stated that § 6330(d)(1)'s deadline is jurisdictional.
Section 6330(d)(1) provides that a “person may, within 30 days of a
determination under this section, petition the Tax Court for review of
such determination (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with re-
spect to such matter).” Whether this provision limits the Tax Court's
jurisdiction to petitions fled within the 30-day timeframe depends on
the meaning of “such matter,” the phrase marking the bounds of the
Tax Court's jurisdiction. Boechler contends that it refers only to the
immediately preceding phrase: a “petition [to] the Tax Court for review
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200 BOECHLER
v. COMMISSIONER
Syllabus
of such determination,” making the fling deadline independent of the
jur
isdictional grant. The Commissioner, by contrast, argues that “such
matter” refers to the entire frst clause of the sentence, sweeping in the
deadline and granting jurisdiction only over petitions fled within that
time, making the deadline jurisdictional.
The text does not clearly mandate the jurisdictional reading. It is
hard to see how it could, given that “such matter” lacks a clear anteced-
ent. Moreover, Boechler's interpretation has a small edge under the
last-antecedent rule, which instructs that the correct antecedent is usu-
ally the closest reasonable one. There are also other plausible ways to
read “such matter.” For example, “such matter” might refer to “such
determination” or the preceding subsection's list of “[m]atters” that may
be considered during the collection due process hearing, see § 6330(c),
but neither possibility ties the Tax Court's jurisdiction to the fling dead-
line. And it is diffcult to make the case that the jurisdictional reading
is clear where multiple plausible, nonjurisdictional interpretations exist.
Nothing else in the provision's text or structure advances the case for
jurisdictional clarity. Finally, other tax provisions enacted around the
same time as § 6330(d)(1) much more clearly link their jurisdictional
grants to a fling deadline—see §§ 6404(g)(1), 6015(e)(1)(A)—accentuat-
ing the lack of comparable clarity in § 6330(d)(1). Pp. 203–206.
(b) The Commissioner's counterarguments fall short. In this con-
text, it is not enough that his interpretation of the statute is plausible,
or that some might even think it better than Boechler's. To satisfy the
clear-statement rule, the Commissioner's interpretation must be clear,
and it is not. A requirement “does not become jurisdictional simply
because it is placed in a section of a statute that also contains jurisdic-
tional provisions.” Auburn, 568 U. S., at 155. Rather than proximity,
what is needed is a clear tie between the deadline and the jurisdictional
grant. The Commissioner also contends that a neighboring provision,
§ 6330(e)(1), clarifes the jurisdictional effect of § 6330(d)(1)'s fling dead-
line. Section 6330(e)(1) plainly conditions the Tax Court's jurisdiction
to grant an injunction to enforce the suspension of levy actions during
collection due process hearings on a timely fling under § 6330(d)(1).
But, if anything, § 6330(e)(1)'s clear jurisdictional statement only high-
lights the lack of such clarity in § 6330(d)(1). Finally, the Commissioner
insists that § 6330(d)(1)'s fling deadline is jurisdictional because it was
enacted at a time when Congress was aware of lower court cases that
had held that an analogous tax provision, § 6213(a), is jurisdictional.
Those lower court cases, however, almost all predate this Court's effort
to “bring some discipline” to the use of the term “jurisdictional.” Hen-
derson, 562 U. S., at 435. Pp. 206–208.
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201
Syllabus
(c) Nonjurisdictional limitations periods are presumptively subject to
equit
able tolling, Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89,
95–96, and nothing rebuts the presumption here. Section 6330(d)(1)
does not expressly prohibit equitable tolling, directs its 30-day time
limit at the taxpayer, not the court, and appears in a section of the Tax
Code that is particularly protective of taxpayers, see Auburn, 568 U. S.,
at 160.
The Commissioner invokes United States v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347,
which held equitable tolling inapplicable to § 6511's deadline for taxpay-
ers to fle refund claims, but that case is inapposite. Brockamp's hold-
ing rested on several distinctive features of § 6511 that are absent here.
Unlike § 6511's deadline, § 6330(d)(1)'s deadline is not written in “em-
phatic form” or with “detailed” and “technical” language, nor is it reit-
erated multiple times. Id., at 350–351. And § 6330(d)(1) admits of a
single exception (as opposed to § 6511's six). See § 6330(d)(2). If any-
thing, these differences underscore the reasons why equitable tolling
applies to § 6330(d)(1). Despite the Commissioner's protestations, the
Court is not convinced that allowing § 6330(d)(1) to be equitably tolled
will appreciably add to the uncertainty already present in the process.
Whether Boechler is entitled to equitable tolling on the facts of this case
should be determined on remand. Pp. 208–211.
967 F. 3d 760, reversed and remanded.
Barrett, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Melissa Arbus Sher ry argued the cause for petitioner.
With her on the briefs were Caroline A. Flynn and Amy
Feinberg.
Jonathan C. Bond argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were Solicitor General Prelogar, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Hubbert, Deputy Solicitor Gen-
eral Gannon, Francesca Ugolini, Joan I. Oppenheimer,
Janet A. Bradley, and Judith A. Hagley.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for Federal Tax Clin-
ics et al. by Shay Dvoretzky and Emily J. Kennedy; for the National Tax-
payers Union Foundation et al. by Joseph D. Henchman, Tyler Martinez,
Karen Harned, and Elizabeth Milito; and for A. Lavar Taylor by Mr. Tay-
lor, pro se.
Carlton M. Smith fled a brief for the Center for Taxpayer Rights et al.
as amici curiae.
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202 BOECHLER
v. COMMISSIONER
Opinion of the Court
Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court.
The
Internal Revenue Service can seize taxpayer property
to collect tax debts. Before it does so, however, the tax-
payer is typically entitled to a “collection due process hear-
ing ”—a proceeding at which the taxpayer can challenge the
levy or offer collection alternatives like payment by install-
ment. That hearing may have a happy (or at least relatively
happy) ending from the taxpayer's perspective. But if not,
the taxpayer has 30 days to petition the Tax Court for review.
Boechler, P.C., the petitioner in this case, missed the dead-
line by one day. According to the Commissioner of the IRS,
this tardiness extinguished Boechler's opportunity to seek
review of the agency's determination. The Commissioner
insists that the deadline is jurisdictional, which means that
the Tax Court has no authority to consider late-fled peti-
tions. And even if it is not jurisdictional, the Commissioner
argues, the Tax Court lacks the power to accept a tardy fling
by applying the doctrine of equitable tolling. We disagree
with the Commissioner on both scores.
I
Boechler is a law frm in Fargo, North Dakota. In 2015,
the IRS notifed Boechler of a discrepancy in its tax flings.
When Boechler did not respond, the agency assessed an “in-
tentional disregard” penalty and notifed Boechler of its in-
tent to levy—in other words, to seize and sell—Boechler's
property to satisfy the penalty. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 6330(a),
6721(a)(2), (e)(2)(A). That got Boech ler 's attention, and
in an effort to prevent the levy, it requested a hearing be-
fore the agency's Independent Offce of Appeals. § 6330(b).
This proceeding—known as a collection due process hear-
ing—generally provides taxpayers with administrative re-
view before the IRS takes their property. § 6330(a)(1). At
its hearing, Boechler challenged the penalty, arguing both
that there was no discrepancy in its tax flings and that the
penalty was excessive.
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203
Opinion of the Court
The Independent Offce of Appeals sustained the proposed
le
vy. Under § 6330(d)(1), Boechler had 30 days to petition
the Tax Court to review this collection due process determi-
nation. But Boechler dropped the ball and fled its petition
a day late. The Tax Court dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction and the Eighth Circuit affrmed, agreeing that
§ 6330(d)(1)'s 30-day fling deadline is jurisdictional and thus
cannot be equit ably tol led. 967 F. 3d 760 (2020). We
granted certiorari. 594 U. S. ––– (2021).
II
A
Jurisdictional requirements mark the bounds of a “court's
adjudicatory authority.” Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443,
455 (2004). Yet not all procedural requirements ft that bill.
Many simply instruct “parties [to] take certain procedural
steps at certain specifed times” without conditioning a
court's authority to hear the case on compliance with those
steps. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435 (2011).
These nonjurisdictional rules “promote the orderly progress
of litigation” but do not bear on a court's power. Ibid.
The distinction matters. Jurisdictional requirements can-
not be waived or for feited, must be raised by cour ts
sua sponte, and, as relevant to this case, do not allow for
equitable exceptions. Id., at 434–435; Sebelius v. Auburn
Regional Medical Center, 568 U. S. 145, 154 (2013). Mindful
of these consequences, we have endeavored “to bring some
discipline” to use of the jurisdictional label. Henderson, 562
U. S., at 435.
To that end, we treat a procedural requirement as jurisdic-
tional only if Congress “clearly states” that it is. Arbaugh
v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 515 (2006). Congress need
not “incant magic words,” Auburn, 568 U. S., at 153, but the
“traditional tools of statutory construction must plainly show
that Congress imbued a procedural bar with jurisdictional
consequences,” United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S.
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204 BOECHLER
v. COMMISSIONER
Opinion of the Court
402, 410 (2015). This case therefore turns on whether Con-
gress
has clearly stated that § 6330(d)(1)'s deadline to peti-
tion for review of a collection due process determination is
jurisdictional.
Section 6330(d)(1) provides:
“The person may, within 30 days of a determination
under this section, petition the Tax Court for review of
such determination (and the Tax Court shall have juris-
diction with respect to such matter).”
The only jurisdictional language appears in the parenthetical
at the end of the sentence. All agree that the parenthetical
grants the Tax Court jurisdiction over petitions for review
of collection due process determinations. And all agree that
the provision imposes a 30-day deadline to fle those peti-
tions. The question is whether the provision limits the Tax
Court's jurisdiction to petitions fled within that timeframe.
The answer depends on the meaning of “such matter,” the
phrase marking the bounds of the Tax Court's jurisdiction.
Boechler contends that it refers only to the immediately pre-
ceding phrase: a “petition [to] the Tax Court for review of
such determination.” If so, the fling deadline is independ-
ent of the jurisdictional grant. The Commissioner, by con-
trast, argues that “such matter” refers to the entire frst
clause of the sentence, sweeping in the deadline and granting
jurisdiction only over petitions fled within that time. On
this reading, the deadline is jurisdictional.
As we see it, the text does not clearly mandate the juris-
dictional reading. It is hard to see how it could, given that
“such matter” lacks a clear antecedent. The word “matter”
does not appear elsewhere in § 6330(d)(1), and no other
“ `noun or noun phrase' ” serves as the obvious antecedent.
A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
Legal Texts 144 (2012). Both parties cope with this awk-
ward structure by treating “petition” as a noun, even though
it appears in the provision as a verb. Maybe the parties
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205
Opinion of the Court
are right that the statute asks the single word “petition” to
per
form double duty. But relying on this grammatical
sleight of hand does not exactly help the Commissioner's ar-
gument that the text is clear. Moreover, even taking “peti-
tion” as a noun, Boechler's interpretation has a small edge.
The last-antecedent rule instructs that the correct anteced-
ent is usually “the nearest reasonable” one. Ibid. And
Boechler links “such matter” to the phrase immediately pre-
ceding the jurisdictional parenthetical, while the Commis-
sioner stretches back one phrase more. This is hardly a
slam dunk for Boechler, but it is one reason to prefer its
reading—or at least to regard the Commissioner's as not
clearly right.
It is also worth noting that the parties' back-and-forth
does not exhaust the universe of plausible ways to read “such
matter.” For example, “such matter” might refer to “such
determination” (which in turn refers to a “determination
under this section”). Or “such matter” might refer to the
preceding subsection's list of “[m]atters” that may be consid-
ered during the collection due process hearing. 26 U. S. C.
§ 6330(c). Neither possibility ties the Tax Court's jurisdic-
tion to the fling deadline, and that is another point in
Boechler's favor. Where multiple plausible interpretations
exist—only one of which is jurisdictional—it is diffcult to
make the case that the jurisdictional reading is clear. See
Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U. S. 277, 287 (2011).
Nothing else in the provision's text or structure advances
the case for jurisdictional clarity. The deadline, which ap-
pears in the frst independent clause of the sentence, explains
what the taxpayer may do: “The person may, within 30 days
of a determination under this section, petition the Tax Court
for review of such determination.” § 6330(d)(1). The juris-
dictional grant, which appears in a parenthetical at the end
of the sentence, speaks to what the Tax Court shall do: “(and
the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such
matter).” Ibid. As explained above, this language can be
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206 BOECHLER
v. COMMISSIONER
Opinion of the Court
plausibly construed to condition the Tax Court's jurisdiction
on
a timely fling. But the condition would not be express
and would be found in a parenthetical, which is typically used
to convey an “aside” or “afterthought.” B. Garner, Modern
English Usage 1020 (4th ed. 2016).
Finally, the broader statutory context confrms the lack
of any clear statement in § 6330(d)(1). Other tax provisions
enacted around the same time as § 6330(d)(1) much more
clearly link their jurisdictional grants to a fling deadline.
See 26 U. S. C. § 6404(g)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. II) (the Tax Court
has “jurisdiction over any action . . . to determine whether
the Secretary's failure to abate interest under this section
was an abuse of discretion, . . . if such action is brought
within 180 days”); § 6015(e)(1)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. IV) (“The
individual may petition the Tax Court (and the Tax Court
shall have jurisdiction) to determine the appropriate relief
available to the individual under this section if such petition
is fled during the 90-day period”). These provisions accen-
tuate the lack of comparable clarity in § 6330(d)(1).
B
The Commissioner 's counterarguments fall short. To
begin with, the Commissioner repeats his refrain that “such
matter” refers to the entire frst clause of the sentence,
thereby conditioning the Tax Court's jurisdiction on the
deadline. We agree that this is a plausible interpretation of
the statute. Some might even think it better than Boech-
ler's. But in this context, better is not enough. To satisfy
the clear-statement rule, the jurisdictional condition must be
just that: clear. And as we have already explained, the
Commissioner's interpretation is not.
What of the fact that the jurisdictional grant and fling
deadline appear in the same provision, even the same sen-
tence? This does not render the Commissioner's reading
clear either. A requirement “does not become jurisdictional
simply because it is placed in a section of a statute that also
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207
Opinion of the Court
contains jurisdictional provisions.” Auburn, 568 U. S., at
155.
Consequently, this is not the frst time we have parsed
a single statutory sentence to distinguish between its juris-
dictional and nonjurisdictional elements. See Weinberger v.
Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 763–764 (1975). Rather than proximity,
the important feature is the one that is missing here: a clear
tie between the deadline and the jurisdictional grant.
The Commissioner contends that a neighboring provision
clarifes the jurisdictional effect of the fling deadline. Sec-
tion 6330(e)(1) provides that “if a [collection due process]
hearing is requested . . . the levy actions which are the sub-
ject of the requested hearing . . . shall be suspended for the
period during which such hearing, and appeals therein, are
pending.” To enforce that suspension, a “proper court, in-
cluding the Tax Court,” may “enjoi[n]” a “levy or proceeding
during the time the suspension . . . is in force,” but “[t]he
Tax Court shall have no jurisdiction under this paragraph to
enjoin any action or proceeding unless a timely appeal has
been fled under subsection (d)(1).” § 6330(e)(1).
Section 6330(e)(1) thus plainly conditions the Tax Court's
jur isdic ti on to en joi n a levy on a ti mely fi l i ng under
§ 6330(d)(1). According to the Commissioner, this suggests
that § 6330(d)(1)'s fling deadline is also jurisdictional. It
would be strange, the Commissioner says, to make the dead-
line a jurisdictional requirement for a particular remedy (an
injunction), but not for the underlying merits proceeding it-
self. If that were so, the Tax Court could accept late-fled
petitions but would lack jurisdiction to enjoin collection in
such cases. So if the IRS disobeyed § 6330(e)(1)'s instruc-
tion to suspend the levy during the hearing and any appeal,
the taxpayer would have to initiate a new proceeding in dis-
trict court to make the IRS stop.
We are unmoved—and not only because the scenario the
Commissioner posits would arise from the IRS's own recal-
citrance. The possibility of dual-track jurisdiction might
strengthen the Commissioner's argument that his interpre-
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208 BOECHLER
v. COMMISSIONER
Opinion of the Court
tation is superior to Boechler's. Yet as we have already ex-
plai
ned, the Commissioner's interpretation must be not only
better, but also clear. And the prospect that § 6330(e)(1) de-
prives the Tax Court of authority to issue an injunction in a
subset of appeals (where a petition for review is both fled
late and accepted on equitable tolling grounds) does not
carry the Commissi oner over that l i ne. If anyth i ng,
§ 6330(e)(1)'s clear statement—that “[t]he Tax Court shall
have no jurisdiction . . . to enjoin any action or proceeding
unless a timely appeal has been fled”—highlights the lack of
such clarity in § 6330(d)(1).
The Commissioner's weakest argument is his last: He in-
sists that § 6330(d)(1)'s fling deadline is jurisdictional be-
cause at the time that deadline was enacted, lower courts
had held that an analogous tax provision regarding IRS
defciency determinations is jurisdictional. (That provision
says that “[w]ithin 90 days . . . the taxpayer may fle a peti-
tion with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the def-
ciency.” 26 U. S. C. § 6213(a).) According to the Commis-
sioner, Congress was aware of these lower court cases and
expected § 6330(d)(1)'s time limit to have the same effect.
So, he says, the statutory backdrop resolves any doubt that
might linger in the text.
The Commissioner's argument misses the mark. The
cases he cites almost all predate this Court's effort to “bring
some discipline” to the use of the term “jurisdictional.”
Henderson, 562 U. S., at 435. And while this Court has been
willing to treat “ `a long line of [Supreme] Cour[t] decisions
left undisturbed by Congress' ” as a clear indication that a
requirement is jurisdictional, Fort Bend County v. Davis,
587 U. S. –––, ––– (2019), no such “long line” of authority
exists here.
III
Of course, the nonjurisdictional nature of the fling dead-
line does not help Boechler unless the deadline can be equi-
tably tolled. Equitable tolling is a traditional feature of
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Opinion of the Court
American jurisprudence and a background principle against
w
hich Congress draf ts limitations periods. Lozano, 572
U. S., at 10–11. Because we do not understand Congress to
alter that backdrop lightly, nonjurisdictional limitations peri-
ods are presumptively subject to equitable tolling. Irwin v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95–96 (1990).
1
We see nothing to rebut the presumption here. Section
6330(d)(1) does not expressly prohibit equitable tolling, and
its short, 30-day time limit is directed at the taxpayer, not
the court. Cf. id., at 94–96 (holding that a statutory time
limit with the same characteristics is subject to equitable
tolling). The deadline also appears in a section of the Tax
Code that is “ ` “unusually protective” ' ” of taxpayers and a
scheme in which “ `laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers,' ”
often “ `initiate the process.' ” Auburn, 568 U. S., at 160.
This context does nothing to rebut the presumption that non-
jurisdictional deadlines can be equitably tolled.
To counter these points, the Commissioner invokes United
States v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347 (1997), in which we held
equitable tolling inapplicable to § 6511's deadline for taxpay-
ers to fle refund claims. Id., at 348. But Brockamp, which
rested on several distinctive features of that statutory dead-
line, is inapposite. Congress wrote the time limit in “unusu-
ally emphatic form,” and its “detailed technical” language
“c[ould not] easily be read as containing implicit exceptions.”
Id., at 350. The statute also “reiterate[d]” the deadline
“several times in several different ways.” Id., at 351. And
the statute “explicit[ly] list[ed]” numerous (six) exceptions to
the deadline. Id., at 352. The “nature of the underlying
1
In passing, the Commissioner briefy suggests that equitable tolling
might not apply outside the realm of Article III courts. We have already
applied it in other non-Article III contexts, however, and the Commis-
sioner does not ask us to reconsider those precedents. See Young v.
United States, 535 U. S. 43, 47 (2002) (bankruptcy court limitations pe-
riod); United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. 402, 407, 420 (2015)
(deadline to present claim to agency).
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Opinion of the Court
subject matter—tax collection—underscore[d] the linguistic
poi
nt.” Ibid. That was because of the “administrative
problem” of allowing equitable tolling when the “IRS pro-
cesse[d] more than 200 million tax returns” and “issue[d]
more than 90 million refunds” each year. Ibid.
Section 6330(d)(1)'s deadline is a far cry from the one in
Brockamp. This deadline is not written in “emphatic form”
or with “detailed” and “technical” language, nor is it reiter-
ated multiple times. The deadline admits of a single excep-
tion (as opposed to Brockamp's six), which applies if a tax-
payer is prohibited from fling a petition with the Tax Court
because of a bankruptcy proceeding. § 6330(d)(2). That
makes this case less like Brockamp and more like Holland
v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631 (2010), in which we applied equitable
tolling to a deadline with a single statutory exception. See
id., at 647–648. And it bears emphasis that Brockamp does
not control simply because it also dealt with a statute relat-
ing to tax collection. In this case, any concerns about the
administrability of applying equitable tolling to § 6330(d)(1)
pale in comparison to those at issue in Brockamp, which
dealt with a central provision of tax law. The deadline here
serves a far more limited and ancillary role in the tax collec-
tion system. If anything, the differences between the stat-
ute at issue in Brockamp and this one underscore the reasons
why equitable tolling applies to § 6330(d)(1).
The Commissioner protests that if equitable tolling is
available, the IRS will not know whether it can proceed with
a collection action after § 6330(d)(1)'s deadline passes. The
Commissioner acknowledges that the deadline is already
subject to tolling provisions found elsewhere in the Tax
Code—for example, tolling is available to taxpayers located
in a combat zone or disaster area. Tr. of Oral Arg. 37–40.
But he says that the IRS can easily account for these contin-
gencies because it continuously monitors whether any tax-
payer is in a combat zone or disaster area. Ibid. Tolling
the § 6330(d)(1) deadline outside these circumstances, the
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211
Opinion of the Court
Commissioner insists, would create much more uncertainty.
Id.,
at 37–38.
We are not convinced that the possibility of equitable toll-
ing for the relatively small number of petitions at issue in
this case will appreciably add to the uncertainty already
present in the process. To take the most obvious example,
petitions for review are considered fled when mailed. 26
U. S. C. § 7502(a)(1). The 30-day deadline thus may come
and go before a petition “fled” within that time comes to
the IRS's attention. Presumably, the IRS does not monitor
when petitions for review are mailed. So it is not as if the
IRS can confdently rush to seize property on day 31 anyway.
None of this is to say that Boechler is entitled to equitable
tolling on the facts of this case. That should be determined
on remand. We simply hold that § 6330(d)(1)'s fling dead-
line, like most others, can be equitably tolled in appropriate
cases.
***
Section 6330(d)(1)'s 30-day time limit to fle a petition for
review of a collection due process determination is an ordi-
nary, nonjurisdictional deadline subject to equitable tolling.
We reverse the contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None