Johnson v. Guzman Chavez

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 594 U. S. Part 2
Pages 523–558
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 29, 2021
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
523
Syllabus
JOHNSON, ACTING DIRECTOR OF U. S. IMMI-
GRA
TION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
et al. v. GUZMAN CHAVEZ et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit
No. 19–897. Argued January 11, 2021—Decided June 29, 2021
Federal immigration law establishes procedures for removing aliens living
unlawfully in the United States as well as for determining whether such
persons are detained during removal proceedings. The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) may arrest and detain an alien “pending a
decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.”
8 U. S. C. § 1226(a). An alien detained under § 1226(a) may generally
apply for release on bond or conditional parole. § 1226(a)(2). If an
alien is ordered removed and the order becomes “administratively fnal,”
detention becomes mandatory. §§ 1231(a)(1)(A)–(B), (a)(2). If an alien
removed under this process reenters the country without authorization,
that person faces reinstatement of “the prior order of removal from its
original date.” § 1231(a)(5). That order “is not subject to being re-
opened or reviewed,” and the alien “shall be removed under the prior
order at any time after the reentry.” Ibid.
Respondents are aliens who were removed from the United States
and later reentered without authorization. When DHS reinstated their
prior removal orders, each respondent sought withholding-only relief to
prevent DHS from executing those orders based on fear of returning to
their home country as designated in the removal orders. While re-
spondents' withholding-only proceedings were pending, DHS detained
respondents, and respondents sought release on bond, which was ini-
tially denied. The Government opposed their release, maintaining that
because respondents were detained under § 1231, not § 1226, they were
not entitled to bond hearings. Respondents fled habeas proceedings in
District Court, seeking a declaration that § 1226 governs their detention,
as well as an injunction ordering the Government to grant them individ-
ualized bond hearings consistent with § 1226. The District Court
entered summary judgment for respondents, and the Fourth Circuit
affrmed.
Held: Section § 1231, not § 1226, governs the detention of aliens subject to
reinstated orders of removal. Pp. 533–547.
(a) Section 1231 authorizes detention “when an alien is ordered re-
moved” and enters the “removal period,” which begins, as relevant here,

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524 JOHNSON
v. GUZMAN CHAVEZ
Syllabus
on “[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively fnal.” It
is
undisputed that each respondent was previously “ordered removed”
pursuant to a valid order of removal and that those orders were “rein-
stated from [their] original date[s]” under § 1231(a)(5). Those rein-
stated removal orders were also “administratively fnal.” By inserting
the word “administratively,” Congress made clear that DHS need
not wait for the alien to seek or exhaust judicial review of that order.
Respondents contend that even if § 1231 normally governs in such
cases, it ceases to apply when the alien pursues withholding-only relief.
Respondents' arguments cannot overcome the statute's plain text.
Pp. 533–542.
(1) Respondents misunderstand the nature of withholding-only pro-
ceedings when they argue that because an immigration judge or the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) might determine that DHS cannot
remove an alien to the specifc country designated in the removal order,
the question whether the alien is “to be removed” remains “pending ”
and is therefore governed by § 1226. If an immigration judge grants an
application for withholding of removal, DHS is prohibited from remov-
ing the alien to that particular country, not from the United States.
The removal order remains in full force, and DHS retains the authority
to remove the alien to any other authorized country. This Court and
the BIA have long understood the nature of withholding-only relief this
way. See, e. g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U. S. 415, 419. Pp. 535–538.
(2) Respondents next argue that a removal order does not become
“administratively fnal” until the withholding-only proceedings conclude.
A reinstated removal order, they contend, loses its prior fnality
when the alien initiates withholding-only proceedings. This argument
ignores that removal orders and withholding-only proceedings address
two distinct questions and end in two separate orders. See Nasrallah
v. Barr, 590 U. S. –––, –––. Because the validity of removal orders is
not affected by the grant of withholding-only relief, an alien's initiation
of withholding-only proceedings does not render non-fnal an otherwise
“administratively fnal” reinstated order of removal. Pp. 539–540.
(3) Respondents submit that the “except as otherwise provided in
this section” language in the opening clause of § 1231(a)(1)(A)—which
sets the default for the length of the removal period at 90 days—places
a limit on when the removal period is triggered. The most natural
reading of that phrase, however, is that the Government must remove
an alien within 90 days unless another section of § 1231 specifcally con-
templates that the removal period can exceed 90 days. The presence
of specifc statutory provisions in § 1231 that relate to the length of the
removal period leads to the conclusion that the opening clause of
§ 1231(a)(1)(A) refers to them and not the withholding-only provision,

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525
Syllabus
which does not mention the length of the removal period and does not
st
and in the way of removal to a third country. Pp. 540–542.
(b) Statutory structure confrms this Court's textual reading. Every
provision applicable to respondents is located in § 1231. It would thus
be odd if the provision governing their detention was located in § 1226,
rather than § 1231, which contains its own detention provision. More-
over, the inclusion of the statutory withholding provision in § 1231,
grouped with other provisions that relate to where DHS may remove
an alien, illustrates how withholding-only relief fts within the removal
process generally. The order of the applicable Immigration and Nation-
ality Act provisions provides further context for interpreting the proper
application of § 1226 and § 1231. Section 1226 applies before an alien
proceeds through the removal proceedings and obtains a decision; § 1231
applies after. Pp. 542–544.
(c) Respondents' contrary reading would also undermine Congress's
judgment regarding the detention of different groups of aliens who
posed different fight risks. Aliens who have not been ordered removed
are less likely to abscond because they have a chance of being found
admissible, while aliens who have already been ordered removed are
generally inadmissible, see § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii), and have already demon-
strated a willingness to violate the terms of a removal order, see
§ 1231(a)(6). Congress had obvious reasons to treat these two groups
differently. P. 544.
(d) Respondents' remaining arguments are that withholding-only pro-
ceedings are a legal impediment that, like the three triggers to the start
of the removal period listed in § 1231(a)(1)(B), must be eliminated before
the removal period begins and that Congress could not have intended
§ 1231 to apply to an alien in withholding-only proceedings because
withholding-only proceedings often take longer than 90 days. Neither
argument is persuasive. Pp. 544–547.
940 F. 3d 867, reversed.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to footnote 4.
Roberts, C. J., and Kavanaugh and Barrett, JJ., joined that opinion in
full. Thomas, J., fled an opinion concurring except for footnote 4 and
concurring in the judgment, in which Gorsuch, J., joined, post, p. 547.
Breyer, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor and Kagan,
JJ., joined, post, p. 548.
Vivek Suri argued the cause for petitioners. With him
on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Wall, Deputy
Solicitor General Kneedler, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General Stewart, and Brian C. Ward.

526 JOHNSON
v. GUZMAN CHAVEZ
Opinion of the Court
Paul W. Hughes argued the cause for respondents. With
h
im on the brief were Michael B. Kimbe rly, Andrew A.
Lyons-Berg, Eugene R. Fidell, and Rachel C. McFarland.*
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, except
as to footnote 4.
Federal immigration law contains various provisions
authorizing the Government to detain aliens during the
removal process. This case concerns two of them: 8 U. S. C.
§ 1226 and 8 U. S. C. § 1231. We are asked to decide which
of those provisions applies to aliens who were removed from
the United States but later reentered without authorization,
were subject to reinstated orders of removal, and then
sought withholding of removal based on fear of persecution
in the particular countries designated by their removal
orders. If the answer is § 1226, which applies “pending a
decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the
United States,” then the alien may receive a bond hearing
before an immigration judge. If the answer is § 1231, which
applies after the alien is “ordered removed,” then the alien
is not entitled to a bond hearing. We conclude that § 1231,
not § 1226, governs the detention of aliens subject to rein-
stated orders of removal, meaning those aliens are not en-
titled to a bond hearing while they pursue withholding of
removal.
*Christopher J. Hajec and John M. Miano fled a brief for the Immigra-
tion Reform Law Institute as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the American
Civil Liberties Union by Michael K. T. Tan, Omar C. Jadwat, Judy Rabi-
novitz, Cecillia D. Wang, and David D. Cole; for the American Immigra-
tion Council et al. by Elizabeth B. Prelogar; for Former United States
Immigration Judges et al. by David G. Keyko; for Human Rights First
et al. by Eugene M. Gelernter and Hardy Vieux; for the National Immi-
grant Justice Center by Nicole Henning and Charles Roth; and for the
National Immigration Litigation Alliance et al. by Mark C. Fleming,
Trina Realmuto, and Matt H. Adams.
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Opinion of the Court
I
A
The
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) establishes
procedures for removing aliens living unlawfully in the
United States. In the ordinary course, if the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS)
1
discovers that an alien is living
in the United States without authorization, it may initiate
removal proceedings against the alien by sending him a “no-
tice to appear.” 110 Stat. 3009–587, as added and amended,
8 U. S. C. § 1229(a). That notice informs the alien of, among
other things, the charges against him and the time and place
of the hearing at which an immigration judge will determine
whether the alien is to be removed. §§ 1229(a)(1)(D), (G)(i).
The INA further provides that DHS may arrest and detain
the alien “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be
removed from the United States.” § 1226(a). Aliens who
are arrested and detained may generally apply for release on
bond or conditional parole. § 1226(a)(2).
2
To secure release,
the alien must show that he does not pose a danger to the
community and that he is likely to appear for future proceed-
ings. 8 CFR §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8) (2020); In re Adeniji,
22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1113 (BIA 1999). If DHS denies the
alien's request, the alien may request a bond hearing in front
of an immigration judge by fling an application for a change
i n the a l ien's detenti on conditi ons. See §§ 236.1(d)(1),
1003.19(a), 1236.1(d)(1). Either the alien or DHS may ap-
1
Although many of the provisions at issue in this case refer to the Attor-
ney General, Congress has also empowered the Secretary of Homeland
Security to enforce the Immigration and Nationality Act. See Nielsen v.
Preap, 586 U. S. –––, ––– n. 2 (2019); see also Brief for Petitioners 2–3, and
n. 1; Brief for Respondents 7, and n. 2.
2
There is one exception. For certain criminal aliens and aliens who
have connections to terrorism, detention is mandatory and release is per-
mitted in very limited circumstances. See 8 U. S. C. § 1226(c); Nielsen,
586 U. S., at ––– – –––, ––– – –––. That exception does not apply here.
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528 JOHNSON
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peal the immigration judge's decision to the Board of Im-
m
igration Appeals (BIA). See §§ 236.1(d)(3)(i), 1003.19(f ),
1236.1(d)(3)(i).
At some poi nt, the a l ien w i l l a lso have the above-
mentioned hearing before an immigration judge to deter-
mine whether he is inadmissible or deportable, and therefore
subject to removal. 8 U. S. C. § 1229a(a)(1). The alien may
seek various forms of relief or protection from removal, such
as asylum or withholding of removal. See § 1229a(c)(4)(A);
8 CFR §§ 1208.4(b)(3)(i), 1240.11(c), (e). If the immigration
judge decides that the alien is inadmissible or deportable and
that the alien is not entitled to any of the relief or protection
that he requested, the immigration judge will issue an order
of removal. 8 U. S. C. § 1229a(c)(5). If the immigration
judge issues an order of removal, the alien may fle a motion
to reconsider, a motion to reopen, an appeal to the BIA, and
a petition for review in federal court. §§ 1229a(c)(5)–(7),
1252(b); 8 CFR § 1240.15.
Once an alien is ordered removed, DHS must physically
remove him from the United States within a 90-day “removal
period.” 8 U. S. C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). The removal period be-
gins on the latest of three dates: (1) the date the order of
removal becomes “administratively fnal,” (2) the date of the
fnal order of any court that entered a stay of removal, or (3)
the date on which the alien is released from non-immigration
detention or confnement. § 1231(a)(1)(B). During the re-
moval period, detention is mandatory. § 1231(a)(2).
Under § 1231, the removal period may be extended in at
least three circumstances, such that an alien remains de-
tained after 90 days have passed. First, the removal period
may be extended if the alien fails to make a timely applica-
tion for travel documents or acts to prevent his removal.
§ 1231(a)(1)(C). Second, DHS may stay the immediate re-
moval of certain aliens if it decides that such removal is not
practicable or proper, or if the alien is needed to testify in a
pending prosecution. § 1231(c)(2)(A). And fnally, the stat-
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Opinion of the Court
ute provides that an alien may be detained beyond the re-
mova
l period or released under supervision if he is (1) inad-
missible, (2) removable as a result of violations of status
requirements, entry conditions, or the criminal law, or for
national security or foreign policy reasons, or (3) a risk to
the community or unlikely to comply with the removal order.
§ 1231(a)(6); see also 8 CFR § 241.4 (setting out procedures
DHS must follow to impose continued detention). Con-
tinued detention under this provision creates the “post-
removal-period.”
Although the statute does not specify a time limit on how
long DHS may detain an alien in the post-removal period,
this Court has “read an implicit limitation” into the statute
“in light of the Constitution's demands,” and has held that
an alien may be detained only for “a period reasonably neces-
sary to bring about that alien's removal from the United
States.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678, 689 (2001). And
according to the Court, a period reasonably necessary to
bring about the alien's removal from the United States is
presumptively six months. Id., at 701. After that point, if
the alien “provides good reason to believe that there is no
signifcant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foresee-
able future,” the Government must either rebut that show-
ing or release the alien. Ibid.; see also 8 CFR § 241.13 (set-
ting out the Zadvydas procedures).
If no exception applies, an alien who is not removed within
the 90-day removal period will be released subject to super-
vision. See 8 U. S. C. § 1231(a)(3); see also 8 CFR § 241.5.
B
In addition to the removal procedures outlined above, Con-
gress has created an expedited process for aliens who reenter
the United States without authorization after having already
been removed. The relevant statutory provision states:
“If the Attorney General fnds that an alien has reen-
tered the United States illegally after having been re-
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530 JOHNSON
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Opinion of the Court
moved or having departed voluntarily, under an order
of
removal, the prior order of removal is reinstated from
its original date and is not subject to being reopened or
reviewed, the alien is not eligible and may not apply
for any relief under this chapter, and the alien shall be
removed under the prior order at any time after the
reentry.” § 1231(a)(5).
DHS's regulations set out the process for reinstating an
order of removal. In short, the agency obtains the alien's
prior order of removal, confrms the alien's identity, deter-
mines whether the alien's reentry was unauthorized, pro-
vides the alien with written notice of its determination,
allows the alien to contest that determination, and then rein-
states the order. See 8 CFR §§ 241.8(a)–(c), 1241.8(a)–(c).
Title 8 U. S. C. § 1231(a)(5) applies to “all illegal reen-
trants,” and it “explicitly insulates the removal orders from
review,” while also “generally foreclos[ing] discretionary
relief from the terms of the reinstated order.” Fernandez-
Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U. S. 30, 35 (2006). It does not, how-
ever, preclude an alien from pursuing withholding-only relief
to prevent DHS from executing his removal to the particular
country designated in his reinstated removal order. Ibid.,
n. 4; see also § 1231(b)(3)(A).
C
Much of this case turns on the nature of withholding-only
proceedings. There are two paths for seeking withholding
of removal. First, the alien may seek statutory withholding
under § 1231(b)(3)(A), which provides that “the Attorney
General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney
General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in that country because of the alien's race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.” Second, the alien may seek withholding
under regulations implementing the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
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531
Opinion of the Court
or Punishment (CAT), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–
20,
1465 U. N. T. S. 113, which prohibits removal of an alien
to a country where the alien is likely to be tortured. See 8
CFR §§ 208.16–208.17, 1208.16–1208.17.
The process for applying for withholding of removal
depends on whether the alien is subject to the standard re-
moval proceedings or a reinstated order of removal. As
mentioned above, an alien subject to the standard removal
process typically applies for withholding during the course
of his removal proceedings. See supra, at 528. But be-
cause an alien subject to a reinstated order of removal will
not have any removal proceedings, the process begins for
him only if he expresses a fear to DHS of returning to the
country of removal. See §§ 208.31(a), 1208.31(a). At that
point, DHS will refer him to an asylum offcer for a reason-
able fear determination, which will normally be conducted
within 10 days of the referral. §§ 208.31(b), 1208.31(b). If
the asylum offcer concludes that the alien has a reasonable
fear, he will refer the matter to an immigration judge for
initiation of withholding-only proceedings. §§ 208.31(e),
1208.31(e). Those proceedings are “limited to a determina-
tion of whether the alien is eligible for withholding or defer-
ral of removal,” and as such, “all parties are prohibited from
raising or considering any other issues, including but not lim-
ited to issues of admissibility, deportability, eligibility for
waivers, and el ig ibi l ity for any other for m of rel ief. ”
§§ 208.2(c)(3)(i), 1208.2(c)(3)(i). The immigration judge's
fnal decision as to withholding can be appealed to the BIA.
§§ 208.31(e), 1208.31(e).
If an alien is granted withholding-only relief, DHS may
not remove the alien to the country designated in the re-
moval order unless the order of withholding is terminated.
§§ 208.22, 1208.22. But because withholding of removal is a
form of “ `country specifc' ” relief, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U. S. 421, 428, n. 6 (1987), nothing prevents DHS “from
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532 JOHNSON
v. GUZMAN CHAVEZ
Opinion of the Court
try to which removal has been withheld or deferred,”
§§
208.16(f ), 1208.16(f ); see also §§ 208.17(b)(2), 1208.17(b)(2).
D
Respondents are aliens who were removed from the
United States and later reentered without authorization.
Guzman Chavez v. Hott, 940 F. 3d 867, 870 (CA4 2019).
When DHS discovered their presence, it reinstated their
prior removal orders. Id., at 870–871. Each respondent
expressed a fear of returning to his or her home country
and was referred to an asylum offcer for a reasonable fear
interview. Id., at 871. In each case, the asylum offcer
determined that the respondent had a reasonable fear of
persecution or torture and referred the respondent to an im-
migration judge for withholding-only proceedings. Ibid.
Although some of the respondents were initially granted
supervised release, all were ultimately detained by DHS.
Ibid. They then sought release on bond while their
withholding-only proceedings were pending. The Govern-
ment opposed release, maintaining that because respondents
were detained under 8 U. S. C. § 1231, not § 1226, they were
not entitled to bond hearings.
Respondents fled two habeas proceedings in the Eastern
District of Virginia seeking a declaration that § 1226 rather
than § 1231 governs their detention, as well as an injunction
ordering the Government to grant them individualized bond
hearings consistent with § 1226.
3
In both cases, the District
Court entered summary judgment in favor of respondents,
concluding that § 1226 governs their detention. See Romero
v. Evans, 280 F. Supp. 3d 835, 849 (2017); Diaz v. Hott, 297
F. Supp. 3d 618, 623, 628 (2018). The Government appealed
3
In one of the proceedings, the District Court certifed a Virginia-wide
class of aliens detained during withholding-only proceedings. 940 F. 3d,
at 871. The Government did not challenge below, and does not challenge
in this Court, the District Court's decision to certify the class, and we do
not address that decision here.
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Opinion of the Court
both decisions, and the Fourth Circuit affrmed, over a dis-
sent
by Judge Richardson. See 940 F. 3d, at 882. In doing
so, the Fourth Circuit joined the Second Circuit but departed
from the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits. Compare Guerra
v. Shanahan, 831 F. 3d 59, 64 (CA2 2016), with Martinez v.
LaRose, 968 F. 3d 555, 559 (CA6 2020); Guerrero-Sanchez v.
Warden York County Prison, 905 F. 3d 208, 213 (CA3 2018);
Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 882 F. 3d 826, 832 (CA9 2017). We
granted certiorari to resolve the split. Albence v. Guzman
Chavez, 590 U. S. ––– (2020). We conclude that § 1231, not
§ 1226, governs respondents' detention and now reverse the
judgment of the Fourth Circuit.
4
II
A
We turn frst to the statutory text. Section 1226 provides
that “an alien may be arrested and detained pending a deci-
sion on whether the alien is to be removed from the United
States.” § 1226(a). Section 1231, by contrast, authorizes
detention “when an alien is ordered removed” and enters the
“removal period,” which begins on “[t]he date the order of
removal becomes administratively fnal.” §§ 1231(a)(1)(A)–
(B), (2).
5
It further provides that when an alien reenters
the country after having already been removed, “the prior
order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is
not subject to being reopened or reviewed.” § 1231(a)(5).
In that scenario, “the alien is not eligible and may not apply
for any relief under this chapter” and “shall be removed
under the prior order at any time after the reentry.” Ibid.
The parties agree that § 1226 governs the detention of
aliens until § 1231's “removal period” begins. As relevant
4
We have jurisdiction to review the decision below. See Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U. S. 281, 292–296 (2018) (plurality opinion).
5
The other two triggers for the removal period—a court order lifting a
stay and the release from non-immigration detention or confnement—do
not apply here. See §§ 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii)–(iii).
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here, the removal period begins when an alien is “ordered
removed,
” and the removal order becomes “administratively
fnal.” To resolve this case, we therefore must decide two
questions: whether respondents were “ordered removed”
and whether their reinstated removal orders were “adminis-
tratively fnal.” The answer to both questions is yes.
First, respondents have been “ordered removed.” It is
undisputed that each respondent was previously removed
pursuant to a valid order of removal. And after respond-
ents later reentered the United States without authorization,
those prior orders were “reinstated from [their] original
date[s]” under § 1231(a)(5). Those reinstated orders are not
subject to reopening or review, nor are respondents eligible
for discretionary relief under the INA. Instead, they “shall
be removed under the prior order at any time after the
reentry. ” Ibid. Accordingly, respondents' prior orders,
reinstated under § 1231(a)(5), show that respondents were
ordered removed.
Second, respondents' reinstated removal orders are “ad-
ministratively fnal.” Although that phrase is not defned in
the statute, its meaning is clear. By using the word “admin-
istratively,” Congress focused our attention on the agency's
review proceedings, separate and apart from any judicial re-
view proceedings that may occur in a court. Context con-
frms this interpretation. Recall that under § 1231(a)(1)(B),
the removal period begins “on the latest of ” three events:
(1) “[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively
fnal”; (2) “[i]f the removal order is judicially reviewed and if
a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of
the court's fnal order”; and (3) “[i]f the alien is detained or
confned” outside the immigration process, the date of the
alien's release. Reading the frst two provisions together, it
is clear that DHS need not wait for the alien to seek, and a
court to complete, judicial review of the removal order before
executing it. Rather, once the BIA has reviewed the order
(or the time for seeking the BIA's review has expired), DHS
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Opinion of the Court
is free to remove the alien unless a court issues a stay. That
rei
nforces why Congress included “administratively” before
the word “fnal” in the frst provision.
Respondents do not contest that their prior removal or-
ders have long been “administratively fnal,” as we under-
stand the term. See Brief for Respondents 8, 20–21, 24–26.
6
Each had the opportunity to seek review in the BIA after the
initial removal order was entered, and § 1231(a)(5) explicitly
prohibits them from seeking review or relief from the order
after it is reinstated following unlawful reentry. In other
words, there is nothing left for the BIA to do with respect
to the removal order other than to execute it. Thus, re-
spondents' orders are administratively fnal.
For these reasons, § 1231's detention provisions are a natu-
ral ft for aliens subject to reinstated orders of removal.
Respondents and the dissent appear to accept this much but
nevertheless contend that even if § 1231 normally governs
aliens in this posture, it ceases to apply when such an alien
pursues withholding-only relief. See post, at 553–554 (opin-
ion of Breyer, J.). Each of the arguments on this score fails.
1
Respondents frst argue that because an immigration
judge or the BIA might determine that DHS cannot remove
an alien to the specifc country designated in the removal
order, the question whether the alien is “to be removed”
remains “pending ” and is therefore governed by § 1226.
Respondents misunderstand the nature of withholding-only
proceedings. When an alien applies for withholding-only re-
6
Respondents do argue, however, that some lower courts' interpretation
of the phrase “fnal order of removal” as it is used in 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(1)
requires that this Court adopt respondents' interpretation of § 1231 here.
Brief for Respondents 24–26, and n. 8. We express no view on whether
the lower courts are correct in their interpretation of § 1252, which uses
different language than § 1231 and relates to judicial review of removal
orders rather than detention.
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536 JOHNSON
v. GUZMAN CHAVEZ
Opinion of the Court
lief, he does so as to a particular country. See 8 CFR
§§
208.31(a), 1208.31(a). The proceedings that result from
such an application are “limited to a determination of
whether the alien is eligible for withholding or deferral of
removal,” and “all parties are prohibited from raising or con-
sidering any other issues, including but not limited to issues
of admissibility, deportability, eligibility for waivers, and
eligibility for any other form of relief.” §§ 208.2(c)(3)(i),
1208.2(c)(3)(i). If an immigration judge grants an applica-
tion for withholding of removal, he prohibits DHS from re-
moving the alien to that particular country, not from the
United States. The removal order is not vacated or other-
wise set aside. It remains in full force, and DHS retains the
authority to remove the alien to any other country author-
ized by the statute. See §§ 208.16(f ), 1208.16(f ), 1240.12(d).
And the statute provides numerous options: a country desig-
nated by the alien; the alien's country of citizenship; the
alien's previous country of residence; the alien's country of
birth; the country from which the alien departed for the
United States; and fnally, any country willing to accept the
alien. Brief for Petitioners 3 (citing 8 U. S. C. § 1231(b)(2)).
In short, withholding-only relief is country-specifc. It re-
lates to where an alien may be removed. It says nothing,
however, about the antecedent question whether an alien is
to be removed from the United States.
This Court and the BIA have long understood the nature
of withholding-only relief this way. In INS v. Aguirre-
A gu ir re, 526 U. S. 415, 419 (1999), we disti ng uished
withholding-only relief from asylum, noting that “a grant of
asylum permits an alien to remain in the United States and
to apply for permanent residency after one year,” while
“withholding only bars deporting an alien to a particular
country or countries.” (Emphasis added.) And in Matter
of I–S & C–S, 24 I. & N. Dec. 432, 434 (BIA 2008), the BIA
made clear that withholding-only relief “does not afford [an
alien] any permanent right to remain in the United States.”

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537
Opinion of the Court
Rather, as the “regulations make clear,” a grant of withhold-
i
ng “does not prevent the DHS from removing an alien to a
country other than the one to which removal has been with-
held.” Ibid. Indeed, just last Term, we affrmed that a
grant of withholding-only relief “means only that, notwith-
standing the order of removal, the noncitizen may not be
removed to the designated country of removal, at least until
conditions change in that country,” and that “the noncitizen
still may be removed at any time to another country.”
Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. –––, ––– (2020) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
Respondents counter that, as a practical matter, the ques-
tions “whether” an alien may be removed and “where” he
may be removed to are indistinguishable because DHS often
does not remove an alien to an alternative country if with-
holding relief is granted. They point to one source claiming
that in 2017, only 1.6% of aliens who were granted withhold-
ing of removal were actually removed to an alternative coun-
try. See Brief for Respondents 6, 30–31 (citing American
Immigration Council & National Immigrant Justice Center,
The Difference Between Asylum and Withholding of Removal
7 (Oct. 2020), www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/
default / fles / research/the_difference_between_asylum_and_
withholding_of_removal.pdf ). But the fact that alternative-
country removal is rare does not make it statutorily unau-
thorized. Here, the statute makes clear that removability
and withholding relief are distinct, and we decline to ignore
the plain import of the statutory text in favor of on-the-
ground statistics about the feasibility of removal to a third
country.
Indeed, respondents' argument—that the decision about
whether an alien “is to be removed” remains “pending ” for
purposes of § 1226 until DHS is certain that it will be able to
carry out that removal—is at odds with the statutory text
of § 1231 and our decision in Zadvydas. To begin, it is not
plausible that an alien is detained under § 1226 instead of
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Opinion of the Court
§ 1231 while DHS resolves any practical problems associated
w
ith the execution of a removal order because § 1231, not
§ 1226, is the part of the INA that anticipates and addresses
those problems. For example, § 1231(a)(1)(C) extends the
removal period if the alien fails to timely apply for travel
documents and therefore cannot be removed to the relevant
country. Section 1231(c)(2)(A) authorizes DHS to stay the
immediate removal of certain aliens if it decides that immedi-
ate removal “is not practicable or proper.” And § 1231(a)(3)
allows for supervised release after the 90-day removal pe-
riod expires “[i]f the alien does not leave or is not removed”
during that time period. Those provisions would be unnec-
essary if questions of how and where an alien is to be re-
moved were bound up in whether the alien was removable
at all under § 1226.
Our decision in Zadvydas confrms this distinction be-
tween whether an alien is to be removed and where an alien
is to be sent. In that case, we addressed claims raised by
two aliens who, due to the Government's inability to locate a
country of removal, had been detained for prolonged periods
of time under § 1231. See 533 U. S., at 684–686. But rather
than holding that these aliens should not have been detained
under § 1231 at all because the decision about whether they
were to be removed remained “pending,” the Court set out
certain procedural mechanisms to allow aliens to seek re-
lease from § 1231 detention if there was no signifcant likeli-
hood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Id.,
at 701. That holding would make little sense if DHS had to
conclusively resolve the question of “where” an alien was to
be removed before resolving “whether” the alien was to be
removed under § 1226.
7
7
Respondents attempt to distinguish our approach in Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U. S. 678 (2001), by arguing that there is a difference between
the Government's inability to remove an alien due to the grant of
withholding-only relief and its inability to remove an alien because of
the geopolitical and practical concerns that prevented removal in that
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539
Opinion of the Court
2
Respondents
next argue that a removal order does not be-
come “administratively fnal” until the withholding-only pro-
ceedings conclude. That is so, they say, even if a reinstated
order of removal is “administratively fnal” at the time of its
reinstatement; according to their submission, when the alien
initiates withholding-only proceedings, the reinstated order
loses its prior fnality. See Brief for Respondents 24–25.
In a similar vein, the dissent contends that respondents' re-
moval orders are not “administratively fnal” because, by
seeking withholding-only relief, respondents are “in effect”
seeking “a modifcation of, a change in, or a withholding of,
the `prior order of removal.' ” Post, at 556–557.
These related arguments suffer from the same faw as the
one just discussed: They ignore that removal orders and
withholding-only proceedings address two distinct questions.
As a result, they end in two separate orders, and the fnality
of the order of removal does not depend in any way on the
outcome of the withholding-only proceedings.
Case law makes this clear. In Matter of I–S & C–S, two
aliens asserted that they were entitled to withholding of re-
moval during their initial removal proceedings. The Immi-
gration Judge concluded that they were removable but
agreed that they were entitled to withholding relief. As a
result, the Immigration Judge did not issue an order of re-
moval but instead simply granted the aliens' withholding ap-
plications. 24 I. & N. Dec., at 432–433. DHS appealed, ar-
guing that it was error for the Immigration Judge not to
case. But the premise of respondents' argument is that a decision about
whether an alien “is to be removed” remains pending during withholding-
only proceedings because it is not certain that the Government will actu-
ally be able to remove the alien from the country. The same lack of cer-
tainty existed in Zadvydas, where the Government's attempt to return an
alien to the country listed in the removal order was rebuffed for geopoliti-
cal or practical reasons, and the Government had to search for an
alternative.
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issue the order of removal. Id., at 433. The BIA agreed.
It
stated that “[a]lthough entering an order of removal prior
to granting withholding may appear to be a technicality,” it
is “axiomatic that in order to withhold removal there must
frst be an order of removal that can be withheld.” Ibid.
(emphasis added). In other words, the order of removal is
separate from and antecedent to a grant of withholding of
removal. Every Member of this Court approved that read-
ing just last Term. In Nasrallah v. Barr, the majority ex-
plained that the grant of withholding relief under CAT “does
not disturb the fnal order of removal,” “affect the validity
of the fnal order of removal,” or otherwise “merge into
the fnal order of removal.” 590 U. S., at –––. The dissent
acknowledged the same. See id., at ––– (opinion of
Thomas, J.) (“The majority correctly notes that a CAT order
does not fall within” the statute's defnition of an order of
removal); id., at ––– – ––– (“[S]tatutory withholding seeks to
prevent removability and is considered after the alien has
been deemed removable. Thus, statutory withholding
claims also do not affect the validity of the underlying re-
moval order” (citation omitted)). Because the validity of re-
moval orders is not affected by the grant of withholding-only
relief, an alien's initiation of withholding-only proceedings
does not render non-fnal an otherwise “administratively
fnal” reinstated order of removal.
3
At oral argument, respondents offered a new textual argu-
ment in support of their position that § 1231 does not govern
their detention. They point to the opening clause of
§ 1231(a)(1)(A), which states in full: “Except as otherwise
provided in this section, when an alien is ordered removed,
the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United
States within a period of 90 days.” (Emphasis added.) Re-
spondents submit that because withholding-only relief is pro-
vided for in § 1231, DHS cannot remove an alien who seeks
such relief, and the removal period cannot begin under
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541
Opinion of the Court
§ 1231(a)(1)(B). Tr. of Oral Arg. 33–34, 45. Stated differ-
ently
, respondents read the “[e]xcept as” language as another
limit on when the removal period is triggered, a reading that
the dissent endorses. See post, at 555–556.
Even assuming that respondents did not forfeit this argu-
ment by failing to raise it in their brief, it fails on the merits.
Section 1231(a)(1)(A) relates to the length of the removal pe-
riod, and it sets the default for that period at 90 days. It
does not, as respondents suggest, serve as the “gateway” for
when the removal period begins. Tr. of Oral Arg. 45.
Those triggers appear in § 1231(a)(1)(B). Nor does it simply
offer “basic operative language” regarding what DHS must
do. Post, at 555. The provision's focus is the length of time
that DHS has to remove an alien once the alien is ordered
removed. And the most natural reading of the “except as
otherwise provided” clause is that DHS must remove an
alien within 90 days unless another subsection of § 1231 spe-
cifcally contemplates that the removal period can exceed 90
days. That aligns with the rest of § 1231, which contains
specifc provisions mandating or authorizing DHS to extend
detention beyond 90 days. See, e. g., § 1231(a)(1)(C) (requir-
ing the extension of the 90-day period and permitting contin-
ued detention “if the alien fails or refuses to make timely
application in good faith for travel or other documents neces-
sary to the alien's departure or conspires or acts to prevent
the a l ien's remova l subjec t to an order of remova l”);
§ 1231(c)(2)(A) (permitting DHS to stay immediate removal
of certain aliens if such “removal is not practicable or
proper” or the alien is needed to testify in a criminal case);
§ 1231(a)(6) (permitting DHS to detain certain groups of
aliens “beyond the removal period”).
8
Given the presence
8
The dissent contends that the second of these provisions, § 1231(c)
(2)(A), is “beside the point” because another provision in that subsection
and a regulation provide that DHS has the authority to release on bond
an alien for whom it had previously stayed immediate removal so that the
alien could testify in a prosecution. See post, at 556. But DHS's ability to

542 JOHNSON
v. GUZMAN CHAVEZ
Opinion of the Court
of specifc statutory provisions in § 1231 under which DHS
is
not required to remove the alien within 90 days, we
have little trouble concluding that the opening clause of
§ 1231(a)(1)(A) refers to them and not the withholding-only
provision, which does not mention the length of the removal
period and does not stand in the way of removal to a third
country.
In short, the statutory text makes clear that § 1231, not
§ 1226, governs respondents' detention, and none of respond-
ents' counterarguments can overcome that plain text.
B
The statutory structure confrms the textual reading.
Consider frst the structure of § 1231 itself, which is titled
“Detention and removal of aliens ordered removed.” Every
provision applicable to respondents is located in § 1231. Re-
spondents' orders of removal are reinstated against them
under § 1231(a)(5). The bar on reopening or reviewing those
removal orders, as well as the requirement that DHS remove
a l iens subjec t to rei nst ated orders, a lso appears i n
§ 1231(a)(5). And the provision allowing respondents to
seek withholding-only relief comes from § 1231(b)(3)(A). It
would thus be odd if the provision governing respondents'
detention was located in § 1226, rather than § 1231, which
contains its own detention provision. See 940 F. 3d, at 887
(Richardson, J., dissenting).
Moreover, the inclusion of the statutory-withholding pro-
vision in § 1231, grouped with other provisions that relate
release certain aliens on bond tells us nothing about the meaning of the
phrase “[e]xcept as otherwise provided” in § 1231(a)(1)(A). The point is
that other provisions in § 1231 contemplate situations in which DHS is not
required to remove an alien in less than 90 days. The dissent otherwise
dismisses the remaining two provisions as “unlike the restriction-on-
removal provision” in that they “sugges[t] . . . an extension of the removal
period beyond 90 days.” Post, at 556. But that is the very feature that
makes these provisions relevant to § 1231(a)(1)(A).
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543
Opinion of the Court
to where DHS may remove an alien, illustrates how
w
ithholding-only relief fts within the removal process gen-
erally. Section 1231(b) is entitled “Countries to which aliens
may be removed.” Paragraph (1) lists all of the countries
to which an alien “arriving at the United States” may be
removed. Paragraph (2) lists all of the countries to which
“[o]ther aliens” may be removed. And paragraph (3)(A)—
the statutory-withholding provision—states that “[n]otwith-
standing paragraphs (1) and (2), the Attorney General may
not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General
decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened
in that country because of the alien's race, religion, national-
ity, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion.” The placement of the statutory-withholding provision
in § 1231 is therefore strong evidence that withholding-only
proceedings are relevant to where an alien will be removed
(and therefore detention under § 1231), not whether the alien
will be removed at all (and therefore detention under § 1226).
The general structure of the INA provides further sup-
port. Sections 1226 and 1231 both appear in Part IV of Title
8, chapter 12, of the United States Code, entitled “Inspection,
Apprehension, Examination, Exclusion, and Removal.” The
sections within that part proceed largely in the sequential
steps of the removal process. Sections 1221 to 1224 address
the arrival of aliens. Section 1225 provides instructions for
inspecting aliens, expediting the removal of some, and refer-
ring others for a removal hearing. Section 1226 authorizes
the arrest and detention of aliens pending a decision on
whether they are to be removed. Section 1227 explains
which aliens are deportable. Section 1228 authorizes the
expedited removal of some of those deportable aliens. Sec-
tions 1229, 1229a, and 1229b set out the process for initiating
and conducting removal proceedings, and they specify the
types of relief that an alien can request during those pro-
ceedings, such as cancellation of removal. Section 1229c ad-
dresses voluntary departure. Section 1230 explains what to
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544 JOHNSON
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do if an alien is admitted. And § 1231 explains what to do if
the
alien is ordered removed.
The order of the sections in Part IV provides helpful con-
text for interpreting the proper application of § 1226 and
§ 1231. See 940 F. 3d, at 887–888 (Richardson, J., dissent-
ing). Section 1226 applies before an alien proceeds through
the removal proceedings and obtains a decision; § 1231 ap-
plies after. Once an alien has been ordered removed from
the United States in a removal proceeding under § 1229a and
that order has been reinstated under § 1231(a)(5), “the alien
cannot go back in time, so to speak, to § 1226.” Id., at 888.
C
Respondents' contrary reading would undermine Con-
gress's judgment regarding the detention of different groups
of aliens who posed different risks of fight: aliens detained
under § 1226 before having been ordered removed and those
held under § 1231 af ter a lready hav i ng been ordered
removed.
Aliens who have not been ordered removed are less likely
to abscond because they have a chance of being found admis-
sible, but aliens who have already been ordered removed are
generally inadmissible. See 8 U. S. C. § 1182(a)(9)(C). The
only apparent relief they can hope to obtain is a grant of
withholding-only relief, and they would seem to still have a
chance to get that relief if they absconded and were again
apprehended. In addition, aliens who reentered the country
illegally after removal have demonstrated a willingness to
violate the terms of a removal order, and they therefore may
be less likely to comply with the reinstated order. See
§ 1231(a)(6). Congress had obvious reasons to treat these
two groups differently.
III
Respondents' remaining arguments are unpersuasive.
They primarily argue that § 1226 governs whenever the INA
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545
Opinion of the Court
does not “authorize” DHS to remove an alien. Brief for Re-
spondents
16. Respondents rely on § 1231(a)(1)(B), which,
again, provides that the removal period begins on the latest
of three dates: (1) the date the order of removal becomes
“administratively fnal,” (2) the date of the fnal order of any
court that entered a stay of removal, or (3) the date on which
the alien is released from non-immigration detention or con-
fnement. Respondents contend that those triggers consti-
tute various legal impediments to removal, and those legal
impediments show that § 1231 detention applies only if DHS
has secured full and complete legal authority to remove an
alien. In other words, to detain an alien under § 1231, DHS
must eliminate all legal impediments to removal. Other-
wise, § 1226 applies. Like the three legal impediments
listed in § 1231(a)(1)(B), respondents say, withholding-only
proceedings are another impediment that deprives DHS of
the full legal authority required to remove.
Respondents' argument fails on multiple levels. First,
even if § 1231(a)(1)(B) imposes three “legal impediments” to
removal, that does not mean that all legal impediments must
be eliminated before the removal period begins. Indeed,
the text of § 1231(a)(1)(B) suggests the opposite. It enumer-
ates three specifc triggers for the removal period but
nowhere includes “the completion of withholding-only pro-
ceedi ngs. ” See NLRB v. SW Gene ra l, Inc., 580 U. S.
288, 302 (2017) (“[E]xpressing one item of an associated
group or series excludes another left unmentioned” (brackets
and internal quotation marks omitted)). Nor does it other-
wise include a catchall provision that might support respond-
ents' position, such as “or the date on which DHS obtains
fnal legal authority to remove the alien.” Second, even if
we accepted that there is an implicit requirement that DHS
have full “legal authority” before the removal period begins,
withholding-only proceedings have nothing to do with that
authority. As explained above, DHS retains its authority
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546 JOHNSON
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Opinion of the Court
during withholding-only proceedings to remove the alien to
any
country other than the country that is the subject of
those proceedings.
Respondents next turn to the 90-day removal requirement
in § 1231(a)(1)(A). They contend that Congress could not
have intended § 1231 to apply to an alien in withholding-only
proceedings because the removal period contemplated by
§ 1231(a)(1)(A) is only 90 days, and withholding-only proceed-
ings take much longer than that. Brief for Respondents 22,
26–27. In respondents' view, the removal period's short du-
ration proves that it is meant to apply only during the fnal
period during which DHS takes steps to put an alien on an
outbound plane. Id., at 22. Even assuming respondents
are correct that withholding-only proceedings are not usually
completed in 90 days, it does not follow that § 1231 is inappli-
cable to aliens who initiate them. In addition to setting out
a 90-day removal period, § 1231 expressly authorizes DHS to
release under supervision or continue the detention of aliens
if removal cannot be effectuated within the 90 days. See
§§ 1231(a)(3), (6). There is no reason why DHS cannot de-
tain aliens in withholding-only proceedings under those same
post-removal-period provisions. As explained above, DHS
routinely holds aliens under these provisions when geopoliti-
cal or practical problems prevent it from removing an alien
within the 90-day period. See, e. g., Zadvydas, 533 U. S., at
684–686.
Relatedly, respondents suggest that because § 1231(a)
(1)(A) says DHS “shall” remove the alien within the 90-day
removal period, and it would be practically impossible to do
that in most cases involving withholding-only proceedings,
§ 1231 must not apply when withholding-only proceedings
are pending. See Brief for Respondents 26. But this argu-
ment overlooks the rest of § 1231's directive, which states
that DHS “shall” remove the alien within 90 days “[e]xcept
as otherwise provided in this section.” § 1231(a)(1)(A).
And, as noted above, “this section” provides for post-removal
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547
Opinion of Thomas, J.
detention and supervised release in the event an alien cannot
be
removed within the 90-day removal period, §§ 1231(a)(3),
(6). Interpreting § 1231 to apply even if withholding-only
proceedings remain pending longer than 90 days thus does
not “mak[e] it structurally impossible” for DHS “to satisfy
its statutory obligation,” as respondents argue. Brief for
Respondents 26.
9
***
We reverse the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Gorsuch joins,
concurr i ng except for footnote 4 and concurr ing i n the
judgment.
This Court has an “independent obligation” to assess
whether it has jurisdiction. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546
U. S. 500, 514 (2006). We do not have it here.
Congress has restricted our jurisdiction in removal cases.
See 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(9); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S.
281, 316 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment). Under § 1252(b)(9), we can exercise judi-
cial review of “questions of law and fact . . . arising from any
action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien” in
only two circumstances. One is to review a fnal order of
removal. § 1252(b)(9). The other is to exercise an express
9
The parties offer two other arguments, neither of which we need ad-
dress. The Government asks that we apply deference under Chevron
U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837
(1984), to its interpretation of § 1231. But Chevron deference does not
apply where the statute is clear. For their part, respondents argue that
the canon of constitutional avoidance favors application of § 1226, not
§ 1231, to their detention. But that canon “comes into play only when,
after the application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to
be susceptible of more than one construction.” Jennings, 583 U. S., at 296
(internal quotation marks omitted). As already explained, the text makes
plain that § 1231, not § 1226, governs.
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Breyer, J., dissenting
grant of jurisdiction elsewhere in § 1252. Ibid.; Jennings,
583
U. S., at 316. Neither circumstance is present here.
Therefore, if respondents' claims “aris[e] from any action
taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien,” the juris-
dictional bar in § 1252(b)(9) applies. And for all the reasons
I discussed in Jennings, challenges to detention during the
removal process, such as this one, “fall within the heartland
of § 1252(b)(9).” Id., at 318.
Although Jennings concerned aliens whom the Govern-
ment had not yet ordered removed whereas the aliens here
have removal orders reinstated against them, the result does
not change. Section 1252(b)(9) “cover[s] all claims related to
removal proceedings.” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. –––,
–––, n. 2 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal quotation
marks omitted). That includes claims arising after fnal or-
ders of removal are issued, such as withholding-of-removal
claims. See id., at ––– – –––. And it includes claims like
the ones here, which involve a part “of the deportation process
that necessarily serve[s] the purpose of ensuring an alien's re-
moval.” Jennings, 583 U. S., at 318 (opinion of Thomas, J.).
In light of this jurisdictional problem, the Court should
vacate and remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction. But “because the Court has held that we have
jurisdiction in cases like these” and the Court's opinion is
otherwise correct, I join it except for footnote four. See
Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) (Thomas, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment).
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Sotomayor and
Justice Kagan join, dissenting.
Respondents in this case are noncitizens previously or-
dered removed from the United States. After leaving the
United States, each of them later returned (illegally). The
Government then reinstated their original removal orders.
See 8 U. S. C. § 1231(a)(5). Each of the respondents argued

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549
Breyer, J., dissenting
to immigration authorities that the Government could not
remove
them because they reasonably feared persecution or
torture in the country to which the Government sought to
send them. And pursuant to the United States' interna-
tional commitments, the immigration authorities began the
process of determining whether the Government should
grant withholding-only relief (the withholding or deferral of
removal). See § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 CFR §§ 208.16–208.18,
208.31, 241.8(e), 1208.16–1208.18, 1208.31, 1241.8(e) (2020).
The question in this case is whether respondents are enti-
tled to a bond hearing while immigration authorities engage
in the lengthy process of determining whether respondents
have the legal right (because of their fear of persecution or
torture) to have their removal withheld. The Court points
to two statutory provisions that might answer that question.
The frst, § 1226, is a more general provision governing de-
tention, and favors respondents. It says that “pending a
decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the
United States,” 8 U. S. C. § 1226(a), the Government “may
release the alien on . . . bond” or “conditional parole.”
§§ 1226(a)(2)(A), (B); see also 8 CFR §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8)
(authorizing parole where the alien has demonstrated that
“such release would not pose a danger to property or per-
sons” and he or she “is likely to appear for any future
proceeding ”). The second, § 1231, is a provision that more
specifcally applies to “aliens ordered removed,” and can be
read to favor the Government because it does not expressly
provide for a bond hearing during what it calls the 90-day
“removal period.” 8 U. S. C. § 1231(a)(2); see also 8 CFR
§ 241.13(b)(2)(ii). The Government claims that § 1231 applies
to respondents and allows the Government to deny them
bond hearings while their withholding-only relief proceed-
ings take place.
The Court agrees with the Government. In its view, re-
spondents' circumstances fall within the scope of what § 1231
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calls a “removal period.” §§ 1231(a)(1)(A)–(B). And it be-
l
ieves that section implicitly allows the Government to deny
bond hearings during the 90-day removal period. See ante,
at 532–533; § 1231(a)(2). I agree that we have jurisdiction
to review the decision below. See ante, at 533, n. 4; see also
Jenn ings v. Rodr i guez, 583 U. S. 281, 354 – 355 (2018)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). In my view, however, respondents
do not fall within the scope of § 1231. Hence, § 1231 does not
apply. Rather, respondents' circumstances are governed by
the more general section that concerns the conditions of de-
tention pending a fnal determination on removal. See
§ 1226. And they are entitled to the bond hearings for which
that general section provides. See § 1226(a)(2).
I
Readers should keep in mind two subsections of § 1231's
relevant statutory text. The frst subsection at issue makes
clear what § 1231 is about, namely, a “removal period.” It
then sets forth a general rule. It says:
“(1) Removal period
“(A) In general
“Except as otherwise provided in this section, when
an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall
remove the alien from the United States within a period
of 90 days (in this section referred to as the `removal
period').” 8 U. S. C. § 1231(a)(1)(A).
(Readers should also note that while many of the provi-
sions at issue here refer to the “Attorney General,” Congress
has elsewhere transferred enforcement of some of those pro-
visions to the Secretary of Homeland Security. See Nielsen
v. Preap, 586 U. S. –––, –––, n. 2 (2019).) The second subsec-
tion sets forth a restriction on removal (the restriction-on-
removal provision), an exception to the general rule. It
says:
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“(3) Restriction on removal to a country where
a
lien's life or freedom would be threatened
“(A) In general
“[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to
a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien's
life or freedom would be threatened in that country be-
cause of the alien's race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
§ 1231(b)(3)(A).
This restriction on removal when an alien fears persecu-
tion or torture embodies an important international legal
obligation that the United States has undertaken. See Ref-
ugee Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 107, codifed in part at 8 U. S. C.
§ 1231(b)(3); see also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, Art. 1, § 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U. S. T. 6223, 6225, T. I. A. S.
No. 6577 (United States acceding to Articles 2 through 34 of
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Art.
33(1), July 28, 1951, 189 U. N. T. S. 150). The United States
also follows a policy that withholds or defers removal “of any
person to a country in which there are substantial grounds
for believing the person would be in danger of being sub-
jected to torture.” § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681–822, note follow-
ing 8 U. S. C. § 1231, p. 884; 8 CFR §§ 208.16–208.18 (imple-
menting the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10,
1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20, 1465 U. N. T. S. 85). These
policy commitments, embodied in § 1231's restriction-on-
removal provision, apply to any alien ordered removed, in-
cluding respondents, who are entitled to ask for withholding-
only relief. See Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U. S. 30,
35, n. 4 (2006); 8 CFR §§ 208.31, 241.8(e), 1208.31, 1241.8(e).
A
The procedures to determine whether an alien qualifes for
withholding-only relief are complex. Any alien, including

552 JOHNSON
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Breyer, J., dissenting
one “whose remova l is rei nst ated” under 8 U. S. C.
§
1231(a)(5), must be afforded the opportunity to “expres[s] a
fear of returning to the country of removal” specifed in the
order of removal. 8 CFR § 208.31(a) (boldface omitted).
An asylum offcer will then interview the individual to deter-
mine whether that individual has “a reasonable fear of perse-
cution or torture.” § 208.31(c). (Asylum offcers found that
each respondent here has a “reasonable fear.” Romero v.
Evans, 280 F. Supp. 3d 835, 837 (ED Va. 2017).) If so, an
immigration judge will “full[y] conside[r] . . . the request for
withholding of removal only.” §§ 208.31(e); 1208.31(e). If
the immigration judge denies the claim, the alien can appeal
to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and, as applica-
ble, seek judicial review. §§ 208.31(e), (g), 1208.31(e), (g); 8
U. S. C. §§ 1252(a)(1), (4).
Studies have found that this procedure often takes over a
year, with some proceedings lasting well over two years
before eligibility for withholding-only relief is resolved.
See Hausman, ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project, Fact-
Sheet: Withholding-Only Cases and Detention 2 (Apr. 19,
2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/fles/feld_document/
withholding_only_fact_sheet_-_fnal.pdf (fnding an average
length of detention of 114 days when neither party appealed
the immigration judge's fnal decision, 301 days when at least
one party appealed and the BIA rendered a fnal decision,
and 447 days when the BIA remanded the case and the immi-
gration judge made a fnal decision); see also, e. g., Martinez
v. Larose, 968 F. 3d 555, 558 (CA6 2020) (alien detained for
over 28 months while awaiting withholding-only relief eligi-
bility determination).
Studies have also found that, once withholding-only relief
is granted, the alien is ordinarily not sent to another, less
dangerous country. Rather, the alien typically remains in
the United States for the foreseeable future. See Brief
for Respondents 6 (noting only 1.6% of noncitizens granted
withholding-only relief were ever actually removed to an al-
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ternative country (citing American Immigration Council &
Nati
onal Immigrant Justice Center, The Difference Between
Asylum and Withholding of Removal 7 (Oct. 2020), https://
www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org / sites / default / files/
research/ the_difference_between_asylum_and_withholding_
of_removal.pdf )).
These fgures—particularly the length of time needed to
complete the related administrative proceedings—raise an
obvious question. Typically, Congress permits aliens ini-
tially placed in removal proceedings to apply for bond (while
such proceedings transpire). See 8 U. S. C. § 1226(a)(2).
That makes sense. A bond hearing does not mean an alien
will run away. Bond is normally granted only if the immi-
gration judge has assurance that the alien will not abscond
and is instead “likely to appear for any future proceeding.”
8 CFR §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8). And an alien's release
from detention during such proceedings may have collateral
effects. See Katzmann, When Legal Representation Is De-
fcient: The Challenge of Immigration Cases for the Courts,
143 Daedalus 37, 43–44 (2014) (describing how those detained
during removal proceedings are less likely to achieve the
outcomes they seek).
I can understand why Congress might not want to grant
a bond hearing to an alien whose circumstances fall
within the removal period. That period, after all, should
normally be brief. The statute says “90 days.” 8 U. S. C.
§ 1231(a)(1)(A). But why would Congress want to deny a
bond hearing to individuals who reasonably fear persecution
or torture, and who, as a result, face proceedings that may
last for many months or years (while their withholding-only
proceedings wend their way toward completion)? I can fnd
no satisfactory answer to this question.
B
Does the statutory provision's language nonetheless re-
quire the majority's result? In my view, it does not. Re-
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read the frst seven words of that provision's general rule.
They
say that the provision's removal rules apply “[e]xcept
as otherwise provided in this section.” § 1231(a)(1)(A) (em-
phasis added). And later in the same section, following that
“except clause,” the restriction-on-removal provision says
that “the Attorney General may not remove” an alien who
falls within its terms. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (emphasis added); see
also note following § 1231, at 884. Why does that provision,
then, not count as what the general statutory rule calls an
“except[ion]?”
Read on. Following the “general” terms governing the
removal period rule, § 1231 says:
“(B) Beginning of Period
“The removal period begins on the latest of the
following:
“(i) The date the order of removal becomes adminis-
tratively fnal.
“(ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if
a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the
date of the court's fnal order.
“(iii) If the alien is detained or confned . . . , the date
the alien is released from detention or confnement.”
§ 1231(a)(1) (emphasis added).
No one here claims that § 1231 authorizes detention with-
out a bond hearing before the removal period begins. And
the most natural reading of the italicized language should
lead to the conclusion that the removal period has not yet
begun. The removal period does not commence until the
administrative proceedings are over, i. e., until “the order of
removal” is “administratively fnal.” And the order is not
“fnal” until the immigration judge and the BIA fnally deter-
mine whether the restriction on removal applies and prohib-
its removal (unless and until the Government can identify a
willing alternative receiving country).
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II
A
The
majority believes we must read the statute differently.
It reads the “except clause” as serving only to extend the
“length of the removal period,” ante, at 540–542, not to ex-
empt the removal procedures altogether. In its view, the
time during which respondents seek administrative relief
from the order of removal due to a reasonable fear of perse-
cution or torture nevertheless remains within the “removal
period,” which the restriction-on-removal provision simply
extends. (And, as I said, the majority assumes that § 1231
allows the Government to deny bond hearings during the 90-
day “removal period.”)
While this is a possible reading, it is not what the statute
actually says. The statute begins with the phrase “except
as otherwise provided in this section,” and it follows that
clause with basic operative language, namely, “the Attorney
General shall remove the alien.” § 1231(a)(1)(A). It does
not say, “within a period of 90 days except if this section
provides for a longer period.” The majority's interpreta-
tion is an awkward way to read that sentence.
The majority then points to three statutory phrases to
wh ich it bel ieves the “except clause” appl ies. Those
phrases, it says, are evidence that the “except clause” simply
instructs that “the removal period may be extended” for
three reasons. Ante, at 528. The frst provision, plainly ti-
tled “Suspension of period,” “extend[s]” the “removal period
. . . beyond a period of 90 days” if the alien, for example, fails to
seek appropriate travel documents. § 1231(a)(1)(C) (boldface
omitted). A second provision allows the Government to
“detai[n] beyond the removal period” individuals who have
committed certain serious crimes or pose “a risk to the com-
munity or [are] unlikely to comply with the order of re-
moval.” § 1231(a)(6). And a third allows the Government
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to “stay the removal of an alien” if “immediate removal is
not
practicable or proper” or the alien is “needed to testify”
in a prosecution. §§ 1231(c)(2)(A)(i), (ii).
The third example, however, is beside the point, for it
comes equipped with its own bond and supervised released
possibility, staying (rather than extending) the removal pe-
riod. See § 1231(c)(2)(C); 8 CFR § 241.6(a). The frst two
examples are unlike the restriction-on-removal provision in
that their language simply suggests, not invalidation of the
removal order's identifed country of removal, but an exten-
sion of the removal period beyond 90 days. See 8 U. S. C.
§ 1231(a)(1)(C) (“exten[d] beyond a period of 90 days”);
§ 1231(a)(6) (“detai[n] beyond the removal period”). The
restriction-on-removal provision contains no such language.
I add that the majority's exceptions, unlike the restriction-
on-removal provision, typically do not entail proceedings
that last (and keep the alien in the United States) for many
months or years. Nor do they call into question whether
the removal order will ultimately be implemented. These
inconsistencies suggest the “except clause” does more than
merely extend the 90-day limit.
B
The majority's interpretation of the words “administra-
tively fnal” is no more convincing. The majority says that
these words apply only to the fnality of the original removal
orders, i. e., the orders issued before respondents left
the country and returned, as of the time those orders were
first issued. Af ter a l l, the major ity adds, see an te,
at 534–535, a further subsection of § 1231 says that “the prior
order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is
not subject to being reopened or reviewed, [and] the alien
. . . may not apply for any relief under this chapter.”
§ 1231(a)(5).
This last mentioned provision, however, is not relevant
here. It cannot prevent an alien from seeking what is in
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effect a modifcation of, a change in, or a withholding of, the
“pr
ior order of removal” for reasons of fear of persecution or
torture. After all, § 1231(b)(3)(A) says the contrary. Gov-
ernment practice is also to the contrary. See note following
§ 1231, at 884; 8 CFR §§ 208.31, 241.8(e), 1208.31, 1241.8(e).
And all here agree that the aliens are legally entitled to seek
that withholding-only relief. See Fernandez-Vargas, 548
U. S., at 35, n. 4.
Now consider the temporal problem. The time when the
majority says the reinstated removal order became “admin-
istratively fnal” is the time at which the original order of
removal became fnal. But to take the words “administra-
tively fnal” as referring only to that time would lead to a
very peculiar statute. It means that most reinstated re-
moval orders will have become administratively fnal many
years before the proceedings during which they are rein-
stated. Recall that in most instances the 90-day removal
period begins when the removal order becomes administra-
tively fnal. If the majority is right, in the case of most re-
spondents, the 90-day removal period began long before the
aliens left the country, let alone returned. Did the 90-day
removal period begin to run at that earlier time? Did it
run and then terminate? Is there now no removal period?
Read as the majority does, the 90-day limit that governs all
of § 1231 would not apply at all to aliens in respondents'
circumstances.
For this reason, I believe the better reading of those words
would be to apply them to any removal orders, reinstated or
not, that are not yet “administratively fnal.” And here, the
orders are not fnal until the administrative proceedings (con-
cerning eligibility for withholding-only relief on account of
fear of persecution or torture) are complete. Cf. Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 178 (1997) (agency action is not “fnal”
until, inter alia, all “rights or obligations have been deter-
mined . . . from which legal consequences will fow” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).

558 JOHNSON
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***
In
sum, I can fnd no good reason why Congress would
have wanted categorically to deny bond hearings to those
who, like respondents, seek to have removal withheld or de-
ferred due to a reasonable fear of persecution or torture.
And I do not agree with the majority's reading of the stat-
ute's language as denying them that opportunity. If, as I
believe, § 1231 does not apply to the withholding-only relief
proceedings before us, then, as the majority concedes, see
ante, at 526, § 1226 applies, and grants them bond hearings.
I would apply that provision and afford respondents bond
hearings.
With respect, I dissent.
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