Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 594 U. S. Part 2
Pages 338–381
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
June 25, 2021
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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338 OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
Syllabus
YELLEN, SECRETARY OF TREASURY v. CON-
FEDERA
TED TRIBES OF THE CHEHALIS
RESERVATION et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the district of columbia circuit
No. 20–543. Argued April 19, 2021—Decided June 25, 2021*
Title V of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES)
Act allocates $8 billion to “Tribal governments” to compensate for un-
budgeted expenditures made in response to COVID–19. 42 U. S. C.
§ 801(a)(2)(B). The question in these cases is whether Alaska Native
Corporations (ANCs) are eligible to receive any of that $8 billion.
Under the CARES Act, a “Tribal government” is the “recognized
governing body of an Indian tribe” as defned in the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA). §§ 801(g)(5), (1).
ISDA, in turn, defnes an “Indian Tribe” as “any Indian tribe, band,
nation, or other organized group or community, including any Alaska
Native village or regional or village corporation as defned in or estab-
lished pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act [(ANCSA),]
which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services
provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as
Indians.” 25 U. S. C. § 5304(e).
Consistent with the Department of the Interior's longstanding view
that ANCs are Indian tribes under ISDA, the Department of the Treas-
ury determined that ANCs are eligible for relief under Title V of
the CARES Act, even though ANCs are not “federally recognized
tribes” (i. e., tribes with which the United States has entered into a
government-to-government relationship). A number of federally rec-
ognized tribes sued. The District Court entered summary judgment
for the Treasury Department and the ANCs, but the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed.
Held: ANCs are “Indian tribe[s]” under ISDA and thus eligible for funding
under Title V of the CARES Act. Pp. 347–367.
(a) The ANCs argue that they fall under the plain meaning of ISDA's
defnition of “Indian tribe.” Respondents ask the Court to adopt a
term-of-art construction that equates being “recognized as eligible for
*Together with No. 20–544, Alaska Native Village Corp. Association
et al. v. Con federated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation et al., also on
certiorari to the same court.

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Cite
as: 594 U. S. 338 (2021)
339
Syllabus
the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indi-
ans
because of their status as Indians” with being a “federally recog-
nized tribe.” Pp. 347–365.
(1) Under the plain meaning of ISDA, ANCs are Indian tribes.
ANCs are “established pursuant to” ANCSA and thereby “recognized
as eligible” for that Act's benefts. ANCSA, which made ANCs eligible
to select tens of millions of acres of land and receive hundreds of millions
of tax-exempt dollars, 43 U. S. C. §§ 1605, 1610, 1611, is a special program
provided by the United States to “Indians,” i. e., Alaska Natives.
Given that ANCSA is the only statute ISDA's “Indian tribe” defnition
mentions by name, eligibility for ANCSA's benefts satisfes the defni-
tion's fnal “recognized-as-eligible” clause. Pp. 347–351.
(2) Respondents ask the Court to read ISDA's “Indian tribe” def-
nition as a term of art. But respondents fail to establish that the lan-
guage of ISDA's recognized-as-eligible clause was an accepted way of
saying “a federally recognized tribe” in 1975, when ISDA was passed.
Nor is the mere inclusion of the word “recognized” enough to import a
term-of-art meaning. Respondents also fail to show that the language
of the recognized-as-eligible clause later became a term of art that
should be backdated to ISDA's passage in 1975. Pp. 351–358.
(3) Even if ANCs did not satisfy the recognized-as-eligible clause,
they would still satisfy ISDA's defnition of an “Indian tribe.” If re-
spondents were correct that only a federally recognized tribe can satisfy
that clause, then the best way to read the “Indian tribe” defnition would
be for the recognized-as-eligible clause not to apply to ANCs at all.
Otherwise, despite being prominently “includ[ed]” in the “Indian tribe”
defnition, 25 U. S. C. § 5304(e), all ANCs would be excluded by a federal-
recognition requirement there is no reasonable prospect they could ever
satisfy. Pp. 358–363.
(4) Respondents' remaining arguments that ANCs are not Indian
tribes under ISDA are unpersuasive. They frst argue that the ANCs
misrepresent how meaningful a role they play under ISDA because the
actual number of ISDA contracts held by ANCs is negligible. This
point is largely irrelevant. No one would argue that a federally recog-
nized tribe was not an Indian tribe under ISDA just because it had
never entered into an ISDA contract. Respondents further argue that
treating ANCs as Indian tribes would complicate the administration of
ISDA. But respondents point to no evidence of such administrative
burdens in the 45 years the Executive Branch has treated ANCs as
Indian tribes. Respondents also warn that blessing ANCs' status
under ISDA will give ANCs ammunition to press for participation in
other statutes that incorporate ISDA's “Indian tribe” defnition. This
concern cuts both ways, as adopting respondents' position would pre-

340 YEL
LEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS
RESERVATION
Syllabus
sumably exclude ANCs from the many other statutes incorporating
ISD
A's defnition, even those under which ANCs have long benefted.
Pp. 363–365.
(b) One respondent tribe further argues that the CARES Act ex-
cludes ANCs regardless of whether they are Indian tribes under ISDA,
because ANCs do not have a “recognized governing body.” In the
ISDA context, the term “recognized governing body” has long been un-
derstood to apply to an ANC's board of directors, and nothing in either
the CARES Act or ISDA suggests that the term places additional limits
on the kinds of Indian tribes eligible to beneft under the statutes.
Pp. 365–367.
976 F. 3d 15, reversed and remanded.
Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Breyer, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined, and in which
Alito, J., joined as to Parts I, II–C, II–D, III, and IV. Gorsuch, J., fled
a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas and Kagan, JJ., joined, post, p. 367.
Matthew Guarnieri argued the cause for the federal peti-
tioner in No. 20–543. With him on the briefs were Acting
Solicitor General Prelogar, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Boynton, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Michael
S. Raab, and Daniel Tenny.
Paul D. Clement argued the cause for petitioners in
No. 20–544. With him on the briefs were Erin E. Murphy
and Matthew D. Rowen.
Jeffrey S. Rasmussen argued the cause for respondents in
both cases. With him on the brief for respondent Ute In-
dian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation were Fran-
ces C. Bassett, Riyaz A. Kanji, Cory J. Albright, Katie E.
Jones, Lynsey R. Gaudioso, Kannon K. Shanmugam, John
E. Echohawk, Nicole Ducheneaux, Harold Chesnin, Bradley
G. Bledsoe Downes, Alexander B. Ritchie, Lisa Koop Gunn,
Paul Spruhan, and Eric Dahlstrom. Richard W. Hughes
fled a brief for respondent Confederated Tribes of the Che-
halis Reservation et al. in both cases.†
†Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were fled for the
State of Alaska by Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General of Alaska, and Laura
Wol ff and Mary Ann Lundquist, Assistant Attorneys General; for the
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341
Opinion of the Court
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court.*
In
March 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Re-
lief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, 134 Stat. 281.
Title V of the Act allocates $8 billion of monetary relief to
“Tribal governments.” 134 Stat. 502, 42 U. S. C. § 801(a)
(2)(B). Under the CARES Act, a “Tribal government” is
the “recognized governing body of an Indian Tribe” as de-
fned in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assist-
ance Act (ISDA). §§ 801(g)(5), (1). ISDA, in turn, defnes
an “Indian tribe” as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other
organized group or community, including any Alaska Native
village or regional or village corporation as defned in or es-
tablished pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act[,] which is recognized as eligible for the special programs
and services provided by the United States to Indians be-
cause of their status as Indians.” 25 U. S. C. § 5304(e).
The Department of the Treasury asked the Department
of the Interior, the agency that administers ISDA, whether
Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) meet that defnition.
Consistent with its longstanding view, the Interior Depart-
Alaska Federation of Natives by James H. Lister, Jon M. DeVore, George
R. Pitts, and Carissa Siebeneck Anderson; for the Association of Alaska
Housing Authorities by Hyland Hunt and Ruthanne M. Deutsch; for the
Cook Inlet Region, Inc., by Allon Kedem, Ethan Shenkman, and Sally L.
Pei; and for Sen. Lisa Murkowski et al. by Christine V. Williams.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance in both cases were fled for the
State of Utah et al. by Sean D. Reyes, Attorney General of Utah, Melissa
Holyoak, Solicitor General, Lance Sorenson, Assistant Attorney General,
Mike Hunter, Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Mithun Mansinghani,
Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States
as follows: Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Austin
Knudsen of Montana, and Jason R. Ravnsborg of South Dakota; for Five
Indian Tribes by Margaret C. Rosen feld and George Forman; for the Na-
tional Congress of American Indians et al. by Kaighn Smith, Jr., Seth
P. Waxman, and Paul R. Q. Wol fson; for Professors et al. by Colette
Routel; and for Rep. Raúl M. Grijalva by Alan E. Schoen feld.
*Justice Alito joi ns Par ts I, II– C, II–D, III, and IV of th is
opinion.
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342 YEL
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Opinion of the Court
ment said yes. The Treasury Department then set aside ap-
proxi
mately $500 million of CARES Act funding for the
ANCs. The question presented is whether ANCs are “In-
dian tribe[s]” under ISDA, and are therefore eligible to re-
ceive the CARES Act relief set aside by the Treasury De-
partment. The Court holds that they are.
I
This is not the frst time the Court has addressed the
unique circumstances of Alaska and its indigenous popula-
tion. See, e. g., Sturgeon v. Frost, 587 U. S. 28 (2019); Stur-
geon v. Frost, 577 U. S. 424 (2016); Alaska v. Native Village
of Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U. S. 520 (1998); Metla-
katla Indian Community v. Egan, 369 U. S. 45 (1962). The
“simple truth” refected in those prior cases is that “Alaska
is often the exception, not the rule.” Sturgeon, 577 U. S., at
440. To see why, one must frst understand the United
States' unique historical relationship with Alaska Natives.
A
When the United States purchased the Territory of Alaska
from Russia in 1867, Alaska Natives lived in communities
dispersed widely across Alaska's 365 million acres. In the
decades that followed, “[t]here was never an attempt in
Alaska to isolate Indians on reservations,” as there had been
in the lower 48 States. Metlakatla Indian Community, 369
U. S., at 51. As a consequence, the claims of Alaska Natives
to Alaskan land remained largely unsettled even following
Alaska's admission to the Union as our 49th State in 1959.
1
1
There were some exceptions. Congress created by statute two Alaska
Native reservations: the Annette Islands Reserve in 1891 and the Kluk-
wan Reserve in 1957. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, § 15, 26 Stat. 1101; Act of
Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. 85–271, 71 Stat. 596. Under the 1936 Amendment
to the Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 254, 49 Stat. 1250, six further reser-
vations were formed. See Letter from T. Sansonetti, Solicitor of the
U. S. Dept. of Interior, to M. Lujan, Jr., Secretary of Interior 33 (Jan. 11,
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343
Opinion of the Court
See Alaska Statehood Act, § 4, 72 Stat. 339; Sturgeon, 577
U
. S., at 429.
That changed in 1971 with the Alaska Native Claims Set-
tlement Act (ANCSA). 85 Stat. 688, 43 U. S. C. § 1601 et seq.
ANCSA offcially dispensed with the idea of recreating in
Alaska the system of reservations that prevailed in the lower
48 States. It extinguished Alaska Natives' claims to land
and hunting rights and revoked all but one of Alaska's exist-
ing reservations. § 1610. In exchange, “Congress author-
ized the transfer of $962.5 million in state and federal funds
and approximately 44 million acres of Alaska land to state-
chartered private business corporations that were to be
formed pursuant to” ANCSA. Native Village of Venetie
Tribal Government, 522 U. S., at 524. These corporations
are called ANCs.
Relevant here, ANCs come in two varieties: regional
ANCs and village ANCs. To form the regional ANCs, the
Act directed the Secretary of the Interior to divide Alaska
into 12 geographic regions. § 1606(a). Within each region,
Alaska Natives were instructed to “incorporate under the
laws of Alaska a Regional Corporation to conduct business
for proft.” § 1606(d). To form the village ANCs, the Act
identifed approximately 200 Alaska “Native villages,” a
term encompassing any community of 25 or more Alaska Na-
tives living together as of the 1970 census. §§ 1602(c),
1610(b), 1615(a). For each Alaska Native village, ANCSA
ordered the “Native residents” to create an accompanying
village corporation to “hold, invest, manage and/or distribute
lands, property, funds, and other rights and assets for and
on behalf ” of the village. §§ 1602( j), 1607(a). ANCSA then
1993). Alaska also saw the creation of certain “executive order reserves,”
which were more limited in purpose and scope and, like all reserves
in Alaska besides the Annette Islands Reserve, were ultimately revoked
by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). See generally
D. Case & D. Voluck, Alaska Natives and Americans Laws 85–112 (3d
ed. 2012).
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directed the Secretary to prepare a roll showing the region
and,
if applicable, village to which each living Alaska Native
belonged. § 1604. Enrolled Alaska Natives then received
shares in their respective ANCs. §§ 1606(g), 1607.
B
In 1975, four years after ANCSA's enactment, Congress
passed ISDA. 25 U. S. C. § 5301 et seq. ISDA answered the
call for a “new national policy” of “autonomy” and “control”
for Native Americans and Alaska Natives. H. R. Doc.
No. 91–363, p. 3 (1970); see also Menominee Tribe of Wis. v.
United States, 577 U. S. 250, 252 (2016) (“Congress enacted
[ISDA] in 1975 to help Indian tribes assume responsibility
for aid programs that beneft their members”).
ISDA decentralized the provision of federal Indian bene-
fts away from the Federal Government and toward Native
American and Alaska Native organizations. ISDA allows
any “Indian tribe” to request that the Secretary of the Inte-
rior enter into a self-determination contract with a desig-
nated “tribal organization.” § 5321(a)(1). Under such a
contract, the tribal organization delivers federally funded
economic, infrastructure, health, or education benefts to the
tribe's membership.
As originally drafted, ISDA's “Indian tribe” defnition did
not mention ANCs. H. R. 6372, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 1(a)
(1973) (defning “Indian tribe” to mean “an Indian tribe,
band, nation, or Alaska Native Community for which the
Federal Government provides special programs and services
because of its Indian identity”). Prior to passage, however,
the defnition was amended twice to include, frst, Alaska
Native villages and, second, ANCs. See H. R. Rep. No. 93–
1600, p. 14 (1974) (“The Subcommittee amended the defni-
tion of `Indian tribe' to include regional and village corpora-
tions established by [ANCSA]”). Today, ISDA defnes an
“Indian tribe” as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other
organized group or community, including any Alaska Native
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345
Opinion of the Court
village or regional or village corporation as defned in or es-
t
ablished pursuant to [ANCSA], which is recognized as eligi-
ble for the special programs and services provided by the
United States to Indians because of their status as Indi-
ans.” § 5304(e).
2
Despite the express inclusion of ANCs in the defnition of
“Indian tribe,” a question arose in the Interior Department
whether the “recognized-as-eligible clause” limits the defni-
tion to “federally recognized tribes” only. A federally rec-
ognized tribe is one that has entered into a “government-
to-government relationship [with] the United States.” 1 F.
Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 3.02[3] (N. New-
ton ed. 2012). This recognition can come in a number of
ways: “from treaty, statute, executive or administrative
order, or from a course of dealing with the tribe as a political
entity.” W. Canby, American Indian Law in a Nutshell 4
(7th ed. 2020). As private companies incorporated under
state law, ANCs have never been “recognized” by the United
States in this sovereign political sense.
In 1976, the year after ISDA's enactment, the Interior De-
partment's Assistant Solicitor for Indian Affairs issued a
memorandum on the status of ANCs under ISDA. App. 44–
48. In the Assistant Solicitor's view, the express inclusion
of ANCs within the defnition of “Indian tribe” confrmed
that ANCs are Indian tribes under ISDA, even though they
are not federally recognized tribes. In the decades since,
the Interior Department has repeatedly reaffrmed that posi-
tion. See, e. g., 60 Fed. Reg. 9250 (1995) (ANCs “ha[ve] been
designated as `tribes' for the purposes of some Federal
laws,” including ISDA); 58 Fed. Reg. 54364 (1993) (ANCs
“are not governments, but they have been designated as
`tribes' for the purposes of ” ISDA); 53 Fed. Reg. 52833 (1988)
(ISDA “specifcally include[s]” ANCs).
2
In 1990, Congress made “technical corrections” to ISDA. S. Rep.
No. 101–226, p. 10 (1989). Relevant here, Congress inserted a comma
after the “Indian tribe” defnition's reference to ANCSA, bringing the
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346 YEL
LEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS
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Opinion of the Court
C
In
2020, Congress incorporated ISDA's “Indian tribe”
defnition into the CARES Act. 42 U. S. C. § 801(g)(1).
Title V of the Act allocates $150 billion to “States, Tribal
governments, and units of local government” to compensate
for unbudgeted expenditures made in response to COVID–19.
§ 801(a)(1). Of that $150 billion, $8 billion is reserved for
“Tribal governments.” § 801(a)(2)(B). A “Tribal govern-
ment” is the “recognized governing body of an Indian Tribe,”
as ISDA defnes the latter term. §§ 801(g)(5), (1).
On April 23, 2020, the Treasury Department determined
that ANCs are eligible for CARES Act relief, and set aside
more than $500 million for them (since reduced to approxi-
mately $450 million). App. 53–54; Letter from E. Prelogar,
Acting Solicitor General, to S. Harris, Clerk of Court (May
12, 2021). Soon after the Treasury Department's announce-
ment, a number of federally recognized tribes (respondents)
sued, arguing that only federally recognized tribes are In-
dian tribes under ISDA, and thus under the CARES Act.
Some Tribes further argued that ANCs do not have a “recog-
nized governing body” for purposes of the CARES Act and
are ineligible to receive its funding for that reason as well.
The suits were consolidated in the District Court for the
District of Columbia, which ultimately entered summary
judgment for the Treasury Department and the ANCs. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit re-
versed. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation v.
Mnuchin, 976 F. 3d 15 (2020). In its view, the recognized-
as-eligible clause is a term of art requiring any Indian tribe
to be a federally recognized tribe. Because no ANC is fed-
erally recognized, the court reasoned, no ANC qualifes for
funding under Title V of the CARES Act. In so holding,
the D. C. Circuit split with the Ninth Circuit, which had held
decades prior in Cook Inlet Native Assn. v. Bowen, 810 F. 2d
defnition to what it is today. Act of May 24, 1990, § 2(a)(1), 104 Stat. 206.

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Opinion of the Court
1471 (1987), that ANCs are Indian tribes for ISDA purposes,
regardless
of whether they have been federally recognized.
Id., at 1474.
We granted certiorari, 592 U. S. ––– (2021), to resolve
the Circuit split and determine whether ANCs are eligible
for the CARES Act funding set aside by the Treasury
Department.
II
All but one of the respondent Tribes agree that ANCs are
eligible to receive the CARES Act funds in question if they
are Indian tribes for purposes of ISDA.
3
The primary ques-
tion for the Court, then, is whether ANCs satisfy ISDA's
defnition of “Indian tribe.” The ANCs ask the Court to
answer that question by looking to the defnition's plain
meaning. Respondents ask the Court to adopt a term-of-art
construction that equates being “recognized as eligible for
the special programs and services provided by the United
States to Indians” with being a “federally recognized tribe,”
i. e., a tribe recognized by the United States in a sovereign
political sense.
A
Starting with the plain meaning, an “Indian tribe” under
ISDA is a “tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or
community, including any Alaska Native village or regional
or village corporation as defned in or established pursuant
to [ANCSA], which is recognized as eligible for the special
programs and services provided by the United States to
Indians because of their status as Indians.” 25 U. S. C.
§ 5304(e). The defnition's frst two clauses are straightfor-
ward enough. The frst lists entities that might count as
Indian tribes under the Act (e. g., tribes, bands, nations).
The second, “the Alaska clause,” makes clear that Alaska
Native villages and ANCs are “includ[ed].” The third, “the
3
The Court addresses the arguments of that one Tribe in Part III,
in fra.
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recognized-as-eligible clause,” requires more analysis. Ac-
cordi
ng to that clause, the listed entities must be “recognized
as eligible for the special programs and services provided by
the United States to Indians because of their status as
Indians.”
ANCs, of course, are “established pursuant to” ANCSA
within the meaning of the Alaska clause. They are thereby
“recognized as eligible” for ANCSA's benefts. The trickier
question is whether eligibility for the benefts of ANCSA
counts as eligibility for “the special programs and services
provided by the United States to Indians because of their
status as Indians.”
It does. Contrary to the dissent's view, post, at 375–376
(opinion of Gorsuch, J.), ANCSA is readily described as a
special program provided by the United States to “Indians”
(in this case, Alaska Natives). See 43 U. S. C. § 1626 (de-
scribing ANCSA's relationship to “other programs”). The
scope of that program is substantial: ANCSA made ANCs
eligible to select tens of millions of acres of land and receive
hundreds of millions of tax-exempt dollars. §§ 1605, 1610,
1611. Not just a one-time payment, ANCSA provides for
revenue sharing among the regional ANCs to ensure Alaska
Natives across the State beneft from an ongoing equitable
distribution of ANC profts. § 1606(i). ANCSA further en-
trusts ANCs to “hold, invest, manage and/or distribute
lands, property, funds, and other rights and assets for and on
behalf ” of Alaska Natives, who are the ANCs' shareholders,
as well as to distribute dividends to them. See §§ 1602( j),
1606( j). Moreover, ANCs and their shareholders are “eligi-
ble for the benefts of ” ANCSA, § 1606(d), precisely because
of their status as Indians. See § 1626(e)(1) (“For all pur-
poses of Federal law, a Native Corporation shall be consid-
ered to be a corporation owned and controlled by Natives”);
note following § 1601, p. 1136 (ANCSA is “ `Indian legislation
enacted by Congress pursuant to its plenary authority under
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349
Opinion of the Court
the Constitution of the United States to regulate Indian
affairs'
”).
Respondents do not deny that the benefts of ANCSA are
“a” special program or service provided by the United States
to Indians. According to respondents, however, such bene-
fts are not “the” special programs and services provided to
Indians (e. g., healthcare, education, and other social services
provided by federal agencies like the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs and the Indian Health Service). “The” special pro-
grams and services, respondents assert, are available only to
federally recognized tribes (or, more precisely, to members
of such tribes). In respondents' view, ANCs are thus
“includ[ed]” in the “Indian tribe” defnition's Alaska clause
only to be excluded en masse from that defnition by the
recognized-as-eligible clause.
That would certainly be an odd result. Fortunately, the
text does not produce it. ISDA's “Indian tribe” defnition
does not specify the particular programs and services an en-
tity must be eligible for to satisfy the recognized-as-eligible
clause. Given that ANCSA is the only statute the “Indian
tribe” defnition mentions by name, the best reading of the
defnition is that being eligible for ANCSA's benefts by itself
satisfes the recognized-as-eligible clause.
Consider a similarly worded example. A doctor recom-
mends getting a blood test every six months to “any child,
adult, or senior, including anyone over the age of 75 whose
blood-sugar levels have tested in the prediabetic range
within the last fve years, who exhibits the warning signs
of Type 2 diabetes.” Without further context, it is unclear
exactly which warning signs the doctor is referring to, or
how many of those signs a child, adult, or senior must exhibit
before warranting biannual testing. But it is fair to say that
individuals over 75 with prediabetic blood-sugar levels
within the last fve years should get tested biannually, even
if they exhibit no other warning signs. By expressly “in-
cluding ” individuals with that one warning sign, the doctor's
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LEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS
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recommendation makes clear that particular sign, by itself,
is
warning enough.
Just so here: Congress' express inclusion of ANCs “estab-
lished pursuant to [ANCSA]” confrms that eligibility for
ANCSA's benefts alone is eligibility enough to be an Indian
tribe. ANCs thus satisfy ISDA's Indian tribe defnition, re-
gardless of whether they and their shareholders are eligible
for federal Indian programs and services other than those
provided in ANCSA. At any rate, the one-to-one relation-
ship respondents posit between membership in a federally
recognized tribe and eligibility for federal Indian benefts
more broadly does not hold in the unique circumstances of
Alaska. See Letter from E. Prelogar, Acting Solicitor
General, to S. Harris, Clerk of Court (Apr. 22, 2021) (“[T]he
federal government has historically provided benefts and
services to Alaska Natives who are not enrolled members of
a federally recognized Indian tribe”); D. Case & D. Voluck,
Alaska Natives and Americans Laws 30 (3d ed. 2012) (“[T]he
federal government has, at least since the end of the nine-
teenth century, provided a wide variety of programs and
services to Alaska Natives solely because of their status as
Natives”). So ANCSA is not, in fact, the only federal Indian
program or service for which ANCs and their shareholders
are eligible.
It should come as no surprise that Congress made ANCs
eligible to contract under ISDA. After all, Congress itself
created ANCs just four years earlier to receive the benefts
of the Alaska land settlement on behalf of all Alaska Natives.
Allowing ANCs to distribute federal Indian benefts more
broadly is entirely consistent with the approach Congress
charted in ANCSA. Accord, 1 American Indian Policy Re-
view Comm'n, Final Report, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 495
(Comm. Print 1977) (ANCs “might well be the form or orga-
nization best suited to sponsor certain kinds of federally
funded programs” in Alaska); 43 U. S. C. § 1606(r) (“The au-
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promote the health, education, or welfare of . . . shareholders
or
family members is expressly authorized and confrmed”).
Under the plain meaning of ISDA, ANCs are Indian tribes,
regardless of whether they are also federally recognized
tribes. In so holding, the Court does not open the door to
other Indian groups that have not been federally recognized
becoming Indian tribes under ISDA. Even if such groups
qualify for certain federal benefts, that does not make them
similarly situated to ANCs. ANCs are sui generis entities
created by federal statute and granted an enormous amount
of special federal benefts as part of a legislative experiment
tailored to the unique circumstances of Alaska and recreated
nowhere else. Moreover, with the exception of Alaska Na-
tive villages (which are now federally recognized), no entities
other than ANCs are expressly “includ[ed]” by name in
ISDA's “Indian tribe” defnition. Cf. Sturgeon, 577 U. S., at
440 (“All those Alaska-specifc provisions refect the simple
truth that Alaska is often the exception, not the rule”).
B
Respondents urge this Court to discard the plain meaning
of the “Indian tribe” defnition in favor of a term-of-art con-
struction. In respondents' view, the 69 words of the “Indian
tribe” defnition are a long way of saying just 8: An “Indian
tribe” means a “federally recognized tribe.” If that is right,
respondents are correct that ANCs are not Indian tribes,
because everyone agrees they are not federally recognized
tribes. To prevail on this argument, however, respondents
must demonstrate that the statutory context supports read-
ing ISDA's “Indian tribe” defnition as a term of art rather
than according to its plain meaning. See Johnson v. United
States, 559 U. S. 133, 139 (2010). Their efforts are not
persuasive.
In arguing for a term-of-art construction, respondents frst
rely on a series of Acts that terminated various tribes start-
ing in the late 1950s. Those Acts closed tribal membership
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rolls, specifed the division of tribal assets, and revoked
tr
ibal constitutions. See, e. g., Act of Sept. 21, 1959, Pub. L.
86–322, 73 Stat. 592. Following termination, the tribe and
its members were no longer “entitled to any of the
special services performed by the United States for Indians
because of their status as Indians.” § 5, id., at 593. As re-
spondents note, this language resembles (although does not
mirror precisely) the fnal words of ISDA's recognized-as-
eligible clause. If being terminated means no longer being
“entitled to any of the special services performed by the
United States for Indians because of their status as Indians,”
the argument goes, then being “recognized as eligible for the
special programs and services provided by the United States
to Indians because of their status as Indians” means being a
federally recognized tribe.
Respondents misjudge the relevance of these termination
statutes. Those statutes do not contain the words “recog-
nized as eligible”; they do not even contain the word “recog-
nized.” Furthermore, the termination statutes use their
ISDA-reminiscent phrasing not as a synonym for termina-
tion but to describe just one, among other, consequences of
a tribe's constitution being revoked. See, e. g., ibid. (“The
constitution of the tribe . . . shall be revoked by the Secre-
tary. Thereafter, the tribe and its members shall not be
entitled to any of the special services performed by the
United States for Indians because of their status as Indians,
all statutes of the United States that affect Indians because
of their status as Indians shall be inapplicable to them, and
the laws of the several States shall apply to them in the
same manner they apply to other persons or citizens within
their jurisdiction”).
Some linguistic similarity between ISDA and the termina-
tion statutes does not suggest that the language of the
recognized-as-eligible clause was an accepted way of saying
“a federally recognized tribe” in 1975. It instead supports
a much more limited proposition: A federally recognized
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tribe that has not been terminated is “entitled” to “special
serv
ices performed by the United States for Indians,” and
thereby satisfes ISDA's similarly worded recognized-as-
eligible clause. But of course, no one disputes that being a
federally recognized tribe is one way to qualify as an Indian
tribe under ISDA; it is just not the only way.
Nor is the mere inclusion of the word “recognized” enough
to give the recognized-as-eligible clause a term-of-art mean-
ing. True, the word “recognized” often refers to a tribe
w ith wh ich the United St ates has a gover nment-to-
government relationship (particularly when it is sandwiched
between the words “federally” and “tribe”). That does not
mean, however, that the word “recognized” always connotes
political recognition.
4
“Recognized” is too common and context dependent a word
to bear so loaded a meaning wherever it appears, even in
laws concerning Native Americans and Alaska Natives. Cf.
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U. S. 223, 235 (2011) (declining
to read “unavoidable” as a term of art in part because “ `[u]n-
avoidable' is hardly a rarely used word”). Certainly, “recog-
nized” can signify political recognition; it can also refer to
something far more pedestrian. See, e. g., Black's Law Dic-
4
Indeed, “recognition” is not even the sole term used to describe tribes
with which the United States maintains a government-to-government re-
lationship; “acknowledgement” is often used for that same purpose. See
1 F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 3.02[3] (N. Newton ed.
2012) (“Federal acknowledgement or recognition of an Indian group's legal
status as a tribe is a formal political act confrming the tribe's existence
as a distinct political society, and institutionalizing the government-to-
government relationship between the tribe and the federal government”).
For instance, in 1978, three years after ISDA's enactment, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs adopted “procedures for acknowledging that certain Ameri-
can Indian tribes exist.” 43 Fed. Reg. 39361. To this day, applications
to become a federally recognized tribe are made to the Offce of Federal
Acknowledgement, and the Interior Department still uses “recognized”
and “acknowledged” somewhat interchangeably. See, e. g., 86 Fed. Reg.
7554 (2021) (“Published below is an updated list of federally acknowledged
Indian Tribes”).
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tionary 1436 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (defning “recognition” as
“
[r]atifcation; confrmation; an acknowledgment that some-
thing done by another person in one's name had one's author-
ity”). The type of recognition required is a question best
answered in context. See, e. g., 25 U. S. C. § 3002(a)(2)(C)(1)
(providing for control over certain cultural items “in the In-
dian tribe that is recognized as aboriginally occupying the
area in which the objects were discovered”); § 4352(3) (defn-
ing a “Native Hawaiian organization” as a nonproft that,
among other things, “is recognized for having expertise in
Native Hawaiian culture and heritage, including tourism”).
In ISDA, the required recognition is of an entity's eligibility
for federal Indian programs and services, not a government-
to-government relationship with the United States.
5
Respondents next rely on sources that postdate ISDA.
Ordinarily, however, this Court reads statutory language as
a term of art only when the language was used in that way
at the time of the statute's adoption. See Food Marketing
Institute v. Argus Leader Media, 588 U. S. 427, 438 (2019)
(rejecting a term-of-art reading where the parties “mustered
no evidence that the terms of ” the statute carried a “special-
ized common law meaning . . . at the time of their adoption”).
5
The dissent reads the congressional fndings to ISDA as providing a
textual clue that government-to-government recognition is required. See
post, at 373 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.) (“When Congress passed ISDA, it
sought to provide Indians `meaningful leadership roles' that are `crucial to
the realization of self-government' ” (citing 25 U. S. C. § 5301)). As al-
ready explained, however, supra, at 350–351, allowing ANCs to contract
under ISDA, notwithstanding their lack of political recognition, is entirely
consistent with that statute's stated objective of “establish[ing] . . . a
meaningful Indian self-determination policy.” § 5302(b). Congress also
designed ANCSA to be “in conformity with the real economic and social
needs of Natives” and to facilitate “maximum participation by Natives in
decisions affecting their rights and property.” 43 U. S. C. § 1601(b).
ANCs are the vehicles Congress created to further that policy of self-
determination. Accord, S. Conf. Rep. No. 92–581, p. 37 (1971) (“[T]he cre-
ation of Regional and Village Corporations” is part of “a policy of self-
determination on the part of the Alaska Native people”).
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In relying on sources postdating ISDA, respondents must
show
not only that the language of the recognized-as-eligible
clause later became a term of art, but also that this term-of-
art understanding should be backdated to ISDA's passage in
1975. They cannot make that showing.
Respondents lean most heavily on the Federally Recog-
nized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994 (List Act), enacted almost
20 years after ISDA. See 25 U. S. C. §§ 5130, 5131. The
List Act requires the Secretary of the Interior to publish an
annual list of “all Indian tribes which the Secretary recog-
nizes to be eligible for the special programs and services pro-
vided by the United States to Indians because of their status
as Indians.” § 5131(a). According to respondents, ANCs'
absence from the Secretary's list confrms that they are not
“eligible for the special programs and services provided by
the United States to Indians because of their status as Indi-
ans,” § 5304(e), and thus fail ISDA's recognized-as-eligible
clause.
Respondents' cross-referencing argument, however, re-
quires the Court to ignore the reason why ANCs are not on
the list. True to its full name, the Federally Recognized
Indian Tribe List Act tasks the Secretary with maintaining
a “ `list of federally recognized tribes' ” only. Note following
§ 5130, p. 678. The List Act, moreover, lacks language like
that in ISDA expressly “including ” ANCs “established pur-
suant to” ANCSA. § 5304(e). The obvious inference, then,
is that ANCs are not on the Secretary's list simply because
they are not federally recognized.
History confrms as much. In 1979, 15 years before the
List Act was passed, the Secretary began publishing a list of
Indian tribes “that have a government-to-government rela-
tionship with the United States.” 44 Fed. Reg. 7235. In
1988, ANCs were added to the Secretary's list, which had
been retitled “Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To
Receive Services From the United States Bureau of Indian
Affairs,” because ANCs are “specifcally eligible for the
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funding and services of the [Bureau of Indian Affairs] by
st
atute” and “should not have to undertake to obtain Federal
Acknowledgement” (i. e., federal recognition). 53 Fed. Reg.
52829, 52832. In 1993, the Secretary dropped ANCs from
the list, concluding that “the inclusion of ANC[s], which lack
tribal status in a political sense, called into question the sta-
tus” of the other entities on the list. 58 Fed. Reg. 54365.
In so doing, the Secretary reaffrmed that ANCs “are not
governments, but they have been designated as `tribes' for
the purposes of some Federal laws,” including ISDA. Id.,
at 54364. The List Act, passed the following year, “con-
frmed the Secretary's authority and responsibility” to main-
tain a list of federally recognized tribes. 60 Fed. Reg. 9251.
Hence, ANCs remained off the list.
To accept respondents' argument, then, the Court would
need to cross-reference ISDA's defnition of an “Indian tribe”
with the Secretary's list, but ignore why ANCs were ex-
cluded from that list in the frst place. The Court declines
to take that doubtful step.
Despite asking the Court to consider post-ISDA statutes
to determine whether ANCs are “Indian tribes” under
ISDA, moreover, respondents largely fail to address post-
ISDA congressional actions that contradict their position.
First, consider Congress' treatment of the Cook Inlet Re-
gion, Inc. (CIRI), the regional ANC for the ANCSA region
covering more than half the Alaskan population. See The
Twelve Regions, ANCSA Regional Association (June 1,
2021), https://ancsaregional.com/the-twelve-regions. In
1994, CIRI contracted under ISDA through its designated
healthcare provider to offer healthcare benefts to Alaska
Natives and Amer ican Indians i n Anchorage and the
Matanuska-Susitna Valley. See Cook Inlet Treaty Tribes v.
Shalala, 166 F. 3d 986, 988 (CA9 1999). A group of Alaska
Native villages sued, arguing that the Federal Government
should have frst obtained their approval. Ibid.; see 25
U. S. C. § 5304(l) (“[I]n any case where [an ISDA contract]
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beneft[s] more than one Indian tribe, the approval of each
such
Indian tribe” is required). Congress mooted the
dispute by passing a bill that waived ISDA's normal tribal
approva l requirement for CIRI's hea lthcare contracts.
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropria-
tions Act, 1998, § 325(a), 111 Stat. 1597–1598. In so doing,
Congress not only assumed CIRI was eligible to enter into
ISDA contracts (notwithstanding its lack of federal recogni-
tion), but actively cleared the way for it to do so.
Next, consider the Native American Housing Assistance
and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA), 25 U. S. C.
§ 4101 et seq., which incorporates ISDA's “Indian tribe” def-
nition, see § 4103(13)(B). NAHASDA creates a housing
block grant program for Indian tribes. § 4111. The re-
gional ANCs (acting through their designated housing au-
thorities) are among the largest recipients of these grants in
Alaska, receiving tens of millions of dollars each year. See
Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, FY 2020 Final
[Indian Housing Block Grant] Funding by [Tribally Desig-
nated Housing Entities] & Regions. For years, Congress
has passed appropriations riders requiring that the existing
recipients of NAHASDA's housing block grants in Alaska
(including ANCs) continue to receive those grants. See,
e. g., Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L.
116–94, Div. H, Tit. II, § 211, 133 Stat. 3003. Following the
D. C. Circuit's decision in this case, Congress awarded addi-
tional grants under NAHASDA and emphasized that, “[f]or
the avoidance of doubt,” the “Indian tribe[s]” eligible for
those grants “shall include Alaska native corporations estab-
lished pursuant to” ANCSA. Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2021, Pub. L. 116–260, Div. N, Tit. V, Subtit. A, § 501(k)
(2)(C), 134 Stat. 2077.
Thus, post-ISDA sources prove no more fruitful to re-
spondents than pre-ISDA ones. Even assuming the Court
should look to events after 1975, respondents cannot cherry-
pick statutes like the List Act without explaining postenact-
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ment developments that undermine their interpretation. In
the
end, the various statutes cited do not support respond-
ents' efforts to exclude ANCs from ISDA by use of a term-
of-art construction.
6
C
Even if ANCs did not satisfy the recognized-as-eligible
clause, however, they would still satisfy ISDA's defnition of
an “Indian tribe.” If respondents were correct that only a
federally recognized tribe can satisfy that clause, then the
best way to read the “Indian tribe” defnition as a whole
would be for the recognized-as-eligible clause not to apply to
the entities in the Alaska clause at all (i. e., to “any Alaska
Native village or regional or village corporation,” 25 U. S. C.
§ 5304(e)). On this reading, the way to tell whether a tribe,
band, nation, or other organized group or community is an
“Indian tribe” is to ask whether it is federally recognized,
but the way to tell whether an Alaska Native village or cor-
poration is an “Indian tribe” is to ask whether it is “defned
in or established pursuant to” ANCSA. Ibid. Otherwise,
despite being prominently “includ[ed]” in the “Indian tribe”
defnition, ibid., all ANCs would be excluded by a federal-
recognition requirement there is no reasonable prospect they
could ever satisfy.
Respondents object (and the dissent agrees) that this con-
struction “produces grammatical incoherence.” Brief for
Respondent Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation
et al. 16; post, at 370–371. They point out that a modifying
clause at the end of a list (like the recognized-as-eligible
clause) often applies to every item in the list. See, e. g.,
Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543
U. S. 335, 344, n. 4 (2005). The so-called series-qualifer
canon can be a helpful interpretive tool, and it supports
6
In so holding, the Court does not decide whether the language of the
recognized-as-eligible clause has been used as a term of art in other stat-
utes subsequent to ISDA's enactment.
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the idea that the recognized-as-eligible clause applies to
e
very type of entity listed in the “Indian tribe” defnition,
including ANCs. Given that the entities in the Alaska
clause are the closest in proximity to the recognized-as-
eligible clause, that canon arguably applies with particular
force here.
As the Court reiterated earlier this Term, however, the
series-qualifer canon gives way when it would yield a “con-
textually implausible outcome.” Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid,
592 U. S. 395, 406–407 (2021); see also id., at 410 (Alito, J.,
concurring in judgment) (noting that “[c]anons are useful
tools, but it is important to keep their limitations in mind.
This may be especially true with respect to . . . the `series-
qualifer' canon”). The most grammatical reading of a sen-
tence in a vacuum does not always produce the best reading
in context. See, e. g., Sturgeon, 577 U. S., at 438 (“Statutory
language `cannot be construed in a vacuum. It is a funda-
mental canon of statutory construction that the words of a
statute must be read in their context and with a view to
their place in the overall statutory scheme' ”); cf. B. Garner,
Modern English Usage 784 (4th ed. 2016) (noting the “in-
creasingly common” “ `remote relative,' ” i. e., the practice of
separating “the relative pronoun (that, which, who) from its
antecedent”).
Consider an example with the same syntax as the “Indian
tribe” defnition. A restaurant advertises “50% off any
meat, vegetable, or seafood dish, including ceviche, which is
cooked.” Say a customer orders ceviche, a Peruvian spe-
cialty of raw fsh marinated in citrus juice. Would she ex-
pect it to be cooked? No. Would she expect to pay full
price for it? Again, no. Under the reading recommended
by the series-qualifer canon, however, the ceviche was a red
herring. Even though the 50%-off sale specifcally named
ceviche (and no other dish), it costs full price because it is
not cooked. That conclusion would make no sense to a rea-
sonable customer.
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Like applying a “cooked” requirement to ceviche, applying
a
“federally recognized” requirement to ANCs is implausible
in context. When Congress enacted ISDA in 1975, not a
single Alaska Native village or ANC had been recognized
for a gover nment-to-gover nment relati onsh ip w ith the
United States. On respondents' reading, then, the entire
Alaska clause originally had no effect. None of its entities
qualifed as Indian tribes for purposes of ISDA, even though
the only entities expressly included in ISDA's defnition of
an “Indian tribe” are those in the Alaska clause.
The only explanation respondents offer for this highly
counterintuitive result is that Congress included Alaska Na-
tive villages and corporations in the “Indian tribe” defnition
on the possibility they might one day become federally recog-
nized. That is highly unlikely. First, the Alaska clause
would be redundant on that account. See Brief for Re-
spondent Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation et al.
31 ([T]he Alaska [clause] is . . . best read as redundant”). A
federally recognized Alaska Native village or ANC would
presumably already ft into one of the pre-existing ISDA cat-
egories of “tribe[s], band[s], nation[s], or other organized
group[s] or communit[ies].” 25 U. S. C. § 5304(e).
Second, it is quite doubtful that anyone in 1975 thought
the United States was going to recognize ANCs as sovereign
political entities. ANCs are for-proft companies incorpo-
rated under state law that Congress itself created just four
years prior to ISDA. They are not at all the type of entities
normally considered for a government-to-government rela-
tionship with the United States. Accord, 25 CFR § 83.4
(2020) (“The Department will not acknowledge,” i. e., feder-
ally recognize, “[a]n association, organization, corporation, or
entity of any character formed in recent times unless the
entity has only changed form by recently incorporating or
otherwise formalizing its existing politically autonomous
community”). Indeed, at the time ISDA was enacted, some
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Opinion of the Court
doubted whether even Alaska Native villages could be feder-
a
lly recognized.
7
Respondents counter by pointing to certain organizations
created in Alaska in the 1930s that later became federally
recognized tribes. One such organization, the Hydaburg
Cooperative Association (HCA), was formed under the 1936
Amendment to the Indian Reorganization Act, which author-
ized Alaska Native groups “not heretofore recognized as
bands or tribes” to organize based on “a common bond
of occupation, or association, or residence.” Ch. 254, 49
Stat. 1250 (codifed at 25 U. S. C. § 5119). The HCA or-
ganized around “a common bond of occupation in the fsh
industry.” Constitution and By-Laws of the Hydaburg
Cooperative Association, Alaska Preamble (1938). Decades
later, the Interior Department acknowledged the HCA as
a federally recognized tribe, even though it is of fairly re-
cent vintage and organized around a bond of occupation
rather than solely around an ancestral tribal heritage. See
58 Fed. Reg. 54369. If the HCA could be federally recog-
nized, respondents say, some might have thought ANCs
could too.
Respondents make too much of the HCA and the small
handful of entities like it, which are not comparable to ANCs.
Unlike ANCs, the former entities were organized under fed-
erally approved constitutions as part of a short-lived attempt
to recreate in Alaska a tribal reservation system like that in
the lower 48 States. ANCs, by contrast, were incorporated
under state law pursuant to legislation that embodied the
formal repudiation of that approach. That the Interior De-
partment deemed the HCA and a handful of other entities
like it federally recognized tribes decades after ISDA's
passage does not mean it was plausible in 1975 to think
7
That doubt was resolved in the villages' favor in 1993. See 58 Fed.
Reg. 54365.
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ANCs would one day become federally recognized tribes,
as
well.
8
Ultimately, respondents resort to the argument that, al-
though the idea of ANCs becoming federally recognized
tribes might be farfetched, it is not technically impossi-
ble. That is, Congress' plenary power over Indian affairs
could conceivably permit it to recognize a government-to-
government relationship between an ANC and the United
States. Perhaps, but possibility is not the same as plausibil-
ity, and both are proper concerns of statutory interpretation.
Consider again the example of a restaurant advertising “50%
off any meat, vegetable, or seafood dish, including ceviche,
which is cooked.” On respondents' logic, because the res-
taurant technically could cook its ceviche, the only way to
read the advertisement is that ceviche is full price unless the
restaurant takes an unexpected culinary step.
That is wrong. The best reading of the advertisement is
that ceviche is 50% off even if it is not cooked, just as the
best reading of ISDA is that ANCs are Indian tribes even
if they are not federally recognized. Any grammatical
awkwardness involved in the recognized-as-eligible clause
skipping over the Alaska clause pales in comparison to the
incongruity of forever excluding all ANCs from an “Indian
tribe” defnition whose most prominent feature is that it spe-
cifcally includes them.
8
Respondents also point to a 1996 bill that would have “deemed” one
regional ANC, CIRI, “an Indian tribal entity for the purpose of federal
programs for which Indians are eligible because of their status as Indians”
and would have mandated that CIRI be “specifcally include[d]” “on any
list that designates federally recognized Indian tribes.” H. R. 3662, 104th
Cong., 2d Sess., §§ 121(a)–(b). By its terms, the bill would not have en-
tered CIRI into a government-to-government relationship with the United
States; it merely would have made CIRI eligible for all federal Indian
programs available to federally recognized tribes. In any event, it is hard
to make too much of a failed bill. See United States v. Craft, 535 U. S.
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D
Respondents
make a few fnal arguments to persuade the
Court that ANCs are not Indian tribes under ISDA. None
succeeds.
Respondents argue frst that the ANCs misrepresent how
meaningful a role they play under ISDA because the actual
number of ISDA contracts held by ANCs is negligible. The
Court does not have the record before it to determine the
exact number and nature of ISDA contracts held by ANCs or
their designees, either historically or currently. The point
is largely irrelevant, however. No one would argue that a
federally recognized tribe was not an Indian tribe under
ISDA just because it had never entered into an ISDA con-
tract. The same is true for ANCs. To the extent respond-
ents argue that ruling for them would be of little practical
consequence given the small number of ISDA contracts held
by ANCs, quantity is not the only issue. For example, CIRI
contracts through a designee to provide healthcare to thou-
sands of Alaska Natives in Anchorage and the Matanuska-
Susitna Valley. Brief for CIRI as Amicus Curiae 9. The
loss of CIRI's ability alone to contract under ISDA would
have signifcant effects on the many Alaska Natives it cur-
rently serves.
9
ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
9
Respondents argue that CIRI's healthcare services would survive a
ruling in respondents' favor, because CIRI's ISDA contract is provided
for “by separate statute.” Brief for Respondent Confederated Tribes of
Chehalis Reservation et al. 52. As discussed, after CIRI entered into an
ISDA contract to provide healthcare benefts, a group of Alaskan tribes
sued. See Cook Inlet Treaty Tribes v. Shalala, 166 F. 3d 986, 988 (CA9
1999). Congress then passed a bill to moot the dispute. Department of
the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, § 325(a), 111
Stat. 1597–1598. It is not entirely clear whether this bill means that
CIRI's ISDA contract would survive a ruling that ANCs are not Indian
tribes under ISDA. But the fact that Congress intervened to ensure that
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Respondents further argue that treating ANCs as Indian
tr
ibes would complicate the administration of ISDA. If an
ISDA contract will beneft multiple Indian tribes, each such
tribe has to agree to the contract before it can go into effect.
25 U. S. C. § 5304(l). Because membership in ANCs and fed-
erally recognized tribes often overlap, respondents argue
that ANCs will be able to veto any ISDA contract sought by
a federally recognized tribe in Alaska.
Without discounting the possibility of administrative bur-
dens, this concern is overstated. The Executive Branch has
treated ANCs as Indian tribes for 45 years, yet respondents
point to no evidence of such a problem ever having arisen.
If such a problem does arise, moreover, the Interior Depart-
ment may be able to craft an administrative solution. Cf.
46 Fed. Reg. 27178, 27179 (1981) (Indian Health Service regu-
lations establishing an “order of precedence” among Alaskan
entities “[f]or the purposes of contracting under” ISDA and
requiring authorizing resolutions from “[v]illages, as the
smallest tribal units under” ANCSA).
Respondents also warn that blessing ANCs' status under
ISDA will give them ammunition to press for participation in
the many statutes besides the CARES Act that incorporate
ISDA's “Indian tribe” defnition. See, e. g., Indian Health
Care Improvement Act, § 4(d), 90 Stat. 1401; Native Ameri-
can Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996,
§ 4(12)(B), 110 Stat. 4019–4020; Indian Tribal Energy Devel-
opment and Self-Determination Act of 2005, [Title V of the
Energy Policy Act of 2005], § 503(a), 119 Stat. 764–765.
As the Government notes, however, there may well be
statutes that incorporate ISDA's “Indian tribe” defnition but
exclude ANCs from participation in other ways. See Brief
for Federa l Petiti oner 33 – 34 (citi ng, e. g., 7 U. S. C.
§§ 1639o(2), 1639p(a)(1) (defning “Indian tribe” to incorpo-
rate the ISDA defnition, but also requiring participants to
a regional ANC could more easily contract under ISDA is, if anything,
further indication that the Court's ruling today is the correct one.
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Opinion of the Court
exercise “ `regulatory authority over . . . territory of the In-
dian
tribe' ”)). Moreover, this concern cuts both ways. If
respondents' reading prevailed, ANCs would presumably be
excluded from all other statutes incorporating ISDA's def-
nition, even those under which ANCs have long benefted.
That includes the Indian Tribal Energy Development and
Self-Determination Act of 2005, under which ANCs have
received millions of dollars of energy assistance. See Brief
for Federal Petitioner 33. That also includes NAHASDA,
which, as discussed, creates a housing block grant program
under which the regional ANCs are some of the biggest
recipients in Alaska. See supra, at 357. Currently, over
10,000 Alaskans live in housing units built, improved, or man-
aged by these regional authorities. See Brief for Associa-
tion of Alaska Housing Authorities as Amicus Curiae 15.
All told, the Court's decision today does not “vest ANCs
with new and untold tribal powers,” as respondents fear.
Brief for Respondent Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Res-
ervation et al. 54. It merely confrms the powers Congress
expressly afforded ANCs and that the Executive Branch has
long understood ANCs to possess.
III
Almost everyone agrees that if ANCs are Indian tribes
under ISDA, they are eligible for funding under Title V of
the CARES Act. If Congress did not want to make ANCs
eligible for CARES Act funding, its decision to incorporate
ISDA's “Indian tribe” defnition into the CARES Act would
be inexplicable. Had Congress wished to limit CARES Act
funding to federally recognized tribes, it could simply have
cross-referenced the List Act instead, as it had in numerous
statutes before.
10
Instead, Congress invoked a defnition
10
See, e. g., Indian Arts and Crafts Amendments Act of 2010, § 203(a)(2),
124 Stat. 2263 (“The term `Indian tribe' has the meaning given the term
in section 102 of the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994”);
Helping Expedite and Advance Responsible Tribal Home Ownership Act
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Opinion of the Court
that expressly includes ANCs (and has been understood for
decades
to include them). Today's ruling merely gives ef-
fect to that decision.
Nevertheless, the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and
Ouray Reservation argues that the CARES Act excludes
ANCs regardless of whether they are Indian tribes under
ISDA. Recall that the CARES Act allocates money to
“Tribal governments.” 42 U. S. C. § 801(a)(2)(B). A “Tribal
government” is “the recognized governing body of an Indian
Tribe.” § 801(g)(5). According to the Utes, ANCs do not
have a “recognized governing body” because that term ap-
plies to the governing body of a federally recognized tribe
alone.
As the Utes implicitly acknowledge, however, federal rec-
ognition is usually discussed in relation to tribes, not their
governing bodies. Brief for Respondent Ute Indian Tribe
of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation 13 (“The recognized
relationship is a political relationship between the United
States and the tribe”); see also, e. g., note following 25
U. S. C. § 5130, p. 678 (“ `[T]he United States has a trust
responsibility to recognized Indian tribes, maintains a
government-to-government relationship with those tribes,
and recognizes the sovereignty of those tribes' ”). In addi-
tion, the CARES Act's use of the term “recognized govern-
ing body” is borrowed from ISDA itself, which lists the “rec-
ognized governing body” of an Indian tribe as one type of
“tribal organization” empowered to contract with the gov-
ernment on the tribe's behalf. § 5304(l). In the ISDA con-
text, this term has long been understood to apply to an
ANC's board of directors, the ANC's governing body as a
matter of corporate law. See, e. g., App. 45 (An ANC's
“board of directors . . . is its `governing body' ”); see also
Black's Law Dictionary, at 219 (defning “Board of Directors”
as “[t]he governing body of a private corporation”). Indeed,
of 2012, § 2, 126 Stat. 1150 (same); Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of
1998, § 2, 112 Stat. 619 (same).
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respondents do not dispute that the plain meaning of “recog-
ni
zed governing body” covers an ANC's board of directors.
11
Looking to the plain meaning of “recognized governing
body” makes even more sense because nothing in either the
CARES Act or ISDA suggests that the term “recognized
governing body” places additional limits on the kinds of In-
dian tribes eligible to beneft under the statutes. In both
laws, the term instead pinpoints the particular entity that
will receive funding on behalf of an Indian tribe. See 42
U. S. C. § 801(g)(5); 25 U. S. C. § 5304(l). Because ANCs are
Indian tribes within the meaning of the CARES Act, an
ANC's board of directors is a “recognized governing body”
eligible to receive funding under Title V of the Act.
IV
The Court today affrms what the Federal Government has
maintained for almost half a century: ANCs are Indian tribes
under ISDA. For that reason, they are Indian tribes under
the CARES Act and eligible for Title V funding. The judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Thomas and
Justice Kagan join, dissenting.
The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
(CARES Act) directed trillions of dollars to various recipi-
ents across the Nation to help them address the COVID–19
pandemic. Our case focuses on $8 billion Congress set aside
for “Tribal governments.” The question we must answer
is whether Alaska's for-proft Alaska Native Corporations
11
The Utes rely also on Seldovia Native Assn., Inc. v. Lujan, 904 F. 2d
1335 (CA9 1990). Seldovia never discussed the term “recognized govern-
ing body” and concerned whether ANCs are Indian tribes for purposes of
Circuit precedent construing the Eleventh Amendment. Id., at 1350.

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(ANCs) qualify as “Tribal governments.” If they do, they
may
receive approximately $450 million of the earmarked
funds; if not, the money will go to tribes across the country.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
wrote a thoughtful and unanimous opinion holding that
ANCs are not “Tribal governments.” Today, the Court dis-
agrees, providing two competing theories for its result.
Respectfully, I fnd neither persuasive and would affrm.
I
The Alaska Native Clai ms Settlement Ac t of 1971
(ANCSA) sought to “settle all land claims by Alaska Na-
tives” by “transfer[ring] $962.5 million in state and federal
funds and approximately 44 million acres of Alaska land to
state-chartered private business corporations” in which
Alaska Natives were given shares. Alaska v. Native Vil-
lage of Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U. S. 520, 523–524
(1998); 43 U. S. C. § 1601 et seq. In particular, ANCSA
established over 200 “Village Corporations” and 12 “Regional
Corporations.” §§ 1602, 1606. The Village Corporations
were created to hold and manage “lands, property, funds, and
other rights and assets for and on behalf of a Native village.”
§ 1602( j). Meanwhile, shares in the Regional Corporations
went to individuals across many different tribes and villages.
§§ 1604, 1606(g)(1)(A). These corporations received most of
the settlement funds and lands Congress provided, assets
they use to “conduct business for proft.” §§ 1606(d), 1610–
1613; see also Brief for Federal Petitioner 5. Today, ANCs
are involved in oil and gas, mining, military contracting, real
estate, construction, communications and media, engineer-
ing, plastics, timber, and aerospace manufacturing, among
other things. GAO, Report to Congressional Requesters,
Regional Alaska Native Corporations: Status 40 Years After
Establishment, and Future Considerations (GAO–13–121,
Dec. 2012). “In fscal year 2017, ANCs had a combined net
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369
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
revenue of $9.1 billion.” Confederated Tribes of Chehalis
Rese
rvation v. Mnuchin, 456 F. Supp. 3d 152, 157 (DC 2020).
Everyone agrees that ANCs are entitled to some CARES
Act relief. Already, they have received benefts Congress
allocated to corporations, like the Paycheck Protection Pro-
gram. See Brief for Respondent Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah
and Ouray Reservation 1 (Brief for Respondent Ute Tribe).
Congress also accounted for ANC shareholders, and all Alas-
kans, when it directed over $2 billion to the State. In fact,
Alaska received more money per capita than all but two
other States. Id., at 3; Congressional Research Service,
General State and Local Fiscal Assistance and COVID–19:
Background and Available Data (Feb. 8, 2021). The Alaska
Native Villages received hundreds of millions of those dollars
because everyone agrees they qualify as tribal governments
for purposes of the CARES Act. See ibid. This suit con-
cerns only the ANCs' claim of entitlement to additional
funds statutorily reserved for “Tribal governments.” 42
U. S. C. § 801(a)(2)(B). If that counterintuitive proposition
holds true, ANCs will receive approximately $450 million
that would otherwise fnd its way to recognized tribal
governments across the country, including Alaska's several
hundred Native Villages. See Letter from E. Prelogar,
Acting Solicitor General, to S. Harris, Clerk of Court
(May 12, 2021).
In the CARES Act, Congress defned a “Tribal govern-
ment” as the “recognized governing body of an Indian
Tribe.” § 801(g)(5). In turn, Congress specifed in § 801(g)(1)
that the term “Indian Tribe” should carry here the same
meaning that it bears in the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act of 1975 (ISDA). The relevant
portion of that statute provides as follows:
“ `Indian tribe' [or `Indian Tribe'] means any Indian
tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or commu-
nity, including any Alaska Native village or regional or
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village corporation as defned in or established pursuant
to
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (85 Stat.
688) [43 U. S. C. 1601 et seq.], which is recognized as eli-
gible for the special programs and services provided by
the United States to Indians because of their status as
Indians.” 25 U. S. C. § 5304(e).
The question before us thus becomes whether ANCs count
as “Indian tribes” under the longstanding terms Congress
adopted in ISDA almost 50 years ago. To resolve that
dispositive question, we must answer two subsidiary ones:
(1) Does the statute's fnal clause (call it the recognition
clause) apply to the ANCs listed earlier? (2) If so, are
ANCs “recognized as eligible for the special programs and
services provided by the United States to Indians because of
their status as Indians”? In my view, the recognition clause
does apply to ANCs along with the other listed entities.
And ANCs are not “recognized” as tribes eligible for the
special programs and services provided by the United States
to Indians because of their status as Indians.
II
A
Start with the question whether the recognition clause
applies to the ANCs. As the nearest referent and part of
an integrated list of other modifed terms, ANCs must be
subject to its terms. Unsurprisingly, the Court of Appeals
reached this conclusion unanimously. Lawyers often debate
whether a clause at the end of a series modifes the entire
list or only the last antecedent. E. g., Lockhart v. United
States, 577 U. S. 347, 350–352 (2016); id., at 362–369 (Kagan,
J., dissenting); Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 592 U. S. 395, 402–
404 (2021); id., at 409–413 (Alito, J., concurring in judg-
ment). In ISDA, for example, some might wonder whether
the recognition clause applies only to ANCs or whether
it also applies to the previously listed entities—“Indian

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tribe[s], band[s], nation[s],” etc. But it would be passing
strange
to suggest that the recognition clause applies to ev-
erything except the term immediately preceding it. A
clause that leaps over its nearest referent to modify every
other term would defy grammatical gravity and common
sense alike. See, e. g., Facebook, Inc., 592 U. S., at 404;
Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U. S.
335, 344, n. 4 (2005).
Exempting ANCs from the recognition clause would be
curious for at least two further reasons. First, the refer-
ence to ANCs comes after the word “including.” No one
disputes that the recognition clause modifes “any Indian
tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community.”
So if the ANCs are included within these previously listed
nouns—as the statute says they are—it's hard to see how
they might nonetheless evade the recognition clause. Sec-
ond, in the proceedings below it was undisputed that the rec-
ognition clause modifes the term “Alaska Native village[s],”
even as the ANCs argued that the clause does not modify
the term “Alaska Native . . . regional or village corporation.”
Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation v. Mnuchin,
976 F. 3d 15, 23 (CADC 2020); Brief for Federal Petitioner
46. But to believe that, one would have to suppose the rec-
ognition clause skips over only half its nearest antecedent.
How the clause might do that mystifes. See Facebook, 592
U. S., at 403 (“It would be odd to apply the modifer . . . to
only a portion of this cohesive preceding clause”).
At least initially, the Court accepts the obvious and con-
cedes that the recognition clause modifes everything in the
list that precedes it. Ante, at 347–348. But this leaves the
Court in a bind. If the recognition clause applies to ANCs,
then ANCs must be “recognized” in order to receive funds.
And “recognition” is a formal concept in Indian law: “Federal
acknowledgement or recognition of an Indian group's legal
status as a tribe is a formal political act confrming the tribe's
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the government-to-government relationship between the
tr
ibe and the federal government.” 1 F. Cohen, Handbook
of Federal Indian Law § 3.02[3], pp. 133–134 (N. Newton ed.
2012); see also id., § 3.02[2], at 132–133. No one contends
that ANCs are recognized by the federal government in
this sense.
Admittedly, not every statutory use of the word “recog-
nized” must carry the same meaning. See ante, at 353–354.
But not only does ISDA arise in the feld of Indian law where
the term “recognition” has long carried a particular meaning.
The statute proceeds to refer to groups that are “recognized
as eligible for the special programs and services provided by
the United States to Indians because of their status as Indi-
ans.” This full phrase is a mouthful, but it was a familiar
one to Congress by the time it passed ISDA in 1975. In
preceding decades, Congress used similar language in stat-
ute after statute granting and terminating formal federal
recognition of certain tribes.
1
All of which strongly sug-
1
E. g., Act of Sept. 21, 1959, § 5, 73 Stat. 593 (upon termination, the
former Tribe and its members “shall not be entitled to any of the special
services performed by the United States for Indians because of their sta-
tus as Indians”); Act of Aug. 23, 1954, § 2, 68 Stat. 769 (same); Act of Aug.
18, 1958, § 10(b), 72 Stat. 621 (same); Act of Sept. 5, 1962, § 10, 76 Stat. 431
(same); Act of Apr. 12, 1968, Pub. L. 90–287, § 2, 82 Stat. 93 (“Nothing in
this Act shall make such tribe or its members eligible for any services
performed by the United States for Indians because of their status as
Indians”); Menominee Restoration Act, Pub. L. 93–197, 87 Stat. 770 (An
Act “to reinstitute the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin as a federally
recognized sovereign Indian tribe; and to restore to the Menominee Tribe
of Wisconsin those Federal services furnished to American Indians be-
cause of their status as American Indians”). This sort of language also
appeared in recognition statutes in the years immediately following ISDA.
E. g., Indian Tribal Restoration Act, § 4, 92 Stat. 247 (Tribes and their
members “shall be entitled to participate in the programs and services
provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indi-
ans”); Siletz Indian Tribe Restoration Act, § 3(a), 91 Stat. 1415 (reinstating
eligibility for “all Federal services and benefts furnished to federally rec-
ognized Indian tribes”); Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah Restoration Act, § 3a,
94 Stat. 317 (same).
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gests that ISDA's recognition clause likewise refers to the
sor
t of formal government-to-government recognition that
triggers eligibility for the full “panoply of benefts and serv-
ices” the federal government provides to Indians. 1 Cohen,
Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 3.02[3], at 134.
There is more ev idence too. When Congress passed
ISDA, it sought to provide Indians “meaningful leader-
ship roles” that are “crucial to the realization of self-
government.” 25 U. S. C. § 5301. Accordingly, “tribes may
enter into `self-determination contracts' with federal agen-
cies to take control of a variety of federally funded pro-
grams.” Menominee Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 577
U. S. 250, 252 (2016); see also § 5321. Handing over federal
government programs to tribal governments in order to fa-
cilitate self-government is precisely the sort of government-
to-government activity that aligns with formal recognition.
See also §§ 5384, 5385 (refecting later amendments to ISDA)
(instructing the Secretary to enter compacts and funding
agreements “with each Indian tribe participating in self-
governance in a manner consistent with the Federal Gov-
ernment's trust responsibility, treaty obligations, and the
government-to-government relationship between Indian
tribes and the United States”).
The CARES Act itself offers still further clues. In the
provision at issue before us, Congress appropriated money
“for making payments to States, Tribal governments, and
units of local government.” 42 U. S. C. § 801(a)(1). Includ-
ing tribal governments side-by-side with States and local
governments reinforces the conclusion that Congress was
speak i ng of gover nment entities capable of hav i ng a
government-to-government relationship with the United
States. Recall, as well, that the CARES Act defnes tribal
governments as the “recognized governing body of an Indian
Tribe.” § 801(g)(5). ANCs, like most corporations, have a
board of directors, 43 U. S. C. § 1606(f ), and a corporate board
may well be the governing body of an enterprise. But they
do not govern any people or direct any government.
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B
W
hile initially acknowledging that the recognition clause
applies to ANCs, the Court interprets its terms differently.
Rather than understanding it as denoting a government-to-
government relationship, the Court says, we should look
to its “plain meaning.” Ante, at 347. But even if we could
somehow set aside everything we know about how the term
is used in Indian law and the CARES Act itself, it's far from
clear what “plain meaning ” the Court alludes to or how
ANCs might fall within it.
First, consider the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List
Act of 1994 (List Act). The List Act instructs the Secretary
of the Interior to keep a list of all federally recognized Indian
tribes. It does so using language materially identical to
that found in ISDA's recognition clause: “The Secretary shall
publish in the Federal Register a list of all Indian tribes
which the Secretary recognizes to be eligible for the special
programs and services provided by the United States to
Indians because of their status as Indians.” 25 U. S. C.
§ 5131(a). No one before us thinks the Secretary of the Inte-
rior should list the ANCs as federally recognized tribes.
And given that, it is unclear how ANCs might count as feder-
ally recognized tribes under ISDA. To be sure, the List Act
came after ISDA. But the Court never attempts to explain
how the plain meaning of nearly identical language in re-
markably similar legal contexts might nevertheless differ.
Second, on any account, ISDA requires an Indian tribe or
group to be “recognized.” But what work does this term
do on the Court's interpretation? Without explanation, the
Court asserts that ANCs are “ `recognized as eligible' for
ANCSA's benefts” because they are “ `established pursuant
to' ANCSA.” Ante, at 348. But on this understanding, any
group eligible for benefts would seem, on that basis alone, to
be “recognized” as eligible for those benefts. The Court's
reading comes perilously close to rendering the term “recog-
nized” surplusage: If ISDA really does capture any group
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Gorsuch, J., dissenting
merely “eligible” for federal benefts, why not just say that
and
avoid introducing a term with a particular and well-
established meaning in federal Indian law?
Third, even putting aside the recognition requirement,
ISDA says tribes must receive services from the United
States “because of their status as Indians.” § 5304(e).
The Court says that ANSCA made ANCs eligible for settle-
ment funds and lands because its shareholders are Alaska
Natives. Ante, at 348. But is compensation provided to
proft-maximizing corporations whose shareholders happen
to be Alaska Natives (at least initially, see 43 U. S. C.
§§ 1606(h)(1), 1629c) a beneft provided to Indians? And
were ANSCA settlement funds provided to ANCs and their
shareholders because of their Indian status or simply be-
cause Congress wanted to resolve a land dispute regardless
of the claimants' status? See § 1601(b) (“[T]he settlement
should be accomplished . . . without establishing any perma-
nent racially defned institutions, rights, privileges, or
obligations . . . ”); but see § 1626(e)(1) (“For all purposes of
Federal law, a Native Corporation shall be considered to be
a corporation owned and controlled by Natives . . . ”).
Again, the answers remain unclear. Ante, at 348.
Finally, ISDA provides that tribes must be recognized as
eligible for “the special programs and services provided by
the United States.” 25 U. S. C. § 5304(e) (emphasis added).
It is a small word to be sure, but “the” suggests the statute
refers to a particular slate of programs and services—here
the full panoply of federal Indian benefts—not just any spe-
cial programs and services the government might supply.
See Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U. S. 392, 408 (2019) (“[G]rammar
and usage establish that `the' is `a function word . . . indicat-
[ing] that a following noun or noun equivalent is defnite or
has been previously specifed by context' ” (quoting Merriam-
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1294 (11th ed. 2005))). It's
undisputed too that, while ANSCA provided certain compen-
sation to ANCs, Congress has never made those entities “eli-
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gible for the full range of federal services and benefts avail-
a
ble to [recog nized] Indian tr ibes. ” Br ief for Federa l
Petitioner 48.
Rather than confront this last problem, the Court elides it.
In its opinion “the special programs and services” becomes
“federal Indian programs and services,” ante, at 350, 354.
Nor, even if one were to (re)interpret “the special programs”
as “some special programs,” is it clear whether ANCSA qual-
ifes. See ante, at 350. On what account is settling a dis-
pute over land title a “program” or “service”? See 43
U. S. C. § 1626(a) (“The payments and grants authorized
under this chapter constitute compensation for the extin-
guishment of claims to land, and shall not be deemed to sub-
stitute for any governmental programs otherwise available
to the Native people of Alaska”). Beyond even that,
ANCSA extended specifc compensation to ANCs—money
and title—in exchange for settling land claims. ANCSA
provided ANCs nothing in the way of health, education, eco-
nomic, and social services of the sort that ISDA allows tribes
to contract with the federal government to provide.
The Court's reply creates another anomaly too. If receiv-
ing any federal money really is enough to satisfy the recogni-
tion clause, many other Indian groups might now suddenly
qualify as tribes under the CARES Act, ISDA, and other
federal statutes. A 2012 GAO study, for example, identifed
approximately 400 nonfederally recognized tribes in the
lower 48 States, of which 26 had recently received direct
funding from federal programs. GAO, Indian Issues: Fed-
eral Funding for Non-Federally Recognized Tribes (GAO–
12–348, Apr. 2012). This number does not include additional
entities that may have received federal benefts in the form
of loans, procurement contrac ts, t ax expenditures, or
amounts received by individual members. Id., at 35. And
still other groups may have federal rights secured by treaty,
which may exist even if the tribe is no longer recognized.
Cf. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U. S. 404, 412–413

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(1968). How does the Court solve this problem? With an
ipse
dixit. See ante, at 351 (“[T]he Court does not open
the door to other Indian groups that have not been federally
recognized becoming Indian tribes under ISDA”). The
Court's “plain meaning ” argument thus becomes transparent
for what it is—a bare assertion that the recognition clause
carries a different meaning when applied to ANCs than when
applied to anyone else.
III
With its frst theory facing so many problems, the Court
offers a backup. Now the Court suggests that ANCs qualify
as tribes even if they fail to satisfy the recognition clause.
Ante, at 358. Because ISDA's opening list of entities spe-
cifcally includes ANCs, the Court reasons, the recognition
clause must be read as inapplicable to them alone. Essen-
tially, the Court quietly takes us full circle to the beginning
of the case—endorsing an admittedly ungrammatical reading
of the statute in order to avoid what it calls the “implausible”
result that ANCs might be included in ISDA's frst clause
only to be excluded by its second. Ante, at 360.
But it is diffcult to see anything “implausible” about that
result. When Congress adopted ANSCA in 1971, it “cre-
ated over 200 new legal entities that overlapped with exist-
ing tribes and tribal nonproft service organizations.” Brief
for Professors and Historians as Amici Curiae 27. At that
time, there was no List Act or statutory criteria for formal
recognition. Instead, as the Court of Appeals ably docu-
mented, confusion reigned about whether and which Alaskan
entities ultimately might be recognized as tribes. 976 F. 3d,
at 18; see also Brief for Professors and Historians as Amici
Curiae 28; Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 270–271
(1941). When Congress adopted ISDA just four years later,
it sought to account for this uncertainty. The statute listed
three kinds of Alaskan entities: Alaska Native Villages, Vil-
lage Corporations, and Regional Corporations. And the law
did “meaningful work by extending ISDA's defnition of In-
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dian tribes” to whichever among them “ultimately were rec-
og
nized.” 976 F. 3d, at 26. It is perfectly plausible to think
Congress chose to account for uncertainty in this way; Con-
gress often adopts statutes whose application depends on
future contingencies. E. g., Gundy v. United States, 588
U. S. 128, 158–159 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing
examples).
Further aspects of Alaskan history confrm this under-
standing. Over time, the vast majority of Alaska Native
Villages went on to seek—and win—formal federal recogni-
tion as Indian tribes. See 86 Fed. Reg. 7557–7558 (2021);
Brief for Respondent Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Res-
ervation et al. 23. (It's this recognition which makes them
indisputably eligible for CARES Act relief. See supra, at
368–369.) By the time it enacted ISDA, too, Congress had al-
ready authorized certain Alaska Native groups to organize
based on “a common bond of occupation, or association, or
residence.” 25 U. S. C. § 5119. This standard, which did
not require previous recognition as “bands or tribes,” was
unique to Alaska. See ibid. And at least one such entity—
the Hydaburg Cooperative Association, organized around the
fsh industry—also went on to receive federal tribal recogni-
tion in the 1990s. 86 Fed. Reg. 7558; see also Brief for Re-
spondent Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation et
al. 35–36. Though short lived and not a full government-
to-government political recognition, the Secretary of the
Interior at one point even listed ANCs as “ `Indian Entities
Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services From the
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs,' ” before eventually
removing them. Ante, at 355–356. And in 1996, Congress
considered a bill that would have “deemed” a particular
ANC—the Cook Inlet Region, Inc.—“an Indian tribal entity
for the purpose of federal programs for which Indians are
eligible because of their status as Indians” and required that
it be included on “any list that designates federally recog-
nized Indian tribes.” H. R. 3662, 104th Cong., 2d Sess.,
§ 121. Of course, the ANCs before us currently are not rec-
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379
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
ognized as tribes. But all this history illustrates why it is
hardly
implausible to suppose that a rational Congress in
1975 might have wished to account for the possibility that
some of the Alaskan entities listed in ISDA might go on to
win recognition.
The particular statutory structure Congress employed in
ISDA was perfectly ordinary too. Often Congress begins
by listing a broad universe of potentially affected parties fol-
lowed by limiting principles. Take this example from the
CARES Act. Congress afforded benefts to certain “ `unit[s]
of local government,' ” and defned that term to mean “a
county, municipality, town, township, village, parish, bor-
ough, or other unit of general government below the State
level with a population that exceeds 500,000.” 42 U. S. C.
§ 801(g)(2). The litigants tell us no parish in the country
today has a population exceeding half a million. See Brief
for Respondent Ute Tribe 31. Suppose they're right. Is
that any basis for throwing out the population limitation and
suddenly including all parishes? Of course not. Once
more, an opening list provides the full feld of entities that
may be eligible for relief and the concluding clause does the
more precise work of winnowing it down. The clauses work
in harmony, not at cross-purposes.
2
2
To support its implausibility argument, the Court proposes a hypothet-
ical advertisement for “ `50% off any meat, vegetable, or seafood dish, in-
cluding ceviche, which is cooked.' ” Ante, at 359. The Court posits that
any reasonable customer would expect a discount even on uncooked cev-
iche. It's a colorful example, but one far afeld from Indian law and the
technical statutory defnitions before us. Even taken on its own terms,
too, the example is a bit underdone. A reasonable customer might notice
some tension in the advertisement, but there are many plausible take-
aways. Maybe the restaurant uses heat to cook its ceviche—many chefs
“lightly poach lobster, shrimp, octopus or mussels before using them in
ceviche.” See Cordle, No-Cook Dishes, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 17,
2013, p. L4. Maybe the restaurant meant to speak of ceviche as “cooked”
in the sense of “fsh . . . `cooked' by marinating it in an acidic dressing ”
like lime juice. See Bittman, Ceviche Without Fear, N. Y. Times, Aug. 14,
2002, p. F3. Or maybe the restaurant simply listed every dish it makes,
understanding some dishes would be excluded by the concluding “cooked”

380 YEL
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Gorsuch, J., dissenting
In defense of its implausibility argument, the Court sub-
mits
any other reading would yield a redundancy. Unless
ANCs are exempt from the recognition clause, the Court
suggests, Congress had no reason to mention them in the
statute's opening clause because they already “ft into one
of the pre-existing ISDA categories,” like “ `tribe[s], band[s],
nation[s], or other organized group[s] or communit[ies],' ”
ante, at 360 (quoting 25 U. S. C § 5304(e)).
But this much is hard to see too. Admittedly, illustrative
examples of more general terms are in some sense always
redundant. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534
U. S. 84, 89 (2001) (“[That] is meant simply to be illustrative,
hence redundant”). But Congress often uses illustrative ex-
amples in its statutory work, and the practice is not entirely
pointless. As this Court has explained, illustrative exam-
ples can help orient affected parties and courts to Congress's
thinking, and often they serve to “remove any doubt” about
whether a particular listed entity is captured within broader
defnitional terms. Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552
U. S. 214, 226 (2008); see also Federal Land Bank of St. Paul
v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U. S. 95, 99–100 (1941); A.
Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 176–177 (2012). That
much is certainly true here. If Congress had failed to list
ANCs in ISDA's frst clause, a dispute could have arisen over
whether these corporate entities even qualify as “Indian . . .
organized group[s] or communit[ies].” See Brief for Peti-
tioners in No. 20–544, p. 5; supra, at 375 (citing 43 U. S. C.
§ 1601(b)).
Having said all this, my disagreement with the Court's
“implausibility” argument is a relatively modest one. We
agree that linguistic and historical context may provide use-
ful interpretive guidance, and no one today seeks to suggest
that judges may sanitize statutes in service of their own sen-
proviso. Even in the Court's own hypothetical it is not “implausible” to
apply the modifer across the board.
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Gorsuch, J., dissenting
sibilities about the rational and harmonious.
3
Instead,
our
disagreement is simply about applying the plain meaning,
grammar, context, and canons of construction to the particu-
lar statutory terms before us. As I see it, an ordinary
reader would understand that the recognition clause applies
the same way to all Indian groups. And if that's true,
there's just no way to read the text to include ANCs as
“Tribal governments” for purposes of the CARES Act.
*
In my view, neither of the Court's alternative theories for
reversal can do the work required of it. The recognition
clause denotes the formal recognition between the federal
government and a tribal government that triggers eligibility
for the full panoply of special benefts given to Indian tribes.
Meanwhile, a fair reading of that clause indicates that it ap-
plies to ANCs. Accordingly, with respect, I would affrm.
3
The Court does not suggest, for example, that the reading of the stat-
ute it rejects would be “absurd.” Absurdity doctrine “does not license
courts to improve statutes (or rules) substantively, so that their outcomes
accord more closely” with “ `what we might think is the preferred result.' ”
Jaskolski v. Daniels, 427 F. 3d 456, 461 (CA7 2005) (Easterbrook, J., for
the court) (ellipsis omitted). At most, it may serve a linguistic function—
capturing circumstances in which a statute's apparent meaning is so “un-
thinkable” that any reasonable reader would immediately (1) know that it
contains a “technical or ministerial” mistake, and (2) understand the cor-
rect meaning of the text. See Lexington Ins. Co. v. Precision Drilling
Co., 830 F. 3d 1219, 1221–1223 (CA10 2016); A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading
Law 237–238 (2012). Anything more would threaten the separation of
powers, undermine fair notice, and risk upsetting hard-earned legislative
compromises. Ibid.; see also Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 587 U. S.
761, 778–779 (2019).
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