Edwards v. Vannoy

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 593 U. S. Part 1
Pages 255–309
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
May 17, 2021
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

OCTOBER
TERM, 2020
255
Syllabus
EDWARDS v. VANNOY, WARDEN
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the fth circuit
No. 19–5807. Argued December 2, 2020—Decided May 17, 2021
In 2007, a Louisiana jury found petitioner Thedrick Edwards guilty of
armed robbery, rape, and kidnapping. At the time, Louisiana law per-
mitted non-unanimous jury verdicts if at least 10 of the 12 jurors found
the defendant guilty. In Edwards's case, 11 of 12 jurors returned a
guilty verdict as to some crimes, and 10 of 12 jurors returned a guilty
verdict as to others. After Edwards's conviction became fnal on direct
review, Edwards fled a federal habeas corpus petition, arguing that the
non-unanimous jury verdict violated his constitutional right to a unani-
mous jury. The District Court rejected Edwards's claim as foreclosed
by Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404, and the Fifth Circuit denied a
certifcate of appealability. While Edwards's petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari was pending, the Court repudiated Apodoca and held that a state
jury must be unanimous to convict a criminal defendant of a serious
offense. Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. –––. Edwards now argues
that the Ramos jury-unanimity rule applies retroactively on federal col-
lateral review.
Held: The Ramos jury-unanimity rule does not apply retroactively on fed-
eral collateral review. Pp. 262–276.
(a) A new rule of criminal procedure applies to cases on direct review,
even if the defendant's trial has already concluded. But the Court has
stated that new rules of criminal procedure ordinarily do not apply ret-
roactively on federal collateral review. The Court has stated that a
new procedural rule will apply retroactively on federal collateral review
only if the new rule constitutes a “watershed” rule of criminal proce-
dure. Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 311 (plurality opinion). When the
Teague Court frst articulated that “watershed” exception, however, the
Court stated that it was “unlikely” that such watershed “components of
basic due process have yet to emerge.” Id., at 313. And in the 32
years since Teague, the Court has never found that any new procedural
rule actually satisfes the purported exception. Pp. 262–264.
(b) To determine whether Ramos applies retroactively on federal col-
lateral review, the Court must frst ask whether Ramos announced a
new rule of criminal procedure and, if so, whether that rule falls within
an exception for watershed rules of criminal procedure that apply retro-
actively on federal collateral review. The Court concludes that Ramos
announced a new rule and that the jury-unanimity rule announced
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256 EDW
ARDS v. VANNOY
Syllabus
by Ramos does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review.
Pp
. 264–272.
(1) The Ramos jury-unanimity rule is new because it was not “dic-
tated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction be-
came fnal,” Teague, 489 U. S., at 301, or “apparent to all reasonable
jurists” at that time, Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U. S. 518, 528. On the
contrary, before Ramos, many courts interpreted Apodaca to allow for
non-unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal trials. And the Ramos
Court expressly repudiated Apodaca. Pp. 265–266.
(2) The new rule announced in Ramos does not qualify as a “water-
shed” procedural rule that applies retroactively on federal collateral re-
view. In an attempt to distinguish Ramos from the long line of cases
where the Court has declined to retroactively apply new procedural
rules, Edwards emphasizes three aspects of Ramos: (i) the signifcance
of the jury-unanimity right; (ii) Ramos's reliance on the original mean-
ing of the Constitution; and (iii) the effect of Ramos in preventing racial
discrimination in the jury process. But the Court has refused to retro-
actively apply other momentous cases with similar attributes. In De-
Stefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631, the Court declined to retroactively
apply Duncan v. Louisiana, 395 U. S. 145, even though Duncan estab-
lished the jury right itself. In Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U. S. 406, the
Court declined to retroactively apply Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S.
36, even though Crawford relied on the original meaning of the Sixth
Amendment to restrict the use of hearsay evidence against criminal
defendants. And in Allen v. Hardy, 478 U. S. 255 (per curiam), the
Court declined to retroactively apply Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79,
even though Batson held that state prosecutors may not discriminate
on the basis of race when exercising individual peremptory challenges.
There is no good rationale for treating Ramos differently from Duncan,
Crawford, and Batson. Pp. 267–271.
(3) Given the Court's numerous precedents holding that landmark
and historic decisions announcing new rules of criminal procedure do
not apply retroactively on federal collateral review, the Court acknowl-
edges that the watershed exception is moribund and that no new rules
of criminal procedure can satisfy the purported exception for watershed
rules. Continuing to articulate a theoretical exception that never actu-
ally applies in practice offers false hope to defendants, distorts the law,
misleads judges, and wastes the resources of defense counsel, prosecu-
tors, and courts. Moreover, no one can reasonably rely on an exception
that is non-existent in practice, so no reliance interests can be affected
by forthrightly acknowledging reality. The watershed exception must
“be regarded as retaining no vitality.” Herrera v. Wyoming, 587 U. S.
–––, ––– (internal quotation marks omitted). Pp. 271–272.
Affrmed.

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257
Syllabus
Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C.
J., Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Thomas, J.,
fled a concurring opinion, in which Gorsuch, J., joined, post, p. 276.
Gorsuch, J., fled a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post,
p. 282. Kagan, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer and Soto-
mayor, JJ., joined, post, p. 295.
André Bélanger argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Yigal Bander, James P. Manasseh,
Collin P. Wedel, Andrew B. Talai, Jeffrey T. Green, and
Naomi A. Igra.
Elizabeth Baker Murrill, Solicitor General of Louisiana,
argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief
were Jeff Landry, Attorney General of Louisiana, Shae Mc-
Phee, Deputy Solicitor General, Josiah M. Kollmeyer, Assist-
ant Solicitor General, Hillar Moore, Stacy Wright, and Jef-
frey M. Harris.
Christopher G. Michel argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging affrmance. With him on
the brief were Acting Solicitor General Wall, Acting Assist-
ant Attorney General Rabbitt, Deputy Solicitor General
Feigin, and Sofa M. Vickery.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American
Civil Liberties Union et al. by David D. Cole, Lisa S. Blatt, Amy Mason
Saharia, Cassandra Stubbs, Brian W. Stull, Ezekiel Edwards, Jennesa
Calvo-Friedman, Bruce Hamilton, Clark M. Neily III, Jay R. Schweik-
ert, Arthur Rizer, and John W. Whitehead; for the Center on Race, In-
equality, and the Law et al. by Deborah N. Archer and Vincent M. South-
erland; for the DKT Liberty Project by Jessica Ring Amunson; for
Former Judges et al. by Michael R. Dreeben, Jeremy R. Girton, Yaira
Dubin, Seth P. Waxman, and Alan E. Schoen feld; for Human Rights for
Kids et al. by Bennett L. Cohen, Tony Torain, James Dold, Suzanne La
Pierre, John Ellem, and Carol A. Kolinchak; for Law Professors et al.
by Elizabeth B. Wydra and Brianne J. Gorod; for the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Laura G. Ferguson, Timothy P. O'Toole,
and Barbara E. Bergman; and for JonRe Taylor by Thomas Frampton.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of
Oregon by Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General of Oregon, Benjamin
Gutman, Solicitor General, and Doug M. Petrina and Christopher A. Per-
due, Assistant Attorneys General; and for the Commonwealth of Puerto
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258 EDW
ARDS v. VANNOY
Opinion of the Court
Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court.
Last
Term in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ––– (2020),
this Court held that a state jury must be unanimous to con-
vict a criminal defendant of a serious offense. Ramos repu-
diated this Court's 1972 decision in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406
U. S. 404, which had allowed non-unanimous juries in state
criminal trials. The question in this case is whether the
new rule of criminal procedure announced in Ramos applies
retroactively to overturn fnal convictions on federal collat-
eral review. Under this Court's retroactivity precedents,
the answer is no.
This Court has repeatedly stated that a decision announc-
ing a new rule of criminal procedure ordinarily does not
apply retroactively on federal collateral review. See Teague
v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion); see also
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 639–640, and n. 20 (1965).
Indeed, in the 32 years since Teague underscored that princi-
ple, this Court has announced many important new rules of
criminal procedure. But the Court has not applied any of
those new rules retroactively on federal collateral review.
See, e. g., Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U. S. 406, 421 (2007) (Con-
Rico by Isaías Sánchez-Báez, Solicitor General of Puerto Rico, and Carlos
Lugo-Fiol.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the Federal Public Defender for
the District of Oregon et al. by Stephen R. Sady and Shaun S. McCrea;
for the Innocence Project New Orleans by Richard Davis; for the
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Matthew O.
Gatewood, Kristen Clarke, Jon M. Greenbaum, Arthur Ago, Noah
Baron, and John H. Fleming; for Louisiana Professors of Law by Her-
bert V. Larson, Jr.; for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund,
Inc., by Sherrilyn A. Ifll, Janai S. Nelson, and Samuel Spital; for the
Promise of Justice Initiative et al. by G. Ben Cohen, E. King Alexander,
Jr., and Letty S. Di Giulio; for the Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice
Center et al. by Devi M. Rao, Amir H. Ali, and John Mills; and for Ed-
ward L. Tarpley, Jr., et al. by Allison A. Davis and Chris J. K. Swift.
A brief of amici curiae was fled for Jonathan F. Mitchell et al. by Adam
K. Mortara, pro se, and Taylor A. R. Meehan.

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259
Opinion of the Court
frontation Clause rule recognized in Crawford v. Washing-
t
on, 541 U. S. 36 (2004), does not apply retroactively). And
for decades before Teague, the Court also regularly declined
to apply new rules retroactively, including on federal collat-
eral review. See, e. g., DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631,
635 (1968) (per curiam) ( jury-trial rule recognized in Dun-
can v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968), does not apply
retroactively).
In light of the Court's well-settled retroactivity doctrine,
we conclude that the Ramos jury-unanimity rule likewise
does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review.
We therefore affrm the judgment of the U. S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit.
I
On the night of May 13, 2006, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
Thedrick Edwards and an accomplice kidnapped Ryan Eaton,
a student at LSU. As Eaton was getting out of his car, Ed-
wards and his accomplice confronted Eaton at gunpoint and
forced him back into the car. Edwards and his accomplice
then jumped into the car with Eaton. They drove with
Eaton to an ATM where they hoped to withdraw money
using Eaton's card. When they discovered that Eaton did
not have any money in his account, they drove to Eaton's
apartment. Once there, they bound and blindfolded Eaton,
rummaged through his apartment, and took some of his be-
longings to Eaton's car.
After they were back in the car, Edwards and his accom-
plice coerced Eaton into arranging a meeting with Eaton's
girlfriend. They then drove to the girlfriend's apartment
and, at gunpoint, forced Eaton to knock on the door. When
Eaton's girlfriend opened the door, Edwards and his accom-
plice rushed inside. Both Edwards and his accomplice were
armed, and Edwards's accomplice had his gun drawn. Ed-
wards and his accomplice instructed Eaton, Eaton's girl-
friend, and two other women in the apartment to lie on the
foor. Edwards then raped one of the women. His accom-
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260 EDW
ARDS v. VANNOY
Opinion of the Court
plice raped another woman. As they left, they grabbed
some
personal property from the apartment. Edwards and
his accomplice hurried back into Eaton's car and drove
around the corner. They then abandoned the car and fed.
Two days later, Edwards and his accomplice confronted
another man at gunpoint and forced him to withdraw money
from an ATM.
Within a day of the second incident, the police collected
substantial evidence implicating Edwards in both episodes.
The police obtained warrants to search his residence and to
arrest him. The day after the police executed the search
warrant but before an arrest, Edwards turned himself in to
the police and confessed to his crimes. The police video-
taped Edwards's confession. (The video is part of the joint
appendix. See supremecourt.gov/media /media.aspx.)
Edwards was indicted in Louisiana state court for armed
robbery, kidnapping, and rape. Edwards pled not guilty and
went to trial. Before trial, Edwards moved to suppress the
videotaped confession on the ground that the confession was
involuntary. The trial court denied the suppression motion.
At trial, the jury heard Edwards's confession and other
evidence against him, including the testimony of eyewit-
nesses. The jury convicted Edwards of fve counts of armed
robbery, two counts of kidnapping, and one count of rape.
At the time, Louisiana law permitted guilty verdicts if at
least 10 of the 12 jurors found the defendant guilty. The
jury convicted Edwards by an 11-to-1 vote on one of the
armed robbery counts, the two kidnapping counts, and the
rape count. The jury convicted Edwards by a 10-to-2 vote
on the four remaining armed robbery counts.
At sentencing, the trial judge stated: “I can say without
hesitation that this is the most egregious case that I've had
before me.” Record 1113. The judge sentenced Edwards
to life imprisonment without parole. The Louisiana First

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261
Opinion of the Court
Circuit Court of Appeal affrmed the conviction and sentence.
In
March 2011, Edwards's conviction became fnal on direct
review.
After his conviction became fnal, Edwards applied for
state post-conviction relief in the Louisiana courts. The
Louisiana courts denied relief.
In 2015, Edwards fled a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the U. S. District Court for the Middle District
of Louisiana. He argued that the non-unanimous jury ver-
dict violated his constitutional right to a unanimous jury.
The District Court rejected that claim as foreclosed by this
Court's 1972 decision in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404.
In Apodaca, this Court ruled that the Constitution does
not require unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal trials.
The Apodaca majority consisted of a plurality opinion by
four Justices and an opinion concurring in the judgment by
Justice Powell. In his opinion, Justice Powell acknowledged
that the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous jury in
federal criminal trials. 406 U. S., at 371. But in his view,
the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate that right
against the States, meaning that a unanimous jury was not
constitutionally required in state criminal trials. Id., at 373,
376–377. In subsequent years, many federal and state
courts viewed Justice Powell's opinion as the controlling
opinion from Apodaca. See, e. g., Timbs v. Indiana, 586
U. S. –––, –––, n. 1 (2019); McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S.
742, 766, n. 14 (2010).
In Edwards's case, the District Court likewise followed
Justice Powell's opinion from Apodaca and concluded that a
unanimous jury is not constitutionally required in state crim-
inal trials. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
denied a certifcate of appealability. 2019 WL 8643258 (May
20, 2019). Edwards then petitioned for a writ of certiorari
in this Court, arguing that the Constitution requires a unani-
mous jury in state criminal trials.
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262 EDW
ARDS v. VANNOY
Opinion of the Court
II
W
hile Edwards's petition for certiorari was pending, this
Court decided Ramos and rejected Justice Powell's opinion
in Apodaca. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ––– (2020);
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 (1972). The Court held
that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Sixth
Amendment right to a unanimous jury against the States.
Therefore, in state court as well as federal court, a jury must
be unanimous to convict a defendant of a serious offense.
1
The Court's decision in Ramos directly affected Louisiana
and Oregon, which were the only two States that still al-
lowed non-unanimous juries. For those States, this Court's
decision in Ramos immediately triggered a pressing ques-
tion: Does Ramos apply retroactively to overturn fnal con-
victions on federal collateral review? We granted certiorari
in Edwards's case to decide that question. 590 U. S. –––
(2020). We conclude that Ramos does not apply retroac-
tively on federal collateral review.
A
A new rule of criminal procedure applies to cases on direct
review, even if the defendant's trial has already concluded.
See Griffth v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, 328 (1987). But
under the habeas corpus statute as interpreted by this
Court, a new rule of criminal procedure ordinarily does not
apply retroactively to overturn fnal convictions on federal
collateral review. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 310
(1989) (plurality opinion); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302,
313–314 (1989).
2
1
Ramos does not apply to defendants charged with petty offenses,
which typically are offenses that carry a maximum prison term of six
months or less. 590 U. S., at –––, n. 7. See also Blanton v. North Las
Vegas, 489 U. S. 538, 543 (1989) (defning petty offense).
2
Before Griffth v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314 (1987), the Court sometimes
would decline to apply new procedural rules even to cases on direct review.
See, e. g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 721 (1966) (rule announced
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263
Opinion of the Court
In stating that new procedural rules ordinarily do not
apply
retroactively on federal collateral review, Teague rein-
forced what had already been the Court's regular practice
for several decades under the retroactivity standard articu-
lated in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 (1965). Link-
letter set forth a balancing test for determining retroactivity.
But even under Linkletter, “new rules that constituted clear
breaks with the past generally were not given retroactive
effect,” including on federal collateral review. Teague, 489
U. S., at 304 (plurality opinion).
As the Court has explained, applying “constitutional rules
not in existence at the time a conviction became fnal seri-
ously undermines the principle of fnality which is essential
to the operation of our criminal justice system.” Id., at 309.
Here, for example, applying Ramos retroactively would po-
tentially overturn decades of convictions obtained in reliance
on Apodaca. Moreover, conducting scores of retrials years
after the crimes occurred would require signifcant state re-
sources. See Teague, 489 U. S., at 310 (plurality opinion).
And a State may not be able to retry some defendants at all
because of “lost evidence, faulty memory, and missing wit-
nesses.” Allen v. Hardy, 478 U. S. 255, 260 (1986) (per cu-
riam) (internal quotation marks omitted). When previously
convicted perpetrators of violent crimes go free merely be-
cause the evidence needed to conduct a retrial has become
stale or is no longer available, the public suffers, as do the
victims. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U. S. 66, 72
(1986). Even when the evidence can be reassembled, con-
ducting retrials years later inficts substantial pain on crime
victims who must testify again and endure new trials. In
this case, the victims of the robberies, kidnappings, and
in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), applies only to cases in which
the trial began after the date of the Miranda decision). Griffth ended
that practice and declared that new rules apply to all cases on direct
review.
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264 EDW
ARDS v. VANNOY
Opinion of the Court
rapes would have to relive their trauma and testify again, 15
years
after the crimes occurred.
Put simply, the “costs imposed upon the States by retroac-
tive application of new rules of constitutional law on habeas
corpus thus generally far outweigh the benefts of this appli-
cation.” Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 242 (1990) (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted). For that reason,
the Court has repeatedly stated that new rules of criminal
procedure ordinarily do not apply retroactively on federal
collateral review.
The Court has identifed only one possible exception to
that principle. The Court has stated that a new procedural
rule will apply retroactively on federal collateral review only
if it constitutes a “watershed” rule of criminal procedure.
Teague, 489 U. S., at 311 (plurality opinion). But the Teague
Court stated that it was “unlikely” that such watershed
“components of basic due process have yet to emerge.” Id.,
at 313; see also Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U. S. 406, 417
(2007); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U. S. 348, 352 (2004); Tyler
v. Cain, 533 U. S. 656, 667, n. 7 (2001). And in the 32 years
since Teague, as we will explain, the Court has never found
that any new procedural rule actually satisfes that pur-
ported exception.
3
B
To determine whether Ramos applies retroactively on fed-
eral collateral review, we must answer two questions.
First, did Ramos announce a new rule of criminal proce-
dure, as opposed to applying a settled rule? A new rule
3
By contrast, a new substantive rule—for example, a rule that particu-
lar conduct cannot constitutionally be criminalized—usually applies retro-
actively on federal collateral review. See Welch v. United States, 578
U. S. 120, 128–129 (2016). The parties here agree, as do we, that the rule
announced in Ramos is procedural. The Ramos rule affects “only the
manner of determining the defendant's culpability,” not the “range of con-
duct or the class of persons that the law punishes.” Schriro v. Summer-
lin, 542 U. S. 348, 353 (2004) (emphasis deleted).
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Opinion of the Court
ordinarily does not apply retroactively on federal collateral
re
view.
Second, if Ramos announced a new rule, does it fall within
an exception for watershed rules of criminal procedure that
apply retroactively on federal collateral review?
1
Ramos held that a state jury must be unanimous to convict
a defendant of a serious offense. In so holding, Ramos an-
nounced a new rule.
A rule is new unless it was “dictated by precedent exist-
ing at the time the defendant's conviction became fnal.”
Teague, 489 U. S., at 301 (plurality opinion). In other words,
a rule is new unless, at the time the conviction became fnal,
the rule was already “apparent to all reasonable jurists.”
Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U. S. 518, 528 (1997). The stark-
est example of a decision announcing a new rule is a decision
that overrules an earlier case. See Whorton, 549 U. S.,
at 416.
The jury-unanimity requirement announced in Ramos was
not dictated by precedent or apparent to all reasonable ju-
rists when Edwards's conviction became fnal in 2011. On
the contrary, before Ramos, many courts interpreted Apo-
daca to allow for non-unanimous jury verdicts in state crimi-
nal trials.
4
In addition, in Ramos itself, six Members of the
4
See, e. g., Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U. S. –––, –––, n. 1 (2019) (the “Sixth
Amendment requires jury unanimity in federal, but not state, criminal
proceedings”); McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 766, n. 14 (2010) (“The
Court has held that although the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury
requires a unanimous jury verdict in federal criminal trials, it does not
require a unanimous jury verdict in state criminal trials”); Schad v. Ari-
zona, 501 U. S. 624, 634, n. 5 (1991) (plurality opinion) (a “state criminal
defendant, at least in noncapital cases, has no federal right to a unanimous
jury verdict”); Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U. S. 130, 137 (1979) (the Court
has “approved the use of certain nonunanimous verdicts in cases involving
12-person juries”); Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U. S. 618, 625 (1976) (the
“holding in Apodaca” was that “the jury's verdict need not be unani-
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266 EDW
ARDS v. VANNOY
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Court acknowledged that Apodaca allowed non-unanimous
jury
verdicts in state criminal trials. See 590 U. S., at –––
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in part); id., at ––– (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring in part); id., at ––– – ––– (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in judgment); id., at ––– (Alito, J., joined by Roberts,
C. J., and Kagan, J., dissenting). And other Members of the
Court recognized that Apodaca at least muddied the waters
of the Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Id., at –––,
and n. 36 (plurality opinion). In short, even in Ramos itself,
the Court indicated that the decision was not dictated by
precedent or apparent to all reasonable jurists.
Edwards responds that the Court's decision in Ramos
must have applied a settled rule, not a new rule, because
the decision adhered to the original meaning of the Sixth
Amendment's right to a jury trial and the Fourteenth
Amendment's incorporation of that right (and others) against
the States. That argument confates the merits question
presented in Ramos with the retroactivity question pre-
sented here. On the merits question, the critical point, as
the Court thoroughly explained in Ramos, is that the Consti-
tution's text and history require a unanimous jury in state
criminal trials. On the retroactivity question, the critical
point is that reasonable jurists who considered the question
before Ramos interpreted Apodaca to allow non-unanimous
jury verdicts in state criminal trials.
By renouncing Apodaca and expressly requiring unani-
mous jury verdicts in state criminal trials, Ramos plainly
announced a new rule for purposes of this Court's retroactiv-
ity doctrine. And new rules of criminal procedure ordi-
narily do not apply retroactively on federal collateral review.
mous”); Smith v. Swarthout, 742 F. 3d 885, 895, n. 4 (CA9 2014) (“The
Supreme Court has instructed that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments do not require a unanimous verdict in state criminal prosecutions”);
see also 6 W. LaFave, J. Israel, N. King, & O. Kerr, Criminal Procedure
§ 22.1(e), p. 23 (4th ed. 2015) (the “Sixth Amendment does not require jury
unanimity in state criminal trials”).
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Opinion of the Court
2
H
aving determined that Ramos announced a new rule re-
quiring jury unanimity, we must consider whether that new
rule falls within an exception for watershed rules of crimi-
nal procedure that apply retroactively on federal collateral
review.
This Court has stated that the watershed exception is “ex-
tremely narrow” and applies only when, among other things,
the new rule alters “our understanding of the bedrock proce-
dural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.”
Whorton, 549 U. S., at 417–418 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In the abstract, those various adjectives—watershed, nar-
row, bedrock, essential—do not tell us much about whether
a particular decision of this Court qualifes for the watershed
exception. In practice, the exception has been theoretical,
not real. The Court has identifed only one pre-Teague pro-
cedural rule as watershed: the right to counsel recognized in
the Court's landmark decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U. S. 335, 344–345 (1963). See Whorton, 549 U. S., at 419,
421. The Court has never identifed any other pre-Teague
or post-Teague rule as watershed. None.
Moreover, the Court has fatly proclaimed on multiple oc-
casions that the watershed exception is unlikely to cover any
more new rules. Even 32 years ago in Teague itself, the
Court stated that it was “unlikely” that additional watershed
rules would “emerge.” 489 U. S., at 313 (plurality opinion).
And since Teague, the Court has often reiterated that “it is
unlikely that any such rules have yet to emerge.” Whorton,
549 U. S., at 417 (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted); see also Beard v. Banks, 542 U. S. 406, 417 (2004);
Summerlin, 542 U. S., at 352; Tyler, 533 U. S., at 667, n. 7;
Graham v. Collins, 506 U. S. 461, 478 (1993); Sawyer, 497
U. S., at 243; Butler v. McKellar, 494 U. S. 407, 416 (1990).
Consistent with those many emphatic pronouncements, the
Court since Teague has rejected every claim that a new pro-
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cedural rule qualifes as a watershed rule. For example, in
Beard
v. Banks, 542 U. S., at 408, the Court declined to retro-
actively apply the rule announced in Mills v. Maryland, 486
U. S. 367, 384 (1988), that capital juries may not be required
to disregard certain mitigating factors. In O'Dell v. Nether-
land, 521 U. S. 151, 153 (1997), the Court refused to retroac-
tively apply the rule announced in Simmons v. South Caro-
lina, 512 U. S. 154, 156 (1994), that a capital defendant must
be able, in certain circumstances, to inform the sentencing
jury that he is parole ineligible. In Lambrix v. Singletary,
520 U. S., at 539–540, the Court declined to retroactively
apply the rule announced in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U. S.
1079, 1082 (1992) (per curiam), that sentencers may not
weigh invalid aggravating circumstances before recommend-
ing or imposing the death penalty. In Sawyer v. Smith, 497
U. S., at 229, the Court refused to retroactively apply the
rule announced in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320, 323
(1985), which prohibited a death sentence by a jury led to
the false belief that responsibility for the sentence rested
elsewhere.
The list of cases declining to retroactively apply a new rule
of criminal procedure extends back long before Teague to
some of this Court's most historic criminal procedure deci-
sions. For example, in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719,
721 (1966), the Court declined to retroactively apply Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 444–445 (1966), which re-
quired that police inform individuals in custody of certain
constitutional rights before questioning them. And in Link-
letter v. Walker, 381 U. S., at 639–640, the Court refused to
retroactively apply Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 655 (1961),
which incorporated the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule against the States.
Edwards seeks to distinguish Ramos from the long line of
cases where the Court has declined to retroactively apply
new procedural rules. Edwards emphasizes three aspects
of Ramos: (i) the signifcance of the jury-unanimity right; (ii)
Ramos's reliance on the original meaning of the Constitution;
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and (iii) the effect of Ramos in preventing racial discrimina-
ti
on in the jury process.
But Edwards's attempts to distinguish Ramos are unavail-
ing because the Court has already considered and rejected
those kinds of arguments in prior retroactivity cases.
First, Edwards emphasizes the signifcance of the jury-
unanimity right for criminal defendants. But that argu-
ment for retroactivity cannot be squared with the Court's
decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968), and
DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631 (1968) (per curiam). In
Duncan, the Court repudiated several precedents and ruled
that a defendant has a constitutional right to a jury trial in
a state criminal case. 391 U. S., at 149–150, 154–155. Not-
withstanding the extraordinary signifcance of Duncan in
guaranteeing a jury trial and expanding the rights of crimi-
nal defendants, the Court in DeStefano declined to retroac-
tively apply the jury right. 392 U. S., at 633; see also Sum-
merlin, 542 U. S., at 356–358 (relying on DeStefano and
rejecting retroactivity of jury right recognized in Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U. S. 584, 589 (2002)). We cannot discern a
principled basis for retroactively applying the subsidiary
Ramos jury-unanimity right when the Court in DeStefano
declined to retroactively apply the broader jury right itself.
5
5
Edwards argues that the Ramos rule mirrors the rule announced in
Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U. S. 130, 134 (1979). In Burch, the Court held
that six-person jury verdicts must be unanimous. According to Edwards,
the Court retroactively applied Burch in Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U. S.
323 (1980). But the Justices who concurred in the judgment and supplied
the decisive opinion in Brown said only that the Burch rule should apply
to all cases on direct review. 447 U. S., at 337 (opinion of Powell, J., joined
by Stevens, J.). They did not say that the rule should apply retroactively
on federal collateral review. So Brown does not help Edwards here.
The Court's decision in Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U. S. 203 (1972)
(per curiam), is no more helpful to Edwards. In In re Winship, the Court
held that a jury must fnd guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.” 397 U. S.
358, 364 (1970). And in Ivan V., the Court held that the rule announced
in Winship applied in a case on direct review. 407 U. S., at 205. But in
its numerous retroactivity cases, this Court has never identifed the
Winship rule as a watershed rule of criminal procedure that applies retro-
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Second, Edwards stresses that Ramos relied on the origi-
na
l meaning of the Sixth Amendment. But that argument
for retroactivity is inconsistent with Crawford v. Washing-
ton, 541 U. S. 36 (2004), and Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U. S.
406 (2007). In Crawford, the Court relied on the original
meaning of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause to
overrule precedent and restrict the use of hearsay evidence
against criminal defendants. 541 U. S., at 60–69. Notwith-
standing Crawford's reliance on the original meaning of the
Sixth Amendment, the Court in Whorton declined to retro-
actively apply Crawford. 549 U. S., at 421.
Third, Edwards says that Ramos prevents racial discrimi-
nation by ensuring that the votes of all jurors, regardless
of race, matter in the jury room. But that argument for
retroactivity cannot prevail in light of Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U. S. 79 (1986), and Allen v. Hardy, 478 U. S. 255 (1986)
(per curiam). In Batson, the Court overruled precedent
and revolutionized day-to-day jury selection by holding that
state prosecutors may not discriminate on the basis of race
when exercising individual peremptory challenges. 476
U. S., at 92–93, 96–98. Nonetheless, the Court in Allen de-
clined to retroactively apply Batson. 478 U. S., at 261; see
also Teague, 489 U. S., at 295–296 (reaffrming Allen).
The Court's decisions in Duncan, Crawford, and Batson
were momentous and consequential. All three decisions
fundamentally reshaped criminal procedure throughout the
actively on federal collateral review. That no doubt explains why, in his
submissions to this Court, Edwards himself did not cite Ivan V. in support
of his retroactivity argument.
In any event, Brown and Ivan V. were pre-Teague decisions. See
Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989). Because Teague tightened the pre-
vious standard set forth in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 (1965),
for applying a decision retroactively on federal collateral review, pre-
Teague decisions holding that a rule is retroactive are not as relevant as
pre-Teague decisions holding that a rule is not retroactive, such as
DeStefano.
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United States and signifcantly expanded the constitutional
r
ights of criminal defendants. One involved the jury-trial
right, one involved the original meaning of the Sixth Amend-
ment's Confrontation Clause, and one involved racial discrim-
ination in jury selection. Yet the Court did not apply any
of those decisions retroactively on federal collateral review.
Ramos is likewise momentous and consequential. But we
see no good rationale for treating Ramos differently from
D uncan, Crawfo rd, and Ba t so n. Consistent w ith the
Court's long line of retroactivity precedents, we hold that
the Ramos jury-unanimity rule does not apply retroactively
on federal collateral review.
6
In so concluding, we recognize that the Court's many ret-
roactivity precedents taken together raise a legitimate ques-
tion: If landmark and historic criminal procedure decisions—
including Mapp, Miranda, Duncan, Crawford, Batson, and
now Ramos—do not apply retroactively on federal collateral
review, how can any additional new rules of criminal proce-
dure apply retroactively on federal collateral review? At
this point, some 32 years after Teague, we think the only
candid answer is that none can—that is, no new rules of
criminal procedure can satisfy the watershed exception. We
cannot responsibly continue to suggest otherwise to litigants
and courts. In Teague itself, the Court recognized that the
purported exception was unlikely to apply in practice, be-
cause it was “unlikely” that such watershed “components of
basic due process have yet to emerge.” 489 U. S., at 313
(plurality opinion). The Court has often repeated that “it
is unlikely that any of these watershed rules has yet to
emerge.” Tyler, 533 U. S., at 667, n. 7 (alteration and inter-
nal quotation marks omitted); see also, e. g., Whorton, 549
6
The Ramos rule does not apply retroactively on federal collateral re-
view. States remain free, if they choose, to retroactively apply the jury-
unanimity rule as a matter of state law in state post-conviction proceed-
ings. See Dan forth v. Minnesota, 552 U. S. 264, 282 (2008).
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U. S., at 417; Summerlin, 542 U. S., at 352. And for decades,
the
Court has rejected watershed status for new procedural
rule after new procedural rule, amply demonstrating that
the purported exception has become an empty promise.
Continuing to articulate a theoretical exception that never
actually applies in practice offers false hope to defendants,
distorts the law, misleads judges, and wastes the resources
of defense counsel, prosecutors, and courts. Moreover, no
one can reasonably rely on an exception that is non-existent
in practice, so no reliance interests can be affected by forth-
rightly acknowledging reality. It is time—probably long
past time—to make explicit what has become increasingly
apparent to bench and bar over the last 32 years: New proce-
dural rules do not apply retroactively on federal collateral
review. The watershed exception is moribund. It must
“be regarded as retaining no vitality.” Herrera v. Wyo-
ming, 587 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
3
We respectfully offer four responses to the dissent.
First, in the dissent's view, if a right is important enough
to justify overruling or repudiating precedent (as in Ramos),
then it often is important enough to apply retroactively as
a watershed rule of criminal procedure. But the Court's
precedents say the opposite and demonstrate that the dis-
sent's position erroneously inverts stare decisis and Teague.
Teague recognized that the Court would occasionally an-
nounce new rules of criminal procedure by overruling or re-
pudiating existing precedents. Teague further explained,
however, that it was “unlikely” that such new procedural
rules would apply retroactively on federal collateral review.
489 U. S., at 313 (plurality opinion). In other words, under
this Court's longstanding case law, it is easier to overrule or
repudiate a precedent—as the Court did in Mapp, Miranda,
Duncan, Batson, and Crawford, for example—than it is to
apply the new procedural rule retroactively on federal collat-
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Opinion of the Court
eral review—as demonstrated by the Court's corresponding
non-retroac
tivity decisions in Linkletter, Johnson, DeStef-
ano, Allen, and Whorton.
The Ramos Court fully understood all of this. Although
Ramos stopped short of expressly deciding this retroactivity
question (because it was not squarely presented), Ramos dis-
cussed retroactivity and plainly foreshadowed today's deci-
sion. The lead opinion in Ramos—which was joined in rele-
vant part by two of today's dissenters, Justice Breyer and
Justice Sotomayor—explained that overruling or repudi-
ating Apodaca was not likely to signifcantly affect Louisi-
ana's and Oregon's reliance interests in preserving fnal con-
victions because Ramos was not likely to apply retroactively
on federal collateral review. In particular, the lead opinion
said that the States' “worries” about Ramos applying retro-
actively and overturning hundreds of fnal convictions out-
stripped “the facts” because “Teague's test is a demanding
one, so much so that this Court has yet to announce a new
rule of criminal procedure capable of meeting it.” Ramos,
590 U. S., at ––– (opinion of Gorsuch, J.); see also id., at ––– –
––– (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). The lead opinion
added that Teague is “demanding by design, expressly cali-
brated to address the reliance interests States have in the
fnality of their criminal judgments.” Id., at ––– (opinion of
Gorsuch, J.). In light of that explicit language in Ramos,
the Court's decision today can hardly come as a surprise.
In short, the Court's holding today—namely, that Ramos
does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review—
carefully adheres to Ramos and tracks the Court's many
longstanding precedents on retroactivity.
Second, the dissent suggests that the Court knows that
Ramos should apply retroactively under the watershed ex-
ception, but wants to avoid applying Ramos retroactively,
and for that reason has decided to just eliminate the water-
shed exception altogether. That suggestion is unfounded.
Ramos was a momentous decision, and those of us who
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joined it continue to agree with it. But as we have ex-
plai
ned, Ramos itself analyzed the Court's retroactivity prec-
edents and foretold today's decision on retroactivity. We
are simply following through on what Ramos (as well as the
Court's many other precedents) already said about retroac-
tivity to now squarely hold that Ramos does not apply retro-
actively on federal collateral review. If we thought other-
wise and believed that Ramos qualifed under the Court's
precedents as a rule that applies retroactively, we would cer-
tainly say so. But applying our retroactivity precedents, we
have concluded that Ramos does not apply retroactively—
just as the Court has previously held that other historic
cases like Mapp, Miranda, Duncan, Batson, and Crawford
did not apply retroactively. After reaching that conclusion,
we then took account of the overall jurisprudential landscape
of the last several decades in Teague cases and acknowledged
what has become unmistakably clear: The purported water-
shed exception is moribund.
Third, on that last point, the dissent responds that Teague
nominally identifed a retroactivity exception for watershed
procedural rules and that we should do so as well. But the
problem, as we see it, is that Teague simultaneously said that
it was “unlikely” that new procedural rules would qualify as
watershed. 489 U. S., at 313 (plurality opinion). So Teague
took with one hand what it seemingly gave with the other.
And in the 32 years since Teague, this Court has never once
held that a new procedural rule qualifes for the purported
watershed exception. What is more, the Court has regu-
larly repeated that Teague's watershed exception would
likely never be satisfed. The Court today need not and
does not overrule any post-Teague cases that held the water-
shed exception satisfed because there are no post-Teague
cases that held the watershed exception satisfed.
As noted above, no stare decisis values would be served
by continuing to indulge the fction that Teague's purported
watershed exception endures. No one can reasonably rely
on a supposed exception that has never operated in practice.
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Opinion of the Court
And perpetuating what has become an illusory exception
misleads
litigants and judges, and needlessly expends the
scarce resources of defense counsel, prosecutors, and courts.
At this point, given that landmark cases like Mapp, Mi-
randa, Duncan, Batson, Crawford, and now Ramos have not
applied retroactively, we are simply acknowledging reality
and stating the obvious: The purported watershed exception
retains no vitality.
Fourth, the dissent asserts that the Court is not living up
to the promise of Ramos for criminal defendants. To begin
with, the dissent cannot reasonably charge the Court with
failing to live up to Ramos given that Ramos itself explicitly
forecast today's decision on retroactivity. Moreover, with
respect, Justice Kagan dissented in Ramos. To be sure,
the dissent's position on the jury-unanimity rule in Ramos
was perfectly legitimate, as is the dissent's position on retro-
activity in today's case. And it is of course fair for a dissent
to vigorously critique the Court's analysis. But it is another
thing altogether to dissent in Ramos and then to turn around
and impugn today's majority for supposedly shortchanging
criminal defendants. To properly assess the implications for
criminal defendants, one should assess the implications of
Ramos and today's ruling together. And criminal defend-
ants as a group are better off under Ramos and today's deci-
sion, taken together, than they would have been if Justice
Kagan's dissenting view had prevailed in Ramos. If the
dissent's view had prevailed in Ramos, no defendant would
ever be entitled to the jury-unanimity right—not on collat-
eral review, not on direct review, and not in the future. By
contrast, under the Court's holdings in Ramos and this case,
criminal defendants whose cases are still on direct review or
whose cases arise in the future will have the beneft of the
jury-unanimity right announced in Ramos. The rhetoric in
today's dissent is misdirected. Different Members of the
Court have reached different conclusions in Ramos and in
this case, but each Member of the Court has acted in good
faith in deciding the diffcult questions before us.
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***
T
o summarize the Court's retroactivity principles: New
substantive rules alter “the range of conduct or the class of
persons that the law punishes.” Summerlin, 542 U. S., at
353. Those new substantive rules apply to cases pending in
trial courts and on direct review, and they also apply retroac-
tively on federal collateral review. New procedural rules
alter “only the manner of determining the defendant's cul-
pability.” Ibid. (emphasis deleted). Those new procedural
rules apply to cases pending in trial courts and on direct
review. But new procedural rules do not apply retroac-
tively on federal collateral review.
Ramos announced a new rule of criminal procedure. It
does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review.
We affrm the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Gorsuch joins,
concurring.
I join the majority in full because it correctly charts its
way through precedent to hold expressly what we have long
implied: “New procedural rules do not apply retroactively on
federal collateral review.” Ante, at 272. I write separately
to highlight that we could also have resolved this case by
applying the statutory text of the Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). AEDPA directs
federal courts to deny “any claim that was adjudicated on
the merits in State court” unless the state court's decision
“was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Su-
preme Court.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). In 2011, petitioner
urged a Louisiana court to hold that the Federal Constitution
requires jury unanimity, and the court rejected that claim on
the merits. That conclusion was consistent with Apodaca v.
Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 (1972), in which this Court deter-
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Thomas, J., concurring
mined that the Constitution does not require unanimous jury
verdic
ts for state criminal convictions. AEDPA thus leaves
no room for this Court—or any federal court—to grant
relief.
I
A
Congress frst prescribed federal habeas jurisdiction in the
Judiciary Act of 1789. That statute did not clearly defne
the scope of relief, but “the black-letter principle of the com-
mon law [was] that the writ was simply not available at all
to one convicted of crime by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion.”
1
Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Ha-
beas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 465–
466 (1963) (Bator); see Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S. 651, 663
(1996) (citing Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193 (1830)). And the
writ did not extend at all to prisoners confned under state
authority. Bator 465.
Congress expanded the writ in the Habeas Corpus Act of
1867. Ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385. This Act extended the writ to
prisoners in state custody but again provided only “bare
guidelines” about the scope of the writ.
2
Wright v. West,
505 U. S. 277, 285 (1992) (plurality opinion). At frst, this
Court continued to apply the common-law rule that allowed
1
Section 14 of the Judiciary Act provided that “courts of the United
States . . . shall have power to issue writs of . . . habeas corpus” and that
“justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts,
shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an
inquiry into the cause of commitment.—Provided, That writs of habeas
corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are
in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are
committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be
brought into court to testify.” 1 Stat. 81–82.
2
The relevant language of the Act stated that courts, “in addition to the
authority already conferred by [the Judiciary Act of 1789], shall have
power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may
be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any
treaty or law of the United States.” 14 Stat. 385.
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a state petitioner to challenge only “the jurisdiction of the
cour
t that had rendered the judgment under which he was
in custody.” Ibid. But the Court later “expand[ed] the cat-
egory of claims deemed to be jurisdictional for habeas pur-
poses.” Ibid. In 1874, for example, this Court found juris-
dictional defects whenever state courts imposed sentences
under unconstitutional statutes or imposed sentences not au-
thorized by a statute. Ibid. (collecting cases). And a few
decades later, the Court expanded relief to situations where,
in the eyes of the federal court, “no state court had provided
a full and fair opportunity to litigate” a prisoner's federal
claims. Ibid. But absent a “jurisdictional” defect, a state
court judgment was entitled to “ `absolute respect' ” as long
as the prisoner “ `had been given an adequate opportunity to
obtain full and fair consideration of his federal claim in the
state courts.' ” Ibid. That rule left no room to grant relief
simply because a state court made an error of law.
In 1953, this Court abruptly changed course and decided
that federal courts could grant a writ of habeas corpus sim-
ply because they disagreed with a state court's judgment.
See Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 463. Around the same
time, this Court declared that many constitutional rights
of criminal procedure—some old, and some new—applied
against the States. See, e. g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643
(1961) (exclusionary rule); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S.
335 (1963) (right to a court-appointed attorney); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) (right to be informed of right
against self-incrimination). That combination predictably
raised tough questions: Should new rules apply retroactively
to fnal state-court judgments, allowing federal courts to
grant habeas relief even if state courts did not err when issu-
ing their decisions? And if so, by what authority could fed-
eral courts grant that relief ?
Admitting that “the Constitution neither prohibits nor re-
quires retrospective effect,” Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S.

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618, 629 (1965), the Court took an atextual and ad hoc ap-
proach,
presumably based on its interpretation of the 1867
Act. The Court declared that some federal decisions apply
retroactively to fnal state convictions, thus allowing federal
courts to grant habeas relief depending on the “merits and
demerits in each case.” Ibid. To guide the analysis, Link-
letter announced several factors for federal courts to con-
sider: “the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose
and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further
or retard its operation.” Ibid.
This rule did “not le[ad] to consistent results,” so two dec-
ades later the Court tried a new interpretation of the 1867
Act. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 302 (1989) (plurality
opinion); Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U. S. 264, 278 (2008)
(“Teague's general rule of nonretroactivity was an exercise of
this Court's power to interpret the federal habeas statute”).
Relevant here, Teague allowed federal courts to give new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure retroactive effect
on habeas review only if the new rule was “watershed,”
“ `bedrock,' ” or “ `essential.' ” 489 U. S., at 311 (emphasis
deleted).
3
B
Teague, however, was not the fnal word on how federal
courts should review the decisions of state courts. In 1996,
Congress enacted AEDPA, the most signifcant change to
3
Two years before Teague, this Court overruled cases that had allowed
courts to apply the balancing test in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S.
618 (1965), to cases on direct review, holding instead that the Constitution
required courts to apply new procedural rules retroactively to cases
on direct appellate review. Griffth v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, 328 (1987).
Teague also explained that new rules that “accord constitutional pro-
tection to . . . primary activity” retroactively apply to cases on fed-
eral collateral review. 489 U. S., at 307, 310–311. These are considered
subst antive r u les. See Welch v. Un i ted Sta tes, 578 U. S. 120, 128
(2016).
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the habeas corpus statute since 1867. AEDPA flled in the
“
bare guidelines” of the 1867 Act by creating a comprehen-
sive system for addressing federal habeas claims brought by
state prisoners. See Wright, 505 U. S., at 285.
Directly relevant here are two provisions that ensure that
state courts have the primary role in adjudicating these
claims. First, a prisoner must exhaust his claims in state
court before he can seek relief in federal court. If “any
available [state-law] procedure” remains open, a federal
“writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be granted.” §§ 2254(b)–
(c). Second, once a state court has had the opportunity to
decide that claim, AEDPA demands that federal courts re-
spect that judgment. The law precludes relief “with respect
to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim” either
(1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States,” or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evi-
dence presented in the State court proceeding.” § 2254(d).
It is not enough for a federal court to disagree with the state
court—much less disagree on a point of law that this Court
had not yet settled when the state court issued its judgment.
Rather, the state court's decision must confict with clearly
established law and be obviously wrong “beyond any possi-
bility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Rich-
ter, 562 U. S. 86, 103 (2011); Greene v. Fisher, 565 U. S. 34,
38–40 (2011).
II
A
Here, the system worked as designed. Edwards pre-
sented his unanimous jury claim to a Louisiana court. And
the state court reasonably relied on Apodaca in rejecting
that claim. AEDPA is clear about what happens next—
relief “shall not be granted.” § 2254(d).
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Thomas, J., concurring
Our analysis could have begun and ended there—with
§
2254(d)(1)'s plain text. Congress, through AEDPA, has
made clear that federal courts cannot provide relief in this
case. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U. S. 190, 221
(2016) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Ex parte Bollman, 4
Cranch 75, 94 (1807) (Marshall, C. J.) (“[T]he power to award
the writ by any of the courts of the United States, must be
given by written law”).
B
The Court, instead, relies on Teague. I join the Court's
opinion because it correctly applies precedent and leads to
the same judgment, but I would be remiss if I did not point
out two other problems with Teague.
First, it has never been clear what gave this Court author-
ity to grant habeas relief to state prisoners based on “new”
constitutional rules of criminal procedure. Teague did not
explain why the 1867 Act gave federal courts this power.
Moreover, Teague primarily focused on moving the law in
the opposite direction of Linkletter's permissive approach to
collaterally reviewing fnal state convictions. See Danforth,
552 U. S., at 278 (“Teague . . . situated the rule it announced
in th[e] line of cases adjusting the scope of federal habeas
relief in accordance with equitable and prudential considera-
tions”). Even if federal courts had this power, we never de-
cided whether Congress' most recent version of the habeas
statute—AEDPA—continued to allow such relief. Given all
that, the majority wisely closes a door to retroactive relief
that likely never existed in the frst place.
Second, the Court's reliance on Teague today and in the
past should not be construed to signal that AEDPA is an
afterthought in analyzing a claim like petitioner's or that
Teague cou ld justi fy rel ief where AEDPA forecloses
it. AEDPA does contemplate that some new constitutional
rules might be retroactive in narrow circumstances. See
§§ 2254(e)(2)(A)( i) (evidentiary hear ings), 2244( b)(2)(A)
(second-or-successive bar), 2244(d)(1)(C) (statute of limita-
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tions). But it does not contemplate retroactive rules upset-
ti
ng a state court's adjudication of an issue that reasonably
applied the law at the time. Section 2254(d)—the absolute
bar on claims that state courts reasonably denied—has no
exception for retroactive rights. Congress' decision to cre-
ate retroactivity exceptions to the statute of limitations and
to the bar on second-or-successive petitions but not for
§ 2254(d) is strong evidence that Teague could never have led
to relief here. Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23
(1983).
4
The plain text applies regardless of what a previous
interpretation of a previous statute says.
5
***
A state court rejected petitioner's claim that he was enti-
tled to a unanimous jury verdict. That adjudication was not
unreasonable or contrary to clearly established federal law.
AEDPA's explicit directive thus independently resolves this
case: “a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be granted.”
§ 2254(d).
Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Thomas joins,
concurring.
Sometimes this Court leaves a door ajar and holds out the
possibility that someone, someday might walk through it—
4
As Justice Gorsuch correctly points out, federal courts have “equita-
ble discretion to decide whether to issue the writ or to provide a remedy,”
which includes the powers to create doctrines such as harmless error.
Post, at 289 (concurring opinion). And federal courts can rely on those
doctrines as well as statutory bars to deny relief. That is why, as Justice
Gorsuch explains, an equitable retroactivity bar with no watershed ex-
ception can independently justify denying relief. Post, at 291, n. 5.
5
The Constitution does not require that habeas relief be available for
new “watershed” rules of criminal procedure. See, e. g., Brown v. Allen,
344 U. S. 443, 532–533 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result); Linkletter,
381 U. S., at 629. Teague also acknowledged that a later change in law
does not require invalidating a fnal judgment. See 489 U. S., at 308–309
(plurality opinion). And again, habeas corpus traditionally did not apply
at all to prisoners sentenced by a court with valid jurisdiction. See Bator
465–466.
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though no one ever has or, in truth, ever will. In Teague v.
L
ane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), the Court suggested that one day
it might apply a new “watershed” rule of criminal procedure
retroactively to undo a fnal state court conviction. But that
day never came to pass. Instead, over the following three
decades this Court denied “watershed” status to one rule
after another. Rules guaranteeing individuals the right to
confront their accusers. Rules ensuring that only a jury
may decide a defendant's fate in a death penalty case. Rules
preventing racially motivated jury selection. All failed to
win retroactive application. Today, the Court candidly ad-
mits what has been long apparent: Teague held out a “false
hope” and the time has come to close its door. Ante, at 272.
We take this step not because this Court's criminal proce-
dure rulings are somehow unimportant. Any decision seek-
ing to enforce liberties enshrined in the Constitution has
a claim to “watershed” importance. Instead, we abandon
Teague's test because it poses a question this Court has no
business asking.
I
Though we often refer to the writ of habeas corpus, the
common law knew severa l. See Ex par te Bo llm an, 4
Cranch 75, 97–98 (1807). All had one thing in common:
Each required a custodian to produce (habeas) a prisoner's
person (corpus). But they served different ends. Some
writs were tools for moving a prisoner from one court to
another—whether for a new prosecution (ad respondendum)
or to execute a prior judgment (ad satisfaciendum). Others
functioned more like a subpoena to procure a prisoner's pres-
ence to testify in court (ad testifcandum). Others still
served to remove a case from an inferior court to a superior
one (cum causa). 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England 129–131 (1768).
Among them all, however, only one came to be known as
“The Great Writ.” The writ of habeas corpus ad subjicien-
dum was a mechanism for asking “why the liberty of [a] sub-
jec[t] is restrained.” Id., at 131 (emphasis added). Lead-
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ing up to the English Civil War, monarchs sometimes jailed
their
subjects summarily and indefnitely, with little explana-
tion and even less process. E. g., Darnel's Case, 3 How.
St. Tr. 1–59 (K. B. 1627). In response, common law courts
developed the ad subjiciendum writ to force the Crown to
provide reasons for its actions and, if necessary, to ensure
adequate process—like a criminal trial—to justify any fur-
ther detention. See Petition of Right, 3 Car. 1, ch. 1, ¶¶ 5,
8 (1628). In other words, “habeas corpus [w]as the instru-
ment by which due process could be insisted upon.” Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507, 555 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Great though it was, the writ's power was never limitless.
A prisoner confned under a fnal judgment of conviction by
a court of competent jurisdiction stood on different footing
than one confned by the King without trial. A court might
issue the writ asking, “What is the reason for confnement?”
But if the return came back: “Because he's serving a custo-
dial sentence after being convicted of a crime,” the inquiry
was usually at an end. See Opinion on the Writ of Habeas
Corpus, Wilm. 77, 88, 97 Eng. Rep. 29, 36 (K. B. 1758); cf.
Anonymus, Cart. 221, 124 Eng. Rep. 928 (C. P. 1671); Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, ch. 2, ¶¶ 2, 20. Custody pur-
suant to a fnal judgment was proof that a defendant had
received the process due to him. See, e. g., Bushell's Case,
Vaugh. 135, 142–143, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1009–1010 (C. P.
1670).
In 1789, Congress authorized federal courts to issue the
habeas writ. 1 Cong. ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82; Ex parte
Bollman, 4 Cranch, at 93–94. When called upon to inter-
pret that statute, this Court defned the scope of habeas
review by looking “to the common law.” Id., at 93–94.
Unsurprisingly, it proceeded to restate the longstanding
rule associated with criminal judgments: Ad subjiciendum
provided no recourse for a prisoner confned pursuant to
a fnal judgment of conviction. Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet.
193, 209 (1830). As Chief Justice Marshall rhetor ically
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asked, “is not that judgment in itself suffcient cause?” Id.,
at
202 (emphasis added).
If the answer was nearly always yes, one important excep-
tion existed both here and in England. A habeas court
could grant relief if the court of conviction lacked jurisdiction
over the defendant or his offense. Id., at 202–203. Still,
the exception was “confned” to that “limited class of cases.”
Ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18, 21 (1876). One judge could
not grant relief just because he might have decided the
merits of the case differently than another had. As this
Court put it, a perceived “error in the judgment or pro-
ceedings, under and by virtue of which the party is impris-
oned, constitute[d] no ground for” relief. Ex parte Sie-
bold, 100 U. S. 371, 375 (1880). Any other approach, the
Court explained, risked converting the habeas writ into “a
mere writ of error,” little more than a chance to redo a trial
or its appeal. Ibid.
Originally, Congress allowed federal courts to issue habeas
writs only to federal custodians. Reconstruction changed
that. After the Civil War, Congress granted federal courts
the power to issue habeas writs to state authorities as well.
See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, 39 Cong. ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
1
Even then, however, this Court continued to interpret the
habeas statute consistent with historical practice. If a pris-
oner was in custody pursuant to a fnal state court judgment,
1
That Act conferred on federal courts the “power to grant writs of ha-
beas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her
liberty in violation of ” federal law. § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (emphasis added).
Two earlier statutes extended federal habeas jurisdiction to state custodi-
ans, but only for a much narrower class of cases. In 1833, Congress au-
thorized federal courts to issue habeas process to state custodians detain-
ing federal offcers for acts taken to implement federal law. Act of Mar.
2, 1833, § 7, 4 St at. 634 – 635. Th is prov isi on lives on i n 28 U. S. C.
§ 2241(c)(2). And in 1842, Congress permitted federal courts to issue ha-
beas process to state custodians detaining foreign offcials whose acts im-
plicated the law of nations. Act of Aug. 29, 1842, Ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539. It,
too, lives on in 28 U. S. C. § 2241(c)(4).
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a federal court was powerless to revisit those proceedings
unless
the state court had acted without jurisdiction. E. g.,
In re Graham, 138 U. S. 461, 462 (1891); Tinsley v. Anderson,
171 U. S. 101, 104–106 (1898); Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U. S.
184, 185–186 (1899); Medcraf v. Hodge, 245 U. S. 630, 630
(1917) (per curiam).
Under the view that prevailed in this country for most of
our history, and in England for even longer, Teague's ques-
tion about the “retroactive” application of “watershed” rules
of criminal procedure to undo fnal criminal judgments would
have made no sense. Because a fnal judgment of convic-
tion, pursuant to a full-fedged criminal trial, was the process
due to a criminal serving a custodial sentence, the habeas
writ had served its purpose. A fnal judgment evidenced a
lawful basis for confnement and was “binding on all the
world.” Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet., at 207.
II
Only in the middle of the twentieth century did things
really begin to change. In 1915, this Court suggested that
a state court's extreme departure from “established modes”
of criminal trial practice, such as proceeding under the spec-
ter of mob violence, might be akin to the loss of “jurisdic-
tion,” at least if no corrective mechanism like an appeal ex-
isted. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 326, 335–336 (1915).
But if that represented an innovation, it was a modest one.
The same cannot be said for Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443,
464, 478 (1953). There, this Court effectively recast habeas
as another way for federal courts to redress practically any
error of federal law they might fnd in state court proceed-
ings. Never mind that state courts are obligated to follow
federal law under the Supremacy Clause. Never mind that
those courts may have already passed on a defendant's argu-
ment about his federal rights. See id., at 487; id., at 497–
501 (Frankfurter, J.). Never mind, too, that the defendant
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may have lost on appeal within the state court system, and
e
ven petitioned this Court for direct review. See id., at
456–457; id., at 489–497 (Frankfurter, J.). Everyone accepts
that, in our criminal justice system today, a judgment be-
comes fnal only after the completion of a trial and the ap-
pellate process, including the opportunity to seek certiorari
from this Court on questions of federal law. See Clay v.
United States, 537 U. S. 522, 527 (2003).
2
Yet, even after all
that, Brown held, a federal district court could still vacate a
fnal state court judgment based on any perceived error of
federal law it might detect—and do so though the entire
state judicial system and this Court had seen nothing amiss.
344 U. S., at 465–487; id., at 506–507 (Frankfurter, J.).
The result? As Justice Jackson warned, habeas became
little more than an ordinary appeal with an extraordinary
Latin name. The Court “so departed from [the fnality]
principle that the profession now believes that the issues
[federal courts] actually consider [in] habeas corpus are
substantially the same as would be considered on appeal.”
Id., at 540 (Jackson, J., concurring in result). “The fatal
sentence that in real life writes fnis to many causes”—
Judgment affrmed. or Certiorari denied.—became “in legal
theory . . . a complete blank.” Id., at 543. Justice Jackson
feared that this result not only “trivializ[ed] . . . the
writ,” but promised practical problems too. Id., at 536. A
large new “haystack” of frivolous habeas petitions was sure
to follow, making it that much harder for courts to identify
2
When a sovereign furnishes an opportunity to appeal (as state and
federal governments now do), it necessarily invites an appellate court to
revisit an initial merits determination. See J. Baker, An Introduction to
English Legal History 148–153 (5th ed. 2019) (describing development of
the appeal at common law); G. Jacob, A New Law-Dictionary (1729) (de-
fning “appeal”). Under an appellate system, then, “none of th[e] [preced-
ing decisions] are fnal” in an ultimate sense until any appeals are con-
cluded. 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 411
(1768).
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the meritorious “needle.” Id., at 537. The only solution
J
ustice Jackson could see was to hold fast to the traditional
rule: A fnal judgment, after completion of trial and the ex-
haustion of any direct appellate review, was res judicata, and
the sole exception was a lack of jurisdiction. Id., at 543–
544.
Brown not only upended centuries of settled precedent
and invited practical problems; it produced anomalies as well.
The very same term it decided Brown, this Court rejected
Brown's fx-any-error approach for fnal judgments issued by
military courts. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137, 142 (1953)
(plurality opinion); id., at 147 (Minton, J., concurring in judg-
ment). So only state convicts—not United States service
members—were afforded an additional avenue for appellate
relief in the garb of habeas corpus proceedings. It turned
out, too, that only state courts—not executive tribunals—
were forced to suffer the indignity of having their fnal judg-
ments reopened. So federal courts wound up with more
power to reopen the judgments of a different sovereign's
courts than the administrative proceedings of the federal
government itself. See Rushing v. Wilkinson, 272 F. 2d
633, 641 (CA5 1959); M. Howe, Foreword: The Supreme
Court, 1952 Term, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 91, 160–162 (1953).
With time, these implications became clear and, as Justice
Jackson predicted, Brown's innovation proved unsustainable.
The haystack just grew too large. During the 1960s, this
Court incorporated the exclusionary rule against the States.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 655 (1961). It announced a
Sixth Amendment right to a public defender. Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 339–340, 342 (1963). It barred
the government from speaking to the defendant outside de-
fense counsel's presence. Massiah v. United States, 377
U. S. 201, 204–206 (1964). And it announced a new script
governing police interrogations. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U. S. 436, 467–477 (1966). This proliferation of new fed-
era l procedura l r ights, combi ned w ith a federa l post-
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conviction mechanism that functioned like an ordinary ap-
pea
l, soon yielded a giant haystack of habeas petitions.
For years, this Court struggled to devise rules for sorting
the hay from the needles. Its approach varied wildly and
inconsistently over time. In a few cases, the Court held a
new rule of criminal procedure should not apply retroac-
tively to settled convictions. Tehan v. United States ex. rel.
Shott, 382 U. S. 406, 409, n. 3, 419 (1966); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 622, 639–640 (1965). On occasion,
though, it extended the beneft of a new rule to litigants with
fnal criminal judgments—sometimes only to the named peti-
tioner in this Court, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 377
(1964), other times to everyone laboring under a fnal judg-
ment, McNerlin v. Denno, 378 U. S. 575, 575 (1964) (per cu-
riam). Justice Harlan called these divergent results “an ex-
traordinary collection of rules.” Desist v. United States, 394
U. S. 244, 256–257 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). He even
wondered whether they could “properly be considered the
legitimate products of a court of law.” Id., at 259.
III
It was only in this world that Teague's question about the
retroactive application of new “watershed” rules of criminal
procedure could even begin to make sense. In an effort to
bring some coherence to the area, the Court refocused its
attention on the terms of the federal habeas statute. The
statute provides that “ [w]r its of habeas corpus may be
granted”—not that they must be granted. 28 U. S. C.
§ 2241(a) (emphasis added); see also § 2243. The law thus in-
vests federal courts with equitable discretion to decide
whether to issue the writ or to provide a remedy. Withrow
v. Williams, 507 U. S. 680, 716 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
3
3
That is how this Court reads nearly identical text in the Declaratory
Judgment Act (DJA). Because the DJA says federal courts “ `may de-
clare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party,' ” district
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Exercising this remedial discretion, the Court began to de-
velop
doctrines aimed at returning the Great Writ closer to
its historic offce. It decided that some claims are not cogni-
zable on federal habeas review if state courts provide a
mechanism for review. Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 494–
495 (1976). It established procedural default rules to pre-
vent habeas petitioners from evading independent and ade-
quate state law grounds for sustaining their convictions.
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 86–87 (1977). It crafted
a heightened harmless error standard, calibrated to refect
the fnality interests at stake in the post-conviction context.
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, 633–638 (1993). And
it applied abuse-of-the-writ rules to prevent an endless cycle
of petition and re-petition by prisoners with nothing but time
on their hands. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 489–493
(1991).
Chief among these new-but-old developments was Teague.
Drawing on the historic role of habeas, the Court held that
newly recognized rules of criminal procedure should not nor-
mally apply to cases “which have become fnal.” 489 U. S.,
at 304–310.
4
Hard experience since Brown had reminded
the Court that fnality, “the idea that at some point a crimi-
nal conviction reaches an end, a conclusion, a termination, `is
essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.' ”
Prost v. Anderson, 636 F. 3d 578, 582 (CA10 2011). One
might “always continue to ask” whether a particular judg-
ment was “correct.” P. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev.
441, 446–448 (1963). But if the rule of law means anything,
it means the fnal result of proceedings in courts of com-
petent jurisdiction establishes what is correct “in the eyes
courts “possess discretion” to award declaratory relief. Wilton v. Seven
Falls Co., 515 U. S. 277, 282, 286 (1995).
4
Although the lead opinion in Teague garnered only a plurality, a major-
ity of the Court adopted the plurality's rule later that same year in Penry
v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 313 (1989).

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of the law.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390, 399–400
(1993).
5
IV
W
hile Teague did much to return the writ to its original
station, it didn't quite complete the journey. After insisting
that fnal judgments cannot be reopened as a “general rule,”
Teague left some wiggle room. It added that some new
rules of criminal procedure might yet apply retroactively if
they had “watershed” signifcance. 489 U. S., at 311. Why?
Because “ `time and growth in social capacity, as well as judi-
cial perceptions,' ” might “ `alter our understanding of the
bedrock procedural elements' ” necessary to satisfy notions
of “ `fairness.' ” Ibid. To help the world know what a wa-
tershed rule might look like, the Court described it in vari-
ous ways—“bedrock,” “fundamental,” “central,” an “absolute
prerequisite.” Id., at 311–314. A rule ftting that bill,
Teague said, would do two things: (1) “ `signifcantly im-
prove' ” existing procedures for determining factual guilt or
innocence and (2) “implicate the fundamental fairness of the
trial.” Id., at 312–313.
6
5
Apparently believing our judge-made doctrines did not go far enough,
Congress added further “new restrictions” of its own in the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Felker v. Turpin, 518
U. S. 651, 664 (1996). But AEDPA creates only additional conditions to
relief; it did not do away with the discretion afforded courts in the habeas
statute, or the various rules this Court has formulated in the exercise of
that discretion. As this Court has (unanimously) explained, “AEDPA did
not codify Teague” and the one “neither abrogates [n]or qualifes the
other.” Greene v. Fisher, 565 U. S. 34, 39 (2011). That is why Teague's
retroactivity bar operates “in addition” to AEDPA's relitigation bar in 28
U. S. C. § 2254(d). Horn v. Banks, 536 U. S. 266, 272 (2002) (per curiam).
Because a retroactivity bar and a relitigation bar both pose threshold bar-
riers, Justice Thomas's concurrence highlights how AEDPA provides an
additional reason why the Fifth Circuit correctly denied a certifcate of
appealability here. Ante, at 280 (concurring opinion); see Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U. S. 322, 350 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring).
6
Teague also discussed an exception to the fnality rule for certain “sub-
stantive rules.” Because the parties agree that Ramos involved only a
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But all these words have yielded nothing. In more than
three
decades since Teague, not a single new rule of criminal
procedure has satisfed its “watershed” test. Ante, at 267–
272. Nor is it as if we have lacked promising candidates.
This Court has refused “watershed” status to new rules that
seek to ensure death penalty decisions are made by jurors
rather than judges. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U. S.
348 (2004) (denying watershed status to Ring v. Arizona,
536 U. S. 584 (2002)). New rules designed to ensure race
discrimination plays no role in jury selection met the same
fate even before Teague. See Allen v. Hardy, 478 U. S. 255
(1986) (per curiam) (denying retroactive application to Bat-
son v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986)). Rules that sought
to realign our jurisprudence with the original meaning of
the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause have failed to
qualify too. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U. S. 406 (2007)
(denying watershed status to Crawford v. Washington, 541
U. S. 36 (2004)).
The Court's decision today retraces this familiar path. It
denies “watershed” status to Ramos v. Louisiana, 590
U. S. ––– (2020), a decision that (like Crawford) returned us
to the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment—and one
that (like Ring and Batson) concerns a vital aspect of the
jury trial right. The Court explains why this result neces-
sarily follows from our post-Teague precedents: If so many
other h igh ly consequentia l r u li ngs have fai led to clear
Teague's bar, it's hard to see how Ramos might. One could
new rule of criminal procedure, little need be said about Teague's “substan-
tive rule” exception. But it is worth noting that substantive rules, which
place certain conduct “ `beyond the power of the criminal law-making au-
thority to proscribe,' ” 489 U. S., at 307, bear at least some resemblance to
this Court's early cases fnding a lack of jurisdiction over a defendant or
an offense. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S., at 376; Ex parte Parks, 93
U. S., at 20–21. Perhaps this aspect of Teague can be understood as accu-
rately invoking the jurisdictional exception to the fnality rule; perhaps
not. See Brown, 344 U. S., at 533, n. 4 (Jackson, J., concurring in result).
But that question is for another day.
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even say that any other result would defy this Court's recent
precedents.
Ante, at 270–271.
At the same time, though, one might also say these prece-
dents illustrate how mystifying the whole Teague project has
been from its inception. If Teague only prohibits the retro-
active application of new rules of criminal procedure, after
all, it's not exactly obvious why that prohibition applies to
cases like Crawford or Ramos. Both decisions sought to re-
align this Court's decisions with the original meaning of the
Sixth Amendment; in that sense, the rights they recognized
were anything but new. And to the extent Teague asks
whether a new rule is “fundamental” or “bedrock,” it's hard
to see how rights originally memorialized in the Constitution
could fail to qualify. Certainly, this Court is in no position
to second-guess the judgment of those who wrote and rati-
fed the Constitution. Surely, too, many of the other rules
of criminal procedure this Court has found less than “funda-
mental” since Teague seem anything but that to those whose
lives they affect. Nor is it only Teague's results that mys-
tify. The test itself has been fraught with contradictions
from the start. It asks litigants to be on the lookout for new
procedural protections “ `implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.' ” Beard v. Banks, 542 U. S. 406, 417 (2004). At the
same time, we have been told, the fact that “a new proce-
dural rule is `fundamental' in some abstract sense is not
enough.” Summerlin, 542 U. S., at 352.
For me, it's here where the history canvassed above mat-
ters. This Court's (in)activity since Teague only begins to
make sense when viewed against the backdrop of the tradi-
tional rule that old judgments are impervious to new chal-
lenges. Yes, this Court's decisions should apply to all cases
pending in trial courts and on direct appeal. But they
should not apply retroactively in habeas. The reason has
nothing to do with whether Members of this Court happen
to think the rules they announce are “new” in some sense
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that: The writ of habeas corpus does not authorize federal
cour
ts to reopen a judgment issued by a court of competent
jurisdiction once it has become fnal. Supra, at 283–286.
It's here, too, where today's decision makes its real contri-
bution. If Teague pointed us back in the direction of the
traditional rule, each of the cases that has followed in its
wake has edged us, step-by-step, closer still. Today's deci-
sion advances the progress by making express what has long
been barely implicit: The “watershed” exception for new
rules of criminal procedure is no exception at all. Ante, at
272. Not only does this development do much to honor the
traditional understanding of habeas review and the great
weight of this Court's precedents throughout its history. It
also allows us to retire a test that was unknown in law until
1989 and whose contours remain unknowable decades later.
It frees this Court from the dreary task of needing to concoct
reasons to denigrate the importance of obviously important
rules like those discussed in Ramos, Ring, Batson, and
Crawford, which affect the lives and liberty of countless indi-
viduals. It does away with the strange business of having
to repackage old rules as new ones. And it eliminates
the need for litigants and lower courts to endure years of
protracted litigation—tangling with a contradictory test
and seemingly inexplicable precedents—all sure to achieve
noth i ng. The Cour t's candor today is admirable —and
correct.
7
7
The dissent criticizes today's decision as a departure from modern habeas
precedent. Post, at 296; post, at 297, n. 2; post, at 305–307. But the dis-
sent's history is selective. The dissent champions decisions from the 1950s,
'60s, and '70s. But it disregards how those decisions departed from a cen-
tury of this Court's precedents and the common law before that. Supra,
at 286–289. At the same time, the dissent's account overlooks this Court's
precedents refusing to afford retroactive application in every case since
the 1980s. Post, at 303–304; post, at 305–306, n. 7. The dissent may prefer
decisions within a particular 30-year window. But it is too much to say
this preference is required to “[r]espec[t] stare decisis.” Post, at 295, n. 1.

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Kagan, J., dissenting
With these observations, I am pleased to join the Court's
opi
nion. My vote in similar cases to come will, I hope, “be
guided as nearly as [possible] by the principles set forth
herein.” Brown, 344 U. S., at 548 (Jackson, J., concurring
in result).
Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Breyer and Jus-
tice Sotomayor join, dissenting.
“A verdict, taken from eleven, [i]s no verdict at all,” this
Court proclaimed just last Term. Ramos v. Louisiana, 590
U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2020) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Citing centuries of history, the Court in Ramos
termed the Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury
“vital,” “essential,” “indispensable,” and “fundamental” to
the American legal system. Id., at –––, –––, –––. The
Court therefore saw ft to disregard stare decisis and over-
turn a 50-year-old precedent enabling States to convict crim-
inal defendants based on non-unanimous verdicts.
1
And in
taking that weighty step, the Court also vindicated core
principles of racial justice. For in the Court's view, the state
laws countenancing non-unanimous verdicts originated in
white supremacism and continued in our own time to have
racially discriminatory effects. See id., at ––– – –––; id.,
at ––– (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part); id., at ––– – –––
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). Put all that together,
and it is easy to see why the opinions in Ramos read as
historic. Rarely does this Court make such a fundamental
change in the rules thought necessary to ensure fair criminal
process. If you were scanning a thesaurus for a single word
1
I dissented in Ramos precisely because of its abandonment of stare
decisis. See 590 U. S., at ––– – ––– (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Kimble
v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 455 (2015) (“Respecting
stare decisis means sticking to some wrong decisions”). Now that Ramos
is the law, stare decisis is on its side. I take the decision on its own terms,
and give it all the consequence it deserves.
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to describe the decision, you would stop when you came to
“watershed.
”
Yet the Court insists that Ramos's holding does not count
as a “watershed” procedural rule under Teague v. Lane, 489
U. S. 288, 311 (1989) (plurality opinion). The result of to-
day's ruling is easily stated. Ramos will not apply retroac-
tively, meaning that a prisoner whose appeals ran out before
the decision can receive no aid from the change in law it
made. So Thedrick Edwards, unlike Evangelisto Ramos,
will serve the rest of his life in prison based on a 10-to-2
jury verdict. Only the reasoning of today's holding resists
explanation. The majority cannot (and indeed does not)
deny, given all Ramos said, that the jury unanimity require-
ment fts to a tee Teague's description of a watershed proce-
dural rule. Nor can the majority explain its result by rely-
ing on precedent. Although faunting decisions since Teague
that held rules non-retroactive, the majority comes up with
none comparable to this case. Search high and low the set-
tled law of retroactivity, and the majority still has no reason
to deny Ramos watershed status.
So everything rests on the majority's last move—the over-
turning of Teague's watershed exception. If there can never
be any watershed rules—as the majority here asserts out of
the blue—then, yes, jury unanimity cannot be one. The re-
sult follows trippingly from the premise. But adopting the
premise requires departing from judicial practice and princi-
ple. In overruling a critical aspect of Teague, the majority
follows none of the usual rules of stare decisis. It discards
precedent without a party requesting that action. And it
does so with barely a reason given, much less the “special
justifcation” our law demands. Halliburton Co. v. Erica
P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U. S. 258, 266 (2014). The majority
in that way compounds its initial error: Not content to misap-
ply Teague's watershed provision here, see ante, at 267–271,
the majority forecloses any future application, see ante, at
271–272. It prevents any procedural rule ever—no matter

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Kagan, J., dissenting
how integral to adjudicative fairness—from benefting a de-
fendant
on habeas review. Thus does a settled principle of
retroactivity law die, in an effort to support an insupport-
able ruling.
I
Start with what Teague and its progeny repeatedly said
about what makes a new rule of criminal procedure “water-
shed” (so that, before today, the rule applied retroactively).
2
A watershed rule, we held, is “implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty.” Teague, 489 U. S., at 311 (plurality opinion)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Such a rule addresses
one of “the bedrock procedural elements” of the criminal
process. Ibid. (emphasis deleted). Or similarly stated, it
plays a “fundamental” and “central[ ]” role in a trial. Beard
v. Banks, 542 U. S. 406, 418, 420 (2004). More specifcally, a
new rule, to qualify as watershed, must be “essential to [the
trial's] fairness.” Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U. S. 406, 418
(2007); see Teague, 489 U. S., at 312 (plurality opinion). And
it must go to the defendant's guilt or innocence, “prevent[ing]
an impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction.”
Whorton, 549 U. S., at 418 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see Teague, 489 U. S., at 312 (plurality opinion). Those
requirements set a high bar. But they capture—or anyway,
were once meant to—a “small core of rules” needed to fairly
adjudicate a defendant's guilt. Beard, 542 U. S., at 417.
The frst clue that the unanimity rule falls within Teague's
small core is that the Court thought its adoption justifed
overturning precedent. Ramos didn't just announce a new
rule. It reversed a prior, well-settled one. As the majority
recounts, “Ramos repudiated this Court's 1972 decision in
2
Prior to Teague, the Court gave retroactive effect to a somewhat wider
range of new procedural rules. See ante, at 282, n. 5; Dan forth v. Minne-
sota, 552 U. S. 264, 271–273 (2008). To fnd the no-retroactivity-ever rule
that the majority announces today, a time traveler would have to go back
to around 1950—when the Bill of Rights' protections for criminal defend-
ants did not even apply to the States. See ibid.
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Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404, which had allowed non-
unani
mous juries in state criminal trials.” Ante, at 258.
Such a toppling of precedent needs a special justifcation—
more than a run-of-the-mill claim of error. To meet that de-
mand, the Ramos majority described Apodaca as fouting the
essential “meaning of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial
right,” as revealed in both historical practice and judicial de-
cisions. 590 U. S., at –––. Two concurring Justices added,
to support discarding this “egregiously wrong ” precedent,
that the unanimity rule prevents improper verdicts: Apo-
daca “sanctions the conviction” of some defendants who
would otherwise defeat the State's efforts “to [meet] its bur-
den” of proving guilt. 590 U. S., at ––– (Kavanaugh, J.); id.,
at ––– (Sotomayor, J.). And the majority and concurrences
alike invoked racial justice to support abandoning stare
decisis, explaining how a non-unanimity rule has posed a spe-
cial danger of canceling Black jurors' votes. See id., at –––
– –––, –––; id., at ––– (Sotomayor, J.); id., at ––– – ––– (Kav-
anaugh, J.); infra, at 301–302. At bottom, then, the Court
took the unusual step of overruling precedent for the most
fundamental of reasons: the need to ensure, in keeping
with the Nation's oldest traditions, fair and dependable
adjudications of a defendant's guilt. In this much alone,
Ramos's reasoning evokes this Court's descriptions of wa-
tershed rules.
3
3
The majority misunderstands my point about the interaction between
stare decisis and Teague. I am not saying that if a “right is important
enough to justify overruling ” precedent, then it is “important enough to
apply retroactively.” Ante, at 272. (If that were my claim, this dissent
would be far shorter.) Rather, the overruling of precedent—and more,
the justifcations given to support that overruling—are elements to con-
sider when deciding on a rule's watershed status. Or, as I say above, “a
frst clue.” Here, that clue cuts against the majority: Ramos overturned
precedent (rather than just announcing a new rule) on grounds strikingly
reminiscent of Teague's criteria for watershed status. Still more clues,
pointing in the same direction, appear in the coming pages . . . .

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Kagan, J., dissenting
And putting talk of stare decisis aside, there remains much
more
in Ramos to echo Teague. If, as today's majority says,
Teague is full of “adjectives,” ante, at 267, so too is Ramos—
and mostly the same ones. Jury unanimity, the Court pro-
nounced, is an “essential element[ ]” of the jury trial right,
and thus is “fundamental to the American scheme of justice.”
590 U. S., at ––– – –––. The Court discussed the rule's “an-
cient” history—“400 years of English and American cases
requiring unanimity” leading up to the Sixth Amendment.
Id., at –––, –––. As early as the 14th century, English com-
mon law recognized jury unanimity as a “vital right.” Id.,
at –––. Adopting that view, the early American States like-
wise treated unanimity as an “essential feature of the jury
trial.” Id., at –––. So by the time the Framers drafted the
Sixth Amendment, “the right to a jury trial meant a trial in
which the jury renders a unanimous verdict.” Id., at –––
(emphasis in original). Because that was so, no jury verdict
could stand (or in some metaphysical sense, even exist) ab-
sent full agreement: “A verdict, taken from eleven, was no
verdict at all.” Id., at ––– – ––– (internal quotation marks
omitted). Unanimity served as a critical safeguard, needed
to protect against wrongful deprivations of citizens' “hard-
won liberty.” Id., at –––. Or as Justice Story summarized
the law a few decades after the Founding: To obtain a convic-
tion, “unanimity in the verdict of the jury is indispensable.”
Id., at –––.
If a rule so understood isn't a watershed one, then nothing
is. (And that is, of course, what the majority eventually says.)
Once more, from the quotations just above: “fundamental,”
“essential,” “vital,” “indispensable.” No wonder today's
majority declares a new-found aversion to “adjectives”—or,
as a concurring opinion says, “all these words.” Ante, at
267; ante, at 292 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). The una-
nimity rule, as Ramos described it, is as “bedrock” as bed-
rock comes. Teague, 489 U. S., at 315 (plurality opinion). It

300 EDW
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Kagan, J., dissenting
is as grounded in the Nation's constitutional traditions—with
centur
ies-old practice becoming part of the Sixth Amend-
ment's original meaning. And it is as central to the Nation's
idea of a fair and reliable guilty verdict. When can the
State punish a defendant for committing a crime? Return
again to Ramos, this time going back to Blackstone: Only
when “the truth of [an] accusation” is “confrmed by the
unanimous suffrage” of a jury “of his equals and neighbours.”
590 U. S., at ––– (quoting 4 Commentaries on the Laws
of England 343 (1769)). For only then is the jury's fnding
of g ui lt cer t ai n enough—secure enough, mistake-proof
enough—to take away the person's freedom.
Twice before, this Court retroactively applied rules that
are similarly integral to jury verdicts. First, in Ivan V. v.
City of New York, 407 U. S. 203, 204 (1972) (per curiam),
we gave “complete retroactive effect” to the rule of In re
Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970), that a jury must fnd guilt
“beyond a reasonable doubt.” Like Ramos, Winship rested
on an “ancient” legal tradition incorporated into the Consti-
tution. 397 U. S., at 361. As in Ramos, that tradition
served to “safeguard men” from “unjust convictions, with re-
sulting forfeitures” of freedom. 397 U. S., at 362. And as
in Ramos, that protection plays a “vital” part in “the Amer-
ican scheme of criminal procedure.” 397 U. S., at 363–
364. With all that established, the Ivan V. Court needed
just two pages to hold Winship retroactive, highlighting the
reasonable-doubt standard's “indispensable” role in “reduc-
ing the risk” of wrongful convictions. 407 U. S., at 204–205.
Second, in Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U. S. 323 (1980), we ret-
roactively applied the rule of Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U. S.
130 (1979), that a six-person guilty verdict must be unani-
mous. Think about that for a moment: We held retroactive
a unanimity requirement, no different from the one here save
that it applied to a smaller jury. The reasoning should
by now sound familiar. Allowing conviction by a non-
unanimous jury “impair[s]” the “purpose and functioning of
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the jury,” undermining the Sixth Amendment's very “es-
sence
.” Brown, 447 U. S., at 331 (plurality opinion). It
“raises serious doubts about the fairness of [a] trial.” Id., at
335, n. 13. And it fails to “assure the reliability of [a guilty]
verdict.” Id., at 334. So when a jury has divided, as when it
has failed to apply the reasonable-doubt standard, “there has
been no jury verdict within the meaning of the Sixth Amend-
ment.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U. S. 275, 280 (1993).
4
And something still more supports retroactivity here, for
the opinions in Ramos (unlike in Winship or Burch) relied
on a strong claim about racial injustice. The Court detailed
the origins of Louisiana's and Oregon's non-unanimity rules,
locating them (respectively) in a convention to “establish the
supremacy of the white race” and “the rise of the Ku Klux
Klan.” 590 U. S., at ––– (internal quotation marks omitted).
Those rules, the Court explained, were meant “to dilute the
infuence [on juries] of racial, ethnic, and religious minori-
ties”—and particularly, “to ensure that African-American
4
The majority argues that Ivan V. and Brown applied these new rules
only to cases on direct appeal. See ante, at 269–270, n. 5. But that isn't
right. Although Ivan V. itself involved a direct appeal, the Court has
made clear that the “complete retroactive effect” Ivan V. gave Winship
included cases in habeas. See, e. g., United States v. Johnson, 457 U. S.
537, 562–563, n. 21 (1982). And similarly, lower courts uniformly under-
stood Brown to govern habeas cases, even though a concurring opinion
(which supplied the ruling 's ffth and sixth votes) addressed only cases on
direct appeal. See, e. g., Atkins v. Listi, 625 F. 2d 525, 526 (CA5 1980); see
also Brown, 447 U. S., at 337 (opinion of Powell, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
Those applications to habeas cases make sense because the Court of that
time did not often distinguish in its retroactivity rulings between direct
and collateral review. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 300–301 (1967).
For that reason, the majority must fall back on the argument that “Brown
and Ivan V. were pre-Teague decisions” and “Teague tightened the previ-
ous standard” for retroactivity. Ante, at 270, n. 5. That is true enough,
see supra, at 297, n. 2, but irrelevant here given Brown and Ivan V's
reasoning. As just noted, each of those decisions said everything a court
would say today in designating a new rule “watershed”—in essence, that
the rule is central to the process of fairly deciding on a defendant's guilt.
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juror service would be meaningless.” Ibid. (internal quota-
ti
on marks omitted). Two concurring opinions linked that
history to current practice. “In light of the[ir] racist ori-
gins,” Justice Kavanaugh stated, “it is no surprise that
non-unanimous juries can make a difference”—that “[t]hen
and now” they can “negate the votes of black jurors, espe-
cially in cases with black defendants.” Id., at –––; see id.,
at ––– (Sotomayor, J.). But that statement precludes to-
day's result. If the old rule functioned “as an engine of dis-
crimination against black defendants,” id., at ––– (Kava-
naugh, J.), its replacement must “implicat[e]” (as watershed
rules do) “the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the crim-
inal proceeding,” Beard, 542 U. S., at 417 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Or as Justice Kavanaugh put the point
more concretely, the unanimity rule then helps prevent
“racial prejudice” from resulting in wrongful convictions.
Ramos, 590 U. S., at –––. The rule should therefore apply
not just forward but back, to all convictions rendered absent
its protection.
II
The majority argues in reply that the jury unanimity rule
is not so fundamental because . . . . Well, no, scratch that.
Actually, the majority doesn't contest anything I've said
about the foundations and functions of the unanimity re-
quirement. Nor could the majority reasonably do so. For
everything I've said about the unanimity rule comes straight
out of Ramos's majority and concurring opinions. Just
check the citations: I've added barely a word to what those
opinions (often with soaring rhetoric) proclaim. Start with
history. The ancient foundations of the unanimous jury
rule? Check. The inclusion of that rule in the Sixth
Amendment's original meaning? Check. Now go to func-
tion. The fundamental (or bedrock or central) role of the
unanimous jury in the American system of criminal justice?
Check. The way unanimity fgures in ensuring fairness in
criminal trials and protecting against wrongful guilty ver-
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Kagan, J., dissenting
dicts? Check. The link between those purposes and safe-
g
uarding the jury system from (past and present) racial
prejudice? Check. In sum: As to every feature of the una-
nimity rule conceivably relevant to watershed status, Ramos
has already given the answer—check, check, check—and to-
day's majority can say nothing to the contrary.
5
Instead, the majority relies on decisions holding non-
retroactive various other—even though dissimilar—proce-
dural rules. In making that argument from past practice,
the majority adopts two discrete tactics. Call the frst
“throw everything against the wall.” Call the second “slice
and dice.” Neither can avail to render the jury unanimity
rule anything less than what Ramos thought it—as the ma-
jority concedes, “momentous.” Ante, at 270.
As its frst move, the majority lists as many decisions hold-
ing rules non-retroactive as it can muster. See ante, at 267–
269 (reviewing a “long line of cases”). The premise here is
that sheer volume matters: The majority presents the cata-
log as if every rule is as important as every other and as if
comparing any to the unanimity requirement is beside the
point. But that idea founders on this Court's constant re-
frain that watershed rules are only a small subset of proce-
5
The majority does try to say that the plurality opinion in Ramos none-
theless “plainly foreshadowed today's decision” by noting that Teague's
watershed test was “demanding by design,” in recognition of the States'
reliance interests. Ante, at 273 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also ante, at 274–275 (repeating the assertion twice more). But the
Ramos plurality's description of the watershed test was nothing more than
objective fact: Yes, the watershed test was purposefully demanding. As
to whether the watershed test was so demanding as to exclude the jury
unanimity rule, here is what the plurality had to say: “Whether the right
to jury unanimity applies to cases on collateral review is a question for
a future case where the parties will have a chance to brief the issue and
we will beneft from their adversarial presentation.” Ramos, 590 U. S.,
at –––. Not a lot of “plain[ ] foreshadow[ing]” there. Only a fair bit of
wisdom about how to resolve legal issues—which, as I'll later discuss, the
majority could usefully have considered before overruling the watershed
exception. See in fra, at 306–307.
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dural rules. See, e. g., Graham v. Collins, 506 U. S. 461, 478
(1993).
For under that view (as under the very meaning of
“watershed”), nothing could be less surprising than that non-
watershed rules greatly outnumber watershed ones. That
inexorable fact cannot refute the designation of any given
rule—much less of jury unanimity—as watershed. And the
majority's kitchen-sink list becomes yet less probative of the
issue here because most of its bulk comes from decisions on
sentencing. See ante, at 267–268 (citing Beard, 542 U. S., at
408; O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U. S. 151, 153 (1997); Lambrix
v. Singletary, 520 U. S. 518, 540 (1997); Sawyer v. Smith, 497
U. S. 227, 229 (1990); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U. S. 348,
352 (2004)). But Teague itself explains why sentencing pro-
cedures are not watershed: A watershed rule, the Court said
there, must go to the jury's “determination of innocence or
guilt.” 489 U. S., at 313 (plurality opinion); see Beard, 542
U. S., at 417. So the majority's indiscriminate inventory of
non-retroactive rules cannot get it home.
Enter the majority's second stratagem, which tries to con-
quer by dividing. Here, the majority picks out “three
aspects of Ramos” pointing toward watershed status, and
names one prior decision to match each of the three. Ante,
at 268. So in addressing the unanimity rule's “signifcance,”
the majority notes that the Court once held the jury-trial
right non-retroactive. Ante, at 269 (citing DeStefano v.
Woods, 392 U. S. 631, 633 (1968) (per curiam) and Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968)). In tackling Ramos's re-
turn to “original meaning,” the majority points to our deci-
sion that an originalist rule about hearsay evidence should
not apply backward. Ante, at 270 (citing Whorton, 549 U. S.,
at 421 and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 (2004)).
And in discussing Ramos's role in “prevent[ing] racial dis-
crimination,” the majority invokes our denial of retroactivity
to a rule making it easier to prove race-based peremptory
strikes. Ante, at 270 (citing Allen v. Hardy, 478 U. S. 255,
261 (1986) (per curiam) and Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S.
79 (1986)).
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What the majority doesn't fnd—or even pretend to—is
any
decision corresponding to Ramos on all of those dimen-
sions. Take just a pair of examples. The Court has never
suggested that requiring a bench trial has race-based pur-
poses or effects. See DeStefano, 392 U. S., at 633–635.
6
Similarly, the Court thought its new rule on hearsay evi-
dence of less than towering import: Calling the rule “limited
in scope,” we doubted that it would have any effect on the
“accuracy of factfnding.” Whorton, 549 U. S., at 419. I'll
resist making like points about other permutations because
the main point here is a general one. The majority must
slice and dice in this way—dividing Ramos into three for
purposes of comparison—because it cannot fnd any rule
analogous to jury unanimity on all relevant fronts. And that
is for a simple reason: No procedure adopted since Teague so
comprehensively fulflls that decision's criteria for retroactiv-
ity. If any rule is watershed, it is jury unanimity. See
supra, at 299–300.
So the majority is left to overrule Teague's holding on wa-
tershed rules.
7
On the last page or so of its merits discus-
6
Even on the metric of signifcance alone, the Court has not previously
ranked the jury-unanimity and jury-trial rights as today's majority does.
As earlier noted, the Court in Brown found a unanimity rule retroactive
despite its earlier holding that the jury-trial right was not. See supra,
at 300–301. The Court explained that the accuracy and fairness concerns
raised by divided juries—where, by defnition, at least one person retains
reasonable doubt — exceed those arising from judicial verdicts. See
Brown, 447 U. S., at 334–335, n. 13 (plurality opinion). In insisting
otherwise, the majority falls prey to a common greater-includes-the-lesser
fallacy—akin to the view that if a State can eliminate a jury, it can impose
jury rules of whatever kind it likes. See ante, at 269 (reasoning
that the treatment of a “broader” right controls that of a “subsidiary”
right); Brown, 447 U. S., at 334–335, n. 13 (rejecting precisely that
view).
7
In describing the majority as overruling Teague, I do not mean it over-
rules only Teague. That decision doesn't stand alone in stating the water-
shed exception as governing law. As I count, the Court has recited the
exception 17 more times before today. See Montgomery v. Louisiana,
577 U. S. 190, 198 (2016); Welch v. United States, 578 U. S. 120, 128 (2016);
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sion (before it turns to pre-butting this dissent), the majority
el
iminates the watershed exception, declaring it “long past
time” to do so. Ante, at 272. Teague had said there would
not be “many” (retroactive) watershed rules. 489 U. S., at
313 (plurality opinion). The majority now says there will be
none at all. If that is so, of course, jury unanimity cannot
be watershed. Finally, the majority offers an intelligible
reason for declining to apply Ramos retroactively.
But in taking that road, the majority breaks a core judicial
rule: respect for precedent. Stare decisis is a foundation
stone of the rule of law, “promot[ing] the evenhanded, pre-
dictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fos-
ter[ing] reliance on judicial decisions, and contribut[ing] to
the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991). Adherence to
precedent is, of course, “not an inexorable command.” Id.,
at 828. Ramos itself teaches that much. But Ramos also
shows how high stare decisis sets the bar for overruling a
prior decision. To reverse course, we insist on compelling
reasons, thorough explanation, and careful attention to com-
peting interests. But not here. The majority crawls under,
rather than leaps over, the stare decisis bar.
To begin with, no one here asked us to overrule Teague.
This Court usually confnes itself to the issues raised and
briefed by the parties. See, e. g., United States v. Sineneng-
Chaidez v. United States, 568 U. S. 342, 347, n. 3 (2013); Dan forth, 552
U. S., at 266, 274–275; Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U. S. 406, 416 (2007);
Beard v. Banks, 542 U. S. 406, 416–417 (2004); Horn v. Banks, 536 U. S.
266, 271, n. 5 (2002) (per curiam); Tyler v. Cain, 533 U. S. 656, 665 (2001);
Bousley v. United States, 523 U. S. 614, 619–620 (1998); O'Dell v. Nether-
land, 521 U. S. 151, 156–157 (1997); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U. S. 518,
539 (1997); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U. S. 152, 170 (1996); Caspari v. Boh-
len, 510 U. S. 383, 396 (1994); Graham v. Collins, 506 U. S., 461, 477–
478 (1993); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U. S. 333, 345 (1993); Saffe v. Parks,
494 U. S. 484, 494–495 (1990); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 241–242
(1990).
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307
Kagan, J., dissenting
Smith, 590 U. S. –––, ––– (2020) (discussing “the principle of
par
ty presentation”). There may be reasons to ignore that
rule in one or another everyday case. But to do so in
pursuit of overturning precedent is nothing short of extraor-
dinary. Cf. Ramos, 590 U. S., at –––, n. 4 (Kavanaugh, J.)
(An “important factor” protecting stare decisis “is that the
Court typically does not overrule a precedent unless a party
requests overruling ”). We are supposed to (fairly) apply
the prevailing law until a party asks us to change it. And
when a party does make that request, we are supposed to
attend to countervailing arguments—which no one here had
a chance to make. That orderly process, skipped today, is
what enables a court to arrive at a considered decision about
whether to overthrow precedent.
Equally striking, the majority gives only the sketchiest
of reasons for reversing Teague's watershed exception. In
deciding whether to depart from precedent, the Court usu-
ally considers—and usually at length—a familiar set of fac-
tors capable of providing the needed special justifcation.
See, e. g., Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U. S. –––, –––
(2019) (listing such considerations). The majority can't be
bothered with that customary, and disciplining, practice; it
barely goes through the motions. Seldom has this Court so
casually, so off-handedly, tossed aside precedent. In its page
of analysis, the majority offers just one ground for its deci-
sion—that since Teague, the Court has not identifed a new
rule as watershed, and so “the purported exception has be-
come an empty promise.” Ante, at 272. But even viewed
in the abstract, that argument does not fy. That the Court
has not found a watershed rule since Teague does not mean
it could or would not in the future. Teague itself understood
that point: It saw value in the watershed exception even
while recognizing that watershed rules would be few and far
between. 489 U. S., at 313 (plurality opinion). And viewed
in the context of this case, the majority's argument positively
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308 EDW
ARDS v. VANNOY
Kagan, J., dissenting
craters. For the majority today comes face-to-face with a
r
ule that perfectly fts each of Teague's criteria: Jury unanim-
ity, as described in Ramos, is watershed—even though no
prior rule was. See supra, at 297–302. That airtight match
between Ramos and Teague refutes the majority's one stated
reason for overruling the latter decision. The majority
could not rely on the absence of watershed rules to topple
Teague if it had just faithfully applied that decision to this
case.
In choosing otherwise, the majority imposes a steep price
for overruling Apodaca in Ramos. Taking with one hand
what it gave with the other, the Court curtails Ramos's ef-
fects by expunging Teague's provision for watershed rules.
And so too the Court limits the consequences of any similarly
fundamental change in criminal procedure that may emerge
in the future. For the frst time in many decades (since long
before Teague, see supra, at 297, n. 2), those convicted under
rules found not to produce fair and reliable verdicts will be
left without recourse in federal courts.
8
I would not discard Teague's watershed exception and so
keep those unfairly convicted people from getting new trials.
Instead, I would accept the consequences of last Term's hold-
ing in Ramos. A decision like that comes with a promise,
or at any rate should. If the right to a unanimous jury is so
8
The majority's fnal claim is that it is properly immune from this
criticism—that I cannot “turn around and impugn” its ruling—because
“criminal defendants as a group are better off under Ramos and today's
decision, taken together, than they would have been if [my] dissenting
view had prevailed in Ramos.” Ante, at 275. The suggestion is surpris-
ing. It treats judging as scorekeeping—and more, as scorekeeping about
how much our decisions, or the aggregate of them, beneft a particular
kind of party. I see the matter differently. Judges should take cases one
at a time, and do their best in each to apply the relevant legal rules. And
when judges err, others should point out where they went astray. No one
gets to bank capital for future cases; no one's past decisions insulate them
from criticism. The focus always is, or should be, getting the case before
us right.
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309
Kagan, J., dissenting
fundamental—if a verdict rendered by a divided jury is “no
verdic
t at all”—then Thedrick Edwards should not spend his
life behind bars over two jurors' opposition. I respectfully
dissent.
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