Allen v. Cooper

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P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Vol. 589 (Pp. 154–432; 1248–1321)
UNITED STATES REPORTS
Part 2
Volume 589 U. S. - Part 2
Pages 154–432; 1248–1321
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T
February 26 Through April 19, 2020
End of Volume
CHRISTINE LUCHOK FALLON
reporter of decisions
N O T I C E : This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the
bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Publishing Offce
Washington, D.C. 20402

J U S T I C E S
of the
S U P R E M E C O U R T
during the time of these reports
JOHN G. ROBERTS, Jr., Chief Justice.
CLARENCE THOMAS, Associate Justice.
RUTH BADER GINSBURG, Associate Justice.
STEPHEN BREYER, Associate Justice.
SAMUEL A. ALITO, Jr., Associate Justice.
SONIA SOTOMAYOR, Associate Justice.
ELENA KAGAN, Associate Justice.
NEIL M. GORSUCH, Associate Justice.
BRETT M. KAVANAUGH, Associate Justice.
retired
SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, Associate Justice.
ANTHONY M. KENNEDY, Associate Justice.
DAVID H. SOUTER, Associate Justice.
ofcers of the court
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General.
NOEL J. FRANCISCO, Solicitor General.
SCOTT S. HARRIS, Clerk.
CHRISTINE LUCHOK FALLON, Reporter of
Decisions.
PAMELA TALKIN, Marshal.
LINDA S. MASLOW, Librarian.
i

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Allotment of Justices
It is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices of this Court among the circuits,
pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 42, and that such
allotment be entered of record, effective October 19, 2018, viz.:
For the District of Columbia Circuit, John G. Roberts, Jr.,
Chief Justice.
For the First Circuit, Stephen Breyer, Associate Justice.
For the Second Circuit, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate
Justice.
For the Third Circuit, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Associate Justice.
For the Fourth Circuit, John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice.
For the Fifth Circuit, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Associate Justice.
For the Sixth Circuit, Sonia Sotomayor, Associate Justice.
For the Seventh Circuit, Brett M. Kavanaugh, Associate
Justice.
For the Eighth Circuit, Neil M. Gorsuch, Associate Justice.
For the Ninth Circuit, Elena Kagan, Associate Justice.
For the Tenth Circuit, Sonia Sotomayor, Associate Justice.
For the Eleventh Circuit, Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice.
For the Federal Circuit, John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice.
October 19, 2018.
(For next previous allotment, see 586 U. S., Pt. 1, p. iii.)
ii

I N D E X
(Vol. 589 U. S., Part 2)
ABROGATION OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. See Copy-
right Remedy Clarifcation Act of 1990.
ABSENTEE BALLOTS. See Election Law.
ACTUAL KNOW LEDGE. See Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act of 1974.
ADMIRALTY LAW.
Safe-berth clause—Express warranty of safety.—Plain language of
safe-berth clause in parties' subcharter agreement—requiring petitioners
to designate a safe berth for a vessel to load and discharge cargo—estab-
lishes a warranty of safety. CITGO Asphalt Refning Co. v. Frescati Ship-
ping Co., p. 348.
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967.
Consideration of age in personnel decisions—Determination of rem-
edy.—Plain meaning of federal-sector provision of ADEA, 29 U. S. C.
§ 633a(a), demands that personnel actions be untainted by any consider-
ation of age, but but-for causation is important in determining appropriate
remedy that may be obtained. Babb v. Wilkie, p. 399.
ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT.
Meaning of “serious drug offense”—Qualifcation for sentence en-
hancement.—For purposes of Act's sentence enhancement for a defendant
convicted of being a felon in possession of a frearm who has at least three
convictions for “serious drug offense[s],” 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(1), “serious
drug offense” defnition requires only that a state offense involve conduct
specifed in statute; it does not require that state offense match certain
generic offenses. Shular v. United States, p. 154.
BUT-FOR CAUSATION. See Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967; Racial Discrimination in Contracting.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See also Insanity Defense to Criminal
Charge.
Search and seizure—Investigative stop under Fourth Amendment—
Question of reasonableness.—When a police offcer lacks information ne-
iii

iv INDEX
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW See also Insanity Defense to Criminal
Charge.—Continued.
gating an inference that a person driving is vehicle's owner, an investiga-
tive
traffc stop made after running vehicle's license plate and learning
that registered owner's driver's license has been revoked is reasonable
under Fourth Amendment. Kansas v. Glover, p. 376.
COPYRIGHT REMEDY CLARIFICATION ACT OF 1990.
Copyright in fringement claims—Abrogation of state sovereign immu-
nity.—Congress lacked authority to abrogate States' sovereign immunity
from copyright infringement suits in Copyright Remedy Clarifcation Act
of 1990. Allen v. Cooper, p. 248.
CRIMINAL LAW. See Armed Career Criminal Act; Insanity De-
fense to Criminal Charge; Plain-Error Review.
CRIMINAL SENTENCING. See Armed Career Criminal Act; Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure.
DEATH PENALTY. See Insanity Defense to Criminal Charge.
DUE PROCESS. See Insanity Defense to Criminal Charge.
EIGH TH A M EN DM EN T. See I n san it y Defen se t o Cri m i n a l
Charge.
ELECTION LAW.
Deadline for receiving absentee ballots in primary election—Counting
of ballots.—District Court's order granting a preliminary injunction is
stayed to extent it requires Wisconsin to count absentee ballots post-
marked after date of State's election. Republican National Committee v.
Democratic National Committee, p. 423.
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974.
Three-year statute of limitations—Earliest date of plaintiff 's actual
knowledge.—Under Act requirement that plaintiffs with “actual knowl-
edge” of an alleged fduciary breach must fle suit within three years of
gaining that knowledge, 29 U. S. C. § 1113(2), a plaintiff does not necessar-
ily have “actual knowledge” of information contained in disclosures that
he receives but does not read or cannot recall reading. Intel Corp. Invest-
ment Policy Comm. v. Sulyma, p. 178.
ENHANCED SENTENCES. See Armed Career Criminal Act.
EQUITABLE TOLLING. See Immigration and Nationality Act.
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES. See Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967.

INDEX v
FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. See also Plain-
Er
ror Review.
Preserving claim of error for appellate review—Reasonableness of sen-
tence.—Petitioner's district-court argument for a specifc sentence (noth-
ing or less than 12 months) preserved, for purposes of Fed. Rule Crim.
Proc. 51(b), his claim on appeal that sentence imposed was unreasonably
long. Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, p. 169.
FIREARMS. See Armed Career Criminal Act.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. See Copyright Remedy Clarifca-
tion Act of 1990; Insanity Defense to Criminal Charge.
FOURTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law.
FRAUD. See Pre-emption of State Law by Federal Law.
IDENTITY THEFT. See Pre-emption of State Law by Federal Law.
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT.
Motion to reopen removal proceedings—Equitable tolling of statute of
limitations.—Because phrase “questions of law” in the Immigration and
Nationality Act's Limited Review Provision, 8 U. S. C. § 1252(A)(2)(D), in-
cludes application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts,
Fifth Circuit erred in holding that it had no jurisdiction to consider peti-
tioners' “factual” due diligence claims for equitable tolling purposes.
Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, p. 221.
IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT OF 1986. See Pre-
emption of State Law by Federal Law.
INSANITY DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CHARGE.
Insanity at time of commission of crime—Formation of criminal in-
tent—Defense to culpability.—Due process does not require Kansas to
adopt an insanity test that turns on a defendant's ability to recognize that
his crime was morally wrong. Kahler v. Kansas, p. 271.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY. See Copyright Remedy Clarifcation
Act of 1990.
INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS. See Admiralty Law.
PLAIN-ERROR REVIEW.
Unpreserved arguments on appeal—Refusal to entertain factual argu-
ments.—There is no legal basis for Fifth Circuit's practice of declining to
review certain unpreserved factual arguments for plain error. Davis v.
United States, p. 345.

vi INDEX
PRE-EMPTION OF STATE LAW BY FEDERAL LAW.
Sta
te identity-theft and fraud statutes—Question of preemption by fed-
eral immigration laws.—Kansas statutes under which respondents, three
unauthorized aliens, were convicted—for fraudulently using another per-
son's Social Security number on state and federal tax-withholding forms
submitted to their employers—are not expressly preempted by Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act of 1986; and respondents' argument that
those laws are preempted by implication is rejected. Kansas v. Garcia,
p. 191.
QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT. See Immigration and National-
ity Act.
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN CONTRACTING.
Racial discrimination—Mixed-motive claims.—Plaintiff who sues for
racial discrimination in contracting under 42 U. S. C. § 1981 bears burden
of showing that race was a but-for cause of plaintiff 's injury, and that
burden remains constant over life of lawsuit. Comcast Corp. v. National
Assn. of African-American Owned Media, p. 327.
REASONABLENESS STANDARD. See Constitutional Law.
REMEDIES. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE. See Constitutional Law.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. See Copyright Remedy Clarifcation Act
of 1990.
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS. See Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974; Immigration and Nationality Act.
TITLE VII OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964. See Racial Discrimi-
nation in Contracting.
UNPRESERVED ARGUMENTS. See Plain-Error Review.
WISCONSIN. See Election Law.
WORDS AND PHRASES.
“[S]erious drug offense.” Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U. S. C.
§ 924(e)(1). Shular v. United States, p. 154.

CUMULATIV E TABLE OF CA SES REPORTED
(Vol. 589 U. S., Parts 1 and 2)
Notes:
This volume provides the permanent United States Reports citation for
all reported cases. Cases reported before page 901 are those decided
with opinions of the Court or decisions per curiam. Cases reported on
page 901 et seq. are those in which orders were entered. Although the
Table of Cases Reported does not list orders denying a petition for writ
of certiorari, such orders are included chronologically in this volume.
The syllabus in a case constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court
but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience
of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200
U. S. 321, 337 (1906).
A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in a reported case, and who
were members of the Court's Bar at the time the case was argued, are
included in the United States Reports along with the Court's opinion in
the case.
Page
A. v. Leff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032,1101
Abshire v. Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections . . . . 1161
Acevedo Feliciano; Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan v. 57
Actavis Holdco U. S., Inc. v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262
Adams v. Calhoun Cty., Mich. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Adams; Carney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099
Adams v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Adams v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118,1198
Addison v. Family and Social Servs. Admin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Addison v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Adebowale v. Wolf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Adelman v. Root . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Adger; Cleveland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Adventist Health System/Sunbelt Inc.; Konieczko v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Agency for Int'l Development v. Alliance for Open Society Int'l 1119
Ahmed, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915
Alabama; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030
Alaska; Barenz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
vii

viii T
ABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
Alessio v. United Airlines, Inc. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
AMC Networks Inc.; Sawicky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913,1162
Arizona; McKinney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139,1067
Allen; Bussey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Allen v. Cooper. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
Allen v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Alliance for Open Society Int'l; Agency for Int'l Development v. 1119
Al Shimari; CACI Premier Technology, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178
Amalgamated. For labor union, see name of trade.
Amaro v. Balderas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
American Assn. of Political Consultants, Inc.; Barr v. . . . . . . . . . 1127
American Family Ins. Co.; Jammal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188
Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Becerra . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
American Zurich Ins. Co.; Griffn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
Amerson v. U. S. Bankruptcy Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
Ammiyhuwd v. Pompeo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Amtrak Police; Armstrong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1304
Anderson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012
Anderson v. Robitaille . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262
Andrews v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Angeles v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1291
Anyanwu v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Apex Reporting Group, Inc.; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Appel, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Appellate Div., Super. Ct. of Cal., San Mateo Cty.; Drevaleva v. 1128
Appleton v. DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262
Aranoff v. Aranoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Arcadia Mgmt. Servs. Co.; Hettinga v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1292
Archer & White Sales, Inc.; Henry Schein, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Arizona v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Arizona v. Sackler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100
Arizona Dept. of Public Safety; Caldwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Arlotta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Armour v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Armstrong, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102
Armstrong v. Amtrak Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1304
Armstrong v. Doe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Armstrong v. GEICO Ins. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1304
Armstrong v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Armstrong v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1304
Armstrong v.
United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1304
Armstrong v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907,1067
Armstrong v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Arris Int'l, Ltd. v. Iancu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911

T
ABLE OF CASES REPORTED
ix
Page
Arucan v. Cambridge East Healthcare Center .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Arunachalam v. International Business Machines Corp. . . . . . . . . 1097
Arunachalam v. Pazuniak Law Offce, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Arunachalam v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901,1096,1097
Ashley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Assets Protection, Inc.; Haynes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1303
Associate Judge, Circuit Ct. of Ill., Cook Cty.; Curry v. . . . . . . 913,1057
Associate Judge, Circuit Ct. of Ill., Cook Cty.; Santiago v. . . . . . . 1196
Atkinson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012
Atlantic Coast Pipeline v. Cowpasture River Preserv. Assn. . . . . 1189
Atlantic Richfeld Co. v. Christian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Attorney General v. American Assn. of Political Consultants, Inc. 1127
Attorney General; Angeles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1291
Attorney General; Anyanwu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Attorney General; Biton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Attorney General; Geimah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100
Attorney General; Guerrero-Lasprilla v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
Attorney General; Hango v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066
Attorney General; Londono-Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1291
Attorney General; Martinez-Covarrubias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1290
Attorney General; Nasrallah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030
Attorney General; Ogunsula v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Attorney General; Pereida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126,1200
Attorney General; Pratt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Attorney General v. Roane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Attorney General; Sankara v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Attorney General; Tapia-Fierro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1290
Attorney General of Ark. v. Pharmaceutical Care Mgmt. . . . . 1127,1250
Attorney General of Cal.; Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. 1200
Attorney General of Cal.; Thomas More Law Center v. . . . . . . . . 1200
Attorney General of Ga.; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067
Attorney General of N. M.; Amaro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
Aurora Loan Servs., LLC; Elam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Austin v. Oakland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Author Solutions; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
Avery, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
Azar; Rogero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
B. v. Texas Dept. of Family and Protective Servs. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Babb v. Wilkie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399,1164
Baca; Colorado Dept. of State v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165,1178,1250,1270
Bachiller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Badruddoza v. Department of Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . . . . 1292
Balderas; Amaro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
Baldwin; Strother v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246

x T
ABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
Baltimore Wash. Medical Center, Inc.; Porter v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Bank of America Corp. v. Miami, Fla. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041,1249
Barr; Pereida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126,1200
Banca UBAE, S. p. A. v. Peterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Bandemer; Ford Motor Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Banicki; Ibeabuchi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Banister v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057
Bank, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131
Bank Markazi v. Peterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Bank of America Corp.; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Barenz v. Alaska. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
Barla; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Barnes v. Commission, Lawyer Discip., State Bar of Tex. . . . . . . 911
Barnes v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
Barr v. American Assn. of Political Consultants, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Barr; Angeles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1291
Barr; Anyanwu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Barr; Biton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Barr; Geimah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100
Barr; Guerrero-Lasprilla v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
Barr; Hango v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066
Barr; Londono-Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1291
Barr; Martinez-Covarrubias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1290
Barr; Nasrallah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030
Barr; Ogunsula v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Barr; Pratt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Barr v. Roane. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Barr; Sankara v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Barr; Tapia-Fierro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1290
Barrone; Harnage v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
Barrow v. Willis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Bartlett v. Pineda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Batalla Vidal; McAleenan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
Battles v. Rotz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Baxter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
Bazan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1272
B. D. v. Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Servs. . . . . . . . 1130
Bedgood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Beebe, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1293
Beal Bank; Mohorne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
Beaux Art Institute of Plastic Surgery; Tootle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1291
Becerra; Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Becerra; Thomas More Law Center v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Beckwith; Green v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913

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Beeks v. HMC Assets, LLC .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Biel; St. James School v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1273
Bonnell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201,1320
Bracken, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915,1166
Briggs; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066,1130
Brown v. Civil Serv. Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Brown v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1303
Benavente v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Bergen Cty. Prosecutor's Offce; Moretti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Berger; Meier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Berkebile; Couture v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Bern; McLaurine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Berry, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Bhagat v. Iancu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030
Birch-Min v. Middlesex Cty. Bd. of Social Servs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Biton v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Biton v. United Airlines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Biton v. Verrilli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Black v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1290
Black v. Life Unlimited, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Blaher, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Bleau, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Blythe, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176
BNSF R. Co. v. EEOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Board of Ed. of the Township of Teaneck; H. F. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Bonnyman; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Booking.com B. V.; United States Patent and Trademark Offce v. 1055
Booth v. Nissan North America, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Borden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Boyd v. California Public Util. Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Boyd v. Monroe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1290
BP P. L. C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore . . . . . . . . . . . 1040
Bracy; Crank v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Braithwaite v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Brascom, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915
Brawner, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058
Bray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
Brende v. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Bressi v. Gembic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Bridges v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Britton-Harr, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Brockington v. Saul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Brooks, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Brooks v. Gabriel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903

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Brown v. Michigan .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1290
Brown v. Richmond, Va. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Brown v. Saul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
Brown v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011,1078,1189,1304
Brown v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Brownback v. King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1293
Bruner, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177
Brunson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914,1119
Bryan, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Bryant, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914,1119
Bryant v. Department of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Bryant; West v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Buchwald; Lasher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Buchwald Capital Advisors LLC v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe . . . . . 1303
Buhannic, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Burke v. Raven Elec., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Burlington Cty. College; Dinnerstein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Burt; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Bussey v. Allen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Butler v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Byrd, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178
Cabrera-Cosme v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
CACI Premier Technology, Inc. v. Al Shimari . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178
Calderon Lopez, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167,1291,1293
Caldwell v. Arizona Dept. of Public Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Caldwell; Seibert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Calhoun Cty., Mich.; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
California; Arizona v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
California; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1292
California; Moon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
California; Salzwedel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1290
California; Schwartzmiller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
California v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166,1251
California; Texas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
California; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
California Public Util. Comm'n; Boyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Cambridge East Healthcare Center; Arucan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Campbell v. Campbell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Campbell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Capri, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915
Caputo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Carelton Courtyard; Petko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125
Cargill, Inc. v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130
Carney v. Adams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099

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Carr, In re .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Charles, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915,1078
CITGO Asphalt Refning Co. v. Frescati Shipping Co. . . . . . . . 348,1013
Clearstream Banking S. A. v. Peterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Carr; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067
Carswell v. E. Pihl & Son . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100
Carter, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014
Carter v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Carter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125
Casteel, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058
Caswell v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Caterbone v. Lancaster City Bureau of Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Caterbone v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Catholic Foundation of the Diocese of Lafayette; Sonnier v. . . . . . 1172
Central Bank of Iran v. Peterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas, Health Funds; Harris v. . . . 1129
Cerf; Pattishall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Cervantes Valencia v. Davey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Chabot v. Ohio A. Philip Randolph Institute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Champion Mortgage Co. of Tex.; Larson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Chance v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Chaney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Chapdelaine; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1320
Chapman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189
Charter Com. v. National Assn., African American-Owned Media 1291
Chatfeld v. League of Women Voters of Mich. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031
Cherry v. Simons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Chesapeake, Va.; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125
Chi v. Stover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
Chiafalo v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165,1178,1250,1270
Chicago, Ill. v. Fulton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126,1274
Chodosh v. Palm Beach Park Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
Christian; Atlantic Richfeld Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Christian v. Dadmun. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Christian; Sundy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1291
Circuit Ct. of Ky., Laurel Cty.; Reynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
City. See name of city.
Civil Serv. Comm'n; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Clarke; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Clarke; Meyers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Clarke; Yilmaz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Clayborne v. Hansen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Clayton; Stanford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Cleveland v. Adger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
908

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Click-To-Call Technologies, LP; Dex Media, Inc. v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Collins; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066,1130
Colorado Dept. of State v. Baca . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165,1178,1250,1270
Comcast Corp. v. National Assn., African Am.-Owned Media . . 327,1014
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. See Commissioner.
Consumer Financial Prot. Bur.; Seila Law LLC v. . . . 1031,1041,1101,1190
Corrections Commissioner. See name of commissioner.
Coulter v. Paulisick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Click-To-Call Technologies, LP; Thryv, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Clopton v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125
Clowers v. Cradduck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273
Cochrun v. Dooley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Colgate Palmolive Co.; Norton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Collier, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Collins v. Daniels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Collins v. Gonzalez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.; Cunningham v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Comier, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014
Commissioner; Herndon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Commissioner; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Commissioner; Schneider v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Commissioner; Waltner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Commission, Lawyer Discip., State Bar of Tex.; Barnes v. . . . . . . 911
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n; Fejokwu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Commonwealth. See name of Commonwealth.
Connecticut; Actavis Holdco U. S., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262
Conner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Connor Sport Court Int'l, LLC; Maksimuk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1290
Continental Apartments; Torres v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Contra Costa Cty. Children and Family Servs. Bureau; K. S. v. 909
Contreras v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Converteam SAS v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC . . . . . . . . . 1100
Conyers v. Wilkie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Cook v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902,909
Cook Cty., Ill.; Wolf v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190
Cooks; Lucy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Cooks v. Superior Ct. of Cal., Los Angeles Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Cooper; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
Cooper v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099
Corbitt v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
CoreCivic Correctional Center; Marzan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Corizon Correctional Health Care; Tucker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Corrigan; Gullett-El v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
County. See name of county.

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Court of Claims of Ill.; Johnson v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100
Court of Common Pleas of Pa., Union Cty.; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . 1164
Courtright, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915
Couture v. Berkebile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P. C.; Gurvey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Cowpasture River Preserv. Assn.; Atlantic Coast Pipeline v. . . . . 1189
Cowpasture River Preserv. Assn.; United States Forest Serv. v. 1189
Cox, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915
Cox v. Old Republic Nat. Title Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Cox v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012
Cradduck; Clowers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273
Crank v. Bracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Credit Acceptance Corp.; Rajapakse v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101
Crenshaw v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1304
Crick v. Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Cruz, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915
Cunningham v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Cunningham v. Washington Cty., Ore. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Curry v. Lopez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913,1057
Cutler v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
D. v. Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Servs. . . . . . . . . . 1130
Dannewitz, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915,1261
Davis; Harvin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Davis v. Kia Motors America, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Dadmun; Christian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Dahlem v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
DAL Global Servs.; Pittman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013
Dallas Cty., Tex.; Kam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Danforth; Delebreau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125
Daniel v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Daniels; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Dardanelle School Dist.; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Davey; Cervantes Valencia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Davis; Banister v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057
Davis v. Bank of America Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Davis; Black v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1290
Davis; Bridges v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Davis; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1303
Davis v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1292
Davis; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Davis; Clopton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125
Davis; Daniel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Davis; Flint v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125
Davis; Gardner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903

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Davis; Lowery v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1304
Davis; Merryman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Davis; Robertson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Davis; Shove v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273
Davis; Sikes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Davis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345,1173
Davis v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Davis; Vernon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Davis; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Dawson v. Wells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
Day-Petrano v. Hall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
D. B. v. Texas Dept. of Family and Protective Servs. . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. 1013,1041
Deutsche Bank AG; Trump v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1274
Director of penal or correctional institution. See name or title
Dean v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
DeCagna; Xiao Qing Liu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079
DeCoito v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
DeKalb Cty. Assistant Public Defenders; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Delaware; Riley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1320
Delaware; Windsor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Delebreau v. Danforth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125
Democratic Nat. Comm.; Republican Nat. Comm. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 423
Department of Ed.; Bryant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Department of Homeland Security; Badruddoza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1292
Department of Homeland Security v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173
Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam . . . . . . . . . . . 1030
Department of Justice; Simon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Department of the Army; Domingo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Department of the Fam. of the Commw. of P. R.; Soto Nieves v. 1096
Department of Veterans Affairs; Hairston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Derringer v. Saenz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
DeSantis, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co.; Powe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co.; Zamore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
Dex Media, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Technologies, LP . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Diarra v. New York, N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Diaz-Hinirio, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915
Diaz Palencia; Velasquez Perez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Dinnerstein v. Burlington Cty. College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Director, Offce of Workers' Comp. Progs.; Rockwood Casualty v. 1292
of director.
Disbarment, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
District Court. See U. S. District Court.

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District Judge. See U. S. District Judge.
D
istrict of Columbia; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
District of Columbia Offce of Human Rights; McCrea v. . . . . . . . 1197
Dixit v. Singh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc.; Appleton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262
Doe; Armstrong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Doe; Cargill, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130
Doe v. Dardanelle School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Doe v. Federal Election Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013
Doe; McKesson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1272
Doe; Nestle USA, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130
Doe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079,1273
Domingo v. Department of the Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Donahue v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126,1189
Donahue v. Scalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1304
Donahue v. Superior Ct. of Pa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Donate-Cardona v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012
Dongarra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Dooley; Cochrun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Dore; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
Douse v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Doyle, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043
Drake v. Parish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Drevaleva v. Appellate Div., Super. Ct. of Cal., San Mateo Cty. 1128
Drexel Univ.; Lei Ke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1272
Ducey; Taebel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Duhart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Du Ju v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Dummert v. Ngo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Durban, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177
Duriso v. West Gulf Maritime Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Dutton v. McCrea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Eaton, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Eccleston, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066
Eccleston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066
Edmonds, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131,1291
Edmondson v. Lilliston Ford Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1290
Egland; House v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Elam v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Elizabetas G. v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Elliott v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1291
Enclarity Inc. v. Fulton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
English v. Roadhouse Holding Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Enow v. Foxwell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163

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E. Pihl & Son; Carswell v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100
EEOC; BNSF R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Erwin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Escourse-Westbrook v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101,1130
Everitt; Fuquen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101
Everson v. Lantz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Ex parte. See name of party.
Ezor, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057
F. v. Board of Ed. of the Township of Teaneck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Fields, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102,1189
Florida; Truesdale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011,1246
Ford v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131
Fordham Univ.; Rosenwasser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Facebook, Inc.; Rope v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Fahring, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Family and Social Servs. Admin.; Addison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Farmer; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Farthing, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
FDIC; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Federal Election Comm'n; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013
Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn.; Higgins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Fejokwu v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Feliciano; Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan v. . . . . . . . . . 57
Fenstermaker v. Halvorson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Fiat Chrysler; Ottah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Finnegan, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014
First Resolution Investment Corp.; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Flint v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125
Florida; Elliott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1291
Florida v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177
Florida; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Florida; Joseph v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Florida; Kahlow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Florida; Littles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Florida; Lucas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1303
Florida; Palmer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Florida; Perez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Florida; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Florida; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274
Florida; Viera v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Florida Dept. of Children and Families; H. K. V. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Ford, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915

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Ford Motor Co. v. Bandemer .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Frakes; Nesbitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906,1130
Frescati Shipping Co.; CITGO Asphalt Refning Co. v. . . . . . . . 348,1013
Fulton; Chicago, Ill. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126,1274
Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct. . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Forquer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Fortes v. Texas Dept. of Family and Protective Servs. . . . . . . . . . 1291
Fortune v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Fortune Society; Rochester v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Fowler v. Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Foxwell; Enow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Francis, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Frank, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
French, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Frye, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1305
Fulton; Enclarity Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Fulton v. Philadelphia, Pa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Fulton DeKalb Hospital Auth.; Oduok v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Fuquen v. Everitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101
G. v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Glover; Kansas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376,912
Goad v. Steel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Godert; Watson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
Gabriel; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Gallagher Bassett Servs., Inc.; Rubang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057
Garcia; Kansas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Gardner v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Garrett; Pierce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Gee v. June Medical Servs. L. L. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067,1164,1166
GE Energy Power Conversion v. Outokumpu Stainless USA . . . . 1100
GEICO Ins.; Armstrong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1304
Geimah v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100
Gembic; Bressi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
General Counsel of the Regents of the Univ. of Cal.; Touma v. . . . 1188
Genovese; Hodge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1292
George, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Georgia; Florida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177
Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Georgia; Rooney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Germany v. Philipp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Ghelichkhani v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Gilbert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Gillard v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Gilmore; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910

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Gomez; Stephens v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Gonzalez; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189
Goodwin; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066,1250
Gorman; Hayes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Gossage v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Governor of Ariz.; Taebel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Governor of Del. v. Adams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099
Governor of Ga.; Holland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Governor of N. C.; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
Governor of Utah.; Schmidt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031
Goynes v. Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013
Grady Mem. Hospital; Oduok v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Graham; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Grant; Rebenstorf v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1304
Grant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910,1247
Green v. Beckwith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
Greer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Greiner v. Macomb Cty., Mich. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
Griffn v. American Zurich Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
Griffn; Veteto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128,1262
Grigalanz, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Guerrero Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
Guice, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1293
Gullett-El v. Corrigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Gundy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Gurvey v. Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Guttenberg N. J. Police; Xue Jie He v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
Hadsell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914,1125
Hairston v. Department of Veterans Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Hale v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Hall, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Hall v. Author Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
Hall; Day-Petrano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Halvorson; Fenstermaker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Hamilton, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057
Hamman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Hampton, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1305
Hango v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066
Hannah, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Hanover, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Hansen; Clayborne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Harnage v. Barrone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165

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Harris, In re .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178
Harris v. Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas, Health Funds . . . . 1129
Harris v. McCumsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Harsay v. University of Kan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Harvey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
Harvin v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Hauser; Helm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057
Hawaii State Judiciary; Yamano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Hayes v. Gorman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Haynes v. Assets Protection, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1303
Haynes v. Riverside Presbyterian Apartments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
Haynes; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1303
He v. Guttenberg N. J. Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
Head v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Hebdon; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
HEB Grocery Co., LP; Salazar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Helm v. Hauser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057
Helms v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Hepp; Reynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Herb Chambers 1186, Inc.; Kersey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Herbert; Parron v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013
Herbert; Schmidt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031
Hercenberger v. Martin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1303
Hernandez v. Mesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93,1013
Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
Herndon v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Herr; Santa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177
Herrera v. Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Herrera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Herrin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Hettinga v. Arcadia Mgmt. Servs. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1292
Hettinga v. Loumena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
H. F. v. Board of Ed. of the Township of Teaneck . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Hicks, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Hicks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
Higgins v. Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Hill; Santiago v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Hing Wong, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Hinkson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
H. K. V. v. Florida Dept. of Children and Families . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
HMC Assets, LLC; Beeks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Hodge v. Genovese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1292
Holguin-Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169,912,1032

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Page
Holland v. Kemp .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Holley; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Hood; Hudson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Hood; Raimondo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188
Hospital Espanol Auxilio Mutuo de P. R., Inc.; Silva-Ramirez v. 1172
Hot Water Man; Linh Thi Minh Tran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Hotze Health Wellness Center Int'l One, LLC, In re . . . . . . . . . . 1043
House v. Egland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Householder v. Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Howard v. San Diego Cty. Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Howell v. Southerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
HSBC Holdings PLC v. Picard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101
Huang v. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012
Huang v. Pai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.; Xiaohua Huang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012
Hudson v. Hood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Humbert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Hungary v. Simon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Huntington Ingalls, Inc.; Kirkland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Hutchinson v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Iancu; Arris Int'l, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Iancu; Bhagat v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030
Ibeabuchi v. Banicki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Illinois; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Illinois; Cutler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Illinois; Elizabetas G. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Illinois; Gillard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Illinois; Peters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905,1030,1101
Illinois Dept. of Transp.; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1292
Inch; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079
Inch; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Inch; Marr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Inch; Owens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Inch; Raghubir v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162,1249
Inch; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Inch; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Indiana; Addison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Indiana; Kaushal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
ING Bank N. V.; NuStar Energy Servs., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030
Innovation Law Lab; Wolf v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271
In re. See name of party.
Inservco Ins. Servs.; Roberts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Institutions for Life; Rollins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Intel Corp. Investment Policy Comm. v. Sulyma . . . . . . . . . . . 178,1057

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Page
International. For labor union, see name of trade.
Inter
national Business Machines Corp.; Arunachalam v. . . . . . . . 1097
Jackson v. Barla . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Jackson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Jackson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Jackson Masonry, LLC.; Ritzen Group, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35,1032
James, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Jammal v. American Family Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188
Jander; Retirement Plans Comm. of IBM v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49,1014
Jaye v. Oak Knoll Village Condominium Owners Assn., Inc. . . . . . 1096
Jefferson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Jefferson v. Supreme Ct. of Ga. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165,1303
Jefferson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Jenkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Jennings; Schwertz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1291
Jie He v. Guttenberg N. J. Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
Jimenez; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Johnson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915
Johnson v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Johnson v. Court of Claims of Ill. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100
Johnson v. Gilmore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Johnson v. Inch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079
Johnson v. Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, L. L. P. . . . . . . 1320
Johnson; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Johnson v. Saul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Johnson v. Severson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Johnson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031,1078
Johnston, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Joiner v. Sutton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Jones v. Bonnyman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Jones; Crenshaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1304
Jones v. Goodwin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Jones v. Inch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Jones v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Jones v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263
Jones v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263
Jones v. Wetzel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Jones v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Jordan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1303
Joseph v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Joyner; Sheftall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N. A.; Wazney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161,1246
Ju v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118

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Judge; Goad v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Judge, Circuit Ct. of Ala., Montgomery Cty.; Veteto v. . . . . . . 1128,1262
June Medical Servs. L. L. C. v. Gee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067,1164,1166
Kirby; McIntosh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100
Kirkland v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Judge; Sundy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1291
Judge, Criminal Ct. for Sullivan Cty., Tenn.; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Judge, Superior Ct. of Ariz., Maricopa Cty.; Bartlett v. . . . . . . . . 904
June Medical Servs. L. L. C. v. Russo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Jun Xiao v. Regents of Univ. of Minn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
Juvenile Male v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1292
Kahler v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
Kahlow v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Kallis; Metcalf v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Kallis; Millis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Kam v. Dallas Cty., Tex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Kam v. Peyton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Kaneka Corp. v. Xiamen Kingdomway Group Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Kansas v. Garcia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Kansas v. Glover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376,912
Kansas; Kahler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
Kaul, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057
Kaur v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Kaushal v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Ke v. Drexel Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1272
Keita v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
Kelly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079,1121
Kelly v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271
Kemp; Holland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Kenmark Ventures, LLC; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Kentucky; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Servs.; N. B. D. v. . . . . 1130
Kersey v. Herb Chambers 1186, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Key; Crick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Keyes, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Khan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Kia Motors America, Inc.; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Kilroy; In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
Kim; Peters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067
King, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
King; Brownback v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1293
King v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
King v. Neall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Kinney v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161

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Klein; Shields v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Klemm; Rotkiske v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
K. N. v. Montana Dept. of Public Health and Human Servs. . . . 909,1101
Knochel v. Mihaylo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Konieczko v. Adventist Health System/Sunbelt Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Kossie, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914,1201
Kouyate v. United States Customs and Border Protection . . . . . . 1097
Kretser, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043
K. S. v. Contra Costa Cty. Children and Family Servs. Bureau . . 909
K. V. v. Florida Dept. of Children and Families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Labor Union. See name of trade.
Land of Lincoln Mut. Health Ins. Co. v. United States . . . . . . . 912,1057
Law Offces of Nina Ringgold, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102,1201
Leff; T. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032,1101
Leonard, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167,1251
Lewis; Weeks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,1068
Kwasnik, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176
Lake v. Wilkie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1303
Lamprell v. Stuckey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Lancaster City Bureau of Police; Caterbone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Lang, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100
Langston v. Missouri Bd. of Probation and Parole . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Lantz; Everson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
La Rose; Stoutamire v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Larry, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Larson v. Champion Mortgage Co. of Tex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Larson v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Larson v. Pacheco. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Lasher v. Buchwald . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Lasher v. Nebraska State Bd. of Pharmacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Lasher v. Stavis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189
Laventure v. United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Law, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131
League of Women Voters of Mich.; Chatfeld v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031
Lee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190
Legrier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031
Lei Ke v. Drexel Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1272
Lepre v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905,1057
Levy Gardens Partners 2007, L. P. v. Lewis Title Co., Inc. . . . . . 1079
Lewis v. Farmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Lewis v. Lewis' Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Lewis; Mutond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Lewis v. Newburgh Housing Auth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Lewis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099,1163

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Lewis' Estate; Lewis v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Lewis Title Co., Inc.; Levy Gardens Partners 2007, L. P. v. . . . . . 1079
Libby, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Life Unlimited, Inc.; Black v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Lilliston Ford Inc.; Edmondson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1290
Lin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Linear Controls, Inc.; Peterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014
Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, L. L. P.; Johnson v. . . . . . . 1320
Linh Thi Minh Tran v. Stan the Hot Water Man . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Littles v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165,1262,1274
Liu v. DeCagna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079
Liu v. SEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
Lloyd v. Presby's Inspired Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Logan v. Windsor, N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Lomax v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031,1190
Londono-Gonzalez v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1291
Longmire v. Warshaw Burstein Cohen Schlesinger & Kuh, LLP 1130
Lopez, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263,1293
Lopez; Curry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913,1057
Lopez v. MUFG Union Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1290
Louisiana; Dahlem v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Louisiana; Hutchinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections; Abshire v. . . . . 1161
Loumena; Hettinga v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Love, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Lovett v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Lowery v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1304
Lu v. Stanford Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Lucas v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1303
Lucid Energy, Inc.; Rivera Rosado v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908,1200
Lucy v. Cooks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Ludwick; Schreiber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Lundy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131
Lussy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102,1247
Lynch, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121,1177
Maalouf v. Praetorian Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Macomb Cty., Mich.; Greiner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
Macy's, Inc.; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Madrid; Torres v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126,1262
Maehr v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Magistrate Ct. of Troup Cty., Ga.; Stone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Mahally; Wojnarowski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067

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Maine Community Health Options v. United States .
. . . . . . . . 912,1056
Makdessi, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043,1189
Maksimuk v. Connor Sport Court Int'l, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1290
Malachowski v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067
Mallard v. Next Day Temps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1303
Malvo; Mathena v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
Manasquan Savings Bank; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030
Maricopa Cty. Attorney's Offce; Taebel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Marr v. Inch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Marshall v. Steeh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Martin; Hercenberger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1303
Martin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Martinez, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263
Martinez; Ombe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Martinez-Covarrubias v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1290
Maryland; Kaur v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Marzan v. CoreCivic Correctional Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Massachusetts; Lomax v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Mathena v. Malvo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
Matsura v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Matthews; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Mattison, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
May, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
May v. Wilkie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Mayes v. Windom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore; BP P. L. C. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1040
Mazars USA, LLP; Trump v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079,1120,1274
McAleenan v. Batalla Vidal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
McAleenan v. Vidal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014
McBride, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915
McCants v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012
McCarthren v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
McCormick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
McCray, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274
McCrea v. District of Columbia Offce of Human Rights . . . . . . . . 1197
McCrea; Dutton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
McCumsey; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
McDonald, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043,1251
McFadden; McGee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
McGee v. McFadden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
McGinley; Spence v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
McGinley; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1291
McGirt v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119,1178,1200,1292
McGuire v. St. Louis Cty., Mo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247

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McIntosh v. Kirby .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100
Mesa; Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93,1013
Miami, Fla.; Bank of America Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041,1249
Mickens; Wimbush v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,1196
Mitchell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043,1163
Moda Health Plan, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912,1057
Mohorne v. Beal Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
McKesson v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1272
McKinney v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139,1067
McLaurine v. Bern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
McLeod, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177
McMillan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
McNeil, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
McNeil v. Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Medina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273
Meier v. Berger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Mendoza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Merck v. Minnesota Supreme Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
Mergenthaler v. Osekavage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Gossage v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Merryman v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Metcalf v. Kallis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Metzger; Riley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1320
Meyers v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Meyers v. Swiney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Miami, Fla.; Wells Fargo & Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
Michigan; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1290
Michigan; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Middlesex Cty. Bd. of Social Servs.; Birch-Min v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Miguel Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012
Mihaylo; Knochel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Miles; Munt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Miller v. Graham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Miller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Milliman v. Randall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Millis v. Kallis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Mims v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Minaya v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
Minh Tran v. Stan the Hot Water Man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Minnesota Supreme Court; Merck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
Mississippi; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263
Missouri Bd. of Probation and Parole; Langston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Mitchell v. Macy's, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Mnuchin; Sagar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1097

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Monasky v. Taglieri .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68,1042
Monroe; Boyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1290
Montana Dept. of Public Health and Human Servs.; K. N. v. . . 909,1101
Montana Dept. of Revenue; Espinoza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101,1130
Monsegue v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct.; Ford Motor Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Montgomery v. Walgreen Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Moon v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Moore v. Carr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067
Moore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Morales, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915
Moran, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177
Mordaga; Moretti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Moretti v. Bergen Cty. Prosecutor's Offce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Moretti v. Mordaga. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Morgan v. Morgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Morgan; Stoutamire v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Morris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165,1274
Morrissey-Berru; Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. . . . . . . . . 1126,1273
Morrow v. West Central Ga. Workforce Development Corp. . . . . . 1129
Moss v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1304
Mtaza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1291
Mua v. O'Neal Firm, LLP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
MUFG Union Bank, N. A.; Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1290
Munt v. Miles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Munt v. Roy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Muro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
Murphy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274
Mutond v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Myles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
N. v. Montana Dept. of Public Health and Human Servs. . . . . . 909,1101
NantKwest, Inc.; Peter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
National Assn., African Am.-Owned Media; Comcast Corp. v. . . 327,1014
NAACP; Trump v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013,1041
Narvaez, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915
Nasrallah v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030
National Assn., African Am.-Owned Media; Charter Com. v. . . . . 1291
NLRB; Westrum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1292
National R. Passenger Corp.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC; Larson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
N. B. D. v. Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Servs. . . . . . 1130
Neal; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Neall; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Neall; Xiao-Ying Yu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,1118

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Nebraska; Goynes v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013
Nebraska; McNeil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Nebraska State Bd. of Pharmacy; Lasher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Nelson v. Burt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Nelson v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Nelson; Smeaton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Nelson v. Transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189
Nelson; Wazney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1304
Nesbitt v. Frakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906,1130
Nestle USA, Inc. v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130
Nevada; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Nevels v. Piggly Wiggly Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Newburgh Housing Auth.; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
New Jersey Dept. of Labor & Workforce Dev.; Osbourne v. . . . . . 911
New Mexico; Texas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,1032,1130,1177,1273
Newsome v. RSL Funding, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
New York; Caswell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
New York; Department of Homeland Security v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173
New York, N. Y.; Diarra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
New York, N. Y.; New York State Rife & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. 911,1013
New York State Lottery; Rivas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
New York State Rife & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. New York, N. Y. . 911,1013
Next Day Temps; Mallard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1303
NFL v. Ninth Inning, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262
Ngo; Dummert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Nicassio v. Viacom Int'l, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Nieves v. Department of the Family of the Commonwealth of P. R. 1096
Ninth Inning, Inc.; NFL v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262
Nissan North America, Inc.; Booth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
North Carolina; Armstrong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
North Carolina; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1291
Norton v. Colgate Palmolive Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Nosair v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066
NuStar Energy Servs., Inc. v. ING Bank N. V. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030
Oak Knoll Village Condominium Owners Assn., Inc.; Jaye v. . . . . 1096
Oakland; Austin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Obama; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
Ocasio v. Perez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
O'Connor v. Wright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1292
Oduok v. Fulton DeKalb Hospital Auth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Oduok v. Grady Mem. Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Ogunsula v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Ogunsula v. Staffng Now, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Ohio; Kinney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161

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Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst.; Chabot v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst.; Householder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Oklahoma; McGirt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119,1178,1200,1292
Old Republic Nat. Title Ins. Co.; Cox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Ombe v. Martinez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
O'Neal Firm, LLP.; Mua v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Opati v. Republic of Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100
Oracle America, Inc.; Google LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066,1250
Ormond; Warren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1304
Ornalez, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132
Ortiz-Marquez; Lomax v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031,1190
Osbourne v. New Jersey Dept. of Labor & Workforce Dev. . . . . . 911
Osekavage; Mergenthaler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Ottah v. Fiat Chrysler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru . . . . . . . . . 1126,1273
Outokumpu Stainless USA; Converteam SAS v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100
Outokumpu Stainless USA; GE Energy Power Conversion v. . . . 1100
Owens v. Inch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Owens v. University of S. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177
Pacheco; Larson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Packard, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177
Pai; Qihui Huang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Palencia; Velasquez Perez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Palko; Rich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Palm Beach Park Assn.; Chodosh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
Palmer v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Palomarez, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131
Paramo; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Parish; Drake v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Parks, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121,1246
Parks v. Stolc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Parks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Parron v. Herbert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013
Patterson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043,1121
Patterson v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177
Pattishall v. Cerf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Paulisick; Coulter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Pazuniak Law Offce, LLC; Arunachalam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Pearson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Pearson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Pennsylvania; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Pennsylvania; Armstrong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1304
Pennsylvania; Donahue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126,1189
Pennsylvania; Lepre v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905,1057

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Pennsylvania; Little Sisters of the Poor v. .
. . . . . . . . . . 1165,1262,1274
Pennsylvania; Trump v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165,1262,1274
Pereida v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126,1200
Perez v. Diaz Palencia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Perez v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Perez; Ocasio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012
Peter v. NantKwest, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Peters v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905,1030,1101
Peters v. Young Sun Kim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067
Peterson; Banca UBAE, S. p. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Peterson; Bank Markazi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Peterson; Central Bank of Iran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Peterson; Clearstream Banking S. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Peterson v. Linear Controls, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014
Peterson; UnitedHealth Group Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040
Petko v. Carelton Courtyard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125
Petroleo Brasileiro S. A.-Petrobras v. Universities Superannuation
Scheme Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012
Peyton; Kam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Pharmaceutical Care Mgmt. Assn.; Rutledge v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1250
Philadelphia, Pa.; Fulton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Philipp v. Federal Republic of Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Philippe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Phillips v. DeKalb Cty. Assistant Public Defenders . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Picard; HSBC Holdings PLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101
Piccone v. Supreme Ct. of Pa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Pierce v. Garrett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Pierson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262
Piggly Wiggly Corp.; Nevels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Pihl & Son; Carswell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100
Pima Cty., Ariz.; Webb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Pineda; Bartlett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Pittman v. DAL Global Servs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013
Pompeo; Ammiyhuwd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Porter v. Baltimore Wash. Medical Center, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Pouncy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102
Powe v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Praetorian Ins. Co.; Maalouf v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Pratt v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Presby's Inspired Life; Lloyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
President of United States v. NAACP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013,1041
President of United States v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . 1165,1262,1274
Pressley; Wells v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910

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Price; Herrera v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Public.Resource.Org, Inc.; Georgia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Puzey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Qihui Huang v. Pai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Qing Liu v. DeCagna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079
Raburn; Rubio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Raghubir, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014,1163
Raghubir v. Inch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162,1249
Raghubir v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Raimondo v. Hood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188
Rajapakse v. Credit Acceptance Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101
Ram v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Rams Football Co., LLC v. St. Louis Regional Convention . . . . . 1012
Randall, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011,1166
Randall; Milliman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Randolph v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Rashid v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,1101
Rauso v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Raven Elec., Inc.; Burke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Rawnsley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Ray; Walton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Raymond v. Roy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Rebenstorf v. Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1304
Reddick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Regents of Univ. of Cal.; Department of Homeland Security v. 1013,1041
Regents of Univ. of Minn.; Jun Xiao v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
Reina S. C., In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Renchenski, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1305
Rental Maintenance, Inc.; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Republican Nat. Comm. v. Democratic Nat. Comm. . . . . . . . . . . . 423
Republic of Hungary v. Simon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Republic of Sudan; Opati v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100
Retirement Plans Comm. of IBM v. Jander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49,1014
Reynolds, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131
Reynolds v. Circuit Ct. of Ky., Laurel Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Reynolds v. Hepp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Rhines; In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043
Rhines v. South Dakota Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Rhodes v. Swarth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189
Rich v. Palko . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Richards v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Richmond, Va.; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Riley v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1320
Riley v. Metzger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1320

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Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35,1032
Rivas v. New York State Lottery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Rivera Cruz, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915
Rivera Rosado v. Lucid Energy, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908,1200
Riverside Presbyterian Apartments; Haynes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
Roach v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Roadhouse Holding Inc.; English v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Roane; Barr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Roberson v. Rowlett Police Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Roberts, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915
Roberts v. Inservco Ins. Servs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Roberts v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173
Robertson v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Robinson v. Dore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
Robinson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Robinson v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Robinson v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Robinson v. Rental Maintenance, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Robinson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Robinson v. Warden, Federal Correctional Institution, Fort Dix 1078
Robitaille; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262
Rochester v. Fortune Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Rockwood Casualty v. Director, Offce of Workers' Comp. Progs. 1292
Rodriguez v. FDIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Rodriguez; Swartz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Rodriguez Ornalez, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132
Rodriguez-Santana v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Rogero v. Azar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Rollins v. Institutions for Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Roman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914,1119
Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Chicago; Rosas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan v. Acevedo Feliciano . . 57
Romero, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Rooney v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Root; Adelman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Rope v. Facebook, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Rosa, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166,1201
Rosado v. Lucid Energy, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908,1200
Rosas v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Chicago . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Rosenwasser v. Fordham Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Rotkiske v. Klemm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Rotte v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Rotz; Battles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911

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Rowlett Police Dept.; Roberson v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Roy; Munt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Roy; Raymond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Rozberil; Scheib v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
RSL Funding, LLC; Newsome v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Rubang v. Gallagher Bassett Servs., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057
Rubang v. United Airlines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101
Rubin v. Sanchez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Rubio v. Raburn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Ruiz-Rivera., In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915
Rupak v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Russell v. First Resolution Investment Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Russell; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Russo v. June Medical Servs. L. L. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical Care Mgmt. Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1250
S. v. Contra Costa Cty. Children and Family Servs. Bureau . . . . . 909
Sackler; Arizona v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100
St. James School v. Biel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1273
Saul; Watson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910,1165
Scalia; Donahue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1304
Sacramento; Wimberley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1320
Saenz; Derringer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Sagar v. Mnuchin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
St. Louis Cty., Mo.; McGuire v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
St. Louis Regional Convention; Rams Football Co., LLC v. . . . . . 1012
Salazar v. HEB Grocery Co., LP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Salerno, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Salinas v. United States R. Retirement Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1200
Salzwedel v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1290
Samuels; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
Sanchez; Rubin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Sanders v. Obama. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
San Diego Cty. Counsel; Howard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Sang Hing Wong, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Sankara v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Santa v. Herr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177
Santiago v. Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Saul; Brockington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Saul; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
Saul; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Saul; Valent v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Saul; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
Sault Ste. Marie Tribe; Buchwald Capital Advisors LLC v. . . . . . 1303
Sawicky v. AMC Networks Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913,1162

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Schafer, In re .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043,1102
Scheib v. Rozberil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Schmidt v. Herbert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031
Schneider v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Schreiber v. Ludwick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Schwartzmiller v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Schwertz v. Jennings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1291
Scott v. Jimenez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Scranage v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Secretary of Health and Human Servs.; Rogero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Secretary of Labor; Donahue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1304
Secretary of State; Ammiyhuwd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Secretary of Treasury; Sagar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Babb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399,1164
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Conyers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Lake v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1303
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; May v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Toole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
SEC; Liu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
Seibert, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Seibert v. Caldwell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Prot. Bur. . . . 1031,1041,1101,1190
Serna v. Webster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1290
Severson; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Shao v. Tsan-Kuen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
Sharbutt v. Vasquez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100
Sharpe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1290
Shaw v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Sheftall v. Joyner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Shepard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Sheppard v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119,1163
Shields v. Klein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Shimari; CACI Premier Technology, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178
Shipman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057
Shove v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273
Shular v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154,912
Sierra Club, Inc.; United States Fish and Wildlife Serv. v. . . . . . . 1251
Sikes v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Silberman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177
Silva-Ramirez v. Hospital Espanol Auxilio Mutuo de P. R., Inc. 1172
Simmons v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Simon v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172

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Simon; Republic of Hungary v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Simons; Cherry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Simpson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131
Sinceno v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Singh; Dixit v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Sloop; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099
Smeaton v. Nelson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Smiley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Smith, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014,1032,1177,1178
Smith v. Chapdelaine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1320
Smith v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274
Smith v. Haynes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1303
Smith v. Illinois Dept. of Transp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1292
Smith v. Inch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Smith; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Smith v. Manasquan Savings Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030
Smith v. Matthews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Smith v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1291
Smith v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Smith v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079,1320
Smith v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273,1303
Smith v. Wilkie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Sneller, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915
Solomon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Sonnier v. Catholic Foundation of the Diocese of Lafayette . . . . . 1172
Soto Nieves v. Department of the Fam. of the Commw. of P. R. 1096
South Carolina; Wazney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1291
South Dakota Dept. of Corrections; Rhines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Southerland; Howell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Spence, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914,1119
Spence v. McGinley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Spencer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178,1291
Stacy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012
Staffng Now, Inc.; Ogunsula v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Stanford v. Clayton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Stanford Univ.; Lu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Stan the Hot Water Man; Linh Thi Minh Tran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Staszak, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058,1189
Stavis; Lasher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189
Steeh; Marshall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Steel; Goad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Steele, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080,1246
Stephens v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Stewart, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914,1077

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Stewart; Watson v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013
Stewart; Woods v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Stolc; Parks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Stone, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Stone v. Magistrate Ct. of Troup Cty., Ga. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Stoutamire v. La Rose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Stoutamire v. Morgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Stover; Chi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
Strother v. Baldwin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Stuckey; Lamprell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Stucks, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915
Sudan; Opati v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100
Sulyma; Intel Corp. Investment Policy Comm. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 178,1057
Summerhays v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Sundy v. Christian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1291
Sun Kim; Peters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067
Superintendent of penal or correctional institution. See name or
title of superintendent.
Superior Ct. of Cal., Los Angeles Cty.; Cooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Superior Ct. of Cal., San Bernardino Cty.; Yaney v. . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Superior Ct. of Pa.; Donahue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Supreme Ct. of Ga.; Jefferson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165,1303
Supreme Ct. of Pa.; Piccone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Surles, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Sutton, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190
Sutton; Joiner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Swarth; Rhodes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189
Swartz v. Rodriguez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
Swiney; Meyers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
T. A. v. Leff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032,1101
Taebel v. Ducey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Taebel v. Maricopa Cty. Attorney's Offce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Taglieri; Monasky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68,1042
Tamez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Tanvir; Tanzin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078,1130
Tanzin v. Tanvir . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078,1130
Tapia-Fierro v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1290
Tate; Viola v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,1079
Taylor v. Neal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Tchibassa, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915
TCT Mobile Int'l Ltd., In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Texas v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Texas; California v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166,1251
Texas; Lovett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246

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Texas v. New Mexico .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,1032,1130,1177,1273
Texas; Randolph v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Texas; Roberts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173
Texas; Sheppard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119,1163
Texas; United States House of Representatives v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Texas Dept. of Family and Protective Servs.; D. B. v. . . . . . . . . . 1261
Texas Dept. of Family and Protective Servs.; Fortes v. . . . . . . . . 1291
Thi Minh Tran v. Stan the Hot Water Man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100
Thomas, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274
Thomas v. Court of Common Pleas of Pa., Union Cty. . . . . . . . . . 1164
Thomas v. Kenmark Ventures, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Thomas v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Thomas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012
Thomas More Law Center v. Becerra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Thompson v. Hebdon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Thompson v. McGinley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1291
Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Technologies, LP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Thuraissigiam; Department of Homeland Security v. . . . . . . . . . . 1030
Tiburcio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Toole v. Wilkie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Tootle v. Beaux Art Institute of Plastic Surgery . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1291
Torres, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Torres v. Continental Apartments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Torres v. Madrid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126,1262
Touma v. General Counsel of the Regents of the Univ. of Cal. . . . 1188
Town. See name of town.
Townsend v. Vasquez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Tran v. Stan the Hot Water Man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Transit; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189
Trudeau v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Truesdale v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011,1246
Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1274
Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079,1120,1274
Trump v. NAACP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013,1041
Trump v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165,1262,1274
Trump v. Vance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1200,1274
Tsan-Kuen; Shao v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
Tucker v. Corizon Correctional Health Care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Tuttle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Tweed, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Ugwuonye, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177
Uncapher, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102
United. For labor union. See name of trade.

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United Airlines; Biton v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
United Airlines, Inc.; Alessio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
United Airlines, Inc.; Rubang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101
UnitedHealth Group Inc. v. Peterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040
United Nations; Laventure v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
United States. See name of other party.
U. S. Bank N. A.; Thole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100
U. S. Bankruptcy Court; Amerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
United States Customs and Border Protection; Kouyate v. . . . . . 1097
U. S. District Court; Armstrong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907,1096,1097
U. S. District Court; Arunachalam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901,1097
U. S. District Court; Butler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
U. S. District Court; Corbitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
U. S. District Court; Patterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177
U. S. District Court; Raghubir v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
U. S. District Court; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079,1320
U. S. District Court; Viola v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079
U. S. District Court; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
U. S. District Judge; Hudson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
U. S. District Judge; Lasher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
U. S. District Judge; Raimondo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188
United States Fish and Wildlife Serv. v. Sierra Club, Inc. . . . . . . 1251
United States Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Preserv. Assn. 1189
United States House of Representatives v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
United States Patent and Trademark Offce v. Booking.com B. V. 1055
United States R. Retirement Bd.; Salinas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1200
Universities Superannuation Scheme Ltd.; Petroleo Brasileiro
S. A.-Petrobras v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012
University of Kan.; Harsay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
University of S. C.; Owens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177
Upshaw v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100
Utah; Fowler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Utah; Velasquez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
V. v. Florida Dept. of Children and Families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Valencia v. Davey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Valent v. Saul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Valentine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Vance; Trump v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1200,1274
Vanderburg, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Vannoy; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Vannoy; Richards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Vannoy; Simmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Vannoy; Sinceno v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Vannoy; Wills v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130

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Page
Vasquez; Sharbutt v. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100
Vidal; McAleenan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014,1041
Washington; Chiafalo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165,1178,1250,1270
Washington; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273,1303
Watt, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Vasquez; Townsend v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Vazquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Velasquez v. Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Velasquez Perez v. Diaz Palencia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Vernon v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Verrilli; Biton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Veteto, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Veteto v. Griffn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128,1262
Viacom Int'l, Inc.; Nicassio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Viera v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Villalona v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Viola v. Tate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,1079
Viola v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079
Virginia; Armstrong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Virginia; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Virginia; Fortune v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Walgreen Co.; Montgomery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Walker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042,1066,1118,1121,1173
Wallace, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274
Walsh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1304
Waltner v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Walton v. Ray. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Walton; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Warden. See also name of warden.
Warden, Federal Correctional Institution, Fort Dix; Robinson v. 1078
Warren, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080
Warren v. Ormond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1304
Warshaw Burstein Cohen Schlesinger & Kuh, LLP; Longmire v. 1130
Washington v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Washington; Du Ju v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Washington; Roach v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Washington v. Saul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
Washington Cty., Ore.; Cunningham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Wasson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
Watkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031
Watson v. Godert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
Watson v. Saul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910,1165
Watson v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013
Wazney v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161,1246

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Wazney v. Nelson .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1304
Wazney v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1291
Wazney v. Wazney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Webb v. Pima Cty., Ariz. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Webster; Serna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1290
Webster v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Weeks v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,1068
Wei Zhou, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131,1263
Wells; Dawson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
Wells v. Pressley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.; Forquer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.; Helms v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Miami, Fla. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
West v. Bryant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
West Central Ga. Workforce Development Corp.; Morrow v. . . . . 1129
West Gulf Maritime Assn.; Duriso v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Westrum v. NLRB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1292
West Virginia; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Wetzel; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
White; Ford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131
White; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271
White v. Sloop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099
White v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011,1056,1100
Wilkie; Babb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399,1164
Wilkie; Conyers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Wilkie; Lake v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1303
Wilkie; May v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Wilkie; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Wilkie; Toole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Wilkinson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Williams, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912,914,1058
Williams v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Williams v. Inch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Williams v. National R. Passenger Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Williams v. Paramo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Williams v. Samuels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
Williams v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Williams v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Willis; Barrow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Wills v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130
Wilmore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Wilson v. Apex Reporting Group, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Wilson v. Chesapeake, Va. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125

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xliii
Page
Wilson v. Russell .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
Wimbush, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032,1131
Xiao-Ying Yu v. Neall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,1118
Zhou, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131,1263
Zimmermann, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913,1068,1161
Wimberley v. Sacramento. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1320
Wimbush v. Mickens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,1196
Windom; Mayes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273
Windsor v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Windsor, N. Y.; Logan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Wisconsin; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Wojnarowski v. Mahally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067
Wolf; Adebowale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Wolf v. Cook Cty., Ill. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190
Wolf v. Innovation Law Lab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271
Wong, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Woodberry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Woods v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261
Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd.; Barnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
Worthington, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131
Wright v. Holley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Wright; O'Connor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1292
Wright v. West Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Wroten, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131
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Xiao v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270
Xiaohua Huang v. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012
Xiao Qing Liu v. DeCagna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079
Xing Lin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
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Yaney v. Superior Ct. of Cal., San Bernardino Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . 907
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Young Sun Kim; Peters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067
Yu v. Neall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,1118
Zamore v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270

C
ASES ADJUDGED
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AT
OCTOBER TERM, 2019

154 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
Syllabus
SHULAR v. UNITED STATES
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 18–6662. Argued January 21, 2020—Decided February 26, 2020
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) mandates a 15-year minimum
sentence for a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a
frearm who has at least three convictions for “serious drug offense[s].”
18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(1). A state offense ranks as a “serious drug offense”
only if it “involv[es] manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with
i ntent to manufac ture or distr ibute, a control led subst ance. ”
§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).
To determine whether an offender's prior convictions qualify for
ACCA enhancement, this Court has used a “categorical approach,” look-
ing “only to the statutory defnitions of the prior offenses.” Taylor v.
United States, 495 U. S. 575, 600. Under some statutes, a court employ-
ing a categorical approach must come up with a “generic” version of a
crime—that is, the elements of the offense as commonly understood.
The court then determines whether the elements of the offense of con-
viction match those of the generic crime. Other statutes, which ask the
court to determine whether the conviction meets some other criterion,
require no such generic-offense analysis.
Shular pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a frearm and
received a 15-year sentence, the mandatory minimum under ACCA. In
imposing this sentence, the District Court held that Shular's six prior
cocaine-related convictions under Florida law qualifed as “serious drug
offense[s]” triggering ACCA enhancement. The Eleventh Circuit af-
frmed, concluding that § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)'s “serious drug offense” defni-
tion does not require a comparison to a generic offense.
Held: Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)'s “serious drug offense” defnition requires
only that the state offense involve the conduct specifed in the statute;
it does not require that the state offense match certain generic offenses.
Pp. 160–165.
(a) The parties agree that § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) requires a categorical ap-
proach. They differ, however, on what comparison the statute requires.
In the Government's view, § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) identifes conduct a court
should compare directly against the state crime's elements. In Shular's
view, § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) identifes generic offenses whose elements a court
must frst expound, then compare against the state crime's elements.
Pp. 160–161.

Cite
as: 589 U. S. 154 (2020)
155
Syllabus
(b) The statutory text and context show that § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) refers
to
conduct, not offenses. In two respects, § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) contrasts
with neighboring § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), which refers to a crime that “is bur-
glary, arson, or extortion” and calls for the generic-offense analysis that
Shular urges. First, the terms in § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)—“manufacturing,
distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a
controlled substance”—can be used to describe conduct. Unlike “bur-
glary,” “arson,” and “extortion,” those terms do not unambiguously
name offenses. Second, by speaking of activities a state-law drug of-
fense “involv[es],” § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) suggests that the descriptive terms
immediately following the word “involving ” identify conduct. To refer
to offenses, it would have been far more natural for the drafter to follow
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) in using “is.” Pp. 161–162.
(c) Shular argues that Congress meant to capture the drug offenses
generally existing in state laws at the time of § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)'s enact-
ment. But he admits that those state laws lacked common nomencla-
ture. The evident solution was for Congress to identify offenses by the
conduct involved, not by the name of the offenses. Shular offers no
persuasive explanation for why Congress would have chosen “involving ”
over “is” to refer to offenses. Nor do the other ACCA provisions on
which Shular relies shed light on whether § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) refers to con-
duct or offenses. Pp. 162–164.
(d) Rejecting a generic-offense approach, Shular contends, would sub-
ject defendants to ACCA enhancement based on outlier state laws. He
emphasizes that the Florida drug offenses of which he was convicted do
not require, as an element, knowledge of the illicit nature of the con-
trolled substance. But Shular overstates the extent to which Florida
law is idiosyncratic, for if a defendant asserts that he was unaware of
the substance's illicit nature, the jury must fnd knowledge beyond a
reasonable doubt. In any event, Shular's interpretation is scarcely the
only one that promotes consistency. Congress intended consistent ap-
plication of ACCA to all offenders who engaged—according to the ele-
ments of their prior convictions—in certain conduct. Pp. 164–165.
(e) The rule of lenity has no application here, for after consulting tra-
ditional canons of interpretation there remains no ambiguity for the rule
of lenity to resolve. P. 165.
736 Fed. Appx. 876, affrmed.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Kava-
naugh, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 166.
Richard M. Summa argued the cause for petitioner.
With h i m on the br iefs were Rando lph P. Mur rell,

156 SHULAR
v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
Je ff rey T. G reen, Da v i d W. M cAl o o n, and Su san E.
Pro
venzano.
Jonathan C. Bond argued the cause for the United States.
With him on the brief were Solicitor General Francisco, As-
sistant Attorney General Benczkowski, Eric J. Feigin, and
David M. Lieberman.*
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U. S. C.
§ 924(e), mandates a 15-year minimum sentence of imprison-
ment for certain defendants with prior convictions for a “se-
rious drug offense.” A state offense ranks as a “serious
drug offense” only if it “involv[es] manufacturing, distribut-
ing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute,
a controlled substance.” § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). This case con-
cerns the methodology courts use to apply that defnition.
While the parties agree that a court should look to the
state offense's elements, they disagree over what the court
should measure those elements against. In the Govern-
ment's view, the court should ask whether those elements
involve the conduct identifed in § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)—namely,
“manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to
manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” Peti-
tioner Eddie Lee Shular, however, contends that the terms
employed in the statute identify not conduct, but offenses.
In his view, those terms are shorthand for the elements of
the offenses as commonly understood. According to Shular,
the court must frst identify the elements of the “generic”
offense, then ask whether the elements of the state offense
match those of the generic crime.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American
Immigration Lawyers Association et al. by Sui Chung, Ira J. Kurzban,
and Michael S. Vastine; for FAMM by David Debold, Avi Weitzman, Lee
R. Crain, Mary Price, and Peter Goldberger; and for the National Associa-
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Caitlin J. Halligan and Jonathan
D. Hacker.

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157
Opinion of the Court
Under the approach he advances, Shular argues, his sen-
tence
is not subject to ACCA enhancement. The generic
offenses named in § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), as Shular understands
them, include a mens rea element of knowledge that the sub-
stance is illicit. He emphasizes that his prior convictions
were for state offenses that do not make knowledge of
the substance's illegality an element of the offense; the state
offenses, he therefore maintains, do not match the generic
offenses in § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).
The question presented: Does § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)'s “serious
drug offense” defnition call for a comparison to a generic
offense? We hold it does not. The “serious drug offense”
defnition requires only that the state offense involve the
conduct specifed in the federal statute; it does not require
that the state offense match certain generic offenses.
I
Ordinarily, a defendant convicted of being a felon in pos-
session of a frearm, in violation of § 922(g)(1), faces a maxi-
mum sentence of ten years. § 924(a)(2). If the offender's
prior criminal record includes at least three convictions
for “serious drug offense[s]” or “violent felon[ies],” how-
ever, ACCA mandates a minimum sentence of 15 years.
§ 924(e)(1).
To determine whether an offender's prior convictions qual-
ify for ACCA enhancement, we have used a “categorical ap-
proach,” under which we look “only to the statutory defni-
tions of the prior offenses.” Taylor v. United States, 495
U. S. 575, 600 (1990). Under this approach, we consider nei-
ther “the particular facts underlying the prior convictions”
nor “the label a State assigns to [the] crime[s].” Mathis v.
United States, 579 U. S. 500, 509–510 (2016) (internal quota-
tion marks and alterations omitted). So, for example, to ap-
ply ACCA's provision defning “violent felony” to include “bur-
glary,” § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), we ask only whether the elements of
the prior conviction constitute burglary; we do not ask what

158 SHULAR
v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
the person did or whether the offense of conviction was
named
“burglary.”
Under some statutes, using a categorical approach re-
quires the court to come up with a “generic” version of a
crime—that is, the elements of “the offense as commonly un-
derstood,” id., at 503.
1
We have required that step when
the statute refers generally to an offense without specifying
its elements. In that situation, the court must defne the
offense so that it can compare elements, not labels. For ex-
ample, in Taylor, confronted with ACCA's unadorned refer-
ence to “burglary,” we identifed the elements of “generic
burglary” based on the “sense in which the term is now used
in the criminal codes of most States.” 495 U. S., at 598–599;
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). We then inquired whether the elements of
the offense of conviction matched those of the generic crime.
Id., at 602. See also, e. g., Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions,
581 U. S. 385, 390 (2017) (“generic federal defnition of sexual
abuse of a minor” for purposes of 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)).
In contrast, other statutes calling for a categorical ap-
proach ask the court to determine not whether the prior con-
viction was for a certain offense, but whether the conviction
meets some other criterion. For example, in Kawashima v.
Holder, 565 U. S. 478 (2012), we applied a categorical ap-
proach to a statute assigning immigration consequences to
prior convictions for “an offense that . . . involves fraud or
deceit” with a loss exceeding $10,000. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).
The quoted language, we held, “mean[s] offenses with ele-
ments that necessarily entail fraudulent or deceitful con-
duct.” Id., at 484 (emphasis added). Consequently, no
identifcation of generic-offense elements was necessary; we
simply asked whether the prior convictions before us met
1
We have also used the term “generic crime” to mean the crime “in
general” as opposed to “the specifc acts in which an offender engaged on
a specifc occasion.” Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U. S. 29, 33–34 (2009).
That is not the sense in which we use “generic” in this opinion.

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159
Opinion of the Court
that measure. Id., at 483–485. See also, e. g., Stokeling v.
U
nited States, 586 U. S. 73, 85–86 (2019) (determining
whether an offense “has as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of
another,” 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)).
This case invites us to decide which of the two categorical
methodologies just described applies in determining whether
a state offense is a “serious drug offense” under ACCA.
ACCA defnes that term to include:
“an offense under State law, involving manufacturing,
distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture
or distribute, a controlled substance (as defned in sec-
tion 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U. S. C.
[§] 802)), for which a maximum term of imprisonment of
ten years or more is prescribed by law.” 18 U. S. C.
§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).
II
Shular pleaded guilty in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida to possessing a frearm
after having been convicted of a felony, in violation of
§ 922(g)(1), and possessing with intent to distribute cocaine
and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(C). The District Court sentenced Shular to imprison-
ment for 15 years, the mandatory minimum under ACCA, to
be followed by three years of supervised release.
In imposing that enhanced sentence, the District Court
took account of Shular's prior convictions under Florida law.
In 2012, Shular pleaded guilty to fve counts of selling co-
caine and one count of possessing cocaine with intent to sell,
all in violation of Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a). That law makes
it a crime to “sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with
intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled sub-
stance.” Ibid. For those offenses, “knowledge of the illicit
nature of a controlled substance is not an element,” but lack

160 SHULAR
v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
of such knowledge “is an affrmative defense.” § 893.101(2).
Shu
lar's six convictions under that Florida law, the District
Court concluded, qualifed as “serious drug offense[s]” trigger-
ing ACCA enhancement under 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit affrmed the sentence. 736 Fed. Appx. 876 (2018).
It relied on Circuit precedent holding that a court applying
§ 924(e)(2)(A)( i i) “ need not search for the elements of
`generic' defnitions” of any offense, because the statute
“require[s] only that the predicate offense `involv[e]' . . . cer-
tain activities.” United States v. Smith, 775 F. 3d 1262,
1267 (2014).
Courts of Appeals have divided on whether § 924(e)(2)
(A)(ii)'s “serious drug offense” defnition requires a compari-
son to a generic offense. Compare, e. g., id., at 1267 (no
generic-offense comparison), with United States v. Franklin,
904 F. 3d 793, 800 (CA9 2018) (court must defne a generic
crime). We granted certiorari to resolve this confict, 588
U. S. 920 (2019), and now affrm the Eleventh Circuit's
judgment.
III
A
The parties here agree that § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) requires a cat-
egorical approach. A court must look only to the state
offense's elements, not the facts of the case or labels pinned
to the state conviction.
They differ, however, on what comparison § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)
requires. Shular would require “a generic-offense matching
exercise”: A court should defne the elements of the generic
offenses identifed in § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), then compare those
elements to the elements of the state offense. Brief for Peti-
tioner 13–14. In the Government's view, a court should
apply “the Kawashima categorical approach”: It should ask
whether the state offense's elements “necessarily entail one

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161
Opinion of the Court
of the types of conduct” identifed in § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Brief
for
United States 13, 20 (emphasis added).
This methodological dispute is occasioned by an interpre-
tive disagreement over § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)'s reference to “man-
ufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manu-
facture or distribute, a controlled substance.” Those terms,
in the Government's view, describe conduct a court can com-
pare directly against the state crime's elements. Shular
sees them instead as offenses whose elements a court must
frst expound.
B
The Government's reading, we are convinced, correctly
interprets the statutory text and context. Two features of
§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), compared against a neighboring provision
referring to offenses, § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), show that § 924(e)(2)
(A)(ii) refers to conduct.
First, the terms in § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)—“manufacturing, dis-
tributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or
distribute, a controlled substance”—are unlikely names for
generic offenses. Those words undoubtedly can be used to
describe conduct. But as Shular acknowledges, they are not
universal names of offenses; instead, States defne “core drug
offenses with all manner of terminology, including: traffck-
ing, selling, giving, dispensing, distributing, delivering, pro-
moting, and producing.” Reply Brief 7.
Contrast § 924(e)(2)(A)( i i) w ith § 924(e)(2)(B)( i i), the
enumerated-offense clause of ACCA's “violent felony” def-
nition, appearing in the same section of the Career Criminals
Amendment Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 3207–39 to 3207–40. That
provision, which refers to a crime that “is burglary, arson, or
extortion,” requires a generic-offense analysis. See Mathis,
579 U. S., at 503. The terms “burglary,” “arson,” and “ex-
tortion”—given their common-law history and widespread
usage—unambiguously name offenses. Cf., e. g., Taylor, 495
U. S., at 590–599 (discussing “burglary”). Drug offenses,

162 SHULAR
v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
Shular admits, lack “the same heritage and the same estab-
l
ished lexicon.” Brief for Petitioner 14.
Second, by speaking of activities a state-law drug offense
“involv[es],” § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) suggests that the descriptive
terms immediately following the word “involving ” identify
conduct. The parties agree that “involve” means “necessar-
ily requir[e].” Brief for Petitioner 14 (citing Random House
Dictionary of the English Language 1005 (2d ed. 1987) (“to
include as a necessary circumstance, condition, or conse-
quence”)); Brief for United States 21 (same). It is natural to
say that an offense “involves” or “requires” certain conduct.
E. g., § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (addressing a crime “involv[ing] con-
duct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another”); Mathis, 579 U. S., at 507 (“The generic offense
[of burglary] requires unlawful entry into a building or other
structure.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
To refer to offenses as Shular urges, it would have been
far more natural for the drafter to follow the enumerated-
offense clause in using “is,” not “involving.” See § 924(e)
(2)(B)(ii) (crime that “is burglary, arson, or extortion”).
There, the word “is” indicates a congruence between “crime”
and the terms that follow, terms that are also crimes. See
American Heritage Dictionary 114 (def. 7a) (1981) (“To equal
in meaning or identity”). Yet Congress did not adopt that
formulation in § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), opting instead for language
suited to conduct.
C
Shular principally urges that at the time of § 924(e)(2)
(A)(ii)'s enactment, federal and state criminal laws widely pro-
hibited the “core conduct” of manufacturing, distributing, and
possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute drugs.
Brief for Petitioner 10–12. Some laws, Shular observes, used
those very terms. See, e. g., 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1) (1982 ed.).
But even if the substance of state drug laws was well estab-
lished—rather than their nomenclature, which Shular con-

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163
Opinion of the Court
cedes was not—Congress could capture that substance by ref-
erence
to conduct, rather than offenses.
Shular points out that the word “involving ” can accommo-
date a generic-offense approach. Cf. Scheidler v. National
Organization for Women, Inc., 537 U. S. 393, 409 (2003) (“act
or threat involving . . . extortion,” 18 U. S. C. § 1961(1), con-
templates “ `generic' extortion” (some internal quotation
marks omitted)). But we have no reason to think Congress
intended that approach for § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)—which uses no
deeply rooted offense name like “extortion” and contrasts
w ith the offense-or iented lang uage of a neighbor i ng
provision.
Endeavoring to explain why Congress might have chosen
“involving ” over “is” in § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), Shular suggests
that variation in state drug-offense terminology required a
word more approximate than “is.” But if Congress was
concerned that state drug offenses lacked clear, universally
employed names, the evident solution was to identify them
instead by conduct. Using “involving ” rather than “is” does
not clarify that the terms are names of offenses; quite the
opposite. See supra, at 162.
Shular asserts that to describe conduct rather than of-
fenses, Congress would have used the language of the
elements clause of the “violent felony” defnition, which cap-
tures a crime that “has as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of
another.” § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added). It would have
been awkward, however, to describe “possessing with intent
to manufacture or distribute”—requiring both possession
and intent—as “an element.” Congress may also have
wanted to clarify that the state offense need not include the
identifed conduct as a formal element. Cf. Kawashima, 565
U. S., at 483–484 (the statutory phrase “an offense that . . .
involves fraud or deceit” “is not limited to offenses that
include fraud or deceit as formal elements” but extends to
offenses “that necessarily entail fraudulent or deceitful

164 SHULAR
v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
conduct”). Whatever the reason, Congress' choice not to
descr
ibe each term in § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) as “an element” nei-
ther refutes that those terms refer to conduct nor shows that
they refer to offenses.
Nor does the other clause of the “serious drug offense”
defnition shed light on the question before us. Section
924(e)(2)(A)(i) includes as “serious drug offenses” “offense[s]
under” specifc portions of the U. S. Code.
2
That provision,
Shular observes, refers to fully defned crimes. But “the
divergent text of the two prov isi ons” of the ser i ous-
drug-offense defnition, as the Government explains, “makes
any divergence in their application unremarkable.” Brief
for United States 22. Congress' decision to identify federal
offenses by reference to the U. S. Code does not speak to
whether it identifed state offenses by reference to named
offenses or conduct.
D
Shular expresses concern that rejecting a generic-offense
approach would yield an anomalous result. Unlike other
drug laws, Shular contends, the Florida law under which he
was previously convicted does not require that the defendant
know the substance is illicit. Unless § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) takes
into account all the elements of the offense as commonly un-
derstood, Shular maintains, defendants would face ACCA en-
hancement based on outlier state laws.
As an initial matter, Shular overstates Florida's disregard
for mens rea. Charged under Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a), a
defendant unaware of the substance's illicit nature can raise
that unawareness as an affrmative defense, in which case
the standard jury instructions require a fnding of knowledge
beyond a reasonable doubt. § 893.101(2); Fla. Crim. Jury
2
Section 924(e)(2)(A)(i) provides that the term “serious drug offense”
includes “an offense under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U. S. C.
[§] 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21
U. S. C. [§] 951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of title 46 for which a maximum
term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.”

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165
Opinion of the Court
Instr. § 25.2 (2020) (online source archived at www.supreme
cour
t.gov).
In any event, both parties' interpretations of 18 U. S. C.
§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) achieve a measure of consistency. Resolv-
ing this case requires us to determine which form of con-
sistency Congress intended: application of ACCA to all
offenders who engaged in certain conduct or to all who
committed certain generic offenses (in either reading, judg-
ing only by the elements of their prior convictions). For
the reasons explained, we are persuaded that Congress
chose the former.
E
Shular urges us to apply the rule of lenity in determin-
ing whether § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) requires a generic-offense-
matching analysis. The rule “applies only when, after con-
sulting traditional canons of statutory construction, we are
left with an ambiguous statute.” United States v. Shabani,
513 U. S. 10, 17 (1994). Here, we are left with no ambiguity
for the rule of lenity to resolve. Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)'s
text and context leave no doubt that it refers to an offense
involving the conduct of “manufacturing, distributing, or
possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a con-
trolled substance.” Because those terms describe conduct
and do not name offenses, a court applying § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)
need not delineate the elements of generic offenses.
3
***
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit is
Affrmed.
3
Shular argues in the alternative that even if § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) does not
call for a generic-offense-matching analysis, it requires knowledge of the
substance's illicit nature. See Brief for Petitioner 23; Reply Brief 8–10.
We do not address that argument. Not only does it fall outside the ques-
tion presented, Pet. for Cert. i, Shular disclaimed it at the certiorari stage,
Supp. Brief for Petitioner 3.

166 SHULAR
v. UNITED STATES
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
Justice Kavanaugh, concurring.
I
join the Court's opinion in full. In Part III–E of the
opinion, the Court rejects Shular's argument for applying
the rule of lenity. I write separately to elaborate on why
the rule of lenity does not apply here.
This Court's longstanding precedents establish that the
rule of lenity applies when two conditions are met.
First, as the Court today says and as the Court has repeat-
edly held, a court may invoke the rule of lenity only “ `after
consulting traditional canons of statutory construction.' ”
Ante, at 165 (quoting United States v. Shabani, 513 U. S. 10,
17 (1994)).
1
In other words, a court must frst employ all of
the traditional tools of statutory interpretation, and a court
may resort to the rule of lenity only “ `after seizing every-
thing from which aid can be derived.' ” Ocasio v. United
States, 578 U. S. 282, 295, n. 8 (2016) (quoting Muscarello v.
United States, 524 U. S. 125, 138–139 (1998)). In summariz-
ing the case law, Justice Scalia underscored that the rule of
lenity “ `comes into operation at the end of the process of
construing what Congress has expressed, not at the begin-
ning.' ” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpre-
tation of Legal Texts 298 (2012) (quoting Callanan v. United
States, 364 U. S. 587, 596 (1961)). Of course, when “a re-
1
See also, e. g., Ocasio v. United States, 578 U. S. 282, 295, n. 8 (2016);
Robers v. United States, 572 U. S. 639, 646 (2014); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain
Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U. S. 1, 16 (2011); Abbott v. United States,
562 U. S. 8, 28, n. 9 (2010); United States v. Hayes, 555 U. S. 415, 429 (2009);
Burgess v. United States, 553 U. S. 124, 135 (2008); Muscarello v. United
States, 524 U. S. 125, 138 (1998); Caron v. United States, 524 U. S. 308, 316
(1998); United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 499 (1997); Reno v. Koray, 515
U. S. 50, 65 (1995); Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 239 (1993);
Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U. S. 395, 410 (1991); Moskal v. United
States, 498 U. S. 103, 108 (1990); Callanan v. United States, 364 U. S. 587,
596 (1961). Cf. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843, n. 9 (1984) (instructing courts to employ “tradi-
tional tools of statutory construction” before concluding that a statute is
ambiguous and deferring to an agency's reasonable interpretation).

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167
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
viewing court employs all of the traditional tools of construc-
ti
on, the court will almost always reach a conclusion about
the best interpretation,” thereby resolving any perceived
ambiguity. Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U. S. 558, 632 (2019) (Kava-
naugh, J., concurring in judgment). That explains why the
rule of lenity rarely comes into play.
Second, this Court has repeatedly explained that the rule
of lenity applies only in cases of “ `grievous' ” ambiguity—
where the court, even after applying all of the traditional
tools of statutory interpretation, “ `can make no more than a
guess as to what Congress intended.' ” Ocasio, 578 U. S., at
295, n. 8 (quoting Muscarello, 524 U. S., at 138–139). The
Court has stated that the “simple existence of some statu-
tory ambiguity” is “not suffcient to warrant application of
that rule, for most statutes are ambiguous to some degree.”
Id., at 138. To be sure, as Justice Scalia rightly noted, the
term “ `grievous ambiguity' ” provides “ `little more than at-
mospherics, since it leaves open the crucial question—almost
invariably present—of how much ambiguousness constitutes
an ambiguity.' ” Reading Law, at 299 (quoting United
States v. Hansen, 772 F. 2d 940, 948 (CADC 1985) (Scalia, J.,
for the court)); see also Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Inter-
pretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118 (2016). That said, atmo-
spherics can matter. Although the Court has not always
been perfectly consistent in its formulations, the Court has
repeatedly emphasized that a court must fnd not just ambi-
guity but “grievous ambiguity” before resorting to the rule
of lenity.
2
2
See, e. g., Shaw v. United States, 580 U. S. 63, 71–72 (2016); Salman v.
United States, 580 U. S. 39, 51 (2016); Abramski v. United States, 573 U. S.
169, 188, n. 10 (2014); Robers, 572 U. S., at 646; United States v. Castleman,
572 U. S. 157, 172–173 (2014); Barber v. Thomas, 560 U. S. 474, 488 (2010);
Dolan v. United States, 560 U. S. 605, 621 (2010); Dean v. United States,
556 U. S. 568, 577 (2009); Hayes, 555 U. S., at 429; Staples v. United States,
511 U. S. 600, 619, n. 17 (1994); Chapman v. United States, 500 U. S. 453,
463 (1991); Huddleston v. United States, 415 U. S. 814, 831 (1974).

168 SHULAR
v. UNITED STATES
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
To sum up: Under this Court's longstanding precedents,
the
rule of lenity applies when a court employs all of the
traditional tools of statutory interpretation and, after doing
so, concludes that the statute still remains grievously ambig-
uous, meaning that the court can make no more than a guess
as to what the statute means.
Because the Court correctly concludes that the rule of len-
ity does not apply in this case, I join the Court's opinion
in full.

OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
169
Syllabus
HOLGUIN-HERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the fth circuit
No. 18–7739. Argued December 10, 2019—Decided February 26, 2020
A criminal defendant who wants to “preserve a claim of error” for appel-
late review must frst inform the trial judge “of [1] the action the party
wishes the court to take, or [2] the party's objection to the court's action
and the grounds for that objection.” Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 51(b).
Petitioner Holguin-Hernandez was convicted on drug charges and sen-
tenced to 60 months in prison and fve years of supervised release while
he was still serving a term of supervised release for an earlier convic-
tion. The Government asked the District Court to impose an additional
consecutive prison term of 12 to 18 months for violating the conditions
of the earlier term. Petitioner countered that 18 U. S. C. § 3553's sen-
tencing factors either did not support imposing any additional time or
supported a sentence of less than 12 months. The court nonetheless
imposed a consecutive 12-month term. Petitioner argued on appeal
that this sentence was unreasonably long because it was “ `greater than
necessar[y]' to accomplish the goals of sentencing,” Kimbrough v.
United States, 552 U. S. 85, 101, but the Fifth Circuit held that he had
forfeited that argument by failing to object to the reasonableness of the
sentence in the District Court.
Held: Petitioner's district-court argument for a specifc sentence (nothing
or less than 12 months) preserved his claim on appeal that the sentence
imposed was unreasonably long. A party who informs the court of the
“action” he “wishes the court to take,” Rule 51(b), ordinarily brings to
the court's attention his objection to a contrary decision. That is cer-
tainly true where, as here, the defendant advocates for a sentence
shorter than the one actually imposed. Judges, having in mind their
“overarching duty” under § 3553(a) “to `impose a sentence suffcient, but
not greater than necessary,' to serve the purposes of sentencing,” would
ordinarily understand that a defendant in that circumstance was making
the argument that the shorter sentence would be “ `suffcient' ” and a
longer sentence “ `greater than necessary.' ” Pepper v. United States,
562 U. S. 476, 493 (quoting § 3553(a)). Nothing more is needed to pre-
serve a claim that a longer sentence is unreasonable. Defendants need
not also refer to the “reasonableness” of a sentence. Rule 51 abolished
the requirement of making formal “exceptions” to a district court's deci-
sion. And, in any event, reasonableness pertains to the standard of

170 H
OLGUIN-HERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
“appellate review” of a trial court's sentencing decision, Gall v. United
Sta
tes, 552 U. S. 38, 46 (emphasis added); it is not the substantive stand-
ard that trial courts apply under § 3553(a). A defendant who, by advo-
cating for a particular sentence, communicates to the trial judge his
view that a longer sentence is “greater than necessary” has thereby
informed the court of the legal error at issue in an appellate challenge
to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.
Other issues raised by the Government and amicus are not addressed
here because they were not considered by the Fifth Circuit. Pp. 173–175.
746 Fed. Appx. 403, vacated and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Alito, J.,
fled a concurring opinion, in which Gorsuch, J., joined, post, p. 175.
Kendall Turner argued the cause for petitioner. With
her on the briefs were Philip J. Lynch, Jeffrey L. Fisher,
Brian H. Fletcher, and Pamela S. Karlan.
Morgan L. Ratner argued the cause for the United States.
With her on the briefs were Solicitor General Francisco,
Assistant Attorney General Benczkowski, Eric J. Feigin,
and Francesco Valentini.
K. Winn Allen, by invitation of the Court, 588 U. S. 919,
argued the cause as amicus curiae urging affrmance. With
him on the brief were Kasdin M. Mitchell and Lauren N.
Beebe.*
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
A criminal defendant who wishes a court of appeals to con-
sider a claim that a ruling of a trial court was in error must
frst make his objection known to the trial-court judge. The
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide two ways of
doing so. They say that
“[a] party may preserve a claim of error by informing
the court . . . of [1] the action the party wishes the court
to take, or [2] the party's objection to the court's action
*Chanakya A. Sethi, Rakesh N. Kilaru, Barbara E. Bergman, and Dan-
iel L. Kaplan fled a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.

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as: 589 U. S. 169 (2020)
171
Opinion of the Court
and the grounds for that objection.” Fed. Rule Crim.
Proc.
51(b).
Errors “not brought to the court's attention” in one of these
two ways are subject to review only insofar as they are
“plain.” Rule 52(b); see United States v. Olano, 507 U. S.
725, 732–736 (1993).
In this case, a criminal defendant argued in the District
Court that the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U. S. C.
§ 3553(a) did not support imposing any prison time for a
supervised-release violation. At the very least, the defend-
ant contended, any term of imprisonment should be less than
12 months long. The judge nevertheless imposed a sentence
of 12 months. The question is whether the defendant's
district-court argument for a specifc sentence (namely, noth-
ing or less than 12 months) preserved his claim on appeal
that the 12-month sentence was unreasonably long. We
think that it did.
I
Petitioner in this case, Gonzalo Holguin-Hernandez, was
convicted of drug traffcking and sentenced to 60 months in
prison and fve years of supervised release. At the time of
his conviction, he was also serving a term of supervised re-
lease related to an earlier crime. The Government asked
the court to fnd that petitioner had violated the conditions
of that earlier term, to revoke it, and to impose an additional
consecutive prison term consistent with the pertinent Sen-
tencing Guidelines, namely, 12 to 18 months in prison. See
United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual
§§ 7B1.4(a), 7B1.3(f ) (Nov. 2018).
Petitioner's counsel argued that there “would be no reason
under [18 U. S. C. §] 3553 that an additional consecutive
sentence would get [petitioner's] attention any better than”
the fve years in prison the court had already imposed for
the current traffcking offense. App. 10. She added that
petitioner understood that, if he offended again, he was

172 H
OLGUIN-HERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
“going to serve his life in prison.” Ibid. And she urged
the
court to impose either “no additional time or certainly
less than the [G]uidelines.” Ibid. At the least, she said,
the court should “depart” from the Guidelines, imposing a
sentence “below” the applicable range “because it is a sub-
stantial sentence and to me overrepresents the role that he
played in” the underlying offense. Ibid.
The court then imposed a consecutive term of 12 months,
a sentence at the bottom of, but not below, the Guidelines
range. See id., at 11. The judge indicated that he did not
disagree with counsel's argument, but thought that circum-
stances justifed a greater sentence. He asked counsel if
there was “[a]nything further.” Ibid. Counsel said that
there was not. See ibid.
Petitioner appealed, arguing that the 12-month sentence
was unreasonably long in that it was “ `greater than neces-
sar[y]' to accomplish the goals of sentencing.” Kimbrough
v. United States, 552 U. S. 85, 101 (2007) (quoting 18 U. S. C.
§ 3553(a)); see also, e. g., Gall v. United States, 552 U. S. 38,
49–50 (2007) (noting the District Court's obligation to “con-
sider all of the § 3553(a) factors to determine” the “appro-
priate sentence”); 18 U. S. C. § 3583(e) (making these factors
applicable in substantial part to proceedings to revoke or
modify a term of supervised release). The Court of Appeals
held that petitioner had forfeited this argument by failing to
“object in the district court to the reasonableness of the
sentence imposed.” 746 Fed. Appx. 403 (CA5 2018) (per
curiam). The court would, of course, consider whether the
error petitioner asserted was “plain.” See ibid.; Rule 52(b)
(permitting review of a plain error “even though it was not
brought to the court's attention”). But it found no plain
error, and so it affrmed.
Petitioner sought review in this Court and, in light of dif-
ferences among the Courts of Appeals, we granted his peti-
tion for certiorari. Compare 746 Fed. Appx. 403 with, e. g.,
United States v. Curry, 461 F. 3d 452, 459 (CA4 2006); United

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as: 589 U. S. 169 (2020)
173
Opinion of the Court
States v. Vonner, 516 F. 3d 382, 389 (CA6 2008) (en banc);
U
nited States v. Castro-Juarez, 425 F. 3d 430, 433–434 (CA7
2005); United States v. Sullivan, 327 Fed. Appx. 643, 645
(CA7 2009); United States v. Autery, 555 F. 3d 864, 868–871
(CA9 2009); United States v. Torres-Duenas, 461 F. 3d 1178,
1183 (CA10 2006); United States v. Gonzalez-Mendez, 545
Fed. Appx. 848, 849, and n. 1 (CA11 2013); United States v.
Bras, 483 F. 3d 103, 113 (CADC 2007). Because the Govern-
ment agrees with petitioner that the Fifth Circuit's approach
is inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, we appointed K. Winn Allen to defend the judgment
below as amicus curiae. He has ably discharged his
responsibilities.
II
Congress has instructed sentencing courts to impose sen-
tences that are “ `suffcient, but not greater than necessary,
to comply with' ” (among other things) certain basic objec-
tives, including the need for “just punishment, deterrence,
protection of the public, and rehabilitation.” Dean v. United
Sta tes, 581 U. S. 62, 67 (2017) (quoti ng 18 U. S. C.
§ 3553(a); emphasis added); see Pepper v. United States, 562
U. S. 476, 491, 493 (2011). If the trial court follows proper
procedures and gives adequate consideration to these and
the other listed factors, then the question for an appellate
court is simply, as here, whether the trial court's chosen sen-
tence was “reasonable” or whether the judge instead “abused
his discretion in determining that the § 3553(a) factors sup-
ported” the sentence imposed. Gall, 552 U. S., at 56; see
United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220, 261–262 (2005).
By “informing the court” of the “action” he “wishes
the court to take,” Rule 51(b), a party ordinarily brings to
the court's attention his objection to a contrary deci-
sion. See Rule 52(b). And that is certainly true in cases
such as this one, where a criminal defendant advocates
for a sentence shorter than the one ultimately imposed.
Judges, having in mind their “overarching duty” under

174 H
OLGUIN-HERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
§ 3553(a), would ordinarily understand that a defendant in
that
circumstance was making the argument (to put it in
statutory terms) that the shorter sentence would be “ `suff-
cient' ” and a longer sentence “ `greater than necessary' ” to
achieve the purposes of sentencing. Pepper, 562 U. S., at
493 (quoting § 3553(a)). Nothing more is needed to preserve
the claim that a longer sentence is unreasonable.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals' suggestion
that defendants are required to refer to the “reasonableness”
of a sentence to preserve such claims for appeal. See 746
Fed. Appx. 403; United States v. Peltier, 505 F. 3d 389, 391
(CA5 2007). The rulemakers, in promulgating Rule 51, in-
tended to dispense with the need for formal “exceptions” to
a trial court's rulings. Rule 51(a); see also Advisory Com-
mittee's 1944 Notes on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 51, 18 U. S. C.
App., p. 591. They chose not to require an objecting party
to use any particular language or even to wait until the
court issues its ruling. Rule 51(b) (a party may “infor[m]
the court” of its position either “when the court ruling or
order is made or” when it is “sought”). The question is sim-
ply whether the claimed error was “brought to the court's
attention.” Rule 52(b). Here, it was.
The Court of Appeals properly noted that, to win on ap-
peal, a defendant making such a claim must show that the
trial court's decision was not “reasonable.” Gall, 552 U. S.,
at 56. But that fact is not relevant to the issue here. Our
decisions make plain that reasonableness is the label we have
given to “the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard” that “ap-
plies to appellate review” of the trial court's sentencing deci-
sion. Id., at 46 (emphasis added); see Kimbrough, 552 U. S.,
at 90–91; Rita v. United States, 551 U. S. 338, 351 (2007);
Booker, 543 U. S., at 261. The substantive standard that
Congress has prescribed for trial courts is the “parsimony
principle” enshrined in § 3553(a). Dean, 581 U. S., at 67; see
Pepper, 562 U. S., at 491. A defendant who, by advocating
for a particular sentence, communicates to the trial judge his

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as: 589 U. S. 169 (2020)
175
Alito, J., concurring
view that a longer sentence is “greater than necessary”
has
thereby informed the court of the legal error at issue in
an appellate challenge to the substantive reasonableness of
the sentence. He need not also refer to the standard of
review.
III
The Government and amicus raise other issues. They ask
us to decide what is suffcient to preserve a claim that a trial
court used improper procedures in arriving at its chosen sen-
tence. And they ask us to decide when a party has properly
preserved the right to make particular arguments support-
ing its claim that a sentence is unreasonably long. We shall
not consider these matters, however, for the Court of Ap-
peals has not considered them. See, e. g., Tapia v. United
States, 564 U. S. 319, 335 (2011); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544
U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005). We hold only that the defendant
here proper ly preserved the clai m that h is 12-month
sentence was unreasonably long by advocating for a shorter
sentence and thereby arguing, in effect, that this shorter
sentence would have proved “suffcient,” while a sentence of
12 months or longer would be “greater than necessary” to
“comply with” the statutory purposes of punishment. 18
U. S. C. § 3553(a).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Alito, w ith whom Justice Gorsuch joins,
concurring.
I agree with the Court that a defendant who requests
a specifc sentence during a sentencing hearing need not ob-
ject to the sentence after its pronouncement in order to pre-
serve a challenge to its substantive reasonableness (i. e.,
length) on appeal. I write to emphasize what we are not
deciding.

176 H
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Alito, J., concurring
First, we do not decide “what is suffcient to preserve a
clai
m that a trial court used improper procedures in arriving
at its chosen sentence.” Ante, at 175. That question is not
currently before us. Nevertheless, as we have previously
explained, failing to object at all to a procedural error
(e. g., a district court's miscalculation of the Guidelines range)
will subject a procedural challenge to plain-error review.
Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U. S. 189, 193–194
(2016).
Second, we do not decide what is suffcient to preserve any
“particular” substantive-reasonableness argument. Ante,
at 175. Again, the question here “is simply whether the
claimed error was `brought to the court's attention.' ” Ante,
at 174 (quoting Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(b)). Thus, we do
not suggest that a generalized argument in favor of less im-
prisonment will insulate all arguments regarding the length
of a sentence from plain-error review. The plain-error rule
serves many interests, judicial effciency and fnality being
chief among them. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U. S.
129, 134–135 (2009). Requiring a party to bring an error to
the attention of the court enables the court to correct itself,
obviating the need for an appeal. At the very least, the
court can explain its reasoning and thus assist the appellate
process. A court cannot address particular arguments or
facts not brought to its attention.
Third, we do not decide whether this petitioner properly
preserved his particular substantive-reasonableness argu-
ments, namely, that he did not pose a danger to the public
and that a 12-month sentence would not serve deter-
rence purposes. See ante, at 171–172, 175. In determining
whether arguments have been preserved, courts should make
a case-specifc assessment of how the error was “brought to
the court's attention.” Rule 52(b); see also, e. g., United
States v. Vonner, 516 F. 3d 382, 392 (CA6) (en banc) (“While we
do not require defendants to challenge the `reasonableness' of
their sentences in front of the district court, we surely should

Cite
as: 589 U. S. 169 (2020)
177
Alito, J., concurring
apply plain-error review to any arguments for leniency that
the
defendant does not present to the trial court”), cert.
denied, 555 U. S. 816 (2008). On remand, the Fifth Circuit
can decide whether petiti oner preserved these speci fic
arguments and whether the sentence was substantively
unreasonable.

178 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
Syllabus
INTEL CORPORATION INVESTMENT POLICY
COMMITTEE
et al. v. SULYMA
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 18–1116. Argued December 4, 2019—Decided February 26, 2020
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) requires
plaintiffs with “actual knowledge” of an alleged fduciary breach to fle
suit within three years of gaining that knowledge, 29 U. S. C. § 1113(2),
rather than within the 6-year period that would otherwise apply. Re-
spondent Sulyma worked at Intel Corporation from 2010 to 2012 and
participated in two Intel retirement plans. In October 2015, he sued
petitioners—administrators of those plans—alleging that they had man-
aged the plans imprudently. Petitioners countered that the suit was
untimely under § 1113(2) because Sulyma fled it more than three years
after they had disclosed their investment decisions to him. Although
Sulyma had visited the website that hosted many of these disclosures
many times, he testifed that he did not remember reviewing the rele-
vant disclosures and that he had been unaware of the allegedly impru-
dent investments while working at Intel. The District Court granted
summary judgment to petitioners under § 1113(2). The Ninth Circuit
reversed. That court agreed with petitioners that Sulyma could have
known about the investments from the disclosures, but held that his
testimony created a dispute as to when he gained “actual knowledge”
for purposes of § 1113(2).
Held: A plaintiff does not necessarily have “actual knowledge” under
§ 1113(2) of the information contained in disclosures that he receives
but does not read or cannot recall reading. To meet § 1113(2)'s “actual
knowledge” requirement, the plaintiff must in fact have become aware
of that information. Pp. 184–190.
(a) ERISA's “plain and unambiguous statutory language” must be en-
forced “according to its terms.” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins.
Co., 560 U. S. 242, 251. Although ERISA does not defne the phrase “ac-
tual knowledge,” its meaning is plain. Dictionaries confrm that, to have
“actual knowledge” of a piece of information, one must in fact be aware
of it. Legal dictionaries give “actual knowledge” the same meaning.
The law will sometimes impute knowledge—often called “constructive”
knowledge—to a person who fails to learn something that a reasonably
di ligent person wou ld have lear ned. The additi on of “ac tua l” i n
§ 1113(2) signals that the plaintiff's knowledge must be more than hypo-
thetical. Congress has repeatedly drawn the same “linguistic distinc-

Cite
as: 589 U. S. 178 (2020)
179
Syllabus
tion,” Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U. S. 633, 647, elsewhere in ERISA.
W
hen Congress has included both actual and constructive knowledge
in ERISA limitations provisions, Congress has done so explicitly. But
Congress has never added to § 1113(2) the language it has used in those
other provisions to encompass both forms of knowledge. Pp. 184–187.
(b) Petitioners' arguments for a broader reading of § 1113(2) based on
text, context, purpose, and statutory history all founder on Congress's
choice of the word “actual.” Petitioners may well be correct that heed-
ing the plain meaning of § 1113(2) substantially diminishes the protec-
tion that it provides for ERISA fduciaries. But if policy considerations
suggest that the current scheme should be altered, Congress must be
the one to do it. Pp. 187–189.
(c) This opinion does not foreclose any of the “usual ways” to prove
actual knowledge at any stage in the litigation. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U. S. 825, 842. Plaintiffs who recall reading particular disclosures
will be bound by oath to say so in their depositions. Actual knowledge
can also be proved through “inference from circumstantial evidence.”
Ibid. And this opinion does not preclude defendants from contending
that evidence of “willful blindness” supports a fnding of “actual knowl-
edge.” Cf. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S. A., 563 U. S. 754,
769. Pp. 189–190.
909 F. 3d 1069, affrmed.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the briefs were Ginger D. Anders, Jordan D.
Segall, John J. Buckley, Jr., Daniel F. Katz, Vidya Atre
Mirmira, David Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, Juli Ann Lund, and
Tanya Abrams.
Matthew W. H. Wessler argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Jonathan E. Taylor, Gregory Y.
Porter, and Joseph A. Creitz.
Matthew Guarnieri argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging affrmance. With him on
the brief were Solicitor General Francisco, Deputy Attor-
ney General Kneedler, and G. William Scott.*
*Mark A. Perry, Matthew S. Rozen, Peter C. Tolsdorf, Leland P. Frost,
Kevin Carroll, and Daryl Joseffer fled a brief for the National Association
of Manufacturers et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for AARP et al.
by Paul Blankenstein, Dara S. Smith, and William Alvarado Rivera;

180 INTEL
CORP. INVESTMENT POLICY COMM. v. SULYMA
Opinion of the Court
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
The
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) requires plaintiffs with “actual knowledge” of an
alleged fduciary breach to fle suit within three years of
gaining that knowledge rather than within the 6-year period
that would otherwise apply. § 413(a)(2)(A), 88 Stat. 889, as
amended, 29 U. S. C. § 1113. The question here is whether
a plaintiff necessarily has “actual knowledge” of the informa-
tion contained in disclosures that he receives but does not
read or cannot recall reading. We hold that he does not and
therefore affrm.
I
A
Retirement plans governed by ERISA must have at least
one named fduciary, § 1102(a)(1), who must manage the plan
prudently and solely in the interests of participants and their
benefciaries, § 1104(a). Fiduciaries who breach these duties
are personally liable to the plan for any resulting losses.
§ 1109(a). ERISA authorizes participants and their benef-
ciaries, as well as co-fduciaries and the Secretary of Labor,
to sue for that relief. § 1132(a)(2).
Such suits must be fled within one of three time periods,
each with different triggering events. The frst begins
when the breach occurs. Specifcally, under § 1113(1), suit
must be fled within six years of “the date of the last action
which constituted a part of the breach or violation” or, in
cases of breach by omission, “the latest date on which the
fduciary could have cured the breach or violation.” We
have referred to § 1113(1) as a statute of repose, which “ef-
fect[s] a legislative judgment that a defendant should be free
from liability after the legislatively determined period of
time.” California Public Employees' Retirement System v.
and for the Pension Rights Center by Elizabeth Hopkins and Karen W.
Ferguson.

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as: 589 U. S. 178 (2020)
181
Opinion of the Court
ANZ Securities, Inc., 582 U. S. 497, 505 (2017) (internal quo-
t
ation marks omitted).
The second period, which accelerates the fling deadline,
begins when the plaintiff gains “actual knowledge” of the
breach. Under § 1113(2), suit must be fled within three
years of “the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual
knowledge of the breach or violation.” Section 1113(2) is a
statute of limitations, which “encourage[s] plaintiffs to pur-
sue diligent prosecution of known claims.” Id., at 504 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
The third period, which applies “in the case of fraud or
concealment,” begins when the plaintiff discovers the alleged
breach. § 1113. In such cases, suit must be fled within six
years of “the date of discovery.” Ibid.
B
Respondent Sulyma worked at Intel Corporation from
2010 to 2012. He participated in two Intel retirement plans,
the Intel Retirement Contribution Plan and the Intel 401(k)
Savings Plan. Payments into these plans were in turn in-
vested in two funds managed by the Intel Investment Policy
Committee.
1
These funds mostly comprised stocks and
bonds. After the stock market decline in 2008, however, the
committee increased the funds' shares of alternative assets,
such as hedge funds, private equity, and commodities.
These assets carried relatively high fees. And as the stock
market rebounded, Sulyma's funds lagged behind others such
as index funds.
Sulyma fled this suit on behalf of a putative class in Octo-
ber 2015, alleging primarily that the committee and other
plan administrators (petitioners here) had breached their
fduciary duties by overinvesting in alternative assets.
Petitioners countered that the suit was untimely under
1
Specifcally the Intel Global Diversifed Fund, in which his retirement
contribution plan was automatically invested, and the Intel Target Date
2045 Fund, which he chose for his 401(k) plan.

182 INTEL
CORP. INVESTMENT POLICY COMM. v. SULYMA
Opinion of the Court
§ 1113(2). Although Sulyma fled it within six years of the
a
lleged breaches, he fled it more than three years after peti-
tioners had disclosed their investment decisions to him.
ERISA and its implementing regulations mandate various
disclosures to plan participants. See generally 29 U. S. C.
§§ 1021–1031; see also Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 577
U. S. 312, 321–323 (2016). Sulyma received numerous disclo-
sures while working at Intel, some explaining the extent to
which his retirement plans were invested in alternative
assets. In November 2011, for example, he received an e-
mail informing him that a Qualifed Default Investment Al-
ternative (QDIA) notice was available on a website called
NetBenefts, where many of his disclosures were hosted.
See App. 149–151; see also 29 CFR §§ 2550.404c–5(b) through
(d) (2019) (QDIA notices); § 2520.104b–1(c) (regulating elec-
tronic disclosure). This notice broke down the percentages
at which his 401(k) fund was invested in stocks, bonds, hedge
funds, and commodities. See App. 236. In 2012, he re-
ceived a summary plan description explaining that the funds
were invested in stocks and alternative assets, id., at 227,
and referring him to other documents—called fund fact
sheets—with the percentages in graphical form. See 29
U. S. C. §§ 1022, 1024(b) (summary plan descriptions); see also
App. 307 (June 2012 fact sheet for his 401(k) plan fund); id.,
at 338 (June 2012 fact sheet for his retirement contribution
plan fund); id., at 277–340 (other fact sheets provided during
his tenure at Intel). Also in 2012, he received e-mails di-
recting him to annual disclosures that petitioners provided
for both his plans, which showed the underlying funds' re-
turn rates and again directed him to the NetBenefts site
for further information. See 29 CFR § 2550.404a–5; see also
App. 242–243 (retirement contribution plan annual disclo-
sure); id., at 250–251 (401(k) plan annual disclosure).
Petitioners submitted records showing that Sulyma visited
the NetBenefts site repeatedly during his employment.
Id., at 258–276. But he testifed in his deposition that he

Cite
as: 589 U. S. 178 (2020)
183
Opinion of the Court
did not “remember reviewing ” the above disclosures during
h
is tenure. Id., at 175; see also id., at 183, 193, 196–197.
He also stated in a declaration that he was “unaware” while
working at Intel “that the monies that [he] had invested
through the Intel retirement plans had been invested in
hedge funds or private equity.” Id., at 212. He recalled re-
viewing only account statements sent to him by mail, which
directed him to the NetBenefts site and noted that his plans
were invested in “short-term/other” assets but did not spec-
ify which. See, e. g., id., at 375.
The District Court granted summary judgment to peti-
tioners under § 1113(2), reasoning that “[i]t would be im-
proper to allow Sulyma's claims to survive merely because
he did not look further into the disclosures made to him.”
2017 WL 1217185, *9 (ND Cal., Mar. 31, 2017). The Ninth
Circuit reversed. As relevant here,
2
the court construed
“actual knowledge” to mean “what it says: knowledge that
is actual, not merely a possible inference from ambiguous
circumstances.” 909 F. 3d 1069, 1076 (2018) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). Although Sulyma “had suffcient infor-
mation available to him to know about the allegedly impru-
dent investments” more than three years before fling suit,
the court held that his testimony created a dispute as to
when he actually gained that knowledge. Id., at 1077.
Several Circuits have likewise construed § 1113(2) to re-
quire “knowledge that is actual,” id., at 1076, but one has
construed it to require only proof of suffcient disclosure.
3
2
The court also addressed the separate question of what exactly a plain-
tiff must actually know about a defendant's conduct and the relevant law
in order for § 1113(2) to apply. That question is not before us and we do
not address it.
3
Compare Caputo v. Pfzer, Inc., 267 F. 3d 181, 194 (CA2 2001); Reich
v. Lancaster, 55 F. 3d 1034, 1056–1057 (CA5 1995); Gluck v. Unisys Corp.,
960 F. 2d 1168, 1176 (CA3 1992); Radiology Center, S. C., v. Stifel, Nico-
laus & Co., 919 F. 2d 1216, 1222 (CA7 1990); Brock v. Nellis, 809 F. 2d 753,
754–755 (CA11 1987), with Brown v. Owens Corning Investment Review
Comm., 622 F. 3d 564, 571 (CA6 2010) (“Actual knowledge does not require

184 INTEL
CORP. INVESTMENT POLICY COMM. v. SULYMA
Opinion of the Court
We granted certiorari, 587 U. S. 1050 (2019), to resolve
whether
the phrase “actual knowledge” does in fact mean
“what it says,” 909 F. 3d, at 1076, and hold that it does.
II
A
“We must enforce plain and unambiguous statutory lan-
guage” in ERISA, as in any statute, “according to its terms.”
Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U. S. 242, 251
(2010). Although ERISA does not defne the phrase “actual
knowledge,” its meaning is plain. Dictionaries are hardly
necessary to confrm the point, but they do. When Congress
passed ERISA, the word “actual” meant what it means
today: “existing in fact or reality.” Webster's Seventh New
Collegiate Dictionary 10 (1967); accord, Merriam-Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary 13 (11th ed. 2005); see also American
Heritage Dictionary 14 (1973) (“In existence; real; factual”);
id., at 18 (5th ed. 2011) (“Existing in reality and not potential,
possible, simulated, or false”). So did the word “knowl-
edge,” which meant and still means “the fact or condition of
being aware of something.” Webster's Seventh New Colle-
giate Dictionary, at 469; accord, Merriam-Webster's Colle-
giate Dictionary, at 691; see also American Heritage Diction-
ary 725 (1973) (“Familiarity, awareness, or understanding
gained through experience or study”); id., at 973 (2011)
(same). Thus, to have “actual knowledge” of a piece of infor-
mation, one must in fact be aware of it.
Legal dictionaries give “actual knowledge” the same
meaning: “[r]eal knowledge as distinguished from presumed
knowledge or knowledge imputed to one.” Ballentine's Law
Dictionary 24 (3d ed. 1969); accord, Black's Law Dictionary
1043 (11th ed. 2019) (defning “actual knowledge” as “[d]irect
proof that the individual Plaintiffs actually saw or read the documents
that disclosed the allegedly harmful investments” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).

Cite
as: 589 U. S. 178 (2020)
185
Opinion of the Court
and clear knowledge, as distinguished from constructive
knowledge”).
4
The
qualifer “actual” creates that distinc-
tion. In everyday speech, “actual knowledge” might seem
redundant; one who claims “knowledge” of a topic likely
means to suggest that he actually knows a thing or two about
it. But the law will sometimes impute knowledge—often
called “constructive” knowledge—to a person who fails to
learn something that a reasonably diligent person would
have learned. See id., at 1043. Similarly, we held in
Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U. S. 633 (2010), that the word
“discovery,” when used in a statute of limitations without
qualifcation, “encompasses not only those facts the plaintiff
actually knew, but also those facts a reasonably diligent
plaintiff would have known.” Id., at 648. The addition of
“actual” in § 1113(2) signals that the plaintiff 's knowledge
must be more than “potential, possible, virtual, conceivable,
theoretical, hypothetical, or nominal.” Black's Law Diction-
ary 53 (4th ed. 1951). Indeed, in Merck, we cited § 1113(2)
as evidence of the “linguistic distinction” between “ `actual
knowledge' ” and the “hypothetical” knowledge that a rea-
sonably diligent plaintiff would have. 559 U. S., at 646–647
(quoting § 1113(2); emphasis in original).
Congress has drawn the same distinction elsewhere in
ERISA. Multiple provisions contain alternative 6-year and
3-year limitations periods, with the 6-year period beginning
at “the date on which the cause of action arose” and the
4
Petitioners cite this dictionary's somewhat puzzling second defnition
of “ac tua l knowledge, ” wh ich it dubs “ i mplied ac tua l knowledge”:
“[k]nowledge of information that would lead a reasonable person to inquire
further.” Black's Law Dictionary, at 1043. Not even this entry, however,
appears to equate “implied actual knowledge” with “actual knowledge” as
normally understood. It instead proceeds to reference the common-law
“discovery rule,” ibid., under which a limitations period begins when “the
plaintiff discovers (or reasonably should have discovered) the injury giv-
ing rise to the claim,” id., at 585 (emphasis added); see also Merck & Co.
v. Reynolds, 559 U. S. 633, 646 (2010). As we noted in Merck, that rule
is broader than “actual knowledge.” Id., at 647.

186 INTEL
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Opinion of the Court
3-year period starting at “the earliest date on which the
plai
ntiff acquired or should have acquired actual knowledge
of the existence of such cause of action.” §§ 1303(e)(6), (f )(5)
(emphasis added); accord, §§ 1370(f )(1)–(2), 1451(f )(1)–(2).
ERISA also requires plaintiffs challenging the suspension of
benefts under § 1085 to do so within “one year after the ear-
liest date on which the plaintiff acquired or should have ac-
quired actual knowledge of the existence of such cause of
action.” § 1085(e)(9)(I)(iv). Thus, Congress has repeatedly
drawn a “linguistic distinction” between what an ERISA
plaintiff actually knows and what he should actually know.
Merck, 559 U. S., at 647. And when Congress has included
both forms of knowledge in a provision limiting ERISA ac-
tions, it has done so explicitly. We cannot assume that it
meant to do so by implication in § 1113(2). Instead we “gen-
erally presum[e] that Congress acts intentionally and pur-
posely when it includes particular language in one section of
a statute but omits it in another.” BFP v. Resolution Trust
Corporation, 511 U. S. 531, 537 (1994) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Petitioners dispute the characterization of anything less
than actual knowledge as constructive knowledge, arguing
that the latter term usually refers to information that a
plaintiff must seek out rather than information that is sent
to him. But if a plaintiff is not aware of a fact, he does not
have “actual knowledge” of that fact however close at hand
the fact might be. § 1113(2). And Congress has never
added to § 1113(2) the language it has used in other ERISA
limitations provisions to encompass both what a plaintiff ac-
tually knows and what he reasonably could know.
As presently written, therefore, § 1113(2) requires more
than evidence of disclosure alone. That all relevant informa-
tion was disclosed to the plaintiff is no doubt relevant in
judging whether he gained knowledge of that information.
See Part III, infra. To meet § 1113(2)'s “actual knowledge”

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187
Opinion of the Court
requirement, however, the plaintiff must in fact have become
aware
of that information.
B
Petitioners offer arguments for a broader reading of
§ 1113(2) based on text, context, purpose, and statutory his-
tory. Al l founder on Congress's choice of the word
“actual.”
As for text, petitioners do not dispute the normal defni-
tions of “actual,” “knowledge,” or “actual knowledge.”
They focus instead on the least conspicuous part of the
phrase “had actual knowledge”: the word “had.” § 1113(2).
Once a plaintiff receives a disclosure, they argue, he “ha[s]”
the knowledge that § 1113(2) requires because he effectively
holds it in his hand. Ibid. In other words, he has the req-
uisite knowledge because he could acquire it with reasonable
effort. That turns § 1113(2) into what it is plainly not: a
constructive-knowledge requirement.
Petitioners' contextual argument fails for the same reason.
As they point out, ERISA's disclosure regime is meant to
“ensur[e] that `the individual participant knows exactly
where he stands with respect to the plan.' ” Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U. S. 101, 118 (1989) (quoting
H. R. Rep. No. 93–533, p. 11 (1973)). This is the reason for
ERISA's requirements that disclosures be written for a lay
audience. See, e. g., 29 U. S. C. § 1022(a). Once plan ad-
ministrators satisfy their obligations to impart knowledge,
petitioners say, § 1113(2)'s knowledge requirement is satis-
fed too. But that is simply not what § 1113(2) says. Un-
like other ERISA limitations periods—which also form
§ 1113(2)'s context—§ 1113(2) begins only when a plaintiff ac-
tually is aware of the relevant facts, not when he should be.
And a given plaintiff will not necessarily be aware of all facts
disclosed to him; even a reasonably diligent plaintiff would
not know those facts immediately upon receiving the disclo-
sure. Although “the words of a statute must be read in

188 INTEL
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Opinion of the Court
their context,” Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489
U
. S. 803, 809 (1989), petitioners' argument again gives the
word “actual” little meaning at all.
Petitioners also argue that § 1113(2)'s plain meaning under-
mines its purpose of protecting plan administrators from
suits over bygone investment decisions. If a plan partici-
pant can simply deny knowledge, they say, administrators
will rarely get the beneft of § 1113(2). But even if this is
true, as it may well be, we cannot say that heeding the clear
meaning of the word “actual” renders the statute so “ `[in]co-
herent' ” that it must be disregarded. Kingdomware Tech-
nologies, Inc. v. United States, 579 U. S. 162, 171 (2016).
For one thing, plan participants are not the only potential
plaintiffs subject to § 1113. The Secretary of Labor, for ex-
ample, may also sue imprudent fduciaries for the beneft of
plan participants. See § 1132(a)(2). And the United States
represents that the Secretary will have a hard time doing so
within § 1113(2)'s timeframe if deemed to have actual knowl-
edge of the facts contained in the many reports that the De-
partment receives from ERISA plans each year. See Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae 27–28. Moreover, the
statute's repose period will still protect defendants from
suits fled more than six years after the alleged breach.
See § 1113(1).
Petitioners may well be correct that heeding the plain
meaning of § 1113(2) substantially diminishes the protection
that it provides for ERISA fduciaries, but by the same
token, petiti oners' interpretati on would greatly reduce
§ 1113(1)'s value for benefciaries, given the disclosure regime
that petitioners themselves emphasize. Choosing between
these alternatives is a task for Congress, and we must as-
sume that the language of § 1113(2) refects Congress's
choice. If policy considerations suggest that the current
scheme should be altered, Congress must be the one to do it.
See, e. g., Azar v. Allina Health Services, 587 U. S. 566, 582–
583 (2019).

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189
Opinion of the Court
Finally, petitioners argue that the plain meaning of “actual
knowledge”
renders an earlier version of § 1113(2) incoher-
ent. As originally enacted, the § 1113(2) limitations period
began either when the plaintiff gained actual knowledge of
the alleged breach or when “a report from which [the plain-
tiff] could reasonably be expected to have obtained knowl-
edge . . . was fled with” the Secretary of Labor. 29 U. S. C.
§ 1113(2) (1976 ed.). That latter, constructive-knowledge
clause was later repealed. See Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1987, § 9342(b), 101 Stat. 1330–371. According to
petitioners, if “actual knowledge” means what it says, then
the original version of § 1113(2) charged plan participants
with learning what was sent to the Secretary but not what
was sent to them.
The version at issue here, however, is the current one—
from which Congress removed any mention of constructive
knowledge. “When Congress acts to amend a statute, we
presume it intends its amendment to have real and sub-
stantial effect.” Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices,
Inc., 542 U. S. 241, 258–259 (2004) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Section 1113(2)'s history thus more readily sug-
gests that the current version does in fact require actual
knowledge.
III
Nothing in this opinion forecloses any of the “usual ways”
to prove actual knowledge at any stage in the litigation.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825, 842 (1994). Plaintiffs who
recall reading particular disclosures will of course be bound
by oath to say so in their depositions. On top of that, actual
knowledge can be proved through “inference from circum-
stantial evidence.” Ibid.; see also Staples v. United States,
511 U. S. 600, 615–616, n. 11 (1994) (“[K]nowledge can be in-
ferred from circumstantial evidence”). Evidence of disclo-
sure would no doubt be relevant, as would electronic records
showing that a plaintiff viewed the relevant disclosures and
evidence suggesting that the plaintiff took action in response

190 INTEL
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Opinion of the Court
to the information contained in them. And though, “[a]t the
summary
judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party,” that is true “only
if there is a `genuine' dispute as to those facts.” Scott v.
Harris, 550 U. S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
56(c)). If a plaintiff 's denial of knowledge is “blatantly
contradicted by the record,” “a court should not adopt that
version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for
summary judgment.” 550 U. S., at 380.
Today's opinion also does not preclude defendants from
contending that evidence of “willful blindness” supports a
fnding of “actual knowledge.” Cf. Global-Tech Appliances,
Inc. v. SEB S. A., 563 U. S. 754, 769 (2011).
In the case before us, however, petitioners do not argue
that “actual knowledge” is established in any of these ways,
only that they need not offer any such proof. And that is
incorrect.
***
For these reasons, we affrm.
It is so ordered.

OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
191
Syllabus
KANSAS v. GARCIA
certiorari
to the supreme court of kansas
No. 17–834. Argued October 16, 2019—Decided March 3, 2020*
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) makes it unlaw-
ful to hire an alien knowing that he or she is unauthorized to work
in the United States. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1324a(a)(1), (h)(3). IRCA requires
employers to comply with a federal employment verifcation system.
§ 1324a(b). Using a federal work-authorization form (I–9), they “must
attest” that they have “verifed” that any new employee, regardless of
citizenship or nationality, “is not an unauthorized alien” by examining
approved documents, e. g., a United States passport or an alien registra-
tion card, § 1324a(b)(1)(A). IRCA concomitantly requires all employees
to complete an I–9 by their frst day of employment and to attest that
they are authorized to work. § 1324a(b)(2). Every employee must also
provide certain personal information, including name, address, birth
date, Social Security number, e-mail address, and telephone number. It
is a federal crime for an employee to provide false information on an
I–9 or to use fraudulent documents to show work authorization. See
18 U. S. C. §§ 1028, 1546. But it is not a federal crime for an alien to
work without authorization, and state laws criminalizing such conduct
are preempted. Arizona v. United States, 567 U. S. 387, 403–407. The
I–9 forms and appended documentation, as well as the employment veri-
fcation system, may only be used for enforcement of the Immigration
and Nati ona lity Ac t or other speci fied federa l proh ibiti ons. See
§§ 1324a(b)(5), (d)(2)(F). IRCA does not directly address the use of an
employee's federal and state tax-withholding forms, the W–4 and K–4
respectively. Finally, IRCA expressly “preempt[s] any State or local
law imposing civil or criminal sanctions . . . upon those who employ,
or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.”
§ 1324a(h)(2).
Kansas makes it a crime to commit “identity theft” or engage in fraud
to obtain a beneft. Respondents, three unauthorized aliens, were tried
for fraudulently using another person's Social Security number on the
W–4's and K–4's that they submitted upon obtaining employment.
They had used the same Social Security numbers on their I–9 forms.
*Together with Kansas v. Morales (see this Court's Rule 12.4) and
Kansas v. Ochoa-Lara (see this Court's Rule 12.4), also on certiorari to
the same court.

192 K
ANSAS v. GARCIA
Syllabus
Respondents were convicted, and the Kansas Court of Appeals affrmed.
A
divided Kansas Supreme Court reversed, concluding that § 1324a(b)(5)
expressly prohibits a State from using any information contained within
an I–9 as the basis for a state law identity-theft prosecution of an alien
who uses another's Social Security information in an I–9. The court
deemed irrelevant the fact that this information was also included in the
W–4 and K–4. One justice concurred based on implied preemption.
Held:
1. The Kansas statutes under which respondents were convicted are
not expressly preempted. IRCA's express preemption provision ap-
plies only to employers and those who recruit or refer prospective em-
ployees and is thus plainly inapplicable. The Kansas Supreme Court
instead relied on § 1324a(b)(5), which broadly restricts any use of an
I–9, information “contained in” an I–9, and any documents appended to
an I–9, reasoning that respondents' W–4's and K–4's used the same false
Social Security numbers contained in their I–9's. The theory that no
information placed on an I–9 could ever be used by any entity or person
for any reason—other than the handful of federal statutes mentioned in
§ 1324a(b)(5)—is contrary to standard English usage. A tangible object
can be “contained in” only one place at any point in time, but information
may be “contained in” many different places. The mere fact that an
I–9 contains an item of information, such as a name or address, does not
mean that information “contained in” the I–9 is used whenever that
name or address is used elsewhere. Nothing in § 1324a(b)(5)'s text sup-
ports the Kansas Supreme Court's limiting interpretation to prosecuting
aliens for using a false identity to establish “employment eligibility.”
And respondents' express preemption argument cannot be saved by
§ 1324a(d)(2)(F), which prohibits use of the federal employment verifca-
tion system “for law enforcement purposes other than” enforcement of
IRCA and the same handfu l of federa l st atutes menti oned i n
§ 1324a(b)(5). This argument fails because it rests on a misunderstand-
ing of the meaning of the federal “employment verifcation system.”
The sole function of that system is to establish that an employee is
not barred from working in this country. The completion of tax-
withholding documents plays no part in the process of determining
whether a person is authorized to work. Pp. 203–207.
2. Respondents' argument that Kansas's laws are preempted by impli-
cation is also rejected. Pp. 208–213.
(a) The laws do not fall into a feld that is implicitly reserved exclu-
sively for federal regulation, including respondents' claimed feld of
“fraud on the federal verifcation system.” The submission of tax-
withholding forms is neither part of, nor “related” to, the verifcation
system. Employees may complete their W–4's, K–4's, and I–9's at
roughly the same time, but IRCA plainly does not foreclose all state

Cite
as: 589 U. S. 191 (2020)
193
Syllabus
regulation of information required as a precondition of employment. In
arg
uing that the State's statutes require proof that the accused engaged
in the prohibited conduct for the purpose of getting a “beneft,” respond-
ents confate the beneft that results from complying with the federal
employment verifcation system with the beneft of actually getting a
job. Submitting W–4's and K–4's helped respondents get jobs, but it
did not assist them in showing that they were authorized to work in
this country. Federal law does not create a comprehensive and unifed
system regarding the information that a State may require employees
to provide. Pp. 208–210.
(b) There is likewise no ground for holding that the Kansas statutes
at issue confict with federal law. It is certainly possible to comply with
both IRCA and the Kansas statutes, and respondents do not suggest
otherwise. They instead maintain that the Kansas statutes, as applied
in their prosecutions, stand as “an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes” of IRCA—one of which is purportedly
that the initiation of any legal action against an unauthorized alien for
using a false identity in applying for employment should rest exclusively
within the prosecutorial discretion of federal authorities. Respondents
analogize their case to Arizona v. United States, 567 U. S., at 404–407,
where the Court concluded that a state law making it a crime for an
unauthorized alien to obtain employment conficted with IRCA, which
does not criminalize that conduct. But here, Congress made no deci-
sion that an unauthorized alien who uses a false identity on tax-
withholding forms should not face criminal prosecution, and it has made
using fraudulent information on a W–4 a federal crime. Moreover, in
the present cases, there is certainly no suggestion that the Kansas
prosecutions frustrated any federal interests. Federal authorities
played a role in all three cases, and the Federal Government fully
supports Kansas's position in this Court. In the end, however, the
possibility that federal enforcement priorities might be upset is not
enough to provide a basis for preemption. The Supremacy Clause gives
priority to “the Laws of the United States,” not the criminal law en-
forcement priorities or preferences of federal offcers. Art. VI, cl. 2.
Pp. 210–213.
306 Kan. 1113, 401 P. 3d 588 (frst judgment); 306 Kan. 1100, 401 P. 3d 155
(second judgment); and 306 Kan. 1107, 401 P. 3d 159 (third judgment),
reversed and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., fled a
concurring opinion, in which Gorsuch, J., joined, post, p. 213. Breyer,
J., fled an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined, post, p. 215.

194 K
ANSAS v. GARCIA
Counsel
Derek Schmidt, Attorney General of Kansas, argued the
cause
for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Jeffrey
A. Chanay, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Toby Crouse,
Solicitor General, Kristafer Ailslieger, Deputy Solicitor Gen-
eral, and Bryan C. Clark, Natalie Chalmers, Dwight R. Car-
swell, and Steven J. Obermeier, Assistant Solicitors General,
Stephen M. Howe, and Jacob M. Gontesky.
Christopher G. Michel argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on
the brief were Solicitor General Francisco, Assistant At-
torney General Hunt, Deputy Solicitor General Wall, Dep-
uty Assistant Attorney General Mooppan, and Mark B.
Stern.
Paul W. Hughes argued the cause for respondents. With
him on the brief were Michael B. Kimberly, Sarah P.
Hogarth, Randall L. Hodgkinson, Rick Kittel, and Rekha
Sharma-Crawford.†
†Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Indi-
ana et al. by Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Thomas M.
Fisher, Solicitor General, Kian J. Hudson, Deputy Solicitor General, and
Julia C. Payne, Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General
for their respective States as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Kevin
G. Clarkson of Alaska, Christopher M. Carr of Georgia, Aaron M. Frey
of Maine, Jim Hood of Mississippi, Dave Yost of Ohio, Mike Hunter of
Oklahoma, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Herbert H. Slatery III of Ten-
nessee, Ken Paxton of Texas, and Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia; for
the Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund by Lawrence J. Joseph;
and for the Immigration Reform Law Institute by Christopher J. Hajec
and Lew J. Olowski.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Harold
C. Becker and Matthew J. Ginsburg; for Immigration Law Scholars et al.
by Trisha B. Anderson; for Law Offce of David J. Grummon, P. A., by
Brian Leininger; for the National Immigration Law Center et al. by
Kristi L. Graunke, Meredith B. Stewart, Matthew J. Piers, Caryn C. Led-
erer, and Nicholas Espíritu; and for Puente Arizona et al. by Anne Lai.
Kathleen M. Sullivan and Daryl Joseffer fled a brief for the Chamber
of Commerce of the United States of America as amicus curiae.

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as: 589 U. S. 191 (2020)
195
Opinion of the Court
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
Kansas
law makes it a crime to commit “identity theft”
or engage in fraud to obtain a beneft. Respondents—three
aliens who are not authorized to work in this country—were
convicted under these provisions for fraudulently using an-
other person's Social Security number on state and federal
tax-withholding forms that they submitted when they ob-
tained employment. The Supreme Court of Kansas held
that a provision of the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986 (IRCA), 100 Stat. 3359, expressly preempts the Kan-
sas statutes at issue insofar as they provide a basis for these
prosecutions. We reject this reading of the provision in
question, as well as respondents' alternative arguments
based on implied preemption. We therefore reverse.
I
A
The foundation of our laws on immigration and naturaliza-
tion is the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat.
163, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq., which sets out the
“ `terms and conditions of admission to the country and the
subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the country.' ”
Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Whit-
ing, 563 U. S. 582, 587 (2011). As initially enacted, the INA
did not prohibit the employment of illegal aliens, and this
Court held that federal law left room for the States to regu-
late in this feld. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351, 353
(1976).
With the enactment of IRCA, Congress took a different
approach. IRCA made it unlawful to hire an alien knowing
that he or she is unauthorized to work in the United States.
8 U. S. C. §§ 1324a(a)(1)(A), (h)(3). To enforce this prohibi-
tion, IRCA requires employers to comply with a federal em-
ployment verifcation system. § 1324a(b). Using a federal
work-authorization form (I–9), employers “must attest”
that they have “verifed” that an employee “is not an unau-

196 K
ANSAS v. GARCIA
Opinion of the Court
thorized alien” by examining approved documents such
as
a United States passport or alien registration card.
§ 1324a( b)(1)(A); see a lso §§ 1324a( b)(1)(B)–(D); 8 CFR
§ 274a.2(a)(2) (2019) (establishing Form I–9). This require-
ment applies to the hiring of any individual regardless of
citizenship or nationality. 8 U. S. C. § 1324a(b)(1). Employ-
ers who fail to comply may face civil and criminal sanctions.
See §§ 1324a(e)(4), (f ); 8 CFR § 274a.10. IRCA instructs em-
ployers to retain copies of their I–9 forms and allows
employers to make copies of the documents submitted by
employees to show their authorization to work. 8 U. S. C.
§§ 1324a(b)(3)–(4).
IRCA concomitantly imposes duties on all employees, re-
gardless of citizenship. No later than their frst day of em-
ployment, all employees must complete an I–9 and attest
that they fall into a category of persons who are author-
ized to work in the United States. § 1324a(b)(2); 8 CFR
§ 274a.2(b)(1)(i)(A). In addition, under penalty of perjury,
every employee must provide certain personal information—
specifcally: name, residence address, birth date, Social Secu-
rity number, e-mail address, and telephone number. It is a
federal crime for an employee to provide false information
on an I–9 or to use fraudulent documents to show author-
ization to work. See 18 U. S. C. §§ 1028, 1546. Federal law
does not make it a crime for an alien to work without au-
thorization, and this Court has held that state laws criminal-
izing such conduct are preempted. Arizona v. United
States, 567 U. S. 387, 403–407 (2012). But if an alien works
illegally, the alien's immigration status may be adversely
affected. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1255(c)(2), (8), 1227(a)(1)(C)(i).
While IRCA imposes these requirements on employers
and employees, it also limits the use of I–9 forms. A pro-
vision entitled “Limitation on use of attestation form,”
§ 1324a(b)(5), provides that I–9 forms and “any information
contained in or appended to such form[s] may not be used for
purposes other than for enforcement of ” the INA or other

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as: 589 U. S. 191 (2020)
197
Opinion of the Court
specifed provisions of federal law, including those prohibit-
i
ng the making of a false statement in a federal matter (18
U. S. C. § 1001), identity theft (§ 1028), immigration-document
fraud (§ 1546), and perjury (§ 1621). In addition, 8 U. S. C.
§ 1324a(d)(2)(F) prohibits use of the “employment verifcation
system” “for law enforcement purposes,” apart from the en-
forcement of the aforementioned federal statutes.
Although IRCA expressly regulates the use of I–9's and
documents appended to that form, no provision of IRCA di-
rectly addresses the use of other documents, such as federal
and state tax-withholding forms, that an employee may
complete upon beginning a new job. A federal regulation
provides that all employees must furnish their employers
with a signed withholding exemption certifcate when they
start a new job, but federal law apparently does not require
the discharge of an employee who fails to do so. See 26
CFR §§ 31.3402(f )(2)–1, (5)–1 (2019). Instead, the regulation
provides that if an employee fails to provide a signed W–4,
the employer must treat the employee “as a single person
claiming no withholding exemptions.” § 31.3402(f )(2)–1(a).
The submission of a fraudulent W–4, however, is a federal
crime. 26 U. S. C. § 7205.
Kansas uses a tax-withholding form (K–4) that is similar
to the federal form. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79–3298 (2018 Cum.
Supp.); Kansas Dept. of Revenue, Notice 07–07: New K–4
Form for State Withholding (Sept. 2007), www.orthodon.
com/ home/document/KS-WithholdingFor m.pdf ; Kansas
Dept. of Revenue, Kansas Withholding Form K–4, www.
ksrevenue.org/k4info.html. Employees must attest to the
veracity of the information under penalty of perjury. Form
K–4, Kansas Employee's Withholding Allowance Certifcate
(rev. Nov. 2018), www.ksrevenue.org/pdf/k-4.pdf; Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 21–5903; see also Kansas Dept. of Revenue, Tax Fraud
Enforcement, www.ksrevenue.org/taxfraud.html.
Finally, IRCA contains a provision that expressly “pre-
empt[s] any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanc-

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ANSAS v. GARCIA
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tions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon
those
who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employ-
ment, unauthorized aliens.” 8 U. S. C. § 1324a(h)(2) (empha-
sis added). This provision makes no mention of state or
local laws that impose criminal or civil sanctions on employ-
ees or applicants for employment. See ibid.
B
Like other States, Kansas has laws against fraud, forger-
ies, and identity theft. These statutes apply to citizens and
aliens alike and are not limited to conduct that occurs in
connection with employment. The Kansas identity-theft
statute criminalizes the “using ” of any “personal identifying
information” belonging to another person with the intent to
“[d]efraud that person, or anyone else, in order to receive
any beneft.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21–6107(a)(1). “[P]ersonal
identifying information” includes, among other things, a per-
son's name, birth date, driver's license number, and Social
Security number. § 21–6107(e)(2). Kansas courts have in-
terpreted the statute to cover the use of another person's
Social Security number to receive the benefts of employ-
ment. See State v. Meza, 38 Kan. App. 2d 245, 247–250, 165
P. 3d 298, 301–302 (2007).
Kansas's false-information statute criminalizes, among
other things, “making, generating, distributing or drawing ”
a “written instrument” with knowledge that it “falsely states
or represents some material matter” and “with intent to de-
fraud, obstruct the detection of a theft or felony offense or
induce offcial action.” § 21–5824.
The respondents in the three cases now before us are
aliens who are not authorized to work in this country but
nevertheless secured employment by using the identity of
other persons on the I–9 forms that they completed when
they applied for work. They also used these same false
identities when they completed their W–4's and K–4's. All
three respondents were convicted under one or both of the

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Kansas laws just mentioned for fraudulently using another
person'
s Social Security number on tax-withholding forms.
We summarize the pertinent facts related to these three
prosecutions.
C
Ramiro Garcia. In August 2012, a local patrol offcer
stopped Garcia for speeding and learned that Garcia had
been previously contacted by a fnancial crimes detective
about possible identity theft. App. 39–44, 89–91; 306 Kan.
1113, 1114, 401 P. 3d 588, 590 (2017). Local authorities ob-
tained the documents that Garcia had completed when he
began work at a restaurant, and a joint state-federal investi-
gation discovered that Garcia had used another person's So-
cial Security number on his I–9, W–4, and K–4 forms. The
State then charged Garcia with identity theft. The com-
plaint alleged that, when he began work at the restaurant,
he used another person's Social Security number with the
intent to defraud and in order to receive a beneft. App. 9–10.
Donaldo Morales. A joint state-federal investigation of
Morales began after the Kansas Department of Labor noti-
fed a Social Security agent that an employee at a local res-
taurant was using a Social Security number that did not
match the identifying information in the department's fles.
306 Kan. 1100, 1101, 401 P. 3d 155, 156 (2017); App. to Pet.
for Cert. 73; App. 124–125, 168–170. A federal agent con-
tacted the restaurant and learned that Morales had used an-
other person's Social Security number on his I–9, W–4, and
K–4 forms. The federal agent arrested Morales, who then
admitted that he had bought the Social Security number
from someone he met in a park. App. 171–172; 306 Kan., at
1101–1102, 401 P. 3d, at 156; App. to Pet. for Cert.73. This
information was turned over to state prosecutors, who
charged Morales with identity theft and making false infor-
mation. App. 124–125; 306 Kan., at 1101, 401 P. 3d, at 156.
Guadalupe Ochoa-Lara. Ochoa-Lara came to the atten-
tion of a joint state-federal task force after offcers learned

200 K
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that he had used a Social Security number issued to someone
else
when he leased an apartment. 306 Kan. 1107, 1108–1109,
401 P. 3d 159, 160–161 (2017). The individual to whom this
number was lawfully assigned advised the investigating off-
cers that she had no knowledge that another person was using
her number, and she later told authorities that income that she
had not earned had been reported under her number. Id.,
at 1109, 401 P. 3d, at 160. After contacting the restaurant
where Ochoa-Lara worked, investigators determined that he
had also used the same Social Security number to complete
his I–9 and W–4 forms. Ibid. The State charged Ochoa-
Lara with identity theft and making false information for
using another's Social Security number on those documents.
D
In all three cases, respondents argued before trial that
IRCA preempted their prosecutions. They relied on 8
U. S. C. § 1324a(b)(5), which, as noted, provides that I–9
forms and “any information contained in or appended to such
form[s] may not be used for purposes other than for enforce-
ment of ” the INA or other listed federal statutes. In re-
sponse, the State dismissed the charges that were based on
I–9's and agreed not to rely on the I–9's at trial. The State
maintained, however, that § 1324a(b)(5) did not apply to re-
spondents' use of false Social Security numbers on the tax-
withholding forms.
The trial courts allowed the State to proceed with the
charges based on those forms. The State entered the K–
4's and W–4's into evidence against Garcia and Morales, and
Ochoa-Lara stipulated to using a stolen Social Security num-
ber on a W–4. App. 109–110; 306 Kan., at 1108–1109, 401
P. 3d, at 160–161.
1
Respondents were convicted, and three
1
In Morales's bench trial, the State also introduced into evidence his I–
9 and a photocopy of a permanent resident card and Social Security card
that was appended to his I–9. App. 152–154, 178–179. The trial court,
however, explicitly assured Morales that it would not make any fndings

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separate panels of the Kansas Court of Appeals affrmed
their
convictions.
A divided Kansas Supreme Court reversed, concluding
that “the plain and unambiguous language of 8 U. S. C.
§ 1324a(b)(5)” expressly prohibits a State from using “any in-
formation contained within [an] I–9 as the bas[i]s for a state
law identity theft prosecution of an alien who uses another's
Social Security information in an I–9.” 306 Kan., at 1130–
1131, 401 P. 3d, at 599 (emphasis deleted). The court added
that “[t]he fact that this information was included in the W–
4 and K–4 did not alter the fact that it was also part of the
I–9.” Id., at 1131, 401 P. 3d, at 599. In deciding the appeal
on these grounds, the court appears to have embraced the
proposition that any fact to which an employee attests in an
I–9 is information that is “contained in” the I–9 and is thus
subject to the restrictions imposed by § 1324a(b)(5), namely,
that this fact cannot be used by anyone for any purpose other
than the few listed in that provision. Nevertheless, the
court suggested that its holding did not sweep this broadly
but was instead limited to the prosecution of aliens for using
a false identity to establish “employment eligibility.” Id., at
1126, 1131, 401 P. 3d, at 596, 600.
Justice Luckert concurred based on implied, not express,
preemption. In her view, IRCA occupies “the feld” within
which the prosecutions at issue fell, namely, “the use of false
documents, including those using the identity of others, when
an unauthorized alien seeks employment.” Id., at 1136, 401
P. 3d, at 602. Justice Luckert also opined that the Kansas
statutes, as applied in these cases, confict with IRCA
because they “usur[p] federal enforcement discretion” regard-
based on the I–9, and defense counsel did not further object to the intro-
duction of the I–9 into evidence. Id., at 150–151. Before the state appel-
late courts, Morales did not argue that admitting the I–9 and photocopy
was error. Nor did his brief in opposition to certiorari argue that the
admission of these exhibits provided a ground for relief under federal law.
See this Court's Rule 15.2.

202 K
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ing the treatment of aliens who obtain employment even
though
they are barred from doing so under federal law.
Ibid., 401 P. 3d, at 603.
Two members of the court, Justices Biles and Stegall, dis-
sented, and we granted review. 586 U. S. 1221 (2019).
II
The Supremacy Clause provides that the Constitution, fed-
eral statutes, and treaties constitute “the supreme Law of
the Land.” Art. VI, cl. 2. The Clause provides “a rule of
decision” for determining whether federal or state law ap-
plies in a particular situation. Armstrong v. Exceptional
Child Center, Inc., 575 U. S. 320, 324 (2015). If federal law
“imposes restrictions or confers rights on private actors”
and “a state law confers rights or imposes restrictions that
confict with the federal law,” “the federal law takes prece-
dence and the state law is preempted.” Murphy v. Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Assn., 584 U. S. 453, 477 (2018).
In all cases, the federal restrictions or rights that are said
to confict with state law must stem from either the Constitu-
tion itself or a valid statute enacted by Congress. “There
is no federal pre-emption in vacuo,” without a constitutional
text, federal statute, or treaty made under the authority of
the United States. Puerto Rico Dept. of Consumer Affairs
v. ISLA Petroleum Corp., 485 U. S. 495, 503 (1988); see also
Whiting, 563 U. S., at 607 (preemption cannot be based on “a
`freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is
in tension with federal objectives' ”); Virginia Uranium, Inc.
v. Warren, 587 U. S. 761, 767 (2019) (lead opinion of Gor-
such, J.) (“Invoking some brooding federal interest or ap-
pealing to a judicial policy preference” does not show
preemption).
In some cases, a federal statute may expressly preempt
state law. See Pacifc Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Re-
sources Conservation and Development Comm'n, 461 U. S.

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203
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190, 203 (1983) (“It is well established that within constitu-
ti
onal limits Congress may pre-empt state authority by so
stating in express terms”). But it has long been established
that preemption may also occur by virtue of restrictions or
rights that are inferred from statutory law. See, e. g., Os-
born v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 865 (1824) (re-
jecting argument that a federal exemption from state regula-
tion “not being expressed, ought not to be implied by the
Court”). And recent cases have often held state laws to be
impliedly preempted. See, e. g., Arizona, 567 U. S., at 400–
408; Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp., 565 U. S.
625, 630–631 (2012); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U. S. 604,
617–618 (2011).
In these cases, respondents do not contend that the Kansas
statutes under which they were convicted are preempted in
their entirety. Instead, they argue that these laws must
yield only insofar as they apply to an unauthorized alien's
use of false documents on forms submitted for the purpose
of securing employment. In making this argument, re-
spondents invoke all three categories of preemption identi-
fed in our cases. They defend the Kansas Supreme Court's
holding that provisions of IRCA expressly bar their prosecu-
tions. And they also argue that the decision below is
supported by “feld” or “confict” preemption or some combi-
nation of the two. We consider these arguments in turn.
III
We begin with the argument that the state criminal stat-
utes under which respondents were convicted are expressly
preempted.
As noted, IRCA contains a provision that expressly pre-
empts state law, but it is plainly inapplicable here. That
provision applies only to the imposition of criminal or civil
liability on employers and those who receive a fee for
recruiting or referring prospective employees. 8 U. S. C.

204 K
ANSAS v. GARCIA
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§ 1324a(h)(2). It does not mention state or local laws that
i
mpose criminal or civil sanctions on employees or applicants
for employment.
The Kansas Supreme Court did not base its holding on this
provision but instead turned to § 1324a(b)(5), which is far
more than a preemption provision. This provision broadly
restricts any use of an I–9, information contained in an I–9,
and any documents appended to an I–9. Thus, unlike a typi-
cal preemption provision, it applies not just to the States but
also to the Federal Government and all private actors.
The Kansas Supreme Court thought that the prosecutions
in these cases ran afoul of this provision because the charges
were based on respondents' use in their W–4's and K–4's of
the same false Social Security numbers that they also in-
serted on their I–9's. Taken at face value, this theory would
mean that no information placed on an I–9—including an em-
ployee's name, residence address, date of birth, telephone
number, and e-mail address—could ever be used by any en-
tity or person for any reason.
This interpretation is fatly contrary to standard English
usage. A tangible object can be “contained in” only one
place at any point in time, but an item of information is dif-
ferent. It may be “contained in” many different places, and
it is not customary to say that a person uses information that
is contained in a particular source unless the person makes
use of that source.
Consider a person's e-mail address, one of the bits of infor-
mation that is called for on an I–9. A person's e-mail
address may be “contained in” a great many places. Indi-
viduals often provide their e-mail addresses to a wide circle
of friends, acquaintances, online vendors, work-related con-
tacts, and others. In addition, the records of every recipient
of an e-mail from a particular person will contain that ad-
dress.
2
In ordinary speech, no one would say that a person
2
Of course, a considerate sender may remember to put the addresses in
the BCC line.

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Opinion of the Court
who uses an e-mail address has used information that is
cont
ained in all these places.
Suppose that John used his e-mail address fve years ago
to purchase a pair of shoes and that the vendor has that
address in its fles. Suppose that John now sends an e-mail
to Mary and that Mary sends an e-mail reply. No one would
say that Mary has used information contained in the fles of
the shoe vendor.
Or consider this bit of information: that the frst man set
foot on the moon on July 20, 1969.
3
That fact was reported
in newspapers around the world, from Neil Armstrong 's
hometown newspaper, the Wapakoneta (Ohio) Daily News,
4
to the Soviet newspaper Izvestia.
5
Suppose that an elemen-
tary school student writes a report in which she states that
the frst man walked on the moon in 1969. No one would
say that the student used information contained in the Wapa-
koneta Daily News or Izvestia if she never saw those publi-
cations. But it would be natural to say that the student
used information contained in a book in the school library if
that is where she got the information for her report.
Accordingly, the mere fact that an I–9 contains an item of
information, such as a name or address, does not mean that
information “contained in” the I–9 is used whenever that
name or address is later employed.
3
Twentieth Century Almanac 405 (R. Ferrell & J. Bowman eds. 1984);
NASA, The First Person on the Moon (last updated Apr. 9, 2009), www.
nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/k-4/stories/frst-person-on-moon.html.
4
Neil Steps on the Moon, Wapakoneta Daily News, July 21, 1969, p. 1,
https:// blogs.loc.gov/ headlinesandheroes/2019/08/newspaper-coverage-of-
one-giant-leap-for-mankind.
5
See The First Steps: Luna Took the Envoys of the Earth, Izvestia,
Moscow Evening ed., July 21, 1969, p. 1 (transl.); NASA, Astronautics and
Aeronautics, 1969: Chronology on Science, Technology, and Policy 233
(NASA SP–4014 1970); see also McFall-Johnsen, Newspaper Front Pages
From 50 Years Ago Reveal How the World Reacted to the Apollo 11 Moon
Landing, Business Insider US, July 20, 2019, http://www.businessinsider.
com/apollo-11-moon-landing-newspaper-front-pages-2019-7/.

206 K
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If this were not so, strange consequences would ensue.
Reca
ll that 8 U. S. C. § 1324a(b)(5) applies to the Federal
Government. Under 26 U. S. C. § 7205, it is a crime to will-
fully supply false information on a W–4, and this provision
is not among those listed in 8 U. S. C. § 1324a(b)(5). Thus, if
an individual provided the same false information on an I–9
and a W–4, the Federal Government could not prosecute this
individual under 26 U. S. C. § 7205 even if the Government
made no use whatsoever of the I–9. And that is just the
beginning.
Suppose that an employee truthfully states on his I–9 that
his name is Jim Smith. Under the interpretation of 8
U. S. C. § 1324a(b)(5) that the Kansas Supreme Court seem-
ingly adopted, no one could use Jim's name for any purpose.
If he robbed a bank, prosecutors could not use his name in
an indictment. His employer could not cut a paycheck using
that name. His sister could not use his name to mail him a
birthday card.
The Kansas Supreme Court tried to fend off these conse-
quences by suggesting that its interpretation applied only to
the prosecution of aliens for using a false identity to establish
“employment eligibility.” 306 Kan., at 1126, 401 P. 3d, at
596. But there is no trace of these limitations in the text of
§ 1324a(b)(5). The point need not be belabored any further:
The argument that § 1324a(b)(5) expressly bars respondents'
prosecutions cannot be defended.
Apparently recog ni zi ng th is, respondents tur n to
§ 1324a(d)(2)(F), which prohibits use of the federal employ-
ment verifcation system
6
“for law enforcement purposes
other than” enforcement of IRCA and the same handful
of federal statutes mentioned in § 1324a(b)(5): 18 U. S. C.
§ 1001 (fa lse statements), § 1028 ( identity thef t), § 1546
(immigration-document fraud), and § 1621 (perjury).
6
This provision refers to “[t]he system,” but it is apparent that this
means “the employment verifcation system,” which is described in some
detail in § 1324a(b). There is no other system to which this reference
could plausibly refer.

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This argument fails because it rests on a misunderstanding
of
the meaning of the federal “employment verifcation sys-
tem.” The sole function of that system is to establish that
an employee is not barred from working in this country due
to alienage. As described in § 1324a(b), the system includes
the steps that an employee must take to establish that he or
she is not prohibited from working, the steps that an em-
ployer must take to verify the employee's status, and certain
related matters—such as the preservation and copying of
records that are used to show authorization to work.
The federal employment verifcation system does not in-
clude things that an employee must or may do to satisfy re-
quirements unrelated to work authorization. And complet-
ing tax-withholding documents plays no part in the process
of determining whether a person is authorized to work.
7
In-
stead, those documents are part of the apparatus used to
enforce federal and state income tax laws.
8
For all these reasons, there is no express preemption in
these cases.
7
Moreover, these documents are not always submitted when an em-
ployee begins a job. Instead, new W–4's and K–4's may be, and often are,
completed at later dates when an employee wishes to make changes that
affect the amount of withholding. 26 CFR § 31.3402(f )(2)–1; IRS, Publica-
tion 505: Tax Withholding and Estimated Tax 3 (May 15, 2019) (“During
the year, changes may occur . . . . When this happens, you may need to
give your employer a new Form W–4 . . . . Otherwise, if you want to
change your withholding allowances for any reason, you can generally do
that whenever you wish”); Kansas Dept. of Revenue, Kansas Withholding
Form K–4, www.ksrevenue.org/k4info.html.
8
Respondents also contend that 18 U. S. C. § 1546(c) expressly preempts
the relevant Kansas statutes as applied in their prosecutions, but it is
impossible to see any basis for that argument in the statutory text. This
subsection, which is part of a provision that criminalizes certain conduct
relating to immigration and authorization to work, provides that the sec-
tion “does not prohibit any lawfully authorized investigative, protective,
or intelligence activity” of a federal or state law enforcement agency, a
federal intelligence agency, or others engaged in certain activity relating
to the prosecution of organized crime. How this provision can be seen as
expressly barring respondents' prosecutions is a mystery.

208 K
ANSAS v. GARCIA
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IV
W
e therefore proceed to consider respondents' alternative
argument that the Kansas laws, as applied, are preempted by
implication. This argument, like all preemption arguments,
must be grounded “in the text and structure of the statute
at issue.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U. S. 658,
664 (1993).
A
Respondents contend, frst, that the Kansas statutes, as
applied, fall into a feld that is implicitly reserved exclusively
for federal regulation. In rare cases, the Court has found
that Congress “legislated so comprehensively” in a particu-
lar feld that it “left no room for supplementary state legisla-
tion,” R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479
U. S. 130, 140 (1986), but that is certainly not the situation
here.
In order to determine whether Congress has implicitly
ousted the States from regulating in a particular feld, we
must frst identify the feld in which this is said to have
occurred. In their merits brief in this Court, respondents'
primary submission is that IRCA preempts “the feld of
fraud on the federal employment verifcation system,” Brief
for Respondents 41 (quotation altered), but this argument
fails because, as already explained, the submission of tax-
withholding forms is not part of that system.
At some points in their brief, respondents defne the sup-
posedly preempted feld more broadly as the “feld relating
to the federal employment verifcation system,” id., at 42
(emphasis added); see also id., at 40, but this formulation
does not rescue the argument. The submission of tax-
withholding forms is fundamentally unrelated to the federal
employment verifcation system because, as explained, those
forms serve entirely different functions. The employment
verifcation system is designed to prevent the employment
of unauthorized aliens, whereas tax-withholding forms help

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Opinion of the Court
to enforce income tax laws. And using another person's So-
cia
l Security number on tax forms threatens harm that has
no connection with immigration law.
For instance, using another person's Social Security num-
ber on tax-withholding forms affects the wages reported
to federal and state tax authorities. In addition, many
benefts—such as those for disability, unemployment, and
retirement—are tied to an individual's work status and in-
come. Inaccurate data also affect the accuracy of a State's
tax information.
9
It is true that employees generally complete their W–4's
and K–4's at roughly the same time as their I–9's, but IRCA
plainly does not foreclose all state regulation of information
that must be supplied as a precondition of employment.
New employees may be required by law to provide all sorts
of information that has nothing to do with authorization to
work in the United States, such as information about age (for
jobs with a minimum age requirement), educational degrees,
licensing, criminal records, drug use, and personal informa-
tion needed for a background check. IRCA surely does not
preclude States from requiring and regulating the submis-
sion of all such information.
Respondents suggest that federal law precludes their
prosecutions because both the Kansas identity-theft statute
and the Kansas false-information statute require proof that
the accused engaged in the prohibited conduct for the pur-
pose of getting a “beneft.” Their argument is as follows.
Since the beneft alleged by the prosecution in these cases
was getting a job, and since the employment verifcation
system concerns authorization to work, the theory of re-
spondents' prosecutions is related to that system.
This argument confates the beneft that results from com-
plying with the federal employment verifcation system (ver-
9
See, e. g., Kansas Dept. of Revenue, Annua l Repor ts, www.
ksrevenue.org/prannualreport.html; Kansas Dept. of Revenue, Tax Fraud
Enforcement, www.ksrevenue.org/taxfraud.html.

210 K
ANSAS v. GARCIA
Opinion of the Court
ifying authorization to work in the United States) with the
beneft
of actually getting a job. Submitting W–4's and K–
4's helped respondents get jobs, but this did not in any way
assist them in showing that they were authorized to work in
this country. Thus, respondents' “relating to” argument
must be rejected, as must the even broader defnitions of
the putatively preempted feld advanced by respondents at
earlier points in this litigation.
Contrary to respondents' suggestion, IRCA certainly does
not bar all state regulation regarding the “use of false docu-
ments . . . when an unauthorized alien seeks employment.”
Brief in Opposition 21. Nor does IRCA exclude a State
from the entire “feld of employment verifcation.” Id., at
22. For example, IRCA certainly does not prohibit a public
school system from requiring applicants for teaching posi-
tions to furnish legitimate teaching certifcates. And it does
not prevent a police department from verifying that a pro-
spective offcer does not have a record of abusive behavior.
Respondents argue that feld preemption in these cases
“follows directly” from our decision in Arizona, 567 U. S. 387,
Brief for Respondents 45–46, but that is not so. In Arizona,
relying on our prior decision in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U. S. 52 (1941), we held that federal immigration law occu-
pied the feld of alien registration. 567 U. S., at 400–402.
“Federal law,” we observed, “makes a single sovereign re-
sponsible for maintaining a comprehensive and unifed sys-
tem to keep track of aliens within the Nation's borders.”
Id., at 401–402. But federal law does not create a compre-
hensive and unifed system regarding the information that a
State may require employees to provide.
In sum, there is no basis for fnding feld preemption in
these cases.
B
We likewise see no ground for holding that the Kansas
statutes at issue confict with federal law. It is certainly

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possible to comply with both IRCA and the Kansas statutes,
and
respondents do not suggest otherwise. They instead
maintain that the Kansas statutes, as applied in their prose-
cutions, stand as “an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes” of IRCA—one of which is
purportedly that the initiation of any legal action against an
unauthorized alien for using a false identity in applying for
employment should rest exclusively within the prosecutorial
discretion of federal authorities. Brief for Respondents 49–
55. Allowing Kansas to bring prosecutions like these, ac-
cording to respondents, would risk upsetting federal enforce-
ment priorities and frustrating federal objectives, such as
obtaining the cooperation of unauthorized aliens in making
bigger cases. Ibid.
Respondents analogize these cases to our holding in Ari-
zona, 567 U. S., at 404–407—that a state law making it a
crime for an unauthorized alien to obtain employment con-
ficted with IRCA, which does not criminalize that conduct—
but respondents' analogy is unsound. In Arizona, the
Court inferred that Congress had made a considered decision
that it was inadvisable to criminalize the conduct in question.
In effect, the Court concluded that IRCA implicitly con-
ferred a right to be free of criminal (as opposed to civil) pen-
alties for working illegally, and thus a state law making it a
crime to engage in that conduct conficted with this federal
right.
Nothing similar is involved here. In enacting IRCA, Con-
gress did not decide that an unauthorized alien who uses a
false identity on tax-withholding forms should not face crimi-
nal prosecution. On the contrary, federal law makes it a
crime to use fraudulent information on a W–4. 26 U. S. C.
§ 7205.
The mere fact that state laws like the Kansas provisions
at issue overlap to some degree with federal criminal provi-
sions does not even begin to make a case for confict preemp-

212 K
ANSAS v. GARCIA
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tion. From the beginning of our country, criminal law en-
forcement
has been primarily a responsibility of the States,
and that remains true today. In recent times, the reach of
federal criminal law has expanded, and there are now many
instances in which a prosecution for a particular course of
conduct could be brought by either federal or state prosecu-
tors. Our federal system would be turned upside down if
we were to hold that federal criminal law preempts state law
whenever they overlap, and there is no basis for inferring
that federal criminal statutes preempt state laws whenever
they overlap. Indeed, in the vast majority of cases where
federal and state laws overlap, allowing the States to prose-
cute is entirely consistent with federal interests.
In the present cases, there is certainly no suggestion that
the Kansas prosecutions frustrated any federal interests.
Federal authorities played a role in all three cases, and the
Federal Government fully supports Kansas's position in this
Court. In the end, however, the possibility that federal en-
forcement priorities might be upset is not enough to provide
a basis for preemption. The Supremacy Clause gives prior-
ity to “the Laws of the United States,” not the criminal law
enforcement priorities or preferences of federal offcers.
Art. VI, cl. 2.
Finally, contrary to respondents' suggestion, these cases
are very different from Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal
Comm., 531 U. S. 341 (2001), and Wisconsin Dept. of Indus-
try v. Gould Inc., 475 U. S. 282 (1986). In Buckman Co., the
preempted state tort claim for fraud on the Food and Drug
Administration threatened serious disruption of the sensitive
and highly technical process of approving medical devices.
531 U. S., at 347–353. In these cases, the state prosecutions
posed no comparable risk.
In Gould, the decision rested on a special preemption rule
governing state laws regulating matters that the National
Labor Relations Act “protects, prohibits, or arguably pro-
tects.” 475 U. S., at 286–289; San Diego Building Trades

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213
Thomas, J., concurring
Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 246 (1959). No similar
r
ule is operative or appropriate here.
***
For these reasons, the judgments of the Supreme Court of
Kansas are reversed, and these cases are remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Gorsuch joins,
concurring.
I agree that Kansas' prosecutions and convictions of re-
spondents for identity theft and making false information are
not pre-empted by § 101(a)(1) of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986, 8 U. S. C. § 1324a. I write separately
to reiterate my view that we should explicitly abandon our
“purposes and objectives” pre-emption jurisprudence.
The founding generation treated conficts between federal
and state laws as implied repeals. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,
564 U. S. 604, 622 (2011) (plurality opinion). Then, as now,
courts disfavored repeals by implication. See, e. g., Warder
v. Arell, 2 Va. 282, 299 (1796) (opinion of President Judge); 2
T. Cunningham, A New and Complete Law-Dictionary (2d
ed. 1771) (defning “Statute”); 4 M. Bacon, A New Abridg-
ment of the Law 638 (3d ed. 1768). To overcome this disfa-
vor, legislatures included non obstante clauses in statutes.
See Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 237–240, and
nn. 42–44 (2000) (collecting examples). Courts understood
non obstante provisions to mean that, “[r]ather than strain-
ing the new statute in order to harmonize it with prior law,
[they] were supposed to give the new statute its natural
meaning and to let the chips fall where they may.” Id.,
at 242.
The Founders included a non obstante provision in the
Supremacy Clause. It directs that “the Judges in every

214 K
ANSAS v. GARCIA
Thomas, J., concurring
State shall be bound” by the “Constitution, and the Laws of
the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, . . . any Thing in the Consti-
tution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstand-
ing.” Art. VI, cl. 2. If we interpret the Supremacy Clause
as the founding generation did, our task is straightforward.
We must use the accepted methods of interpretation to as-
certain whether the ordinary meaning of federal and state
law “directly confict.” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. S. 555, 590
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). “[F]ederal law
pre-empts state law only if the two are in logical contradic-
tion.” Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 587 U. S.
299, 319 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Nelson,
supra, at 236–237.
The doctrine of “purposes and objectives” pre-emption im-
permissibly rests on judicial guesswork about “broad federal
policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions
of congressional purposes that are not contained within the
text of federal law.” Wyeth, supra, at 587 (opinion of
Thomas, J.); see also Arizona v. United States, 567 U. S. 387,
440 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). I therefore cannot apply “purposes and objectives”
pre-emption doctrine, as it is contrary to the Supremacy
Clause.*
In these cases, the Court correctly distinguishes our “pur-
poses and objectives” precedents and does not engage in a
“ `freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute
*I am also skeptical of feld pre-emption, “at least as applied in the
absence of a congressional command that a particular feld be pre-empted.”
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U. S. 564, 617
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting). For today, however, it suffces to say that
the Court correctly applies our feld pre-emption precedents and that
“nothing in the text of the relevant federal statutes indicates that Con-
gress intended” to pre-empt a pertinent feld. Arizona, 567 U. S., at 439
(opinion of Thomas, J.).

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215
Opinion of Breyer, J.
is in tension with federal objectives.' ” Wyeth, supra, at 588
(
opinion of Thomas, J.) (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences
LLC, 544 U. S. 431, 459 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part)). It also acknowl-
edges that “[t]he Supremacy Clause gives priority to `the
laws of the United States,' not the criminal law enforcement
priorities or preferences of federal offcers.” Ante, at 212.
Because the Court rejects respondents' “purposes and objec-
tives” argument without atextual speculation about legisla-
tive intentions, I join its opinion in full.
Justice Breyer, w ith whom Justice Ginsburg,
Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan join, concurring
in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that nothing in the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 100 Stat. 3359, ex-
pressly preempts Kansas' criminal laws as they were applied
in the prosecutions at issue here. But I do not agree with
the majority's conclusion about implied preemption.
When we confront a question of implied preemption, the
words of the statute are especially unlikely to determine the
answer by themselves. Nonetheless, in my view, IRCA's
text, together with its structure, context, and purpose, make
it “ `clear and manifest' ” that Congress has occupied at least
the narrow feld of policing fraud committed to demonstrate
federal work authorization. Arizona v. United States, 567
U. S. 387, 400 (2012) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947)); see Brief for United States
as Amicus Curiae in Puente Arizona v. Arpaio, No. 15–
15211 etc. (CA9), p. 15 (contending that the Act preempts
state criminal laws “to the extent they regulate fraud com-
mitted to demonstrate authorization to work in the United
States under federal immigration law”); Tr. of Oral Arg.
22–23 (standing by the Government's position in Puente
Arizona). That is to say, the Act reserves to the Federal
Government—and thus takes from the States—the power to

216 K
ANSAS v. GARCIA
Opinion of Breyer, J.
prosecute people for misrepresenting material information in
an
effort to convince their employer that they are authorized
to work in this country.
The Act creates what we have called “a comprehensive
scheme” to “comba[t] the employment of illegal aliens.”
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U. S. 137,
147 (2002). To that end, the statute's text sets forth highly
detailed requirements. The Act specifes, for example: that
employers and employees must affrm in writing that the em-
ployee is authorized to work in the United States, 8 U. S. C.
§§ 1324a(b)(1)(A), (b)(2); that only certain documents suffce
to demonstrate identity and work authorization (e. g., a pass-
port or alien-registration card), §§ 1324a(b)(1)(B)–(D); that
employers and employees must affrm the truthfulness of the
information they have given by “a hand-written or an elec-
tronic signature,” §§ 1324a(b)(1)(A), (b)(2); that all this infor-
mation must be consolidated on the I–9 form, ibid.; that the
employer must store the I–9 in “paper, microfche, microflm,
or electronic” form, typically for three years, § 1324a(b)(3);
and that employers must make it available for federal inspec-
tion, ibid.
IRCA also contains two carefully calibrated sets of sanc-
tions for noncompliance. On the employer side, the Act
makes it unlawful for employers to hire someone without
complying with the I–9 process, § 1324a(a)(1)(B), or to re-
cruit, hire, or employ someone the employer knows to be
unauthorized, §§ 1324a(a)(1)(A), (a)(2). The Act subjects em-
ployers who violate these prohibitions to an escalating series
of civil and criminal penalties. See §§ 1324a(e)(4)–(5), (f ).
It also expressly “preempt[s] any State or local law imposing
civil or criminal sanctions” on those employers, but with a
saving clause that gives States some room to regulate em-
ployers (and only employers) in this area “through licensing
and similar laws.” § 1324a(h)(2); see also Chamber of Com-
merce of United States of America v. Whiting, 563 U. S. 582,
587 (2011).

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217
Opinion of Breyer, J.
On the employee side, IRCA is somewhat more lenient.
Employees,
unlike employers, are not subject to punishment
for mere failure to complete the paperwork that the Act re-
quires. See § 1324a(e)(5). And while employees who work
without authorization may suffer adverse immigration conse-
quences, unauthorized work does not by itself trigger federal
criminal prosecution. See Arizona, 567 U. S., at 404–405
(citing §§ 1227(a)(1)(C)(i), 1255(c)(2), (c)(8)). Rather, the Act
makes it a federal crime for anyone to commit fraud “for the
purpose of satisfying ” the Act's requirements. 18 U. S. C.
§ 1546(b).
Our precedent demonstrates that IRCA impliedly pre-
empts state laws that trench on Congress' detailed and deli-
cate design. In Arizona, we invalidated a state law that
made it a crime for an unauthorized alien to work. 567
U. S., at 403. In reaching that conclusion, we acknowledged
that the Act's employer-related sections contain an express
preemption provision, while the employee-related provisions
do not. Id., at 406. Even so, the Act's employee-related
provisions retained, through implication, preemptive force.
Id., at 406–407.
Congress, we explained, “made a deliberate choice not to
impose criminal penalties on aliens who” merely “seek, or
engage in, unauthorized employment.” Id., at 405. The
Act puts combating the employment of unauthorized aliens
at the forefront of federal immigration policy. Id., at 404.
But it also refects “a considered judgment” not to pursue
that goal at all costs. Id., at 405. “Unauthorized workers
trying to support their families” usually “pose less danger
than alien smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime.”
Id., at 396. And they may have “children born in the United
States, long ties to the community,” or other attributes that
could counsel in favor of prosecutorial restraint. Ibid.
We ultimately held in Arizona that the States thus may
not make criminal what Congress did not, for any such state
law “would interfere with the careful balance struck by Con-

218 K
ANSAS v. GARCIA
Opinion of Breyer, J.
gress with respect to unauthorized employment of aliens.”
Id.
, at 406. Given that “obstacle to the regulatory system
Congress chose,” we concluded that the state law at issue
conficted with the federal Act and was therefore preempted.
Id., at 406–407.
State laws that police fraud committed to demonstrate fed-
eral work authorization are similarly preempted. Even
though IRCA criminalizes that conduct, the Act makes clear
that only the Federal Government may prosecute people
for misrepresenting their federal work-authorization status.
This is so for two reasons.
First, the Act takes from the States the most direct means
of policing work-authorization fraud. It prohibits States
from using for that purpose both the I–9 and the federal
employment verification system more generally. See 8
U. S. C. §§ 1324a( b)(5), (d)(2)(F). Those two provisions
strongly suggest that the Act occupies the feld of policing
fraud committed to demonstrate federal work authorization.
Otherwise, their express prohibitions would not constrain
the States in any meaningful way. States could evade the
Act simply by creating their own work-authorization form
with the same requirements as the I–9, requiring employees
to submit that form at the same time as the I–9, and prose-
cuting employees who make misrepresentations on the state
form. No one contends that the States may do that.
Second, consider another part of our decision in Arizona.
We also addressed in that case a different federal statute,
one establishing a federal alien-registration system. See
567 U. S., at 400–403. Pointing to that statute's “full set of
standards governing alien registration, including the punish-
ment for noncompliance,” we concluded that Congress had
enacted “a comprehensive and unifed system to keep track
of aliens within the Nation's borders.” Id., at 401–402.
The statute therefore left no room for a state law designed
to police violations of the federal alien-registration system.
Similarly, IRCA's intricate procedures and penalties create

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219
Opinion of Breyer, J.
a comprehensive and unifed system to keep track of who is
author
ized to work within the Nation's borders. See supra,
at 216–217. This too shows that criminal enforcement falls
to the Federal Government alone.
Nor does it matter that the state statutes invalidated in
Arizona had expressly targeted aliens. In preemption
cases, we must consider not just what a state law says, but
also what it does. Wos v. E. M. A., 568 U. S. 627, 637 (2013).
For this reason, even generally applicable and facially neu-
tral state laws may be preempted when applied in a particu-
lar factual context in a particular way. See, e. g., Buckman
Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U. S. 341, 347–350 (2001)
(rejecting claims grounded in generally applicable state-law
principles because they were based on a preempted theory
of liability); Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U. S. 273, 289
(2014) (similar). And here, Kansas applied its criminal laws
to do what IRCA reserves to the Federal Government
alone—police fraud committed to demonstrate federal work
authorization. That is true even though Kansas prosecuted
respondents based on their tax-withholding forms, rather
than their I–9s.
Take Donaldo Morales, for example. Kansas charged him
under two state antifraud statutes. Both required the State
to prove, as an element, an intent to defraud. See Kan. Stat.
Ann. §§ 21–5824(a), 21–6107(a)(1) (2018 Cum. Supp.). Kan-
sas law defnes “intent to defraud” as the “intention to de-
ceive another person, and to induce such other person, in
reliance upon such deception, to” transfer a property right.
§ 21–5111(o). Kansas' theory of guilt was that Morales in-
tended to deceive his employer about his federal work-
authorization status so that his employer, in reliance upon
that deception, would give him a job. At trial, the State
elicited testimony that employees needed “proof of eligibility
to work in the United States.” App. 149. It then argued
that Morales knew people like him had to use a false Social
Security number to get a job because of “how they were

220 K
ANSAS v. GARCIA
Opinion of Breyer, J.
here.” Id., at 176. The trial court, sitting as the fnder of
fac
t, confrmed how it understood the reliance that Morales
induced: Morales convinced his employer that he was “a legal
citizen,” even though he was in truth “undocumented.” Id.,
at 179–181.
On different facts, there would have been no preemption.
Had Kansas proved instead that Morales used a false Social
Security number on his tax-withholding forms to induce an-
other sort of reliance (e. g., to hide a criminal history), or
perhaps to obtain another kind of beneft (e. g., to pay less in
taxes), IRCA would permit the prosecution. But that is not
what Kansas did. What Kansas did was prosecute Morales
for misrepresenting his federal work-authorization status for
the purpose of obtaining employment. Kansas' prosecution
of Morales thus fell squarely within the feld that, in my view,
the federal Act preempts.
By permitting these prosecutions, the majority opens a co-
lossal loophole. Starting a new job almost always involves
flling out tax-withholding forms alongside an I–9. So un-
less they want to give themselves away, people hoping to
hide their federal work-authorization status from their
employer will put the same false information on their tax-
withholding forms as they do on their I–9. To let the States
prosecute such people for the former is, in practical effect,
to let the States police the latter. And policing the latter is
what the Act expressly forbids.
For these reasons, I would hold that federal law impliedly
preempted Kansas' criminal laws as they were applied in
these cases. Because the majority takes a different view,
with respect, I dissent.

OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
221
Syllabus
GUERRERO-LASPRILLA v. BARR, ATTORNEY
GENERAL
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for
the fth circuit
No. 18–776. Argued December 9, 2019—Decided March 23, 2020*
The Immigration and Nationality Act provides for judicial review of a fnal
Government order directing the removal of an alien from this country.
8 U. S. C. § 1252(a). Section 1252(a)(2)(C) limits the scope of that review
where the removal rests upon the fact that the alien has committed
certain crimes. And § 1252(a)(2)(D), the Limited Review Provision,
says that in such instances courts may consider only “constitutional
claims or questions of law.”
Petitioners Guerrero-Lasprilla and Ovalles, aliens who lived in the
United States, committed drug crimes and were subsequently ordered
removed (Guerrero-Lasprilla in 1998 and Ovalles in 2004). Neither
fled a motion to reopen his removal proceedings “within 90 days of
the date of entry of [the] fi na l admi nistrative order of remova l. ”
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). Nonetheless, Guerrero-Lasprilla (in 2016) and Oval-
les (in 2017) asked the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen their
removal proceedings, arguing that the 90-day time limit should be equi-
tably tolled. Both petitioners, who had become eligible for discretion-
ary relief due to various judicial and Board decisions years after their
removal, rested their claim for equitable tolling on Lugo-Resendez v.
Lynch, 831 F. 3d 337, in which the Fifth Circuit had held that the 90-day
time limit could be equitably tolled. The Board denied both petitioners'
requests, concluding, inter alia, that they had not demonstrated the
requisite due diligence. The Fifth Circuit denied their requests for
review, holding that, given the Limited Review Provision, it “lack[ed]
jurisdiction” to review petitioners' “factual” due diligence claims. Peti-
tioners contend that whether the Board incorrectly applied the equita-
ble tolling due diligence standard to the undisputed facts of their cases
is a “question of law” that the Provision authorizes courts of appeals
to consider.
Held: Because the Provision's phrase “questions of law” includes the appli-
cation of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts, the Fifth
*Together with No. 18–1015, Ovalles v. Barr, Attorney General, also on
certiorari to the same court.

222 GUERRERO-LASPRIL
LA v. BARR
Syllabus
Circuit erred in holding that it had no jurisdiction to consider petition-
ers'
claims of due diligence for equitable tolling purposes. Pp. 227–236.
(a) Nothing in the statute's language precludes the conclusion that
Congress used the term “questions of law” to refer to the application of
a legal standard to settled facts. Indeed, this Court has at times re-
ferred to the question whether a given set of facts meets a particular
legal standard as presenting a legal inquiry. See Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U. S. 319, 326 (“Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim
on the basis of a dispositive issue of law”); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S.
511, 528, n. 9 (“[T]he appealable issue is a purely legal one: whether the
facts alleged . . . support a claim of violation of clearly established law”);
cf. Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U. S. 373, 376 (“The effect of
admitted facts is a question of law”). That judicial usage indicates that
the statutory term “questions of law” can reasonably encompass ques-
tions about whether settled facts satisfy a legal standard. The Court
has sometimes referred to such a question as a “mixed question of law
and fact.” See, e. g., U. S. Bank N. A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC,
583 U. S. 387, 394. And the Court has often used the phrase “mixed
questions” in determining the proper standard for appellate review of a
district, bankruptcy, or agency decision that applies a legal standard to
underlying facts. But these cases present no such question involving
the standard of review. And, in any event, nothing in those cases, nor in
the language of the statute, suggests that the statutory phrase “questions
of law” excludes the application of law to settled facts. Pp. 227–228.
(b) A longstanding presumption, the statutory context, and the stat-
ute's history all support the conclusion that the application of law to
undisputed or established facts is a “questio[n] of law” within the mean-
ing of § 1252(a)(2)(D). Pp. 228–234.
(1) A “well-settled” and “strong presumption,” McNary v. Haitian
Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U. S. 479, 496, 498, “favor[s] judicial review
of administrative action,” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 251. That
presumption, which can only be overcome by “ ` “clear and convincing
evidence” ' ” of congressional intent to preclude judicial review, Reno v.
Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U. S. 43, 64, has consistently been
applied to immigration statutes, Kucana, 558 U. S., at 251. And there
is no reason to make an exception here. Because the Court can reason-
ably interpret the statutory term “questions of law” to encompass the
application of law to undisputed facts, and given that a contrary inter-
pretation would result in a barrier to meaningful judicial review, the
presumption indicates that “questions of law” does indeed include mixed
questions. Pp. 229–230.

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223
Syllabus
(2) The Limited Review Provision's immediate statutory context
bel
ies the Government and the dissent's claim that “questions of law”
excludes the application of law to settled facts. The Provision is part of
§ 1252, which also contains § 1252(b)(9), the “zipper clause.” The zipper
clause is meant to “consolidate `judicial review' of immigration proceed-
ings into one action in the court of appeals.” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S.
289, 313. The zipper clause's language makes clear that Congress un-
derstood the statutory term “questions of law and fact” to include the
application of law to facts. One interpretation of the zipper clause at
the very least disproves the Government's argument that Congress con-
sistently uses a three-part typology, such that “questions of law” cannot
include mixed questions. And another interpretation—that “questions
of law” in the zipper clause includes mixed questions—directly supports
the holding here and would give the term the same meaning in the
zipper clause and the Limited Review Provision. Pp. 230–231.
(3) The Provision's statutory history and relevant precedent also
support this conclusion. The Provision was enacted in response to
INS v. St. Cyr, in which the Court interpreted the predecessor of
§ 1252(a)(2)(C) to permit habeas corpus review in order to avoid the seri-
ous constitutional questions that would arise from a contrary interpreta-
tion, 533 U. S., at 299–305, 314. In doing so, the Court suggested that
the Constitution, at a minimum, protected the writ of habeas corpus
“ `as it existed in 1789.' ” Id., at 300–301. The Court then noted the
kinds of review that were traditionally available in a habeas proceeding,
which included “detentions based on errors of law, including the errone-
ous application or interpretation of statutes.” Id., at 302 (emphasis
added). Congress took up the Court's invitation to “provide an ade-
quate substitute [for habeas review] through the courts of appeals,” id.,
at 314, n. 38. It made clear that the limits on judicial review in various
§ 1252 provisions included habeas review, and it consolidated virtually
all review of removal orders in one proceeding in the courts of appeals.
Congress also added the Limited Review Provision, permitting review
of “constitutional claims or questions of law.” Congress did so, the stat-
utory history strongly suggests, because it sought an “adequate substi-
tute” for habeas in view of St. Cyr's guidance. If “questions of law”
in the Provision does not include the misapplication of a legal standard
to undisputed facts, then review would not include an element that
St. Cyr said was traditionally reviewable in habeas. Lower court prec-
edent citing St. Cyr and legislative history also support this conclusion.
Pp. 231–234.
(c) The Government's additional arguments in favor of its contrary
reading are unpersuasive. More than that, the Government's interpre-

224 GUERRERO-LASPRIL
LA v. BARR
Opinion of the Court
tation is itself diffcult to reconcile with the Provision's basic purpose of
prov
iding an adequate substitute for habeas review. Pp. 234–236.
No. 18–776, 737 Fed. Appx. 230; No. 18–1015, 741 Fed. Appx. 259, vacated
and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ.,
joined. Thomas, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Alito, J., joined
as to all but Part II–A–1, post, p. 236.
Paul W. Hughes argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Michael B. Kimberly, Ethan H.
Townsend, Mark Andrew Prada, Mario R. Urizar, Eugene
R. Fidell, Andrew J. Pincus, Charles A. Rothfeld, and
Brian Wolfman.
Frederick Liu argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were Solicitor General Francisco, Assist-
an t At t o r ney Gene ral Hun t, Depu ty So l ici t o r General
Kneedler, Donald E. Keener, John W. Blakeley, and W. Man-
ning Evans.†
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 242(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
codifed as 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a), provides for judicial review of
a fnal Government order directing the removal of an alien
from this country. See 66 Stat. 163, as amended, 8 U. S. C.
§ 1101 et seq. A subdivision of that section limits the scope
of that review where the removal rests upon the fact that
the alien has committed certain crimes, including aggravated
felonies and controlled substance offenses. § 1252(a)(2)(C).
†Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American
Civil Liberties Union Foundation by Jennifer B. Sokoler, Cody Wofsy, Lee
Gelernt, Omar C. Jadwat, and David Cole; for the American Immigration
Counsel et al. by Trina Realmuto, Kristin Macleod-Ball, Emma Winger,
and Mark C. Fleming; and for Scholars of Habeas Corpus Law by Lucas
Guttentag, Joshua S. Lipshutz, Jesenka Mrdjenovic, and Shannon Han.

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225
Opinion of the Court
Another subdivision, § 1252(a)(2)(D), which we shall call the
Li
mited Review Provision, says that in such instances courts
may consider only “constitutional claims or questions of law.”
The question that these two consolidated cases present is
whether the phrase “questions of law” in the Provision in-
cludes the application of a legal standard to undisputed or
established facts. We believe that it does.
I
The two petitioners before us, Pedro Pablo Guerrero-
Lasprilla and Ruben Ovalles, are aliens who lived in the
United States. Each committed a drug crime and conse-
quently became removable. App. 33; Record in No. 18–1015,
p. 66. In 1998, an Immigration Judge ordered Guerrero-
Lasprilla removed. Record in No. 18–776, p. 137. In 2004,
the Board of Immigration Appeals ordered Ovalles removed,
reversing a decision by an Immigration Judge. App. to Pet.
for Cert. in No. 18–1015, pp. 32a–35a. Both removal orders
became administratively fnal, and both petitioners left the
country.
Several months after their removal orders became fnal,
each petitioner's window for fling a timely motion to reopen
his removal proceedings closed. That is because the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act permits a person one motion to
reopen, “a form of procedural relief that asks the Board to
change its decision in light of newly discovered evidence or
a change in circumstances.” Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U. S. 1,
12, 14 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the
motion must usually be fled “within 90 days of the date
of entry of a fnal administrative order of removal.” 8
U. S. C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).
Nonetheless, Guerrero-Lasprilla (in 2016) and Ovalles (in
2017) asked the Board to reopen their removal proceedings.
Recognizing that the 90-day time limit had long since passed,
both petitioners argued that the time limit should be equita-

226 GUERRERO-LASPRIL
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Opinion of the Court
bly tolled. Both petitioners, who had become eligible for
discreti
onary relief due to various judicial and Board deci-
sions years after their removal, rested their claim for equita-
ble tolling on Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch, 831 F. 3d 337 (CA5
2016). In that case, the Fifth Circuit had held that the 90-
day time limit could be “equitably tolled.” Id., at 344.
Guerrero-Lasprilla fled his motion to reopen a month after
Lugo-Resendez was decided. App. 5. Ovalles fled his mo-
tion to reopen eight months after the decision. Id., at 35.
The Board denied both petitioners' requests for equitable
tolling, concluding, inter alia, that they had failed to demon-
strate the requisite due diligence. App. to Pet. for Cert.
in No. 18–1015, at 6a; App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 18–776,
p. 12a.
Guerrero-Laspr illa and Ova lles each asked the Fif th
Circuit to review the Board's decision. See 8 U. S. C.
§ 1252(a)(1); 28 U. S. C. § 2342; Reyes Mata v. Lynch, 576 U. S.
143, 147 (2015) (“[C]ircuit courts have jurisdiction when an
alien appeals from the Board's denial of a motion to reopen
a removal proceeding ”). The Fifth Circuit denied their re-
quests for review, concluding in both cases that “whether
an alien acted diligently in attempting to reopen removal
proceedings for purposes of equitable tolling is a factual
question.” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Sessions, 737 Fed. Appx.
230, 231 (2018) (per curiam); Ovalles v. Sessions, 741 Fed.
Appx. 259, 261 (2018) (per curiam). And, given the Limited
Review Provision, it “lack[ed] jurisdiction” to review those
“factual” claims. 737 Fed. Appx., at 231; 741 Fed. Appx.,
at 261.
Both petitioners claim that the underlying facts were not
in dispute, and they asked us to grant certiorari in order to
determine whether their claims that the Board incorrectly
applied the equitable tolling due diligence standard to the
“undisputed” (or established) facts is a “question of law,”
which the Limited Review Provision authorizes courts of ap-
peals to consider. We agreed to do so.

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II
The
Limited Review Provision provides that, in this kind
of immigration case (involving aliens who are removable for
having committed certain crimes), a court of appeals may
consider only “constitutional claims or questions of law.” 8
U. S. C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). The issue before us is, as we have
said, whether the statutory phrase “questions of law” in-
cludes the application of a legal standard to undisputed or
established facts. If so, the Fifth Circuit erred in holding
that it “lack[ed] jurisdiction” to consider the petitioners'
claims of due diligence for equitable tolling purposes. We
conclude that the phrase “questions of law” does include this
type of review, and the Court of Appeals was wrong to hold
the contrary.
A
Consider the statute's language. Nothing in that lan-
guage precludes the conclusion that Congress used the term
“questions of law” to refer to the application of a legal stand-
ard to settled facts. Indeed, we have at times referred to
the question whether a given set of facts meets a particular
legal standard as presenting a legal inquiry. Do the facts
alleged in a complaint, taken as true, state a claim for relief
under the applicable legal standard? See Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 12(b)(6); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U. S. 319, 326 (1989)
(“Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the
basis of a dispositive issue of law”). Did a Government off-
cial's alleged conduct violate clearly established law? See
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 528, n. 9 (1985) (“[T]he
appealable issue is a purely legal one: whether the facts al-
leged . . . support a claim of violation of clearly established
law”); cf. Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U. S. 373,
376 (1941) (“The effect of admitted facts is a question of
law”). Even the dissent concedes that we have sometimes
referred to mixed questions as raising a legal inquiry. See
post, at 239 (opinion of Thomas, J.). While that judicial

228 GUERRERO-LASPRIL
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Opinion of the Court
usage alone does not tell us what Congress meant by the
st
atutory term “questions of law,” it does indicate that the
term can reasonably encompass questions about whether set-
tled facts satisfy a legal standard.
We have sometimes referred to such a question, which has
both factual and legal elements, as a “mixed question of law
and fact.” See, e. g., U. S. Bank N. A. v. Village at Lake-
ridge, LLC, 583 U. S. 387, 394 (2018) (“[W]hether the histori-
cal facts found satisfy the legal test chosen” is a “so-called
`mixed question' of law and fact” (citing Pullman-Standard
v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 289, n. 19 (1982))). And we have
often used the phrase “mixed questions” in determining the
proper standard for appellate review of a district, bank-
ruptcy, or agency decision that applies a legal standard to
underlying facts. The answer to the “proper standard”
question may turn on practical considerations, such as
whether the question primarily “require[s] courts to expound
on the law, particularly by amplifying or elaborating on a
broad legal standard” (often calling for review de novo), or
rather “immerse[s] courts in case-specifc factual issues”
(often calling for deferential review). Village at Lakeridge,
583 U. S., at 396. But these cases present no such question
involving the standard of review. And, in any event, noth-
ing in those cases forecloses the conclusion that the applica-
tion of law to settled facts can be encompassed within the
statutory phrase “questions of law.” Nor is there anything
in the language of the statute that suggests that “questions
of law” excludes the application of law to settled facts.
B
The Government, respondent here, argues to the contrary.
Namely, the Government claims that Congress intended to
exclude from judicial review all mixed questions. We do not
agree. Rather, a longstanding presumption, the statutory
context, and the statute's history all support the conclusion
that the application of law to undisputed or established facts
is a “questio[n] of law” within the meaning of § 1252(a)(2)(D).

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1
Consider
frst “a familiar principle of statutory construc-
tion: the presumption favoring judicial review of administra-
tive action.” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 251 (2010).
Under that “well-settled” and “strong presumption,” Mc-
Nary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U. S. 479, 496, 498
(1991), when a statutory provision “is reasonably susceptible
to divergent interpretation, we adopt the reading that ac-
cords with traditional understandings and basic principles:
that executive determinations generally are subject to judi-
cial review.” Kucana, 558 U. S., at 251 (quoting Gutierrez
de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U. S. 417, 434 (1995); internal
quotation marks omitted); see McNary, 498 U. S., at 496
(“[G]iven [that] presumption . . . , it is most unlikely that
Congress intended to foreclose all forms of meaningful judi-
cial review”). The presumption can only be overcome by
“clear and convincing evidence” of congressional intent to
preclude judicial review. Reno v. Catholic Social Services,
Inc., 509 U. S. 43, 64 (1993) (quoting Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 141 (1967); internal quotation marks
omitted); see Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 579
U. S. 261, 273–274 (2016).
We have “consistently applied” the presumption of review-
ability to immigration statutes. Kucana, 558 U. S., at 251.
And we see no reason to make an exception here. The dis-
sent's “doubts” about the presumption, see post, at 242–244,
do not undermine our recognition that it is a “well-settled”
principle of statutory construction, McNary, 498 U. S., at
496. Notably, even the Government does not dispute the
soundness of the presumption or its applicability here. See
Brief for Respondent 47–48 (arguing only that the presump-
tion is overcome).
As discussed above, we can reasonably interpret the statu-
tory term “questions of law” to encompass the application of
law to undisputed facts. See supra, at 227–228. And as we
explain further below, infra, at 235–236, interpreting the Lim-
ited Review Provision to exclude mixed questions would effec-

230 GUERRERO-LASPRIL
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Opinion of the Court
tively foreclose judicial review of the Board's determinations
so
long as it announced the correct legal standard. The re-
sulting barrier to meaningful judicial review is thus a strong
indication, given the presumption, that “questions of law”
does indeed include the application of law to established
facts. That is particularly so given that the statutory con-
text and history point to the same result.
2
Consider next the Limited Review Provision's immediate
statutory context. That context belies the Government and
the dissent's claim that “questions of law” refers only to
“pure” questions and necessarily excludes the application of
law to settled facts. See Brief for Respondent 19–26; post,
at 238–241. The Limited Review Provision forms part of
§ 1252, namely, § 1252(a)(2)(D). The same statutory section
contains a provision, § 1252(b)(9), which we have called a
“ `zipper clause.' ” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 313 (2001).
We have explained that Congress intended the zipper clause
to “consolidate judicial review of immigration proceedings
into one action in the court of appeals.” Ibid. (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). The zipper clause reads in part as
follows:
“Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, in-
cluding interpretation and application of constitutional
and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken
. . . to remove an alien from the United States under
this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review
of a fnal order under this section.” § 1252(b)(9) (empha-
sis added).
Because it is meant to consolidate judicial review, the zipper
clause must encompass mixed questions. Indeed, the clause
by its very language includes the “application of [a] statutory
provisio[n].” Ibid.
The zipper clause accordingly makes clear that Congress
understood the statutory term “questions of law and fact” to

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Opinion of the Court
include the application of law to facts. Reread the zipper
clause:
It uses the terms “[(1)] questions of law and [(2)] fact,
including” the “application of ” statutes, i. e., the application
of law to fact. Ibid. (emphasis added). Thus, there are
three possibilities: Congress either used (1) “questions of
law,” (2) “fact,” or (3) the combination of both terms to en-
compass mixed questions. Even the Government does not
argue that Congress used “questions of fact” alone to cover
mixed questions. Congress thus either meant the term
“questions of law” alone to include mixed questions, or it
used both “questions of law” and questions of “fact” to en-
compass mixed questions. The latter interpretation at the
very least disproves the Government's argument that Con-
gress consistently uses a three-part typology, referring to
mixed questions separately from questions of law or ques-
tions of fact (such that “questions of law” cannot include
mixed questions). See Brief for Respondent 21; see also
post, at 238 (arguing that this Court has often used that
three-part typology and thus “questions of law” must
exclude mixed questions). And the former interpretation
directly supports the conclusion that “questions of law”
includes mixed questions. That interpretation gives “ques-
tions of law” the same meaning across both provisions. No-
tably, when Congress enacted the Limited Review Provision,
it added language to the end of the zipper clause (following
the language quoted above) to clarify that, except as pro-
vided elsewhere in § 1252, “ `no court shall have jurisdiction' ”
to “ `review . . . such questions of law or fact.' ” § 106, 119
Stat. 311. There is thus every reason to think that Congress
used the phrase “questions of law” to have the same meaning
in both provisions.
3
Consider also the Limited Review Provision's statutory
history and the relevant precedent. The parties agree
that Congress enacted the Limited Review Provision in re-
sponse to this Court's decision in St. Cyr. See Brief for Re-

232 GUERRERO-LASPRIL
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spondent 16, 27–31; Brief for Petitioners 31–33. In that
case
, the Court evaluated the effect of various allegedly
jurisdiction-stripping provisions, including the predecessor
to § 1252(a)(2)(C). That predecessor (which today is modi-
fed by the Limited Review Provision) essentially barred
judicial review of removal orders based on an alien's com-
mission of certain crimes. See St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 298,
311 (citing § 1252(a)(2)(C) (1994 ed., Supp. V)). This Court
interpreted that predecessor and the other purportedly
jurisdiction-stripping provisions as not barring (i. e., as per-
mitting) review in habeas corpus proceedings, to avoid
the serious constitutional questions that would be raised by
a contrary interpretation. See St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 299–
305, 314.
In doing so, the Court suggested that the Constitution, at
a minimum, protected the writ of habeas corpus “ `as it ex-
isted in 1789.' ” Id., at 300–301. The Court then noted the
kinds of review that were traditionally available in a habeas
proceeding, which included “detentions based on errors of
law, including the erroneous application or interpretation of
statutes.” Id., at 302 (emphasis added). And it supported
this view by citing cases from the 18th and early 19th centu-
ries. See id., at 302–303, and nn. 18–23. English cases con-
sistently demonstrate that the “erroneous application . . . of
statutes” includes the misapplication of a legal standard to
the facts of a particular case. See, e. g., Hollingshead's
Case, 1 Salk. 351, 91 Eng. Rep. 307 (K. B. 1702); King v.
Nathan, 2 Str. 880, 93 Eng. Rep. 914 (K. B. 1724); King v.
Rudd, 1 Cowp. 331, 334–337, 98 Eng. Rep. 1114, 1116–1117
(K. B. 1775); King v. Pedley, 1 Leach 325, 326, 168 Eng. Rep.
265, 266 (1784). The Court ultimately made clear that “Con-
gress could, without raising any constitutional questions,
provide an adequate substitute [for habeas review] through
the courts of appeals.” St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 314, n. 38.
Congress took up this suggestion. It made clear that the
limits on judicial review in various provisions of § 1252 in-

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233
Opinion of the Court
cluded habeas review, and it consolidated virtually all review
of
removal orders in one proceeding in the courts of appeals.
See § 106(a), 119 Stat. 310–311 (inserting specifc references
to 28 U. S. C. § 2241 and “ `any other habeas corpus provi-
sion' ”). At the same time, Congress added the Limited Re-
view Provision, which permits judicial review of “ `constitu-
tional claims or questions of law,' ” the words directly before
us now. 119 Stat. 310.
This statutory history strongly suggests that Congress
added the words before us because it sought an “adequate
substitute” for habeas in view of St. Cyr's guidance. See
supra, at 232. If so, then the words “questions of law” in the
Limited Review Provision must include the misapplication of
a legal standard to undisputed facts, for otherwise review
would not include an element that St. Cyr said was tradition-
ally reviewable in habeas.
We reach the same conclusion through reference to lower
court precedent. After we decided St. Cyr, numerous
Courts of Appeals held that habeas review included review
of the application of law to undisputed facts. See Cadet v.
Bulger, 377 F. 3d 1173, 1184 (CA11 2004) (“[W]e hold that
the scope of habeas review available in [28 U. S. C.] § 2241
petitions by aliens challenging removal orders . . . includes
. . . errors of law, including both statutory interpretations
and application of law to undisputed facts or adjudicated
facts”); Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft, 342 F. 3d 207, 222 (CA3
2003) (same); Mu-Xing Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F. 3d 130, 143
(CA2 2003) (same); Singh v. Ashcroft, 351 F. 3d 435, 441–442
(CA9 2003) (“[O]ther courts have rejected the Government's
argument that only `purely legal questions of statutory inter-
pretation' permit the exercise of habeas jurisdiction. . . . We
agree with those rulings”). We normally assume that Con-
gress is “aware of relevant judicial precedent” when it enacts
a new statute. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U. S. 633, 648
(2010). Thus, we should assume that Congress, aware of
this precedent (and wishing to substitute review in the

234 GUERRERO-LASPRIL
LA v. BARR
Opinion of the Court
courts of appeals for habeas review), would have intended
the
phrase “questions of law” to include the application of a
legal standard to established or undisputed facts.
Those who deem legislative history a useful interpretive
tool will fnd that the congressional history of the Limited
Review Provision supports this analysis. The House Con-
ference Report refers to St. Cyr and adds that Congress'
amendments are designed to “provide an `adequate and ef-
fective' alternative to habeas corpus” in the courts of ap-
peals. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 109–72, p. 175 (2005) (citing
St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 314, n. 38). The Report adds that the
amendments “would not change the scope of review that
criminal aliens currently receive.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 109–
72, at 175. And as we know, that “scope of review” included
review of decisions applying a legal standard to undisputed
or established facts. That is what this Court, in St. Cyr, had
said was traditionally available in habeas; and it was how
courts of appeals then determined the scope of habeas re-
view. Notably, the legislative history indicates that Con-
gress was well aware of the state of the law in the courts of
appeals in light of St. Cyr. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 109–
72, at 174 (discussing issues on which the Courts of Appeals
agreed and those on which they had split after St. Cyr).
The statutory history and precedent, as well as the legisla-
tive history, thus support the conclusion that the statutory
term “questions of law” includes the application of a legal
standard to established facts.
III
The Government makes two signifcant arguments that we
have not yet discussed. First, it points out that § 1252(a)
(2)(C) forbids (subject to the Limited Review Provision) re-
view of a removal order based on an alien's commission of
certain crimes. If the words “questions of law” include
“mixed questions,” then for such aliens, the Limited Review
Provision excludes only (or primarily) agency fact-fnding

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Opinion of the Court
from review. But if Congress intended no more than that,
then
why, the Government asks, did it not just say so directly
rather than eliminate judicial review and then restore it for
“constitutional claims or questions of law?” Brief for Re-
spondent 49–50.
One answer to this question is that the Limited Review
Provision applies to more of the statute than the immedi-
ately preceding subparagraph. See § 1252(a)(2)(D) (applying
notwithstanding “subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any other
provision of this chapter (other than this section)”). An-
other answer is that Congress did not write the Limited Re-
view Provision on a blank slate. Rather, subparagraph (C)
initially forbade judicial review, and Congress then simply
wrote another subparagraph refecting our description in
St. Cyr of the review traditionally available in habeas (or a
substitute for habeas in the courts of appeals). See supra,
at 231–233. That statutory history also illustrates why the
dissent errs in relying so signifcantly on language in subpar-
agraph (C) proscribing judicial review. See post, at 229–230,
232 (referring to the “sweeping ” and “broad” language of
subparagraph (C)). A broad and sweeping reading of sub-
paragraph (C) was precisely what this Court rejected in
St. Cyr, and Congress enacted subparagraph (D) in response
to that opinion. Subparagraph (C)—constrained as it is by
subparagraph (D)—must thus be read in that context.
Second, the Government argues that our interpretation
will undercut Congress' efforts to severely limit and stream-
line judicial review of an order removing aliens convicted of
certain crimes. See Brief for Respondent 29–30; see also
post, at 246, n. 5 (noting that the legislative history indicates
that Congress intended to streamline removal proceedings
by limiting judicial review). The Limited Review Provision,
however, will still forbid appeals of factual determinations—
an important category in the removal context. And that
Provisi on, taken together w ith other contemporaneous
amendments to § 1252, does streamline judicial review rela-

236 GUERRERO-LASPRIL
LA v. BARR
Thomas, J., dissenting
tive to the post-St. Cyr regime, by signifcantly curtailing
habeas
proceedings in district courts.
More than that, the Government's interpretation is itself
diffcult to reconcile with the Provision's basic purpose of
providing an adequate substitute for habeas review. That
interpretation would forbid review of any Board decision
applying a properly stated legal standard, irrespective of
how mistaken that application might be. By reciting the
standard correctly, the Board would be free to apply it in a
manner directly contrary to well-established law. The Gov-
ernment, recognizing the extreme results of its interpreta-
tion, suggested at oral argument that the courts of appeals
might still be able to review certain “categori[es]” of applica-
tions, such as whether someone being in a coma always,
sometimes, or never requires equitable tolling. See Tr. of
Oral Arg. 38. The Government, however, left the nature
and rationale of this approach unclear. The approach does
not overcome the problem we have just raised, and seems
diffcult to reconcile with the language and purposes of the
statute.
***
For these reasons, we reverse the Fifth Circuit's “jurisdic-
tional” decisions, vacate its judgments, and remand these
cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Alito joins as to
all but Part II–A–1, dissenting.
We granted certiorari to decide whether a denial of equita-
ble tolling for lack of due diligence is reviewable as a “ques-
tion of law” under 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Not content
with resolving that narrow question, the Court categorically
proclaims that federal courts may review immigration judges'
applications of any legal standard to established facts in
criminal aliens' removal proceedings. Ante, at 224–225. In

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237
Thomas, J., dissenting
doing so, the majority effectively nullifes a jurisdiction-
str
ipping statute, expanding the scope of judicial review well
past the boundaries set by Congress. Because this arroga-
tion of authority fouts both the text and structure of the
statute, I respectfully dissent.
I
Under § 1252(a)(2)(C), “[n]otwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law (statutory or nonstatutory), . . . no court shall
have jurisdiction to review any fnal order of removal against
an alien who is removable by reason of having committed
[cer tain] cr imina l offense[s]. ” Th is broad jur isdiction-
stripping provision is known as the “criminal-alien bar.”
The only excepti ons to the prov isi on's other w ise a l l-
encompassing language are found in § 1252(a)(2)(D), which
states that “[n]othing in subparagraph . . . (C) . . . shall be
construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or
questions of law.” Thus, under the criminal-alien bar, any
claim that neither is constitutional nor raises a question of
law is unreviewable. Because petitioners raise no constitu-
tional claim and due diligence in the equitable-tolling context
is not a “question of law,” their claims are unreviewable.
A
Equitable tolling 's due-diligence requirement presents a
mixed question of law and fact. A litigant will qualify for
equitable tolling only if he “has pursued his rights diligently
but some extraordinary circumstance prevents him from
bringing a timely action.” Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572
U. S. 1, 10 (2014). To determine whether a litigant has exer-
cised due diligence, judges must conduct what this Court has
characterized as an “ `equitable, often fact-intensive' ” in-
quiry, considering “in detail” the unique facts of each case to
decide whether a litigant's efforts were reasonable in light of
his circumstances. Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631, 653–
654 (2010) (Breyer, J., for the Court). In other words,

238 GUERRERO-LASPRIL
LA v. BARR
Thomas, J., dissenting
courts ask “whether the historical facts found satisfy the
lega
l test,” which, as this Court recently (and unanimously) re-
cognized, is a quintessential “ `mixed question' of law and
fact.” U. S. Bank N. A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583
U. S. 387, 394 (2018) (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint,
456 U. S. 273, 289, n. 19 (1982)); but see ante, at 227–228.
B
The text of § 1252(a)(2)(D) authorizes courts to review only
“constitutional claims or questions of law.” It does not refer
to mixed questions of law and fact, and cannot be divined to
do so. As the statute's plain language and structure demon-
strate, “questions of law” cannot reasonably be read to in-
clude mixed questions.
Although the statute does not defne “questions of law,”
longstanding historical practice indicates that the phrase
does not encompass mixed questions of law and fact. For
well over a century, this Court has recognized questions of
law, questions of fact, and mixed questions of law and fact
as three discrete categories. See, e. g., Pullman-Standard,
supra, at 288 (distinguishing between a “question of law,” a
“mixed question of law and fact,” and a “pure question of
fact”); Ross v. Day, 232 U. S. 110, 116 (1914) (distinguishing
between “a mere question of law” and “a mixed question of
law and fact”); Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106,
109 (1904) (distinguishing between “mixed questions of law
and fact” and questions “of law alone”); Jewell v. Knight, 123
U. S. 426, 432 (1887) (distinguishing between “questions of
law only,” “questions of fact,” and questions “of mixed law
and fact”); Republican River Bridge Co. v. Kansas Pacifc
R. Co., 92 U. S. 315, 318–319 (1876) (distinguishing between
a “mixed question of law and fact,” a “law question,” and a
“fact [question]”). A leading civil procedure treatise at the
time of § 1252(a)(2)(D)'s enactment confrms this understand-
ing. See 9A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure §§ 2588–2589 (2d ed. 1995) (distinguishing be-

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239
Thomas, J., dissenting
tween conclusions and questions of law, and “mixed questions
of
law and fact”).
The majority resists this conclusion by pointing to cases
in which the Court has characterized mixed questions as
either legal or factual. But this occasional emphasis on
either law or fact does not change the reality that many
questions include both. This Court sometimes uses these
two categories because “[m]ixed questions are not all alike”
and, in certain contexts, this Court must distinguish between
them by determining whether they present primarily legal
or primarily factual inquiries. Village at Lakeridge, supra,
at 395–396 (whether a creditor is a nonstatutory insider pre-
sents a factual inquiry); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U. S. 319, 326 (1989) (whether a complaint fails to state a
claim presents a legal inquiry).
1
The Court often uses these labels in contexts that lend
themselves to a fact/ law dichotomy. For example, it asks
whether a question is primarily legal or primarily factual
when it needs to determine the appropriate standard of
appellate review. See, e. g., Village at Lakeridge, supra, at
396. A similar dichotomy arises when the Court considers
whether an issue is one for the judge or jury. See, e. g.,
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, 512 (1995) (“the
application-of-legal-standard-to-fact sort of question . . . ,
commonly called a `mixed question of law and fact,' has typi-
cally been resolved by juries” as a fact issue).
But these considerations are irrelevant in the context of
a statutory judicial-review provision such as § 1252(a)(2),
1
The majority also cites Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511 (1985), for
the proposition that “whether a given set of facts meets a particular legal
standard . . . present[s] a legal inquiry.” Ante, at 227. But that case
involved a motion for summary judgment, so the inquiry was limited to
whether “a given proposition of law was not clearly established at the
time the defendant committed the alleged acts.” 472 U. S., at 529, n. 10.
It did not concern the application of facts to a legal standard, such as
whether “the defendant's actions were in fact unlawful.” Ibid.

240 GUERRERO-LASPRIL
LA v. BARR
Thomas, J., dissenting
which contains text that refers only to “questions of law.”
The
federal appellate judges who review claims under this
provision are competent to review legal, factual, and mixed
questions alike; their authority is constrained only by the
statutory text. Our task, therefore, is simply to interpret
the words of the statute, which invoke no forced dichotomy
because Congress could have easily included mixed questions
in the text if it wanted to do so. See, e. g., 38 U. S. C.
§ 7292(d) (referring to a “challenge to a law . . . as applied to
the facts of a particular case” as distinct from “questions
of law”). Accordingly, there is no need to place the due-
diligence inquiry into either category here.
2
Moreover, conflati ng “questi ons of law” w ith mixed
questions would lead to absurd results in light of the stat-
ute's structure. The crimina l-alien bar, which directly
precedes 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), is an unequivocally broad
jurisdiction-stripping provision, barring review “[n]otwith-
standing any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatu-
tory).” § 1252(a)(2)(C). That is the default rule. Section
1252(a)(2)(D) merely delineates two narrow exceptions to
this criminal-alien bar—“constitutional claims” and “ques-
tions of law.”
Reading “questions of law” to include all mixed questions
would turn § 1252(a)(2)'s structure on its head. It would
transform § 1252(a)(2)(D)'s narrow exception into a broad
provision permitting judicial review of all criminal aliens'
challenges to their removal proceedings except the precious
few that raise only pure questions of fact. Because those
questions are already effectively unreviewable under the Im-
migration and Nationality Act's (INA's) extremely deferen-
tial standard, § 1252(b)(4)(B) (Board's “fndings of fact are
conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be com-
pelled to conclude to the contrary”), this interpretation
2
Even if this statute were interpreted in terms of a fact/ law dichotomy,
the majority offers no explanation as to why the due-diligence inquiry
would fall on the “primarily legal” side of the line.

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241
Thomas, J., dissenting
would reduce the jurisdiction-stripping provision to a near
nu
llity. Put another way, the exception would all but swal-
low the rule.
3
The logical reading of § 1252(a)(2) is that the
exception is narrower than the rule and covers only what is
stated in the text: constitutional claims and questions of law.
4
II
Undeterred by the statute's text and structure, the major-
ity concludes that criminal aliens are entitled to judicial
review of any question involving the application of estab-
lished facts to a legal standard. Ante, at 224–225. Even a
fact-intensive mixed question like due diligence, which re-
quires “[p]recious little” “legal work,” Village at Lakeridge,
583 U. S., at 398, is a “question of law” according to the ma-
jority. To justify its erroneous reading of the text, the ma-
jority resorts to the presumption favoring judicial review
and to legislative intent. Neither interpretive tool is appro-
priate for, or helpful to, the majority's analysis.
A
The majority relies heavily on the presumption favoring
judicial review of agency action as set out in our modern
cases. Ante, at 229–230. Even accepting those precedents,
3
The majority claims we must read § 1252(a)(2)(C) “in th[e] context” of
the purported legislative intent behind § 1252(a)(2)(D). Ante, at 235. As
explained below, atextual legislative intent is not an appropriate tool for
interpreting a statute. See in fra, at 243. But even if it were, the pur-
ported legislative intent here supports a narrow reading of § 1252(a)(2)(D)
that leaves much of § 1252(a)(2)(C) intact. See in fra, at 246–247.
4
The majority makes much of the phrase “questions of law and fact” in
another subsection of § 1252, known as the “zipper clause,” which consoli-
dates judicial review of immigration proceedings. Ante, at 230–231 (dis-
cussing 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(9)). But that language is most naturally read
to encompass all three categories—“questions of law,” “questions of . . .
fact,” and “questions of law and fact.” § 1252(b)(9). At a minimum, the
meaning of the zipper clause's text is ambiguous and cannot overcome the
plain text of §§ 1252(a)(2)(C)–(D).

242 GUERRERO-LASPRIL
LA v. BARR
Thomas, J., dissenting
which no party asks us to reconsider, the presumption does
no
work here because the statute's text and structure plainly
preclude review of mixed questions.
1
As an initial matter, I have come to have doubts about
our modern cases applying the presumption of reviewability.
Courts have long understood that they “generally have juris-
diction to grant relief ” when individuals are injured by un-
lawful administrative action. American School of Magnetic
Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 108 (1902). Applying
this well-settled principle, we have refused to read a stat-
ute's “silence . . . as to judicial review” to preclude such re-
view. Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, 309 (1944); see also
Board of Governors, FRS v. Agnew, 329 U. S. 441, 444 (1947).
But the modern presumption of reviewability relied on by
the majority today goes far beyond this traditional approach.
The modern presumption developed against the backdrop
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140–141 (1967); see
also Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife
Serv., 586 U. S. 9, 22 (2018). In that statute, Congress
created a general right of judicial review for individuals in-
jured by agency action. 5 U. S. C. § 702. Notably, however,
Congress also specifed that this right did not apply when
“statutes preclude judicial review.” § 701(a)(1).
Rather than recognize that courts should give the words
of both the APA and agencies' organic statutes their natural
meaning, the Court relied on “[t]he spirit of [legislators']
statements” in Committee Reports and the “broadly reme-
dial purposes of the [APA]” to craft a strong presumption of
reviewability. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U. S. 229, 232 (1953).
The Court ultimately concluded that statutory text alone,
even that which “appears to bar [ judicial review],” is “not
conclusive.” Id., at 233. Under this approach, a court will
yield its jurisdiction “only upon a showing of `clear and con-

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as: 589 U. S. 221 (2020)
243
Thomas, J., dissenting
vincing evidence,' ” drawn from a statute's purpose and legis-
lative
history, that Congress “intended” as much. Abbott
Laboratories, supra, at 139, 141; see also ante, at 229.
There are at least three reasons to doubt the soundness of
this modern presumption. First, it elevates the supposed
purpose or “spirit” of the APA over the statute's text. The
“spirit” of a law is nothing more than “the unhappy interpre-
tive conception of a supposedly better policy than can be
found in the words of [the] authoritative text.” A. Scalia &
B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
344 (2012). Its invocation represents a “bald assertion of an
unspecifed and hence unbounded judicial power to ignore
what the law says.” Id., at 343. And it is especially prob-
lematic to rely on the “spirit” of the APA in actions arising
under a separate substantive statute with a judicial-review
provision that is entirely distinct from the APA, such as
the INA.
Second, the Court's test for rebutting the presumption re-
lies heavily on legislative intent, inviting courts to discern
the mental processes of legislators through legislative his-
tory. But “[e]ven assuming a majority of Congress read the
[legislative history], agreed with it, and voted for [the stat-
ute] with the same intent, `we are a government of laws, not
of men, and are governed by what Congress enacted rather
than by what it intended.' ” Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v.
Somers, 583 U. S. 149, 172 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) (quoting Lawson v. FMR
LLC, 571 U. S. 429, 459–460 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in
principal part and concurring in judgment)).
Finally, the clear-and-convincing-evidence requirement ap-
pears to confict with the text of the Constitution. Under
Articles I and III, Congress has the authority to establish
the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts and to regulate
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. See Art. I, § 8,
cl. 9; Art. III, § 2, cl. 2; see also Patchak v. Zinke, 583
U. S. 244, 252–255 (2018). It occasionally wields this power

244 GUERRERO-LASPRIL
LA v. BARR
Thomas, J., dissenting
to prevent federal courts from reviewing certain actions
t
hrough jur isdic ti on-str ippi ng st atutes. See, e. g., 12
U. S. C. §§ 1818(i)(1), 4208; 15 U. S. C. § 719h(c)(3); 31 U. S. C.
§ 3730(e)(4)(A). Using this modern presumption, however,
the Court has reached the opposite result, despite a statute's
plain text. See, e. g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289 (2001);
see also ante, at 229–230. By placing heightened require-
ments on statutes promulgated under Congress' exclusive
authority rather than simply giving effect to their ordinary
meaning, courts upset the delicate balance of power refected
in the Constitution's text.
2
Even assuming that the modern presumption is justifed
and can properly be applied to actions outside the APA con-
text, it does no work in these cases. First, as explained
above, “questions of law” cannot reasonably be read to in-
clude mixed questions. See supra, at 241–243; cf. Kucana
v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 251 (2010). But even if it could,
the sweeping language of § 1252(a)(2)(C) provides clear and
convincing evidence that judicial review of mixed questions
is barred. The broad language of that provision leaves no
room for ambiguity as to Congress' design. In erecting the
criminal-alien bar, Congress unequivocally precluded judicial
review of wide swaths of claims. The presumption, to the
extent it should apply here at all, is thus frmly rebutted.
The Court nevertheless concludes that the presumption of
reviewability dictates today's result. It bases this conclu-
sion on the observation that “interpreting [§ 1252(a)(2)(D)] to
exclude mixed questions would effectively foreclose judicial
review of the Board's determinations so long as it announced
the correct legal standard.” Ante, at 229–230. But “[t]he
resulting barrier to meaningful judicial review” is not a prob-
lem in need of a judicial solution, ante, at 230—it is evidence
of Congress' design, which is precisely the sort of “clear and
convincing evidence” that should “dislodge the presump-
tion,” Kucana, supra, at 252 (internal quotation marks omit-

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245
Thomas, J., dissenting
ted). By using Congress' preclusive design to justify rather
than
dislodge the presumption, the majority dramatically ex-
pands the presumption, rendering it effectively irrebuttable.
B
The majority next relies on the purported purpose of
§ 1252(a)(2)(D) to justify its reading of the text. It claims
that Congress intended to provide an “ `adequate substitute'
for habeas in view of St. Cyr's guidance” regarding the scope
of the Suspension Clause. Ante, at 233. As explained
above, legislative intent, to the extent it exists independent
of the words in the statute, is unhelpful to the proper inter-
pretation of a statute's text. See supra, at 243. But its
invocation is especially unhelpful to the majority here.
Even assuming Congress looked to St. Cyr when drafting
§ 1252(a)(2)(D), the limited “guidance” provided in that opin-
ion supports my reading of the statute, not the majority's.
As an initial matter, the Court in St. Cyr expressly de-
clined to resolve “the diffcult question of what the Sus-
pension Clause protects.” 533 U. S., at 301, n. 13. Re-
spondent in that case argued that § 1252(a)(2)(C) would
violate the Suspension Clause if it were read to preclude re-
view of all questions of law in habeas proceedings. But
rather than affrm that position, the Court concluded that it
was enough to merely identify that “substantial constitu-
tional questio[n]” to warrant rejection of the Government's
interpretation. Id., at 300. Indeed, the meaning of the
Suspension Clause and its applicability to removal proceed-
ings remain open questions. See Department of Homeland
Security v. Thuraissigiam, 589 U. S. 1034 (2019) (granting
certiorari). In explaining its decision, the Court in St. Cyr
merely asserted that the Suspension Clause “protects the
writ as it existed in 1789” and noted that “there is substan-
tial evidence . . . that pure questions of law” were generally
covered by the common-law writ. 533 U. S., at 301, 304–305
(emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). The

246 GUERRERO-LASPRIL
LA v. BARR
Thomas, J., dissenting
decision said nothing about mixed questions or the applica-
ti
on of settled facts to a legal standard.
The majority relies on one sentence of dicta in St. Cyr,
which states that the common-law writ addressed “the erro-
neous application or interpretation of statutes.” Id., at 302;
see ante, at 232. But the application of a statute does not
always involve applying facts to a legal standard, nor is it
necessarily analogous to the equitable and fact-intensive
due-diligence inquiry.
The majority next suggests that Congress was familiar
with the underlying details of common-law cases cited in
St. Cyr, ante, at 232, or the lower court decisions expanding
on St. Cyr's dicta, ante, at 233. But such a “fanciful pre-
sumption of legislative knowledge” cannot justify the majori-
ty's position. Scalia, Reading Law, at 324.
5
And if Con-
gress were presumed to have such a robust knowledge of our
precedents, one would certainly expect it to be familiar with
our historical practice of using “questions of law” and “mixed
questions” as distinct terms. See supra, at 238.
The only guidance provided by St. Cyr's dicta concerned
“pure questions of law.” 533 U. S., at 305; see also id., at
5
To support its reliance on this presumption, the majority cites Merck &
Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U. S. 633 (2010). But that case presumed that when
Congress used a specifc term it imported a particular meaning that courts
had given the term through uniform interpretation. See id., at 647–648.
The majority goes much further here, claiming that Congress' “intent”
was to give effect to lower courts' interpretations of this Court's dicta.
Ante, at 234. Contrary to the majority's suggestion, nothing in the legis-
lative history indicates that Congress relied on lower courts' interpreta-
tions of St. Cyr in enacting § 1252(a)(2)(D). Congress merely highlighted
the “confusion in the federal courts” as one of “the many problems caused
by St. Cyr.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 109–72, pp. 173–174 (2005). Notably,
the Report also stated that “the most signifcant [problem]” was “that
[the] decision allow[ed] criminal aliens to delay their expulsion from the
United States for years.” Id., at 173. Thus, even if one could divine a
shared legislative intent by reading this Conference Report, it would ap-
pear that Congress intended to streamline removal proceedings by limit-
ing judicial review to the greatest extent possible under St. Cyr.

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247
Thomas, J., dissenting
314, n. 38 (“[T]his case raises only a pure question of law . . . ,
not
. . . an objection to the manner in which discretion was
exercised”). So even if it were appropriate to assume that
Congress enacted § 1252(a)(2)(D) with the collective intention
of following St. Cyr's guidance (which it is not), that statu-
tory purpose supports reading “questions of law” to mean
just that: “questions of law.”
***
Ironically, the majority refers to § 1252(a)(2)(D) as the
“Limited Review Provision.” Ante, at 225. But according
to the majority's interpretation, it is anything but “lim-
ited”—nearly all claims are reviewable. That reading con-
tradicts the plain text and structure of § 1252(a)(2), which
was enacted to strip federal courts of their jurisdiction to
review most criminal aliens' claims challenging removal pro-
ceedings. The Constitution gives the Legislative Branch
the authority to curtail that jurisdiction. We cannot simply
invoke this presumption of reviewability to circumvent Con-
gress' decision. Doing so upsets, not preserves, the separa-
tion of powers refected in the Constitution's text. I re-
spectfully dissent.

248 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
Syllabus
ALLEN et al. v. COOPER, GOVERNOR OF NORTH
CAROLIN
A, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit
No. 18–877. Argued November 5, 2019—Decided March 23, 2020
In 1996, a marine salvage company named Intersal, Inc., discovered the
shipwreck of the Queen Anne's Revenge off the North Carolina coast.
North Carolina, the shipwreck's legal owner, contracted with Intersal
to conduct recovery operations. Intersal, in turn, hired videographer
Frederick Allen to document the efforts. Allen recorded videos and
took photos of the recovery for more than a decade. He registered
copyrights in all of his works. When North Carolina published some of
Allen's videos and photos online, Allen sued for copyright infringement.
North Carolina moved to dismiss the lawsuit on the ground of state
sovereign immunity. Allen countered that the Copyright Remedy Clar-
ifcation Act of 1990 (CRCA) removed the States' sovereign immunity
in copyright infringement cases. The District Court agreed with Allen,
fnding in the CRCA's text a clear congressional intent to abrogate state
sovereign immunity and a proper constitutional basis for that abroga-
tion. The court acknowledged that Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627, precluded
Congress from using its Article I powers—including its authority over
copyrights—to deprive States of sovereign immunity. But the court
held that Congress could accomplish its objective under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourth Circuit reversed, reading Flor-
ida Prepaid to prevent recourse to both Article I and Section 5.
Held: Congress lacked authority to abrogate the States' immunity from
copyright infringement suits in the CRCA. Pp. 254–267.
(a) In general, a federal court may not hear a suit brought by any
person against a nonconsenting State. But such suits are permitted if
Congress has enacted “unequivocal statutory language” abrogating the
States' immunity from suit, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S.
44, 56, and some constitutional provision allows Congress to have thus
encroached on the States' sovereignty. Congress used clear language
to abrogate the States' immunity from copyright infringement suits in
the CRCA. Allen contends that Congress's constitutional power to do
so arises either from the Intellectual Property Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8,
or from Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which authorizes Con-
gress to “enforce” the commands of the Due Process Clause. Each con-
tention is foreclosed by precedent. Pp. 254–256.

Cite
as: 589 U. S. 248 (2020)
249
Syllabus
(b) The Intellectual Property Clause enables Congress to grant both
copyr
ights and patents. In Allen's view, Congress's authority to abro-
gate sovereign immunity from copyright suits naturally follows, in order
to “secur[e]” a copyright holder's “exclusive Right” as against a State's
intrusion. But that theory was rejected in Florida Prepaid. That
case considered the constitutionality of the Patent Remedy Act, which,
like the CRCA, attempted to put “States on the same footing as private
parties” in patent infringement lawsuits. 527 U. S., at 647, 648. Flor-
ida Prepaid acknowledged that Congress's goal of providing uniform
remedies in infringement cases was a “proper Article I concern,” but
held that Seminole Tribe precluded Congress from using its Article I
powers “to circumvent” the limits sovereign immunity “place[s] upon
federal jurisdiction,” 517 U. S., at 73. For the same reason, Article I
cannot support the CRCA. Allen reads Central Va. Community Col-
lege v. Katz, 546 U. S. 356, to have replaced Seminole Tribe's general
rule with a clause-by-clause approach to evaluating whether a particular
constitutional provision allows the abrogation of sovereign immunity.
But Katz rested on the unique history of the Bankruptcy Clause. 546
U. S., at 369, n. 9. And even if the limits of Katz's holding were not so
clear, Florida Prepaid, together with stare decisis, would doom Allen's
argument. Overruling Florida Prepaid would require a “special justi-
fcation,” over and above the belief “that the precedent was wrongly
decided,” Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U. S. 258,
266, which Allen does not offer. Pp. 256–260.
(c) Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to abro-
gate the States' immunity as part of its power “to enforce” the Amend-
ment's substantive prohibitions. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S.
507, 519. For Congress's action to fall within its Section 5 authority,
“[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury
to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.” Id.,
at 520. This test requires courts to consider the nature and extent of
state conduct violating the Fourteenth Amendment and to examine the
scope of Congress's response to that injury. Florida Prepaid again
serves as the critical precedent. There, the Court defned the scope of
unconstitutional patent infringement as intentional conduct for which
there is no adequate state remedy. 527 U. S., at 642–643, 645. Because
Congress failed to identify a pattern of unconstitutional patent infringe-
ment when it enacted the Patent Remedy Act, the Court held that the
Act swept too far. Given the identical scope of the CRCA and Patent
Remedy Act, this case could be decided differently only if the CRCA
responded to materially stronger evidence of unconstitutional infringe-
ment. But as in Florida Prepaid, the legislative record contains thin
evidence of infringement. Because this record cannot support Con-
gress's choice to strip the States of their sovereign immunity in all copy-

250 AL
LEN v. COOPER
Syllabus
right infringement cases, the CRCA fails the “congruence and propor-
ti
onality” test. Pp. 260–266.
895 F. 3d 337, affrmed.
Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined, and in
which Thomas, J., joined except for the fnal paragraph in Part II–A and
the fnal paragraph in Part II–B. Thomas, J., fled an opinion concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 267. Breyer, J., fled an
opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post,
p. 269.
Derek L. Shaffer argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Todd Anten, Ellyde R. Thompson,
Lisa M. Geary, Joanna E. Menillo, Susan Freya Olive,
David L. McKenzie, and G. Jona Poe, Jr.
Ryan Y. Park, Deputy Solicitor General of North Carolina,
argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief
were Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General of North Carolina,
Matthew W. Sawchak, Solicitor General, and Nicholas S.
Brod, Assistant Solicitor General.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American
Society of Media Photographers, Inc., et al. by Thomas B. Maddrey, J.
Michael Heinlen, and Mickey H. Osterreicher; for the Constitutional Ac-
countability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, and David
H. Gans; for the Copyright Alliance et al. by Beth S. Brinkmann, Ronald
G. Dove, Jr., and Daryl Joseffer; for Dow Jones & Co., Inc., by Robert
P. LoBue; for the Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago by
Donald W. Rupert, Charles W. Shifey, and Robert H. Resis; for Law Pro-
fessors by Owen J. McGovern and William J. Rich, pro se; for Oracle
America, Inc., by Kelsi Brown Corkran, Karen Johnson-McKewan, and
Brian P. Goldman; for Public Law Scholars by Ernest A. Young and Chris
Dove; for the Recording Industry Association of America et al. by Elaine
J. Goldenberg; for the Software & Information Industry Association by J.
Matthew Williams, Theresa B. Bowman, and Christopher A. Mohr; for
the Washington Legal Foundation by Cory L. Andrews and Corbin K.
Barthold; and for Ralph Oman by Melissa Arbus Sherry, Sarang Vijay
Damle, and Joseph Wetzel.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of West
Virginia et al. by Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General of West Virginia,

Cite
as: 589 U. S. 248 (2020)
251
Opinion of the Court
Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.
In
two basically identical statutes passed in the early
1990s, Congress sought to strip the States of their sovereign
immunity from patent and copyright infringement suits.
Not long after, this Court held in Florida Prepaid Postsec-
ondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S.
627 (1999), that the patent statute lacked a valid constitu-
tional basis. Today, we take up the copyright statute. We
fnd that our decision in Florida Prepaid compels the same
conclusion.
I
In 1717, the pirate Edward Teach, better known as Black-
beard, captured a French slave ship in the West Indies and
renamed her Queen Anne's Revenge. The vessel became his
fagship. Carrying some 40 cannons and 300 men, the Re-
venge took many prizes as she sailed around the Caribbean
and up the North American coast. But her reign over those
Lindsay S. See, Solicitor General, and John M. Masslon II, and by the
Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Steve Mar-
shall of Alabama, Kevin G. Clarkson of Alaska, Mark Brnovich of Ari-
zona, Leslie Rutledge of Arkansas, William Tong of Connecticut, Ashley
Moody of Florida, Christopher M. Carr of Georgia, Lawrence G. Wasden
of Idaho, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Curtis T. Hill, Jr., of Indiana, Derek
Schmidt of Kansas, Jeffrey Martin Landry of Louisiana, Brian E. Frosh
of Maryland, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Jim
Hood of Mississippi, Tim Fox of Montana, Doug Peterson of Nebraska,
Gurbir S. Grewal of New Jersey, Dave Yost of Ohio, Mike Hunter of Okla-
homa, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania, Alan
Wilson of South Carolina, Jason Ravnsborg of South Dakota, Herbert H.
Slatery III of Tennessee, Ken Paxton of Texas, Sean Reyes of Utah, Mark
R. Herring of Virginia, and Robert C. Ferguson of Washington; for the
American Library Association et al. by Jonathan Band; for the Associa-
tion of Public and Land-grant Universities et al. by Scott A. Keller and
Lauren J. Dreyer; for Law Professors by Trevor S. Cox and Matthew R.
McGuire; and for Simone Rose by Andrew H. Erteschik, Saad Gul, and
John Michael Durnovich.
James Klaiber fled a brief for the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York as amicus curiae.

252 AL
LEN v. COOPER
Opinion of the Court
seas was short-lived. In 1718, the ship ran aground on a
sandbar
a mile off Beaufort, North Carolina. Blackbeard
and most of his crew escaped without harm. Not so the Re-
venge. She sank beneath the waters, where she lay undis-
turbed for nearly 300 years.
In 1996, a marine salvage company named Intersal, Inc.,
discovered the shipwreck. Under federal and state law, the
wreck belongs to North Carolina. See 102 Stat. 433, 43
U. S. C. § 2105(c); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 121–22 (2019). But
the State contracted with Intersal to take charge of the re-
covery activities. Intersal in turn retained petitioner Fred-
erick Allen, a local videographer, to document the operation.
For over a decade, Allen created videos and photos of divers'
efforts to salvage the Revenge's guns, anchors, and other re-
mains. He registered copyrights in all those works.
This suit arises from North Carolina's publication of some
of Allen's videos and photos. Allen frst protested in 2013
that the State was infringing his copyrights by uploading
his work to its website without permission. To address that
allegation, North Carolina agreed to a settlement paying
Allen $15,000 and laying out the parties' respective rights to
the materials. But Allen and the State soon found them-
selves embroiled in another dispute. Allen complained that
North Carolina had impermissibly posted fve of his videos
online and used one of his photos in a newsletter. When the
State declined to admit wrongdoing, Allen fled this action in
Federal District Court. It charges the State with copyright
infringement (call it a modern form of piracy) and seeks
money damages.
North Carolina moved to dismiss the suit on the ground of
sovereign immunity. It invoked the general rule that fed-
eral courts cannot hear suits brought by individuals against
nonconsenting States. See State Defendants' Memorandum
in No. 15–627 (EDNC), Doc. 50, p. 7. But Allen responded
that an exception to the rule applied because Congress had
abrogated the States' sovereign immunity from suits like his.

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See Plaintiffs' Response, Doc. 57, p. 7. The Copyright Rem-
edy
Clarifcation Act of 1990 (CRCA or Act) provides that a
State “shall not be immune, under the Eleventh Amendment
[or] any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit
in Federal court” for copyright infringement. 17 U. S. C.
§ 511(a). And the Act specifes that in such a suit a State
will be liable, and subject to remedies, “in the same manner
and to the same extent as” a private party. § 501(a); see
§ 511(b).
1
That meant, Allen contended, that his suit against
North Carolina could go forward.
The District Court agreed. Quoting the CRCA's text, the
court frst found that “Congress has stated clearly its intent
to abrogate sovereign immunity for copyright claims against
a state.” 244 F. Supp. 3d 525, 533 (EDNC 2017). And that
abrogation, the court next held, had a proper constitutional
basis. Florida Prepaid and other precedent, the District
Court acknowledged, precluded Congress from using its Ar-
ticle I powers—including its authority over copyrights—to
take away a State's sovereign immunity. See 244 F. Supp.
3d, at 534. But in the court's view, Florida Prepaid left
open an alternative route to abrogation. Given the States'
“pattern” of “abus[ive]” copyright infringement, the court
held, Congress could accomplish its object under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 244 F. Supp. 3d, at 535.
On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed. It read Florida Prepaid to pre-
vent recourse to Section 5 no less than to Article I. A Sec-
tion 5 abrogation, the Fourth Circuit explained, must be
1
The CRCA served as the model for the Patent and Plant Variety Pro-
tection Clarifcation Act (Patent Remedy Act), passed two years later (and
repudiated by this Court in Florida Prepaid, see supra, at 251). Using
the same language, the latter statute provided that a State “shall not be
immune, under the [E]leventh [A]mendment [or] any other doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity, from suit in Federal court” for patent infringement. § 2,
106 Stat. 4230. And so too, the statute specifed that in such a suit, a
State will be liable, and subject to remedies, “in the same manner and to
the same extent as” a private party. Ibid.

254 AL
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“congruent and proportional” to the Fourteenth Amendment
i
njury it seeks to remedy. 895 F. 3d 337, 350 (2018). Flor-
ida Prepaid had applied that principle to reject Congress's
attempt, in the Patent Remedy Act, to abolish the States'
immunity from patent infringement suits. See 527 U. S., at
630. In the Fourth Circuit's view, nothing distinguished the
CRCA. That abrogation, the court reasoned, was “equally
broad” and rested on a “similar legislative record” of consti-
tutional harm. 895 F. 3d, at 352. So Section 5 could not
save the law.
Because the Court of Appeals held a federal statute in-
valid, this Court granted certiorari. 587 U. S. 1039 (2019).
We now affrm.
II
In our constitutional scheme, a federal court generally may
not hear a suit brought by any person against a noncon-
senting State. That bar is nowhere explicitly set out in the
Constitution. The text of the Eleventh Amendment (the
single most relevant provision) applies only if the plaintiff is
not a citizen of the defendant State.
2
But this Court has
long understood that Amendment to “stand not so much for
what it says” as for the broader “presupposition of our
constitutional structure which it confrms.” Blatchford v.
Native Village of Noatak, 501 U. S. 775, 779 (1991). That
premise, the Court has explained, has several parts. First,
“each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system.”
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44, 54 (1996).
Next, “[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be
amenable to [a] suit” absent consent. Id., at 54, 70, n. 13
(quoting The Federalist No. 81, p. 487 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)
(A. Hamilton)). And last, that fundamental aspect of sover-
2
The Eleventh Amendment reads: “The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of an-
other State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”

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eignty constrains federal “judicial authority.” Blatchford,
501
U. S., at 779.
But not entirely. This Court has permitted a federal
court to entertain a suit against a nonconsenting State on
two conditions. First, Congress must have enacted “un-
equivocal statutory language” abrogating the States' immu-
nity from the suit. Seminole Tribe, 517 U. S., at 56 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U. S.
223, 228 (1989) (requiring Congress to “mak[e] its intention
unmistakably clear”). And second, some constitutional pro-
vision must allow Congress to have thus encroached on the
States' sovereignty. Not even the most crystalline abroga-
tion can take effect unless it is “a valid exercise of constitu-
tional authority.” Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528
U. S. 62, 78 (2000).
No one here disputes that Congress used clear enough lan-
guage to abrogate the States' immunity from copyright in-
fringement suits. As described above, the CRCA provides
that States “shall not be immune” from those actions in
federal court. § 511(a); see supra, at 253. And the Act
specifes that a State stands in the identical position as a
private defendant—exposed to liability and remedies “in the
same manner and to the same extent.” § 501(a); see § 511(b).
So there is no doubt what Congress meant to accomplish.
Indeed, this Court held in Florida Prepaid that the essen-
tially verbatim provisions of the Patent Remedy Act “could
not have [made] any clearer” Congress's intent to remove the
States' immunity. 527 U. S., at 635.
The contested question is whether Congress had authority
to take that step. Allen maintains that it did, under either
of two constitutional provisions. He frst points to the
clause in Article I empowering Congress to provide copy-
right protection. If that fails, he invokes Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which authorizes Congress to “en-
force” the commands of the Due Process Clause. Neither
contention can succeed. The slate on which we write today

256 AL
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Opinion of the Court
is anything but clean. Florida Prepaid, along with other
precedent,
forecloses each of Allen's arguments.
A
Congress has power under Article I “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.” § 8, cl. 8. That
provision—call it the Intellectual Property Clause—enables
Congress to grant both copyrights and patents. And the
monopoly rights so given impose a corresponding duty (i. e.,
not to infringe) on States no less than private parties. See
Goldstein v. California, 412 U. S. 546, 560 (1973).
In Allen's view, Congress's authority to abrogate sover-
eig n i mmunity from copyr ight suits natura l ly fol lows.
Abrogation is the single best—or maybe, he says, the only—
way for Congress to “secur[e]” a copyright holder's “exclu-
sive Right[s]” as against a State's intrusion. See Brief for
Petitioners 20 (quoting Art. I, § 8, cl. 8). So, Allen contends,
the authority to take that step must fall within the Article I
grant of power to protect intellectual property.
The problem for Allen is that this Court has already re-
jected his theory. The Intellectual Property Clause, as just
noted, covers copyrights and patents alike. So it was the
frst place the Florida Prepaid Court looked when deciding
whether the Patent Remedy Act validly stripped the States
of immunity from infringement suits. In doing so, we ac-
knowledged the reason for Congress to put “States on the
same footing as private parties” in patent litigation. 527
U. S., at 647. It was, just as Allen says here, to ensure “uni-
form, surefre protection” of intellectual property. Reply
Brief 10. That was a “proper Article I concern,” we al-
lowed. 527 U. S., at 648. But still, we said, Congress could
not use its Article I power over patents to remove the
States' immunity. We based that conclusion on Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, decided three years earlier. There, the

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Court had held that “Article I cannot be used to circumvent”
the
limits sovereign immunity “place[s] upon federal jurisdic-
tion.” 517 U. S., at 73. That proscription ended the matter.
Because Congress could not “abrogate state sovereign im-
munity [under] Article I,” Florida Prepaid explained, the
Intellectual Property Clause could not support the Patent
Remedy Act. 527 U. S., at 636. And to extend the point to
this case: if not the Patent Remedy Act, not its copyright
equivalent either, and for the same reason. Here too, the
power to “secur[e]” an intellectual property owner's “exclu-
sive Right” under Article I stops when it runs into sovereign
immunity. § 8, cl. 8.
Allen claims, however, that a later case offers an exit ramp
from Florida Prepaid. In Central Va. Community College
v. Katz, 546 U. S. 356, 359 (2006), we held that Article I's
Bankruptcy Clause enables Congress to subject noncon-
senting States to bankruptcy proceedings (there, to recover
a preferential transfer). We thus exempted the Bankruptcy
Clause from Seminole Tribe's general rule that Article I can-
not justify haling a State into federal court. In bankruptcy,
we decided, sovereign immunity has no place. But if that is
true, Allen asks, why not say the same thing here? Allen
reads Katz as “adopt[ing] a clause-by-clause approach to
evaluating whether a particular clause of Article I” allows
the abrogation of sovereign immunity. Brief for Petitioners
20. And he claims that the Intellectual Property Clause
“supplies singular warrant” for Congress to take that step.
Ibid. That is so, Allen reiterates, because “Congress could
not `secur[e]' authors' `exclusive Right' to their works if [it]
were powerless” to make States pay for infringing conduct.
Ibid.
But everything in Katz is about and limited to the Bank-
ruptcy Clause; the opinion refects what might be called
bankruptcy exceptionalism. In part, Katz rested on the
“singular nature” of bankruptcy jurisdiction. 546 U. S., at
369, n. 9. That jurisdiction is, and was at the Founding,

258 AL
LEN v. COOPER
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“principally in rem”—meaning that it is “premised on the
debtor
and his estate, and not on the creditors” (including a
State). Id., at 369–370 (internal quotation marks omitted).
For that reason, we thought, “it does not implicate States'
sovereignty to nearly the same degree as other kinds of ju-
risdiction.” Id., at 362. In remaining part, Katz focused on
the Bankruptcy Clause's “unique history.” Id., at 369, n. 9.
The Clause emerged from a felt need to curb the States' au-
thority. The States, we explained, “had wildly divergent
schemes” for discharging debt, and often “refus[ed] to re-
spect one another's discharge orders.” Id., at 365, 377.
“[T]he Framers' primary goal” in adopting the Clause was
to address that problem—to stop “competing sovereigns[ ]”
from interfering with a debtor's discharge. Id., at 373.
And in that project, the Framers intended federal courts to
play a leading role. The nation's frst Bankruptcy Act, for
example, empowered those courts to order that States re-
lease people they were holding in debtors' prisons. See id.,
at 374. So through and through, we thought, the Bank-
ruptcy Clause embraced the idea that federal courts could
impose on state sovereignty. In that, it was sui generis—
again, “unique”—among Article I's grants of authority. Id.,
at 369, n. 9.
Indeed, Katz's view of the Bankruptcy Clause had a yet
more striking aspect, which further separates it from any
other. The Court might have concluded from its analysis
that the Clause allows Congress to abrogate the States' sov-
ereign immunity (as Allen argues the Intellectual Property
Clause does). But it did not; it instead went further. Rely-
ing on the above account of the Framers' intentions, the
Court found that the Bankruptcy Clause itself did the abro-
gating. Id., at 379 (“[T]he relevant `abrogation' is the one
effected in the plan of the [Constitutional] Convention”). Or
stated another way, we decided that no congressional abroga-
tion was needed because the States had already “agreed in
the plan of the Convention not to assert any sovereign immu-

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Opinion of the Court
nity defense” in bankruptcy proceedings. Id., at 377. We
therefore
discarded our usual rule—which Allen accepts as
applying here—that Congress must speak, and indeed speak
unequivocally, to abrogate sovereign immunity. Compare
id., at 378–379 (“[O]ur decision today” does not “rest[ ] on
any statement Congress ha[s] made on the subject of state
sovereign immunity”), with supra, at 255 (our ordinary rule).
Our decision, in short, viewed bankruptcy as on a different
plane, governed by principles all its own. Nothing in that
underst andi ng i nv ites the k i nd of genera l, “clause-by-
clause” reexamination of Article I that Allen proposes. See
supra, at 257. To the contrary, it points to a good-for-one-
clause-only holding.
And even if Katz's confnes were not so clear, Florida Pre-
paid, together with stare decisis, would still doom Allen's
argument. As Allen recognizes, if the Intellectual Property
Clause permits the CRCA's abrogation, it also would permit
the Patent Remedy Act's. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 9 (predicting
that if his position prevailed, “ultimately, the Patent Remedy
Act would be revisited and properly upheld as a valid exer-
cise of Congress's Article I power”). Again, there is no dif-
ference between copyrights and patents under the Clause,
nor any material difference between the two statutes' provi-
sions. See supra, at 253, and n. 1, 256. So we would have
to overrule Florida Prepaid if we were to decide this case
Allen's way. But stare decisis, this Court has understood, is
a “foundation stone of the rule of law.” Michigan v. Bay
Mills Indian Community, 572 U. S. 782, 798 (2014). To re-
verse a decision, we demand a “special justifcation,” over
and above the belief “that the precedent was wrongly de-
cided.” Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573
U. S. 258, 266 (2014). Allen offers us nothing special at all;
he contends only that if the Court were to use a clause-by-
clause approach, it would discover that Florida Prepaid was
wrong (because, he says again, the decision misjudged Con-
gress's authority under the Intellectual Property Clause).

260 AL
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See Brief for Petitioners 37; supra, at 256–257. And with that
charge
of error alone, Allen cannot overcome stare decisis.
B
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, unlike almost all
of Article I, can authorize Congress to strip the States of
immunity. The Fourteenth Amendment “fundamentally al-
tered the balance of state and federal power” that the orig-
inal Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment struck.
Seminole Tribe, 517 U. S., at 59. Its frst section imposes
prohibitions on the States, including (as relevant here) that
none may “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” Section 5 then gives Congress
the “power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,” those lim-
itations on the States' authority. That power, the Court has
long held, may enable Congress to abrogate the States' im-
munity and thus subject them to suit in federal court. See
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 456 (1976).
For an abrogation statute to be “appropriate” under Sec-
tion 5, it must be tailored to “remedy or prevent” conduct
infringing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive prohibi-
tions. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 519 (1997).
Congress can permit suits against States for actual violations
of the rights guaranteed in Section 1. See Fitzpatrick, 427
U. S., at 456. And to deter those violations, it can allow
suits against States for “a somewhat broader swath of con-
duct,” including acts constitutional in themselves. Kimel,
528 U. S., at 81. But Congress cannot use its “power to
enforce” the Fourteenth Amendment to alter what that
Amendment bars. See id., at 88 (prohibiting Congress from
“substantively redefn[ing]” the Fourteenth Amendment's
requirements). That means a congressional abrogation is
valid under Section 5 only if it suffciently connects to con-
duct courts have held Section 1 to proscribe.
To decide whether a law passes muster, this Court has
framed a type of means-end test. For Congress's action to

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fall within its Section 5 authority, we have said, “[t]here must
be
a congruence and proportionality between the injury to
be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end.” Boerne, 521 U. S., at 520. On the one hand, courts
are to consider the constitutional problem Congress faced—
both the nature and the extent of state conduct violating the
Fourteenth Amendment. That assessment usually (though
not inevitably) focuses on the legislative record, which shows
the evidence Congress had before it of a constitutional
wrong. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U. S., at 646. On the
other hand, courts are to examine the scope of the response
Congress chose to address that injury. Here, a critical ques-
tion is how far, and for what reasons, Congress has gone
beyond redressing actual constitutional violations. Hard
problems often require forceful responses and, as noted
above, Section 5 allows Congress to “enact[ ] reasonably pro-
phylactic legislation” to deter constitutional harm. Kimel,
528 U. S., at 88; Boerne, 521 U. S., at 536 (Congress's conclu-
sions on that score are “entitled to much deference”); supra,
at 260. But “[s]trong measures appropriate to address one
harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser
one.” Boerne, 521 U. S., at 530. Always, what Congress
has done must be in keeping with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment rules it has the power to “enforce.”
All this raises the question: When does the Fourteenth
Amendment care about copyright infringement? Some-
times, no doubt. Copyrights are a form of property. See
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 128 (1932). And the
Fourteenth Amendment bars the States from “depriv[ing]”
a person of property “without due process of law.” But even
if sometimes, by no means always. Under our precedent, a
merely negligent act does not “deprive” a person of property.
See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 328 (1986). So an
infringement must be intentional, or at least reckless, to
come within the reach of the Due Process Clause. See id.,
at 334, n. 3 (reserving whether reckless conduct suffces).

262 AL
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And more: A State cannot violate that Clause unless it fails
to
offer an adequate remedy for an infringement, because
such a remedy itself satisfes the demand of “due process.”
See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517, 533 (1984). That
means within the broader world of state copyright infringe-
ment is a smaller one where the Due Process Clause comes
into play.
Because the same is true of patent infringement, Florida
Prepaid again serves as the critical precedent. That deci-
sion defned the scope of unconstitutional infringement in
line with the caselaw cited above—as intentional conduct for
which there is no adequate state remedy. See 527 U. S., at
642–643, 645. It then searched for evidence of that sort of
infringement in the legislative record of the Patent Remedy
Act. And it determined that the statute's abrogation of im-
munity—again, the equivalent of the CRCA's—was out of all
proportion to what it found. That analysis is the starting
point of our inquiry here. And indeed, it must be the ending
point too unless the evidence of unconstitutional infringe-
ment is materially different for copyrights than patents.
Consider once more, then, Florida Prepaid, now not on
Article I but on Section 5.
In enacting the Patent Remedy Act, Florida Prepaid
found, Congress did not identify a pattern of unconstitutional
patent infringement. To begin with, we explained, there
was only thin evidence of States infringing patents at all—
putting aside whether those actions violated due process.
The House Report, recognizing that “many states comply
with patent law,” offered just two examples of patent in-
fringement suits against the States. Id., at 640 (quoting
H. R. Rep. No. 101–960, pt. 1, p. 38 (1990)). The appellate
court below, boasting some greater research prowess, discov-
ered another seven in the century-plus between 1880 and
1990. See 527 U. S., at 640. Even the bill's House sponsor
conceded the lack of “any evidence” of “widespread violation
of patent laws.” Id., at 641 (quoting statement of Rep. Kast-

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Opinion of the Court
enmeier). What was more, there was no evidence that any
i
nstance of infringement by States crossed constitutional
lines. Congress, we observed, “did not focus” on intentional
or reckless conduct; to the contrary, the legislative record
suggested that “most state infringement was innocent or at
worst negligent.” Id., at 645. And similarly, Congress
“barely considered the availability of state remedies for pat-
ent infringement.” Id., at 643. So, we concluded, nothing
could support the idea that States were more than sporadi-
cally (if that) “depriving patent owners of property without
due process of law.” Id., at 646.
Given that absence of evidence, Florida Prepaid held, the
Patent Remedy Act swept too far. Recall what the Patent
Remedy Act did—and did not. It abrogated sovereign im-
munity for any and every patent suit, thereby “plac[ing]
States on the same footing as private parties.” Id., at 647.
It did not set any limits. It did not, for example, confne the
abrogation to suits alleging “nonnegligent infringement or
infringement authorized [by] state policy.” Ibid. Neither
did it target States refusing to offer alternative remedies to
patent holders. No, it exposed all States to the hilt—on a
record that failed to show they had caused any discernible
constitutional harm (or, indeed, much harm at all). That im-
balance made it impossible to view the legislation “as respon-
sive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.”
Id., at 646 (quoting Boerne, 521 U. S., at 532). The statute's
“indiscriminate scope” was too “out of proportion” to any
due process problem. 527 U. S., at 646–647. It aimed not
to correct such a problem, but to “provide a uniform remedy
for patent infringement” writ large. Id., at 647. The Pat-
ent Remedy Act, in short, did not “enforce” Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment—and so was not “appropriate”
under Section 5.
Could, then, this case come out differently? Given the
identical scope of the CRCA and Patent Remedy Act, that
could happen only if the former law responded to materially

264 AL
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Opinion of the Court
stronger evidence of infringement, especially of the unconsti-
tuti
onal kind. Allen points to a signifcant disparity in how
Congress created a record for the two statutes. See Brief
for Petitioners 7–10, 47–50. Before enacting the CRCA,
Congress asked the then-Register of Copyrights, Ralph
Oman, to submit a report about the effects of the Eleventh
Amendment on copyright enforcement. Oman and his staff
conducted a year-long examination, which included a request
for public comments eliciting letters from about 40 copyright
holders and industry groups. The fnal 158-page report con-
cluded that “copyright proprietors have demonstrated they
will suffer immediate harm if they are unable to sue infring-
ing states in federal court.” Copyright Offce, Copyright Li-
ability of States and the Eleventh Amendment 103 (1988)
(Oman Report). Is that report enough, as Allen claims, to
fip Florida Prepaid's outcome when it comes to copyright
cases against the States?
It is not. Behind the headline-grabbing conclusion, noth-
ing in the Oman Report, or the rest of the legislative record,
cures the problems we identifed in Florida Prepaid. As
an initial matter, the concrete evidence of States infringing
copyrights (even ignoring whether those acts violate due
process) is scarcely more impressive than what the Florida
Prepaid Court saw. Despite undertaking an exhaustive
search, Oman came up with only a dozen possible examples
of state infringement. He listed seven court cases brought
against States (with another two dismissed on the merits)
and fve anecdotes taken from public comments (but not fur-
ther corroborated). See Oman Report, at 7–9, 90–97. In
testifying about the report, Oman acknowledged that state
infringement is “not widespread” and “the States are not
going to get involved in wholesale violation of the copyright
laws.” Hearings on H. R. 1131 before the Subcommittee on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Jus-
tice, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 53 (1989) (House Hearings). In-

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Opinion of the Court
deed, he opined: “They are all respectful of the copyright
law”
and “will continue to respect the law”; what State, after
all, would “want[ ] to get a reputation as a copyright pirate?”
Id., at 8. The bill's House and Senate sponsors got the point.
The former admitted that “there have not been any signif-
cant number” of copyright violations by States. Id., at 48
(Rep. Kastenmeier). And the latter conceded he could not
currently see “a big problem.” Hearings on S. 497 before
the Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks,
101st Cong., 1st Sess., 130 (1989) (Sen. DeConcini). This is
not, to put the matter charitably, the stuff from which Sec-
tion 5 legislation ordinarily arises.
And it gets only worse. Neither the Oman Report nor
any other part of the legislative record shows concern with
whether the States' copyright infringements (however few
and far between) violated the Due Process Clause. Of the
12 infringements listed in the report, only two appear inten-
tional, as they must be to raise a constitutional issue. See
Oman Report, at 7–8, 91 (describing a judicial fnding of
“willful” infringement and a public comment charging contin-
ued infringement after a copyright owner complained). As
Oman testifed, the far greater problem was the frequency
of “honest mistakes” or “innocent” misunderstandings; the
beneft of the bill, he therefore thought, would be to “guard
against sloppiness.” House Hearings, at 8–9. Likewise,
the legislative record contains no information about the
availability of state-law remedies for copyright infringement
(such as contract or unjust enrichment suits)—even though
they might themselves satisfy due process. Those defcien-
cies in the record match the ones Florida Prepaid empha-
sized. See 527 U. S., at 643–645. Here no less than there,
they signal an absence of constitutional harm.
Under Florida Prepaid, the CRCA thus must fail our
“congruence and proportionality” test. Boerne, 521 U. S., at
520. As just shown, the evidence of Fourteenth Amend-

266 AL
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ment injury supporting the CRCA and the Patent Remedy
A
ct is equivalent—for both, that is, exceedingly slight. And
the scope of the two statutes is identical—extending to
every infringement case against a State. It follows that the
balance the laws strike between constitutional wrong and
statutory remedy is correspondingly askew. In this case,
as in Florida Prepaid, the law's “indiscriminate scope” is
“out of proportion” to any due process problem. 527 U. S.,
at 646–647; see supra, at 263. In this case, as in that one,
the statute aims to “provide a uniform remedy” for stat-
utory infringement, rather than to redress or prevent uncon-
stitutional conduct. 527 U. S., at 647; see supra, at 263.
And so in this case, as in that one, the law is invalid under
Section 5.
That conclusion, however, need not prevent Congress from
passing a valid copyright abrogation law in the future. In
doing so, Congress would presumably approach the issue dif-
ferently than when it passed the CRCA. At that time, the
Court had not yet decided Seminole Tribe, so Congress prob-
ably thought that Article I could support its all-out abroga-
tion of immunity. See supra, at 256. And to the extent it
relied on Section 5, Congress acted before this Court created
the “congruence and proportionality” test. See supra, at
261. For that reason, Congress likely did not appreciate the
importance of linking the scope of its abrogation to the re-
dress or prevention of unconstitutional injuries—and of cre-
ating a legislative record to back up that connection. But
going forward, Congress will know those rules. And under
them, if it detects violations of due process, then it may enact
a proportionate response. That kind of tailored statute can
effectively stop States from behaving as copyright pirates.
Even while respecting constitutional limits, it can bring digi-
tal Blackbeards to justice.
III
Florida Prepaid all but prewrote our decision today.
That precedent made clear that Article I's Intellectual Prop-

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Opinion of Thomas, J.
erty Clause could not provide the basis for an abrogation
of
sovereign immunity. And it held that Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment could not support an abrogation on
a legislative record like the one here. For both those rea-
sons, we affrm the judgment below.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
I agree with the Court's conclusion that the Copyright
Remedy Clarifcation Act of 1990, 17 U. S. C. § 501 et seq.,
does not validly abrogate States' sovereign immunity. But
I cannot join the Court's opinion in its entirety. I write sep-
arately to note two disagreements and one question that re-
mains open for resolution in a future case.
First, although I agree that Florida Prepaid Postsecond-
ary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627
(1999), is binding precedent, I cannot join the Court's discus-
sion of stare decisis. The Court claims we need “ `special
justifcation[s]' ” to overrule precedent because error alone
“cannot overcome stare decisis.” Ante, at 259–260. That
approach “does not comport with our judicial duty under
Article III.” Gamble v. United States, 587 U. S. 678, 711
(2019) (Thomas, J., concurring). If our decision in Florida
Prepaid were demonstrably erroneous, the Court would be
obligated to “correct the error, regardless of whether other
factors support overruling the precedent.” 587 U. S., at 718
(same).
Here, adherence to our precedent is warranted because
petitioners have not demonstrated that our decision in Flor-
ida Prepaid “is incorrect, much less demonstrably errone-
ous.” Gamble, 587 U. S., at 726 (same). The Court in Flor-
ida Prepaid correctly concluded that “Congress may not
abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I
powers,” including its powers under the Intellectual Prop-
erty Clause. 527 U. S., at 636 (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla.

268 AL
LEN v. COOPER
Opinion of Thomas, J.
v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44, 72–73 (1996)). Petitioners' claims
to
the contrary are unpersuasive.*
Second, I do not join the Court's discussion regarding fu-
ture copyright legislation. In my view, we should opine on
“only the case before us in light of the record before us.”
Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U. S.
802, 818 (2019). We should not purport to advise Congress
on how it might exercise its legislative authority, nor give
our blessing to hypothetical statutes or legislative records
not at issue here.
Finally, I believe the question whether copyrights are
property within the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause remains open. The Court
relies on Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123 (1932), to
conclude that “[c]opyrights are a form of property.” Ante,
at 261. But Fox Film Corp. addressed “property” in the
context of state tax laws, not the Due Process Clause. 286
U. S., at 128. And although we stated in Florida Prepaid
that patents are “property” for due process purposes, we did
not analyze the Fourteenth Amendment's text, and neither
of the cases we cited involved due process. 527 U. S., at 642
(citing Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 197 (1857); Consoli-
dated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U. S. 92, 96 (1877)); see also
Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 Va.
L. Rev. 885, 887 (2000) (noting that the “Court has not always
been attentive to the `property' threshold” of the Due Proc-
ess Clauses). Because the parties agree that petitioners'
copyr ights are proper ty, and because the Four teenth
Amendment does not authorize this statute's abrogation of
*Because I adhere to our precedents regarding Article I and state sov-
ereign immunity, I continue to believe that Central Va. Community
College v. Katz, 546 U. S. 356 (2006), was wrongly decided. See id., at
379–385 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Court today rightfully limits that
decision to the Bankruptcy Clause context, calling it a “good-for-one-
clause-only holding.” Ante, at 259. I would go a step further and recog-
nize that the Court's decision in Katz is not good for even that Clause.

Cite
as: 589 U. S. 248 (2020)
269
Breyer, J., concurring in judgment
state sovereign immunity either way, we need not resolve
th
is open question today. I would, however, be willing to
consider the matter in an appropriate case.
For these reasons, I join all of the Court's opinion except
for the fnal paragraph in Part II–A and the fnal paragraph
in Part II–B.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
concurring in the judgment.
The Constitution gives Congress certain enumerated pow-
ers. One of them is set forth in the Intellectual Property
Clause: Congress may “promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. “And the monopoly
rights so given,” the Court acknowledges, operate against
“States no less than private parties.” Ante, at 256. States,
in other words, have “a specifc duty” not to infringe that “is
assigned by law” and upon which “individual rights depend.”
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 166 (1803). One might
therefore expect that someone injured by a State's violation
of that duty could “resort to the laws of his country for a
remedy,” ibid., especially where, as here, Congress has
sought to provide one. Or more concretely, one might think
that Walt Disney Pictures could sue a State (or anyone else)
for hosting an unlicensed screening of the studio's 2003 block-
buster flm, Pirates of the Caribbean (or any one of its
many sequels).
Yet the Court holds otherwise. In its view, Congress'
power under the Intellectual Property Clause cannot support
a federal law providing that, when proven to have pirated
intellectual property, States must pay for what they plun-
dered. Ante, at 256–260. To subject nonconsenting States
to private suits for copyright or patent infringement, says
the Court, Congress must endeavor to pass a more “tailored
statute” than the one before us, relying not on the Intellec-

270 AL
LEN v. COOPER
Breyer, J., concurring in judgment
tual Property Clause, but on § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
Ante, at 266. Whether a future legislative effort
along those lines will pass constitutional muster is anyone's
guess. But faced with the risk of unfairness to authors and
inventors alike, perhaps Congress will venture into this
great constitutional unknown.
That our sovereign-immunity precedents can be said to
call for so uncertain a voyage suggests that something is
amiss. Indeed, we went astray in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U. S. 44 (1996), as I have consistently main-
tained. See College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Post-
secondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, 699–701 (1999)
(dissenting opinion); Federal Maritime Comm'n v. South
Carolina Ports Authority, 535 U. S. 743, 787–788 (2002)
(same). We erred again in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627
(1999), by holding that Congress exceeded its § 5 powers
when it passed a patent counterpart to the copyright statute
at issue here. See id., at 652–664 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
But recognizing that my longstanding view has not carried
the day, and that the Court's decision in Florida Prepaid
controls this case, I concur in the judgment. See ante, 259–
260, 265–266; Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576
U. S. 446, 455–456 (2015); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt,
587 U. S. 230, 261 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
271
Syllabus
KAHLER v. KANSAS
certiorari
to the supreme court of kansas
No. 18–6135. Argued October 7, 2019—Decided March 23, 2020
In Clark v. Arizona, 548 U. S. 735, this Court catalogued the diverse
strains of the insanity defense that States have adopted to absolve men-
tally ill defendants of criminal culpability. Two—the cognitive- and
moral-incapacity tests—appear as alternative pathways to acquittal in
the landmark English ruling M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng.
Rep. 718. The moral-incapacity test asks whether a defendant's illness
left him unable to distinguish right from wrong with respect to his crim-
inal conduct. Respondent Kansas has adopted the cognitive-incapacity
test, which examines whether a defendant was able to understand what
he was doing when he committed a crime. Specifcally, under Kansas
law a defendant may raise mental illness to show that he “lacked the
culpable mental state required as an element of the offense charged,”
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21–5209. Kansas does not recognize any additional
way that mental illness can produce an acquittal, although a defendant
may use evidence of mental illness to argue for a lessened punishment at
sentencing. See §§ 21–6815(c)(1)(C), 21–6625(a). In particular, Kansas
does not recognize a moral-incapacity defense.
Kansas charged petitioner James Kahler with capital murder after he
shot and killed four family members. Prior to trial, he argued that
Kansas's insanity defense violates due process because it permits the
State to convict a defendant whose mental illness prevented him from
distinguishing right from wrong. The court disagreed and the jury re-
turned a conviction. During the penalty phase, Kahler was free to raise
any arg ument he w ished that ment a l i l lness shou ld mitigate h is
sentence, but the jury still imposed the death penalty. The Kansas
Supreme Court rejected Kahler's due process argument on appeal.
Held: Due process does not require Kansas to adopt an insanity test that
turns on a defendant's ability to recognize that his crime was morally
wrong. Pp. 279–297.
(a) A state rule about criminal liability violates due process only if it
“offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Leland v. Oregon,
343 U. S. 790, 798 (internal quotation marks omitted). History is the
primary guide for this analysis. The due process standard sets a high
bar, and a rule of criminal responsibility is unlikely to be suffciently
entrenched to bind all States to a single approach. As the Court ex-
plained in Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514, the scope of criminal responsi-

272 K
AHLER v. KANSAS
Syllabus
bility is animated by complex and ever-changing ideas that are best left
to
the States to evaluate and reevaluate over time. This principle ap-
plies with particular force in the context of the insanity defense, which
also involves evolving understandings of mental illness. This Court has
thus twice declined to constitutionalize a particular version of the insan-
ity defense, see Leland, 343 U. S. 790; Clark, 548 U. S. 735, holding
instead that a State's “insanity rule[ ] is substantially open to state
choice,” id., at 752. Pp. 279–282.
(b) Against this backdrop, Kahler argues that Kansas has abolished
the insanity defense—and, in particular, that it has impermissibly jetti-
soned the moral-incapacity approach. As a starting point, Kahler is
correct that for hundreds of years jurists and judges have recognized
that insanity can relieve criminal responsibility. But Kansas recognizes
the same: Under Kansas law, mental illness is a defense to culpability if
it prevented a defendant from forming the requisite criminal intent; a
defendant is permitted to offer whatever evidence of mental health he
deems relevant at sentencing; and a judge has discretion to replace a
defendant's prison term with commitment to a mental health facility.
So Kahler can prevail only by showing that due process requires
States to adopt a specifc test of insanity—namely, the moral-incapacity
test. He cannot do so. Taken as a whole, the early common-law cases
and commentaries reveal no settled consensus favoring Kahler's pre-
ferred right-from-wrong rule. Even after M'Naghten gained popular-
ity in the 19th century, States continued to experiment with new ap-
proaches. Clark therefore declared: “History shows no deference to
M'Naghten that could elevate its formula to the level of fundamental
principle.” 548 U. S., at 749–752. The tapestry of approaches States
have adopted shows that no single version of the insanity defense has
become so ingrained in American law as to rank as “fundamental.” Id.,
at 749.
This result is not surprising. Ibid. The insanity defense sits at the
juncture of medical views of mental illness and moral and legal theories
of criminal culpability—two areas of confict and change. Small wonder
that no particular test of insanity has developed into a constitutional
baseline. And it is not for the courts to insist on any single criterion
moving forward. Defning the precise relationship between criminal
culpability and mental illness requires balancing complex considera-
tions, among them the workings of the brain, the purposes of criminal
law, and the ideas of free will and responsibility. This balance should
remain open to revision as new medical knowledge emerges and societal
norms evolve. Thus—as the Court recognized previously in Leland,
Powell, and Clark—the defense is a project for state governance, not
constitutional law. Pp. 282–297.
307 Kan. 374, 410 P. 3d 105, affrmed.

Cite
as: 589 U. S. 271 (2020)
273
Syllabus
Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and
Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined. Breyer, J.,
fled a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg and Sotomayor, JJ., joined,
post, p. 297.
Sarah O'Rourke Schrup argued the cause for petitioner.
With her on the briefs were Meryl Carver-Allmond, Clay-
ton J. Perkins, Jeffrey T. Green, Tobias S. Loss-Eaton, and
Naomi Igra.
Toby Crouse, Solicitor General of Kansas, argued the cause
for respondent. With him on the brief were Derek Schmidt,
Attorney General of Kansas, Jeffrey A. Chanay, Chief Dep-
uty Attorney General, Kristafer Ailslieger and Brant M.
Laue, Deputy Solicitors General, and Dwight R. Carswell,
Natalie Chalmers, and Rachel L. Pickering, Assistant Solic-
itors General.
Elizabeth B. Prelogar argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging affrmance. With her on the
brief were Solicitor General Francisco, Assistant Attorney
General Benczkowski, Eric J. Feigin, and Christopher J.
Smith.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American Bar
Association by Robert M. Carlson, Matthew S. Hellman, David A.
Strauss, and Sarah M. Konsky; for the American Civil Liberties Union
et al. by Caitlin Halligan, David Cole, and Cassandra Stubbs; for the
American Psychiatric Association et al. by Aaron M. Panner, David W.
Ogden, Paul R. Q. Wol fson, Nathalie F. P. Gil foyle, Deanne M. Ottavi-
ano, Ira Abraham Burnim, Jennifer Mathis, and Mark J. Heyrman; for
the Idaho Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by Jonah J.
Horwitz, Craig Durham, Brian McComas, and Richard P. Mauro; by
Legal Historians et al. by Allison R. McLaughlin and Theresa Wardon
Benz; for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Jona-
than L. Marcus and Barbara E. Bergman; for Philosphy Professors by
Eugene R. Fidell; and for 290 Criminal Law and Mental Health Law Pro-
fessors by Richard J. Bonnie, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of Utah
et al. by Sean D. Reyes, Attorney General of Utah, Tyler R. Green, Solici-
tor General, Thomas B. Brunker, Deputy Solicitor General, and Andrew
F. Peterson, Assistant Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for
their respective States as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Kevin G.

274 K
AHLER v. KANSAS
Opinion of the Court
Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.
Th
is case is about Kansas's treatment of a criminal defend-
ant's insanity claim. In Kansas, a defendant can invoke
mental illness to show that he lacked the requisite mens rea
(intent) for a crime. He can also raise mental illness after
conviction to justify either a reduced term of imprisonment
or commitment to a mental health facility. But Kansas, un-
like many States, will not wholly exonerate a defendant on
the ground that his illness prevented him from recogniz-
ing his criminal act as morally wrong. The issue here is
whether the Constitution's Due Process Clause forces Kan-
sas to do so—otherwise said, whether that Clause compels
the acquittal of any defendant who, because of mental illness,
could not tell right from wrong when committing his crime.
We hold that the Clause imposes no such requirement.
I
A
In Clark v. Arizona, 548 U. S. 735, 749 (2006), this Court
catalogued state insanity defenses, counting four “strains
variously combined to yield a diversity of American stand-
ards” for when to absolve mentally ill defendants of criminal
culpability. The frst strain asks about a defendant's “cogni-
tive capacity”—whether a mental illness left him “unable to
understand what he [was] doing ” when he committed a
crime. Id., at 747, 749. The second examines his “moral
capacity”—whether his illness rendered him “unable to un-
derstand that his action [was] wrong.” Ibid. Those two in-
Clarkson of Alaska, Leslie Rutledge of Arkansas, Ashley Moody of Flor-
ida, Christopher M. Carr of Georgia, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Curtis
T. Hill, Jr., of Indiana, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Eric Schmitt of Missouri,
Timothy C. Fox of Montana, Doug Peterson of Nebraska, Dave Yost of
Ohio, Mike Hunter of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, and Ken
Paxton of Texas; and for Lynn Denton et al. by Allyson N. Ho, Bradley
G. Hubbard, Steven J. Twist, and Paul G. Cassell.
Andrew T. Tutt, R. Stanton Jones, and Stephen K. Wirth fled a brief of
amicus curiae for John F. Stinneford.

Cite
as: 589 U. S. 271 (2020)
275
Opinion of the Court
quiries, Clark explained, appeared as alternative pathways
to
acquittal in the landmark English ruling M'Naghten's
Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H. L. 1843), as well
as in many follow-on American decisions and statutes: If the
defendant lacks either cognitive or moral capacity, he is not
criminally responsible for his behavior. Yet a third “build-
ing block[ ]” of state insanity tests, gaining popularity from
the mid-19th century on, focuses on “volitional incapacity”—
whether a defendant's mental illness made him subject to
“irresistible[ ] impulse[s]” or otherwise unable to “control[ ]
his actions.” Clark, 548 U. S., at 749, 750, n. 11; see, e. g.,
Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 597, 2 So. 854, 866–867 (1887).
And bringing up the rear, in Clark's narration, the “product-
of-mental-illness test” broadly considers whether the defend-
ant's criminal act stemmed from a mental disease. 548 U. S.,
at 749–750.
As Clark explained, even that taxonomy fails to capture
the feld's complexity. See id., at 750, n. 11. Most notable
here, M'Naghten's “moral capacity” prong later produced a
spinoff, adopted in many States, that does not refer to moral-
ity at all. Instead of examining whether a mentally ill de-
fendant could grasp that his act was immoral, some jurisdic-
tions took to asking whether the defendant could understand
that his act was illegal. Compare, e. g., People v. Schmidt,
216 N. Y. 324, 333–334, 110 N. E. 945, 947 (1915) (Cardozo, J.)
(asking about moral right and wrong), with, e. g., State v.
Hamann, 285 N. W. 2d 180, 183 (Iowa 1979) (substituting
ideas of legal right and wrong). That change in legal stand-
ard matters when a mentally ill defendant knew that his act
violated the law yet believed it morally justifed. See, e. g.,
Schmidt, 216 N. Y., at 339, 110 N. E., at 949; People v. Ser-
ravo, 823 P. 2d 128, 135 (Colo. 1992).
1
1
Another complicating factor in Clark's classifcation scheme is that
States “limit, in varying degrees, which sorts of mental illness” can sup-
port an insanity claim. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U. S. 735, 750, n. 11 (2006).
So even two States using the same test for judging culpability may apply
it to differently sized sets of offenders. See in fra, at 295, n. 12.

276 K
AHLER v. KANSAS
Opinion of the Court
Kansas law provides that “[i]t shall be a defense to a prose-
cuti
on under any statute that the defendant, as a result of
mental disease or defect, lacked the culpable mental state
required as an element of the crime charged.” Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 21–5209 (2018 Cum. Supp.).
2
Under that statute, a
defendant may introduce any evidence of any mental illness
to show that he did not have the intent needed to commit
the charged crime. Suppose, for example, that the defend-
ant shot someone dead and goes on trial for murder. He
may then offer psychiatric testimony that he did not under-
stand the function of a gun or the consequences of its use—
more generally stated, “the nature and quality” of his ac-
tions. M'Naghten, 10 Cl. & Fin., at 210, 8 Eng. Rep., at 722.
And a jury crediting that testimony must acquit him. As
everyone here agrees, Kansas law thus uses M'Naghten's
“cognitive capacity” prong—the inquiry into whether a men-
tally ill defendant could comprehend what he was doing
when he committed a crime. See Brief for Petitioner 41;
Brief for Respondent 31; Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 18. If the defendant had no such capacity, he could
not form the requisite intent—and thus is not criminally
responsible.
At the same time, the Kansas statute provides that “[m]en-
tal disease or defect is not otherwise a defense.” § 21–5209.
In other words, Kansas does not recognize any additional
way that mental illness can produce an acquittal.
3
Most im-
portant for this case, a defendant's moral incapacity cannot
exonerate him, as it would if Kansas had adopted both origi-
nal prongs of M'Naghten. Assume, for example, that a de-
2
At the time of the crime in this case, a materially identical provision
was codifed at § 22–3220 (2007).
3
Four other States similarly exonerate a mentally ill defendant only
when he cannot understand the nature of his actions and so cannot form
the requisite mens rea. See Alaska Stat. §§ 12.47.010(a), 12.47.020 (2018);
Idaho Code Ann. §§ 18–207(1), (3) (2016); Mont. Code Ann. § 46–14–102
(2019); Utah Code § 76–2–305 (2017).

Cite
as: 589 U. S. 271 (2020)
277
Opinion of the Court
fendant killed someone because of an “insane delusion that
God
ha[d] ordained the sacrifce.” Schmidt, 216 N. Y., at
339, 110 N. E., at 949. The defendant knew what he was
doing (killing another person), but he could not tell moral
right from wrong; indeed, he thought the murder morally
justifed. In many States, that fact would preclude a crimi-
nal conviction, although it would almost always lead to com-
mitment in a mental health facility. In Kansas, by contrast,
evidence of a mentally ill defendant's moral incapacity—or
indeed, of anything except his cognitive inability to form the
needed mens rea—can play no role in determining guilt.
That partly closed-door policy changes once a verdict is
in. At the sentencing phase, a Kansas defendant has wide
latitude to raise his mental illness as a reason to judge him
not fully culpable and so to lessen his punishment. See
§§ 21–6815(c)(1)(C), 21–6625(a). He may present evidence (of
the kind M'Naghten deemed relevant) that his disease made
him unable to understand his act's moral wrongness—as in
the example just given of religious delusion. See § 21–
6625(a). Or he may try to show (in line with M'Naghten's
spinoff ) that the illness prevented him from “appreciat[ing]
the [conduct's] criminality.” § 21–6625(a)(6). Or again, he
may offer testimony (here invoking volitional incapacity)
that he simply could not “conform [his] conduct” to legal re-
straints. Ibid. Kansas sentencing law thus provides for an
individualized determination of how mental illness, in any or
all of its aspects, affects culpability. And the same kind of
evidence can persuade a court to place a defendant who
needs psychiatric care in a mental health facility rather than
a prison. See § 22–3430. In that way, a defendant in Kan-
sas lacking, say, moral capacity may wind up in the same
kind of institution as a like defendant in a State that would
bar his conviction.
B
This case arises from a terrible crime. In early 2009,
Karen Kahler fled for divorce from James Kahler and moved

278 K
AHLER v. KANSAS
Opinion of the Court
out of their home with their two teenage daughters and 9-
year-old
son. Over the following months, James Kahler be-
came more and more distraught. On Thanksgiving week-
end, he drove to the home of Karen's grandmother, where he
knew his family was staying. Kahler entered through the
back door and saw Karen and his son. He shot Karen twice,
while allowing his son to fee the house. He then moved
through the residence, shooting Karen's grandmother and
each of his daughters in turn. All four of his victims died.
Kahler surrendered to the police the next day and was
charged with capital murder.
Before trial, Kahler fled a motion arguing that Kansas's
treatment of insanity claims violates the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause. Kansas, he asserted, had “un-
constitutionally abolished the insanity defense” by allowing
the conviction of a mentally ill person “who cannot tell the
difference between right and wrong.” App. 11–12. The
trial court denied the motion, leaving Kahler to attempt to
show through psychiatric and other testimony that severe
depression had prevented him from forming the intent to
kill. See id., at 16; § 21–5209. The jury convicted Kahler of
capital murder. At the penalty phase, the court permitted
Kahler to offer additional evidence of his mental illness and
to argue in whatever way he liked that it should mitigate
his sentence. The jury still decided to impose the death
penalty.
Kahler appealed, again challenging the constitutionality of
Kansas's approach to insanity claims. The Kansas Supreme
Court rejected his argument, relying on an earlier preceden-
tial decision. See 307 Kan. 374, 400–401, 410 P. 3d 105, 124–
125 (2018) (discussing State v. Bethel, 275 Kan. 456, 66 P. 3d
840 (2003)). There, the court denied that any single version
of the insanity defense is so “ingrained in our legal system”
as to count as “fundamental.” Id., at 473, 66 P. 3d, at 851.
The court thus found that “[d]ue process does not mandate
that a State adopt a particular insanity test.” Ibid.

Cite
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279
Opinion of the Court
Kahler then asked this Court to decide whether the Due
Process
Clause requires States to provide an insanity de-
fense that acquits a defendant who could not “distinguish
right from wrong ” when committing his crime—or, other-
wise put, whether that Clause requires States to adopt the
moral-incapacity test from M'Naghten. Pet. for Cert. 18.
We granted certiorari, 586 U. S. 1221 (2019), and now hold it
does not.
4
II
A
A challenge like Kahler's must surmount a high bar.
Under well-settled precedent, a state rule about criminal
liability—laying out either the elements of or the defenses
to a crime—violates due process only if it “offends some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Leland v.
Oregon, 343 U. S. 790, 798 (1952) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Our primary guide in applying that standard is
“historical practice.” Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U. S. 37, 43
(1996) (plurality opinion). And in assessing that practice,
we look primarily to eminent common-law authorities (Black-
stone, Coke, Hale, and the like), as well as to early English
and American judicial decisions. See, e. g., id., at 44–45;
Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197, 202 (1977). The ques-
tion is whether a rule of criminal responsibility is so old and
venerable—so entrenched in the central values of our legal
system—as to prevent a State from ever choosing another.
An affrmative answer, though not unheard of, is rare. See,
e. g., Clark, 548 U. S., at 752 (“[T]he conceptualization of
criminal offenses” is mostly left to the States).
4
Kahler also asked us to decide whether the Eighth Amendment re-
quires that States make available the moral-incapacity defense. See Pet.
for Cert. 18. But that claim is not properly before us. Kahler did not
raise the argument below, and the Kansas courts therefore did not ad-
dress it.

280 K
AHLER v. KANSAS
Opinion of the Court
In Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514 (1968), this Court ex-
plai
ned why. There, Texas declined to recognize “chronic
alcoholism” as a defense to the crime of public drunkenness.
Id., at 517 (plurality opinion). The Court upheld that deci-
sion, emphasizing the paramount role of the States in setting
“standards of criminal responsibility.” Id., at 533. In re-
fusing to impose a “constitutional doctrine” defning those
standards, the Court invoked the many “interlocking and
overlapping concepts” that the law uses to assess when a
person should be held criminally accountable for “his antiso-
cial deeds.” Id., at 535–536. “The doctrines of actus reus,
mens rea, insanity, mistake, justifcation, and duress”—the
Court counted them off—refect both the “evolving aims of
the criminal law” and the “changing religious, moral, philo-
sophical, and medical views of the nature of man.” Id., at
536. Or said a bit differently, crafting those doctrines
i nvolves ba lanci ng and reba lanci ng over time complex
and oft-competing ideas about “social policy” and “moral
culpability”—about the criminal law's “practical effective-
ness” and its “ethical foundations.” Id., at 538, 545, 548
(Black, J., concurring). That “constantly shifting adjust-
ment” could not proceed in the face of rigid “[c]onstitution[al]
formulas.” Id., at 536–537 (plurality opinion). Within
broad limits, Powell thus concluded, “doctrine[s] of criminal
responsibility” must remain “the province of the States.”
Id., at 534, 536.
Nowhere has the Court hewed more closely to that view
than in addressing the contours of the insanity defense.
Here, uncertainties about the human mind loom large. See,
e. g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68, 81 (1985) (“[P]sychia-
trists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes
mental illness, on [proper] diagnos[es, and] on cure and treat-
ment”). Even as some puzzles get resolved, others emerge.
And those perennial gaps in knowledge intersect with differ-
ing opinions about how far, and in what ways, mental illness
should excuse criminal conduct. See Clark, 548 U. S., at

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749–752 (canvassing how those competing views produced a
wea
lth of insanity tests); supra, at 274–275. “This whole
problem,” we have noted, “has evoked wide disagreement.”
Leland, 343 U. S., at 801. On such unsettled ground, we
have hesitated to reduce “experimentation, and freeze [the]
dialogue between law and psychiatry into a rigid constitu-
tional mold.” Powell, 392 U. S., at 536–537. Indeed, while
addressing the demand for an alcoholism defense in Powell,
the Court pronounced—as something close to self-evident—
that “[n]othing could be less fruitful” than to defne a specifc
“insanity test in constitutional terms.” Id., at 536.
And twice before we have declined to do so. In Leland v.
Oregon, a criminal defendant challenged as a violation of
due process the State's use of the moral-incapacity test of
insanity—the very test Kahler now asks us to require. See
343 U. S., at 800–801. According to the defendant, Oregon
instead had to adopt the volitional-incapacity (or irresistible-
impulse) test to comply with the Constitution. See ibid.;
supra, at 275. We rejected that argument. “[P]sychiatry,”
we frst noted, “has made tremendous strides since [the
moral-incapacity] test was laid down in M'Naghten's Case,”
implying that the test seemed a tad outdated. 343 U. S., at
800–801. But still, we reasoned, “the progress of science
has not reached a point where its learning ” would demand
“eliminat[ing] the right and wrong test from [the] criminal
law.” Id., at 801. And anyway, we continued, the “choice
of a test of legal sanity involves not only scientifc knowledge
but questions of basic policy” about when mental illness
should absolve someone of “criminal responsibility.” Ibid.
The matter was thus best left to each State to decide on its
own. The dissent agreed (while parting from the majority
on another ground): “[I]t would be indefensible to impose
upon the States[ ] one test rather than another for determin-
ing criminal culpability” for the mentally ill, “and thereby
to displace a State's own choice.” Id., at 803 (opinion of
Frankfurter, J.).

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A half-century later, we reasoned similarly in Clark.
There
, the defendant objected to Arizona's decision to dis-
card the cognitive-incapacity prong of M'Naghten and leave
in place only the moral-incapacity one—essentially the fip-
side of what Kansas has done. Again, we saw no due proc-
ess problem. Many States, we acknowledged, allowed a de-
fendant to show insanity through either prong of M'Naghten.
See 548 U. S., at 750. But we denied that this approach
“represents the minimum that a government must provide.”
Id., at 748. In so doing, we invoked the States' traditional
“capacity to defne crimes and defenses,” and noted how
views of mental illness had been particularly “subject to fux
and disagreement.” Id., at 749, 752. And then we sur-
veyed the disparate ways that state laws had historically
excused criminal conduct because of mental disease—those
“strains variously combined to yield a diversity of American
standards.” See id., at 749–752; supra, at 274–275. The ta-
keaway was “clear”: A State's “insanity rule[ ] is substan-
tially open to state choice.” Clark, 548 U. S., at 752. Reit-
erating Powell's statement, Clark held that “no particular”
insanity test serves as “a baseline for due process.” 548
U. S., at 752. Or said just a bit differently, that “due process
imposes no single canonical formulation of legal insanity.”
Id., at 753.
B
Yet Kahler maintains that Kansas's treatment of insanity
fails to satisfy due process. He sometimes makes his argu-
ment in the broadest of strokes, as he did before trial. See
supra, at 278. Kansas, he then contends, has altogether
“abolished the insanity defense,” in disregard of hundreds of
years of historical practice. Brief for Petitioner 39. His cen-
tral claim, though, is more confned. It is that Kansas has im-
permissibly jettisoned the moral-incapacity test for insanity.
See id., at 12, 23. As earlier noted, both Clark and Leland
described that test as coming from M'Naghten. See 548 U. S.,
at 749; 343 U. S., at 801; supra, at 274–275, 281. But according

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to Kahler (and the dissent), the moral-incapacity inquiry
emerged
centuries before that decision, thus forming part of
the English common-law heritage this country inherited.
See Brief for Petitioner 21, 42; post, at 300–310 (opinion of
Breyer, J.). And the test, he claims, served for all that
time—and continuing into the present—as the touchstone of
legal insanity: If a defendant could not understand that his
act was morally wrong, then he could not be found criminally
liable. See Brief for Petitioner 20–23; see also post, at 310–
312. So Kahler concludes that the moral-incapacity stand-
ard is a “principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”
Leland, 343 U. S., at 798; see supra, at 279. In essence—
and contra Clark—that test is the “single canonical formula-
tion of legal insanity” and thus the irreducible “baseline for
due process.” 548 U. S., at 752–753; see supra, at 282.
5
One point, frst, of agreement: Kahler is right that for hun-
dreds of years jurists and judges have recognized insanity
(however defned) as relieving responsibility for a crime.
“In criminal cases therefore,” Sir William Blackstone wrote,
“lunatics are not chargeable for their own acts, if committed
when under these incapacities.” 4 Commentaries on the
Laws of England 24 (1769). Sir Edward Coke even earlier
5
Although the dissent at times claims to the contrary, its argument is
the same. Given the clear direction of our precedent, the dissent must
purport to grant the States “leeway” in defning legal insanity. Post, at
297. But the entirety of the dissent's historical analysis focuses on the
moral-incapacity standard—attempting to show, just as Kahler does, that
it both preceded and succeeded M'Naghten. See post, at 300–313. And
in line with that narration, the dissent insists on moral understanding as
the indispensable criterion of legal sanity—the sine qua non of criminal
responsibility. See, e. g., post, at 297, 299–300, 304–305, 313–317. In-
deed, the dissent offers only one way the States have actual “leeway” to
change their insanity rules: They can “expand upon M'Naghten's princi-
ples” by fnding that even some who have moral capacity are insane.
Post, at 318. But that is just to say that moral capacity is the constitu-
tional foor—again, exactly what Kahler argues.

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explained that in criminal cases, “the act and wrong of a mad
man
shall not be imputed to him.” 2 Institutes of the Laws
of England § 405, p. 247b (1628) (Coke). And so too Henry
de Bracton thought that a “madman” could no sooner be
found criminally liable than a child. 2 Bracton on Laws and
Customs of England 384 (S. Thorne transl. 1968) (Bracton).
That principle of non-culpability appeared in case after case
involving allegedly insane defendants, on both sides of the
Atlantic. “The defen[s]e of insanity[ ] is a defen[s]e for all
crimes[,] from the highest to the lowest,” said the Court in
Old Bailey. Trial of Samuel Burt (July 19, 1786), in 6 Pro-
ceedings in the Old Bailey 874 (E. Hodgson ed. 1786) (Old
Bailey Proceedings). Repeated Justice Story, when riding
circuit: “In general, insanity is an excuse for the commission
of every crime, because the party has not the possession of
that reason, which includes responsibility.” United States v.
Drew, 25 F. Cas. 913 (No. 14,993) (CC Mass. 1828); see also,
e. g., State v. Marler, 2 Ala. 43, 49 (1841) (“If the prisoner
was insane, he was not an accountable being ”); Cornwell v.
State, 8 Tenn. 147, 156 (1827) (“[P]erfect madness” will “free
a man from punishment for crime”). We have not found a
single case to the contrary.
But neither do we think Kansas departs from that broad
principle. First, Kansas has an insanity defense negating
criminal liability—even though not the type Kahler de-
mands. As noted earlier, Kansas law provides that it is “a
defense to a prosecution” that “the defendant, as a result of
mental disease or defect, lacked the culpable mental state
required” for a crime. § 21–5209; see supra, at 276. That
provision enables a defendant to present psychiatric and other
evidence of mental illness to defend himself against a crimi-
nal charge. More specifcally, the defendant can use that ev-
idence to show that his illness left him without the cognitive
capacity to form the requisite intent. See supra, at 276.
Recall that such a defense was exactly what the defendant
in Clark wanted, in preference to Arizona's moral-incapacity
defense: His (unsuccessful) appeal rested on the trial court's

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exclusion of psychiatric testimony to show that he lacked the
rele
vant mens rea. See 548 U. S., at 745–747; supra, at 282.
Here, Kahler could do what Clark could not—try to show
through such testimony that he had no intent to kill. Of
course, Kahler would have preferred Arizona's kind of insan-
ity defense ( just as Clark would have liked Kansas's). But
that does not mean that Kansas (any more than Arizona)
failed to offer any insanity defense at all.
Second, and signifcantly, Kansas permits a defendant to
offer whatever mental health evidence he deems relevant at
sentencing. See §§ 21–6815(c)(1)(C), 21–6625(a); supra, at
277. A mentally ill defendant may argue there that he is
not blameworthy because he could not tell the difference be-
tween right and wrong. Or, because he did not know his
conduct broke the law. Or, because he could not control his
behavior. Or, because of anything else. In other words,
any manifestation of mental illness that Kansas's guilt-phase
insanity defense disregards—including the moral incapacity
Kahler highlights—can come in later to mitigate culpability
and lessen punishment. And that same kind of evidence can
persuade a judge to replace any prison term with commit-
ment to a mental health facility. See § 22–3430; supra, at
277. So as noted above, a defendant arguing moral incapac-
ity may well receive the same treatment in Kansas as in
States that would acquit—and, almost certainly, commit—
him for that reason. See supra, at 277. In sum, Kansas
does not bar, but only channels to sentencing, the mental
health evidence that falls outside its intent-based insanity
defense. When combined with Kansas's allowance of mental
health evidence to show a defendant's inability to form crimi-
nal intent, that sentencing regime defeats Kahler's charge
that the State has “abolish[ed] the insanity defense en-
tirely.”
6
Brief for Petitioner 39.
6
We here conclude only that Kansas's scheme does not abolish the insan-
ity defense. We say nothing, one way or the other, about whether any
other scheme might do so.

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So Kahler can prevail here only if he can show (again, con-
tra
Clark) that due process demands a specifc test of legal
insanity—namely, whether mental illness prevented a de-
fendant from understanding his act as immoral. Kansas, as
we have explained, does not use that type of insanity rule.
See supra, at 276–277. If a mentally ill defendant had
enough cognitive function to form the intent to kill, Kansas
law directs a conviction even if he believed the murder mor-
ally justifed. In Kansas's judgment, that delusion does not
make an intentional killer entirely blameless. See Brief for
Respondent 40. Rather than eliminate, it only lessens the
defendant's moral culpability. See ibid. And sentencing is
the appropriate place to consider mitigation: The decision-
maker there can make a nuanced evaluation of blame, rather
than choose, as a trial jury must, between all and nothing.
See ibid. In any event, so Kansas thinks.
7
Those views
are contested and contestable; other States—many others—
have made a different choice. But Kahler must show more
than that. He must show that adopting the moral-incapacity
version of the insanity rule is not a choice at all—because,
7
The dissent is therefore wrong to suggest that Kansas's law has become
untethered from moral judgments about culpability. See post, at 297, 299,
311–318. No doubt, Kansas's moral judgments differ from the dissent's.
Again, Kansas believes that an intentional killer is not wholly blameless,
even if, for example, he thought his actions commanded by God. The
dissent, in contrast, considers Kansas's view benighted (as maybe some in
the majority do too). But that is not a dispute, as the dissent suggests,
about whether morality should play a role in assigning legal responsibility.
It is instead a disagreement about what morality entails—that is, about
when a defendant is morally culpable for an act like murder. See State v.
Bethel, 275 Kan. 456, 465–471, 66 P. 3d 840, 847–850 (2003) (accepting Kan-
sas's view that “moral blameworthiness” is linked to a defendant's intent
to kill, rather than to his ability to tell right from wrong). And we have
made clear, from Leland to Powell to Clark, that courts do not get to
make such judgments. See supra, at 280–282. Instead, the States have
broad discretion to decide who counts as blameworthy, and to weigh that
along with other factors in defning the elements of, and defenses to,
crimes.

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again, that version is “so rooted in the traditions and con-
science
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Le-
land, 343 U. S., at 798. And he cannot. The historical rec-
ord is, on any fair reading, complex—even messy. As we
will detail, it reveals early versions of not only Kahler's pro-
posed standard but also Kansas's alternative.
Early commentators on the common law proposed various
formulations of the insanity defense, with some favoring a
morality inquiry and others a mens rea approach. Kahler
cites William Lambard's 16th-century treatise defning a
“mad man” as one who “hath no knowledge of good nor evil”
(the right and wrong of the day). Eirenarcha, ch. 21, p. 218
(1581). He likewise points to William Hawkins's statement,
over a hundred years later, that a “lunatick[ ]” is not punish-
able because “under a natural disability of distinguishing
between good and evil.” 1 Pleas of the Crown § 1, p. 2
(1716) (capitalization omitted). Both true enough. But
other early versions of the insanity test—and from a more
famous trio of jurists—demanded the kind of cognitive im-
pairment that prevented a defendant from understanding the
nature of his acts, and thus intending his crime. Henry de
Bracton's 13th-century treatise gave rise to what became
known as the “wild beast” test. See J. Biggs, The Guilty
Mind 82 (1955). Used for hundreds of years, it likened a
“madman” to an “animal[ ] which lack[s] reason” and so could
not have “the intention to injure.” Bracton 384; see ibid.
(A “madman” cannot commit a crime because “[i]t is will and
purpose which mark” misdeeds). Sir Edward Coke simi-
larly linked the defnition of insanity to a defendant's inabil-
ity to form criminal intent. He described a legally insane
person in 1628 as so utterly “without his mind or discretion”
that he could not have the needed mens rea. 2 Coke § 405,
at 247b. So too Lord Matthew Hale a century later. He
explained that insanity involves “a total alienation of the
mind or perfect madness,” such that a defendant could not act
“animo felonico,” meaning with felonious intent. 1 Pleas

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of the Crown, ch. 4, pp. 30, 37 (1736); see id., at 37 (“[F]or
bei
ng under a full alienation of mind, he acts not per electio-
nem or intentionem [by choice or intent]”).
8
Quite a few of the old common-law cases similarly stressed
the issue of cognitive capacity. To be sure, even these cases
included some references to the ability to tell right from
wrong (and the dissent eagerly cherry-picks every one of
them). But the decisions' overall focus was less on whether
a defendant thought his act moral than on whether he had
the ability to do much thinking at all. In the canonical case
of Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (1724), for example, the
jury charge descended straight from Bracton:
“[I]t is not every kind of frantic humour or something
unaccountable in a man's actions, that points him out to
8
The dissent tries to recruit these three jurists to the side of the moral-
incapacity test, see post, at 300–302, but cannot succeed. Even the care-
fully curated passages the dissent quotes focus on cognitive capability
rather than moral judgment. See, e. g., post, at 301–302 (asking whether
a defendant had “sense and reason” or “understanding and liberty of will”).
In so doing, they refer to the defendant's ability to form the requisite mens
rea, or felonious intent. See Clark, 548 U. S., at 747; supra, at 274–275.
The dissent still insists all is not lost because (it says) mens rea itself
hinged at common law on a defendant's “moral understanding.” Post, at
304–305. Here, the dissent infers from the use of “good-from-evil” lan-
guage in various common-law treatises and cases that moral blameworthi-
ness must have defned the mens rea inquiry. See ibid. But to begin
with—and to repeat the point made in the text—the most infuential trea-
tises used little of that language, emphasizing instead the need for a de-
fendant to intend his act in the ordinary sense of the term. And as we
will explain, the joint presence of references to mens rea and moral under-
standing in other common-law sources involving insanity does not show
that most jurists saw the two concepts as one and the same. See in fra
this page and 289–291. Some may well have viewed mens rea through a
moral prism; but others emphasized cognitive understanding in using that
term; and still others combined the moral and cognitive in diverse ways.
Which is to say that the record is far more complicated than the dissent
lets on, with jurists invoking, both within particular sources and across all
of them, a variety of ways to resolve insanity claims. And under our long-
established precedent, that motley sort of history cannot provide the basis
for a successful due process claim.

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be such a madman as is to be exempted from punish-
ment:
it must be a man that is totally deprived of his
understanding and memory, and doth not know what he
is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild
beast.” Id., at 764–765.
And the court offered an accompanying test linking that lack
of reason to mens rea: If a man is “deprived of his reason,
and consequently of his intention, he cannot be guilty.” Id.,
at 764; see ibid. (defning a “madman” as a “person that hath
no design”); see also Trial of William Walker (Apr. 21,
1784), in 4 Old Bailey Proceedings 544, 547 (asking whether
the defendant had a “distemper of mind which had deprived
him of the use of his reason” or instead whether “he knew
what he was doing [and] meant to do it”); Beverley's Case, 4
Co. Rep. 123b, 124b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1118, 1121 (K. B. 1603)
(asking whether a man “is deprived of reason and under-
standing ” and so “cannot have a felonious intent”). The
House of Lords used much the same standard in Rex v. Lord
Ferrers, 19 How. St. Tr. 886 (1760), when sitting in judgment
on one of its members. There, the Solicitor General told the
Lords to address “the capacity and intention of the noble
prisoner.” Id., at 948. Relying heavily on Hale's treatise,
he defned the legally insane as suffering from an “alienation
of mind” and a “total[ ] want of reason.” Id., at 947. And
in recapping the evidence on that issue, he asked about the
defendant's intention: “Did [Ferrers] proceed with delibera-
tion? Did he know the consequences” of his act? Id., at
948.
9
9
Even in the face of these instructions, the dissent claims that Arnold
and Ferrers actually used the moral-incapacity test. See post, at 305–
307. The assertion is based on some “good and evil” language (in Ferrers,
mostly from witnesses) appearing in the case reports. But scholars gen-
erally agree, in line with our view, that Arnold and Ferrers “demonstrate
how strictly” courts viewed “the criteria of insanity.” 1 N. Walker, Crime
and Insanity in England 53 (1968) (noting that the two decisions “have
often been cited” for that proposition). Kahler himself does not dispute
the point; indeed, he essentially concedes our reading. Rather than try

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In such cases, even the language of morality mostly
worked
in service of the emphasis on cognition and mens
rea. The idea was that if a defendant had such a “total[ ]
want of reason” as to preclude moral thinking, he could not
possibly have formed the needed criminal intent. Id., at
947. Lord Chief Justice Mansfeld put the point neatly in
Bellingham's Case, 1 G. Collinson, Treatise on the Law Con-
cerning Idiots, Lunatics, and Other Persons Non Compotes
Mentis 636 (1812) (Collinson). He instructed the jury:
“If a man were deprived of all power of reasoning, so as
not to be able to distinguish whether it was right or
wrong to commit the most wicked transaction, he could
not certainly do an act against the law. Such a man, so
destitute of all power of judgment, could have no inten-
tion at all.” Id., at 671.
On that account, moral incapacity was a byproduct of the
kind of cognitive breakdown that precluded fnding mens
rea, rather than a self-suffcient test of insanity. See also
Rex v. Offord, 5 Car. & P. 168, 169, 172 Eng. Rep. 924, 925
(N. P. 1831) (“express[ing] complete accordance in the obser-
vations of th[e] learned Judge” in Bellingham). Or said an-
other way, a mentally ill defendant's inability to distinguish
right from wrong, rather than independently producing
an insanity acquittal, served as a sign—almost a kind of
evidence—that the defendant lacked the needed criminal
intent.
Other early common-law cases do not adopt the mens rea
approach—but neither can they sustain Kahler's position.
Kahler relies mainly on Hadfeld's Case, 27 How. St. Tr. 1281
to make the decisions say something they do not, he argues only
that they were “outlier[s]” and “could hardly have been less typical.”
Brief for Petitioner 22, n. 5; Reply Brief 4 (internal quotation marks
omitted). But that contrasting response fares no better. As even the
dissent agrees, these were the “seminal” common-law decisions relating to
insanity—indeed, two of only a small number in that period to make it
into offcial reports. Post, at 305.

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(1800), to show that common-law courts would acquit a men-
t
ally ill defendant who understood the nature of his act, but
believed it moral. See Reply Brief 4. There, the defendant
had deliberately set out to assassinate King George III on
the view that doing so would bring about the Second Com-
ing. See 27 How. St. Tr., at 1322. The judge instructed the
jury that the defendant was so “deranged” as to make acquit-
tal appropriate. Id., at 1353. Maybe, as Kahler argues,
that directive stemmed from the defendant's inability to tell
right from wrong. But the judge never used that language,
or stated any particular legal standard, so it is hard to know.
Still other judges explained insanity to juries by throwing
everything against the wall—mixing notions of cognitive in-
capacity, moral incapacity, and more, without trying to order,
prioritize, or even distinguish among them. See, e. g., Re-
gina v. Oxford, 9 Car. & P. 525, 545–548, 173 Eng. Rep. 941,
950 (N. P. 1840); Trial of Francis Parr (Jan. 15, 1787), in 2
Old Bailey Proceedings 228–229; Bowler's Case, 1 Collinson
674. Those decisions treat the inability to make moral judg-
ments more as part of an all-things-considered assessment
of legal insanity, and less as its very defnition. But even if
some of them belong in Kahler's corner, that would be far
from enough. Taken as a whole, the common-law cases re-
veal no settled consensus favoring Kahler's preferred insan-
ity rule. And without that, they cannot support his pro-
posed constitutional baseline.
Only with M'Naghten, in 1843, did a court articulate, and
momentum grow toward accepting, an insanity defense
based independently on moral incapacity. See Clark, 548
U. S., at 749; Leland, 343 U. S., at 801; supra, at 274–275, 281.
The M'Naghten test, as already described, found insanity in
either of two circumstances. See supra, at 274–275. A de-
fendant was acquitted if he “labour[ed] under such a defect
of reason, from disease of the mind, [1] as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, [2] if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.”

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10 Cl. & Fin., at 210, 8 Eng. Rep., at 722 (emphasis added).
That
test disaggregated the concepts of cognitive and moral
incapacity, so that each served as a stand-alone defense.
And its crisp two-part formulation proved infuential, not
only in Great Britain but in the United States too. Over the
course of the 19th century, many States adopted the test,
making it the most popular one in the country.
Still, Clark unhesitatingly declared: “History shows no
deference to M'Naghten that could elevate its formula to the
level of fundamental principle.” 548 U. S., at 749. As
Clark elaborated, even M'Naghten failed to unify state in-
sanity defenses. See 548 U. S., at 749–752. States contin-
ued to experiment with insanity rules, refecting what one
court called “the infnite variety of forms [of] insanity” and
the “diffcult and perplexing ” nature of the defense. Rob-
erts v. State, 3 Ga. 310, 328, 332 (1847). Some States in the
1800s gravitated to the newly emergent “volitional incapac-
ity” standard, focusing on whether the defendant could at all
control his actions. Clark, 548 U. S., at 749; see, e. g., Rob-
erts, 3 Ga., at 331. One court viewed that inquiry as “much
more practical” than the “right and wrong test,” which it
thought often “speculative and diffcult of determination.”
State v. Felter, 25 Iowa 67, 82, 84 (1868); see Leland, 343
U. S., at 801 (recognizing such skepticism about the moral-
incapacity test); supra, at 281. Another prophesied that the
volitional test was the one “towards which all the modern
authorities in this country[ ] are gradually but surely tend-
ing.” Parsons, 81 Ala., at 586, 2 So., at 859. But that test,
too, failed to sweep all before it: State innovation proceeded
apace. See, e. g., State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399, 442 (1870)
(applying the “product” test, which excuses a defendant
whose crime “was the offspring or product of mental dis-
ease”); N. D. Cent. Code Ann. § 12.1–04.1–01(1)(a) (2012) (re-
placing the right-from-wrong test with an inquiry into
whether the defendant's act arose from “[a] serious distortion
of [his] capacity to recognize reality”). Much as medical

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views of mental illness changed as time passed, so too did
lega
l views of how to account for that illness when assign-
ing blame.
As earlier noted, even the States that adopted M'Naghten
soon divided on what its second prong should mean. See
supra, at 274–275. Most began by asking, as Kahler does,
about a defendant's ability to grasp that his act was im-
moral. See, e. g., Wright v. State, 4 Neb. 407, 409 (1876);
State v. Spencer, 21 N. J. L. 196, 201 (1846). Thus, Clark
labeled M'Naghten's second prong a test of “moral capacity,”
and invoked the oft-used phrase “telling right from wrong ”
(or in older language, good from evil) to describe its central
inquiry. 548 U. S., at 747, 753; see supra, at 275. But over
the years, 16 States have reoriented the test to focus on the
defendant's understanding that his act was illegal—that is,
legally rather than morally “wrong.”
10
They thereby ex-
cluded from the ranks of the insane those who knew an act
was criminal but still thought it right.
Contrary to Kahler's (and the dissent's) contention, that
difference matters. See Reply Brief 7 (claiming that “there
is little daylight between these inquiries”); post, at 312–313,
317 (same). The two tests will treat some, even though not
all, defendants in opposite ways. And the defendants they
will treat differently are exactly those Kahler (and the dissent)
10
See State v. Skaggs, 120 Ariz. 467, 472, 586 P. 2d 1279, 1284 (1978);
Wallace v. State, 766 So. 2d 364, 367 (Fla. App. 2000); State v. Hamann,
285 N. W. 2d 180, 184 (Iowa 1979); Commonwealth v. Lawson, 475 Mass.
806, 811, 62 N. E. 3d 22, 28 (2016); State v. Worlock, 117 N. J. 596, 610–611,
569 A. 2d 1314, 1322 (1990); People v. Wood, 12 N. Y. 2d 69, 76, 187 N. E.
2d 116, 121–122 (1962); State v. Carreiro, 2013-Ohio-1103, 988 N. E. 2d 21,
27 (App.); McElroy v. State, 242 S. W. 883, 884 (Tenn. 1922); McAfee v.
State, 467 S. W. 3d 622, 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); State v. Crenshaw,
98 Wash. 2d 789, 794–795, 659 P. 2d 488, 492–493 (1983); Ark. Code Ann.
§ 5–2–301(6) (2017); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, § 5/6–2(a) (West 2016); Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 504.020(1) (West 2016); Md. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § 3–
109(a) (2018); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 161.295(1) (2019); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13,
§ 4801(a)(1) (2019).

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focus on: those who know exactly what they are doing
(
including that it is against the law) but believe it morally
justifed—because, say, it is commanded by God (or in the
dissent's case, a dog). See Brief for Petitioner 15; post, at
315; Schmidt, 216 N. Y., at 339, 110 N. E., at 949.
11
A famed
theorist of criminal law put the point this way:
“A kills B knowing that he is killing B, and knowing that
it is illegal to kill B, but under an insane delusion that
the salvation of the human race will be obtained by . . .
the murder of B[.] A's act is a crime if the word `wrong '
[in M'Naghten] means illegal. It is not a crime if the
word wrong means morally wrong.” 2 J. Stephen, His-
tory of the Criminal Law of England, ch. 19, p. 149
(1883).
So constitutionalizing the moral-incapacity standard, as
Kahler requests, would require striking down not only the
11
The great judge (later Justice) whom the dissent cites to suggest there
is no real difference between the legal wrong and moral wrong tests wrote
a lengthy opinion whose point was the opposite. Consider a case, Judge
Cardozo said: “A mother kills her infant child to whom she has been devot-
edly attached. She knows the nature and quality of the act; she knows
that the law condemns it; but she is inspired by an insane delusion that
God has appeared to her and ordained the sacrifce.” People v. Schmidt,
216 N. Y. 324, 339, 110 N. E. 945, 949 (1915). If the legal wrong test were
used, Judge Cardozo continued, “it would be the duty of a jury to hold her
responsible for the crime.” Ibid. But not if the focus was, as in the
original M'Naghten test, on moral wrong. And that difference led the
New York Court of Appeals to hold that the trial court's jury instruction
was in error. See 216 N. Y., at 340, 110 N. E., at 950. The additional
cases the dissent cites to downplay the distinction between moral and legal
wrong in fact follow Schmidt in recognizing when they diverge. See Wor-
lock, 117 N. J., at 611, 569 A. 2d, at 1322 (explaining that “the distinction
between moral and legal wrong may be critical” when, for example, a de-
fendant “knowingly kill[s] another in obedience to a command from God”);
Crenshaw, 98 Wash. 2d, at 798, 659 P. 2d, at 494 (acknowledging Schmidt's
view that even when a defendant “knows that the law and society condemn
[her] act,” she should not be held responsible if “her free will has been
subsumed by her belief in [a] deifc decree”).

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fve state laws like Kansas's (as the dissent at times suggests,
see
post, at 312), but 16 others as well (as the dissent eventu-
ally concedes is at least possible, see post, at 317). And with
what justification? The emergence of M'Naghten's legal
variant, far from raising a due process problem, merely con-
frms what Clark already recognized. Even after its articu-
lation in M'Naghten (much less before), the moral-incapacity
test has never commanded the day. Clark, 548 U. S., at
749.
12
Indeed, just decades ago Congress gave serious consider-
ation to adopting a mens rea approach like Kansas's as the
federal insanity rule. See United States v. Pohlot, 827 F. 2d
889, 899, and n. 9 (CA3 1987) (describing bipartisan support
for that proposal). The Department of Justice at the time
favored that version of the insanity test. Perhaps more sur-
prisingly, the American Medical Association did too. And
the American Psychiatric Association took no position one
way or the other. Although Congress chose in the end to
adhere to the M'Naghten rule, the debate over the bill itself
reveals continuing division over the proper scope of the in-
sanity defense.
12
The diversity of American approaches to insanity is also evident in
the States' decisions about which kinds of mental illness can support the
defense. See Clark, 548 U. S., at 750, n. 11; supra, at 275, n. 1. Some
States limit the defense to those with a “severe” mental disease. See,
e. g., Ala. Code § 13A–3–1 (2015). Others prohibit its assertion by defend-
ants with specifc mental disorders. See, e. g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–
502 (2010) (“psychosexual” or “impulse control disorders”); Ore. Rev. Stat.
§ 161.295(2) (“personality disorder[s]”). In particular, many States follow
the Model Penal Code in prohibiting psychopaths from raising the defense.
See ALI, Model Penal Code § 4.01(2), p. 163 (1985); e. g., Ind. Code § 35–
41–3–6(b) (2019) (“abnormality manifested only by repeated unlawful or
otherwise antisocial conduct”). All those limitations apply even when the
defendant's mental illness prevented him from recognizing that his crime
was immoral. In that way too, many States have departed from the
principle that Kahler (along with the dissent) claims the Constitution
commands.

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Nor is that surprising, given the nature of the inquiry. As
the
American Psychiatric Association once noted, “insanity
is a matter of some uncertainty.” Insanity Defense Work
Group, Statement on the Insanity Defense, 140 Am. J. Psych.
681, 685 (1983). Across both time and place, doctors and sci-
entists have held many competing ideas about mental illness.
And that is only the half of it. Formulating an insanity de-
fense also involves choosing among theories of moral and
legal culpability, themselves the subject of recurrent contro-
versy. At the juncture between those two spheres of con-
fict and change, small wonder there has not been the stasis
Kahler sees—with one version of the insanity defense en-
trenched for hundreds of years.
And it is not for the courts to insist on any single criterion
going forward. We have made the point before, in Leland,
Powell, and Clark. See supra, at 280–282. Just a brief re-
minder: “[F]ormulating a constitutional rule would reduce,
if not eliminate, [the States'] fruitful experimentation, and
freeze the developing productive dialogue between law and
psychiatry into a rigid constitutional mold.” Powell, 392
U. S., at 536–537. Or again: In a sphere of “fux and dis-
agreement,” with “fodder for reasonable debate about what
the cognate legal and medical tests should be,” due process
imposes no one view of legal insanity. Clark, 548 U. S., at
752–753. Defning the precise relationship between criminal
culpability and mental illness involves examining the work-
ings of the brain, the purposes of the criminal law, the ideas
of free will and responsibility. It is a project demanding
hard choices among values, in a context replete with uncer-
tainty, even at a single moment in time. And it is a project,
if any is, that should be open to revision over time, as new
medical knowledge emerges and as legal and moral norms
evolve. Which is all to say that it is a project for state gov-
ernance, not constitutional law.
We therefore decline to require that Kansas adopt an in-
sanity test turning on a defendant's ability to recognize that

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his crime was morally wrong. Contrary to Kahler's view,
Kansas
takes account of mental health at both trial and sen-
tencing. It has just not adopted the particular insanity
defense Kahler would like. That choice is for Kansas to
make—and, if it wishes, to remake and remake again as the
future unfolds. No insanity rule in this country's heritage
or history was ever so settled as to tie a State's hands centu-
ries later. For that reason, we affrm the judgment below.
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Ginsburg and
Justice Sotomayor join, dissenting.
Like the Court, I believe that the Constitution gives the
States broad leeway to defne state crimes and criminal pro-
cedures, including leeway to provide different defnitions and
standards related to the defense of insanity. But here, Kan-
sas has not simply redefned the insanity defense. Rather,
it has eliminated the core of a defense that has existed for
centuries: that the defendant, due to mental illness, lacked
the mental capacity necessary for his conduct to be consid-
ered morally blameworthy. Seven hundred years of Anglo-
American legal history, together with basic principles long
inherent in the nature of the criminal law itself, convince me
that Kansas' law “ `offends . . . principle[s] of justice so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental.' ” Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790, 798
(1952) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105
(1934)).
I
A much-simplifed example will help the reader under-
stand the conceptual distinction that is central to this case.
Consider two similar prosecutions for murder. In Prosecu-
tion One, the accused person has shot and killed another per-
son. The evidence at trial proves that, as a result of severe
mental illness, he thought the victim was a dog. Prosecu-

298 K
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tion Two is similar but for one thing: The evidence at trial
proves
that, as a result of severe mental illness, the defend-
ant thought that a dog ordered him to kill the victim.
Under the insanity defense as traditionally understood, the
government cannot convict either defendant. Under Kan-
sas' rule, it can convict the second but not the frst.
To put the matter in more explicitly legal terms, consider
the most famous statement of the traditional insanity de-
fense, that contained in M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200,
8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H. L. 1843). Lord Chief Justice Tindal,
speaking for a majority of the judges of the common-law
courts, described the insanity defense as follows:
“[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it
must be clearly proved that, at the time of the commit-
ting of the act, the party accused was labouring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, [1] as
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing; or, [2] if he did know it, that he did not know he
was doing what was wrong.” Id., at 210, 8 Eng. Rep.,
at 722.
The frst prong (sometimes referred to as “cognitive incapac-
ity”) asks whether the defendant knew what he was doing.
This prong corresponds roughly to the modern concept of
mens rea for many offenses. The second (sometimes re-
ferred to as “moral incapacity”) goes further. It asks, even
if the defendant knew what he was doing, did he have the
capacity to know that it was wrong? Applying this test to
my example, a court would fnd that both defendants success-
fully established an insanity defense. Prosecution One (he
thought the victim was a dog) falls within M'Naghten's frst
prong, while Prosecution Two (he thought the dog ordered
him to do it) falls within its second prong.
In Kansas' early years of statehood, its courts recognized
the M'Naghten test as the “cardinal rule of responsibility in
the criminal law.” State v. Nixon, 32 Kan. 205, 206, 4 P. 159,

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160 (1884). Kansas “steadfastly adhered to that test” for
more
than a century. State v. Baker, 249 Kan. 431, 449–450,
819 P. 2d 1173, 1187 (1991). But in 1995, Kansas “ `legisla-
tively abolish[ed] the insanity defense.' ” State v. Jorrick,
269 Kan. 72, 82, 4 P. 3d 610, 617 (2000) (quoting Rosen, Insan-
ity Denied: Abolition of the Insanity Defense in Kansas, 8
Kan. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 253, 254–255 (1997)). Under the new
provision, a criminal defendant's mental disease or defect is
relevant to his guilt or innocence only insofar as it shows
that he lacked the intent defned as an element of the offense,
or mens rea. If the defendant acted with the required level
of intent, then he has no defense based on mental illness.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21–5209 (2018 Cum. Supp.).
Under Kansas' changed law, the defendant in Prosecution
One could defend against the charge by arguing that his
mental illness prevented him from forming the mental state
required for murder (intentional killing of a human being)—
just as any defendant may attempt to rebut the State's prima
facie case for guilt. The defendant in Prosecution Two has
no defense. Because he acted with the requisite level of in-
tent, he must be convicted regardless of any role his mental
illness played in his conduct. See 307 Kan. 374, 401, 410
P. 3d 105, 125 (2018) (acknowledging that Kansas' mens rea
approach “allows conviction of an individual who had no ca-
pacity to know that what he or she was doing was wrong ”).
I do not mean to suggest that M'Naghten's particular ap-
proach to insanity is constitutionally required. As we have
said, “[h]istory shows no deference to M'Naghten.” Clark
v. Arizona, 548 U. S. 735, 749 (2006). M'Naghten's second
prong is merely one way of describing something more fun-
damental. Its basic insight is that mental illness may so
impair a person's mental capacities as to render him no more
responsible for his actions than a young child or a wild ani-
mal. Such a person is not properly the subject of the crimi-
nal law. As I shall explain in the following section, through-
out history, the law has attempted to embody this principle

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in a variety of ways. As a historical matter, M'Naghten is
by
far its most prominent expression, but not its exclusive
one. Other ways of capturing it may well emerge in the
future. The problem with Kansas' law is that it excises this
fundamental principle from its law entirely.
II
The Due Process Clause protects those “ `principle[s] of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our peo-
ple as to be ranked as fundamental.' ” Leland, 343 U. S., at
798. Our “primary guide” in determining whether a princi-
ple of justice ranks as fundamental is “historical practice.”
Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U. S. 37, 43 (1996) (plurality opin-
ion). The Court contends that the historical formulations of
the insanity defense were so diverse, so contested, as to
make it impossible to discern a unifed principle that Kansas'
approach offends. I disagree.
Few doctrines are as deeply rooted in our common-law
heritage as the insanity defense. Although English and
early American sources differ in their linguistic formulations
of the legal test for insanity, with striking consistency, they
all express the same underlying idea: A defendant who, due
to mental illness, lacks suffcient mental capacity to be held
morally responsible for his actions cannot be found guilty of
a crime. This principle remained embedded in the law even
as social mores shifted and medical understandings of mental
illness evolved. Early American courts incorporated it into
their jurisprudence. The States eventually codifed it in
their criminal laws. And to this day, the overwhelming ma-
jority of U. S. jurisdictions recognize insanity as an affrma-
tive defense that excuses a defendant from criminal liability
even where he was capable of forming the mens rea required
for the offense. See Appendix, infra.
A
Consider the established common-law background of the
insanity defense at and around the time the Framers wrote
the Constitution. The four preeminent common-law jurists,

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Bracton, Coke, Hale, and Blackstone, each linked criminality
to
the presence of reason, free will, and moral understanding.
It is “will and purpose,” wrote Henry de Bracton in his 13th-
century treatise, that “mark malefcia [misdeeds].” 2 Brac-
ton on Laws and Customs of England 384 (S. Thorne transl.
1968) (Bracton); Oxford Latin Dictionary 1067 (P. Glare ed.
1982). A “madman,” he explained, “can no more commit an
injuria [unlawful conduct] or a felony than a brute animal,
since they are not far removed from brutes.” 2 Bracton 424;
Oxford Latin Dictionary, at 914. Seizing on Bracton's re-
ference to “ brute anima ls” (sometimes translated “wild
beasts”), the Court concludes that Bracton's approach, like
Kansas', would excuse only those who lack capacity to form
any intention at all. See ante, at 287. But what does it
mean to be like a “brute animal”? A brute animal may well
and readily intend to commit a violent act without being able
to judge its moral nature. For example, when a lion stalks
and kills its prey, though it acts intentionally, it does not
offend against the criminal laws. See 2 Bracton 379 (noting
that “murder” is defned as “by the hand of man” to “distin-
guish it from the case of those slain or devoured by beasts
and animals which lack reason”).
Bracton's other references to “madmen” shed further light
on the meaning he attached to that term. Bracton de-
scribed such persons as “without sense and reason” and
“lack[ing] animus.” Id., at 324, 424. And he likened a “lu-
natic” to an “infant,” who cannot be held liable in damages
unless he “is capable of perceiving the wrongful character of
his act.” Id., at 324; see also 4 id., at 356 (“[I]n many ways
a minor and a madman are considered equals or not very
different, because they lack reason” (footnote omitted)).
Thus, Bracton's “brute animal” included those who lacked
the qualities of reason and judgment that make human be-
ings responsible moral agents. See Platt, The Origins and
Development of the “Wild Beast” Concept of Mental Illness
and Its Relation to Theories of Criminal Responsibility, 1
Issues in Crim. 1, 6 (1965).

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Breyer, J., dissenting
Leaving Bracton, let us turn to Sir Edward Coke, writing
i
n the early 17th century. Coke wrote that “the act and
wrong of a mad man shall not be imputed to him,” not be-
cause he could not engage in intentional conduct (the equiva-
lent of the modern concept of mens rea), but because he
lacked something more—“mind or discretion.” 2 Institutes
of the Laws of England § 405, p. 247b (1628). Coke, like
Bracton before him, likened a “mad man” to an “[i]nfant,”
who could not be punished as a criminal “untill he be of the
age of fourteene, which in Law is accounted the age of discre-
tion.” Ibid. What is it that the “[i]nfant” lacks? Since
long before Coke's time, English jurists and scholars believed
that it was the moral nature, not the physical nature, of an
act that a young child is unlikely to understand. See Platt &
Diamond, The Origins of the “Right and Wrong ” Test of
Criminal Responsibility and Its Subsequent Development in
the United States: An Historical Survey, 54 Cal. L. Rev. 1227,
1233–1234 (1966) (Platt & Diamond).
Sir Matthew Hale also premised criminal liability on the
presence of “understanding and liberty of will,” without
which “there can be no transgression, or just reason to incur
the penalty or sanction of that law instituted for the punish-
ment of the crimes or offenses.” 1 History of the Pleas of the
Crown, ch. 2, pp. 14–15 (1736). Hale, too, likened insane per-
sons to “infants” under the age of 14, who were subject to the
criminal laws only if they “had discretion to judge between
good and evil.” Id., ch. 3, at 26–27; id., ch. 4, at 30 (a person
who is “labouring under melancholy distempers hath yet ordi-
narily as great understanding, as ordinarily a child of fourteen
years hath, is such a person as may be guilty of treason or
felony”). Those suffering from “total insanity” could not be
guilty of capital offenses, “for they have not the use of under-
standing, and act not as reasonable creatures, but their ac-
tions are in effect in the condition of brutes.” Id., at 30–32.
Sir William Blackstone, whose infuence on the founding
generation was the most profound, was yet more explicit. A
criminal offense, he explained, requires both a “vitious will”

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and a “vitious act.” 4 Commentaries on the Laws of Eng-
land
21 (1769). Persons suffering from a “defciency in will”
arising from a “defective or vitiated understanding ” were
“not [criminally] chargeable for their own acts.” Id., at 24.
Citing Coke, he explained that murder must be “committed by
a person of sound memory and discretion” because a “lunatic
or infant” is “incapable of committing any crime, unless in
such cases where they shew a consciousness of doing wrong,
and of course a discretion, or discernment, between good and
evil.” Id., at 195–196 (emphasis deleted). And he opined
that deprivation of “the capacity of discerning right from
wrong ” is necessary “to form a legal excuse.” Id., at 189.
These four eminent jurists were not alone. Numerous
other commentators expressly linked criminal liability with
the accused's capacity for moral agency. William Lambard's
1581 treatise ranked a “mad man” as akin to a “childe” who
had “no knowledge of good nor evil.” Eirenarcha, ch. 21,
p. 218. If such a person killed a man, that is “no felonious
acte” because “they can[n]ot be said to have any understand-
ing wil[l].” Ibid. But if “upon examination” it appeared
that “they knew what they did, [and] it was ill, the[n]
seemeth it to be otherwise.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Mi-
chael Dalton's 1618 manual for justices of the peace in-
structed that “[i]f one that is Non compos mentis . . . kill a
man, this is no felonie; for they have no knowledge of good
and evill, nor can have a felonious intent, nor a will or mind
to do harme.” The Countrey Justice 215. William Haw-
kins, in 1716, wrote that “those who,” like “[l]unaticks,” are
“under a natural Disability of distinguishing between Good
and Evil . . . are not punishable by any criminal Prosecution
whatsoever.” 1 Pleas of the Crown § 1, p. 2; see also id., at
1 (“The Guilt of offending against any Law whatsoever . . .
can never justly be imputed to those who are either uncap-
able of understanding it, or of conforming themselves to it”).
English treatises on the law of mental disability adopted
the same view. George Collinson explained that “[t]o excuse
a man in the commission of a crime, he must at the period

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when he committed the offence, have been wholly incapable
of
distinguishing between good and evil, or of comprehending
the nature of what he is doing.” Treatise on the Law Con-
cerning Idiots, Lunatics, and Other Persons Non Compotes
Mentis § 7, p. 474 (1812) (Collinson); see also id., § 2, at 471
(“[A]n evil intention is implied in every offence, and consti-
tutes the charge of every indictment: but a non compos, not
having a will of his own, cannot have an intention morally
good or bad; so that the overt act by which alone the motives
of other men are discerned, with respect to him proves noth-
ing ”). Similarly, Leonard Shelford, summarizing English
case law, wrote that “[t]he essence of a crime consists in the
animus or intention of the person who commits it, considered
as a free agent, and in a capacity of distinguishing between
moral good and evil.” Practical Treatise on the Law Con-
cerning Lunatics, Idiots, and Persons of Unsound Mind 458
(1833) (emphasis deleted).
The majority believes that I am “cherry-pick[ing]” refer-
ences to moral understanding while ignoring references to
intent and mens rea. See ante, at 288–290, and nn. 8, 9.
With respect, I disagree. The Court points out, correctly,
that many of the common-law sources state that the insane
lack mens rea or felonious intent. But what did they mean
by that? At common law, the term mens rea ordinarily in-
corporated the notion of “general moral blameworthiness”
required for criminal punishment. Sayre, Mens Rea, 45
Harv. L. Rev. 974, 988 (1932); 3 Encyclopedia of Crime & Jus-
tice 995 (2d ed. 2002) (as used at common law, the term mens
rea “is synonymous with a person's blameworthiness”). The
modern meaning of mens rea is narrower and more technical.
Ibid. It refers to the “state of mind or inattention that,
together with its accompanying conduct, the criminal law
defnes as an offense.” Ibid. When common-law writers
speak of intent or mens rea, we cannot simply assume that
they use those terms in the modern sense. That is an anach-

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ronism. Instead, we must examine the context to under-
st
and what meaning they ascribed to those terms. And
when we do so, we see that, over and over again, they link
criminal intent to the presence of free will and moral under-
standing. The Court dismisses those passages as just “some
`good and evil' language.” Ante, at 289, n. 9. But it fails to
explain why, if mens rea in the modern sense were suffcient,
these common-law writers discuss the role of moral agency
at all, much less why such language appears in virtually
every treatise and virtually every case. In the Court's view,
all that is just spilled ink.
The English case law illustrates this point. In the semi-
nal case of Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (1724), the
defendant stood accused of shooting Lord Onslow while la-
boring under the insane delusion that Onslow had bewitched
him. Id., at 699, 721. The Court emphasizes Justice Tra-
cy's statement to the jury that if a man is “ `deprived of his
reason, and consequently of his intention, he cannot be
guilty,' ” concluding that the court adopted a modern mens
rea test. Ante, at 289. But in the passage immediately
preceding that statement, Justice Tracy explained that the
defendant's intent to shoot was clearly proved, and that the
only remaining question was whether his mental illness ex-
cused him from blame:
“That he shot, and that wilfully [is proved]: but whether
maliciously, that is the thing: that is the question;
whether this man hath the use of his reason and sense?
If he was under the visitation of God, and could not dis-
tinguish between good and evil, and did not know what
he did, though he committed the greatest offence, yet
he could not be guilty of any offence against any law
whatsoever; for guilt arises from the mind, and the
wicked will and intention of the man. If a man be de-
prived of his reason, and consequently of his intention,
he cannot be guilty; and if that be the case, though he

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had actually killed my lord Onslow, he is exempted from
punishment.
” 16 How. St. Tr., at 764 (emphasis added;
brackets in original).
See also ibid. (summarizing the testimony of one Mr. Coe,
who testifed that he went to the defendant three days after
the shooting “and asked him, If he intended to kill my lord
Onslow? and he said, Yes, to be sure”). On the next page,
Justice Tracy concluded that the jury must deter mi ne
whether the evidence “doth shew a man, who knew what he
was doing, and was able to distinguish whether he was doing
good or evil, and understood what he did.” Id., at 765.
Likewise, in the case of Rex v. Lord Ferrers, 19 How.
St. Tr. 886 (1760), the solicitor general instructed the mem-
bers of the House of Lords to consider the “ `capacity and
intention' ” of the accused, to be sure, ante, at 289, but what
did he mean by those terms? The ultimate question of in-
sanity, he explained, depended on the defendant's capacity at
the time of the offense to distinguish right from wrong:
“My lords, the question therefore must be asked; is the
noble prisoner at the bar to be acquitted from the guilt
of murder, on account of insanity? It is not pretended
to be a constant general insanity. Was he under the
power of it, at the time of the offence committed?
Could he, did he, at that time, distinguish between good
and evil?” 19 How. St. Tr., at 948.
In summation, the solicitor general argued that Lord Fer-
rers' own witnesses failed to provide any testimony “which
proves his lunacy or insanity at any time.” Id., at 952. Re-
viewing the pertinent evidence, he noted that one witness
testifed that he “had observed great oddities in my lord,”
but acknowledged that he “never saw him in such a situation,
as not to be capable of distinguishing between good and evil,
and not to know, that murder was a great crime.” Ibid.
Another admitted under questioning by the Lords that “he
thought lord Ferrers capable of distinguishing between

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mora l and i mmora l ac ti ons. ” Ib i d. The defendant's
brother
was the only witness to testify that “at particular
times, the noble lord might not be able to distinguish be-
tween moral good and evil,” but even he, the solicitor general
argued, had been unable to testify to “any instance within
his own recollection.” Id., at 953. If Lord Ferrers' bare
intention to kill were suffcient to convict, why the extensive
discussion of the evidence concerning his capacity for moral
understanding?
These examples refect the prevailing view of the law
around the time of the founding. Judges regularly in-
structed juries that the defendant's criminal liability de-
pended on his capacity for moral responsibility. See, e. g.,
Trial of Samuel Burt (July 19, 1786), in 6 Old Bailey Pro-
ceedings 875 (E. Hodgson ed. 1786) (to acquit based on insan-
ity, it must be shown that the mental disorder “takes away
from the party all moral agency and accountability,” and “de-
stroys in them, for the time at least, all power of judging
between right and wrong ”); Trial of Francis Parr (Jan. 15,
1787), 2 id., at 228 ( jury must “judge whether at the moment
of committing [the offense] he was not a moral agent, capable
of discerning between good and evil, and of knowing the con-
sequences of what he did”); Bowler's Case, 1 Collinson 673–
674, n. ( judge “concluded by observing to the jury, that it
was for them to determine whether the Prisoner, when he
committed the offence with which he stood charged, was or
was not incapable of distinguishing right from wrong ”).
The government's attorneys agreed that this was the proper
inquiry. See, e. g., Parker's Case, 1 id., at 479–480 (the At-
torney General argued that “the jury must be perfectly sat-
isfed, that at the time when the crime was committed, the
prisoner did not really know right from wrong ”).
In none of the common-law cases was the judge's reference
to the defendant's capacity for moral agency simply a proxy
for the narrow modern notion of mens rea. See ante, at 290.
Something more was required. Consider Bell ingham's

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Case, 1 Collinson 636. The defendant stood accused of the
murder
of Spencer Perceval, the Chancellor of the Exche-
quer, in the lobby of the House of Commons. Ibid. The
Court emphasizes Chief Justice Mansfeld's statement that
one who could not distinguish right from wrong “ `could have
no intention at all,' ” concluding that Chief Justice Mansfeld
viewed moral incapacity as a symptom of cognitive break-
down rather than a test of insanity. Ante, at 290. But, as
in Rex v. Arnold, see supra, at 305–306, the defendant's in-
tention to shoot Perceval was not seriously in dispute. 1
Collinson 670. Instead, his guilt or innocence turned on his
capacity for moral blame. The “single question” for the
jury, charged the Chief Justice, “was whether, when [the de-
fendant] committed the offence charged upon him, he had
suffcient understanding to distinguish good from evil, right
from wrong, and that murder was a crime not only against
the law of God, but against the law of his Country.” Id., at
673. Lord Lyndhurst, presiding over the case of Rex v. Of-
ford, 5 Car. & P. 168, 172 Eng. Rep. 924 (N. P. 1831), certainly
understood that inquiry to be the crux of Chief Justice Mans-
feld's charge. Citing Bellingham's Case, he instructed the
jury that “[t]he question was, did [the accused] know that he
was committing an offence against the laws of God and na-
ture?” 5 Car. & P., at 168, 172 Eng. Rep., at 925.
The Court dismisses other common-law cases as failing to
articulate a clear legal standard. See ante, at 290–291.
But these cases, too, required more than bare intent. In
Hadfeld's Case, 27 How. St. Tr. 1281 (1800), the defendant
was acquitted after the prosecution conceded that he was “in
a deranged state of mind” when he shot at King George III.
Id., at 1353. And in Regina v. Oxford, 9 Car. & P. 525, 173
Eng. Rep. 941 (N. P. 1840), the court observed that a “person
may commit a criminal act, and yet not be responsible.” Id.,
at 546, 173 Eng. Rep., at 950. Although it acknowledged the
diffculty of “lay[ing] down the rule of the English law on the
subject,” it summed up the inquiry as “whether the prisoner

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Breyer, J., dissenting
was labouring under that species of insanity which satisfes
you
that he was quite unaware of the nature, character, and
consequences of the act he was committing, or, in other
words, whether he was under the infuence of a diseased
mind, and was really unconscious at the time he was commit-
ting the act, that it was a crime.” Id., at 546–547, 173 Eng.
Rep., at 950. Although these and other English cases dis-
cuss insanity in terms that are less precise than our modern
taxonomy of mental states, their lesson is clear. To be
guilty of a crime, the accused must have something more
than bare ability to form intentions and carry them out.
B
These fundamental principles of criminal responsibility
were incorporated into American law from the early days of
the Republic. Early American commentaries on the crimi-
nal law generally consisted of abridgments of the works of
prominent English jurists. As early as 1792, one such
abridgment instructed that “lunaticks, who are under a natu-
ral disability of distinguishing between good and evil are not
punishable by any criminal prosecution.” R. Burn, Abridg-
ment, or the American Justice 300; see also W. Stubbs,
Crown Circuit Companion 288 (1st Am. ed. 1816) (“If one
that is non compos mentis . . . kill a man, this is no felony;
for they have not knowledge of good and evil, nor can have
a felonious intent, nor a will or mind to do harm”). And an
infuential founding-era legal dictionary described the “gen-
eral rule” that lunatics, “being by reason of their natural
disabilities incapable of judging between good and evil, are
punishable by no criminal prosecution whatsoever.” 2 T.
Cunningham, New and Complete Law Dictionary (2d corr.
ed. 1771). Similarly, the frst comprehensive American text
on forensic medicine, published in 1823, cited Chief Justice
Mansfeld's charge to the jury in Bellingham's Case for the
proposition that “[s]o long as they could distinguish good
from evil, so long would they be answerable for their con-

310 K
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duct.” 1 T. Beck, Elements of Medical Jurisprudence 369.
These
principles, it concluded, “are doubtless correct, and
conducive to the ends of justice.” Id., at 370.
Early American jurists closely hewed to these principles.
In case after case, judges instructed juries that they must
inquire into the defendant's capacity for moral understand-
ing. See, e. g., Meriam's Case, 7 Mass. 168 (1810), 6 N. Y.
City-Hall Recorder 162 (1822) (whether the defendant was
“at the time, capable of distinguishing good from evil”);
Clark's Case, 1 N. Y. City-Hall Recorder 176, 177 (1816)
(same); Ball's Case, 2 N. Y. City-Hall Recorder 85, 86 (1817)
(same); United States v. Clarke, 25 F. Cas. 454 (No. 14,811)
(CC DC 1818) (whether defendant was “in such a state of
mental insanity . . . as not to have been conscious of the
moral turpitude of the act”); Cornwell v. State, 8 Tenn. 147,
155 (1827) (whether the prisoner “had not suffcient under-
standing to know right from wrong ”).
C
As the foregoing demonstrates, by the time the House of
Lords articulated the M'Naghten test in 1843, its “essential
concept and phraseology” were “already ancient and thor-
oughly embedded in the law.” Platt & Diamond 1258; see
also 1 W. Russell, Crimes and Misdemeanors 8–14 (3d ed.
1843) (summarizing the pre-M'Naghten English case law and
concluding that the key questions were whether “there be
thought and design, a faculty to distinguish the nature of
actions, [and] to discern the difference between moral good
and evil”). Variations on the M'Naghten rules soon became
the predominant standard in the existing States of the
United States. Platt & Diamond 1257. That tradition has
continued, almost without exception, to the present day.
It is true that, even following M'Naghten, States continued
to experiment with different formulations of the insanity de-
fense. See ante, at 291–292. Some adopted the volitional
incapacity, or “irresistible-impulse,” test. But those States

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understood that innovation to expand, not contract, the scope
of
the insanity defense, excusing not only defendants who
met some variant of the traditional M'Naghten test but also
those who understood that their conduct was wrong but were
incapable of restraint. See, e. g., Parsons v. State, 81 Ala.
577, 584–585, 2 So. 854, 858–859 (1887); Bradley v. State, 31
Ind. 492, 507–508 (1869); State v. Felter, 25 Iowa 67, 82–83
(1868); Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 385, 391–392 (1863).
So too, the “offspring ” or “product” test, which asks
whether the defendant's conduct was attributable to mental
disease or defect. The States that adopted this test did so
out of the conviction that the M'Naghten test was too restric-
tive in its approach to assessing the accused's capacity for
criminal responsibility. See Durham v. United States, 214
F. 2d 862, 874 (CADC 1954) (“We conclude that a broader
test should be adopted”); State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399, 441–
442 (1870); see also Reid, Understanding the New Hampshire
Doctrine of Criminal Insanity, 69 Yale L. J. 367, 386 (1960)
(“[T]he New Hampshire doctrine . . . is more liberal and has
a wider range than M'Naghten rules”). Even as States ex-
perimented with broader insanity rules, they retained the
core of the traditional common-law defense.
In the early 20th century, several States attempted to
break with that tradition. The high courts of those States
quickly struck down their restrictive laws. As one justice
of the Mississippi Supreme Court wrote in 1931: The “com-
mon law proceeds upon an idea that before there can be a
crime there must be an intelligence capable of comprehend-
ing the act prohibited, and the probable consequence of the
act, and that the act is wrong.” Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss.
142, 158, 132 So. 581, 583 (Ethridge, J., concurring). Accord-
ingly, Justice Ethridge said, insanity “has always been a
complete defense to all crimes from the earliest ages of the
common law.” Ibid.; State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 116,
110 P. 1020, 1022–1023 (1910); cf. State v. Lange, 168 La. 958,
965, 123 So. 639, 642 (1929).

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Today, 45 States, the Federal Government, and the Dis-
tr
ict of Columbia continue to recognize an insanity defense
that retains some inquiry into the blameworthiness of the
accused. Seventeen States and the Federal Government use
variants of the M'Naghten test, with its alternative cognitive
and moral incapacity prongs. Three States have adopted
M'Naghten plus the volitional test. Ten States recognize a
defense based on moral incapacity alone. Thirteen States
and the District of Columbia have adopted variants of the
Model Penal Code test, which combines volitional incapacity
with an expanded version of moral incapacity. See Appendix,
infra. New Hampshire alone continues to use the “product”
test, asking whether “a mental disease or defect caused the
charged conduct.” State v. Fichera, 153 N. H. 588, 593,
903 A. 2d 1030, 1035 (2006). This broad test encompasses
“ `whether the defendant knew the difference between right
and wrong and whether the defendant acted impulsively,' ” as
well as “ `whether the defendant was suffering from delusions
or hallucinations.' ” State v. Cegelis, 138 N. H. 249, 255, 638
A. 2d 783, 786 (1994). And North Dakota uses a unique for-
mulation that asks whether the defendant “lacks substantial
capacity to comprehend the harmful nature or consequences
of the conduct, or the conduct is the result of a loss or serious
distortion of the individual's capacity to recognize reality.”
N. D. Cent. Code Ann. § 12.1–04.1–01(1) (2012).
Of the States that have adopted the M'Naghten or Model
Penal Code tests, some interpret knowledge of wrongfulness
to refer to moral wrong, whereas others hold that it means
legal wrong. See ante, at 274–276, 293–295. While there is,
of course, a logical distinction between those interpretations,
there is no indication that it makes a meaningful difference
in practice. The two inquiries are closely related and excuse
roughly the same universe of defendants. See State v. Wor-
lock, 117 N. J. 596, 609–611, 569 A. 2d 1314, 1321–1322 (1990)
(“In most instances, legal wrong is coextensive with moral

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Breyer, J., dissenting
wrong ”); State v. Crenshaw, 98 Wash. 2d 789, 799, 659 P. 2d
488,
494 (1983) (“ `[S]ince by far the vast majority of cases in
which insanity is pleaded as a defense to criminal prosecu-
tions involves acts which are universally recognized as mor-
ally wicked as well as illegal, the hair-splitting distinction
between legal and moral wrong need not be given much at-
tention' ”); People v. Schmidt, 216 N. Y. 324, 340, 110 N. E.
945, 949 (1915) (Cardozo, J.) (“Knowledge that an act is for-
bidden by law will in most cases permit the inference of
knowledge that, according to the accepted standards of man-
kind, it is also condemned as an offense against good mor-
als”); see also ALI, Model Penal Code § 4.01, Explanatory
Note, p. 164 (1985) (explaining that “few cases are likely to
arise in which the variation will be determinative”).
III
A
Consider the basic reason that underlies and explains this
long legal tradition. That reason reveals that more is at
stake than its duration alone. The tradition refects the fact
that a community's moral code informs its criminal law. As
Henry Hart stated it, the very defnition of crime is conduct
that merits “a formal and solemn pronouncement of the
moral condemnation of the community.” The Aims of the
Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401, 405 (1958).
The criminal law does not adopt, nor does it perfectly
track, moral law. It is no defense simply to claim that one's
criminal conduct was morally right. But the criminal law
nonetheless tries in various ways to prevent the distance be-
tween criminal law and morality from becoming too great.
In the words of Justice Holmes, a law that “punished conduct
[that] would not be blameworthy in the average member of
the community would be too severe for that community to
bear.” O. Holmes, The Common Law 50 (1881); see also
ibid. (“[T]o deny that criminal liability . . . is founded on

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blameworthiness . . . would shock the moral sense of any
civ
ilized community”).
Sometimes the criminal law seeks to keep its strictures
roughly in line with the demands of morality through grants
of discretion that will help it to reach appropriate results in
individual cases, including special instances where the law
points one way and morality the other. Thus, prosecutors
need not prosecute. Jurors (however instructed) may de-
cide to acquit. Judges may exercise the discretion the law
allows them to impose a lenient sentence. Executives may
grant clemency.
And sometimes the law attempts to maintain this balance
by developing and retaining a “collection of interlocking and
overlapping concepts,” including defenses, that will help “as-
sess the moral accountability of an individual for his antiso-
cial deeds.” Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514, 535–536 (1968)
(plurality opinion). These concepts and defenses include
“actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justifcation, and
duress.” Id., at 536.
As we have recognized, the “process of adjustment” within
and among these overlapping legal concepts “has always
been thought to be the province of the States.” Ibid. Mat-
ters of degree, specifc content, and aptness of application all
may be, and have always been, the subject of legal dispute.
But the general purpose—to ensure a rough congruence be-
tween the criminal law and widely accepted moral senti-
ments—persists. To gravely undermine the insanity de-
fense is to pose a signifcant obstacle to this basic objective.
The majority responds that Kansas has not removed the
element of blameworthiness from its treatment of insanity;
it has simply made a different judgment about what conduct
is blameworthy. See ante, at 286, n. 7. That is not how the
Kansas Supreme Court has characterized its law. See State
v. Bethel, 275 Kan. 456, 472, 66 P. 3d 840, 850 (2003) (holding
that Kansas law provides for “no consideration,” at the guilt
phase, “of whether wrongfulness was inherent in the defend-

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Breyer, J., dissenting
ant's intent”). In any event, as the Court acknowledges, the
St
ates' discretion in this area must be constrained within
“broad limits,” ante, at 280, which are derived from history
and tradition. The question is whether Kansas' approach
transgresses those limits. I doubt that the Court would de-
clare, for example, that a State may do away with the de-
fenses of duress or self-defense on the ground that, in its
idiosyncratic judgment, they are not required. With respect
to the defense of insanity, I believe that our history shows
clearly that the criminal law has always required a higher
degree of individual culpability than the modern concept of
mens rea. See Part II, supra. And in my view, Kansas' de-
parture from this long uniform tradition poses a serious
problem.
B
To see why Kansas' departure is so serious, go back to our
two simplifed prosecutions: the frst of the defendant who,
because of serious mental illness, believes the victim is a dog;
the second of a defendant who, because of serious mental
illness, believes the dog commanded him to kill the victim.
Now ask, what moral difference exists between the defend-
ants in the two examples? Assuming equivalently convinc-
ing evidence of mental illness, I can fnd none at all. In both
cases, the defendants differ from ordinary persons in ways
that would lead most of us to say that they should not be
held morally responsible for their acts. I cannot fnd one
defendant more responsible than the other. And for centu-
ries, neither has the law.
More than that, scholars who have studied this subject tell
us that examples of the frst kind are rare. See Brief for 290
Criminal Law and Mental Health Law Professors as Amici
Curiae 12. Others repeat this claim. See Slobogin, An
End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in
Criminal Cases, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1199, 1205 (2000); Morse, Men-
tal Disorder and Criminal Law, 101 J. Crim. L. & C. 885,
933 (2011). That is because mental illness typically does not

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deprive individuals of the ability to form intent. Rather, it
affec
ts their motivations for forming such intent. Brief for
290 Criminal Law and Mental Health Law Professors as
Amici Curiae 12. For example, the American Psychiatric
Association tells us that individuals suffering from mental
illness may experience delusions—erroneous perceptions of
the outside world held with strong conviction. They may
believe, incorrectly, that others are threatening them harm
(persecutory delusions), that God has commanded them to
engage in certain conduct (religious delusions), or that they
or others are condemned to a life of suffering (depressive
delusions). Brief for American Psychiatric Association
et al. as Amici Curiae 25–26. Such delusions may, in some
cases, lead the patient to behave violently. Id., at 28. But
they likely would not interfere with his or her perception in
such a way as to negate mens rea. See H. R. Rep. No. 98–
577, p. 15, n. 23 (1984) (“Mental illness rarely, if ever, renders
a person incapable of understanding what he or she is doing.
Mental illness does not, for example, alter the perception of
shooting a person to that of shooting a tree”).
Kansas' abolition of the second part of the M'Naghten test
requires conviction of a broad swath of defendants who are
obviously insane and would be adjudged not guilty under any
traditional form of the defense. This result offends deeply
entrenched and widely recognized moral principles under-
pinning our criminal laws. See, e. g., National Comm'n on
Reform of Fed. Crim. Laws, Final Report, Proposed New
Fed. Crim. Code § 503, pp. 40–41 (1971) (to attribute guilt
to a “manifestly psychotic person” would “be immoral and
inconsistent with the aim of a criminal code”); H. R. Rep.
No. 98–577, at 7–8 (“[T]he abolition of the affrmative insan-
ity defense would alter that fundamental basis of Anglo-
American criminal law: the existence of moral culpability as
a prerequisite for punishment”); ABA Criminal Justice Men-
tal Health Standards § 7–6.1, pp. 336–338 (1989) (rejecting
the mens rea approach “out of hand” as “a jarring reversal of

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hundreds of years of moral and legal history” that “inhibits
i
f not prevents the exercise of humane judgment that has
distinguished our criminal law heritage”).
By contrast, the rule adopted by some States that a de-
fendant must be acquitted if he was unable to appreciate the
legal wrongfulness of his acts, see ante, at 293–295, would
likely lead to acquittal in the mine run of such cases. See
supra, at 312–313. If that is so, then that rule would not
pose the same due process problem as Kansas' approach.
That issue is not before us, as Kansas' law does not provide
even that protection to mentally ill defendants.
C
Kansas and the Solicitor General, in their efforts to justify
Kansas' change, make four important arguments. First,
they point to cases in this Court in which we have said that
the States have broad leeway in shaping the insanity de-
fense. See Leland, 343 U. S. 790; Clark, 548 U. S. 735. In
Leland, we rejected the defendant's argument that the Con-
stitution required the adoption of the “ `irresistible impulse' ”
test. 343 U. S., at 800–801. Similarly, in Clark, we upheld
Arizona's effort to eliminate the frst part of the M'Naghten
rule, applicable to defendants whose mental illness deprived
them of the ability to know the “ `nature and quality of the
act,' ” 548 U. S., at 747–748. If Arizona can eliminate the
frst prong of M'Naghten, Kansas asks, why can Kansas not
eliminate the second part?
The answer to this question lies in the fact that Arizona,
while amending the insanity provisions of its criminal code,
did not in practice eliminate the traditional insanity defense
in any signifcant part. See 548 U. S., at 752, n. 20 (reserv-
ing the question whether “the Constitution mandates an in-
sanity defense”). As we pointed out, “cognitive incapacity
is itself enough to demonstrate moral incapacity.” Id., at
753. Evidence that the defendant did not know what he was
doing would also tend to establish that he did not know that

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it was wrong. Id., at 753–754. And Prosecution One (he
thought
the victim was a dog) would still fail. The ability
of the States to refuse to adopt other insanity tests, such as
the “irresistible impulse” test or the “product of mental ill-
ness” test are also beside the point. See Leland, 343 U. S.,
at 800–801. Those tests both expand upon M'Naghten's
principles. Their elimination would cut the defense back to
what it traditionally has been, not, as here, eliminate its
very essence.
Second, the United States as amicus curiae suggests that
the insanity defense is simply too diffcult for juries to ad-
minister. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12–13.
Without doubt, assessing the defendant's claim of insanity is
diffcult. That is one reason I believe that States must re-
main free to refne and redefne their insanity rules within
broad bounds. But juries have been making that determi-
nation for centuries and continue to do so in 45 States. And
I do not see how an administrative diffculty can justify abol-
ishing the heart of the defense.
Third, Kansas argues that it has not abolished the insanity
defense or any signifcant part of it. It has simply moved
the stage at which a defendant can present the full range of
mental-capacity evidence to sentencing. See Brief for Re-
spondent 8; ante, at 277. But our tradition demands that an
insane defendant should not be found guilty in the frst place.
Moreover, the relief that Kansas offers, in the form of sen-
tencing discretion and the possibility of commitment in lieu
of incarceration, is a matter of judicial discretion, not of right.
See State v. Maestas, 298 Kan. 765, 316 P. 3d 724 (2014).
The insane defendant is, under Kansas law, exposed to harsh
criminal sanctions up to and including death. And Kansas'
sentencing provisions do nothing to alleviate the stigma and
the collateral consequences of a criminal conviction.
Finally, Kansas argues that the insane, provided they are
capable of intentional action, are culpable and should be held
liable for their antisocial conduct. Brief for Respondent 40.
To say this, however, is simply to restate the conclusion for

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Appendix to opinion of Breyer, J.
M'Naghten Plus Volitional Incapacity
State Text
Georgia “A person shall not be found guilty of a crime if, at the time of
the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime, the person
did not have mental capacity to distinguish between right and
wrong in relation to such act, omission, or negligence.” Ga. Code
Ann. § 16–3–2 (2019).
“A person shall not be found guilty of a crime when, at the time
of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime, the per-
son, because of mental disease, injury, or congenital defciency, act-
ed as he did because of a delusional compulsion as to such act
which overmastered his will to resist committing the crime.”
§ 16–3–3.
New “In order to support a verdict of insanity under the M'Naghten
Mexico test, the jury must be satisfed that the defendant (1) did not know
the
nature and quality of the act or (2) did not know that it was
wrong. This rule prevailed in New Mexico until 1954 when this
court in State v. White, 56 N. M. 324, 270 P. 2d 727 (1954) made a
careful analysis of the authorities and made a limited extension of
the M'Naghten rule, adding a third ingredient. The court held
that if the accused, (3) as a result of disease of the mind `was
incapable of preventing himself from committing ' the crime, he
could be adjudged insane and thereby relieved of legal responsibil-
ity for what would otherwise be a criminal act.” State v. Hartley,
90 N. M. 488, 490, 565 P. 2d 658, 660 (1977).
Virginia “As applied in Virginia, the defense of insanity provides that a
defendant may prove that at the time of the commission of the act,
he was suffering from a mental disease or defect such that he did
not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he
did know it, he did not know what he was doing was wrong. . . .
In addition, we have approved in appropriate cases the granting
of an instruction defning an `irresistible impulse' as a form of legal
insanity. The irresistible impulse doctrine is applicable only to
that class of cases where the accused is able to understand the
nature and consequences of his act and knows it is wrong, but his
mind has become so impaired by disease that he is totally deprived
of the mental power to control or restrain his act.” Orndorff v.
Commonwealth, 279 Va. 597, 601, n. 5, 691 S. E. 2d 177, 179, n. 5
(2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Moral Incapacity
State Text
Arizona “A person may be found guilty except insane if at the time of
the commission of the criminal act the person was afficted with
a mental disease or defect of such severity that the person did
not know the criminal act was wrong.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 13–502(A) (2010).
Delaware “In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affrmative defense
that, at the time of the conduct charged, as a result of mental
illness or serious mental disorder, the accused lacked substantial
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the accused's conduct.”
Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 401(a) (2015).

OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
327
Syllabus
COMCAST CORP. v. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
AFRICAN
AMERICAN-OWNED MEDIA et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 18–1171. Argued November 13, 2019—Decided March 23, 2020
Entertainment Studios Network (ESN), an African-American-owned
television-network operator, sought to have cable television conglomer-
ate Comcast Corporation carry its channels. Comcast refused, citing
lack of programming demand, bandwidth constraints, and a preference
for programming not offered by ESN. ESN and the National Associa-
tion of African American-Owned Media (collectively, ESN) sued, alleg-
ing that Comcast's behavior violated 42 U. S. C. § 1981, which guarantees
“[a]ll persons . . . the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts
. . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” The District Court dismissed the
complaint for failing plausibly to show that, but for racial animus, Com-
cast would have contracted with ESN. The Ninth Circuit reversed,
holding that ESN needed only to plead facts plausibly showing that race
played “some role” in the defendant's decisionmaking process and that,
under this standard, ESN had pleaded a viable claim.
Held: A § 1981 plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the plaintiff 's
race was a but-for cause of its injury, and that burden remains constant
over the life of the lawsuit. Pp. 331–341.
(a) To prevail, a tort plaintiff typically must prove but-for causation.
See University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570
U. S. 338, 347. Normally, too, the essential elements of a claim remain
constant throughout the lawsuit. See, e. g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life, 504 U. S. 555, 561. ESN suggests that § 1981 creates an exception
to one or both of these general principles, either because a § 1981 plain-
tiff only bears the burden of showing that race was a “motivating factor”
in the defendant's challenged decision or because, even when but-for
causation applies at trial, a plausible “motivating factor” showing is all
that is necessary to overcome a motion to dismiss at the pleading stage.
Pp. 331–341.
(1) Several clues, taken collectively, make clear that § 1981 follows
the usual rules. The statute's text suggests but-for causation: An ordi-
nary English speaker would not say that a plaintiff did not enjoy the
“same right” to make contracts “as is enjoyed by white citizens” if race
was not a but-for cause affecting the plaintiff 's ability to contract. Nor

328 COMCAST
CORP. v. NATIONAL ASSN. OF AFRICAN
AMERICAN-OWNED MEDIA
Syllabus
does the text suggest that the test should be different in the face of a
moti
on to dismiss. The larger structure and history of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 provide further clues. When enacted, § 1981 did not provide
a private enforcement mechanism for violations. That right was judi-
cially created, see Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S.
454, 459, but even in that era, the Court usually insisted that the legal
elements of implied causes of action be at least as demanding as those
found in analogous statutory causes of action. That rule supplies useful
guidance here, where a neighboring section of the 1866 Act uses the
terms “on account of ” and “by reason of,” § 2, 14 Stat. 27—phrases often
held to indicate but-for causation—and gives no hint that a different
rule might apply at different times in the life of a lawsuit. Another
provision provides that in cases not provided for by the Act, the common
law shall govern, § 3, ibid., which in 1866, usually treated a showing of
but-for causation as a prerequisite to a tort suit. This Court's prece-
dents confrm what the statute's language and history indicate. See,
e. g., Johnson, 421 U. S., at 459–460; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60,
78–79. Pp. 333–336.
(2) ESN urges applying the “motivating factor” causation test in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to § 1981 cases. But this Court
has already twice rejected such efforts in other contexts, see, e. g., Gross
v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U. S. 167, and there is no reason
to think it would ft any better here. Moreover, when that test was
added to Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress also
amended § 1981 without mentioning “motivating factors.” Even if ESN
is correct that those amendments clarifed that § 1981 addresses not just
contractual outcomes but the whole contracting process, its claim that a
process-oriented right necessarily pairs with a motivating factor causal
standard is mistaken. The burden-shifting framework of McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, also supplies no support for the
innovations ESN seeks. Pp. 336–341.
(b) The court of appeals should determine in the frst instance how
the operative amended complaint in this case fares under the proper
standard. P. 341.
743 Fed. Appx. 106, vacated and remanded.
Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh,
JJ., joined, and in which Ginsburg, J., joined except for the footnote.
Ginsburg, J., fled an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, post, p. 341.

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329
Opinion of the Court
Miguel A. Estrada argued the cause for petitioner. With
h
im on the briefs were Thomas G. Hungar, Jesse A. Cripps,
and Bradley J. Hamburger.
Morgan L. Ratner argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging vacatur. With her on the brief
were Solicitor General Francisco, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Hunt, Deputy Solicitor General Wall, Marleigh D.
Dover, and Stephanie R. Marcus.
Erwin Chemerinsky argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief were Louis R. Miller, J. Mira Hash-
mall, and David W. Schecter.*
Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court.
Few legal principles are better established than the rule
requiring a plaintiff to establish causation. In the law of
torts, this usually means a plaintiff must frst plead and then
prove that its injury would not have occurred “but for” the
defendant's unlawful conduct. The plaintiffs before us sug-
gest that 42 U. S. C. § 1981 departs from this traditional ar-
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Center for
Workplace Compliance by Rae T. Vann; for the Chamber of Commerce of
the United States of America et al. by Gregory G. Garre, Benjamin W.
Snyder, Daryl Joseffer, Karen R. Harned, Elizabeth Milito, and Fran-
cisco Negrón, Jr.; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Richard
A. Samp.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for Employment
Law Professors by Sandra F. Sperino, Sachin S. Pandya, and Deborah A.
Widiss, all pro se; for the Issues4Life Foundation by Catherine W. Short;
for Law and History Professors by Eugene R. Fidell; for the Lawyer's
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Michael L. Foreman,
Kristen Clarke, Jon Greenbaum, Dariely Rodriguez, and Phylicia H.
Hill; for Members of Congress by Elizabeth B. Wydra and Brianne J.
Gorod; for NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., et al. by
Sherrilyn A. Ifll, Janai S. Nelson, Samuel Spital, Jin Hee Lee, Kristen
A. Johnson, and J. Zachery Morris; and for W. Burlette Carter by
Ms. Carter, pro se.
Paul Hoffman fled a brief for Tort Scholars as amici curiae.

330 COMCAST
CORP. v. NATIONAL ASSN. OF AFRICAN
AMERICAN-OWNED MEDIA
Opinion of the Court
rangement. But looking to this particular statute's text and
h
istory, we see no evidence of an exception.
I
This case began after negotiations between two media
companies failed. African-American entrepreneur Byron
Allen owns Entertainment Studios Network (ESN), the op-
erator of seven television networks—Justice Central.TV,
Comedy.TV, ES.TV, Pets.TV, Recipe.TV, MyDestination.TV,
and Cars.TV. For years, ESN sought to have Comcast, one
of the Nation's largest cable television conglomerates, carry
its channels. But Comcast refused, citing lack of demand
for ESN's programming, bandwidth constraints, and its pref-
erence for news and sports programming that ESN didn't
offer.
With bargaining at an impasse, ESN sued. Seeking bil-
lions in damages, the company alleged that Comcast system-
atically disfavored “100% African American-owned media
companies.” ESN didn't dispute that, during negotiations,
Comcast had offered legitimate business reasons for refusing
to carry its channels. But, ESN contended, these reasons
were merely pretextual. To help obscure its true discrimi-
natory intentions and win favor with the Federal Communi-
cations Commission, ESN asserted, Comcast paid civil rights
groups to advocate publicly on its behalf. As relevant here,
ESN alleged that Comcast's behavior violated 42 U. S. C.
§ 1981(a), which guarantees, among other things, “[a]ll per-
sons . . . the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts
. . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”
Much motions practice followed. Comcast sought to dis-
miss ESN's complaint, and eventually the district court
agreed, holding that ESN's pleading failed to state a claim
as a matter of law. The district court twice allowed ESN a
chance to remedy its complaint's defciencies by identifying
additional facts to support its case. But each time, the court

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331
Opinion of the Court
concluded, ESN's efforts fell short of plausibly showing that,
but
for racial animus, Comcast would have contracted with
ESN. After three rounds of pleadings, motions, and dis-
missals, the district court decided that further amendments
would prove futile and entered a fnal judgment for Comcast.
The Ninth Circuit reversed. As that court saw it, the dis-
trict court used the wrong causation standard when assess-
ing ESN's pleadings. A § 1981 plaintiff doesn't have to point
to facts plausibly showing that racial animus was a “but for”
cause of the defendant's conduct. Instead, the Ninth Circuit
held, a plaintiff must only plead facts plausibly showing that
race played “some role” in the defendant's decisionmaking
process. 743 Fed. Appx. 106, 107 (2018); see also National
Assn. of African American-Owned Media v. Charter Com-
munications, Inc., 915 F. 3d 617, 626 (CA9 2019) (describing
the test as whether “discriminatory intent play[ed] any
role”). And under this more forgiving causation standard,
the court continued, ESN had pleaded a viable claim.
Other circuits dispute the Ninth Circuit's understanding of
§ 1981. Like the district court in this case, for example, the
Seventh Circuit has held that “to be actionable, racial preju-
dice must be a but-for cause . . . of the refusal to transact.”
Bachman v. St. Monica's Congregation, 902 F. 2d 1259, 1262–
1263 (1990). To resolve the disagreement among the circuits
over § 1981's causation requirement, we agreed to hear this
case. 587 U. S. 1051 (2019).
II
It is “textbook tort law” that a plaintiff seeking redress
for a defendant's legal wrong typically must prove but-for
causation. University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center
v. Nassar, 570 U. S. 338, 347 (2013) (citing W. Keeton,
D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on
Law of Torts 265 (5th ed. 1984)). Under this standard, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that, but for the defendant's un-
lawful conduct, its alleged injury would not have occurred.

332 COMCAST
CORP. v. NATIONAL ASSN. OF AFRICAN
AMERICAN-OWNED MEDIA
Opinion of the Court
This ancient and simple “but for” common law causation test,
we
have held, supplies the “default” or “background” rule
against which Congress is normally presumed to have legis-
lated when creating its own new causes of action. 570 U. S.,
at 346–347 (citing Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v.
Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 711 (1978)). That includes when it
comes to federal antidiscrimination laws like § 1981. See
570 U. S., at 346–347 (Title VII retaliation); Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc., 557 U. S. 167, 176–177 (2009) (Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967).
Normally, too, the essential elements of a claim remain
constant through the life of a lawsuit. What a plaintiff must
do to satisfy those elements may increase as a case pro-
gresses from complaint to trial, but the legal elements them-
selves do not change. So, to determine what the plaintiff
must plausibly allege at the outset of a lawsuit, we usually
ask what the plaintiff must prove in the trial at its end. See,
e. g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 561 (1992);
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U. S. 336, 346–
347 (2005); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 678–679 (2009).
ESN doesn't seriously dispute these general principles.
Instead, it suggests § 1981 creates an exception to one or
both of them. At times, ESN seems to argue that a § 1981
plaintiff only bears the burden of showing that race was a
“motivating factor” in the defendant's challenged decision,
not a but-for cause of its injury. At others, ESN appears
to concede that a § 1981 plaintiff does have to prove but-for
causation at trial, but contends the rules should be different
at the pleading stage. According to this version of ESN's
argument, a plaintiff should be able to overcome at least a
motion to dismiss if it can allege facts plausibly showing that
race was a “motivating factor” in the defendant's decision.
ESN admits this arrangement would allow some claims to
proceed past the pleading stage that are destined to fail later
as a matter of law. Still, the company insists, that is what
the statute demands.

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333
Opinion of the Court
A
W
e don't doubt that most rules bear their exceptions.
But, taken collectively, clues from the statute's text, its his-
tory, and our precedent persuade us that § 1981 follows the
general rule. Here, a plaintiff bears the burden of showing
that race was a but-for cause of its injury. And, while the
materials the plaintiff can rely on to show causation may
change as a lawsuit progresses from fling to judgment, the
burden itself remains constant.
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in the after-
math of the Civil War to vindicate the rights of former
slaves. Section 1 of that statute included the language
found codifed today in § 1981(a), promising that “[a]ll persons
. . . shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce con-
tracts, to sue, be parties, [and] give evidence . . . as is enjoyed
by white citizens.” 42 U. S. C. § 1981; Civil Rights Act of
1866, 14 Stat. 27.
While the statute's text does not expressly discuss causa-
tion, it is suggestive. The guarantee that each person is
entitled to the “same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens” directs our attention to the counterfactual—what
would have happened if the plaintiff had been white? This
focus fts naturally with the ordinary rule that a plaintiff
must prove but-for causation. If the defendant would have
responded the same way to the plaintiff even if he had been
white, an ordinary speaker of English would say that the
plaintiff received the “same” legally protected right as a
white person. Conversely, if the defendant would have re-
sponded differently but for the plaintiff 's race, it follows that
the plaintiff has not received the same right as a white per-
son. Nor does anything in the statute signal that this test
should change its stripes (only) in the face of a motion to
dismiss.
The larger structure and history of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 provide further clues. Nothing in the Act specifcally
authorizes private lawsuits to enforce the right to contract.

334 COMCAST
CORP. v. NATIONAL ASSN. OF AFRICAN
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Opinion of the Court
Instead, this Court created a judicially implied private right
of
action, defnitively doing so for the frst time in 1975. See
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 459
(1975); see also Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 491
U. S. 701, 720 (1989). That was during a period when the
Court often “assumed it to be a proper judicial function
to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective
a statute's purpose.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U. S. 120, 132
(2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). With the pas-
sage of time, of course, we have come to appreciate that,
“[l]ike substantive federal law itself, private rights of action
to enforce federal law must be created by Congress” and
“[r]aising up causes of action where a statute has not created
them may be a proper function for common-law courts, but
not for federal tribunals.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S.
275, 286–287 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Yet, even in the era when this Court routinely implied causes
of action, it usually insisted on legal elements at least as
demanding as those Congress specifed for analogous causes
of action actually found in the statutory text. See, e. g.,
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 736
(1975).
That rule supplies useful guidance here. Though Con-
gress did not adopt a private enforcement mechanism for vio-
lations of § 1981, it did establish criminal sanctions in a neigh-
boring section. That provision permitted the prosecution of
anyone who “depriv[es]” a person of “any right” protected
by the substantive provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
“on account of ” that person's prior “condition of slavery” or
“by reason of ” that person's “color or race.” § 2, 14 Stat. 27.
To prove a violation, then, the government had to show that
the defendant's challenged actions were taken “ `on account
of ' ” or “ `by reason of ' ” race—terms we have often held in-
dicate a but-for causation requirement. Gross, 557 U. S., at
176–177. Nor did anything in the statute hint that a differ-
ent and more forgiving rule might apply at one particular

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335
Opinion of the Court
stage in the litigation. In light of the causation standard
Congress
specifed for the cause of action it expressly en-
dorsed, it would be more than a little incongruous for us to
employ the laxer rules ESN proposes for this Court's judi-
cially implied cause of action.
Other provisions of the 1866 statute offer further guidance.
Not only do we generally presume that Congress legislates
against the backdrop of the common law. Nassar, 570 U. S.,
at 347. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 made this background
presumption explicit, providing that “in all cases where [the
laws of the United States] are not adapted to the object [of
carrying the statute into effect] the common law . . . shall . . .
govern said courts in the trial and disposition of such cause.”
§ 3, 14 Stat. 27. And, while there were exceptions, the com-
mon law in 1866 often treated a showing of but-for causation
as a prerequisite to a tort suit. See, e. g., Hayes v. Michigan
Central R. Co., 111 U. S. 228, 241 (1884); Smith, Legal Cause
in Actions of Tort, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 103, 108–109 (1911);
White, The Emergence and Doctrinal Development of Tort
Law, 1870–1930, 11 U. St. Thomas L. J. 463, 464–465 (2014);
1 F. Hilliard, Law of Torts 78–79 (1866); 1 T. Sedgwick, Meas-
ure of Damages 199 (9th ed. 1912). Nor did this prerequisite
normally wait long to make its appearance; if anything,
pleadings standards back then were generally even stricter
than they are in federal practice today. See generally, e. g.,
Lugar, Common Law Pleading Modifed Versus the Federal
Rules, 52 W. Va. L. Rev. 137 (1950).
This Court's precedents confrm all that the statute's lan-
guage and history indicate. When it frst inferred a private
cause of action under § 1981, this Court described it as “af-
ford[ing] a federal remedy against discrimination . . . on
the basis of race,” language (again) strongly suggestive of a
but-for causation standard. Johnson, 421 U. S., at 459–460
(emphasis added). Later, in General Building Contractors
Assn., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U. S. 375 (1982), the Court
explained that § 1981 was “designed to eradicate blatant dep-

336 COMCAST
CORP. v. NATIONAL ASSN. OF AFRICAN
AMERICAN-OWNED MEDIA
Opinion of the Court
rivations of civil rights,” such as where “a private offeror
refuse[
d] to extend to [an African-American], . . . because he
is [an African-American], the same opportunity to enter into
contracts as he extends to white offerees.” Id., at 388 (em-
phasis deleted; internal quotation marks omitted). Once
more, the Court spoke of § 1981 using language—because
of—often associated with but-for causation. Nassar, 570
U. S., at 350. Nor did anything in these decisions even ges-
ture toward the possibility that this rule of causation some-
times might be overlooked or modifed in the early stages of
a case.
This Court's treatment of a neighboring provision, § 1982,
supplies a fnal telling piece of evidence. Because § 1982 was
also frst enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and
uses nearly identical language as § 1981, the Court's “prece-
dents have . . . construed §§ 1981 and 1982 similarly.”
CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U. S. 442, 447 (2008).
Section 1982 guarantees all citizens “the same right . . . as
is enjoyed by white citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” And this
Court has repeatedly held that a claim arises under § 1982
when a citizen is not allowed “to acquire property . . . be-
cause of color.” Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 78–79
(1917) (emphasis added); see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U. S. 409, 419 (1968); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S.
160, 170–171 (1976). If a § 1982 plaintiff must show the de-
fendant's challenged conduct was “because of ” race, it is un-
clear how we might demand less from a § 1981 plaintiff.
Certainly ESN offers no compelling reason to read two such
similar statutes so differently.
B
What does ESN offer in reply? The company asks us to
draw on, and then innovate with, the “motivating factor”
causation test found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. But a critical examination of Title VII's history re-

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337
Opinion of the Court
veals more than a few reasons to be wary of any invitation
to
import its motivating factor test into § 1981.
This Court frst adopted Title VII's motivating factor test
i n Pr i ce Wa te rho u se v. Ho pk in s, 490 U. S. 228 (1989).
There, a plurality and two Justices concurring in the judg-
ment held that a Title VII plaintiff doesn't have to prove
but-for causation; instead, it's enough to show that discrimi-
nation was a motivating factor in the defendant's decision.
Id., at 249–250 (plurality opinion); see also id., at 258–259
(White, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 268–269 (O'Con-
nor, J., concurring in judgment). Once a plaintiff meets this
lesser standard, the plurality continued, the defendant may
defeat liability by establishing that it would have made the
same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff 's race (or
other protected trait) into account. In essence, Price Wa-
terhouse took the burden of proving but-for causation from
the plaintiff and handed it to the defendant as an affrmative
defense. Id., at 246.
But this arrangement didn't last long. Congress soon dis-
placed Price Waterhouse in favor of its own version of the
motivating factor test. In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Con-
gress provided that a Title VII plaintiff who shows that dis-
crimination was even a motivating factor in the defendant's
challenged employment decision is entitled to declaratory
and injunctive relief. § 107, 105 Stat. 1075. A defendant
may still invoke lack of but-for causation as an affrmative
defense, but only to stave off damages and reinstatement,
not liability in general. 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e–2(m), 2000e–
5(g)(2)(B); see also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U. S. 90,
94–95 (2003).
While this is all well and good for understanding Title VII,
it's hard to see what any of it might tell us about § 1981.
Title VII was enacted in 1964; this Court recognized its moti-
vating factor test in 1989; and Congress replaced that rule
with its own version two years later. Meanwhile, § 1981
dates back to 1866 and has never said a word about motivat-

338 COMCAST
CORP. v. NATIONAL ASSN. OF AFRICAN
AMERICAN-OWNED MEDIA
Opinion of the Court
ing factors. So we have two statutes with two distinct his-
tor
ies, and not a shred of evidence that Congress meant them
to incorporate the same causation standard. Worse yet,
ESN's fallback position—that we should borrow the motivat-
ing factor concept only at the pleadings stage—is foreign
even to Title VII practice. To accept ESN's invitation to
consult, tinker with, and then engraft a test from a modern
statute onto an old one would thus require more than a little
judicial adventurism, and look a good deal more like amend-
ing a law than interpreting one.
What's more, it's not as if Congress forgot about § 1981
when it adopted the Civil Rights Act of 1991. At the same
time that it added the motivating factor test to Title VII,
Congress also amended § 1981. See Civil Rights Act of
1991, § 101, 105 Stat. 1072 (adding new subsections (b) and
(c) to § 1981). But nowhere in its amendments to § 1981 did
Congress so much as whisper about motivating factors.
And where, as here, Congress has simultaneously chosen to
amend one statute in one way and a second statute in an-
other way, we normally assume the differences in language
imply differences in meaning. Gross, 557 U. S., at 174–175;
see also Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983).
Still, ESN tries to salvage something from the 1991 law.
It reminds us that one of the amendments to § 1981 defned
the term “make and enforce contracts” to include “making,
performance, modifcation, and termination of contracts, and
the enjoyment of all benefts, privileges, terms, and condi-
tions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U. S. C. § 1981(b).
In all this, ESN asks us to home in on one word, “making.”
By using this particular word, ESN says, Congress clarifed
that § 1981(a) guarantees not only the right to equivalent
contractual outcomes (a contract with the same fnal terms),
but also the right to an equivalent contracting process (no
extra hurdles on the road to securing that contract). And,
ESN continues, if the statute addresses the whole contract-
ing process, not just its outcome, a motivating factor causa-
tion test fts more logically than the traditional but-for test.

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Opinion of the Court
Comcast and the government disagree. As they see it,
the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 unambiguously protected only
outcomes—the right to contract, sue, be a party, and give
evidence. When Congress sought to defne some of these
terms in 1991, it merely repeated one word from the original
1866 Act (make) in a different form (making). No reason-
able reader, Comcast and the government contend, would
think that the addition of the present participle form of a
verb already in the statute carries such a radically different
meaning and so extends § 1981 liability in the new directions
ESN suggests. And, we are told, the statute's original and
continuing focus on contractual outcomes (not processes) is
more consistent with the traditional but-for test of causation.
This debate, we think, misses the point. Of course, Con-
gress could write an employment discrimination statute to
protect only outcomes or to provide broader protection. But,
for our purposes today, none of this matters. The diffculty
with ESN's argument lies in its mistaken premise that a
process-oriented right necessarily pairs with a motivating
factor causal standard. The inverse argument—that an
outcome-oriented right implies a but-for causation standard—
is just as fawed. Either causal standard could conceivably
apply regardless of the legal right § 1981 protects. We need
not and do not take any position on whether § 1981 as amended
protects only outcomes or protects processes too, a question
not passed on below or raised in the petition for certiorari.
Our point is simply that a § 1981 plaintiff frst must show that
he was deprived of the protected right and then establish cau-
sation—and that these two steps are analytically distinct.*
*The concurrence proceeds to offer a view on the nature of the right,
while correctly noting that the Court reserves the question for another
day. We reserve the question because “we are a court of review, not of
frst view,” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005), and do not
normally strain to address issues that are less than fully briefed and that
the district and appellate courts have had no opportunity to consider.
Such restraint is particularly appropriate here, where addressing the issue
is entirely unnecessary to our resolution of the case.

340 COMCAST
CORP. v. NATIONAL ASSN. OF AFRICAN
AMERICAN-OWNED MEDIA
Opinion of the Court
Unable to latch onto either Price Waterhouse or the Civil
Rights
Act of 1991, ESN is left to cast about for some other
hook to support its arguments about § 1981's operation. In
a fnal effort, it asks us to consider the burden-shifting
framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S.
792, 802, 804 (1973). Like the motivating factor test, Mc-
Donnell Douglas is a product of Title VII practice. Under
its terms, once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
race discrimination through indirect proof, the defendant
bears the burden of producing a race-neutral explanation for
its action, after which the plaintiff may challenge that expla-
nation as pretextual. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 257–258 (1981). This burden shift-
ing, ESN contends, is comparable to the regime it proposes
for § 1981.
It is nothing of the kind. Whether or not McDonnell
Douglas has some useful role to play in § 1981 cases, it does
not mention the motivating factor test, let alone endorse its
use only at the pleadings stage. Nor can this come as a sur-
prise: This Court didn't introduce the motivating factor test
into Title VII practice until years after McDonnell Douglas.
For its part, McDonnell Douglas sought only to supply a tool
for assessing claims, typically at summary judgment, when
the plaintiff relies on indirect proof of discrimination. See
411 U. S., at 802–805; see also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Wa-
ters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 (1978); Malamud, The Last Minuet:
Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 2229,
2259 (1995). Because McDonnell Douglas arose in a context
where but-for causation was the undisputed test, it did not
address causation standards. So nothing in the opinion in-
volves ESN's preferred standard. Under McDonnell Doug-
las's terms, too, only the burden of production ever shifts to
the defendant, never the burden of persuasion. See Bur-
dine, 450 U. S., at 254–255; Postal Service Bd. of Governors
v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711, 715–716 (1983). So McDonnell
Douglas can provide no basis for allowing a complaint to

Cite
as: 589 U. S. 327 (2020)
341
Opinion of Ginsburg, J.
survive a motion to dismiss when it fails to allege essential
elements
of a plaintiff 's claim.
III
All the traditional tools of statutory interpretation per-
suade us that § 1981 follows the usual rules, not any excep-
tion. To prevail, a plaintiff must initially plead and ulti-
mately prove that, but for race, it would not have suffered
the loss of a legally protected right. We do not, however,
pass on whether ESN's operative amended complaint “con-
tain[s] suffcient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face' ” under the but-
for causation standard. Iqbal, 556 U. S., at 678–679. The
Ninth Circuit has yet to consider that question because it
assessed ESN's pleadings under a different and mistaken
test. To allow that court the chance to determine the suff-
ciency of ESN's pleadings under the correct legal rule in the
frst instance, we vacate the judgment of the court of appeals
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Ginsburg, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
I join the Court's opinion requiring a plaintiff who sues
under 42 U. S. C. § 1981 to plead and prove race was a but-
for cause of her injury.* In support of that holding, Comcast
*I have previously explained that a strict but-for causation standard
is ill suited to discrimination cases and inconsistent with tort principles.
University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U. S. 338,
383–385 (2013) (dissenting opinion). I recognize, however, that our prece-
dent now establishes this form of causation as a “default rul[e]” in the
present context. Id., at 347 (majority opinion). See ante, at 331–332.
Respondent Entertainment Studios accepts that § 1981 does not displace
that rule, arguing only that a plaintiff 's burden is lower at the pleading
stage than it would be at summary judgment or at trial. See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 36–37.

342 COMCAST
CORP. v. NATIONAL ASSN. OF AFRICAN
AMERICAN-OWNED MEDIA
Opinion of Ginsburg, J.
advances a narrow view of § 1981's scope. Section 1981's
g
uarantee of “the same right . . . to make . . . contracts,”
Comcast urges, covers only the fnal decision whether
to enter a contract, not earlier stages of the contract-
formation process.
The Court devotes a page and a half to this important
issue but declines to resolve it, as it does not bear on the
choice of causation standards before us. Ante, at 338–339.
I write separately to resist Comcast's attempt to cabin a
“sweeping ” law designed to “break down all discrimination
between black men and white men” regarding “basic civil
rights.” Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, 432–
433 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in
original).
Under Comcast's view, § 1981 countenances racial discrimi-
nation so long as it occurs in advance of the fnal contract-
formation decision. Thus, a lender would not violate § 1981
by requiring prospective borrowers to provide one reference
letter if they are white and fve if they are black. Nor would
an employer violate § 1981 by reimbursing expenses for
white interviewees but requiring black applicants to pay
their own way. The employer could even “refus[e] to con-
sider applications” from black applicants at all. Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 21.
That view cannot be squared with the statute. An equal
“right . . . to make . . . contracts,” § 1981(a), is an empty
promise without equal opportunities to present or receive
offers and negotiate over terms. A plaintiff hindered from
enjoying those opportunities may be unable effectively to
form a contract, and a defendant able to impair those oppor-
tunities can avoid contracting without refusing a contract
outright. It is implausible that a law “intended to . . . secure
. . . practical freedom,” Jones, 392 U. S., at 431 (quoting Cong.
Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 474 (1866)), would condone dis-
criminatory barriers to contract formation.

Cite
as: 589 U. S. 327 (2020)
343
Opinion of Ginsburg, J.
Far from confning § 1981's guarantee to discrete moments,
the
language of the statute covers the entirety of the con-
tracting process. The statute defnes “make and enforce
contracts” to “includ[e] the making, performance, modifca-
tion, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all
benefts, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship.” § 1981(b). That encompassing defnition en-
sures that § 1981 “applies to all phases and incidents of
the contractual relationship.” Rivers v. Roadway Express,
Inc., 511 U. S. 298, 302 (1994). See also H. R. Rep. No. 102–
40, pt. 2, p. 37 (1991) (“The Committee intends this provision
to bar all racial discrimination in contracts. This list is in-
tended to be illustrative and not exhaustive.”). In line with
the rest of the defnition, the word “making ” is most sensibly
read to capture the entire process by which the contract is
formed. American Heritage Dictionary 1086 (3d ed. 1992)
(“The process of coming into being ”); 9 Oxford English Dic-
tionary 250 (2d ed. 1989) (“the process of being made”).
Comcast's freeze-frame approach to § 1981 invites the
Court to repeat an error it has committed before. In 1989,
the Court “rea[d] § 1981 not as a general proscription of ra-
cial discrimination in all aspects of contract relations, but as
limited to” certain narrow “enumerated rights.” Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 181. According to
Patterson, the right to “make” a contract “extend[ed] only
to the formation of a contract,” and the right to “enforce” it
encompassed only “access to legal process.” Id., at 176–178.
The Court thus declined to apply § 1981 to “postformation
conduct,” concluding that an employee had no recourse to
§ 1981 for racial harassment occurring after the employment
contract's formation. Id., at 178–179.
Congress promptly repudiated that interpretation. In
1991, “with the design to supersede Patterson,” Congress
enacted the expansive defnition of “make and enforce con-
tracts” now contained in § 1981(b). CBOCS West, Inc. v.

344 COMCAST
CORP. v. NATIONAL ASSN. OF AFRICAN
AMERICAN-OWNED MEDIA
Opinion of Ginsburg, J.
Humphries, 553 U. S. 442, 450 (2008). Postformation racial
harassment
violates § 1981, the amendment clarifes, because
the right to “make and enforce” a contract includes the man-
ner in which the contract is carried out. So too the manner
in which the contract is made.
The complaint before us contains allegations of racial har-
assment during contract formation. In their negotiations,
Entertainment Studios alleges, Comcast required of Enter-
tainment Studios a series of tasks that served no purpose
and on which Entertainment Studios “waste[d] hundreds of
thousands of dollars.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a–50a. The
Court holds today that Entertainment Studios must plead
and prove that race was the but-for cause of its injury—in
other words, that Comcast would have acted differently if
Entertainment Studios were not African-American owned.
But if race indeed accounts for Comcast's conduct, Comcast
should not escape liability for injuries inficted during the
contract-formation process. The Court has reserved that
issue for consideration on remand, enabling me to join its
opinion.

OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
345
Per Curiam
DAVIS v. UNITED STATES
on
petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the fth circuit
No. 19–5421. Decided March 23, 2020
After his July 2016 encounter with police, Charles Davis entered a guilty
plea for being a felon in possession of a frearm, 18 U. S. C. §§ 922(g)(1),
924(a)(2), and for possessing drugs with the intent to distribute them,
21 U. S. C. §§ 841(a)(1), ( b)(1)(C). A presentence report noted that
Davis was also facing pending drug and gun charges in Texas courts
stemming from a separate 2015 state arrest. The District Court sen-
tenced Davis to four years and nine months in prison and ordered that
the federal sentence run consecutively to any sentences that the state
courts might impose for his 2015 state offenses. Davis did not object.
On appeal, Davis argued for the frst time that the District Court erred
by ordering his federal sentence to run consecutively to any sentences
for his 2015 state offenses because the underlying offenses were part of
the “same course of conduct” such that the sentences should have run
concurrently under applicable sentencing guidelines. The Fifth Circuit
characterized Davis' argument as raising factual issues and, based on
Fifth Circuit precedent, refused to entertain Davis' argument. Almost
every other Court of Appeals conducts plain-error review of unpre-
served arguments, including unpreserved factual arguments. Davis
challenges the Fifth Circuit's outlier practice in this Court.
Held: No legal basis exists for the Fifth Circuit's practice of declining to
review certain unpreserved factual arguments for plain error. Under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), “[a] plain error that affects
substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to
the court's attention.” Neither Rule 52(b) nor this Court's cases immu-
nize factual errors from plain-error review.
Certiorari granted; 769 Fed. Appx. 129, vacated and remanded.
Per Curiam.
In July 2016, police offcers in Dallas, Texas, received a tip
about a suspicious car parked outside of a house in the Dallas
area. The offcers approached the car and encountered
Charles Davis in the driver's seat. They ordered him out
of the car after smelling marijuana. As Davis exited the

346 D
AVIS v. UNITED STATES
Per Curiam
car, the offcers spotted a black semiautomatic handgun in
t
he door compar tment. They then searched Davis and
found methamphetamine pills.
Davis had previously been convicted of two state felonies.
In this case, a federal grand jury in the Northern District of
Texas indicted Davis for being a felon in possession of a fre-
arm, 18 U. S. C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and for possessing
dr ugs w ith the i ntent to distr ibute them, 21 U. S. C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Davis pleaded guilty to both counts.
The presentence report prepared by the probation offce
noted that Davis was also facing pending drug and gun
charges in Texas courts stemming from a separate 2015 state
arrest. The District Court sentenced Davis to four years
and nine months in prison and ordered that his sentence run
consecutively to any sentences that the state courts might
impose for his 2015 state offenses. Davis did not object to
the sentence or to its consecutive nature.
Davis appealed to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. On appeal, he argued for the frst time that the
District Court erred by ordering his federal sentence to run
consecutively to any sentence that the state courts might
impose for his 2015 state offenses. Davis contended that his
2015 state offenses and his 2016 federal offenses were part of
the “same course of conduct,” meaning under the Sentencing
Guidelines that the sentences should have run concurrently,
not consecutively. See United States Sentencing Commis-
sion, Guidelines Manual §§ 1B1.3(a)(2), 5G1.3(c) (Nov. 2018).
In the Fifth Circuit, Davis acknowledged that he had failed
to raise that argument in the District Court. When a crimi-
nal defendant fails to raise an argument in the district court,
an appellate court ordinarily may review the issue only for
plain error. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(b).
But the Fifth Circuit refused to entertain Davis' argument
at all. The Fifth Circuit did not employ plain-error review
because the court characterized Davis' argument as raising
factual issues, and under Fifth Circuit precedent, “[q]ues-
tions of fact capable of resolution by the district court upon

Cite
as: 589 U. S. 345 (2020)
347
Per Curiam
proper objection at sentencing can never constitute plain
error
.” 769 Fed. Appx. 129 (2019) (per curiam) (quoting
United States v. Lopez, 923 F. 2d 47, 50 (1991) (per curiam)).
By contrast, almost every other Court of Appeals conducts
plain-error review of unpreserved arguments, including un-
preserved factual arguments. See, e. g., United States v.
González-Castillo, 562 F. 3d 80, 83–84 (CA1 2009); United
States v. Romeo, 385 Fed. Appx. 45, 49–50 (CA2 2010);
United States v. Griffths, 504 Fed. Appx. 122, 126–127 (CA3
2012); United States v. Wells, 163 F. 3d 889, 900 (CA4 1998);
United States v. Sargent, 19 Fed. Appx. 268, 272 (CA6 2001)
(per curiam); United States v. Durham, 645 F. 3d 883, 899–
900 (CA7 2011); United States v. Sahakian, 446 Fed. Appx.
861, 863 (CA9 2011); United States v. Thomas, 518 Fed.
Appx. 610, 612–613 (CA11 2013) (per curiam); United States
v. Saro, 24 F. 3d 283, 291 (CADC 1994).
In this Court, Davis challenges the Fifth Circuit's outlier
practice of refusing to review certain unpreserved factual
arguments for plain error. We agree with Davis, and we
vacate the judgment of the Fifth Circuit.
Rule 52(b) states in full: “A plain error that affects sub-
stantial rights may be considered even though it was not
brought to the court's attention.” The text of Rule 52(b)
does not immunize factual errors from plain-error review.
Our cases likewise do not purport to shield any category
of errors from plain-error review. See generally Rosales-
Mireles v. United States, 585 U. S. 129 (2018); United States
v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725 (1993). Put simply, there is no legal
basis for the Fifth Circuit's practice of declining to review
certain unpreserved factual arguments for plain error.
The petition for certiorari and the motion for leave to pro-
ceed in forma pauperis are granted, the judgment of the
Fifth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opinion. We express
no opinion on whether Davis has satisfed the plain-error
standard.
It is so ordered.

348 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
Syllabus
CITGO ASPHALT REFINING CO. et al. v. FRESCATI
SHIPPING
CO., LTD., et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the third circuit
No. 18–565. Argued November 5, 2019—Decided March 30, 2020
Petitioners (collectively CARCO) sub-chartered the oil tanker M/T Athos I
from tanker operator Star Tankers, which had chartered the tanker
from respondent Frescati Shipping Company. In the fnal stretch of
the tanker's journey from Venezuela to New Jersey, an abandoned ship
anchor punctured the tanker's hull, causing 264,000 gallons of heavy
crude oil to spill into the Delaware River. The Oil Pollution Act of
1990, 33 U. S. C. § 2702(a), required Frescati, the vessel's owner, to cover
the cleanup costs in the frst instance. Pursuant to the statute, Fresca-
ti's liability was limited to $45 million, and the Oil Spill Liability Trust
Fund, operated by the Federal Government (also a respondent here),
reimbursed Frescati for an additional $88 million in cleanup costs.
Frescati and the United States then sued CARCO to recover their
respective portions of the cleanup costs. Both alleged that CARCO
was ultimately at fault for the oil spill because CARCO had breached a
contractual “safe-berth clause” in the subcharter agreement (“charter
party”) between CARCO and Star Tankers. According to Frescati and
the United States, that clause obligated CARCO to select a “safe” berth
that would allow the vessel to come and go “always safely afoat,” and
that obligation amounted to a warranty regarding the safety of the se-
lected berth. After concluding that Frescati was an implied third-
party benefciary of the safe-berth clause, the Third Circuit held that
the clause embodied an express warranty of safety made without regard
to the charterer's diligence in selecting the berth.
Held: The plain language of the parties' safe-berth clause establishes a
warranty of safety. Pp. 355–365.
(a) The Court's analysis begins and ends with the text of the safe-berth
clause. As CARCO acknowledges, the clause imposes on the charterer
a duty to select a safe berth. And given the unqualifed language of
the clause, the charterer's duty is absolute: The charterer must designate
a berth that is “safe” and that allows the vessel to come and go “always”
safely afoat. That absolute duty amounts to a warranty of safety.
That the safe-berth clause does not expressly invoke the term “war-
ranty” does not alter the charterer's duty under the safe-berth clause.
It is well settled that statements of material fact in a charter party are

Cite
as: 589 U. S. 348 (2020)
349
Syllabus
warranties, regardless of their label. See, e. g., Davison v. Von Lingen,
113
U. S. 40, 49–50. Here, it is plain on the face of the contract that the
safe-berth clause sets forth a statement of “material” fact regarding
the condition of the berth selected by the charterer. The charterer's
assurance of a safe berth is the entire root of the safe-berth clause, and
crucially, it is not subject to qualifcations or conditions.
CARCO counters that the safe-berth clause merely imposes a duty of
due diligence in selecting a safe berth. But as a general rule, tort con-
cepts like due diligence have no place in contract analysis. Under basic
precepts of contract law, an obligor is strictly liable for a breach of con-
tract, without regard to fault or diligence. While parties are free to
contract for limitations on liability, the parties here contracted for no
such thing: There is no language in the safe-berth clause even hinting
at due diligence. That omission is particularly notable in context, as
the parties expressly contracted for due-diligence limitations on liability
elsewhere in the charter party.
CARCO's arguments about other clauses in the charter party do not
counsel in favor of a different result. The charter party's “general ex-
ceptions clause,” which limits the charterer's liability for losses due to
“perils of the seas,” does not apply where, as here, another clause ex-
pressly provides for liability stemming from the designation of an unsafe
berth. Nor does a clause requiring Star Tankers to obtain oil-pollution
insurance relieve CARCO of liability under the safe-berth clause. The
pollution-insurance clause covers risks beyond those resulting from the
selection of an unsafe berth.
CARCO's alternative interpretation of the safe-berth clause, as sim-
ply requiring the charterer to pay any expenses resulting from the ves-
sel master's refusal to enter an unsafe berth, is inapposite. Assuming
that the charterer is liable for expenses when the vessel master justif-
ably refuses to enter an unsafe berth, that does not abate the scope of
the charterer's liability when a vessel in fact enters an unsafe berth.
The dissent argues that reading the safe-berth clause to bind the char-
terer to a warranty of safety would necessarily imply that the safe-berth
clause creates contradictory warranties of safety, one on the charterer
and one on the vessel master. Because that confict cannot be, the dis-
sent continues, the safe-berth clause must not bind the charterer to a
warranty of safety. The dissent's conclusion does not follow because
the alleged confict does not exist. Under the safe-berth clause, the
charterer has a duty to select a safe berth, while the vessel master has
a duty to load and discharge at the chosen safe berth. There is no
tension between those two duties. Pp. 355–362.
(b) CARCO's arguments that other authorities have understood safe-
berth clauses differently lack foothold in the text of the safe-berth clause

350 CITGO
ASPHALT REFINING CO. v. FRESCATI
SHIPPING CO.
Syllabus
and are otherwise unconvincing. For instance, CARCO relies on a lead-
i
ng admiralty treatise that urges that safe-berth clauses ought not be
interpreted as establishing a warranty of safety because charterers are
not always in the best position to know the dangers attendant to a given
berth. But whatever that treatise sought to prevail upon courts to
adopt as a prescriptive matter does not alter the plain meaning of the
safe-berth clause here.
Also unavailing is CARCO's contention that Atkins v. Disintegrating
Co., 18 Wall. 272, determined that safe-berth clauses do not embody a
warranty of safety. CARCO relies on a passing statement in Atkins
that did not bear on this Court's ultimate holding that the vessel master
in that case had waived the protection of the safe-berth clause.
Finally, CARCO points out that the Fifth Circuit has held that a simi-
larly unqualifed safe-berth clause merely imposed a duty of due dili-
gence. Orduna S. A. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp., 913 F. 2d 1149. But the
Fifth Circuit did not purport to interpret the language of the safe-berth
clause at issue in that case and instead relied principally on tort law
and policy considerations. The Second Circuit's long line of decisions
interpreting the language of unqualifed safe-berth clauses as embody-
ing an express warranty of safety is more consistent with traditional
contract analysis. See, e. g., Paragon Oil Co. v. Republic Tankers,
S. A., 310 F. 2d 169. Pp. 362–364.
886 F. 3d 291, affrmed.
Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ.,
joined. Thomas, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Alito, J., joined,
post, p. 365.
Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Jacqueline G. Cooper, Jordan B.
Che r r ick, John G. Bissell, De rek A. Wal ke r, J. D w i gh t
LeBlanc, Jr., Douglas L. Grundmeyer, and Richard Q.
Whelan.
Erica L. Ross argued the cause for the United States.
With her on the brief were Solicitor General Francisco, As-
sistant Attorney General Hunt, Deputy Solicitor General
Kneedler, Charles W. Scarborough, and Anne M. Murphy.
Thomas C. Goldstein argued the cause for respondents
Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., et al. With him on the brief
were Sarah E. Harrington, Erica Oleszczuk Evans, John J.

Cite
as: 589 U. S. 348 (2020)
351
Opinion of the Court
Levy, Alfred J. Kuffer, Eugene J. O'Connor, Timothy J. Ber-
gère,
and Jack A. Greenbaum.*
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 2004, the M/T Athos I, a 748-foot oil tanker, allided
1
with a nine-ton anchor abandoned on the bed of the Delaware
River. The anchor punctured the tanker's hull, causing
264,000 gallons of heavy crude oil to spill into the river. As
required by federal statute, respondents Frescati Shipping
Company—the Athos I's owner—and the United States cov-
ered the costs of cleanup. They then sought to reclaim those
costs from petitioners CITGO Asphalt Refning Company
and others (collectively CARCO), which had chartered the
Athos I for the voyage that occasioned the oil spill. Accord-
ing to Frescati and the United States, CARCO had breached
a contractual “safe-berth clause” obligating CARCO to select
a “safe” berth that would allow the Athos I to come and go
“always safely afoat.”
The question before us is whether the safe-berth clause is
a warranty of safety, imposing liability for an unsafe berth
regardless of CARCO's diligence in selecting the berth. We
hold that it is.
I
A
During the relevant period, the Athos I was the subject of
a series of contracts involving three parties: Frescati, Star
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American
Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers Association et al. by Brendan Col-
lins, Edward D. Greenberg, and Richard Moskowitz; for the North Ameri-
can Export Grain Association by Benjamin Beaton and Lauren S. Kuley;
and for Tricon Energy, Ltd., by George R. Diaz-Arrastia.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for BIMCO et al. by
Lizabeth L. Burrell and Christopher R. Nolan; for Manfred W. Arnold by
Chester Douglas Hooper; and for Bernard Eder by M. Hamilton Whit-
man, Jr., and Christopher M. Hannan.
1
An allision is “[t]he contact of a vessel with a stationary object such as
an anchored vessel or a pier.” Black's Law Dictionary 94 (11th ed. 2019).

352 CITGO
ASPHALT REFINING CO. v. FRESCATI
SHIPPING CO.
Opinion of the Court
Tankers, and CARCO. Frescati owned the Athos I. Star
T
ankers, an operator of tanker vessels, contracted with Fres-
cati to charter the Athos I for a period of time. CARCO
then contracted with Star Tankers to subcharter the Athos I
for the inauspicious voyage resulting in the oil spill.
Pertinent here is the subcharter agreement between Star
Tankers and CARCO. In admiralty, such contracts to char-
ter a vessel are termed “charter parties.” Like many mod-
ern charter parties, the agreement between Star Tankers
and CARCO was based on a standard industry form con-
tract. It drew essentially verbatim from a widely used tem-
plate known as the ASBATANKVOY form, named after the
Association of Ship Brokers & Agents (USA) Inc. (ASBA)
trade association that publishes it.
At the core of the parties' dispute is a clause in the charter
party requiring the charterer, CARCO, to designate a safe
berth at which the vessel may load and discharge cargo.
This provision, a standard feature of many charter parties,
is customarily known as a safe-berth clause. The safe-berth
clause here provides, as relevant, that “[t]he vessel shall load
and discharge at any safe place or wharf, . . . which shall be
designated and procured by the Charterer, provided the Ves-
sel can proceed thereto, lie at, and depart therefrom always
safely afoat, any lighterage being at the expense, risk and
peril of the Charterer.” Addendum to Brief for Petitioners
8a.
2
The charter party separately requires CARCO to di-
rect the Athos I to a “safe por[t]” along the Atlantic seaboard
of the United States. Id., at 24a.
2
The parties agree that the safe-berth clause also encompasses what is
often referred to as a “safe-port clause.” The safe-port clause here pro-
vides that “[t]he vessel . . . shall, with all convenient dispatch, proceed as
ordered to Loading Port(s) named . . . , or so near thereunto as she may
safely get (always afoat), . . . and being so loaded shall forthwith proceed
. . . direct to the Discharging Port(s), or so near thereunto as she may
safely get (always afoat), and deliver said cargo.” Addendum to Brief for
Petitioners 4a. The parties do not dispute that the two clauses should be
read in conjunction.

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353
Opinion of the Court
Pursuant to the charter party, CARCO designated as the
ber
th of discharge its asphalt refnery in Paulsboro, New Jer-
sey, on the shore of the Delaware River. In November 2004,
the Athos I set out on a 1,900-mile journey from Puerto Mi-
randa, Venezuela, to Paulsboro, New Jersey, carrying a load
of heavy crude oil. The vessel was in the fnal 900-foot
stretch of its journey when an abandoned ship anchor in the
Delaware River pierced two holes in the vessel's hull. Much
of the Athos I's freight drained into the river.
B
After the Exxon-Valdez oil spill in 1989, Congress passed
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), 104 Stat. 484, 33 U. S. C.
§ 2701 et seq., to promote the prompt cleanup of oil spills.
To that end, OPA deems certain entities responsible for the
costs of oil-spill cleanups, regardless of fault. § 2702(a). It
then limits the liability of such “responsible part[ies]” if they
(among other things) timely assist with cleanup efforts.
§ 2704. Responsible parties that comply with the statutory
conditions receive a reimbursement from the Oil Spill Liabil-
ity Trust Fund (Fund), operated by the Federal Govern-
ment, for any cleanup costs exceeding a statutory limit.
§ 2708; see also § 2704.
Although a statutorily responsible party must pay cleanup
costs without regard to fault, it may pursue legal claims
against any entity allegedly at fault for an oil spill. §§ 2710,
2751(e). So may the Fund: By reimbursing a responsible
party, the Fund becomes subrogated to the responsible par-
ty's rights (up to the amount reimbursed to the responsible
party) against any third party allegedly at fault for the inci-
dent. §§ 2712(f ), 2715(a).
As owner of the Athos I, Frescati was deemed a “responsi-
ble party” for the oil spill under OPA. Frescati worked with
the U. S. Coast Guard in cleanup efforts and covered the
costs of the cleanup. As a result, Frescati's liability was
statutorily limited to $45 million, and the Fund reimbursed

354 CITGO
ASPHALT REFINING CO. v. FRESCATI
SHIPPING CO.
Opinion of the Court
Frescati for an additional $88 million that Frescati paid in
cleanup
costs.
C
Following the cleanup, Frescati and the United States each
sought recovery against CARCO: Frescati sought to recover
the cleanup costs not reimbursed by the Fund, while the
United States sought to recover the amount disbursed by the
Fund. As relevant here, both Frescati and the United
States claimed that CARCO had breached the safe-berth
clause by failing to designate a safe berth, and thus was at
fault for the spill.
After a complicated series of proceedings—including a 41-
day trial, a subsequent 31-day evidentiary hearing, and two
appeals—the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found
for Frescati and the United States. The court frst con-
cluded that Frescati was an implied third-party benefciary
of the safe-berth clause in the charter party between
CARCO and Star Tankers, thereby allowing the breach-of-
contract claims by Frescati and the United States to proceed
against CARCO. In re Frescati Shipping Co., 718 F. 3d 184,
200 (2013). The court then held that the safe-berth clause
embodied an express warranty of safety “made without re-
gard to the amount of diligence taken by the charterer,” and
that CARCO was liable to Frescati and the United States
for breaching that warranty. Id., at 203; In re Frescati
Shipping Co., 886 F. 3d 291, 300, 315 (2018) (case below).
We granted certiorari, 587 U. S. 960 (2019), to resolve
whether the safe-berth clause at issue here merely imposes
a duty of diligence, as the Fifth Circuit has held in a similar
case, or establishes a warranty of safety, as the Second Cir-
cuit has held in other analogous cases. Compare Orduna
S. A. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp., 913 F. 2d 1149 (CA5 1990),
with, e. g., Paragon Oil Co. v. Republic Tankers, S. A., 310
F. 2d 169 (CA2 1962). The former interpretation allows a
charterer to avoid liability by exercising due diligence in se-
lecting a berth; the latter imposes liability for an unsafe

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355
Opinion of the Court
berth without regard to the care taken by the charterer.
Because
we fnd it plain from the language of the safe-berth
clause that CARCO warranted the safety of the berth it des-
ignated, we affrm the judgment of the Third Circuit.
II
Maritime contracts “must be construed like any other con-
tracts: by their terms and consistent with the intent of the
parties.” Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty
Ltd., 543 U. S. 14, 31 (2004); see also 2 T. Schoenbaum, Admi-
ralty & Maritime Law § 11:2, p. 7 (6th ed. 2018) (“[F]ederal
maritime law includes general principles of contract law”).
“ `Where the words of a contract in writing are clear and
unambiguous, its meaning is to be ascertained in accordance
with its plainly expressed intent.' ” M&G Polymers USA,
LLC v. Tackett, 574 U. S. 427, 435 (2015) (quoting 11 R. Lord,
Williston on Contracts § 30:6, p. 108 (4th ed. 2012) (Willis-
ton)). In such circumstances, the parties' intent “can be de-
termined from the face of the agreement” and “the language
that they used to memorialize [that] agreement.” Id., at 97–
98, 112–113. But “[w]hen a written contract is ambiguous,
its meaning is a question of fact, requiring a determination
of the intent of [the] parties in entering the contract”; that
may involve examining “relevant extrinsic evidence of the par-
ties' intent and the meaning of the words that they used.” Id.,
§ 30:7, at 116–119, 124 (footnote omitted).
A
Our analysis starts and ends with the language of the safe-
berth clause. That clause provides, as relevant, that the
charterer “shall . . . designat[e] and procur[e]” a “safe place
or wharf,” “provided [that] the Vessel can proceed thereto,
lie at, and depart therefrom always safely afoat.” Adden-
dum to Brief for Petitioners 8a. As even CARCO acknowl-
edges, the clause plainly imposes on the charterer at least
some “duty to select a `safe' berth.” Brief for Petitioners

356 CITGO
ASPHALT REFINING CO. v. FRESCATI
SHIPPING CO.
Opinion of the Court
21. Given the unqualifed language of the safe-berth clause,
it
is similarly plain that this acknowledged duty is absolute.
The clause requires the charterer to designate a “safe” berth:
That means a berth “free from harm or risk.” Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary 1030 (10th ed. 1994); see also New Ox-
ford American Dictionary 1500 (E. Jewell & F. Abate eds.
2001) (“safe” means “protected from or not exposed to dan-
ger or risk”). And the berth must allow the vessel to come
and go “always” safely afoat: That means afoat “at all times”
and “in any event.” Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, at 35;
see also New Oxford American Dictionary, at 47 (“always”
means “at all times; on all occasions”). Selecting a berth
that does not satisfy those conditions constitutes a breach.
The safe-berth clause, in other words, binds the charterer to
a warranty of safety.
3
No matter that the safe-berth clause does not expressly
invoke the term “warranty.” It is well settled as a matter
of maritime contracts that “[s]tatements of fact contained in
a charter party agreement relating to some material matter
are called warranties,” regardless of the label ascribed in the
charter party. 22 Williston § 58.11, at 40–41 (2017); see also
Davison v. Von Lingen, 113 U. S. 40, 49–50 (1885) (a stipula-
3
The central pillar of the dissent is that the safe-berth clause merely
bestows upon the charterer “the right to `designat[e]' ” the place of dis-
charge, and thus apparently creates no duty to select a safe berth (much
less a warranty of safety). Post, at 366 (opinion of Thomas, J.) (quoting
Addendum to Brief for Petitioners 8a; emphasis added); see also post, at
367 (“the charterer has a right of selection”). That sidesteps the safe-
berth clause's plain terms, which prescribe that the charterer “shall . . .
designat[e] and procur[e]” a “safe place or wharf.” Addendum to Brief
for Petitioners 8a (emphasis added). As we have said before, “the word
`shall' usually connotes a requirement.” Kingdomware Technologies, Inc.
v. United States, 579 U. S. 162, 171 (2016); see also, e. g., Lexecon Inc. v.
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U. S. 26, 35 (1998). The text
thus forecloses the dissent's permissive view that the charterer merely
has an elective “right” to select a berth of discharge but no duty to do
so. And even CARCO disclaims that atextual position. See Brief for
Petitioners 21.

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357
Opinion of the Court
tion going to “substantive” and “material” parts of a charter
par
ty forms “a warranty”); Behn v. Burness, 3 B. & S. 751,
122 Eng. Rep. 281 (K. B. 1863) (“With respect to statements
in a [charter party] descriptive of . . . some material incident
. . . , if the descriptive statement was intended to be a sub-
stantive part of the [charter party], it is to be regarded as a
warranty”). What matters, then, is that the safe-berth
clause contains a statement of material fact regarding the
condition of the berth selected by the charterer.
Here, the safety of the selected berth is the entire root of
the safe-berth clause: It is the very reason for the clause's
inclusion in the charter party. And crucially, the charterer's
assurance of safety is not subject to qualifcations or condi-
tions. Under any conception of materiality and any view of
the parties' intent, the charterer's assurance surely counts
as material. That leaves no doubt that the safe-berth clause
establishes a warranty of safety, on equal footing with any
other provision of the charter party that invokes express
warranty language.
4
CARCO resists this plain reading of the safe-berth clause,
arguing instead that the clause contains an implicit limi-
tation: The clause does not impose “strict liability,” says
CARCO, or “liability without regard to fault.” Brief for
4
Because the materiality of the charterer's assurance of safety is plain
on the face of the charter party, the specifc materiality issue here raises
no question of fact for a jury to resolve. That is not to say that the
materiality of a statement in a charter party is always a question of law.
Nor does the materiality analysis here bear on wholly different materiality
inquiries. For not all questions of materiality are alike: Sometimes mate-
riality is a question of law. See, e. g., 30 Williston § 75:30, at 108 (whether
an alteration of a contract is material). Other times, it involves factual
determinations uniquely suited for a jury. See, e. g., TSC Industries, Inc.
v. Northway, Inc., 426 U. S. 438, 450 (1976) (whether a company's mis-
statements to the public are material for securities-fraud purposes). The
dissent's insistence that materiality is a question of fact “ `in other
contexts' ”—such as securities fraud—thus is inapposite. Post, at 372
(quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, 512 (1995)).

358 CITGO
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SHIPPING CO.
Opinion of the Court
Petitioners 23, 25. In effect, CARCO interprets the safe-
ber
th clause as imposing a mere duty of due diligence in the
selection of the berth. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 19–20 (arguing
that “[CARCO] did [its] due diligence” in “selecting the port
or the berth”); id., at 28 (suggesting that the safe-berth
clause is constrained “as a matter of due diligence in tort
concepts”); Reply Brief 5, n. 3 (asserting that a charterer's
liability under the safe-berth clause “should be addressed
through . . . sources of la[w] such as tort law”). But as a
general rule, due diligence and fault-based concepts of tort
liability have no place in the contract analysis required here.
Under elemental precepts of contract law, an obligor is “lia-
ble in damages for breach of contract even if he is without
fault.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts, p. 309 (1979)
(Restatement (Second)). To put that default contract-law
principle in tort-law terms, “Contract liability is strict liabil-
ity.” Ibid. (emphasis added); see also 23 Williston § 63:8,
at 499 (2018) (“Liability for a breach of contract is, prima
facie, strict liability”). What CARCO thus protests is the
straightforward application of contract liability to a breach
of contract.
Although contract law generally does not, by its own force,
limit liability based on tort concepts of fault, parties are of
course free to contract for such limitations. See Restate-
ment (Second), at 309 (obligor who wishes to avoid strict lia-
bility for breach may “limi[t] his obligation by agreement”).
Here, however, the safe-berth clause is clear that the parties
contracted for no such thing. CARCO does not identify—
nor can we discern—any language in the clause hinting at
“due diligence” or related concepts of “fault.” That omis-
sion is particularly notable in context: Where the parties in-
tended to limit obligations based on due diligence elsewhere
in the charter party, they did so expressly. See Addendum
to Brief for Petitioners 4a (providing that the vessel “b[e]
seaworthy, and hav[e] all pipes, pumps and heater coils in
good working order, . . . so far as the foregoing conditions

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359
Opinion of the Court
can be attained by the exercise of due diligence”); id., at 13a
(rel
ieving vessel owner of responsibility for certain conse-
quences of any “unseaworthiness existing . . . at the inception
of the voyage [that] was discoverable by the exercise of due
diligence”); id., at 41a (requiring vessel owner to “exercise
due diligence to ensure that [a drug and alcohol] policy [on-
board the vessel] is complied with” (capitalization omitted)).
5
That the parties did not do so in the safe-berth clause spe-
cifcally is further proof that they did not intend for such a
liability limitation to inhere impliedly.
6
Unable to identify any liability-limiting language in the
safe-berth clause, CARCO points to a separate “general ex-
ceptions clause” in the charter party that exempts a char-
terer from liability for losses due to “perils of the seas.” Id.,
at 14a. According to CARCO, the “general exceptions
clause” demonstrates that the parties did not intend the safe-
berth clause to impose liability for a “peri[l] of the seas” like
an abandoned anchor. That argument founders on a critical
component of the “general exceptions clause”: By its terms,
it does not apply when liability is “otherwise . . . expressly
provided” in the char ter par ty. Ib i d. The safe-ber th
clause, as explained above, expressly provides for liability
stemming from the designation of an unsafe berth. The
5
It also bears mention that many other industry form charter parties—
not selected by CARCO and Star Tankers—explicitly limit the liability
that may fow from a charterer's selection of a berth. See, e. g., 2E J.
Force & L. Lambert, Benedict on Admiralty, ch. XXVII, § 27–567, ¶ 10
(rev. 7th ed. 2019) (INTERTANKVOY form specifes that “[c]harterers
shall exercise due diligence to ascertain that any places to which they order
the vessel are safe for the vessel and that she will lie there always afoat”).
6
After all, language that limits liability is necessary to overcome the
default rule of strict liability for contractual breach. Supra, at 357–359.
That stands in contrast to the established principle that charter parties
can, at least in the circumstances here, create warranties without invoking
express warranty language. Supra, at 356–357. The dissent overlooks
this distinction when it claims that the absence of express warranty lan-
guage in the safe-berth clause and the presence of it elsewhere in the
charter party imply that no warranty may be found here. Post, at 368.

360 CITGO
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SHIPPING CO.
Opinion of the Court
catchall “general exceptions clause” neither supersedes nor
over
lays it.
7
Likewise immaterial is another clause of the charter party
that requires Star Tankers to obtain oil-pollution insurance.
According to CARCO, that clause evidences the parties' in-
tent to relieve CARCO of oil-spill liability under the safe-
berth clause. But the oil-pollution insurance that Star
Tankers must obtain covers risks beyond simply those at-
tendant to the selection of an unsafe berth. And CARCO's
reading of the insurance clause (as relieving CARCO of oil-
spill liability) does not square with its reading of the safe-
berth clause (as imposing such liability when CARCO fails
to exercise due diligence).
Finally, CARCO offers an alternative interpretation of the
safe-berth clause that focuses on the vessel master's right
instead of the charterer's duty. This alternative interpreta-
tion proceeds from the subclause specifying that the selected
berth be one that the vessel may “proceed thereto, lie at, and
depart therefrom always safely afoat, any lighterage [i. e.,
transfer of goods between vessels] being at the expense, risk
and peril of the Charterer.” Id., at 8a. On CARCO's read-
ing, that subclause means that the vessel master has a right
to refuse entry into a berth that the master perceives to be
unsafe, and the charterer must pay any expenses resulting
from the refusal. We have, to be sure, recognized that simi-
larly worded safe-berth clauses may implicitly denote a ves-
sel master's right to refuse entry and the charterer's result-
7
At oral argument, CARCO urged that the abandoned anchor was not
only “a peril of the sea” but also “an abnormal occurrence.” Tr. of Oral
Arg. 28–29. CARCO's “abnormal occurrence” argument appears to rest
on a recent decision by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom inter-
preting a safe-berth clause not to impose liability if an “abnormal occur-
rence” rendered the selected berth unsafe. See Gard Marine & Energy
Ltd. v. China Nat. Chartering Co., [2017] UKSC 35 (The Ocean Victory).
In its opening brief to this Court, however, CARCO did not cite The Ocean
Victory or argue that the abandoned anchor here constituted an “abnor-
mal occurrence.”

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361
Opinion of the Court
ant obligation to bear the costs of that refusal. See Mencke
v
. Cargo of Java Sugar, 187 U. S. 248 (1902); The Gazelle and
Cargo, 128 U. S. 474 (1888). But that a charterer may be
liable for expenses when a vessel master justifably refuses
to enter an unsafe berth in no way abates the scope of the
charterer's liability when a vessel in fact enters an unsafe
berth. And a tacit recognition of a vessel master's right of
refusal does not overwrite the safe-berth clause's express
prescription of a warranty of safety.
The dissent, too, offers an alternative interpretation. It
claims that if the safe-berth clause binds the charterer to a
warranty of safety, the clause must bind the vessel master
to effectively the same warranty—due to the clause's state-
ment that “ `[t]he vessel shall load and discharge at [a] safe
place or wharf.' ” Post, at 370 (quoting Addendum to Brief
for Petitioners 8a). Because that would “creat[e] contradic-
tory warranties of safety,” the dissent continues, the safe-
berth clause must not bind the charterer to a warranty of
safety (or, apparently, impose an obligation on the charterer
at all). Post, at 371. This conclusion does not follow be-
cause the confict diagnosed by the dissent does not exist.
The safe-berth clause says that “[t]he vessel shall load and
discharge at any safe place or wharf, . . . which shall be desig-
nated and procured by the Charterer.” Addendum to Brief
for Petitioners 8a. Plainly, that means that the “safe place
or wharf . . . shall be designated and procured by the Char-
terer.” Ibid. The vessel master's duty is only to “load and
discharge” at the chosen safe berth. Ibid. (Not, as the dis-
sent urges, at any safe berth the vessel master so desires
regardless of the charterer's contractually required selec-
tion. Post, at 370, n. 4.) On its face, the vessel master's duty
creates no tension with the charterer's duty. And it strains
common sense to insist (as the dissent does) that the vessel
master implicitly has a separate, dueling obligation regarding
the safety of the berth, when the clause explicitly assigns that
responsibility to the charterer. Post, at 370–371. Perhaps

362 CITGO
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SHIPPING CO.
Opinion of the Court
the dissent says it best: We must “rejec[t this] interpretation
that
. . . `se[ts] up . . . two clauses in confict with one an-
other.' ” Post, at 370 (quoting Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U. S. 52, 64 (1995)).
We instead take the safe-berth clause at face value. It
requires the charterer to select a safe berth, and that re-
quirement here amounts to a warranty of safety.
B
CARCO's remaining arguments point to authorities that
have purportedly construed safe-berth clauses to contain
limitations on liability. These arguments fnd no foothold in
the language of the charter party at issue here. And none
is otherwise convincing.
CARCO asserts, for instance, that a leading admiralty
treatise has urged that safe-berth clauses ought not be inter-
preted as establishing a warranty. See G. Gilmore & C.
Black, Law of Admiralty § 4–4, p. 205 (2d ed. 1975) (Gil-
more & Black). Gilmore and Black's position, however,
stemmed from their belief that vessel masters or vessel own-
ers are generally better positioned than charterers to bear
the liability of an unsafe berth. See ibid. (reasoning that
charterers “may know nothing of the safety of ports and
berths, and [are] much less certain to be insured against”
liability for losses stemming from an unsafe berth).
8
Gil-
8
The dissent's claim that Gilmore and Black looked to “ `the very words
of the usual clauses,' ” post, at 367, n. 1 (quoting Gilmore & Black § 4–4,
at 204), relies on a discussion not of the charterer's obligation under the
safe-berth clause but of the vessel master's lack of such obligation, id.,
at 204–205. At most, Gilmore and Black “suggested” that interpret-
ing safe-berth clauses to relieve vessel masters of any obligation to enter
an unsafe berth “might easily be read to contradict” any “affrmative lia-
bility” on the part of the charterer “in case of mishap.” See id.,
at 205. But that supposition is at odds with the language of the safe-
berth clause here, which (as even CARCO acknowledges) plainly con-
templates at least some liability for the charterer's designation of an
unsafe berth. Supra, at 355–357, and n. 3. And as explained, a vessel
master's ability to refuse entry into an unsafe berth does not logically or

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363
Opinion of the Court
more and Black also acknowledged that, as of 1975, many
cour
ts had not interpreted safe-berth clauses in the manner
that they proposed. See id., at 204, and n. 34a, 206, and
n. 36. Whatever Gilmore and Black sought to prevail upon
courts to adopt as a prescriptive matter does not alter the
plain meaning of the safe-berth clause here.
CARCO next contends that in Atkins v. Disintegrating
Co., 18 Wall. 272 (1874), this Court acknowledged that safe-
berth clauses do not embody a warranty of safety. That
greatly overreads Atkins. In that case, this Court affrmed
a District Court's ruling that, although the berth selected by
the charterer was not safe, the vessel master had “waived”
the protection of the safe-berth clause. Atkins v. Fibre Dis-
integrating Co., 2 F. Cas. 78, 79 (No. 601) (EDNY 1868); see
Atkins, 18 Wall., at 299. No one posits that the District
Court's waiver holding has any signifcance in this case.
CARCO, however, points to language in the District Court's
opinion observing that the “safe” berth referenced in the
charter party “impl[ied one] which th[e] vessel could enter
and depart from without legal restraint, and without incur-
ring more than the ordinary perils of the seas.” Atkins, 2
F. Cas., at 79. But the District Court's remark—that a
berth may be safe even if certain perils lurk within—did not
bear on its fnding that the berth in question was unsafe or
its holding that the vessel master had “waived” the protec-
tion of the safe-berth clause. When this Court approved of
the District Court's “views” and “conclusions,” Atkins, 18
Wall., at 299, it did not adopt as controlling precedent—for
all safe-berth clauses going forward—an observation that
was not controlling even for the District Court.
Also misplaced is CARCO's reliance on Orduna S. A., 913
F. 2d 1149. True, the Fifth Circuit there held that a simi-
larly unqualifed safe-berth clause imposed a duty of due dili-
gence. Id., at 1157. But in so holding, the court did not
textually diminish a charterer's liability when the vessel master in fact
enters an unsafe berth selected by the charterer. Supra, at 360–361.

364 CITGO
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SHIPPING CO.
Opinion of the Court
purport to interpret the language of the safe-berth clause
at
issue in that case. Id., at 1156–1157. Instead, it looked
principally to tort law and policy considerations. See, e. g.,
id., at 1156 (“requiring negligence as a predicate for the char-
terer's liability does not increase the risk that the vessel will
be exposed to an unsafe berth”); id., at 1157 (“no legitimate
legal or social policy is furthered by making the charterer
warrant the safety of the berth it selects”). Neither tort
principles nor policy objectives, however, override the safe-
berth clause's unambiguous meaning.
More consistent with traditional contract analysis is the
Second Circuit's long line of decisions interpreting the lan-
guage of unqualifed safe-berth clauses to embody an express
warranty of safety. See, e. g., Paragon Oil Co., 310 F. 2d, at
172–173 (“the express terms of [the] contract” established a
“warranty” obliging the charterer “to furnish, not only a
place which he believes to be safe, but a place where the
chartered vessel can discharge `always afoat' ” (some inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); Park S. S. Co. v. Cities Serv.
Oil Co., 188 F. 2d 804, 805–806 (CA2 1951) (“the natural
meaning of `safe place' is a place entirely safe, not an area
only part of which is safe,” and “the charter party was an
express assurance that the berth was safe”); Cities Serv.
Transp. Co. v. Gulf Refning Co., 79 F. 2d 521 (CA2 1935)
(per curiam) (the “charter party was itself an express assur-
ance . . . that at the berth `indicated' the ship would be able
to lie `always afoat' ”). Those decisions, which focused on
the controlling contract language, all point in the same direc-
tion: When the language of a safe-berth clause obliges a char-
terer to select a safe berth without qualifying the charterer's
duty or the assurance of safety that language establishes a
warranty. That aligns with our decision today.
9
9
The parties also dispute whether the prevailing industry usage of safe-
berth clauses supports reading the safe-berth clause here as a warranty
or as a promise of due diligence. Because the express language of the
safe-berth clause is susceptible to only one meaning, we need not address
these arguments.

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365
Thomas, J., dissenting
III
W
e conclude that the language of the safe-berth clause
here unambiguously establishes a warranty of safety, and
that CARCO has identifed “no reason to contravene the
clause's obvious meaning.” Kirby, 543 U. S., at 31–32. We
emphasize, however, that our decision today “does no more
than provide a legal backdrop against which future [charter
parties] will be negotiated.” Id., at 36. Charterers remain
free to contract around unqualifed language that would oth-
erwise establish a warranty of safety, by expressly limiting
the extent of their obligations or liability.
***
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the plain lan-
guage of the safe-berth clause establishes a warranty of
safety and therefore affrm the judgment of the Third
Circuit.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, w ith whom Justice Alito joi ns,
dissenting.
The Court concludes that the safe-berth clause in the con-
tract at issue unambiguously created a warranty of safety by
the charterer. Although this interpretation provides a clear
background rule for the maritime industry to contract
against, it is the wrong rule and fnds no basis in the con-
tract's plain text. I would hold that the plain language of
the safe-berth clause contains no warranty of safety and re-
mand for factfnding on whether industry custom and usage
establish such a warranty in this case. Accordingly, I re-
spectfully dissent.
I
In 2001, Star Tankers Inc. (Star) entered into a voyage
char ter par ty w ith CITGO Aspha lt Refining Company
(CARCO). That contract included a safe-berth clause that
provided:

366 CITGO
ASPHALT REFINING CO. v. FRESCATI
SHIPPING CO.
Thomas, J., dissenting
“SAFE BERTHING — SHIFTING. The vessel shall
load
and discharge at any safe place or wharf, or along-
side vessels or lighters reachable on her arrival, which
shall be designated and procured by the Charterer, pro-
vided the Vessel can proceed thereto, lie at, and depart
therefrom always safely afoat, any lighterage being at
the expense, risk and peril of the Charterer.” Adden-
dum to Brief for Petitioners 8a.
I agree with the majority that we must interpret the safe-
berth clause “by [its] terms and consistent with the intent of
the parties.” Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. James N. Kirby,
Pty Ltd., 543 U. S. 14, 31 (2004). Unlike the majority, how-
ever, I conclude that the plain meaning of the safe-berth
clause does not include a warranty of safety.
A
The safe-berth clause sets out the rights and obligations
of the vessel master and the charterer. The clause requires
the vessel master to “load and discharge at [a] safe place or
wharf,” but it also gives the master the right to refuse to
proceed if the vessel cannot “lie at, and depart therefrom
always safely afoat.” Addendum to Brief for Petitioners 8a.
The charterer has the right to “designat[e]” a “safe place or
wharf ” for discharge. Ibid. That right, however, must be
exercised by the charterer, see ibid. (using mandatory lan-
guage), and the act of designation must be made in good
faith, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1979).
The right to designate is limited to places that the vessel can
reach, with the charterer bearing the “expense, risk and
peril” of any “lighterage” (i. e., transfer of cargo by means of
another vessel) resulting from its selection. Addendum to
Brief for Petitioners 8a. As the leading admiralty treatise
succinctly explains, the safe-berth clause provides that “if
the port or the berth is unsafe, the master is excused from
taking his ship in, and the charterer must bear the extra
expense . . . entailed by [a proper] refusal” of its selected

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367
Thomas, J., dissenting
place of discharge. G. Gilmore & C. Black, Law of Admi-
ra
lty § 4–4, p. 204 (2d ed. 1975).
1
This reading is consistent with this Court's prior decisions.
The Court has interpreted safe-berth clauses as providing a
limit on the “right to select a dock.” Mencke v. Cargo of
Java Sugar, 187 U. S. 248, 253 (1902); see also The Gazelle
and Cargo, 128 U. S. 474, 485–486 (1888) (holding that the
right of selection is limited by the terms of the contract).
And it has concluded that, if a charterer selects a place
of discharge that cannot be safely reached, the charterer
is liable for lighterage expenses. Mencke, 187 U. S., at
253–254.
Thus, under the plain language of the safe-berth clause,
the vessel master has a duty of discharge and right of refusal,
while the charterer has a right of selection and duty to pay
for lighterage.
B
The majority does not disagree that the safe-berth clause
confers these duties and rights. Quite the opposite. It rec-
ognizes our precedents as embracing this understanding.
Ante, at 360–361. The majority concludes, however, that in
addition to the rights of selection and refusal, the language
of the safe-berth clause “unambiguously” establishes a war-
ranty of safety by the charterer. Ante, at 365. With this,
I cannot agree.
1
The majority states that the views of Gilmore and Black “stemmed
from their belief that vessel masters or vessel owners are generally better
positioned than charterers to bear the liability of an unsafe berth.” Ante,
at 362. While the treatise does contain policy-based arguments, it also
looks to “the very words of the usual clauses” to conclude that the master's
clear textual right to refuse to enter an unsafe port “might easily be read
to contradict” an interpretation of a safe-berth clause that “creat[es] an
affrmative liability of charterer to ship, in case of mishap.” Gilmore &
Black, Law of Admiralty § 4–4, at 204–205. Gilmore and Black's review
of safe-berth clauses contains just as much, if not more, analysis of the
text than the conclusory assertions of the majority. See ante, at 355–356.

368 CITGO
ASPHALT REFINING CO. v. FRESCATI
SHIPPING CO.
Thomas, J., dissenting
1
The
majority frst concludes that the safe-berth clause con-
tains an “express prescription of a warranty of safety.”
Ante, at 361; see also ante, at 355–356. This assertion fnds
no support whatsoever in the plain language of the clause.
First of all, the contract between Star and CARCO con-
tains no express warranty of safety by the charterer, though
the parties repeatedly used express language to create war-
ranties elsewhere in the contract. See Addendum to Brief
for Petitioners 26a (“Charterer's warrant . . . ”), 30a (“Own-
ers warrant . . . ”), ibid. (“Owner warrants . . . ”), 31a (“Owner
warrants . . . ”), 41a (“Owner warrants . . . ”), 42a (“Owner war-
rants . . . ”), 43a (“Owner warrants . . . ”), 44a (“Owner warrants
. . . ”), 45a (“Owner warrants . . . ”) (capitalization omitted). In
contrast, they did not state that the charterer “warrants” the
safety of the place of discharge in the safe-berth clause. As
the majority obliquely recognizes—when trying to rebut a
different argument—“[t]hat omission is particularly notable
in context: Where the parties intended to [create warranties]
elsewhere in the charter party, they did so expressly.”
Ante, at 358. “That the parties did not do so in the safe-
berth clause specifcally is . . . proof that they did not intend
for such a . . . limitation to inhere impliedly.” Ante, at 359.
2
But even setting aside this evidence of the parties' intent
(as the majority does), the safe-berth clause contains no lan-
2
Attempting to avoid the inconsistent application of its own principle,
the majority claims there is a distinction between language limiting liabil-
ity and language creating liability. Ante, at 359, n. 6. In the majority's
view, express language is “necessary” to limit liability, but the parties can
create warranty liability in numerous ways. Ibid. Even assuming that
is correct, it does not negate the proof of the parties' intent here. The
majority can point to no example of the parties “creat[ing] warranties
without invoking express warranty language” in this contract. Ibid. By
contrast, the contract contains no fewer than nine clauses using express
language to create a warranty. The commonsense conclusion is that,
when the parties intended to create a warranty, they used express lan-
guage to do so.

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369
Thomas, J., dissenting
guage that can be construed to create a warranty of safety.
N
or does the clause so much as suggest that the charterer
is liable for all damages arising out of unsafe port condi-
tions. In fact, the trade association that promulgated the
ASBATANKVOY form used in this case specifcally acknowl-
edged that the language of “the clause does not specify
whether the charterer absolutely warrants the safety of the
berth.” Brief for Maritime Law Association of the United
States et al. as Amici Curiae on Pet. for Cert. 19 (empha-
sis added).
Notwithstanding this, the majority states that the clause
“requires the charterer to designate a `safe' berth” and
that requirement “binds the charterer to a warranty of
safety.” Ante, at 356. But certainly not every obligation
in a contract is a warranty. See Brooks, Tarlton, Gilbert,
Douglas & Kressler v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 832 F. 2d
1358, 1375, n. 14 (CA5 1987). Parties often agree to obliga-
tions that govern only their conduct without making any as-
surances as to an ultimate result. For example, “[a] promise
to repair parts of [a] powertrain for six years is a promise
that the manufacturer will behave in a certain way, not a
warranty that the vehicle will behave in a certain way.”
Cosman v. Ford Motor Co., 285 Ill. App. 3d 250, 257, 674
N. E. 2d 61, 66 (1996). The majority does not confront, or
even acknowledge, this distinction. Instead, it indifferently
confates a duty to take a certain action—“designat[e]” a
wharf understood to be safe—with a warranty guaranteeing
a certain result—the ultimate safety of the berth.
3
By confating an action with an outcome, the majority con-
verts every obligation tangentially related to safety into a
warranty of safety. Consider the contract in this case, for
example. If the language stating that the charterer “shall
. . . designat[e] and procur[e]” a “safe place or wharf ” creates
3
I am skeptical that the phrase “place or wharf ” can be read to include
the entire berth. But CARCO failed to develop any argument related to
the scope of this phrase, so I do not address the issue.

370 CITGO
ASPHALT REFINING CO. v. FRESCATI
SHIPPING CO.
Thomas, J., dissenting
a warranty of safety, then so does the language stating that
“
[t]he vessel shall load and discharge at [a] safe place or
wharf.” Addendum to Brief for Petitioners 8a. There is no
textual reason that an obligation to “designat[e]” is any dif-
ferent from an obligation to “discharge.” Ibid. And policy-
based rationalizations cannot justify a distinction because
“[n]either tort principles nor policy objectives . . . override
the safe-berth clause's unambiguous meaning.” Ante, at
364. Thus, employing the majority's approach, the safe-
berth clause contains two competing warranties of safety—
one from the charterer and one from the vessel master—that
could impose conficting obligations.
4
Courts typically avoid
construing contracts in such a manner. See Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U. S. 52, 64 (1995) (re-
jecting an interpretation that the Court believed “se[t] up
. . . two clauses in confict with one another”); United States
v. Pielago, 135 F. 3d 703, 710 (CA11 1998) (“It is a cardinal
principle of contract law that no term of a contract should
be construed to be in confict with another unless no other
reasonable construction is possible”). Setting aside this
contract, the majority makes no attempt to limit its expan-
4
To support its assertion that no confict exists, the majority rewrites
the text of the safe-berth clause. The majority asserts that “[t]he vessel
master's duty is only to `load and discharge' at the chosen safe berth.”
Ante, at 361 (emphasis added). But that is not what the clause says. The
safe-berth clause states: “The vessel shall load and discharge at any safe
place or wharf.” Addendum to Brief for Petitioners 8a (emphasis added).
And, by requiring the charterer to pay for lighterage expenses resulting
from the designation of an unsafe port, the clause specifcally contemplates
the vessel master declining to discharge at a place or wharf that is not
safe. Ibid.; see also Mencke v. Cargo of Java Sugar, 187 U. S. 248, 253
(1902) (requiring the charterer to pay lighterage expenses where vessel
discharged at a location other than the chosen berth). The “which” clause
in the provision—“which shall be designated and procured by the Char-
terer”—modifes “place or wharf,” creating a separate obligation for the
charterer. Addendum to Brief for Petitioners 8a. That separate obliga-
tion, however, does not negate the express obligation imposed on the ves-
sel. Ibid.

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371
Thomas, J., dissenting
sive interpretive approach or provide the barest of explana-
ti
on as to why all obligations that involve the word “safe”
should not be construed as warranties of safety.
In a contract replete with express language creating war-
ranties, I would not construe the plain language of the safe-
berth clause as indirectly creating contradictory warranties
of safety. And I certainly cannot agree with the majority's
conclusion that the safe-berth clause “unambiguously” estab-
lishes a warranty of safety by the charterer. Ante, at 365.
2
Perhaps recognizing the weakness of its assertion that the
safe-berth clause contains a duty or warranty of safety, the
majority pivots to an independent legal theory. It claims
that the safe-berth clause constitutes a material statement
of fact and therefore creates a warranty. Ante, at 357. The
majority's invocation of this theory is puzzling, to say the
least.
As an initial matter, this issue was not preserved in the
Court of Appeals, which, understandably, did not address the
question. In re Frescati Shipping Co., 718 F. 3d 184, 200–
203 (CA3 2013). Nor was the issue developed before this
Court. All we have before us is one conclusory paragraph
in the United States' brief. See Brief for United States 25.
Accordingly, I would decline to address this unpreserved and
undeveloped issue.
Even setting aside forfeiture, the majority's analysis is
questionable in multiple respects. First, the majority asserts
that “the safe-berth clause contains a statement of material
fact regarding the condition of the berth selected by the char-
terer.” Ante, at 357. Not so. The safe-berth clause says
nothing about the safety of the port actually selected by
CARCO (the Paulsboro berth), or any specifc berth for that
matter. It states only that the charterer “shall . . . desig-
nat[e]” a place or wharf. The majority infers from CARCO's
selection of the Paulsboro berth that CARCO believed the

372 CITGO
ASPHALT REFINING CO. v. FRESCATI
SHIPPING CO.
Thomas, J., dissenting
place or wharf was safe. But that is not a statement of fact;
it
is an inference. I hesitate to equate the two without
briefng on the issue, or even a single example of a court
adopting this approach.
Second, even assuming the safe-berth clause contains a
statement of fact, it is not clear that the Court is in a position
to decide whether that statement of fact is “material.”
Many jurisdictions appear to treat materiality as a question
of fact when determining whether a statement creates a war-
ranty. Royal Bus. Machines, Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633
F. 2d 34, 43 (CA7 1980) (“Whether a seller affrmed a fact or
made a promise amounting to a warranty is a question of fact
reserved for the trier of fact”); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Thiokol Corp., 124 F. 3d 1173, 1176 (CA9 1997) (“Whether
the seller's representations formed part of the basis of the
parties' bargain is a question of fact”); Crothers v. Cohen,
384 N. W. 2d 562, 563 (Minn. App. 1986) (“Whether a given
representation constitutes a warranty is ordinarily a ques-
tion of fact for the jury”); General Supply & Equip. Co. v.
Phillips, 490 S. W. 2d 913, 917 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (citing
cases from Illinois, Iowa, Alabama, and Ohio). And “our
cases have recognized in other contexts that the materiality
inquiry, involving as it does `delicate assessments of the in-
ferences a “reasonable [decisionmaker]” would draw from a
given set of facts and the signifcance of those inferences to
him, [is] peculiarly on[e] for the trier of fact.' ” United
States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, 512 (1995). Although this
Court has relied on factual fndings to support a materiality
conclusion, Davison v. Von Lingen, 113 U. S. 40, 50 (1885), I
am not aware of a case in which this Court has treated the
materiality inquiry as a pure question of law without relying
on any factual fndings whatsoever. Again, without briefng
on this issue, I would hesitate to depart, without explanation,
from the approach taken by many courts throughout the
country.
Third, assuming the contract contains a statement of fact
regarding the safety of the berth and further assuming that

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373
Thomas, J., dissenting
materiality is a question of law, I am unpersuaded by the
major
ity's materiality analysis. Materiality must turn at
least in part on a statement's “tendency to induce the making
of the contract.” 22 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 58.11,
p. 41 (4th ed. 2017). The majority's opinion says nothing
about that (likely fact-driven) question. It frst states that
the safety of the selected berth is “the entire root of the safe-
berth clause” and “the very reason for the clause's inclusion.”
Ante, at 357. Even accepting the majority's interpretation,
merely proving that a statement is included in a contract
does not mean that it is material. If that were the law, then
every statement in a contract would be material and there-
fore constitute a warranty. That cannot be right. The ma-
jority next concludes that “[u]nder any conception of materi-
ality and any view of the parties' intent, the charterer's
assurance [of safety with no conditions] surely counts as ma-
terial.” Ibid. But what is the basis for this conclusion?
The majority's experience negotiating maritime contracts?
It defes reality to assert that a standard provision in a form
contract—which has been subject to different interpreta-
tions for nearly three decades—induced every single vessel
master using that form contract to enter into the agreement.
We should recognize this for what it is: an unsupported judi-
cial pronouncement on a question of fact.
The majority's attempt to shore up its analysis with its
alternative statement-of-fact theory makes no difference to
the outcome of this case, because the majority erroneously
holds that the safe-berth clause contains an absolute duty
that was breached. See ante, at 355–356; supra, at 368–371.
But its unreasoned dicta will undoubtedly cause problems for
lower courts and parties in the future.
II
The lack of unambiguous language creating a warranty of
safety in the safe-berth clause does not end our inquiry.
“ `In this endeavor, as with any other contract, the parties'
intentions control.' ” M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett,

374 CITGO
ASPHALT REFINING CO. v. FRESCATI
SHIPPING CO.
Thomas, J., dissenting
574 U. S. 427, 435 (2015) (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. Ani-
m
alFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U. S. 662, 682 (2010)); see also ante,
at 355. The vessel's owner and the United States argue
that, setting aside the plain meaning of the contract's text,
longstanding industry custom supports interpreting the safe-
berth clause as a warranty of safety. I would remand for
factfnding on this issue.
Under both “general maritime law” and ordinary princi-
ples of contract interpretation, evidence of an established
“custom and usage” can be used as an aid to “determin[e] the
parties' intent” and the meaning of the language included in
the contract. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 674, n. 6 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also U. C. C. § 1–303 Comment
3 (2017); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 220. But “the
existence and scope of a particular usage is usually a ques-
tion of fact.” Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U. S. 717, 732,
n. 4 (1988); see also U. C. C. § 1–303(c); Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 219, Comment a; § 222(2). Here, we have no
factual fndings from the District Court to support a custom-
or-usage argument. Such fndings seem particularly neces-
sary in this case: “A trade usage can of course be confned
to a particular geographical area,” 5 M. Kniffn, Corbin on
Contracts § 24.13, p. 110 (J. Perillo ed., rev. 1998), and differ-
ent areas of the country appeared to have different under-
standings of the safe-berth clause at the time of contracting.
See ante, at 354–355 (recognizing Circuit split); Brief for
North American Export Grain Association as Amicus Cu-
riae 9 (stating that in “New Orleans . . . safe-berth clauses
are understood to impose due diligence obligations”). Ac-
cordingly, I would remand for factual fndings on the ques-
tion whether the parties entered into the charter party with
knowledge of an established custom or usage.
***
I appreciate the majority's desire to interpret the safe-
berth clause in a manner that provides clarity to the mari-

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as: 589 U. S. 348 (2020)
375
Thomas, J., dissenting
time industry. The plain meaning of the contract's text,
howe
ver, does not support the majority's interpretation.
Fortunately, the majority's opinion applies only to this spe-
cifc contract, and its assertions regarding a material state-
ment of fact are but dicta. Because I would reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further
proceedings, I respectfully dissent.

376 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
Syllabus
KANSAS v. GLOVER
certiorari
to the supreme court of kansas
No. 18–556. Argued November 4, 2019—Decided April 6, 2020
A Kansas deputy sheriff ran a license plate check on a pickup truck, dis-
covering that the truck belonged to respondent Glover and that Glover's
driver's license had been revoked. The deputy pulled the truck over
because he assumed that Glover was driving. Glover was in fact driv-
ing and was charged with driving as a habitual violator. He moved to
suppress all evidence from the stop, claiming that the deputy lacked
reasonable suspicion. The District Court granted the motion, but the
Court of Appeals reversed. The Kansas Supreme Court in turn re-
versed, holding that the deputy violated the Fourth Amendment by
stopping Glover without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Held: When the offcer lacks information negating an inference that the
owner is driving the vehicle, an investigative traffc stop made after
running a vehicle's license plate and learning that the registered owner's
dr iver 's license has been revoked is reasonable under the Four th
Amendment. Pp. 380–386.
(a) An offcer may initiate a brief investigative traffc stop when he
has “a particularized and objective basis” to suspect legal wrongdoing.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417. The level of suspicion re-
quired is less than that necessary for probable cause and “depends on
` “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which rea-
sonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” ' ” Prado Nava-
rette v. California, 572 U. S. 393, 402. Courts must therefore permit
offcers to make “commonsense judgments and inferences about human
behavior.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U. S. 119, 125. Pp. 380–381.
(b) Here, the deputy's commonsense inference that the owner of a
vehicle was likely the vehicle's driver provided more than reasonable
suspicion to initiate the stop. That inference is not made unreasonable
merely because a vehicle's driver is not always its registered owner or
because Glover had a revoked license. Though common sense suffces
to justify the offcer's inference, empirical studies demonstrate that driv-
ers with suspended or revoked licenses frequently continue to drive.
And Kansas' license-revocation scheme, which covers drivers who have
already demonstrated a disregard for the law or are categorically unft
to drive, reinforces the reasonableness of the inference that an individ-
ual with a revoked license will continue to drive. Pp. 381–383.

Cite
as: 589 U. S. 376 (2020)
377
Syllabus
(c) Glover's counterarguments are unpersuasive. He argues that the
deputy'
s inference was unreasonable because it was not grounded in his
law enforcement training or experience. Such a requirement, however,
is inconsistent with this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
See, e. g., Navarette, 572 U. S., at 402. It would also place the burden
on police offcers to justify their inferences by referring to training ma-
terials or experience, and it would foreclose their ability to rely on com-
mon sense obtained outside of their work duties. Glover's argument
that Kansas' view would permit offcers to base reasonable suspicion
exclusively on probabilities also carries little force. Offcers, like jurors,
may rely on probabilities in the reasonable suspicion context. See, e. g.,
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 8–9. Moreover, the deputy here
did more than that: He combined facts obtained from a database and
commonsense judgments to form a reasonable suspicion that a spe-
cifc individual was potentially engaged in specifc criminal activity.
Pp. 383–385.
(d) The scope of this holding is narrow. The reasonable suspicion
standard “ `takes into account the totality of the circumstances.' ” Na-
varette, 572 U. S., at 397. The presence of additional facts might dispel
reasonable suspicion, but here, the deputy possessed no information suf-
fcient to rebut the reasonable inference that Glover was driving his own
truck. Pp. 385–386.
308 Kan. 590, 422 P. 3d 64, reversed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ.,
joined. Kagan, J., fled a concurring opinion, in which Ginsburg, J.,
joined, post, p. 387. Sotomayor, J., fled a dissenting opinion, post,
p. 391.
Toby Crouse, Solicitor General of Kansas, argued the cause
for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Derek Schmidt,
Attorney General of Kansas, Jeffrey A. Chanay, Chief Dep-
uty Attorney General, Kristafer Ailslieger and Brant M.
Laue, Deputy Solicitors General, and Natalie Chalmers,
Bryan C. Clark, Dwight R. Carswell, and Jodi Litfn, Assist-
ant Solicitors General.
Michael R. Huston argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Francisco, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Benczkowski, Eric J. Feigin, and Amanda B. Harris.

378 K
ANSAS v. GLOVER
Opinion of the Court
Sarah E. Harrington argued the cause for respondent.
W
ith her on the brief were Charles H. Davis, Erica Oleszc-
zuk Evans, Daniel Woofter, and Elbridge Griffy IV.*
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a police offcer
violates the Fourth Amendment by initiating an investiga-
tive traffc stop after running a vehicle's license plate and
learning that the registered owner has a revoked driver's
license. We hold that when the offcer lacks information ne-
gating an inference that the owner is the driver of the vehi-
cle, the stop is reasonable.
I
Kansas charged respondent Charles Glover, Jr., with driv-
ing as a habitual violator after a traffc stop revealed that he
was driving with a revoked license. See Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 8–285(a)(3) (2001). Glover fled a motion to suppress all
evidence seized during the stop, claiming that the offcer
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Okla-
homa et al. by Mike Hunter, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Mithun Man-
singhani, Solicitor General, Randall Yates, Assistant Solicitor General,
and Kevin T. Kane, Chief State's Attorney of Connecticut, and by the
Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Steve Marshall
of Alabama, Leslie Rutledge of Arkansas, Chris Carr of Georgia, Curtis
T. Hill, Jr., of Indiana, Andy Beshear of Kentucky, Doug Peterson of Ne-
braska, Gurbir S. Grewal of New Jersey, Hector H. Balderas of New Mex-
ico, Dave Yost of Ohio, Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania, Alan Wilson of
South Carolina, Herbert H. Slatery III of Tennessee, Ken Paxton of Texas,
Sean D. Reyes of Utah, and Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia; for the
National District Attorneys Association by Scott A. Keller and Benjamin
A. Geslison; and for the National Fraternal Order of Police by Larry H.
James.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Electronic
Privacy Information Center et al. by Marc Rotenberg and Alan Butler; for
Fines and Fees Justice Center et al. by Seanna Brown; for the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by David Debold, Brandon L.
Boxler, and Barbara E. Bergman; for The Rutherford Institute by D. Ali-
cia Hickok and John W. Whitehead; and for Andrew Manuel Crespo by
Mr. Crespo, pro se.

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379
Opinion of the Court
lacked reasonable suspicion. Neither Glover nor the police
offcer
testifed at the suppression hearing. Instead, the
parties stipulated to the following facts:
“1. Deputy Mark Mehrer is a certifed law enforcement
offcer employed by the Douglas County Kansas Sher-
iff 's Offce.
“2. On April 28, 2016, Deputy Mehrer was on routine
patrol in Douglas County when he observed a 1995 Che-
vrolet 1500 pickup truck with Kansas plate 295ATJ.
“3. Deputy Mehrer ran Kansas plate 295ATJ through
the Kansas Department of Revenue's fle service. The
registration came back to a 1995 Chevrolet 1500 pickup
truck.
“4. Kansas Department of Revenue fles indicated the
truck was registered to Charles Glover Jr. The fles
also indicated that Mr. Glover had a revoked driver's
license in the State of Kansas.
“5. Deputy Mehrer assumed the registered owner of the
truck was also the driver, Charles Glover Jr.
“6. Deputy Mehrer did not observe any traffc infrac-
tions, and did not attempt to identify the driver [of] the
truck. Based solely on the information that the regis-
tered owner of the truck was revoked, Deputy Mehrer
initiated a traffc stop.
“7. The driver of the truck was identifed as the defend-
ant, Charles Glover Jr.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 60–61.
The District Court granted Glover's motion to suppress.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “it was reason-
able for [Deputy] Mehrer to infer that the driver was the
owner of the vehicle” because “there were specifc and arti-
culable facts from which the offcer's common-sense inference
gave rise to a reasonable suspicion.” 54 Kan. App. 2d 377,
385, 400 P. 3d 182, 188 (2017).
The Kansas Supreme Court reversed. According to the
court, Deputy Mehrer did not have reasonable suspicion
because his inference that Glover was behind the wheel

380 K
ANSAS v. GLOVER
Opinion of the Court
amounted to “only a hunch” that Glover was engaging in
cr
iminal activity. 308 Kan. 590, 591, 422 P. 3d 64, 66 (2018).
The court further explained that Deputy Mehrer's “hunch”
involved “applying and stacking unstated assumptions that
are unreasonable without further factual basis,” namely, that
“the registered owner was likely the primary driver of the
vehicle” and that “the owner will likely disregard the sus-
pension or revocation order and continue to drive.” Id., at
595–597, 422 P. 3d, at 68–70. We granted Kansas' petition
for a writ of certiorari, 587 U. S. 918 (2019), and now reverse.
II
Under this Court's precedents, the Fourth Amendment
permits an offcer to initiate a brief investigative traffc stop
when he has “a particularized and objective basis for sus-
pecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.”
United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417–418 (1981); see
also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21–22 (1968). “Although a
mere `hunch' does not create reasonable suspicion, the level
of suspicion the standard requires is considerably less than
proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and
obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.” Prado
Navarette v. California, 572 U. S. 393, 397 (2014) (quotation
altered); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 7 (1989).
Because it is a “less demanding ” standard, “reasonable
suspicion can be established with information that is differ-
ent in quantity or content than that required to establish
probable cause.” Alabama v. White, 496 U. S. 325, 330
(1990). The standard “depends on the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and pru-
dent men, not legal technicians, act.” Navarette, supra, at
402 (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 695
(1996); emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted).
Courts “cannot reasonably demand scientifc certainty . . .
where none exists.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U. S. 119, 125
(2000). Rather, they must permit offcers to make “com-

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381
Opinion of the Court
monsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.”
Ib
id.; see also Navarette, supra, at 403 (noting that an offcer
“ `need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct' ”).
III
We have previously recognized that States have a “vital
interest in ensuring that only those qualifed to do so are
permitted to operate motor vehicles [and] that licensing, reg-
istration, and vehicle inspection requirements are being ob-
served.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 658 (1979).
With this in mind, we turn to whether the facts known to
Deputy Mehrer at the time of the stop gave rise to reason-
able suspicion. We conclude that they did.
Before initiating the stop, Deputy Mehrer observed an in-
dividual operating a 1995 Chevrolet 1500 pickup truck with
Kansas plate 295ATJ. He also knew that the registered
owner of the truck had a revoked license and that the model
of the truck matched the observed vehicle. From these
three facts, Deputy Mehrer drew the commonsense inference
that Glover was likely the driver of the vehicle, which pro-
vided more than reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop.
The fact that the registered owner of a vehicle is not al-
ways the driver of the vehicle does not negate the reason-
ableness of Deputy Mehrer's inference. Such is the case
with all reasonable inferences. The reasonable suspicion in-
quiry “falls considerably short” of 51% accuracy, see United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U. S. 266, 274 (2002), for, as we have
explained, “[t]o be reasonable is not to be perfect,” Heien v.
North Carolina, 574 U. S. 54, 60 (2014).
Glover's revoked license does not render Deputy Mehrer's
inference unreasonable either. Empirical studies demon-
strate what common experience readily reveals: Drivers
with revoked licenses frequently continue to drive and there-
fore to pose safety risks to other motorists and pedestrians.
See, e. g., 2 T. Neuman et al., National Coop. Hwy. Research
Program Report 500: A Guide for Addressing Collisions In-

382 K
ANSAS v. GLOVER
Opinion of the Court
volving Unlicensed Drivers and Drivers With Suspended or
Re
voked Licenses, p. III–1 (2003) (noting that 75% of drivers
with suspended or revoked licenses continue to drive); Na-
tional Hwy. and Traffc Safety Admin., Research Note:
Driver License Compliance Status in Fatal Crashes 2 (Oct.
2014) (noting that approximately 19% of motor vehicle fatali-
ties from 2008–2012 “involved drivers with invalid licenses”).
Although common sense suffces to justify this inference,
Kansas law reinforces that it is reasonable to infer that an
individual with a revoked license may continue driving.
The State's license-revocation scheme covers drivers who
have already demonstrated a disregard for the law or are
categorically unft to drive. The Division of Vehicles of the
Kansas Department of Revenue (Division) “shall” revoke
a driver's license upon certain convictions for involuntary
manslaughter, vehicular homicide, battery, reckless driving,
feeing or attempting to elude a police offcer, or conviction
of a felony in which a motor vehicle is used. Kan. Stat. Ann.
§§ 8–254(a), 8–252. Reckless driving is defned as “driv[ing]
any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of
persons or property.” § 8–1566(a). The Division also has
discretion to revoke a license if a driver “[h]as been convicted
with such frequency of serious offenses against traffc regu-
lations governing the movement of vehicles as to indicate a
disrespect for traffc laws and a disregard for the safety of
other persons on the highways,” “has been convicted of three
or more moving traffc violations committed on separate oc-
casions within a 12-month period,” “is incompetent to drive
a motor vehicle,” or “has been convicted of a moving traffc
violation, committed at a time when the person's driving
privileges were restricted, suspended[,] or revoked.” §§ 8–
255(a)(1)–(4). Other reasons include violating license re-
strictions, § 8–245(c), being under house arrest, § 21–6609(c),
and being a habitual violator, § 8–286, which Kansas defnes
as a resident or nonresident who has been convicted three
or more times within the past fve years of certain enumer-
ated driving offenses, § 8–285. The concerns motivating the

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383
Opinion of the Court
State's various grounds for revocation lend further credence
to
the inference that a registered owner with a revoked Kan-
sas driver's license might be the one driving the vehicle.
IV
Glover and the dissent respond with two arguments as to
why Deputy Mehrer lacked reasonable suspicion. Neither
is persuasive.
A
First, Glover and the dissent argue that Deputy Mehrer's
inference was unreasonable because it was not grounded in
his law enforcement training or experience. Nothing in our
Fourth Amendment precedent supports the notion that, in
determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, an offcer
can draw inferences based on knowledge gained only through
law enforcement training and experience. We have repeat-
edly recognized the opposite. In Navarette, we noted a
number of behaviors—including driving in the median, cross-
ing the center line on a highway, and swerving—that as a
matter of common sense provide “sound indicia of drunk
driving.” 572 U. S., at 402. In Wardlow, we made the un-
remarkable observation that “[h]eadlong fight—wherever it
occurs—is the consummate act of evasion” and therefore
could factor into a police offcer's reasonable suspicion deter-
mination. 528 U. S., at 124. And in Sokolow, we recog-
nized that the defendant's method of payment for an airplane
ticket contributed to the agents' reasonable suspicion of drug
traffcking because we “fe[lt] confdent” that “[m]ost business
travelers . . . purchase airline tickets by credit card or check”
rather than cash. 490 U. S., at 8–9. So too here. The in-
ference that the driver of a car is its registered owner does
not require any specialized training; rather, it is a reasonable
inference made by ordinary people on a daily basis.
The dissent reads our cases differently, contending that they
permit an offcer to use only the common sense derived from
his “experiences in law enforcement.” Post, at 395 (opinion
of Sotomayor, J.). Such a standard defes the “common

384 K
ANSAS v. GLOVER
Opinion of the Court
sense” understanding of common sense, i. e., information that
is
accessible to people generally, not just some specialized
subset of society. More importantly, this standard appears
nowhere in our precedent. In fact, we have stated that rea-
sonable suspicion is an “abstract” concept that cannot be re-
duced to “a neat set of legal rules,” Arvizu, 534 U. S., at 274
(internal quotation marks omitted), and we have repeatedly
rejected courts' efforts to impose a rigid structure on the
concept of reasonableness, ibid.; Sokolow, supra, at 7–8.
This is precisely what the dissent's rule would do by insisting
that offcers must be treated as bifurcated persons, com-
pletely precluded from drawing factual inferences based on
the commonly held knowledge they have acquired in their
everyday lives.
The dissent's rule would also impose on police the burden
of pointing to specifc training materials or feld experiences
justifying reasonable suspicion for the myriad infractions in
municipal criminal codes. And by removing common sense
as a source of evidence, the dissent would considerably nar-
row the daylight between the showing required for probable
cause and the “less stringent” showing required for reason-
able suspicion. Prouse, 440 U. S., at 654; see White, 496
U. S., at 330. Finally, it would impermissibly tie a traffc
stop's validity to the offcer's length of service. See Deven-
peck v. Alford, 543 U. S. 146, 154 (2004). Such requirements
are inconsistent with our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
and we decline to adopt them here.
In reaching this conclusion, we in no way minimize the
signifcant role that specialized training and experience rou-
tinely play in law enforcement investigations. See, e. g., Ar-
vizu, supra, at 273–274. We simply hold that such experi-
ence is not required in every instance.
B
Glover and the dissent also contend that adopting Kansas'
view would eviscerate the need for offcers to base reason-
able suspicion on “specifc and articulable facts” particular-

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385
Opinion of the Court
ized to the individual, see Terry, 392 U. S., at 21, because
pol
ice could instead rely exclusively on probabilities. Their
argument carries little force.
As an initial matter, we have previously stated that off-
cers, like jurors, may rely on probabilities in the reasonable
suspicion context. See Sokolow, supra, at 8–9; Cortez, 449
U. S., at 418. Moreover, as explained above, Deputy Mehrer
did not rely exclusively on probabilities. He knew that the
license plate was linked to a truck matching the observed
vehicle and that the registered owner of the vehicle had a
revoked license. Based on these minimal facts, he used com-
mon sense to form a reasonable suspicion that a specifc indi-
vidual was potentially engaged in specifc criminal activity—
driving with a revoked license. Traffc stops of this nature
do not delegate to offcers “broad and unlimited discretion”
to stop drivers at random. United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 882 (1975). Nor do they allow offcers
to stop drivers whose conduct is no different from any other
driver's. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52 (1979). Ac-
cordingly, combining database information and commonsense
judgments in this context is fully consonant with this Court's
Fourth Amendment precedents.
1
V
This Court's precedents have repeatedly affrmed that
“ `the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is “rea-
1
The dissent contends that this approach “pave[s] the road to fnding
reasonable suspicion based on nothing more than a demographic profle.”
Post, at 397 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.). To alleviate any doubt, we reiter-
ate that the Fourth Amendment requires, and Deputy Mehrer had, an
individualized suspicion that a particular citizen was engaged in a particu-
lar crime. Such a particularized suspicion would be lacking in the dis-
sent's hypothetical scenario, which, in any event, is already prohibited by
our precedents. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 876
(1975) (holding that it violated the Fourth Amendment to stop and “ques-
tion [a vehicle's] occupants [about their immigration status] when the only
ground for suspicion [was] that the occupants appear[ed] to be of Mexi-
can ancestry”).

386 K
ANSAS v. GLOVER
Opinion of the Court
sonableness.” ' ” Heien, 574 U. S., at 60 (quoting Riley v.
C
alifornia, 573 U. S. 373, 381 (2014)). Under the totality of
the circumstances of this case, Deputy Mehrer drew an en-
tirely reasonable inference that Glover was driving while his
license was revoked.
We emphasize the narrow scope of our holding. Like all
seizures, “[t]he offcer's action must be ` “justifed at its incep-
tion.” ' ” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Hum-
boldt Cty., 542 U. S. 177, 185 (2004) (quoting United States
v. Sharpe, 470 U. S. 675, 682 (1985)). “The standard takes
into account the totality of the circumstances—the whole
picture.” Navarette, 572 U. S., at 397 (internal quotation
marks omitted). As a result, the presence of additional facts
might dispel reasonable suspicion. See Terry, supra, at 28.
For example, if an offcer knows that the registered owner
of the vehicle is in his mid-sixties but observes that the
driver is in her mid-twenties, then the totality of the circum-
stances would not “raise a suspicion that the particular indi-
vidual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.” Cortez,
supra, at 418; Ornelas, 517 U. S., at 696 (“ `Each case is to be
decided on its own facts and circumstances' ” (quoting Ker
v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 33 (1963))). Here, Deputy Me-
hrer possessed no exculpatory information—let alone suff-
cient information to rebut the reasonable inference that
Glover was driving his own truck—and thus the stop was
justifed.
2
***
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the
Kansas Supreme Court, and we remand the case for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
2
The dissent argues that this approach impermissibly places the burden
of proof on the individual to negate the inference of reasonable suspicion.
Post, at 380–381. Not so. As the above analysis makes clear, it is the infor-
mation possessed by the offcer at the time of the stop, not any information
offered by the individual after the fact, that can negate the inference.

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387
Kagan, J., concurring
Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
concurr
ing.
When you see a car coming down the street, your common
sense tells you that the registered owner may well be behind
the wheel. See ante, at 381, 386. Not always, of course.
Families share cars; friends borrow them. Still, a person
often buys a vehicle to drive it himself. So your suspicion
that the owner is driving would be perfectly reasonable.
See ibid.
Now, though, consider a wrinkle: Suppose you knew that
the registered owner of the vehicle no longer had a valid
driver's license. That added fact raises a new question.
What are the odds that someone who has lost his license
would continue to drive? The answer is by no means obvi-
ous. You might think that a person told not to drive on pain
of criminal penalty would obey the order—so that if his car
was on the road, someone else (a family member, a friend)
must be doing the driving. Or you might have the opposite
intuition—that a person's reasons for driving would over-
come his worries about violating the law, no matter the pos-
sible punishment. But most likely (let's be honest), you just
wouldn't know. Especially if you've not had your own li-
cense taken away, your everyday experience has given you
little basis to assess the probabilities. Your common sense
can therefore no longer guide you.
Even so, Deputy Mark Mehrer had reasonable suspicion to
stop the truck in this case, and I join the Court's opinion
holding as much. Crucially for me, Mehrer knew yet one
more thing about the vehicle's registered owner, and it re-
lated to his proclivity for breaking driving laws. As the
Court recounts, Mehrer learned from a state database that
Charles Glover, the truck's owner, had had his license re-
voked under Kansas law. See ante, at 379. And Kansas al-
most never revokes a license except for serious or repeated
driving offenses. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8–254 (2001); ante,
at 382. Crimes like vehicular homicide and manslaughter, or
vehicular fight from a police offcer, provoke a license revoca-
tion; so too do multiple convictions for moving traffc viola-

388 K
ANSAS v. GLOVER
Kagan, J., concurring
tions within a short time. See ante, at 382. In other words,
a
person with a revoked license has already shown a willing-
ness to fout driving restrictions. That fact, as the Court
states, provides a “reason[ ] to infer” that such a person will
drive without a license—at least often enough to warrant an
investigatory stop. Ibid. And there is nothing else here to
call that inference into question. That is because the par-
ties' unusually austere stipulation confned the case to the
facts stated above—i. e., that Mehrer stopped Glover's truck
because he knew that Kansas had revoked Glover's license.
But as already suggested, I would fnd this a different case
if Kansas had barred Glover from driving on a ground that
provided no similar evidence of his penchant for ignoring
driving laws. Consider, for example, if Kansas had sus-
pended rather than revoked Glover's license. Along with
many other States, Kansas suspends licenses for matters
having nothing to do with road safety, such as failing to pay
parking tickets, court fees, or child support. See Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 8–2110(b) (2018 Cum. Supp.); see also, e. g., N. J. Stat.
Ann. § 39:4–139.10 (West Supp. 2019); Ark. Code Ann. § 9–
14–239 (Supp. 2019). Indeed, several studies have found
that most license suspensions do not relate to driving at all;
what they most relate to is being poor. See Brief for Fines
and Fees Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae 7. So the
good reason the Court gives for thinking that someone with
a revoked license will keep driving—that he has a history
of disregarding driving rules—would no longer apply. And
without that, the case for assuming that an unlicensed driver
is at the wheel is hardly self-evident. It would have to rest
on an idea about the frequency with which even those who had
previously complied with driving laws would defy a State's
penalty-backed command to stay off the roads. But where
would that idea come from? As discussed above, I doubt
whether our collective common sense could do the necessary
work. See supra, at 387. Or otherwise said, I suspect that
any common sense invoked in this altered context would

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389
Kagan, J., concurring
not much differ from a “mere `hunch' ”—and so “not create
reasonable
suspicion.” Prado Navarette v. California, 572
U. S. 393, 397 (2014) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 27
(1968)).
And even when, as under the revocation scheme here, a
starting presumption of reasonable suspicion makes sense,
the defendant may show that in his case additional informa-
tion dictates the opposite result. The Court is clear on this
point, emphasizing that under the applicable totality-of-the-
circumstances test, “the presence of additional facts might
dispel reasonable suspicion” even though an offcer knows
that a car on the road belongs to a person with a revoked
license. Ante, at 386; see ante, at 378 (stating that further
information may “negat[e] an inference that the owner is the
driver of the vehicle”). Just as the Court once said of a
trained drug-detection dog 's “alert,” the license-revocation
signal is always subject to a defendant's challenge, whether
through cross-examination of the offcer or introduction of
his own fact or expert witnesses. Florida v. Harris, 568
U. S. 237, 247 (2013).
That challenge may take any number of forms. The
Court offers a clear example of observational evidence dis-
pelling reasonable suspicion: if the offcer knows the regis-
tered owner of a vehicle is an elderly man, but can see the
driver is a young woman. See ante, at 386. Similarly (if
not as cut-and-dry), when the offcer learns a car has two or
more registered owners, the balance of circumstances may
tip away from reasonable suspicion that the one with the
revoked license is driving. And so too, the attributes of the
car may be relevant. Consider if a car bears the markings
of a peer-to-peer carsharing service; or compare the likeli-
hoods that someone other than the registered owner is driv-
ing (1) a family minivan and (2) a Ferrari. The offcer himself
may have a wealth of accumulated information about such
matters, and the defendant may probe what that knowledge
suggests about the stop at issue.

390 K
ANSAS v. GLOVER
Kagan, J., concurring
Such a challenge may also use statistical evidence, which
is
almost daily expanding in sophistication and scope.
States or municipalities often keep information about “hit
rates” in stops like this one—in other words, the frequency
with which those stops discover unlicensed drivers behind
the wheel. See generally Brief for Andrew Manuel Crespo
as Amicus Curiae 23–27. Somewhat less direct but also
useful are state and local data (collected by governments,
insurance companies, and academics alike) about the average
number of drivers for each registered automobile and the
extent to which unlicensed persons continue to drive. See
id., at 13–18. (If, to use an extreme example, every car had
10 associated drivers, and losing a license reduced driving
time by 90%, an offcer would not have reasonable suspicion
for a stop.) Here too, defendants may question testifying
offcers about such information. Indeed, an offcer may have
his own hit rate, which if low enough could itself negate
reasonable suspicion. See, e. g., United States v. Cortez-
Galaviz, 495 F. 3d 1203, 1208–1209 (CA10 2007) (Gorsuch, J.)
(considering, as part of the reasonable suspicion inquiry, the
frequency of an offcer's misses and the accuracy of the data-
base on which he relied).*
In this strange case, contested on a barebones stipulation,
the record contains no evidence of these kinds. There is but
a single, simple fact: A police offcer learned from a state
database that a car on the road belonged to a person with a
revoked license. Given that revocations in Kansas nearly
*Of course, aggregate statistics of this kind cannot substitute for the
individualized suspicion that the Fourth Amendment requires. See, e. g.,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21, n. 18 (1968) (“Th[e] demand for specifcity . . .
is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence”).
But in a case like this one, the offcer's suspicion is individualized: It arises
from the license status of the known owner of a specifc car. The only
question is whether that suspicion is reasonable—whether, in other words,
there is enough to back up the offcer's belief that the owner is driving the
vehicle. As to that matter, statistics may be highly relevant, either to
support or to cast doubt on the offcer's judgment.

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391
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
always stem from serious or repeated driving violations, I
agree
with the Court about the reasonableness of the off-
cer's inference that the owner, “Glover[,] was driving while
his license was revoked.” Ante, at 386. And because
Glover offered no rebuttal, there the matter stands. But
that does not mean cases with more complete records will all
wind up in the same place. A defendant like Glover may
still be able to show that his case is different—that the “pres-
ence of additional facts” and circumstances “dispel[s] reason-
able suspicion.” Ibid. Which is to say that in more fully
litigated cases, the license-revocation alert does not (as it did
here) end the inquiry. It is but the frst, though no doubt
an important, step in assessing the reasonableness of the of-
fcer's suspicion.
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting.
In upholding routine stops of vehicles whose owners have
revoked licenses, the Court ignores key foundations of our
reasonable-suspicion jurisprudence and impermissibly and
unnecessarily reduces the State's burden of proof. I there-
fore dissent.
I
I begin with common ground. The Fourth Amendment
permits “brief investigatory” vehicle stops, United States v.
Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417 (1981), on “facts that do not consti-
tute probable cause,” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U. S. 873, 881 (1975). To assess whether an offcer had the
requisite suspicion to seize a driver, past cases have consid-
ered the “totality of the circumstances—the whole picture,”
Cortez, 449 U. S., at 417, and analyzed whether the offcer
assembled “fact on fact and clue on clue,” id., at 419.
The stop at issue here, however, rests on just one key fact:
that the vehicle was owned by someone with a revoked li-
cense. The majority concludes—erroneously, in my view—
that seizing this vehicle was constitutional on the record
below because drivers with revoked licenses (as opposed to

392 K
ANSAS v. GLOVER
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
suspended licenses) in Kansas “have already demonstrated a
disregard
for the law or are categorically unft to drive.”
Ante, at 382. This analysis breaks from settled doctrine and
dramatically alters both the quantum and nature of evidence
a State may rely on to prove suspicion.
A
The State bears the burden of justifying a seizure. Flor-
ida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion);
Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 51–52 (1979). This requires
the government to articulate factors supporting its reason-
able suspicion, usually through a trained agent. See Or-
nelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 696 (1996); see also
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 10 (1989). While the
Court has not dictated precisely what evidence a govern-
ment must produce, it has stressed that an offcer must at
least “articulate more than an `inchoate and unparticularized
suspici on or “ hunch” ' of cr iminal activity. ” Ill ino is v.
Wardlow, 528 U. S. 119, 123–124 (2000) (quoting Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 27 (1968)). That articulation must include
both facts and an offcer's “rational inferences from those
facts.” Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S., at 880, 884. A logical
“gap as to any one matter” in this analysis may be overcome
by “ `a strong showing ' ” regarding “ `other indicia of reliabil-
ity.' ” Florida v. Harris, 568 U. S. 237, 245 (2013). But
gaps may not go unflled.
Additionally, reasonable suspicion eschews judicial com-
mon sense, ante, at 382, in favor of the perspectives and in-
ferences of a reasonable offcer viewing “the facts through
the lens of his police experience and expertise.” Ornelas,
517 U. S., at 699; Cortez, 449 U. S., at 416–418 (explaining
that the facts and inferences giving rise to a stop “must be
seen and weighed . . . as understood by those versed in the
feld of law enforcement”); Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U. S.
54, 73 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur enunciation
of the reasonableness inquiry and our justifcation for it . . .

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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
have always turned on an offcer's factual conclusions and an
offcer
's expertise with respect to those factual conclusions”).
It is the reasonable offcer's assessment, not the ordinary
person's—or judge's—judgment, that matters.
1
Finally, a stop must be individualized—that is, based on “a
suspicion that the particular [subject] being stopped is en-
gaged in wrongdoing.” Cortez, 449 U. S., at 418; Prado Na-
varette v. California, 572 U. S. 393, 396–397 (2014). This
does not mean that the offcer must know the driver's iden-
tity. But a seizure must rest on more than the “likelihood
that [a] given person” or particular vehicle is engaged in
wrongdoing. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S., at 886–887. The
inquiry ordinarily involves some observation or report about
the target's behavior—not merely the class to which he be-
longs. See, e. g., Navarette, 572 U. S., at 398, 402 (upholding
vehicle stop based on an anonymous tip about driver conduct,
interpreted in light of the “accumulated experience of thou-
sands of offcers”); Sokolow, 490 U. S., at 10 (evaluating the
collective facts giving rise to suspicion that an individual was
transporting narcotics instead of relying on law enforce-
ment's simplifed drug courier “ `profle' ”).
B
Faithful adherence to these precepts would yield a signif-
cantly different analysis and outcome than that offered by
the majority.
For starters, the majority fips the burden of proof. It
permits Kansas police offcers to effectuate roadside stops
1
Cortez explained why this is so. Law enforcement offcers, behaving
akin to “jurors as factfnders,” have “formulated certain commonsense
conclusions about human behavior” as it relates to “the feld of law en-
forcement.” 449 U. S., at 418. A trained offcer thus “draws inferences
and makes deductions—inferences and deductions that might well elude
an untrained person.” Ibid.; see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U. S.
266, 276 (2002) (crediting offcer assessment of driver behavior that was
based on “his specialized training and familiarity with the customs of the
area's inhabitants”).

394 K
ANSAS v. GLOVER
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
whenever they lack “information negating an inference” that
a
vehicle's unlicensed owner is its driver. Ante, at 378.
This has it backwards: The State shoulders the burden to
supply the key inference that tethers observation to suspi-
cion. The majority repeatedly attributes such an inference
to Deputy Mehrer. Ante, at 381, 383, 386. But that is an
after-the-fact gloss on a seven-paragraph stipulation. No-
where in his terse submission did Deputy Mehrer indicate that
he had any informed belief about the propensity of unlicensed
drivers to operate motor vehicles in the area—let alone that
he relied on such a belief in seizing Glover. Ante, at 378–379.
The consequence of the majority's approach is to absolve
offcers from any responsibility to investigate the identity of
a driver where feasible. But that is precisely what offcers
ought to do—and are more than capable of doing. Of course,
some circumstances may not warrant an offcer approaching
a car to take a closer look at its occupants. But there are
countless other instances where offcers have been able to
ascertain the identity of a driver from a distance and make
out their approximate age and gender. Indeed, our cases
are rife with examples of offcers who have perceived more
than just basic driver demographics. See, e. g., Heien, 574
U. S., at 57 (offcer thought that motorist was “ `very stiff and
nervous' ”); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U. S. 266, 270 (2002)
(offcer observed an “adult man” driving who “appeared
stiff ”); United States v. Ross, 456 U. S 798, 801 (1982) (offcer
pulled alongside car and noticed that the driver matched a
description from an informant); Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S.,
at 875 (offcers stopped a vehicle whose occupants “appeared
to be of Mexican descent”). The majority underestimates
offcers' capabilities and instead gives them free rein to stop
a vehicle involved in no suspicious activity simply because it
is registered to an unlicensed person. That stop is based
merely on a guess or a “hunch” about the driver's identity.
Ward l o w, 528 U. S., at 124 ( i nter na l quot ati on marks
omitted).

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395
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
With no basis in the record to presume that unlicensed
dr
ivers routinely continue driving, the majority endeavors
to fll the gap with its own “common sense.” Ante, at 382.
But simply labeling an inference “common sense” does not
make it so, no matter how many times the majority repeats
it. Cf. ante, at 382, 383, 384, 385. Whether the driver of a
vehicle is likely to be its unlicensed owner is “by no means
obvious.” Ante, at 387 (Kagan, J., concurring). And like
the concurrence, I “doubt” that our collective judicial com-
mon sense could answer that question, even if our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence allowed us to do so. Ante, at 388.
Contrary to the majority's claims, ante, at 380–382, 384,
the reasonable-suspicion inquiry does not accommodate the
average person's intuition. Rather, it permits reliance on a
particular type of common sense—that of the reasonable of-
fcer, developed through her experiences in law enforcement.
Cortez, 449 U. S., at 418. This approach acknowledges that
what may be “common sense” to a layperson may not be
relevant (or correct) in a law enforcement context. Indeed,
this case presents the type of geographically localized in-
quiry where an offcer's “inferences and deductions that
might well elude an untrained person” would come in handy.
Ibid.; see also Arvizu, 534 U. S., at 276 (prizing an offcer's
“specialized training and familiarity with the customs of the
area's inhabitants”). By relying on judicial inferences in-
stead, the majority promotes broad, infexible rules that
overlook regional differences.
Allowing judges to offer their own brand of common sense
where the State's proffered justifcations for a search come
up short also shifts police work to the judiciary. Our
cases—including those the majority cites—have looked to
offcer sensibility to establish inferences about human be-
havior, even though they just as easily could have relied on
the inferences “made by ordinary people on a daily basis.”
Ante, at 383. See, e. g., Navarette, 572 U. S., at 402 (pointing
to “the accumulated experience of thousands of offcers” to

396 K
ANSAS v. GLOVER
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
identify certain “erratic” behaviors “as sound indicia of
dr
unk driving ”); Wardlow, 528 U. S., at 124 (permitting off-
cers to account for the relevant characteristics of a location
when interpreting whether fight from police is “evasive”);
Sokolow, 490 U. S., at 9–10 (crediting the evidentiary signif-
cance of facts “as seen by a trained agent” to identify a suspi-
cious traveler). There is no reason to depart from that prac-
tice here.
Finally, to bolster its conclusion as grounded in “common
experience,” the majority cites “[e]mpirical studies.” Ante,
at 381. But its use of statistics illustrates the danger of re-
lying on large-scale data to carry out what is supposed to be
a particularized exercise. Neither of the referenced reports
tells us the percentage of vehicle owners with revoked li-
censes in Kansas who continue to drive their cars. Neither
report even offers a useful denominator: One lumps drivers
with suspended and revoked licenses together, while the
other examines the license status of only motorists involved
in fatal collisions. The fgures say nothing about how the
behavior of revoked drivers measures up relative to their
licensed counterparts—whether one group is more likely
to be involved in accidents, or whether the incidences are
comparable—which would inform a trooper's inferences
about driver identity.
As the concurrence recognizes, while statistics may help a
defendant challenge the reasonableness of an offcer's ac-
tions, they “cannot substitute for the individualized suspicion
that the Fourth Amendment requires.” Ante, at 390, n. If
courts do not scrutinize offcer observation or expertise in
the reasonable-suspicion analysis, then seizures may be made
on large-scale data alone—data that say nothing about the
individual save for the class to which he belongs. That ana-
lytical approach strays far from “acting upon observed viola-
tions” of law—which this Court has said is the “foremost
method of enforcing traffc and vehicle safety regulations.”
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 659 (1979).

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397
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
The majority today has paved the road to fnding reason-
able
suspicion based on nothing more than a demographic
profle. Its logic has thus made the State's task all but auto-
matic. That has never been the law, and it never should be.
II
The majority's justifcations for this new approach have no
foundation in fact or logic. It supposes that requiring off-
cers to point to “training materials or feld experiences”
would demand “ `scientifc certainty.' ” Ante, at 380–381.
But that is no truer in this case than in other circumstances
where the reasonable-suspicion inquiry applies. Indeed, the
State here was invited to stipulate to the evidence it relied
on to make the stop. It could have easily described the indi-
vidual or “accumulated experience” of offcers in the jurisdic-
tion. Cf. Navarette, 572 U. S., at 402. The State chose not
to present such evidence and has not shown that it could not
have done so. Accordingly, it has proved no harm to itself.
2
In fact, it is the majority's approach that makes scant pol-
icy sense. If the State need not set forth all the information
its offcers considered before forming suspicion, what con-
ceivable evidence could be used to mount an effective chal-
lenge to a vehicle stop, as the concurrence imagines? Ante, at
381. Who could meaningfully interrogate an offcer's action
when all the offcer has to say is that the vehicle was regis-
tered to an unlicensed driver? How would a driver counter
that evidence—by stating that they were of a different age
or gender than the owner and insisting that the offcer could
2
The majority suggests that requiring the State to supply the missing
link between fact and suspicion would “considerably narrow the daylight”
between the reasonable-suspicion showing and that required to establish
probable cause. Ante, at 384. But that may simply be a feature of this
unique context, where the difference between a permissible and impermis-
sible stop turns on a single fact. Given that reasonable suspicion and
probable cause are not “reducible to `precise defnition or quantifcation,' ”
Florida v. Harris, 568 U. S. 237, 243 (2013), the gradation between the
two is bound to vary from case to case.

398 K
ANSAS v. GLOVER
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
have easily discerned that? And where would a defendant
br
ing his arguments if the trial judge makes the key infer-
ence, or by the same token, fails to make an inference that
“might well elude” the untrained? Cortez, 449 U. S., at 418.
Moreover, the majority's distinction between revocation
and suspension may not hold up in other jurisdictions. For
one, whether drivers with suspended licenses have “demon-
strated a disregard for the law or are categorically unft to
drive” is completely unknown. And in several States, the
grounds for revocation include offenses unrelated to driving
ftness, such as using a license to unlawfully buy alcohol.
See, e. g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186.560 (West Cum. Supp.
2019); Mont. Code Ann. § 61–5–206 (2019); R. I. Gen. Laws
§ 31–11–6 (2010). In yet other jurisdictions, “revocation” is
the label assigned to a temporary sanction, which may be
imposed for such infractions as the failure to comply with
child support payments. Okla. Stat., Tit. 47, § 6–201.1
(2011). Whether the majority's “common sense” assump-
tions apply outside of Kansas is thus open to challenge.
***
Vehicle stops “interfere with freedom of movement, are
inconvenient, and consume time.” Prouse, 440 U. S., at 657.
Worse still, they “may create substantial anxiety” through
an “unsettling show of authority.” Ibid. Before subjecting
motorists to this type of investigation, the State must pos-
sess articulable facts and offcer inferences to form suspicion.
The State below left unexplained key components of the
reasonable-suspicion inquiry. In an effort to uphold the con-
viction, the Court destroys Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence that requires individualized suspicion. I respectfully
dissent.

OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
399
Syllabus
BABB v. WILKIE, SECRETARY OF VETERANS
AFF
AIRS
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 18–882. Argued January 15, 2020—Decided April 6, 2020
Petitioner Noris Babb, a clinical pharmacist at a U. S. Department of Vet-
erans Affairs Medical Center, sued the Secretary of Veterans Affairs
(hereinafter VA) for, inter alia, age discrimination in various adverse
personnel actions. The VA moved for summary judgment, offering
nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged actions. The District
Court granted the VA's motion after fnding that Babb had established
a prima facie case, that the VA had proffered legitimate reasons for the
challenged actions, and that no jury could reasonably conclude that
those reasons were pretextual. On appeal, Babb contended the District
Court's requirement that age be a but-for cause of a personnel action
was inappropriate under the federal-sector provision of the Age Dis-
cr i mi nati on i n Employment Ac t of 1967 (ADEA). Because most
federal-sector “personnel actions” affecting individuals aged 40 and
older must be made “free from any discrimination based on age,” 29
U. S. C. § 633a(a), Babb argued, such a personnel action is unlawful if
age is a factor in the challenged decision. Thus, even if the VA's prof-
fered reasons in her case were not pretextual, it would not necessarily
follow that age discrimination played no part. The Eleventh Circuit
found Babb's argument foreclosed by Circuit precedent.
Held: The plain meaning of § 633a(a) demands that personnel actions be
untainted by any consideration of age. To obtain reinstatement, dam-
ages, or other relief related to the end result of an employment decision,
a showing that a personnel action would have been different if age had
not been taken into account is necessary, but if age discrimination
played a lesser part in the decision, other remedies may be appropriate.
Pp. 404–414.
(a) The Government argues that the ADEA's federal-sector provision
imposes liability only when age is a but-for cause of an employment
decision, while Babb maintains that it prohibits any adverse consider-
ation of age in the decision-making process. The plain meaning of the
statutory text shows that age need not be a but-for cause of an employ-
ment decision in order for there to be a violation. Pp. 404–408.
(1) The ADEA does not defi ne the ter m “personnel ac ti on, ”
but a statutory provision governing federal employment, 5 U. S. C.
§ 2302(a)(2)(A), defi nes it to i nclude most employment-related

400 B
ABB v. WILKIE
Syllabus
decisions—an interpretation consistent with the term's general usage.
The
phrase “free from” means “untainted,” and “any” underscores that
phrase's scope. As for “discrimination,” its “normal defnition” is “dif-
ferential treatment.” Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167,
174. And “[i]n common talk, the phrase `based on' indicates a but-for
causal relationship,” Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U. S. 47,
63, thus indicating that age must be a but-for cause of the discrimination
alleged. The remaining phrase—“shall be made”—denotes a duty, em-
phasizing the importance of avoiding the taint. Pp. 405–406.
(2) Two matters of syntax are critical here. First, “based on age”
is an adjectival phrase modifying the noun “discrimination,” not the
phrase “personnel actions.” Thus, age must be a but-for cause of dis-
crimination but not the personnel action itself. Second, “free from any
discrimination” is an adverbial phrase that modifes the verb “made”
and describes how a personnel action must be “made,” namely, in a way
that is not tainted by differential treatment based on age. Thus, the
straightforward meaning of § 633a(a)'s terms is that the statute does
not require proof that an employment decision would have turned out
differently if age had not been taken into account. Instead, if age is a
factor in an employment decision, the statute has been violated.
The Government has no answer to this parsing of the statutory text.
It makes correct points about the meaning of particular words, but
draws the unwarranted conclusion that the statutory text requires
something more than a federal employer's mere consideration of age in
personnel decisions. The Government's only other textual argument is
that the term “made” refers to a particular moment in time, i. e., the
moment when the fnal employment decision is made. That interpreta-
tion, however, does not mean that age must be a but-for cause of the
ultimate outcome. Pp. 406–408.
(b) Contrary to the Government's primary argument, this interpreta-
tion is not undermined by prior cases interpreting the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1681m(a), see Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 551
U. S. 47; the ADEA's private-sector provision, 29 U. S. C. § 623(a)(1), see
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U. S. 167; and Title VII's
anti-retaliation provision, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–3(a), see University of Tex.
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U. S. 338. The language
of § 633a(a) is markedly different from the language of those statutes;
thus the holdings in those cases are entirely consistent with the holding
here. And the traditional rule favoring but-for causation does not
change the result: § 633a(a) requires proof of but-for causation, but the
object of that causation is “discrimination,” not the personnel action.
Pp. 408–411.
(c) It is not anomalous to hold the Federal Government to a stricter
standard than private employers or state and local governments. See

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as: 589 U. S. 399 (2020)
401
Syllabus
§ 623(a). When Congress expanded the ADEA's scope beyond private
employers,
it added state and local governments to the defnition of em-
ployers in the private-sector provision. But it “deliberately prescribed
a distinct statutory scheme applicable only to the federal sector,” Leh-
man v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156, 166, eschewing the private-sector pro-
vision language. That Congress would want to hold the Federal Gov-
ernment to a higher standard is not unusual. See, e. g., 5 U. S. C.
§ 2301(b)(2). Regardless, where the statute's words are unambiguous,
the judicial inquiry is complete. Pp. 411–413.
(d) But-for causation is nevertheless important in determining the
appropriate remedy. Plaintiffs cannot obtain compensatory damages or
other forms of relief related to the end result of an employment decision
without showing that age discrimination was a but-for cause of the em-
ployment outcome. This conclusion is supported by basic principles
long employed by this Court, see, e. g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better
Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 103, and traditional principles of tort and
remedies law. Remedies must be tailored to the injury. Plaintiffs who
show that age was a but-for cause of differential treatment in an employ-
ment decision, but not a but-for cause of the decision itself, can still seek
injunctive or other forward-looking relief. Pp. 413–414.
743 Fed. Appx. 280, reversed and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined,
and in which Ginsburg, J., joined as to all but footnote 3. Sotomayor,
J., fled a concurring opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p. 414.
Thomas, J., fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 415.
Roman Martinez argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Margaret A. Upshaw and Joseph D.
Magri.
Solicitor General Francisco argued the cause for respond-
ent. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorneys Gen-
eral Hunt and Dreiband, Deputy Solicitor General Wall,
Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Davis,
Erica L. Ross, Marleigh D. Dover, Stephanie R. Marcus, and
Thomas E. Chandler.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for AARP et al. by
Daniel B. Kohrman, Laurie A. McCann, and William Alvarado Rivera;
and for the National Treasury Employees Union by Gregory O'Duden,
Julie M. Wilson, and Paras N. Shah.

402 B
ABB v. WILKIE
Opinion of the Court
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.*
The
federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 88 Stat. 74, 29 U. S. C.
§ 633a(a), provides (with just a few exceptions) that “personnel
actions” affecting individuals aged 40 and older “shall be made
free from any discrimination based on age.” We are asked
to decide whether this provision imposes liability only when
age is a “but-for cause” of the personnel action in question.
We hold that § 633a(a) goes further than that. The plain
meaning of the critical statutory language (“made free from
any discrimination based on age”) demands that personnel
actions be untainted by any consideration of age. This does
not mean that a plaintiff may obtain all forms of relief that
are generally available for a violation of § 633a(a), including
hiring, reinstatement, backpay, and compensatory damages,
without showing that a personnel action would have been
different if age had not been taken into account. To obtain
such relief, a plaintiff must show that age was a but-for cause
of the challenged employment decision. But if age discrimi-
nation played a lesser part in the decision, other remedies
may be appropriate.
I
Noris Babb, who was born in 1960, is a clinical pharmacist
at the U. S. Depar tment of Veterans Affairs Medica l
Center in Bay Pines, Florida. Babb brought suit in 2014
against the Secretary of Veterans Affairs (hereinafter VA),
claiming that she had been subjected to age and sex discrimi-
nation, as well as retaliation for engaging in activities pro-
tected by federal anti-discrimination law. Only her age-
discrimination claims are now before us.
Those claims center on the following personnel actions.
First, in 2013, the VA took away Babb's “advanced scope”
designation, which had made her eligible for promotion on
the Federal Government's General Scale from a GS–12 to a
*Justice Ginsburg joins all but footnote 3 of this opinion.

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403
Opinion of the Court
GS–13.
1
Second,
during this same time period, she was de-
nied training opportunities and was passed over for positions
in the hospital's anticoagulation clinic. Third, in 2014, she
was placed in a new position, and while her grade was raised
to GS–13, her holiday pay was reduced. All these actions,
she maintains, involved age discrimination, and in support of
her claims, she alleges, among other things, that supervisors
made a variety of age-related comments.
The VA moved for summary judgment and offered non-
discriminatory reasons for the challenged actions, and the
District Court granted that motion. Evaluating each of
Babb's claims under the burden-shifting framework outlined
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973),
the court found that Babb had established a prima facie case,
that the Secretary had proffered legitimate reasons for the
challenged actions, and that no jury could reasonably con-
clude that those reasons were pretextual.
Babb appealed, contending that the District Court should
not have used the McDonnell Douglas framework because it
is not suited for “mixed motives” claims. She argued that
under the terms of the ADEA's federal-sector provision, a
personnel action is unlawful if age is a factor in the chal-
lenged decision. As a result, she explained that even if the
VA's proffered reasons were not pretextual, it would not nec-
essarily follow that age discrimination played no part.
The Eleventh Circuit panel that heard Babb's appeal found
that her argument was “foreclosed” by Circuit precedent but
added that it might have agreed with her if it were “writing
on a clean slate.” Babb v. Secretary, Dept. of Veterans Af-
fairs, 743 Fed. Appx. 280, 287–288 (2018) (per curiam) (citing
Trask v. Secretary, Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 822 F. 3d 1179
(CA11 2016)).
1
The General Schedule (GS) is a federal pay scale that is divided into 15
numbered grades. See 5 U. S. C. § 5104. “[A]s the number of the grade
increases, so do pay and responsibilities.” United States v. Clark, 454
U. S. 555, 557 (1982).

404 B
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Opinion of the Court
We granted certiorari, 588 U. S. 920 (2019), to resolve a
Circuit
split over the interpretation of § 633a(a).
II
That provision of the ADEA states in relevant part: “All
personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for em-
ployment who are at least 40 years of age . . . shall be made free
from any discrimination based on age.” 29 U. S. C. § 633a(a).
The Government interprets this provision to impose liabil-
ity only when age is a but-for cause of an employment deci-
sion. According to the Government, even if age played a
part in such a decision, an employee or applicant for employ-
ment cannot obtain any relief unless it is shown that the
decision would have been favorable if age had not been taken
into account. This interpretation, the Government con-
tends, follows both from the meaning of the statutory text
and from the “default rule” that we have recognized in other
employment discrimination cases, namely, that recovery for
wrongful conduct is generally permitted only if the injury
would not have occurred but for that conduct. See, e. g.,
University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,
570 U. S. 338, 346–347 (2013).
Babb interprets the provision differently. She maintains
that its language prohibits any adverse consideration of age
in the decision-making process. Accordingly, she argues
proof that age was a but-for cause of a challenged employ-
ment decision is not needed.
A
Which interpretation is correct? To decide, we start with
the text of the statute, see Gross v. FBL Financial Services,
Inc., 557 U. S. 167, 175 (2009), and as it turns out, it is not
necessary to go any further. The plain meaning of the stat-
utory text shows that age need not be a but-for cause of an
employment decision in order for there to be a violation of
§ 633a(a). To explain the basis for our interpretation, we
will frst defne the important terms in the statute and then
consider how they relate to each other.

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405
Opinion of the Court
1
Sec
tion 633a(a) concerns “personnel actions,” and while
the ADEA does not defne this term, its meaning is easy to
understand. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, which
governs federal employment, broadly defnes a “personnel
action” to include most employment-related decisions, such
as appointment, promotion, work assignment, compensation,
and performance reviews. See 5 U. S. C. § 2302(a)(2)(A).
That interpretation is consistent with the term's meaning in
general usage, and we assume that it has the same meaning
under the ADEA.
Under § 633a(a), personnel actions must be made “free
from” discrimination. The phrase “free from” means “un-
tainted” or “[c]lear of (something which is regarded as objec-
tionable).” Webster's Third New International Dictionary
905 (def. 4(a)(2)) (1976); 4 Oxford English Dictionary 521 (def.
12) (1933); see also American Heritage Dictionary 524 (def.
5(a)) (1969) (defning “free” “[u]sed with from” as “[n]ot af-
fected or restricted by a given condition or circumstance”);
Random House Dictionary of the English Language 565
(def. 12) (1966) (defning “free” as “exempt or released from
something specifed that controls, restrains, burdens, etc.”).
Thus, under § 633a(a), a personnel action must be made “un-
tainted” by discrimination based on age, and the addition of
the term “any” (“free from any discrimination based on age”)
drives the point home.
2
And as for “discrimination,” we as-
sume that it carries its “ `normal defnition,' ” which is “ `dif-
ferential treatment.' ” Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed.,
544 U. S. 167, 174 (2005).
Under § 633a(a), the type of discrimination forbidden is
“discrimination based on age,” and “[i]n common talk, the
phrase `based on' indicates a but-for causal relationship.”
2
We have repeatedly explained that “ `the word “any” has an expansive
meaning.' ” Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U. S. 214, 219 (2008)
(quoting United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997)). The standard
dictionary defnition of “any” is “[s]ome, regardless of quantity or number.”
American Heritage Dictionary 59 (def. 2) (1969).

406 B
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Opinion of the Court
Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U. S. 47, 63 (2007);
cf
. Comcast Corp. v. National Assn. of African American-
Owned Media, 589 U. S. 327, 334–335 (2020). Therefore,
§ 633a(a) requires that age be a but-for cause of the discrimi-
nation alleged.
What remains is the phrase “shall be made.” “[S]hall be
made” is a form of the verb “to make,” which means “to
bring into existence,” “to produce,” to “render,” and “to
cause to be or become.” Random House Dictionary of the
English Language, at 866. Thus, “shall be made” means
“shall be produced,” etc. And the imperative mood, denot-
ing a duty, see Black's Law Dictionary 1233 (5th ed. 1979),
emphasizes the importance of avoiding the taint.
2
So much for the individual terms used in § 633a(a). What
really matters for present purposes is the way these terms
relate to each other. Two matters of syntax are critical.
First, “based on age” is an adjectival phrase that modifes
the noun “discrimination.” It does not modify “personnel
actions.” The statute does not say that “it is unlawful to
take personnel actions that are based on age”; it says that
“personnel actions . . . shall be made free from any discrimi-
nation based on age.” § 633a(a). As a result, age must be
a but-for cause of discrimination—that is, of differential
treatment—but not necessarily a but-for cause of a personnel
action itself.
Second, “free from any discrimination” is an adverbial
phrase that modifes the verb “made.” Ibid. Thus, “free
from any discrimination” describes how a personnel action
must be “made,” namely, in a way that is not tainted by
differential treatment based on age. If age discrimination
plays any part in the way a decision is made, then the
decision is not made in a way that is untainted by such
discrimination.
This is the straightforward meaning of the terms of
§ 633a(a), and it indicates that the statute does not require

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as: 589 U. S. 399 (2020)
407
Opinion of the Court
proof that an employment decision would have turned out
di
fferently if age had not been taken into account.
To see what this entails in practice, consider a simple ex-
ample. Suppose that a decision-maker is trying to decide
whether to promote employee A, who is 35 years old, or em-
ployee B, who is 55. Under the employer's policy, candi-
dates for promotion are frst given numerical scores based
on non-discriminatory factors. Candidates over the age of
40 are then docked fve points, and the employee with the
highest score is promoted. Based on the non-discriminatory
factors, employee A (the 35-year-old) is given a score of 90,
and employee B (the 55-year-old) gets a score of 85. But
employee B is then docked 5 points because of age and thus
ends up with a fnal score of 80. The decision-maker looks
at the candidates' fnal scores and, seeing that employee A
has the higher score, promotes employee A.
This decision is not “made” “free from any discrimination”
because employee B was treated differently (and less favor-
ably) than employee A (because she was docked fve points
and A was not). And this discrimination was “based on age”
because the fve points would not have been taken away
were it not for employee B's age.
It is true that this difference in treatment did not affect
the outcome, and therefore age was not a but-for cause of
the decision to promote employee A. Employee A would
have won out even if age had not been considered and em-
ployee B had not lost fve points, since A's score of 90 was
higher than B's initial, legitimate score of 85. But under the
language of § 633a(a), this does not preclude liability.
The Government has no answer to this parsing of the stat-
utory text. It makes two correct points: frst, that “ `dis-
crimination based on age' ” “requires but-for causation,” and,
second, that “ `discrimination' ” means “ ` “differential treat-
ment.” ' ” Brief for Respondent 16–17. But based on these
two points, the Government draws the unwarranted conclu-
sion that “[i]t is thus not enough for a federal employer
merely to consider age . . . if that consideration does not

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Opinion of the Court
actually cause the employer to make a less favorable person-
nel
action than it would have made for a similarly situated
person who is younger.” Id., at 17. That conclusion does
not follow from the two correct points on which it claims to
be based. What follows instead is that, under § 633a(a), age
must be the but-for cause of differential treatment, not that
age must be a but-for cause of the ultimate decision.
3
B
The Government's primary argument rests not on the text
of § 633a(a) but on prior cases interpreting different statutes.
3
Beyond this, the Government's only other textual argument is that the
term “made” refers to a particular moment in time, i. e., the moment when
the fnal employment decision is made. We agree, but this does not mean
that age must be a but-for cause of the ultimate outcome. If, at the time
when the decision is actually made, age plays a part, then the decision is
not made “free from” age discrimination.
It is not clear that Babb actually disagrees with the Government on this
point, although the many references in her brief to the decision-making
process could be read to mean that § 633a(a) can be violated even if age
played no part whatsoever when the actual decision was made. If that is
what Babb wants to suggest, however, we must disagree. It is entirely
natural to regard an employment decision as being “made” at the time
when the outcome is actually determined and not during events leading
up to that decision. See American Heritage Dictionary, at 788 (def. 10)
(defning “make” as “[t]o arrive at” a particular conclusion, i. e., to “make
a decision”). And holding that § 633a(a) is violated when the consider-
ation of age plays no role in the fnal decision would have startling
implications.
Consider this example: A decision-maker must decide whether to pro-
mote employee A, who is under 40, or employee B, who is over 40. A
subordinate recommends employee A and says that the recommendation
is based in part on employee B's age. The decision-maker rebukes this
subordinate for taking age into account, disregards the recommendation,
and makes the decision independently. Under an interpretation that read
“made” expansively to encompass a broader personnel process, § 633a(a)
would be violated even though age played no role whatsoever in the ulti-
mate decision. Indeed, there might be a violation even if the decision-
maker decided to promote employee B. We are aware of no other anti-
discrimination statute that imposes liability under such circumstances, and
we do not think that § 633a(a) should be understood as the frst.

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But contrary to the Government's argument, nothing in
t
hese past decisi ons under mi nes our i nter pret ati on of
§ 633a(a).
1. In Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U. S., at 63,
we interpreted a provision of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA) requiring that notice be provided “[i]f any person
takes any adverse action with respect to any consumer that
is based in whole or in part on any information contained
in a consumer [credit] report.” 15 U. S. C. § 1681m(a) (em-
phasis added). This language is quite different from that of
29 U. S. C. § 633a(a).
In § 1681m(a), the phrase “based . . . on any information
contained in a consumer [credit] report” modifes “adverse
action,” and thus the information in question must be a but-
for cause of the adverse action. By contrast, in § 633a(a),
“based on” does not modify “personnel actions”; it modifes
“discrimination,” i. e., differential treatment based on age.
The Government tries to fnd support in Safeco's discus-
sion of FCRA's reference to an adverse action that is “based
. . . in part” on a credit report. 15 U. S. C. § 1681m(a) (em-
phasis added). The Safeco Court observed that the phrase
“in part” could be read to mean that notice had to be given
“whenever the report was considered in the rate-setting
process,” but it rejected this reading. 551 U. S., at 63. The
Government suggests that the Court reached this conclusion
because it thought that Congress would have “said so ex-
pressly” if it had meant to require notice in situations where
consideration of a credit report was inconsequential. Brief
for Respondent 19. Accordingly, the Government argues,
because § 633a(a) does not say expressly that consideration
of age is unlawful, we should conclude that mere consider-
ation is insuffcient to trigger liability. See id., at 19–20.
This argument fails for two reasons. First, as explained
above, the language of § 633a(a) does expressly impose liabil-
ity if age discrimination plays a part in a federal employment
decision. Second, Safeco did not invoke the sort of super-
plain-statement rule that the Government now attributes to

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Opinion of the Court
it. Instead, the Safeco Court rejected the argument on
other
grounds, including its assessment of the particular
statutory scheme at issue. See 551 U. S., at 63–64. That
reasoning obviously has no application here.
2. In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U. S. 167,
we interpreted the private-sector provision of the ADEA, 29
U. S. C. § 623(a)(1), and held that it requires a plaintiff to
prove that “age was the `but-for' cause of the employer's ad-
verse action.” 557 U. S., at 177. But as we previously rec-
ognized, the ADEA's private- and public-sector provisions
are “couched in very different terms.” Gómez-Pérez v. Pot-
ter, 553 U. S. 474, 488 (2008).
Section 623(a)(1) makes it “unlawful for an employer . . .
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's age.” Thus, the but-
for causal language in § 623(a)(1)––“because of such individu-
al's age”––is an adverbial phrase modifying the verbs (“to
fail or refuse to hire,” etc.) that specify the conduct that
the provision regulates. For this reason, the syntax of
§ 623(a)(1) is critically different from that of § 633a(a), where,
as noted, the but-for language modifes the noun “discrimi-
nati on. ” Th is is i mpor t ant because a l l the verbs i n
§ 623(a)(1)—failing or refusing to hire, discharging, or other-
wise discriminating with respect to “compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment”—refer to end re-
sults.
4
By contrast, the provision in our case, § 633a(a), pro-
hibits any age discrimination in the “mak[ing]” of a personnel
decision, not just with respect to end results.
4
Moreover, even if “discriminating with respect to compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment” could be read more broadly to
encompass things that occur before a fnal decision is made, the ejusdem
generis canon would counsel a court to read that fnal phrase to refer––like
the prior terms––to the fnal decision. See Christopher v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 567 U. S. 142, 163, and n. 19 (2012).

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Opinion of the Court
3. Finally, in University of Tex. Southwestern Medical
C
enter v. Nassar, 570 U. S. 338, we interpreted Title VII's
anti-retaliation provision, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–3(a), as requir-
ing retaliation to be a but-for cause of the end result of the
employment decision. The Court saw no “meaningful tex-
tual difference between the text [of that provision] and the
one in Gross,” 570 U. S., at 352, and the Court found support
for its interpretation in the rule that recovery for an inten-
tional tort generally requires proof “ `that the harm would
not have occurred' in the absence of—that is, but for—the
defendant's conduct,” id., at 346–347 (quoting Restate-
ment of Torts § 431, Comment a, pp. 1159–1160 (1934)).
That reasoning has no application in the present case.
The wording of § 633a(a)––which refers expressly to the
“mak[ing]” of personnel actions in a way that is “free from
any discrimination based on age”––is markedly different
from the language of the statutes at issue in Gross and Nas-
sar, and the traditional rule favoring but-for causation does
not dictate a contrary result. Section 633a(a) requires proof
of but-for causation, but the object of that causation is “dis-
crimination,” i. e., differential treatment, not the personnel
action itself.
For these reasons, Safeco, Gross, and Nassar are entirely
consistent with our holding in this case.
C
We are not persuaded by the argument that it is anoma-
lous to hold the Federal Government to a stricter standard
than private employers or state and local governments.
That is what the statutory language dictates, and if Congress
had wanted to impose the same standard on all employers,
it could have easily done so.
As frst enacted, the ADEA “applied only to actions
against private employers.” Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S.
156, 166 (1981). In 1974, “Congress expanded the scope of
[the] ADEA” to reach both state and local governments and

412 B
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Opinion of the Court
the Federal Government. Ibid. To cover state and local
gover
nments, Congress simply added them to the defnition
of an “employer” in the ADEA's private-sector provision, see
29 U. S. C. § 630(b), and Congress could have easily done the
same for the Federal Government. Indeed, the frst pro-
posal for expansion of the ADEA to government entities did
precisely that. Lehman, 453 U. S., at 166, n. 14.
But Congress did not choose this route. Instead, it “delib-
erately prescribed a distinct statutory scheme applicable
only to the federal sector,” id., at 166, and in doing so, it
eschewed the language used in the private-sector provision,
§ 623(a). See Gómez-Pérez, 553 U. S., at 488. We generally
ascribe signifcance to such a decision. See Russello v.
United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (“ `[W]here Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in
the disparate inclusion or exclusion' ”).
That Congress would want to hold the Federal Government
to a higher standard than state and private employers is not
unusual. See Supp. Letter Brief for Respondent 1 (“The
federal government has long adhered to anti-discrimination
policies that are more expansive than those required by . . .
the ADEA”); e. g., Exec. Order No. 11478, § 1, 3 CFR 446
(1969) (“It is the policy of the Government of the United
States to provide equal opportunity in Federal employment
for all persons, to prohibit discrimination in employment . . .
and to promote the full realization of equal employment op-
portunity through a continuing affrmative program”); Exec.
Order No. 12106, § 1–102, 3 CFR 263 (1978) (amending Exec.
Order No. 11478 to cover discrimination on the basis of age).
And several years after adding § 633a(a) to the ADEA, Con-
gress amended the civil service laws to prescribe similar
standards. See 5 U. S. C. § 2301(b)(2) (“Federal personnel
management should be implemented consistent with the . . .
merit system principl[e that a]ll employees and applicants for
employment should receive fair and equitable treatment in

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413
Opinion of the Court
all aspects of personnel management without regard to . . .
age”).
In
any event, “where, as here, the words of [a] statute are
unambiguous, the ` “judicial inquiry is complete.” ' ” Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U. S. 90, 98 (2003) (quoting Connect-
icut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 254 (1992)).
D
While Babb can establish that the VA violated § 633a(a)
without proving that age was a but-for cause of the VA's
personnel actions, she acknowledges—and we agree—that
but-for causation is important in determining the appro-
priate remedy. It is bedrock law that “requested relief ”
must “redress the alleged injury.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for
Be t te r Env iro nmen t, 523 U. S. 83, 103 (1998). Thus,
§ 633a(a) plaintiffs who demonstrate only that they were sub-
jected to unequal consideration cannot obtain reinstatement,
backpay, compensatory damages, or other forms of relief re-
lated to the end result of an employment decision. To obtain
such remedies, these plaintiffs must show that age discrimi-
nation was a but-for cause of the employment outcome.
We have long employed these basic principles. In Texas
v. Lesage, 528 U. S. 18, 21–22 (1999) (per curiam), we applied
this rule to a plaintiff who sought recovery under Rev. Stat.
§ 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, for an alleged violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. We explained: “[W]here a plaintiff chal-
lenges a discrete governmental decision as being based on
an impermissible criterion and it is undisputed that the gov-
ernment would have made the same decision regardless,
there is no cognizable injury warranting [damages] relief.”
528 U. S., at 21. Cf. Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle,
429 U. S. 274, 285 (1977) (rejecting rule that “would require
reinstatement . . . even if the same decision would have been
reached had the incident not occurred”).
Our conclusion is also supported by traditional principles
of tort and remedies law. “Remedies generally seek to place
the victim of a legal wrong . . . in the position that person

414 B
ABB v. WILKIE
Sotomayor, J., concurring
would have occupied if the wrong had not occurred.” R.
W
eaver, E. Shoben, & M. Kelly, Principles of Remedies Law
5 (3d ed. 2017). Thus, “[a]n actor's liability is limited to
those harms that result from the risks that made the actor's
conduct tortious.” Restatement (Third) of Torts § 29, p. 493
(2005). Remedies should not put a plaintiff in a more favor-
able position than he or she would have enjoyed absent dis-
crimination. But this is precisely what would happen if in-
dividuals who cannot show that discrimination was a but-for
cause of the end result of a personnel action could receive
relief that alters or compensates for the end result.
Although unable to obtain such relief, plaintiffs are not
without a remedy if they show that age was a but-for cause
of differential treatment in an employment decision but not
a but-for cause of the decision itself. In that situation, plain-
tiffs can seek injunctive or other forward-looking relief. De-
termining what relief, if any, is appropriate in the present
case is a matter for the District Court to decide in the frst
instance if Babb succeeds in showing that § 633a(a) was
violated.
***
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Sotomayor, w ith whom Justice Ginsburg
joins, concurring.
I join the majority opinion because I agree that 29 U. S. C.
§ 633a imposes liability even when age is not a “ `but-for
cause' ” of a personnel action. Ante, at 402. I write sepa-
rately to make two observations.
First, the Court does not foreclose § 633a claims arising
from discriminatory processes. Cf. Comcast Corp. v. Na-
tional Assn. of African American-Owned Media, 589 U. S.
327, 342 – 344 (2020) (Ginsburg, J., concurr i ng i n part
and concurring in judgment). If, for example, an employer

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415
Thomas, J., dissenting
hires a 50-year-old person who passed a computer-aptitude
test
administered only to applicants above 40, clearly a ques-
tion could arise as to whether the hiring decision was “made
free from” differential treatment.
Second, this same example may suggest that § 633a per-
mits damages remedies, even when the Government engages
in nondispositive “age discrimination in the `mak[ing]' of a
personnel decision.” Ante, at 410. If an applicant incurs
costs to prepare for the discriminatorily administered apti-
tude test, a damages award compensating for such out-of-
pocket expenses could restore the applicant to the “position
tha[t] he or she would have enjoyed absent discrimination.”
Ante, at 414.
Justice Thomas, dissenting.
Until now, the rule for pleading a claim under a federal
antidiscrimination statute was clear: A plaintiff had to plau-
sibly allege that discrimination was the but-for cause of an
adverse action, unless the statute's text unequivocally re-
placed that standard with a different one. Today, however,
the Court departs from this rule, concluding that the federal-
sector provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (ADEA) imposes liability if an agency's personnel
actions are at all tainted by considerations of age. See ante,
at 402. This rule is so broad that a plaintiff could bring a
cause of action even if he is ultimately promoted or hired
over a younger applicant. This novel “any consideration”
standard does serious damage to our interpretation of anti-
discrimination statutes and disrupts the settled expectations
of federal employers and employees. I therefore respect-
fully dissent.
I
A
In my view, the default rule of but-for causation applies
here because it is not clearly displaced by the text of the
ADEA's federal-sector provision. Though the Court en-
gages at length with the provision's text, it barely acknowl-

416 B
ABB v. WILKIE
Thomas, J., dissenting
edges our default rule, which undergirds our antidiscrimina-
t
i on jur ispr udence. Because the i nter pret ati on of an
antidiscrimination statute must be assessed against the
backdrop of this default rule, I begin by describing the rule
in detail.
We have explained that “[c]ausation in fact—i. e., proof
that the defendant's conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff 's
injury—is a standard requirement of any tort claim,” includ-
ing claims of discrimination. University of Tex. Southwest-
ern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U. S. 338, 346 (2013) (quot-
ing various provisions of the Restatement of Torts (1934)).
“In the usual course, this standard requires the plaintiff to
show that the harm would not have occurred in the absence
of—that is, but for—the defendant's conduct.” 570 U. S., at
346–347 (internal quotation marks omitted). But-for causa-
tion is “the background against which Congress legislate[s],”
and it is “the default rul[e Congress] is presumed to have
incorporated, absent an indication to the contrary in the stat-
ute itself.” Id., at 347 (citing W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Kee-
ton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 265
(5th ed. 1984)). We have recognized as much when inter-
preting 42 U. S. C. § 1981's prohibition against racial discrimi-
nation in contracting, Comcast Corp. v. National Assn. of
A f r ican Ame r ican-O w ned Med i a, 589 U. S. 327 (2020).
Title VII's retaliation provision, Nassar, 570 U. S. 338, and
the private-sector provision of the ADEA, Gross v. FBL Fi-
nancial Services, Inc., 557 U. S. 167 (2009).
Given this established backdrop, the question becomes
whether the federal-sector provision of the ADEA contains
suffciently clear language to overcome the default rule.
The provision states: “All personnel actions affecting em-
ployees or applicants for employment who are at least 40
years of age . . . shall be made free from any discrimination
based on age.” 29 U. S. C. § 633a(a).
I agree with the Court that discrimination means differen-
tial treatment, that “based on” connotes a but-for relation-

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Thomas, J., dissenting
ship, and that “to make” typically means to produce or to
become
. Ante, at 406. But I disagree with the Court's
overall interpretation of how these terms ft together. Spe-
cifcally, the Court believes that “ `based on age' ” modifes
only “ `discrimination,' ” not “ `personnel actions.' ” Ibid.
From this, the Court concludes that the plain meaning of the
text “demands that personnel actions be untainted by any
consideration of age.” Ante, at 402.
In my view, however, the provision is also susceptible of
the Government's interpretation, i. e., that the entire phrase
“discrimination based on age” modifes “personnel actions.”
Under this reading, as the Government explains, the provi-
sion “prohibits agencies from engaging in `discrimination
based on age' in the making of personnel actions.” Brief
for Respondent 16. Because the only thing being “made” in
the statute is a “personnel action,” it is entirely reason-
able to conclude that age must be the but-for cause of that
personnel action.
At most, the substantive mandate against discrimination
in § 633a(a) is ambiguous. And it goes without saying that
an ambiguous provision does not contain the clear language
necessary to displace the default rule. Accordingly, I would
hold that the default rule of but-for causation applies here.
B
The Court attempts to downplay the sweeping nature of
its novel “any consideration” rule by discussing the limited
remedies available under that rule. Specifcally, the Court
declares that a plaintiff can obtain compensatory damages,
backpay, and reinstatement only if he proves that age was a
but-for cause of an adverse personnel action. Otherwise, he
can obtain only injunctive or prospective relief. See ante,
at 413–414.
If the text of the ADEA contained this remedial scheme,
it would support the Court's conclusion regarding causation.
But the Court does not cite any remedial statutory provision.

418 B
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Thomas, J., dissenting
Nor can it, as one does not exist. The Court also fails to cite
any
authority suggesting that its remedial scheme existed,
at common law or otherwise, in 1974 when Congress added
the federal-sector provision to the ADEA. § 28(b)(2), 88
Stat. 74–75.
Instead, the Court principally relies on Texas v. Lesage,
528 U. S. 18 (1999) (per curiam), which applied Mt. Healthy
City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 (1977). See Lesage,
528 U. S., at 20–22. But Mt. Healthy and, by extension, Le-
sage do not assist the Court. In Mt. Healthy, the Court
crafted, for the frst time, a remedial scheme for constitu-
tional claims brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. 429 U. S., at
285–287. Signifcantly, that decision postdates enactment
of the federal-sector provision by three years. And Mt.
Healthy did not import a remedial scheme from a previously
existing statute or common-law rule. Rather, the Court
cited other cases in which it had similarly fashioned a novel
causation standard for constitutional claims—none of which
concerned remedies—as “instructive in formulating the test
to be applied.” Id., at 286–287. It is incongruous to sug-
gest that Congress could have intended to incorporate a re-
medial scheme that appears not to have existed at the time
the statute was passed. Moreover, Mt. Healthy concerned
a constitutional injury, and the Court was tasked with creat-
ing a remedy for that injury in the face of § 1983's silence.
The Court fails to provide any explanation as to why it is
appropriate to rely on judicially fashioned remedies for con-
stitutional injuries in this purely statutory context.
In sum, the Court implausibly concludes that, in the
federal-sector provision of the ADEA, Congress created a
novel “any consideration” causation standard but remained
completely silent as to what remedies were available under
that new rule. Just as implausibly, the Court assumes from
this congressional silence that Congress intended for judges
to craft a remedial scheme in which the available relief would
vary depending on the inficted injury, using an as-yet un-
known scheme.

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Thomas, J., dissenting
I would not follow such an unusual course. We have
st
ated in the past that we must “read [the ADEA] the way
Congress wrote it.” Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power
Laboratory, 554 U. S. 84, 102 (2008). The federal-sector pro-
vision contains no clear language displacing the default rule,
and Congress has demonstrated that it knows how to do so
when it wishes. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(m) (providing that
an employer is liable if an employee establishes that a pro-
tected characteristic was a motivating factor in an employ-
ment action); § 2000e–5(g)(2)(B) (limiting the remedies avail-
able to plaintiffs who establish motivating factor liability).
1
Rather than supplementing a novel rule with a judicially
crafted remedy, I would infer from the textual silence that
Congress wrote the ADEA to conform to the default rule of
but-for causation.
II
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Court's analysis is
its failure to grapple with the sheer unworkability of its rule.
The Court contends that a plaintiff may successfully bring a
cause of action if age “taint[s]” the making of a personnel
action, even if the agency would have reached the same out-
come absent any age-based discrimination. Ante, at 406–407.
Because § 633a(a)'s language also appears in the federal-
sector provision of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–16(a), the
Court's rule presumably applies to claims alleging discrimi-
nation based on sex, race, religion, color, and national origin
as well.
The Court's rule might have some purchase if, as Babb
contends, the Federal Government purposely set up a purely
merit-based system for its personnel actions. But as anyone
with knowledge of the Federal Government's hiring prac-
tices knows, this is hardly the case. Federal hiring is rid-
1
Courts have followed similar reasoning when determining the standard
of causation under the Americans with Disabilities Act. See, e. g., Natof-
sky v. New York, 921 F. 3d 337, 346–348 (CA2 2019); Gentry v. East West
Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816 F. 3d 228, 233–236 (CA4 2016); Serwatka v.
Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F. 3d 957, 961–964 (CA7 2010).

420 B
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Thomas, J., dissenting
dled with exceptions and affrmative action programs, which
by
their very nature are not singularly focused on merit.
A few examples suffce to demonstrate this point. The
Veterans Preference Act of 1944 entitles certain veterans,
their spouses, and their parents to preferences in hiring and
in retention during reductions in force. 5 U. S. C. §§ 2108(3),
3502, 3309; 5 CFR § 211.102 (2019). Affir mative acti on
exists for people with disabilities, both in competitive and
noncompetitive employment. See 29 U. S. C. § 791; 5 CFR
§ 213.3102(u); 29 CFR § 1614.203(d) (2019). The Federal
Equal Opportunity Recruitment Program requires agencies
to implement recruitment plans for women and certain
underrepresented minor ities. 5 U. S. C. § 7201; 5 CFR
§ 720.205. And Exec. Order No. 13171, § 2(a), 3 CFR 299
(2000), requires federal agencies to “provide a plan for re-
cruiting Hispanics that creates a fully diverse workforce for
the agency in the 21st century.” Whatever the wisdom of
these policies, they are not strictly merit-based hiring.
The Court's new rule is irreconcilable with these various
programs because affrmative action initiatives always taint
personnel actions with consideration of a protected charac-
teristic. Consider Exec. Order No. 13583, § 1, 3 CFR 267
(2011), which directs agencies to “develop and implement a
more comprehensive, integrated, and strategic focus on di-
versity and inclusion as a key component of their human re-
sources strategies.” To provide just one example of how
agencies are implementing this requirement, Customs and
Border Protection's plan commits the agency to “[i]ncreas-
[ing the] percentage of applicants from underrepresented
groups for internships and fellowships,” “[c]reat[ing] a tar-
geted outreach campaign to underrepresented groups for ca-
reer development programs at all levels,” “[e]stablish[ing]
and maintain[ing] strategic partnerships with diverse profes-
sional and affnity organizations,” “[a]nalyz[ing] demographic
data for new hires and employee separations to identify and
assess potential barriers to workforce diversity,” and “[d]evel-

Cite
as: 589 U. S. 399 (2020)
421
Thomas, J., dissenting
op[ing] a diversity recruitment perfor mance dashboard
wh
ich provides relevant statistics and related performance
metrics to evaluate progress towards achievement of recruit-
ment goals.” U. S. Customs and Border Protection, Privacy
and Diversity Offce, Diversity and Inclusion: Strategic Plan
2016–2020, pp. 11–15 (2015). Programs such as these inten-
tionally inject race, sex, and national origin into agencies'
hiring and promotion decisions at the express direction of
the President or Congress.
A but-for (or even a motivating-factor
2
) standard of causa-
tion could coexist relatively easily with these affrmative ac-
tion programs, as it would be diffcult for a plaintiff to plausi-
bly plead facts suffcient to establish the requisite causation.
The Court's rule, by contrast, raises the possibility that
agencies will be faced with a food of investigations by the
EEOC or litigation from dissatisfed federal employees. So
long as those employees can show that their employer's deci-
sion to hire a particular job applicant was “tainted” because
that applicant benefted in some way from an affrmative ac-
tion program, their complaints to enjoin these programs can
survive at least the pleadings stage.
3
2
Many Courts of Appeals apply the motivating-factor st andard to
federal-sector Title VII claims. See, e. g., Ponce v. Billington, 679 F. 3d
840, 844 (CADC 2012); Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F. 3d 205, 213–214 (CA3
2008). Even assuming this is a correct interpretation, see 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e–16(d) (incorporating by reference the private-sector motivating-
factor provisions), the Court's “any consideration” rule imposes an even
lower bar. No party submitted briefng on the criteria that courts or the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) use to establish a
motivating factor, but the cases from which this standard was derived
indicate that it mirrored the tort concept of substantial cause. See, e. g.,
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228, 249 (1989) (plurality opinion);
Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 287 (1977).
3
On this score, it is worth mentioning that even the EEOC has not
adopted the Court's low bar but instead employs a motivating-factor
standard. See, e. g., Brenton W. v. Chao, 2017 WL 2953878, *9 (June 29,
2017); Arroyo v. Shinseki, 2012 WL 2952078, *4 (July 11, 2012).

422 B
ABB v. WILKIE
Thomas, J., dissenting
***
T
oday's decision is inconsistent with the default rule un-
derlying our interpretation of antidiscrimination statutes
and our precedents, which have consistently applied that
rule. Perhaps just as important, the Court's holding unnec-
essarily risks imposing hardship on those tasked with man-
aging thousands of employees within our numerous federal
agencies. I respectfully dissent.

OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
423
Per Curiam
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE et al. v.
DEMOCRA
TIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE et al.
on application for stay
No. 19A1016. Decided April 6, 2020
Wisconsin decided to proceed with primary elections scheduled for April 7,
2020, during the COVID–19 pandemic. In federal litigation challenging
voting procedures, a Federal District Court extended the deadline for
municipal clerks to receive absentee ballots from April 7, 2020, to April
13, 2020. Then, fve days before the scheduled election, the District
Court unilaterally ordered that absentee ballots mailed and postmarked
after election day be counted so long as they are received by April
13. Plaintiffs, in their preliminary injunction motions, did not ask the
District Court for this relief.
Held: The District Court's order granting a preliminary injunction is
stayed to the extent it requires the State to count absentee ballots post-
marked after April 7, 2020. The District Court, by enjoining enforce-
ment of a state statutory requirement that ballots for primary election
be mailed by voters and postmarked by election day, afforded relief not
sought in preliminary injunction motions, and violated the principle that
lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter election rules on the eve
of an election. See, e. g., Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1 (per curiam).
Preliminary injunction stayed in part.
Per Curiam.
The applicati on for stay presented to Justice Kava-
naugh and by him referred to the Court is granted. The
District Court's order granting a preliminary injunction is
stayed to the extent it requires the State to count absentee
ballots postmarked after April 7, 2020.
Wisconsin has decided to proceed with the elections sched-
uled for Tuesday, April 7. The wisdom of that decision is
not the question before the Court. The question before the
Court is a narrow, technical question about the absentee bal-
lot process. In this Court, all agree that the deadline for
the municipal clerks to receive absentee ballots has been ex-
tended from Tuesday, April 7, to Monday, April 13. That
extension, which is not challenged in this Court, has afforded

424 REPUBLICAN
NATIONAL COMMITTEE v.
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
Per Curiam
Wisconsin voters several extra days in which to mail their
absentee
ballots. The sole question before the Court is
whether absentee ballots now must be mailed and post-
marked by election day, Tuesday, April 7, as state law would
necessarily require, or instead may be mailed and post-
marked after election day, so long as they are received by
Monday, April 13. Importantly, in their preliminary in-
junction motions, the plaintiffs did not ask that the District
Court allow ballots mailed and postmarked after election
day, April 7, to be counted. That is a critical point in the
case. Nonetheless, fve days before the scheduled election,
the District Court unilaterally ordered that absentee ballots
mailed and postmarked after election day, April 7, still be
counted so long as they are received by April 13. Extending
the date by which ballots may be cast by voters—not just
received by the municipal clerks but cast by voters—for an
additional six days after the scheduled election day funda-
mentally alters the nature of the election. And again, the
plaintiffs themselves did not even ask for that relief in their
preliminary injunction motions. Our point is not that the
argument is necessarily forfeited but that the plaintiffs
themselves did not see the need to ask for such relief. By
changing the election rules so close to the election date and
by affording relief that the plaintiffs themselves did not ask
for in their preliminary injunction motions, the District
Court contravened this Court's precedents and erred by or-
dering such relief. This Court has repeatedly emphasized
that lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the elec-
tion rules on the eve of an election. See Purcell v. Gonzalez,
549 U. S. 1 (2006) (per curiam); Frank v. Walker, 574 U. S.
929 (2014); Veasey v. Perry, 574 U. S. 951 (2014).
The unusual nature of the District Court's order allowing
ballots to be mailed and postmarked after election day is
perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that the District
Court had to issue a subsequent order enjoining the public
release of any election results for six days after election day.

Cite
as: 589 U. S. 423 (2020)
425
Per Curiam
In doing so, the District Court in essence enjoined non-
par
ties to this lawsuit. It is highly questionable, moreover,
that this attempt to suppress disclosure of the election re-
sults for six days after election day would work. And if
any information were released during that time, that would
gravely affect the integrity of the election process. The
District Court's order suppressing disclosure of election re-
sults showcases the unusual nature of the District Court's
order allowing absentee ballots mailed and postmarked after
election day to be counted. And all of that further under-
scores the wisdom of the Purcell principle, which seeks to
avoid this kind of judicially created confusion.
The dissent is quite wrong on several points. First, the
dissent entirely disregards the critical point that the plain-
tiffs themselves did not ask for this additional relief in their
preliminary injunction motions. Second, the dissent con-
tends that this Court should not intervene at this late date.
The Court would prefer not to do so, but when a lower court
intervenes and alters the election rules so close to the elec-
tion date, our precedents indicate that this Court, as appro-
priate, should correct that error. Third, the dissent refers
to voters who have not yet received their absentee ballots.
But even in an ordinary election, voters who request an ab-
sentee ballot at the deadline for requesting ballots (which
was this past Friday in this case) will usually receive their
ballots on the day before or day of the election, which in this
case would be today or tomorrow. The plaintiffs put for-
ward no probative evidence in the District Court that these
voters here would be in a substantially different position
from late-requesting voters in other Wisconsin elections with
respect to the timing of their receipt of absentee ballots. In
that regard, it bears mention that absentee voting has been
underway for many weeks, and 1.2 million Wisconsin voters
have requested and have been sent their absentee ballots,
which is about fve times the number of absentee ballots re-
quested in the 2016 spring election. Fourth, the dissent's

426 REPUBLICAN
NATIONAL COMMITTEE v.
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
Per Curiam
rhetoric is entirely misplaced and completely overlooks the
fac
t that the deadline for receiving ballots was already ex-
tended to accommodate Wisconsin voters, from April 7 to
April 13. Again, that extension has the effect of extending
the date for a voter to mail the ballot from, in effect, Satur-
day, April 4, to Tuesday, April 7. That extension was de-
signed to ensure that the voters of Wisconsin can cast their
ballots and have their votes count. That is the relief that
the plaintiffs actually requested in their preliminary injunc-
tion motions. The District Court on its own ordered yet an
additional extension, which would allow voters to mail their
ballots after election day, which is extraordinary relief and
would fundamentally alter the nature of the election by
allowing voting for six additional days after the election.
Therefore, subject to any further alterations that the State
may make to state law, in order to be counted in this election
a voter's absentee ballot must be either (1) postmarked by
election day, April 7, 2020, and received by April 13, 2020, at
4 p.m., or (2) hand delivered as provided under state law by
April 7, 2020, at 8 p.m.
The Court's decision on the narrow question before the
Court should not be viewed as expressing an opinion on
the broader questi on whether to hold the elec ti on, or
whether other reforms or modifcations in election proce-
dures in light of COVID–19 are appropriate. That point
cannot be stressed enough.
The stay is granted pending fnal disposition of the appeal
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit and the timely fling and disposition of a petition for a
writ of certiorari. Should the petition for a writ of certio-
rari be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically. In
the event the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the
stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment
of this Court.
It is so ordered.

Cite
as: 589 U. S. 423 (2020)
427
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Breyer, Jus-
tice
Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan join, dissenting.
The District Court, acting in view of the dramatically evol-
ving COVID–19 pandemic, entered a preliminary injunction
to safeguard the availability of absentee voting in Wiscon-
sin's spring election. This Court now intervenes at the elev-
enth hour to prevent voters who have timely requested ab-
sentee ballots from casting their votes. I would not disturb
the District Court's disposition, which the Seventh Circuit
allowed to stand.
I
A
Wisconsi n's spr i ng elec ti on is schedu led for tomor-
row, Tuesday, April 7, 2020. At issue are the presiden-
tia l pr imar ies, a seat on the Wisconsin Supreme Cour t,
three seats on the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, over 100
other judgeships, over 500 school board seats, and se-
veral thousand other positions. Democratic National Com-
mittee v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952, 959–960 (WD
Wis. 2020).
In the weeks leading up to the election, the COVID–19
pandemic has become a “public health crisis.” Id., at 958.
As of April 2, Wisconsin had 1,550 confrmed cases of
COVID–19 and 24 deaths attributable to the disease, “with
evidence of increasing community spread.” Id., at 960. On
March 24, the Governor ordered Wisconsinites to stay
at home until April 24 to slow the spread of the disease.
Ibid.
Because gathering at the polling place now poses dire
hea lth r isks, an unprecedented number of Wisconsi n
voters—at the encouragement of public offcials—have
turned to voting absentee. Id., at 960–961. About one
million more voters have requested absentee ballots in
th is elec ti on than in 2016. Ib i d. Accommodating the

428 REPUBLICAN
NATIONAL COMMITTEE v.
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
surge of absentee-ballot requests has heavily burdened elec-
ti
on offcials, resulting in a severe backlog of ballots re-
quested but not promptly mailed to voters. Id., at 961–962.
B
Several weeks ago, plaintiffs—comprising individual Wis-
consin voters, community organizations, and the state and
national Democratic parties—fled three lawsuits against
members of the Wisconsin Elections Commission in the
United States District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin.
1
The District Court consolidated the suits on
March 28. The plaintiffs sought several forms of relief, all
aimed at easing the effects of the COVID–19 pandemic on
the upcoming election.
After holding an evidentiary hearing, the District Court
issued a preliminary injunction on April 2. As relevant
here, the court concluded that the existing deadlines for ab-
sentee voting would unconstitutionally burden Wisconsin cit-
izens' right to vote. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 428,
434 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 789 (1983).
To alleviate that burden, the court entered a twofold remedy.
First, the District Court extended the deadline for voters to
request absentee ballots from April 2 to April 3. Second,
the District Court extended the deadline for election offcials
to receive completed absentee ballots. Previously, Wiscon-
sin law required that absentee ballots be received by 8 p.m.
on election day, April 7; under the preliminary injunction,
the ballots would be accepted until 4 p.m. on April 13, re-
gardless of the postmark date. The District Court also en-
joined members of the Elections Commission and election
inspectors from releasing any report of polling results before
the new absentee-voting deadline, April 13.
1
The state and national Republican parties intervened as defendants.
The District Court denied intervention by the state legislature, which the
Seventh Circuit later allowed.

Cite
as: 589 U. S. 423 (2020)
429
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
Although the members of the Wisconsin Elections Com-
missi
on did not challenge the preliminary injunction, the in-
tervening defendants applied to the Seventh Circuit for a
partial stay. Of the twofold remedy just described, the stay
applicants challenged only the second aspect, the extension
of the deadline for returning absentee ballots. On April 3,
the Seventh Circuit declined to modify the absentee-ballot
deadline. The same applicants then sought a partial stay in
this Court, which the Court today grants.
II
A
The Court's order requires absentee voters to postmark
their ballots by election day, April 7—i. e., tomorrow—even
if they did not receive their ballots by that date. That is a
novel requirement. Recall that absentee ballots were origi-
nally due back to election offcials on April 7, which the Dis-
trict Court extended to April 13. Neither of those deadlines
carried a postmark-by requirement.
While I do not doubt the good faith of my colleagues,
the Cour t's order, I fear, w i l l resu lt i n massive disen-
franchisement. A voter cannot deliver for postmarking
a ballot she has not received. Yet tens of thousands of
voters who timely requested ballots are unlikely to receive
them by April 7, the Court's postmark deadline. Rising
concern about the COVID–19 pandemic has caused a late
surge in absentee-ballot requests. 451 F. Supp. 3d, at
961–962. The Court's suggestion that the current situa-
tion is not “substantially different” from “an ordinary elec-
ti on” bogg les the mi nd. An te, at 425. Some 150,000
requests for absentee ballots have been processed since
Thursday, state records indicate.
2
The surge in absentee-
2
See Wisconsin Elections Commission, Absentee Ballot Report, Apr. 2,
2020, https://elections.wi.gov/node/6806; Wisconsin Elections Commission,
Absentee Ballot Report, Apr. 3, 2020, https://elections.wi.gov/node/6808;
Wisconsin Elections Commission, Absentee Ballot Report, Apr. 4, 2020,

430 REPUBLICAN
NATIONAL COMMITTEE v.
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
ballot requests has overwhelmed election offcials, who face
a
huge backlog in sending ballots. 451 F. Supp. 3d, at
957, 961–962, 967, 976–977. As of Sunday morning, 12,000
ballots reportedly had not yet been mailed out.
3
It takes
days for a mailed ballot to reach its recipient—the postal
service recommends budgeting a week—even without ac-
counting for pandemic-induced mail delays. Id., at 962. It
is therefore likely that ballots mailed in recent days will not
reach voters by tomorrow; for ballots not yet mailed, late
arrival is all but certain.
4
Under the District Court's order,
an absentee voter who receives a ballot after tomorrow could
still have voted, as long as she delivered it to election offcials
by April 13. Now, under this Court's order, tens of thou-
sands of absentee voters, unlikely to receive their ballots
in time to cast them, will be left quite literally without a
vote.
This Court's intervention is thus ill advised, especially so
at this late hour. See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1, 4–5
(2006) (per curiam). Election offcials have spent the past
few days establishing procedures and informing voters in ac-
cordance with the District Court's deadline. For this Court
https://elections.wi.gov/node/6814; Wisconsin Elections Commission, Ab-
sentee Ballot Report, Apr. 5, 2020, https://elections.wi.gov/node/6815.
3
See Wisconsin Elections Commission, Absentee Ballot Report, Apr. 5,
2020, https://elections.wi.gov/ index.php/node/6815.
4
See, e. g., Tr. 18–19 (Apr. 1, 2020) (testimony that mail delivery “can
take up to a week” or longer, threatening “the opportunity for the
voter to receive [the absentee] ballot by mail”); id., at 36 (testimony
that the “transaction time from the time the clerk puts [an absentee ballot]
in the mail to the voter receiving it could take up to a week”); id., at
40 (testimony agreeing that “there will be some people who request . . .
[an] absentee ballot [on April 2] who will not be receiving it in time to
put it in the mail by April 7th”); Brief for City of Green Bay as Amicus
Curiae in No. 3:20–cv–00249 (WD Wis.), p. 5 (“[D]elays at the post of-
fce are . . . affecting the speed with which voters receive their bal-
lots . . . .”).

Cite
as: 589 U. S. 423 (2020)
431
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
to upend the process—a day before the April 7 postmark
deadl
ine—is sure to confound election offcials and voters.
B
What concerns could justify consequences so grave? The
Court's order frst suggests a problem of forfeiture, noting
that the plaintiffs' written preliminary-injunction motions
did not ask that ballots postmarked after April 7 be counted.
But unheeded by the Cour t, a lthough i nitia l ly si lent,
the plaintiffs specifica lly requested that remedy at the
preliminary-injunction hearing in view of the ever-increasing
demand for absentee ballots. See Tr. 102–103 (Apr. 1, 2020).
Second, the Court's order cites Purcell, apparently skepti-
cal of the District Court's intervention shortly before an elec-
tion. Nevermind that the District Court was reacting to a
grave, rapidly developing public health crisis. If proximity
to the election counseled hesitation when the District Court
acted several days ago, this Court's intervention today—
even closer to the election—is all the more inappropriate.
Third, the Court notes that the District Court's order al-
lowed absentee voters to cast ballots after election day. If
a voter already in line by the poll's closing time can still vote,
why should Wisconsin's absentee voters, already in line to
receive ballots, be denied the franchise? According to the
stay applicants, election-distorting gamesmanship might
occur if ballots could be cast after initial results are pub-
lished. But obviating that harm, the District Court en-
joined the publication of election results before April 13, the
deadline for returning absentee ballots, and the Wisconsin
Elections Commission directed election offcials not to pub-
lish results before that date.
5
5
Memorandum from M. Wolfe, Administrator of the Wisconsin Elections
Commission, to Wisconsin Municipal Clerks et al. (Apr. 3, 2020), https://
elections.wi.gov/sites/elections.wi.gov/files/2020-04 /Clerk%20comm%
20re.%20court%20decisions%204.3.pdf.

432 REPUBLICAN
NATIONAL COMMITTEE v.
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
The concerns advanced by the Court and the applicants
pa
le in comparison to the risk that tens of thousands of vot-
ers will be disenfranchised. Ensuring an opportunity for
the people of Wisconsin to exercise their votes should be our
paramount concern.
***
The majority of this Court declares that this case presents
a “narrow, technical question.” Ante, at 423. That is wrong.
The question here is whether tens of thousands of Wisconsin
citizens can vote safely in the midst of a pandemic. Under
the District Court's order, they would be able to do so.
Even if they receive their absentee ballot in the days imme-
diately following election day, they could return it. With
the majority's stay in place, that will not be possible. Either
they will have to brave the polls, endangering their own and
others' safety. Or they will lose their right to vote, through
no fault of their own. That is a matter of utmost impor-
tance—to the constitutional rights of Wisconsin's citizens,
the integrity of the State's election process, and in this most
extraordinary time, the health of the Nation.

Reporter’s Note
Orders commencing with February 26, 2020, begin with page 1248. The
preceding orders in 589 U. S., from October 7, 2019, through February 24,
2020, were reported in Part 1, at 901–1247. These page numbers are the
same as they will be in the bound volume, thus making the permanent
citations available upon publication of the preliminary prints of the United
States Reports.

1248 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
February 26, March 2, 2020 589 U. S.
February 26, 2020
D
ismissal Under Rule 46
No. 18–217. Mathena, Warden v. Malvo. C. A. 4th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 586 U. S. 1221.*] Writ of certiorari dis-
missed under this Court's Rule 46.1.
March 2, 2020
Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded
No. 18–309. Swartz v. Rodriguez, Individually and as
the Surviving Mother and Personal Representative of
*[Reporter’s Note: Argued October 16, 2019. Toby J. Heytens, Solicitor
General of Virginia, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs
were Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, Victoria N. Pearson, Deputy At-
torney General, Matthew R. McGuire, Principal Deputy Solicitor General,
Donald E. Jeffrey III, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Michelle S.
Kallen, Deputy Solicitor General.
Eric J. Feigin argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae
urging vacatur. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Francisco,
Assistant Attorney General Benczkowski, Frederick Liu, and Robert A. Parker.
Danielle Spinelli argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief
were Catherine M. A. Carroll, Kevin M. Lamb, Janet R. Carter, and Craig
S. Cooley.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Indiana
et al. by Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Thomas M. Fisher,
Solicitor General, Kian J. Hudson and Julia C. Payne, Deputy Attorneys
General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows:
Steve Marshall of Alabama, Leslie Rutledge of Arkansas, Ashley Moody of
Florida, Christopher M. Carr of Georgia, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Jeff
Landry of Louisiana, Timothy C. Fox of Montana, Douglas J. Peterson of
Nebraska, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Jason R. Ravnsborg of South
Dakota, Herbert H. Slatery III of Tennessee, Ken Paxton of Texas, Sean
Reyes of Utah, and Bridget Hill of Wyoming; for the Criminal Justice Legal
Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Kymberlee C. Stapleton; for the
Maryland Crime Victims' Resource Center, Inc., by Russell P. Butler and
Victor D. Stone; and for Jonathan F. Mitchell et al. by Taylor A. R. Meehan.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the American Bar
Association by Judy Perry Martinez, Christopher M. Murphy, and Lawrence
A. Wojcik; for Current and Former Prosecutors et al. by Mary B. McCord
and Annie L. Owens; for the Juvenile Law Center et al. by Marsha L. Levick,
Riya Saha Shah, Heather Renwick, and Rebecca Turner; for David I. Bruck
et al. by Ashley C. Parrish; for Erwin Chemerinsky et al. by John Mills,
Larry Yackle, David D. Cole, Deborah A. Jeon, and Sonia Kumar; for Isa
Nichols et al. by Angela C. Vigil; and for Former W. Va. Delegate John Ellem
et al. by Mr. Ellem, pro se, V. Lowry Snow, James L. Dodd, and Suzanne S.
La Pierre.]

ORDERS 1249
589 U. S.
March
2, 2020
J. A. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and
case
remanded for further consideration in light of Hernández v.
Mesa, 589 U. S. 93 (2020). Reported below: 899 F. 3d 719.
No. 18–9164. Muro v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Mo-
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.
Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur-
ther considerati on in light of Ho l gu in-He r n andez v. Un i ted
States, 589 U. S. 169 (2020). Reported below: 765 Fed. Appx. 57.
No. 19–5601. Hicks v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Re-
ported below: 770 Fed. Appx. 215; and
No. 19–5789. McMillan v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Reported below: 774 Fed. Appx. 768. Motions of petitioners for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted,
judgments vacated, and cases remanded for further consideration
in light of Rehaif v. United States, 588 U. S. 225 (2019).
Certiorari Granted—Vacated
No. 19–675. Bank of America Corp. et al. v. City of
Miami, Florida; and
No. 19–688. Wells Fargo & Co. et al. v. City of Miami,
Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted and judgment of
the Court of Appeals vacated as moot. See United States v.
Munsingwear, 340 U. S. 36, 39–40 (1950). Reported below: 923
F. 3d 1260.
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 19–7122. Raghubir v. Inch, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Mo-
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 19–7186. Young v. United States et al. C. A. 11th
Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As
petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk
is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal mat-
ters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).

1250 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 2, 2020 589 U. S.
No. 19–7189. Moore v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Mo-
ti
on of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Reported
below: 772 Fed. Appx. 235.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 19A748. Goad v. Steel, Judge, et al. 274th Jud. Dist.
Ct. Tex., Comal County. Application for stay, addressed to Jus-
tice Ginsburg and referred to the Court, denied.
No. 19M103. Elam et vir v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC,
et al.; and
No. 19M106. Torres v. Continental Apartments et al.
Motions to direct the Clerk to fle petitions for writs of certiorari
out of time denied.
No. 19M104. Hairston v. Department of Veterans Af-
fairs. Motion for leave to proceed as a veteran denied.
No. 19M105. Miller v. United States. Motion for leave to
fle petition for writ of certiorari under seal with redacted copies
for the public record granted.
No. 18–540. Rutledge, Attorney General of Arkansas
v. Pharmaceutical Care Management Assn. C. A. 8th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 589 U. S. 1127.] Motion of petitioner for
leave to fle volume II of the joint appendix under seal granted.
No. 18–956. Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. C. A.
Fed. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 589 U. S. 1066.] Motion of the
Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as ami-
cus curiae and for divided argument granted.
No. 19 – 465. Chiafalo et al. v. Washington. Sup. Ct.
Wash.; and
No. 19–518. Colorado Department of State v. Baca et al.
C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 589 U. S. 1165.] Motion of
petitioners in No. 19–465 to dispense with printing joint appen-
dix granted.
No. 19–7073. Thomas v. Kenmark Ventures, LLC. C. A.
9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pau-
peris denied. Petitioner is allowed until March 23, 2020, within
which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to

ORDERS 1251
589 U. S.
March
2, 2020
submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of
th
is Court.
No. 19–7564. In re Seibert; and
No. 19–7643. In re Leonard. Petitions for writs of habeas
corpus denied.
No. 19–7143. In re McDonald. Petition for writ of manda-
mus denied.
No. 19–7435. In re Brooks. Petition for writ of mandamus
and/or prohibition denied.
Certiorari Granted
No. 19–547. United States Fish and Wildlife Service
et al. v. Sierra Club, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted.
Reported below: 925 F. 3d 1000.
No. 19–840. California et al. v. Texas et al.; and
No. 19–1019. Texas et al. v. California et al. C. A. 5th
Cir. Motion of 33 State Hospital Associations for leave to fle
brief as amici curiae in No. 19–840 granted. Certiorari granted,
cases consolidated, and a total of one hour is allotted for oral
argument. Reported below: 945 F. 3d 355.
No. 19–5410. Borden v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Mo-
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.
Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the peti-
tion. Reported below: 769 Fed. Appx. 266.
Certiorari Denied
No. 18–7105. Hunter v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 749 Fed. Appx. 811.
No. 18–7797. Patrick v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 747 Fed. Appx. 797.
No. 18–8380. Pressey v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–8447. Wilson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 754 Fed. Appx. 930.
No. 18–9547. Williams v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.

1252 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 2, 2020 589 U. S.
No. 18–9772. Howard v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 767 Fed. Appx. 779.
No. 18–9796. Jimerson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 749 Fed. Appx. 950.
No. 19–28. Daniels v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 915 F. 3d 148.
No. 19–229. C. D., By and Through Her Parents, M. D.
et al., et al. v. Natick Public School District et al. C. A.
1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 924 F. 3d 621.
No. 19–550. Watso et al. v. Harpstead, Commissioner,
Minnesota Department of Human Services, et al. C. A.
8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 929 F. 3d 1024.
No. 19–572. Singh v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 924 F. 3d 1030.
No. 19–592. County Commissioners of Carroll County,
Maryland v. Maryland Department of the Environment.
Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 465 Md. 169,
214 A. 3d 61.
No. 19–689. Chapman et al. v. ACE American Insurance
Co. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 774
Fed. Appx. 556.
No. 19–714. Pennsylvania v. Landis. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 201 A. 3d 768.
No. 19–806. Barth v. Township of Bernards, New Jersey,
et al. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–808. Leibundguth Storage & Van Service, Inc. v.
Village of Downers Grove, Illinois. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 939 F. 3d 859.
No. 19–810. Badwal v. Badwal et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 756 Fed. Appx. 101.
No. 19– 817. Shands v. Lakeland Central School Dis-
trict et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
771 Fed. Appx. 121.
No. 19–821. Nsejjere v. Smith et ux. Ct. App. Wash.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 8 Wash. App. 2d 1044.

ORDERS 1253
589 U. S.
March
2, 2020
No. 19–853. Sandra R. et al. v. Arizona Department of
Child
Safety. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 246 Ariz. 180, 436 P. 3d 503.
No. 19–866. Ubinas-Brache v. Surgery Center of Texas,
LP. Ct. App. Tex., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–898. Collins v. Thornton. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 782 Fed. Appx. 264.
No. 19–927. Klocke, Independent Administrator of the
Estate of Klocke v. University of Texas at Arlington.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 938 F. 3d 204.
No. 19 – 928. Johnson v. Darnell, Sheriff, Alachua
County, Florida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 781 Fed. Appx. 961.
No. 19–929. Shuman et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
774 Fed. Appx. 813.
No. 19–942. Zuckerman, as Ancillary Administratrix of
the Estate of Leffmann v. Metropolitan Museum of Art.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 928 F. 3d 186.
No. 19–944. Seldin v. Seldin et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 777 Fed. Appx. 182.
No. 19–952. Goodwin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 774 Fed. Appx. 196.
No. 19–954. Harriss v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 776
Fed. Appx. 425.
No. 19–965. Edwards v. Atterberry et al. Sup. Ct. Ill.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–969. Marshall et al. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
782 Fed. Appx. 565.
No. 19–973. Swanson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–5037. Villanueva v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.

1254 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 2, 2020 589 U. S.
No. 19–5247. Hedlund v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certio-
rar
i denied. Reported below: 245 Ariz. 467, 431 P. 3d 181.
No. 19–5309. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 765 Fed. Appx. 103.
No. 19–5478. Madrigal v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 770 Fed. Appx. 553.
No. 19–5480. Dorsey v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–5575. Yarbrough v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 770 Fed. Appx. 214.
No. 19–5923. Hayes v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 779 Fed. Appx. 574.
No. 19–6078. McDaniel v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 925 F. 3d 381.
No. 19–6148. Wilson v. Grimes et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 770 Fed. Appx. 218.
No. 19–6213. Booker v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–6230. Fincher v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 929 F. 3d 501.
No. 19–6249. Faircloth v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 770 Fed. Appx. 976.
No. 19–6405. Vereen v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 920 F. 3d 1300.
No. 19–6426. Ramirez v. Davis, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi-
sion. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 780
Fed. Appx. 110.
No. 19–6596. Hettinga v. Loumena. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App.
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–6675. Bishop v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 940 F. 3d 1242.

ORDERS 1255
589 U. S.
March
2, 2020
No. 19–6773. Ortega-Limones v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir
. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 776 Fed. Appx. 222.
No. 19–6910. Moliere v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 574 S. W. 3d 21.
No. 19–7064. Beanblossom v. Bay District Schools. Dist.
Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 265
So. 3d 657.
No. 19–7091. Champagne v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 247 Ariz. 116, 447 P. 3d 297.
No. 19–7095. Smith v. United States District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 785 Fed. Appx. 184.
No. 19–7101. Nowakowski v. E. E. Austin & Son, Inc.,
et al. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7108. Moore v. LeGrand, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7110. Johnson v. McMahon, Chief Judge, United
States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7111. Johnson v. Portnoy et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7120. Sanchez v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–7124. Butler v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–7129. Moore v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J., App.
Div. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7135. Hye-Young Park v. Secolsky et al. C. A.
7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7140. Medrano Ortiz v. Solomon et al. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 778 Fed. Appx. 236.
No. 19–7150. Walton v. Kowalski, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.

1256 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 2, 2020 589 U. S.
No. 19–7157. Mother v. Lorain County Children Serv-
ices.
Ct. App. Ohio, 9th App. Dist., Lorain County. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2019-Ohio-1152.
No. 19–7158. Montanez v. McDean, LLC. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 770 Fed. Appx. 592.
No. 19–7160. Espinoza v. Ashe et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–7162. Juan Negron v. Inch, Secretary, Florida
Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–7166. Karnofel v. Superior Waterproong, Inc.
Ct. App. Ohio, 11th App. Dist., Trumbull County. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 2019-Ohio-1409.
No. 19–7168. Johnson v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 IL App (3d) 170074–U.
No. 19–7181. Bell v. Oregon Health & Science Univer-
sity. Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7184. Brewer v. Cunningham, Superintendent,
Fishkill Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 19–7241. Cox v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 1st Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 2018–0769 (La. App. 1 Cir.
2/22/19), 272 So. 3d 597.
No. 19–7277. Moreira v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7284. Wallace v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7297. Burton v. Clarke, Director, Virginia De-
partment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7329. Williams v. Gentry, Warden, et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 782 Fed. Appx. 616.
No. 19–7357. Fordham v. Manzola et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 776 Fed. Appx. 199.
No. 19–7372. Taylor v. District of Columbia. Ct. App.
D. C. Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 1257
589 U. S.
March
2, 2020
No. 19–7376. Trappler v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct.
N
. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 173
App. Div. 3d 1334, 102 N. Y. S. 3d 756.
No. 19–7399. Harris v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7427. Perez-Jimenez v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 781 Fed. Appx. 381.
No. 19–7437. Sparks v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 941 F. 3d 748.
No. 19–7446. Echeverria-Benitez v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 781 Fed. Appx. 375.
No. 19–7450. Steele v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 783 Fed. Appx. 423.
No. 19–7454. Bareld v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 941 F. 3d 757.
No. 19–7457. Villarreal-Estebis v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 782 Fed. Appx. 329.
No. 19–7460. Wright v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 937 F. 3d 8.
No. 19 –7467. Beqiraj v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 788 Fed. Appx. 73.
No. 19–7477. Mejia v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 782 Fed. Appx. 644.
No. 19–7478. Pye v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 781 Fed. Appx. 808.
No. 19–7490. Ernesto Hernandez v. United States. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 784 Fed. Appx. 525.
No. 19–7492. Jensen v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 780 Fed. Appx. 800.
No. 19–7494. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 782 Fed. Appx. 518.
No. 19–7498. Sanders v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.

1258 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 2, 2020 589 U. S.
No. 19–7502. Peters v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 19–7507. Gurule v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 935 F. 3d 878.
No. 19–7510. Block v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–7512. Urias-Marquez v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 783 Fed. Appx. 406.
No. 19–7514. Essien v. Peery, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 783 Fed. Appx. 776.
No. 19–7518. Reyes Garcia et al. v. United States. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 794 Fed. Appx. 567.
No. 19–7519. Hernandez-Nunez v. United States. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 782 Fed. Appx. 633.
No. 19–7522. Matthews v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018–1107 (La. App. 1 Cir.
2/25/19).
No. 19–7540. Jackson v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 782 Fed. Appx. 774.
No. 18–7833. Hayes v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
No. 19–296. Guedes et al. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 920 F. 3d 1.
Statement of Justice Gorsuch respecting the denial of
certiorari.
Does owning a bump stock expose a citizen to a decade in
federal prison? For years, the government didn't think so. But
recently the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
changed its mind. Now, according to a new interpretive rule from
the agency, owning a bump stock is forbidden by a longstanding fed-
eral statute that outlaws the “possession [of] a machine-gun.”
26 U. S. C. § 5685(b); 18 U. S. C. § 924(a)(2). Whether bump stocks
can be fairly reclassifed and effectively outlawed as machine-
g uns under existi ng st atutory defi niti ons, I do not know

ORDERS 1259
1258
St
atement of Gorsuch, J.
and could not say without briefng and argument. Nor do I ques-
ti
on that Congress might seek to enact new legislation directly
regulating the use and possession of bump stocks. But at least
one thing should be clear: Contrary to the court of appeals's deci-
sion in this case, Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), has nothing to say about
the proper interpretation of the law before us.
In the frst place, the government expressly waived reliance
on Chevron. The government told the court of appeals that,
if the validity of its rule (re)interpreting the machinegun statute
“turns on the applicability of Chevron, it would prefer that
the [r]u le be set aside rather than upheld. ” 920 F. 3d 1,
21 (CADC 2019) (per cur i am). Yet, despite this concession,
the court proceeded to uphold the agency's new rule only on
the strength of Chevron deference. Think about it this way.
The executive branch and affected citizens asked the court to
do what courts usually do in statutory interpretation disputes:
supply its best i ndependent judg ment about what the law
means. But, instead of deciding the case the old-fashioned way,
the court placed an uninvited thumb on the scale in favor of
the government.
That was mistaken. This Court has often declined to apply
Chevron deference when the government fails to invoke it. See
Eskridge & Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations From Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 Geo. L. J. 1083, 1121–1124 (2008) (collecting cases);
Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L. J.
969, 982–984 (1992) (same); see BNSF R. Co. v. Loos, 586 U. S.
310 (2019). Even when Chevron deference is sought, this Court
has found it inappropriate where “the Executive seems of two
minds” about the result it prefers. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis,
584 U. S. 497, 520 (2018). Nor is it a surprise that the govern-
ment can lose the beneft of Chevron in situations like these and
ours. If the justifcation for Chevron is that “ `policy choices'
should be left to Executive Branch offcials `directly accountable
to the people,' ” Epic Systems, 584 U. S., at 520 (quoting Chevron,
467 U. S., at 865), then courts must equally respect the Executive's
decision not to make policy choices in the interpretation of Con-
gress's handiwork.
To make matters worse, the law before us carries the possibility
of criminal sanctions. And, as the government itself may have

1260 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
Statement of Gorsuch, J. 589 U. S.
recognized in offering its disclaimer, whatever else one thinks
about
Chevron, it has no role to play when liberty is at stake.
Under our Constitution, “[o]nly the people's elected representa-
tives in the legislature are authorized to `make an act a crime.' ”
United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445, 451 (2019) (quoting United
States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812)). Before courts may
send people to prison, we owe them an independent determination
that the law actually forbids their conduct. A “reasonable”
prosecutor's say-so is cold comfort in comparison. That's why
this Court has “never held that the Government's reading of a
criminal statute is entitled to any deference.” United States v.
Apel, 571 U. S. 359, 369 (2014). Instead, we have emphasized,
courts bear an “obligation” to determine independently what the
law allows and forbids. Abramski v. United States, 573 U. S. 169,
191 (2014); see also 920 F. 3d, at 39–40 (opinion of Henderson, J.);
Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F. 3d 1019, 1027–1032 (CA6
2016) (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). That
obligation went unfulflled here.
Chevron's application in this case may be doubtful for other
reasons too. The agency used to tell everyone that bump stocks
don't qualify as “machineguns.” Now it says the opposite. The
law hasn't changed, only an agency's interpretation of it. And
these days it sometimes seems agencies change their statutory
interpretations almost as often as elections change administra-
tions. How, in all this, can ordinary citizens be expected to keep
up—required not only to conform their conduct to the fairest
reading of the law they might expect from a neutral judge, but
forced to guess whether the statute will be declared ambiguous;
to guess again whether the agency's initial interpretation of the
law will be declared “reasonable”; and to guess again whether a
later and opposing agency interpretation will also be held “rea-
sonable”? And why should courts, charged with the independent
and neutral interpretation of the laws Congress has enacted, defer
to such bureaucratic pirouetting?
Despite these concerns, I agree with my colleagues that the
interlocutory petition before us does not merit review. The er-
rors apparent in this preliminary ruling might yet be corrected
before fnal judgment. Further, other courts of appeals are ac-
tively considering challenges to the same regulation. Before de-
ciding whether to weigh in, we would beneft from hearing their
considered judgments—provided, of course, that they are not af-

ORDERS 1261
589 U. S.
March
2, 5, 2020
ficted with the same problems. But waiting should not be mis-
t
aken for lack of concern.
No. 19–7458. Myers v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 786 Fed.
Appx. 161.
No. 19–7486. Lindsay v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 931 F. 3d 852.
No. 19–7489. Duran v. Diaz, Secretary, California De-
partment of Corrections and Rehabilitation. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari before judgment denied.
Rehearing Denied
No. 19–6153. Nelson v. Burt, Warden, 589 U. S. 1107;
No. 19–6337. Birch-Min v. Middlesex County Board of
Social Services et al., 589 U. S. 1144;
No. 19–6457. D. B. v. Texas Department of Family and
Protective Services, 589 U. S. 1147;
No. 19–6470. Marshall v. Steeh et al., 589 U. S. 1147; and
No. 19–6537. Everson v. Lantz et al., 589 U. S. 1149. Peti-
tions for rehearing denied.
No. 18–9296. In re Dannewitz, 589 U. S. 915. Motion for
leave to fle petition for rehearing denied.
March 5, 2020
Miscellaneous Order
No. 19A984. Woods v. Stewart, Warden, et al. Applica-
tion for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to
Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.
Certiorari Denied
No. 19–7880 (19A976). Woods v. Dunn, Commissioner, Ala-
bama Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir.
Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented
to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.
Certiorari denied. The order heretofore entered by Justice
Thomas is vacated. Reported below: 951 F. 3d 1288.

1262 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 6, 9, 2020 589 U. S.
March 6, 2020
M
iscellaneous Order
No. 19A906. Actavis Holdco U. S., Inc., et al. v. Connecti-
cut et al. D. C. E. D. Pa. Application for stay, presented to
Justice Alito, and by him referred to the Court, denied. The
order heretofore entered by Justice Alito is vacated.
March 9, 2020
Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded
No. 19–566. Pierson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-
tiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further
consideration in light of Rehaif v. United States, 588 U. S. 225
(2019). Reported below: 925 F. 3d 913.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 19M107. National Football League et al. v. Ninth
Inning, Inc., et al. Motion for leave to fle petition for writ of
certiorari with supplemental appendix under seal granted.
No. 19M108. Anderson v. Robitaille. Motion for leave to
fle petition for writ of certiorari with supplemental appendix
under seal denied. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pau-
peris with declaration of indigency under seal denied.
No. 19M109. Appleton v. DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc.
Motion to direct the Clerk to fle petition for writ of certiorari
out of time denied.
No. 19–292. Torres v. Madrid et al. C. A. 10th Cir. [Cer-
tiorari granted, 589 U. S. 1126.] Motion of the Solicitor General
for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and
for divided argument granted.
No. 19–431. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and
Paul Home v. Pennsylvania et al.; and
No. 19–454. Trump, President of the United States,
et al. v. Pennsylvania et al. C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari
granted, 589 U. S. 1165.] Motion of petitioners in No. 19–454 to
dispense with printing joint appendix granted.
No. 19–6516. Veteto v. Grifn, Judge, Circuit Court of
Alabama, Montgomery County, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Mo-

ORDERS 1263
589 U. S.
March
9, 2020
tion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to
proceed
in forma pauperis [589 U. S. 1128] denied.
No. 19–6564. In re Wei Zhou. Motion of petitioner for re-
consideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pau-
peris [589 U. S. 1131] denied.
No. 19–7339. Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A., et al.
C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until March 30, 2020,
within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and
to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of
this Court.
No. 19–7230. In re Lopez. Petition for writ of mandamus
denied.
No. 19–7296. In re Martinez. Petition for writ of manda-
mus and/or prohibition denied.
Certiorari Granted
No. 18–1259. Jones v. Mississippi. Ct. App. Miss. Certio-
rari granted. Reported below: 285 So. 3d 626.
Certiorari Denied
No. 18–9546. Wills v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–320. Wade et ux. v. Kreisler Law, P. C. C. A. 7th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 926 F. 3d 447.
No. 19–549. Hannah P. v. Maguire, Acting Director, Of-
ce of the Director of National Intelligence. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 916 F. 3d 327.
No. 19–670. Fleck v. Wetch et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 937 F. 3d 1112.
No. 19–701. Johnson v. Rimmer et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 936 F. 3d 695.
No. 19–708. Gold Value International Textile, Inc. v.
Sanctuary Clothing, LLC, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 19–725. Guy v. Lampert, Director, Wyoming Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 2019 WY 69, 444 P. 3d 652.

1264 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 9, 2020 589 U. S.
No. 19 – 820. Mc Mahon, Sheriff of San Bernardino
County
, et al. v. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 934 F. 3d 1076.
No. 19–837. Kunkel et al. v. Northern Kentucky Inde-
pendent Health District et al. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari
denied.
No. 19–842. Schwartz v. Clark County, Nevada, et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 775 Fed.
Appx. 918.
No. 19–843. Holtzclaw v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 OK CR 17, 448 P. 3d
1134.
No. 19–844. Graham v. Wininger. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 131 N. E. 3d 187.
No. 19–892. United States ex rel. Gelbman v. City of
New York et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 790 Fed. Appx. 244.
No. 19–916. Risby v. Wolf, Acting Secretary of Home-
land Security, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 768 Fed. Appx. 607.
No. 19–923. Barnes v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 934 F. 3d 901.
No. 19 – 962. Norwood v. West Virginia. Sup. Ct. App.
W. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 242 W. Va. 149, 832
S. E. 2d 75.
No. 19 – 971. James et al. v. JW Gaming Development,
LLC. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 778
Fed. Appx. 545.
No. 19–976. Edge et al. v. City of Everett, Washington.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 929 F. 3d 657.
No. 19–999. Dugan v. Wyoming. Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2019 WY 112, 451 P. 3d 731.
No. 19 –1002. Automotive Body Parts As sn. v. Ford
Global Technologies, LLC. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 930 F. 3d 1314.

ORDERS 1265
589 U. S.
March
9, 2020
No. 19–1018. Gallop v. Adult Correctional Institutions
et
al. Sup. Ct. R. I. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 218
A. 3d 543.
No. 19–6151. Ali v. Foss, Acting Warden, et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 772 Fed. Appx. 580.
No. 19–6482. Smith v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 927 F. 3d 313.
No. 19– 6500. Dominguez-Villalobos v. United States.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 774 Fed.
Appx. 226.
No. 19–6502. Fields v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 932 F. 3d 316.
No. 19–6546. Garcia Ramirez v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 785 Fed. Appx. 758.
No. 19–6795. Conde-Herrera v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 776 Fed. Appx. 234.
No. 19–6796. Castanon-Renteria v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 776 Fed. Appx. 230.
No. 19–6825. Guerrero v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 921 F. 3d 895.
No. 19–6862. Betsinger v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–6877. Brown v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 19–7142. Haymon v. Johnson. App. Div., Super. Ct. Cal.,
County of San Joaquin. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7179. Ari v. California. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 19–7190. Benavides v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7192. Walker v. Pash, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.

1266 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 9, 2020 589 U. S.
No. 19–7195. Weatherspoon v. Colorado. Ct. App. Colo.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 19–7196. Zimmerman v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 5th Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7202. Powell v. Lab Corp. et al. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 789 Fed. Appx. 237.
No. 19–7203. McKinney v. Davis, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi-
sion, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7204. Wilson v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 786 Fed. Appx. 878.
No. 19–7205. Johnson v. Progressive Corporation Insur-
ance Co. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19 –7206. Johnson v. Law Offices of Jennifer S.
Adams et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7210. Cash v. Rupert et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 777 Fed. Appx. 110.
No. 19–7211. Brown v. Sage et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 941 F. 3d 655.
No. 19–7212. Alexander v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7213. Banks v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–7214. Brown v. Mace-Liebson et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 779 Fed. Appx. 136.
No. 19–7219. Canales v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 281 So. 3d 487.
No. 19–7229. Lowe v. Parris et al. Ct. App. Tenn. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–7232. Parra v. Lizarraga, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 1267
589 U. S.
March
9, 2020
No. 19–7240. Allen-Bey v. Michigan State Treasurer.
Ct.
App. Mich. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7244. Alandt v. Arkansas. Ct. App. Ark. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 2018 Ark. App. 493, 561 S. W. 3d
764.
No. 19–7252. Jason v. Tanner, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 938 F. 3d 191.
No. 19–7267. Snowton v. United States et al. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 783 Fed. Appx. 443.
No. 19–7273. Rodriguez-Palomino v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill.,
2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 IL App (2d)
160361–B, 126 N. E. 3d 746.
No. 19–7287. Banks v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7316. Bough v. Hutchison, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19 –7343. Williams v. Hall, Warden. Sup. Ct. Ga.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7384. King v. Benton County Sheriff ’s Office
et al. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7409. Pryor v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 927 F. 3d 1042.
No. 19–7432. Calligan v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 123 N. E. 3d 724.
No. 19–7447. Rudenko v. Shanley, Superintendent, Cox-
sackie Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer ti orari
denied.
No. 19–7468. Phillips v. Kentucky. Ct. App. Ky. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–7470. Martinez-Lopez v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 788 Fed. Appx. 973.
No. 19–7480. Lynch v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 783 Fed. Appx. 904.

1268 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 9, 2020 589 U. S.
No. 19–7482. Nunez v. Bowerman, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 19–7485. Aguon v. Montgomery, Warden, et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7497. Silvestri v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7521. Harley v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 790 Fed. Appx. 844.
No. 19–7533. Sinanan v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 209 A. 3d 519.
No. 19–7535. Reed v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 784 Fed. Appx. 467.
No. 19–7539. Kane v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–7552. Guarascio v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 778 Fed. Appx. 248.
No. 19–7557. Yarbough v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 785 Fed. Appx. 41.
No. 19–7561. Ramirez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 777 Fed. Appx. 748.
No. 19–7566. Asefi v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 788 Fed. Appx. 449.
No. 19–7567. Ben v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 783 Fed. Appx. 443.
No. 19–7568. Brewster v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 783 Fed. Appx. 455.
No. 19–7575. Carter v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 776 Fed. Appx. 820.
No. 19–7581. Taylor et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 935 F. 3d 1279.
No. 19–7587. Burdunice v. Minnesota. Ct. App. Minn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7590. Howell v. Hatton, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 1269
589 U. S.
March
9, 2020
No. 19–7598. Valencia-Cruz v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir
. Certiorari denied.
No. 19 –7610. Camberos-Villapuda v. United States.
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7622. Elliott v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 937 F. 3d 1310.
No. 19–7633. Allen v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19 –7653. Bigbee v. Lebo, Warden. Ct. Crim. App.
Tenn. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7659. Rios et vir v. West Virginia Department of
Health and Human Resources. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 242 W. Va. 581, 836 S. E. 2d 799.
No. 19–7671. Bradley v. Minnesota. Ct. App. Minn. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–392. Armstrong v. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer ti orar i denied. Justice
Sotomayor took no part in the consideration or decision of this
petition. Reported below: 767 Fed. Appx. 166.
No. 19–466. Pittman v. Harris. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Alito would grant the petition for writ of cer-
tiorari. Reported below: 927 F. 3d 266.
No. 19–909. Malouf v. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Re-
ported below: 933 F. 3d 1248.
No. 19–958. Mikhak v. University of Phoenix, Inc. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the
consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 768
Fed. Appx. 740.
No. 19 – 6878. Bolden v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari before judgment denied. Justice Kagan took no part
in the consideration or decision of this petition.
No. 19–7525. Sitzmann v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the

1270 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 9, 10, 2020 589 U. S.
consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 893
F
. 3d 811.
No. 19–7636. Eiland v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the con-
sideration or decision of this petition.
Rehearing Denied
No. 19–125. Zamore v. Deutsche Bank National Trust
Co., Individually and as Trustee for JP Morgan Mortgage
Acquisition Trust 2007–CH5 Asset Backed Pass-Through
Certicates Series 2007–CH5, et al., 589 U. S. 1133;
No. 19–580. Jun Xiao v. Regents of the University of
Minnesota et al., 589 U. S. 1137;
No. 19–599. Mohorne v. Beal Bank et al., 589 U. S. 1138;
No. 19–639. Shao v. Tsan-Kuen Wang, 589 U. S. 1168;
No. 19–5957. Haynes v. Riverside Presbyterian Apart-
ments, 589 U. S. 1072;
No. 19–6281. Sanders v. Obama et al., 589 U. S. 1123;
No. 19–6386. Xue Jie He v. Guttenberg New Jersey Po-
lice et al., 589 U. S. 1145;
No. 19–6387. Grifn v. American Zurich Insurance Co.
et al., 589 U. S. 1145;
No. 19–6532. Amaro v. Balderas, Attorney General of
New Mexico, et al., 589 U. S. 1149;
No. 19–6542. Hall v. Author Solutions et al., 589 U. S.
1149
No. 19–6648. Barenz v. Alaska, 589 U. S. 1151;
No. 19–6744. Merck v. Minnesota Supreme Court et al.,
589 U. S. 1182; and
No. 19–6776. Dawson v. Wells, 589 U. S. 1155. Petitions for
rehearing denied.
March 10, 2020
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 19 – 465. Chiafalo et al. v. Washington. Sup. Ct.
Wash. [Certiorari granted, 589 U. S. 1165.] Case no longer con-
solidated with No. 19–518, Colorado Department of State v. Baca
et al., and one hour is allotted for oral argument in this case.
No. 19–518. Colorado Department of State v. Baca et al.
C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 589 U. S. 1165.] Case no

ORDERS 1271
589 U. S.
March
10, 11, 16, 19, 2020
longer consolidated with No. 19–465, Chiafalo v. Washington, and
one
hour is allotted for oral argument in this case. Justice So-
tomayor took no part in the consideration of this order.
March 11, 2020
Miscellaneous Order
No. 19A960. Wolf, Acting Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity, et al. v. Innovation Law Lab et al. D. C. N. D. Cal.
Application for stay, presented to Justice Kagan, and by her
referred to the Court, granted, and the District Court's April 8,
2019, order granting preliminary injunction is stayed pending the
timely fling and disposition of a petition for writ of certiorari.
Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay shall
terminate automatically. In the event the petition for writ of
certiorari is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the sending
down of the judgment of this Court. Justice Sotomayor would
deny the application.
March 16, 2020
Dismissals Under Rule 46
No. 19–264. Kelly, Superintendent, Oregon State Peni-
tentiary v. White. Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari dismissed under
this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported below: 365 Ore. 1, 443 P. 3d 597.
No. 19–265. Kelly, Superintendent, Oregon State Peni-
tentiary v. White. Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari dismissed under
this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported below: 365 Ore. 21, 443 P. 3d
608.
March 19, 2020
Miscellaneous Order
In l ight of the ongoi ng publ ic hea lth concer ns relati ng to
COVID–19, the following shall apply to cases prior to a ruling on
a petition for a writ of certiorari:
IT IS ORDERED that the deadline to fle any petition for a
writ of certiorari due on or after the date of this order is extended
to 150 days from the date of the lower court judgment, order
denying discretionary review, or order denying a timely petition
for rehearing. See this Court's Rules 13.1 and 13.3.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that motions for extensions of
time pursuant to Rule 30.4 will ordinarily be granted by the

1272 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 19, 23, 2020 589 U. S.
Clerk as a matter of course if the grounds for the application are
di
ffculties relating to COVID–19 and if the length of the exten-
sion requested is reasonable under the circumstances. Such mo-
tions should indicate whether the opposing party has an objection.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, notwithstanding Rules 15.5
and 15.6, the Clerk will entertain motions to delay distribution of
a petition for writ of certiorari where the grounds for the motion
are that the petitioner needs additional time to fle a reply due
to diffculties relating to COVID–19. Such motions will ordi-
narily be granted by the Clerk as a matter of course if the length
of the extension requested is reasonable under the circumstances
and if the motion is actually received by the Clerk at least two
days prior to the relevant distribution date. Such motions should
indicate whether the opposing party has an objection.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that these modifcations to the
Court's Rules and practices do not apply to cases in which certio-
rari has been granted or a direct appeal or original action has
been set for argument.
These modifcations will remain in effect until further order of
the Court.
March 23, 2020
Dismissal Under Rule 46
No. 19–730. McKesson v. Doe. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
dismissed under th is Cour t's Ru le 46. Repor ted below: 945
F. 3d 818.
Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded. (See also Davis v.
United States, 589 U. S. 345 (2020) (per curiam).)
No. 19–6113. Bazan v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Re-
ported below: 772 Fed. Appx. 214; and
No. 19–6431. Bazan v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Re-
ported below: 773 Fed. Appx. 811. Motions of petitioner for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judg-
ments vacated, and cases remanded for further consideration in
light of Davis v. United States, 589 U. S. 345 (2020) (per curiam).
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 19–6991. Lei Ke v. Drexel University. Super. Ct. Pa.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de-
nied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As

ORDERS 1273
589 U. S.
March
23, 2020
petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk
is
directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal mat-
ters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). Reported below: 201 A. 3d 876.
No. 19–7254. Smith v. Washington. Sup. Ct. Wash. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 19–7403. Shove v. Davis, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Mo-
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 19M110. Doe v. United States. Motion for leave to fle
petition for writ of certiorari under seal with redacted copies for
the public record granted.
No. 19M111. Mayes v. Windom et al.; and
No. 19M112. Medina v. United States. Motions to direct
the Clerk to fle petitions for writs of certiorari out of time
denied.
No. 19M113. Clowers v. Cradduck et al. Motion to direct
the Clerk to fle petition for writ of certiorari out of time under
this Court's Rule 14.5 denied.
No. 65, Orig. Texas v. New Mexico. Motion of the Solicitor
General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus cu-
r i ae and for div ided arg ument granted. [ For ear l ier order
herein, see, e. g., 589 U. S. 1177.]
No. 19–267. Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-
Berru; and
No. 19–348. St. James School v. Biel, as Personal Repre-
sentative of the Estate of Biel. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari
granted, 589 U. S. 1126–1127.] Motion of Virginia et al. for leave
to participate in oral argument as amici curiae and for divided
argument denied. Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to
participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided
argument granted.

1274 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 23, 2020 589 U. S.
No. 19–357. City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton et al.
C
. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 589 U. S. 1126.] Motion of
the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as
amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.
No. 19–431. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and
Paul Home v. Pennsylvania et al.; and
No. 19–454. Trump, President of the United States,
et al. v. Pennsylvania et al. C. A. 3d Cir. [Cer ti orari
granted, 589 U. S. 1165.] Motion of petitioner in No. 19–431 to
dispense with printing joint appendix granted.
No. 19–635. Trump v. Vance, District Attorney of the
County of New York, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. [Cer ti orari
granted, 589 U. S. 1120.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave
to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided
argument granted.
No. 19–715. Trump et al. v. Mazars USA, LLP, et al.
C. A. D. C. Cir.; and
No. 19–760. Trump et al. v. Deutsche Bank AG et al.
C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 589 U. S. 1120.] Motion of the
Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as ami-
cus curiae and for divided argument granted.
No. 19–6786. Morris v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Mo-
tion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to
proceed in forma pauperis [589 U. S. 1165] denied.
No. 19–7310. Smith v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
denied. Petitioner is allowed until April 13, 2020, within which
to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit
a petiti on in compliance w ith Ru le 33.1 of the Ru les of th is
Court.
No. 19–932. In re Murphy. Petition for writ of habeas cor-
pus denied.
No. 19–7351. In re Thomas Bey; and
No. 19–7411. In re McCray. Petitions for writs of manda-
mus denied.
No. 19–7374. In re Wallace. Petition for writ of mandamus
and/or prohibition denied.

ORDERS 1275
589 U. S.
March
23, 2020
Certiorari Denied
N
o. 18–8804. Raymond v. Roy et al. Ct. App. Tex., 4th
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–484. Doe et al. v. Federal Election Commission.
C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 920 F. 3d
866.
No. 19–497. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lin-
coln Property Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 920 F. 3d 890.
No. 19–500. Siddiqui v. NetJets Aviation, Inc. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 773 Fed. Appx. 562.
No. 19–597. Reese v. Sprint Nextel Corp. et al. C. A.
Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 774 Fed. Appx.
656.
No. 19–604. Francway v. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
940 F. 3d 1304.
No. 19–607. Woodcrest Homes, Inc. v. Carousel Farms
Metropolitan District. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 442 P. 3d 402.
No. 19–646. Adkins et al. v. Collens. Sup. Ct. Alaska.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 444 P. 3d 187.
No. 19–735. Tong, Attorney General of Connecticut v.
Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority et al. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 930 F. 3d 65.
No. 19–756. Taylor v. Pima County, Arizona, et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 913 F. 3d 930.
No. 19–763. Angino et al. v. TransUnion LLC. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–765. Faust, Director, Arizona Department of
Child Safety v. B. K., by Her Next Friend Tinsley, et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 922 F. 3d 957.
No. 19–852. Maxell, Ltd. v. Fandango Media, LLC. C. A.
Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 779 Fed. Appx.
745.

1276 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 23, 2020 589 U. S.
No. 19–858. GemCap Lending I, LLC v. Quarles & Brady,
LLP,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
787 Fed. Appx. 369.
No. 19–861. Shumski v. Davis, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–876. Ramirez v. Hogue et al. Sup. Ct. N. D. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 ND 245, 933 N. W. 2d 468.
No. 19–884. Caldwell et ux. v. Unum Life Insurance
Company of America. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–885. Swartz et al. v. Heartland Equine Rescue
et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 940
F. 3d 387.
No. 19–886. Negash et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 772 Fed. Appx. 34.
No. 19–888. Longmire v. Warshaw Burstein Cohen Schl-
esinger & Kuh, LLP. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 106 App. Div. 3d 536, 965
N. Y. S. 3d 458.
No. 19–890. Jensen v. Blumenstiel, Judge, United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–895. McDonald v. Bellco Credit Union. Ct. App.
Colo. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–902. Ramon Ochoa v. Levine et al. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–911. Castro v. Simon, Individually and in Her Of-
cial Capacity as Deputy Commissioner, et al. C. A. 2d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 778 Fed. Appx. 50.
No. 19–913. Siddiqui et vir, Individually and as Per-
sonal Representatives of the Estate of Siddiqui, De-
ceased v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 783 Fed. Appx. 484.
No. 19–915. Scott et ux. v. U. S. Bank N. A. et al. C. A.
8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 1277
589 U. S.
March
23, 2020
No. 19–918. Lucero v. Koncilja et al. C. A. 10th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 781 Fed. Appx. 786.
No. 19–921. Paz v. Director, New Jersey Division of Tax-
ation. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–938. Clark v. New York Commissioner of Social
Services. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–961. Haselrig v. Inslee. Ct. App. Wash. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 7 Wash. App. 2d 1052.
No. 19 – 964. Lawrence v. University Hospital et al.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 773 Fed.
Appx. 577.
No. 19 – 979. Crick v. Key, Superintendent, Airway
Heights Corrections Center. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer ti orari
denied.
No. 19–989. Johnson, Individually and as Trustee of the
Annabell M. Palmer Family Trust, et al. v. UBS AG. C. A.
2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 791 Fed. Appx. 240.
No. 19–991. Primm v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–1005. Hotze Health Wellness Center Interna-
tional One, LLC, et al. v. Environmental Research
Center, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1007. Abdul-Aziz v. National Basketball Associa-
tion Players’ Pension Plan. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 784 Fed. Appx. 46.
No. 19–1011. Kelly v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1015. Walker v. Ameriprise Financial Services,
Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 787
Fed. Appx. 211.
No. 19–1017. Solutran, Inc. v. Elavon, Inc., et al. C. A.
Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 931 F. 3d 1161.
No. 19–1025. City of Ferguson, Missouri v. Fant et al.
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

1278 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 23, 2020 589 U. S.
No. 19–1027. Caswell v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 788 Fed. Appx. 650.
No. 19–1032. Waters v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 937 F. 3d 1344.
No. 19–1041. Khrapko v. Splain et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–1068. Inchierchiere v. Florida Department of
Corrections et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–5487. Nino v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 750 Fed. Appx. 589.
No. 19–5926. Quintanar v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 777 Fed. Appx. 706.
No. 19–5995. Clark v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–6236. Eichler v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 781 Fed. Appx. 707.
No. 19– 6282. Salazar-Martinez v. United States (Re-
por ted below: 774 Fed. Appx. 192); Morales-Gallegos v.
United States (774 Fed. Appx. 191); and Robledo-Cuevas v.
United States (774 Fed. Appx. 919). C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–6296. Holmes v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 770 Fed. Appx. 1013.
No. 19–6361. McKown v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 930 F. 3d 721.
No. 19–6363. Pearson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–6370. Bennett v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 770 Fed. Appx. 547.
No. 19–6464. Garcia-Jacobo v. Feather, Warden. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 771 Fed. Appx. 787.
No. 19–6465. Jones v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 927 F. 3d 365.

ORDERS 1279
589 U. S.
March
23, 2020
No. 19–6710. Bowling v. Clarke, Director, Virginia De-
p
artment of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 920 F. 3d 192.
No. 19–6740. Rhoton v. Brown, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–6901. Barrera-Montes v. United States;
No. 19–6938. Garcia-Solar v. United States; and
No. 19–7484. Perez-Cruz v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 775 Fed. Appx. 523.
No. 19–6906. Alexander v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 776 Fed. Appx. 860.
No. 19–6918. Nance v. Ford, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 922 F. 3d 1298.
No. 19–6934. Johnson v. Davis, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
935 F. 3d 284.
No. 19–6942. Carter v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 781 Fed. Appx. 707.
No. 19–6965. Kincaide v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 787 Fed. Appx. 908.
No. 19–7011. Golden v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 786 Fed. Appx. 164.
No. 19–7021. Hunter et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 932 F. 3d 610.
No. 19–7022. Cruz v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–7045. Jones v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 777 Fed. Appx. 177.
No. 19–7222. Richardson v. Thomas, Warden. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 930 F. 3d 587.
No. 19–7224. Jones v. Goldberg et al. Ct. Sp. App. Md.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 241 Md. App. 740 and 743.
No. 19–7233. Nash v. Kenney et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 784 Fed. Appx. 54.

1280 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 23, 2020 589 U. S.
No. 19–7262. Mallari v. Vessigault et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 771 Fed. Appx. 835.
No. 19–7263. Khurana v. Idaho Department of Health
and Welfare. Ct. App. Idaho. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7279. Oliphant-Johns v. Good Deal Remodeling.
Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7280. Jones v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 770 Fed. Appx. 1019.
No. 19–7281. Grant v. MTGLQ Investors, L. P. Ct. App.
D. C. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7282. Arnold v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 19–7286. Caldwell v. Downs et al. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 789 Fed. Appx. 183.
No. 19–7290. Garland v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 32 N. Y. 3d 1094, 114 N. E. 3d
1071.
No. 19–7295. Johnson v. Nationwide Insurance Co. et al.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7299. Barrera v. Nagy, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7300. Booker v. Davis, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi-
sion. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7301. Goodrum v. Hutchison, Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7302. Shampine v. Sarver’s Realty et al. C. A.
6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7303. Smith v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–7306. Pronin v. Wright et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 784 Fed. Appx. 181.

ORDERS 1281
589 U. S.
March
23, 2020
No. 19–7308. McGavitt v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 8th Dist.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 19–7311. Frazier v. City of Omaha Police Depart-
ment et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7317. Chailla v. Navient Department of Educa-
tion et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
791 Fed. Appx. 226.
No. 19–7319. Waters v. Stewart et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 776 Fed. Appx. 134.
No. 19–7321. Snowton v. United States et al. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 786 Fed. Appx. 472.
No. 19–7328. Taylor v. City of Colonial Heights, Vir-
ginia (Reported below: 775 Fed. Appx. 129); and Taylor v. Ir-
ving, Sheriff, City of Richmond, Virginia (777 Fed. Appx.
682). C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7338. Moran v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 288 So. 3d 77.
No. 19–7340. Vazquez-Suarez v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App.
Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 282 So. 3d
106.
No. 19–7342. Turner v. Cadney et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–7344. Williams v. Jackson County, Missouri. C. A.
8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 770 Fed. Appx.
312.
No. 19–7345. Sanchez v. Davis, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi-
sion. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 936
F. 3d 300.
No. 19–7346. Clark v. Department of the Army et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 775 Fed.
Appx. 168.
No. 19–7347. Marshall v. Texas (two judgments). Ct. App.
Tex., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.

1282 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 23, 2020 589 U. S.
No. 19–7348. Alston, aka Austin v. New York. App. Div.,
Sup
. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 174 App. Div. 3d 1349, 105 N. Y. S. 3d 680.
No. 19–7349. Osornio v. Supreme Court of the United
States et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7350. Batteneld v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App.
Okla. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7353. Okon v. Knutson, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7354. Martin v. Kelley, Director, Arkansas De-
partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7355. Gaines v. Johnson, Administrator, New Jer-
sey State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7358. Harrell v. Faireld Police Department
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7360. Simonton v. Garman, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Rockview, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19 –7362. Regalado v. Trump, President of the
United States, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7373. Tyagi v. Smith et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 790 Fed. Appx. 42.
No. 19–7377. Adger v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y.,
4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 170 App.
Div. 3d 1619, 94 N. Y. S. 3d 471.
No. 19–7378. Diaz v. San Bernardino County, California,
et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist., Div. 2. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 790 Fed. Appx. 42.
No. 19–7379. Capers v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 7 Cal. 5th 989, 446 P. 3d 726.
No. 19–7380. Constance v. United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7383. May v. Arkansas. Ct. App. Ark. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2019 Ark. App. 443, 587 S. W. 3d 257.

ORDERS 1283
589 U. S.
March
23, 2020
No. 19–7385. Kimbel v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 4th Dist.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 19 –7390. Ellis v. Oklahoma. Ct. Cr im. App. Okla.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7395. Crump v. United States et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 765 Fed. Appx. 143.
No. 19–7397. Hudson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation
and Parole. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer ti orar i denied. Repor ted
below: 651 Pa. 308, 204 A. 3d 392.
No. 19–7398. Gibbons v. Knutson, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7407. Bennett v. Brewer, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 940 F. 3d 279.
No. 19–7413. Clancy v. Florida Department of Correc-
tions et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 782 Fed. Appx. 779.
No. 19–7414. Whitley v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–7415. Davis v. Fayette County Appraisal District
et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 775
Fed. Appx. 779.
No. 19–7428. O’Laughlin v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 934 F. 3d 840.
No. 19–7429. Mitchell v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 7 Cal. 5th 561, 443 P. 3d 1.
No. 19–7436. Reeves v. Saul, Commissioner of Social Se-
curity. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
794 Fed. Appx. 851.
No. 19–7443. Milton v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7449. Smith v. Oreol. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 19–7463. Burlison v. Ellspermann, Individually and
in His Ofcial Capacity as Clerk of Court for Marion

1284 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 23, 2020 589 U. S.
County, Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari de-
nied.
Reported below: 286 So. 3d 775.
No. 19–7471. Brown v. San Bernardino County, Califor-
nia, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7515. Nguyen v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.
Dist., Div. 3. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7516. Mosley v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 782 Fed. Appx. 353.
No. 19–7517. Palacios-Cordero v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 782 Fed. Appx. 365.
No. 19–7520. Feeney v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 780 Fed. Appx. 393.
No. 19–7523. Lawson v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7526. Segura-Resendiz v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 783 Fed. Appx. 422.
No. 19–7528. Smith v. Jackson. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 787 Fed. Appx. 177.
No. 19–7530. Thompson v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 257 So. 3d 573.
No. 19–7536. Simpson v. Bishop et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 781 Fed. Appx. 257.
No. 19–7543. Osborn v. Williams et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–7547. Cashion v. Texas (two judgments). Ct. App.
Tex., 6th Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7548. Cabrera v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 783 Fed. Appx. 450.
No. 19–7551. Herrington v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–7558. Wilson v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 769 Fed. Appx. 825.

ORDERS 1285
589 U. S.
March
23, 2020
No. 19–7562. Smith v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied. Reported below: 770 Fed. Appx. 131.
No. 19–7571. Williams v. Mays, Warden. Ct. Crim. App.
Tenn. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7574. Beltran v. United States; and
No. 19–7594. Lopez-Cabrera v. United States. C. A. 2d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 933 F. 3d 95.
No. 19–7580. Cristo v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 775
Fed. Appx. 303.
No. 19–7584. Yazzie v. Mohave County, Arizona, et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 751 Fed.
Appx. 1018.
No. 19–7585. Ellis v. Barlow-Hurst, Warden. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7586. Donahue v. Pennsylvania Civil Service
Commission. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 204 A. 3d 1064.
No. 19–7588. Bible v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 783 Fed. Appx. 1039.
No. 19–7593. Young Yi v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7599. Smith-Kilpatrick v. United States. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 942 F. 3d 734.
No. 19–7602. Harrell v. Belyea et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7606. McKinnon v. Florida (two judgments). Sup.
Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7608. Perez-Roman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 783 Fed. Appx. 464.
No. 19–7614. Perry v. Brown. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 19–7616. Blajos v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.

1286 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 23, 2020 589 U. S.
No. 19–7617. Amaya-Rivas v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir
. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 784 Fed. Appx. 671.
No. 19–7620. Campbell v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 783 Fed. Appx. 311.
No. 19–7623. Silkeutsabay et al. v. United States. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 776 Fed. Appx. 538.
No. 19–7624. Shaw v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 782 Fed. Appx. 74.
No. 19–7625. Swinton v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 289 So. 3d 469.
No. 19–7630. Hollingshed v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 940 F. 3d 410.
No. 19–7631. Wolgamott v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 776 Fed. Appx. 531.
No. 19–7634. Hankins v. Lowe. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 770 Fed. Appx. 756.
No. 19–7635. Courtney v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 783 Fed. Appx. 444.
No. 19–7638. Cruz Perez v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 785 Fed. Appx. 955.
No. 19–7640. Carrier v. Romero, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7646. Fitzgerald v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 935 F. 3d 814.
No. 19–7648. Harris v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 778 Fed. Appx. 256.
No. 19–7650. D. W. v. Washington State Department of
Children, Youth and Families. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari
denied.
No. 19–7652. Whyte v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 795 Fed. Appx. 353.
No. 19–7654. Eloi v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.

ORDERS 1287
589 U. S.
March
23, 2020
No. 19–7656. Huntoon v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 19–7661. Dervishaj v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 787 Fed. Appx. 12.
No. 19–7662. Orellana v. Madden, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 789 Fed. Appx. 34.
No. 19–7663. LaSalle v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 785 Fed. Appx. 410.
No. 19–7664. Barnett v. United States; and Sesson v.
United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7667. Williams v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 784 Fed. Appx. 876.
No. 19–7675. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7677. Cody v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–7681. Washington v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7682. Beverly v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 943 F. 3d 225.
No. 19–7695. Delacruz v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19 –7697. Lovell v. Children ’s Corner Daycare.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7698. Calderon-Ortalejo v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 784 Fed. Appx.
281.
No. 19–7705. Burghardt v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 939 F. 3d 397.
No. 19–7707. Arthur v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7711. Vescuso v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 783 Fed. Appx. 666.

1288 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 23, 2020 589 U. S.
No. 19–7713. Oudems v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 785 Fed. Appx. 234.
No. 19–7716. Wallace v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 937 F. 3d 130.
No. 19–7718. Reyes v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 795 Fed. Appx. 10.
No. 19–7719. Sheafe v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 789 Fed. Appx. 22.
No. 19–7720. Jones v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 795 Fed. Appx. 889.
No. 19–7730. Alexander v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 780 Fed. Appx. 48.
No. 19–7733. Diaz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–7737. Wolfe v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 781 Fed. Appx. 566.
No. 19–7744. Rai Chowdhuri v. SGT, Inc., et al. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 773 Fed. Appx. 171.
No. 19–7747. Sueiro v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 946 F. 3d 637.
No. 19–7749. Bridges v. Gray, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7750. Brown v. Hutchison, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7752. Ochoa v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 941 F. 3d 1074.
No. 19–7754. Peeters v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 776 Fed. Appx. 948.
No. 19–7757. Popoola v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 933 F. 3d 302.
No. 19–7760. Achey v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 943 F. 3d 909.
No. 19–633. Avery v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 770 Fed. Appx. 741.

ORDERS 1289
589 U. S.
March
23, 2020
Statement of Justice Kavanaugh respecting the denial of
cer
tiorari.
Federal prisoners can seek postconviction relief by fling an
application under 28 U. S. C. § 2255. State prisoners can seek fed-
eral postconviction relief by fling an application under § 2254.
The issue in this case concerns second-or-successive applica-
tions. As relevant here, the law provides that a “claim presented
in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section
2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.”
§ 2244(b)(1) (emphasis added).
The text of that second-or-successive statute covers only appli-
cations fled by state prisoners under § 2254. Yet six Courts of
Appeals have interpreted the statute to cover applications fled
by state prisoners under § 2254 and by federal prisoners under
§ 2255, even though the text of the law refers only to § 2254. See
Gallagher v. United States, 711 F. 3d 315 (CA2 2013); United
States v. Winkelman, 746 F. 3d 134, 135–136 (CA3 2014); In re
Bourgeois, 902 F. 3d 446, 447 (CA5 2018); Taylor v. Gilkey, 314
F. 3d 832, 836 (CA7 2002); Winarske v. United States, 913 F. 3d
765, 768–769 (CA8 2019); In re Baptiste, 828 F. 3d 1337, 1340
(CA11 2016).
Af ter Avery's case was decided, the Sixth Circuit recently
re jected the other Circuits' interpretati on of the second-or-
successive statute and held that the statute covers only applica-
tions fled by state prisoners under § 2254. Williams v. United
States, 927 F. 3d 427 (2019).
Importantly, the United States now agrees with the Sixth Cir-
cuit that “Section 2244(b)(1) does not apply to Section 2255 mo-
tions” and that the contrary view is “inconsistent with the text
of Section 2244.” Brief in Opposition 10, 13. In other words,
the Government now disagrees with the rulings of the six Courts
of Appeals that had previously decided the issue in the Govern-
ment's favor.
In a future case, I would grant certiorari to resolve the circuit
split on this question of federal law.
No. 19–723. White v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Mo-
tion for leave to fle brief in opposition under seal with redacted
copies for the public record granted. Motion for leave to fle
reply brief under seal with redacted copies for the public record
granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 927 F. 3d 257.

1290 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 23, 2020 589 U. S.
No. 19–869. Weber v. Allergan, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 940 F. 3d 1106.
No. 19–6589. Norman et al. v. United States. C. A. D. C.
Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in
the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below:
926 F. 3d 304.
No. 19–7589. Monzel v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the
consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 930
F. 3d 470.
No. 19–7604. Lumpkin v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons set out in Brown v. United States,
586 U. S. 953 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
Rehearing Denied
No. 18–9645. Black v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,
589 U. S. 1132;
No. 19–493. Maksimuk v. Connor Sport Court Interna-
tional, LLC, 589 U. S. 1135;
No. 19–552. Salzwedel v. California et al., 589 U. S. 1136;
No. 19–582. Edmondson v. Lilliston Ford Inc. et al., 589
U. S. 1179;
No. 19–637. Serna v. Webster et al., 589 U. S. 1167;
No. 19–705. Sharpe v. United States, 589 U. S. 1180;
No. 19–6329. Boyd v. Monroe et al., 589 U. S. 1144;
No. 19–6381. Brown v. Michigan, 589 U. S. 1144;
No. 19–6382. Martinez-Covarrubias v. Barr, Attorney
General, 589 U. S. 1144;
No. 19–6438. Tapia-Fierro v. Barr, Attorney General,
et al., 589 U. S. 1123;
No. 19–6439. Lopez v. MUFG Union Bank, N. A., et al.,
589 U. S. 1146;

ORDERS 1291
589 U. S.
March
23, 30, 2020
No. 19– 6495. Schwert z v. Jennings, Warden, 589 U. S.
1148;
N
o. 19–6498. Tootle v. Beaux Art Institute of Plastic
Surgery et al., 589 U. S. 1148;
No. 19–6541. Fortes v. Texas Department of Family and
Protective Services et al., 589 U. S. 1114;
No. 19–6563. Wazney v. South Carolina, 589 U. S. 1149;
No. 19–6575. Elliott v. Florida, 589 U. S. 1150;
No. 19–6579. Smith v. North Carolina et al., 589 U. S.
1150;
No. 19– 6651. Thompson v. Mc Ginley, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Coal Township, 589
U. S. 1152;
No. 19–6694. Sundy v. Christian, Judge, et al., 589 U. S.
1181;
No. 19–6698. Mtaza v. United States, 589 U. S. 1153;
No. 19–6702. In re Calderon-Lopez, 589 U. S. 1167;
No. 19–6887. In re Edmonds, 589 U. S. 1131; and
No. 19–7047. In re Spencer, 589 U. S. 1178. Petitions for
rehearing denied.
March 30, 2020
Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded
No. 18–1185. Charter Communications, Inc. v. National
Association of African American-Owned Media et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case
remanded for further consideration in light of Comcast Corp. v.
National Assn. of African American-Owned Media, 589 U. S.
327 (2020). The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 915 F. 3d 617.
No. 18–1255. Angeles v. Barr, Attorney General. C. A.
5th Cir.; and
No. 18–1454. Londono-Gonzalez v. Barr, Attorney Gen-
eral. C. A. 5th Cir. Repor ted below: 744 Fed. Appx. 898.
Certiorari granted, judgments vacated, and cases remanded for
further consideration in light of Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589
U. S. 221 (2020).

1292 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 30, 2020 589 U. S.
Certiorari Dismissed
N
o. 19–7495. Badruddoza v. Department of Homeland Se-
curity et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See
this Court's Rule 39.8.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 19A914. Davis v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App.
Dist., Div. 1. Application to recall remittitur, addressed to Jus-
tice Thomas and referred to the Court, denied.
No. 19M114. O'Connor, as Next Friend and Guardian of
O’Connor v. Wright et al.;
No. 19M115. Smith v. Illinois Department of Transpor-
tation; and
No. 19M116. Hodge v. Genovese, Warden. Motions to di-
rect the Clerk to fle petitions for writs of certiorari out of time
denied.
No. 19M117. Juvenile Male v. United States. Motion for
leave to fle petition for writ of certiorari under seal with appen-
dix available for the public record denied.
No. 18–9526. McGirt v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.
[Certiorari granted, 589 U. S. 1119.] Motion of the parties, Mus-
cogee (Creek) Nation, and the Solicitor General for enlargement
of time for oral argument and for divided argument granted in
part, and the time is divided as follows: 15 minutes for petitioner,
15 minutes for Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 15 minutes for respond-
ent, and 15 minutes for the Solicitor General.
No. 19–23. Rockwood Casualty Insurance Co. v. Direc-
tor, Ofce of Workers’ Compensation Programs, Depart-
ment of Labor, et al., 589 U. S. 1058. Motion of respondent
Tony Kourianos for attorney's fees and expenses granted. The
Court approves attorney's fees of $22,106.25 and expenses of
$1,531.53.
No. 19–7425. Hettinga v. Arcadia Management Services
Co. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist.; and
No. 19 –7607. Westrum v. National Labor Relations
Board. C. A. 8th Cir. Motions of petitioners for leave to pro-
ceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until
April 20, 2020, within which to pay the docketing fees required

ORDERS 1293
589 U. S.
March
30, 2020
by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule
33.1
of the Rules of this Court.
No. 19–7944. In re Beebe. Petition for writ of habeas cor-
pus denied.
No. 19–7466. In re Calderon Lopez. Motion of petitioner
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for
writ of mandamus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 19–7550. In
and/or prohibition denied.
re Guice. Petition for writ of mandamus
No. 19–7792.
denied.
In re Lopez. Petition for writ of prohibition
Certiorari Granted
No. 19–546. Brownback et al. v. King. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari granted. Reported below: 917 F. 3d 409.
Certiorari Denied
No. 19–442. Perez Castillo v. Barr, Attorney General.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 752 Fed.
Appx. 501.
No. 19–557. McDonald v. United States. C. A. Armed
Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 M. J. 376.
No. 19–608. Elster et al. v. City of Seattle, Washing-
ton. Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193
Wash. 2d 638, 444 P. 3d 590.
No. 19–645. Arizona v. Nunez-Diaz. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 247 Ariz. 1, 444 P. 3d 250.
No. 19–661. Tun-Cos et al. v. Perrotte et al. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 922 F. 3d 514.
No. 19–667. Baker v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 923 F. 3d 390.
No. 19–718. King v. Brownback et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 917 F. 3d 409.
No. 19–784. University of Pennsylvania et al. v. Sweda
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 923
F. 3d 320.

1294 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 30, 2020 589 U. S.
No. 19 –795. Voorhees v. United States. C. A. Ar med
F
orces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: ––– M. J. –––.
No. 19–797. City of St. Louis, Missouri, et al. v. Meier.
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 934 F. 3d 824.
No. 19–798. Bay Point Properties, Inc. v. Mississippi
Transportation Commission et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 937 F. 3d 454.
No. 19–802. Ehrman v. Cox Communications, Inc., et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 932 F. 3d
1223.
No. 19–903. Ramon Ochoa v. Levine et al. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–904. Ramon Ochoa v. Levine et al. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–905. Ramon Ochoa v. Levine et al. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–919. Becker et al. v. Janvey et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 927 F. 3d 830.
No. 19–931. Friedheim v. Field. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 781 Fed. Appx. 664.
No. 19–935. Leeper v. Hamilton County Coal, LLC, et al.
C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 939 F. 3d 866.
No. 19–936. Trentacosta v. Davis, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
782 Fed. Appx. 337.
No. 19–941. Raulerson v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic
and Classication Prison. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 928 F. 3d 987.
No. 19–943. Vazirabadi v. Denver Health and Hospital
Authority et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 782 Fed. Appx. 681.
No. 19–945. Pardes v. Doan. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist.,
Div. 3. Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 1295
589 U. S.
March
30, 2020
No. 19–947. Xiu Jian Sun v. Chatigny. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
ti
orari denied.
No. 19 – 948. Recht zigel v. Minnesota. Ct. App. Minn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–951. Prasad v. General Electric Co. et al. C. A.
6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–955. Hirshauer v. AQ Holdings, LLC, et al. Ct.
Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 239 Md. App.
716 and 722.
No. 19–977. Alfonso Gomez et al. v. Barr, Attorney Gen-
eral. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 776
Fed. Appx. 516.
No. 19–981. English v. Perdue, Secretary of Agricul-
ture. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 777
Fed. Appx. 94.
No. 19–987. Winters, Judge, District Court of Louisi-
ana, Fourth Judicial District, et al. v. Palowsky, Individu-
ally and On Behalf of Alternative Environmental
Solutions, Inc. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 2018–1105 (La. 6/26/19), 285 So. 3d 466.
No. 19–1030. Bishop v. Palm Beach County, Florida. Cir.
Ct. Palm Beach County, Fla. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1050. Brooks v. Colorado. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 448 P. 3d 310.
No. 19–1055. Moss v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 936 F. 3d 52.
No. 19–1071. Carlson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 783 Fed. Appx. 781.
No. 19–6062. Valdez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 911 F. 3d 960.
No. 19–6389. Dennis v. Terris, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 927 F. 3d 955.
No. 19–6720. Myers v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 928 F. 3d 763.

1296 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 30, 2020 589 U. S.
No. 19–6747. Martinez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 775 Fed. Appx. 778.
No. 19–6757. Bowens v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 938 F. 3d 790.
No. 19–7071. Williams v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 931 F. 3d 570.
No. 19–7074. Stitt v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 780 Fed. Appx. 295.
No. 19–7097. Sanchez v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 7 Cal. 5th 14, 439 P. 3d 772.
No. 19–7391. Davis v. Tegley et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–7401. Hockaday v. Christner et al. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7402. Sanders v. Hennepin County Human Serv-
ice and Public Health Department Child Support et al.
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7405. Grant v. Williams. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7406. Antonio Guzman v. Davis, Director, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institu-
tions Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7418. Gifford v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 281 So. 3d 484.
No. 19–7419. Hardin v. Davis, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi-
sion. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7421. Henderson v. Franklin et al. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 782 Fed. Appx. 866.
No. 19–7423. Hamilton v. Ramey, Warden. Sup. Ct. Mo.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7424. Ham v. Superior Court of California, Santa
Clara County, et al. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certio-
rari denied.

ORDERS 1297
589 U. S.
March
30, 2020
No. 19–7431. Loand v. Horton, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 19–7441. Ridley v. Board of County Commissioners
of Sedgwick County, Kansas, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 775 Fed. Appx. 454.
No. 19–7442. Williams v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 585 S. W. 3d 478.
No. 19–7444. Muhammad v. Kozelski et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 776 Fed. Appx. 120.
No. 19–7445. Patterson v. United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 785 Fed. Appx. 131.
No. 19–7448. Rydbom v. Ames, Superintendent, Mount
Olive Correctional Complex. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–7452. Golin et ux. v. San Andreas Regional Cen-
ter et al.; and
No. 19–7453. Delaney v. San Andreas Regional Center
et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist., Div. 1. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7459. Peyton v. Sims, Warden, et al. Ct. App. Ky.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 585 S. W. 3d 250.
No. 19–7461. Cheeks v. Joyner. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 776 Fed. Appx. 796.
No. 19–7462. Bangura v. Pennsylvania et al. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 793 Fed. Appx. 142.
No. 19–7464. Davis v. Raymond Laborde Correctional
Center et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 786 Fed. Appx. 467.
No. 19–7465. Antonio Contreras v. Washington. Ct. App.
Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 9 Wash. App. 2d
1028.
No. 19–7473. Brown v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–7474. Banks v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-
rari denied.

1298 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 30, 2020 589 U. S.
No. 19–7475. Ball v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
N
o. 19–7483. Washington v. Deleon et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7496. Stroner v. Davis, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi-
sion. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7499. Skipp v. United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7500. Spencer v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–7503. Bell v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 284 So. 3d 400.
No. 19–7505. Crump v. Beltz, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–7511. Deville et al. v. Court of Appeal of Cali-
fornia, Second Appellate District, et al. Sup. Ct. Cal.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7534. Scott v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2019 Ark. 94, 571 S. W. 3d 451.
No. 19–7538. Carlson et vir v. Harpstead, Commissioner,
Minnesota Department of Human Services, et al. Ct.
App. Minn. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7549. Ellis v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 784 Fed. Appx. 470.
No. 19–7560. Swain v. Florida Commission on Offender
Review. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
780 Fed. Appx. 676.
No. 19–7570. Tierney-Young v. Saul, Commissioner of
Social Security. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19 –7576. Davis v. Angleton Independent School
District et al. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 582 S. W. 3d 474.

ORDERS 1299
589 U. S.
March
30, 2020
No. 19–7578. Barry v. Warren, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied.
No. 19–7613. Smith- Jeter v. ArtSpace Everet t Lofts
Condominium Assn. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 773 Fed. Appx. 1009.
No. 19–7618. Woods v. Saul, Commissioner of Social Secu-
rity. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7639. Harris v. Chapman, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7651. White v. Fox, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 787 Fed. Appx. 462.
No. 19–7657. Sherrod v. Harkelroad et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 791 Fed. Appx. 377.
No. 19–7665. Chapman v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 785 Fed. Appx. 352.
No. 19–7690. Short v. Superintendent, State Correc-
tional Institution at Greensburg, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7694. Sanders v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 2019 WI App 52, 388 Wis. 2d 502,
933 N. W. 2d 670.
No. 19–7722. Watson v. Virginia (two judgments). Sup. Ct.
Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 297 Va. 355, 827 S. E.
2d 778 (frst judgment); 297 Va. 347, 827 S. E. 2d 782 (second
judgment).
No. 19–7726. Watkins v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 940 F. 3d 152.
No. 19–7732. Hanks v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 795 Fed. Appx. 783.
No. 19–7735. Kearby v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 943 F. 3d 969.
No. 19–7761. Arteaga v. Clark, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.

1300 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 30, 2020 589 U. S.
No. 19–7765. Reyes v. Ercole, Superintendent, Green
Ha
ven Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 785 Fed. Appx. 26.
No. 19–7768. Hersi v. May, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–7771. Blanton v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 783 Fed. Appx. 390.
No. 19–7773. Denton v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 944 F. 3d 170.
No. 19–7775. Isabella v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 918 F. 3d 816.
No. 19–7776. Marzouk v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 776 Fed. Appx. 804.
No. 19–7777. Hoyle v. West Virginia. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 242 W. Va. 599, 836 S. E.
2d 817.
No. 19–7781. Fortner v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 943 F. 3d 1007.
No. 19–7782. Mayer v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7784. Jenkins v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7786. Teitelbaum v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 10th App.
Dist., Franklin County. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7796. Hawkins v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7797. Hubbard v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7798. Cantu Hernandez v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 787 Fed. Appx. 849.
No. 19–7800. Bush v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 944 F. 3d 189.

ORDERS 1301
589 U. S.
March
30, 2020
No. 19–7802. Ramirez Noria v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir
. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 945 F. 3d 847.
No. 19–7804. Flores v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–7811. Crum v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 934 F. 3d 963.
No. 19–7812. Lajaward Khan v. United States. C. A. 2d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 797 Fed. Appx. 546.
No. 19–7816. Gay v. Foster, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 791 Fed. Appx. 748.
No. 19–7817. Acosta v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 786 Fed. Appx. 96.
No. 19–7819. Dost v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 786 Fed. Appx. 117.
No. 19–7820. Derby v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 783 Fed. Appx. 638.
No. 19–7823. Weaver v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 IL App (4th) 170462–U.
No. 19–7824. Fisher v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 943 F. 3d 809.
No. 19–7826. Miller v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7833. Rodriguez-Juarez v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 786 Fed. Appx. 487.
No. 19–7843. Buck v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 786 Fed. Appx. 469.
No. 19–7844. White, aka Hoffman v. United States. C. A.
8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 744 Fed. Appx. 990.
No. 19–7845. Weise v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–7848. Adams v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 770 Fed. Appx. 124.

1302 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
March 30, 2020 589 U. S.
No. 19–7853. Monzon-Silva v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir
. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 791 Fed. Appx. 671.
No. 19–7854. Overstreet v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 790 Fed. Appx. 203.
No. 19–7855. Walker v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 786 Fed. Appx. 470.
No. 19–7857. Adams v. Minnesota. Sup. Ct. Minn. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 936 N. W. 2d 326.
No. 19–7863. Knight v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–311. Cannon, Sheriff, Charleston County, South
Carolina v. Seay. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of respondent for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.
Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, and Justice Kavanaugh
would grant the petition for writ of certiorari. Reported below:
927 F. 3d 776.
No. 19–807. Bank Melli v. Bennett et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 778 Fed.
Appx. 541.
No. 19–950. Yung-Kai Lu v. University of Utah et al.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no
part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported
below: 790 Fed. Appx. 933.
No. 19–1060. Thomas v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Motion
of Cato Institute for leave to fle brief as amicus curiae granted.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 N. Y. 3d 545, 144 N. E.
3d 970.
No. 19–1073. Enzo Life Sciences, Inc. v. Roche Molecu-
lar Systems, Inc., et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.
Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of
this petition. Reported below: 928 F. 3d 1340.
No. 19–7755. Patrick v. United States (Reported below: 785
Fed. Appx. 424); Nunn v. United States; Colasanti v. United
States (787 Fed. Appx. 973); Gildersleeve v. United States

ORDERS 1303
589 U. S.
March
30, April 2, 2020
(788 Fed. Appx. 478); and Beraldo v. United States. C. A.
9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons set out in Brown v. United States, 586
U. S. 951 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari). Recognizing that the Court has repeatedly declined to
grant certiorari on this important issue––whether the right recog-
nized in Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. 591 (2015), applies to
defendants sentenced under the mandatory Sentencing Guide-
lines––I will cease noting my dissent in future petitions present-
ing the question. I hope, however, that the Court will at some
point reconsider its reluctance to answer it.
Rehearing Denied
No. 19–5526. Lake v. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans Af-
fairs, 589 U. S. 1140;
No. 19–5676. Jordan v. United States, 589 U. S. 1083;
No. 19–6215. Haynes v. Assets Protection, Inc., 589 U. S.
1109;
No. 19–6273. Lucas v. Florida, 589 U. S. 1143;
No. 19–6328. Brown v. Davis, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi-
sion, 589 U. S. 1144;
No. 19–6577. Smith v. Haynes, 589 U. S. 1150;
No. 19–6578. Smith v. Washington, 589 U. S. 1150;
No. 19–6598. Hercenberger v. Martin, 589 U. S. 1169;
No. 19–6782. Mallard v. Next Day Temps et al., 589 U. S.
1183; and
No. 19–6916. Jefferson v. Supreme Court of Georgia, 589
U. S. 1215. Petitions for rehearing denied.
April 2, 2020
Dismissals Under Rule 46
No. 18–1218. Buchwald Capital Advisors LLC, Litigation
Trustee to the Greektown Litigation Trust v. Sault Ste.
Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians et al. C. A. 6th Cir.

1304 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
April 2, 6, 2020 589 U. S.
Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported
below:
917 F. 3d 451.
No. 19–7903. Brown v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. Reported below:
786 Fed. Appx. 501.
No. 19–7914. Moss v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46. Reported below: 787
Fed. Appx. 225.
April 6, 2020
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 19–7573. Donahue v. Scalia, Secretary of Labor,
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this
Court's Rule 39.8. Reported below: 789 Fed. Appx. 324.
No. 19–7597. Wazney v. Nelson, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de-
nied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Re-
ported below: 773 Fed. Appx. 768.
Miscellaneous Orders.
No. 19M119. Walsh v. United States. Motion for leave to
fle petition for writ of certiorari with supplemental appendix
under seal granted.
No. 19M120. Rebenstorf v. Grant;
No. 19M121. Crenshaw v. Jones, Secretary, Florida
Department of Corrections;
No. 19M122. Warren v. Ormond, Warden, et al.; and
No. 19M123. Lowery v. Davis, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi-
sion. Motions to direct the Clerk to fle petitions for writs of
certiorari out of time denied.
No. 19M124. Armstrong v. Pennsylvania et al.;
No. 19M125. Armstrong v. United States et al.;
No. 19M126. Armstrong v. Amtrak Police; and
No. 19M127. Armstrong v. GEICO Insurance. Motions to
direct the Clerk to fle petitions for writs of certiorari out of time
under this Court's Rule 14.5 denied.

ORDERS 1305
589 U. S.
Apr
il 6, 2020
No. 19–7894. In re Renchenski; and
N
o. 19–8026. In re Hampton. Petitions for writs of habeas
corpus denied.
No. 19–7884. In re Frye. Petition for writ of mandamus
denied.
Certiorari Denied
No. 19–573. Al-Amin v. Ward, Commissioner, Georgia De-
partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 932 F. 3d 1291.
No. 19–659. Salgado v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 929 F. 3d 1293.
No. 19–680. Sealey et al. v. Gilliam et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 932 F. 3d 216.
No. 19–690. Neville v. Dhillon, Chair, Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 778 Fed. Appx. 280.
No. 19–710. Connecticut Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC, dba
Total Wine & More v. Seagull, Commissioner, Connecticut
Department of Consumer Protection, et al. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 932 F. 3d 22.
No. 19–956. Craig et al. v. O’Kelley, Individually and as
Personal Representative of the Estate of Turner, et al.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 781 Fed.
Appx. 888.
No. 19–986. Vosburgh et al. v. Burnt Hills-Ballston
Lake Central School District et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 778 Fed. Appx. 54.
No. 19 – 990. Southern Illinois Storm Shelters v.
4SEMO.COM, Inc. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 939 F. 3d 905.
No. 19–994. Hill v. Johnson et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 787 Fed. Appx. 604.
No. 19–996. Waters v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari
denied.

1306 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
April 6, 2020 589 U. S.
No. 19–998. Cook, Individually and as Natural Mother
to
Cook, et al. v. Hopkins et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 19–1003. Kinuthia v. Velarde, Acting Chief, Adminis-
trative Appeals Ofce, et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 19–1072. Rothstein v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 939 F. 3d 1286.
No. 19–1075. Copeland v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–1102. Small v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 944 F. 3d 490.
No. 19–1103. INO Therapeutics LLC et al. v. Praxair
Distribution Inc. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 782 Fed. Appx. 1001.
No. 19–6410. Rager v. Augustine, Warden, et al. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 760 Fed. Appx.
947.
No. 19–6501. Felicianosoto v. United States. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 934 F. 3d 783.
No. 19–6800. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 776 Fed. Appx. 227.
No. 19–6967. Boyd et al. v. California Public Utilities
Commission et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 922 F. 3d 929.
No. 19–7081. Adebowale v. Wolf, Acting Secretary of
Homeland Security, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 781 Fed. Appx. 510.
No. 19–7086. Prezioso v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 782 Fed. Appx. 586.
No. 19–7088. Cortez-Rogel v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 777 Fed. Appx. 761.
No. 19–7102. Mendez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 777 Fed. Appx. 745.

ORDERS 1307
589 U. S.
Apr
il 6, 2020
No. 19–7104. Pacheco-Astrudillo v. United States. C. A.
5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 777 Fed. Appx. 766.
No. 19–7112. Galindo-Serrano v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 925 F. 3d 40.
No. 19 –7131. Hanna v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7493. Kirvin v. Grant et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–7513. Smith v. Clarke, Director, Virginia Depart-
ment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7529. Williams v. Litton Loan Services et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 788 Fed.
Appx. 819.
No. 19–7532. Welsh v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 19–7537. Spice v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certio-
rari denied.
No. 19–7541. Hurles v. Shinn, Director, Arizona Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer ti orari
denied.
No. 19–7542. Pelmear et al. v. O’Connor et al. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7545. Palmer v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 785 Fed. Appx. 640.
No. 19–7546. Jorge v. Florida et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–7554. Hillygus v. Doherty et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7556. Jacobs v. Maricopa Integrated Health Care
System. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied.
No. 19 –7559. Jackson v. Department of Housing and
Urban Development et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer ti orari
denied.

1308 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
April 6, 2020 589 U. S.
No. 19–7563. Speed v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of
Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7582. Arellano v. Paramo, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7583. Byrd v. Boutte, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–7591. Payne v. Mangum. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 785 Fed. Appx. 187.
No. 19 –7595. Major v. Baker, Warden. Ct. App. Nev.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7600. Sundy v. Friendship Pavilion Acquisition
Co., LLC. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7605. Kane v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 210 A. 3d 324.
No. 19–7609. Mauricio Castillo v. Baca, Warden. Ct.
App. Nev. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7628. Guyn v. Kent, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–7644. Jones v. Grifth, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7660. West v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 775 Fed. Appx. 38.
No. 19–7666. Woods v. Joyner, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 776 Fed. Appx. 823.
No. 19–7676. Jackson v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 284 So. 3d 515.
No. 19–7679. Brownlee v. Hearns et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 775 Fed. Appx. 35.
No. 19–7708. Aljindi v. United States et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7723. Brammer v. Madden, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 1309
589 U. S.
Apr
il 6, 2020
No. 19–7734. Dennis v. Johnson, Administrator, New Jer-
sey
State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7740. Bell v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 785 Fed. Appx. 140.
No. 19–7759. Emers v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2019 IL App (4th) 170254–U.
No. 19–7762. Amerson et al. v. Atlas Law Firm, P. C.,
et al. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7791. Jackson v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 220 A. 3d 641.
No. 19–7813. Jamerson v. Lewis, Warden. Sup. Ct. Mo.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7830. Pantaleon-Aviles v. United States. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 796 Fed. Appx.
624.
No. 19–7835. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7836. Salahuddin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 930 F. 3d 410.
No. 19–7838. Shockey v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 941 F. 3d 282.
No. 19–7839. Sanchez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 786 Fed. Appx. 492.
No. 19–7851. Martinez-Alvarado v. United States. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 793 Fed. Appx.
829.
No. 19–7869. Wilson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 776 Fed. Appx. 190.
No. 19–7873. Allen v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–7875. Gay v. Daffenbach, Warden, et al. C. A.
10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 781 Fed. Appx.
732.

1310 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
April 6, 2020 589 U. S.
No. 19–7876. Richardson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Cer
tiorari denied. Reported below: 796 Fed. Appx. 795.
No. 19–7881. Farrington v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 795 Fed. Appx. 404.
No. 19–7886. Mahon v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.
No. 19–7887. Juvenile Female v. United States. C. A. 2d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 786 Fed. Appx. 313.
No. 19–7896. Hughes v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 798 Fed. Appx. 388.
No. 19–7898. Murphy v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 792 Fed. Appx. 232.
No. 19–7909. Kilmartin v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 944 F. 3d 315.
No. 19–7911. Cornelius v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 789 Fed. Appx. 70.
No. 19–7916. Gelazela v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 777 Fed. Appx. 898.
No. 19–7917. Feldman v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 931 F. 3d 1245.
No. 19–7934. Betts v. United Airlines, Inc. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 768 Fed. Appx. 577.
No. 19–7940. Fernandez Morales v. United States. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7942. Parsons v. Blades, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19 –7949. Devore v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7950. Valentine v. Nebraska. Ct. App. Neb. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 27 Neb. App. 725, 936 N. W.
2d 16.
No. 19–7967. Durant v. Lawrence, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 19–7970. Shade v. Washburn, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.

ORDERS 1311
589 U. S.
Apr
il 6, 2020
No. 18–1455. Archdiocese of Washington v. Washington
Metropolit
an Area Transit Authority et al. C. A. D. C.
Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in
the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below:
897 F. 3d 314.
Statement of Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Thomas
joins, respecting the denial of certiorari.
Because the full Court is unable to hear this case, it makes a
poor candidate for our review. But for that complication, how-
ever, our intervention and a reversal would be warranted for
reasons admirably explained by Judge Griffth in his dissent below
and by Judge Hardiman in an opinion for the Third Circuit. See
910 F. 3d 1248, 1250–1254 (CADC 2018) (Griffth, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc); Northeastern Pa. Freethought
Society v. Lackawanna Transit System, 938 F. 3d 424, 435–437
(CA3 2019) (noting disagreement with D. C. Circuit).
At Christmastime a few years ago, the Catholic Church sought
to place advertisements on the side of local buses in Washington,
D. C. The proposed image was a simple one—a silhouette of
three shepherds and sheep, along with the words “Find the Per-
fect Gift” and a church website address. No one disputes that,
if Macy's had sought to place the same advertisement with its
own website address, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority (WMATA) would have accepted the business gladly.
Indeed, WMATA admits that it views Christmas as having “ `a
secular half ' ” and “ `a religious half,' ” and it has shown no hesita-
tion in taking secular Christmas advertisements. Pet. for Cert.
1. Still, when it came to the church's proposal, WMATA balked.
That is viewpoint discrimination by a governmental entity and
a violation of the First Amendment. In fact, this Court has al-
ready rejected no-religious-speech policies materially identical to
WMATA's on no fewer than three occasions over the last three
decades. See Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533
U. S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U. S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384 (1993). In each case, the
government opened a forum to discussion of a particular subject
but then sought to ban discussion of that subject from a religious
viewpoint. What WMATA did here is no different.
WMATA's response only underscores its error. WMATA sug-
gests that its conduct comported with our decision in Rosenberger

1312 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
April 6, 2020 589 U. S.
because it banned religion as a subject rather than discriminated
between
religious and nonreligious viewpoints. But that reply
rests on a misunderstanding of Rosenberger. There, the Court
recognized that religion is not just a subject isolated to itself, but
often also “a specifc premise, a perspective, a standpoint from
which a variety of subjects may be discussed and considered.”
515 U. S., at 831. That means the government may minimize
religious speech incidentally by reasonably limiting a forum like
bus advertisement space to subjects where religious views are
unlikely or rare. But once the government allows a subject to
be discussed, it cannot silence religious views on that topic. See
Good News Club, 533 U. S., at 110–112. So the government may
designate a forum for art or music, but it cannot then forbid
discussion of Michelangelo's David or Handel's Messiah. And
once the government declares Christmas open for commentary, it
can hardly turn around and mute religious speech on a subject
that so naturally invites it.
That's not to say WMATA lacks a choice. The Constitution
requires the government to respect religious speech, not to maxi-
mize advertising revenues. So if WMATA fnds messages like
the one here intolerable, it may close its buses to all advertise-
ments. More modestly, it might restrict advertisement space to
subjects where religious viewpoints are less likely to arise with-
out running afoul of our free speech precedents. The one thing
it cannot do is what it did here—permit a subject sure to inspire
religious views, one that even WMATA admits is “half ” religious
in nature, and then suppress those views. The First Amendment
requires governments to protect religious viewpoints, not single
them out for silencing.
No. 19–446. VF Jeanswear LP v. Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 769 Fed. Appx. 477.
Justice Thomas, dissenting.
This case presents the question whether the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) may continue to investigate an
employer's purported wrongdoing after issuing a right-to-sue no-
tice to a private party who, in turn, has initiated her own liti-
gation. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have determined that
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, grants the

ORDERS 1313
1312
Thomas,
J., dissenting
EEOC that power. See EEOC v. Union Pacifc R. Co., 867 F. 3d
843,
848 (CA7 2017); EEOC v. Federal Express Corp., 558 F. 3d
842, 851–852 (CA9 2009). The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand,
has concluded that the plain text of Title VII prohibits such inves-
tigations. See EEOC v. Hearst Corp., 103 F. 3d 462, 469 (1997).
Though this split in authority is shallow, it directly implicates
the EEOC's core investigative powers. If the Fifth Circuit is
correct that issuing a right-to-sue notice terminates the EEOC's
ability to investigate, then the EEOC may be wielding ultra vires
power, impermissibly subjecting employers to time-consuming in-
vestigations. I would grant certiorari to determine whether the
agency is operating within the confnes of the authority granted
by Congress.
I
A
A preliminary analysis of the text suggests that the EEOC
may lack the authority to continue an investigation after it has
issued a right-to-sue notice. The basic provisions governing the
EEOC's role in investigating discrimination claims are found in
42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5. As relevant here, the EEOC's duties are
triggered when it receives “a charge . . . fled by or on behalf of
a person claiming to be aggrieved.” § 2000e–5(b); University of
Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U. S. 182, 190 (1990). The EEOC must provide
notice to the employer “within ten days, and shall make an in-
vestigation thereof. ” § 2000e– 5(b) (emphasis added). “If the
Commission determines after such investigation that there is rea-
sonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission
shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and per-
suasion.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Otherwise, it will dismiss the
charge. Ibid. “The Commission shall make its determination on
reasonable cause as promptly as possible and, so far as practicable,
not later than one hundred and twenty days from the fling of
the charge.” Ibid. But “[i]f a charge fled with the Commission
pursuant to subsection (b) . . . is dismissed by the Commission, or if
within one hundred and eighty days from the fling of such charge . . .
the Commission has not fled a civil action under this section[,]
. . . or the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agree-
ment to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission

1314 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
Thomas, J., dissenting 589 U. S.
. . . shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days
af
ter the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought
against the respondent named in the charge.” § 2000e–(5)(f )(1);
see also Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U. S. 541 (2019).
Regardless of how the EEOC may approach this process in
practice, these statutory provisions set out a clear timetable and
a sequential series of steps for the EEOC to follow. After giving
notice to the employer, it must engage in an investigation that
comes to a defnitive end either because the EEOC has entered
into a conciliation process or because it has dismissed the charge.
Further, the EEOC must issue the right-to-sue notice after 180
days—60 days after the timeline contemplated by the statute for
a reasonable cause determination, which triggers dismissal of a
charge or conciliation efforts. Thus, at frst glance, it appears
that the more natural reading of these provisions is that Con-
gress “expected the EEOC to complete investigations within 120
days[, l]eaving an additional 60 days for the EEOC to determine
whether suit should be fled.” Hearst, 103 F. 3d, at 467.
B
Whatever the correct interpretation of the text, however, the
Ninth Circuit's approach in Federal Express, 558 F. 3d 842, is
highly problematic. The Ninth Circuit began by asserting that
it was bound to enforce an EEOC subpoena if the agency's juris-
diction was “plausible” and not “plainly lacking.” Id., at 848 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). Next, the court noted that the
EEOC has, through regulation, interpreted its own statutory au-
thority to allow the agency to continue processing a charge after
it has issued a right-to-sue notice. Id., at 850; see 29 CFR
§ 1601.28(a)(3) (2019). To cap off its analysis, the Ninth Circuit
gave weight to the fact that the EEOC had further interpreted
its own regulation allowing “ `further processing [of] the charge' ”
after issuing notice to “includ[e] further investigation.” Federal
Express, 558 F. 3d, at 850 (citing EEOC Compliance Manual § 6.4
(2006)). Thus, under this dual layer of agency interpretation, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that Title VII permitted the EEOC to
continue with its investigation after issuing a right-to-sue notice.
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that its reading conficted with
the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hearst, 103 F. 3d 462. But it dis-
agreed with the Fifth Circuit primarily because it viewed Hearst
as conficting with the EEOC's role in vindicating the public's

ORDERS 1315
1312
Thomas,
J., dissenting
interest in eradicating employment discrimination.* Federal Ex-
p
ress, 558 F. 3d, at 852.
The Ninth Circuit's analysis contains at least four faws. Most
egregiously, the Ninth Circuit failed to consider the most useful,
and perhaps dispositive, evidence—the text of Title VII itself.
Nor did it perform anything remotely resembling an independent
assessment of that text. Even under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984),
courts are instructed to engage in their own analysis of the stat-
ute to determine whether any gap has been left for the agency
to fll. Id., at 843, n. 9; see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U. S. 421, 447–448 (1987). The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, by-
passed the statutory text entirely.
Second, the Ninth Circuit's approach to jurisdiction was highly
suspect, if not outright erroneous. As the Ninth Circuit has else-
where recognized, all administrative agencies “are creatures of
statute, bound to the confnes of the statute that created them.”
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Lee, 641 F. 3d 1126,
1135 (2011). This fundamental principle applies not only to sub-
stantive areas regulated by an agency but also to the agency's
underlying jurisdiction. There is no basis for applying a “plainly
lacking ” standard when assessing the authority of an agency to
act, let alone to issue wide-ranging subpoenas that consume the
time and resources of employers.
Third, reliance on and deference to the EEOC's regulation also
seems inappropriate under this Court's Chevron framework. The
regulation was originally promulgated before this Court's decision
in Chevron. See 29 CFR § 1601.28(a)(3) (1978). The associated
rulemaking contains no indication that the agency invoked its
interpretive authority or even believed it was interpreting the
statute at all. See 42 Fed. Reg. 42025, 42030–42031, 47831 (1977);
see also 37 Fed. Reg. 9214–9220 (1973). Thus, it is hardly self-
evident that, even under our precedents, Chevron deference
should apply. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U. S. 212, 222 (2002).
*The Ninth Circuit also relied in part on this Court's decision in EEOC
v. Waffe House, Inc., 534 U. S. 279 (2002), where this Court held that an
employee's agreement to arbitrate employment disputes did not prevent
the EEOC from pursuing victim-specifc relief in court. But that decision
conficts with the principle that the EEOC takes a plaintiff as it fnds him.
See id., at 303–312 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

1316 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
Thomas, J., dissenting 589 U. S.
Last but not least, the Ninth Circuit's invocation of the EEOC
Compl
iance Manual not only assumes that the regulation is ambig-
uous—itself a dubious proposition—but also is premised on so-
called Auer deference to the agency's interpretation of its own
ambiguous regulation. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452 (1997).
This doctrine has rightly fallen out of favor in recent years, as it
directly conficts with the constitutional duty of a judge to faith-
fully and independently interpret the law. See Kisor v. Wilkie,
588 U. S. 558, 592 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment);
Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn., 575 U. S. 92, 112 (2015)
(Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
II
Leaving the Seventh and Ninth Circuit's highly questionable
interpretation undisturbed has wide-reaching ramifcations for
employers subject to litigation in those Circuits. In this case, for
instance, a former salesperson employed by petitioner VF Jeans-
wear LP fled a charge with the EEOC, alleging that she was
demoted on the basis of her sex and age in violation of Title VII.
§ 2000e–2(a)(1). After she fled a complaint in state court, the
EEOC issued her a right-to-sue notice, indicating that it would
not fnish processing her charge within the allotted 180-day time-
frame. The former employee proceeded to litigate her claims in
federal court, and the EEOC did not intervene.
Meanwhile, the EEOC continued with its own, far broader in-
vestigation, including a subpoena directing VF Jeanswear to
“[s]ubmit an electronic database identifying all supervisors, man-
agers, and executive employees at VF Jeanswear's facilities dur-
ing the relevant period,” including information such as the “posi-
tion(s) held and date in each position” and, “if no longer employed,
[the] date of termination, and reason for termination.” 2017 WL
2861182, *2 (D Ariz., July 5, 2017). Thus, the EEOC not only
subjected VF Jeanswear to a second investigation, but it also
issued a subpoena covering material that departed signifcantly
from the employee's original, individualized allegations. As the
District Court noted in refusing to enforce the subpoena, the
EEOC sought information regarding positions for which the em-
ployee never applied, and amounted to “a companywide and na-
tionwide subpoena for discriminatory promotion, a discriminatory
practice not affecting the charging party.” Id., at *6.

ORDERS 1317
589 U. S.
Apr
il 6, 2020
Because the textual argument against the EEOC's power to
issue
this subpoena seems strong, and the argument supporting
it particularly weak, I respectfully dissent from the denial of
certiorari.
No. 19–678. United States ex rel. Schneider v. JPMor-
gan Chase Bank, N. A., et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
No. 19–726. Jones et al. v. Lamkin, Individually and in
His Ofcial Capacity as Marshal of the Civil and Magis-
trate Court of Richmond County, Georgia, et al. C. A.
11th Cir. Motion of National Fraternal Order of Police for leave
to fle brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 781 Fed. Appx. 865.
No. 19–6156. Halprin v. Davis, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi-
sion. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 777
Fed. Appx. 758.
Statement of Justice Sotomayor respecting the denial of
certiorari.
The facts underlying this petition are deeply disturbing. I
write to explain why I nevertheless do not dissent from the denial
of certiorari.
In December 2000, petitioner Randy Ethan Halprin and six
others escaped from a Texas prison and robbed a sporting-goods
store. During the robbery, Offcer Aubrey Hawkins responded to
a distress call and was fatally shot. The State of Texas tried
Halprin and the other escapees separately for their roles in Offcer
Hawkins' death. Presiding over most of those trials, including
Halprin's, was Judge Vickers Cunningham.
In 2003, a jury found Halprin guilty of capital murder and
recommended the death penalty, and then-Judge Cunningham an-
nounced a death sentence. For the next decade, Halprin unsuc-
cessfully sought appellate and collateral relief in the state courts.
In 2014, he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254, to no avail.
Years after the trial, Cunningham—no longer a judge—ran for
a position as a county commissioner. In May 2018, a news outlet
published that Cunningham had created a living trust for his

1318 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
Statement of Sotomayor, J. 589 U. S.
children that would have withheld payments had they married
nonwh
ite non-Christians. (Halprin is Jewish, a fact that featured
prominently at his trial.) A former campaign staffer of Cunning-
ham's also relayed to the news outlet that the former judge
used the acronym “T.N.D.”—short for “Typical N*** Deals”—
to refer to criminal cases involving black defendants. Record
19–70016.1120.
These developments prompted Halprin's counsel to investigate
whether Cunningham had harbored bias against Halprin. Wit-
nesses recounted that, shortly after Halprin's trial, Cunningham
had referred to Ha lpr in w ith derogatory ter ms l ike “f ***n'
Jew”—and that the former judge had also referred to Halprin's
accomplices using similar slurs. Id., at 19–70016.1064. Halprin's
counsel fur ther discovered that Cunni ngham had told cam-
paign staffers that he sought public offce to “save” his city
from “ `n***s, wetbacks, Jews, and dirty Catholics.' ” Id., at
19–70016.1235.
On May 17, 2019, presented with this newly discovered evi-
dence, Halprin fled another § 2254 petition in Federal District
Court. He asserted that Cunningham's bias constituted struc-
tural error depriving Halprin of his constitutional right to a fair
trial. Halprin also requested that the federal court stay the pro-
ceedings so that he could exhaust his claim in state court, and
then fled an application for habeas relief in the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals. (That court has since stayed Halprin's execu-
tion to allow a trial court to consider the claim of judicial bias.)
Meanwhile, the District Court transferred Halprin's recent
§ 2254 petition to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to
determine whether it was an unauthorized “second or successive”
petition. See 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b).* The Fifth Circuit recog-
nized that Halprin had cited evidence of “horrible” “racism and
bigotry” that, if true, would be “completely inappropriate for a
*Section 2244(b)(2)(B) provides in pertinent part:
“A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application
under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be
dismissed unless . . . (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have
been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the
facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as
a whole, would be suffcient to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfnder would have found
the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.”

ORDERS 1319
1317
St
atement of Sotomayor, J.
judge.” In re Halprin, 788 Fed. Appx. 941, 942, n. 2 (2019)
(
per curiam). Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals held, Halprin's
fling was a second or successive petition under federal law be-
cause, “even if ” Cunningham's prejudice were “unknown to Hal-
prin at the time,” the judicial-bias claim would have been “ripe”
during the jury trial. Id., at 943. The Fifth Circuit then con-
cluded that Halprin could not satisfy § 2244(b)'s “ `strict' ” require-
ments for authorizing a second or successive § 2254 application.
Id., at 945. Granting Halprin's argument that judicial bias is
“structural error” warranting an automatic retrial, the Fifth Cir-
cuit still found that Halprin could not show “by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that, absent such bias, no reasonable factfnder would
have found Halprin guilty of the underlying offense.” Id., at
944–945.
In this Court, Halprin contests whether his recent federal peti-
tion is “second or successive” at all. Drawing on Panetti v. Quar-
terman, 551 U. S. 930 (2007), and Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U. S.
320 (2010), Halprin contends that his federal habeas claim cannot
count as “second or successive” under § 2244(b) because he never
“ `had a full and fair opportunity to raise the claim in [his] prior
application' ” to the Federal District Court. Pet. for Cert. 14.
Halprin also urges the Court to exercise its “traditional equitable
authority” to excuse defaulted claims that do not satisfy § 2244(b)'s
literal text. Id., at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Despite these potent arguments, the Court declines to grant
certiorari. I do not dissent for two reasons. First, state-court
proceedings are underway to address—and, if appropriate, to rem-
edy—Halprin's assertion that insidious racial and religious bias
infected his trial. For its part, the State represents that “Hal-
prin has not been deprived of an opportunity to bring his claim
in state court” because the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals re-
cently “stayed his execution and remanded his judicial bias claim
to the trial court for review.” Brief in Opposition 21–22; see
also id., at 28 (“[A]venues of relief remain, including state habeas
proceedings”). Thus, were the Texas courts to agree with Hal-
prin on the merits of his judicial-bias claim, this petition for a
writ of certiorari about a federal procedural provision would be-
come moot.
Second, this Court's denial “carries with it no implication what-
ever regarding the Court's views on the merits of ” Halprin's
claims. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U. S. 912,

1320 OCTOBER
TERM, 2019
April 6, 15, 2020 589 U. S.
919 (1950) (Frankfur ter, J., respec ti ng denia l of cer ti orar i).
Though
the Fifth Circuit has already interpreted § 2244 to deny
Halprin authorization to fle a § 2254 petition, this Court's denial
of certiorari does not prevent Halprin from seeking direct review
from a constitutional ruling by the Texas courts. Nor does it
preclude Halprin from seeking an original writ of habeas corpus
under this Court's Rule 20.
***
“[T]he Due Process Clause clearly requires a `fair trial in a fair
tribuna[l]' before a judge with no actual bias against the defend-
ant.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U. S. 899, 904–905 (1997) (citation
omitted). I trust that the Texas courts considering Halprin's case
are more than capable of guarding this fundamental guarantee.
Rehearing Denied
No. 19–6427. Smith v. Chapdelaine, Warden, et al., 589
U. S. 1146;
No. 19–6762. Wimberley v. Sacramento, 589 U. S. 1183;
No. 19–6863. In re Bonnell, 589 U. S. 1201;
No. 19–6931. Johnson v. Linebarger Goggan Blair &
Sampson, L. L. P., 589 U. S. 1215; and
No. 19–7095. Smith v. United States District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina, 589 U. S. 1255.
Petitions for rehearing denied.
No. 19–6846. Riley v. Metzger, Warden, et al., 589 U. S.
1160; and
No. 19–6856. Riley v. Delaware, 589 U. S. 1160. Petitions
for rehearing denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of these petitions.
April 15, 2020
Miscellaneous Order
In l ight of the ongoi ng publ ic hea lth concer ns relati ng to
COVID–19:
IT IS ORDERED that with respect to every document fled in
a case prior to a ruling on a petition for a writ of certiorari or
petition for an extraordinary writ, or a decision to set an appeal
for argument, a single paper copy of the document, formatted on
8½ × 11 inch paper, may be fled. The document may be format-

ORDERS 1321
589 U. S.
Apr
il 15, 2020
ted under the standards set forth in this Court's Rule 33.2, or
under
the standards set forth in Rule 33.1 but printed on 8½ ×
11 inch paper. The Court may later request that a document
initially submitted on 8½ × 11 inch paper be submitted in book-
let format.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following types of docu-
ments should not be fled in paper form if they are submitted
through the Court's electronic fling system: (1) motions for an
extension of time under Rule 30.4; (2) waivers of the right to
respond to a petition under Rule 15.5; (3) blanket consents to the
fling of amicus briefs under Rules 37.2(a) and 37.3(a); and (4)
motions to delay distribution of a cert. petition under the Court's
order of March 19, 2020. Notwithstanding Rule 34.6 and para-
graph 9 of the Guidelines for the Submission of Documents to
the Supreme Court's Electronic Filing System, these enumerated
flings should be fled electronically in cases governed by Rule
34.6, although other types of documents in those cases should still
be fled in paper form only.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, notwithstanding Rule 29.3,
parties may be relieved of the obligation to effect service of paper
versions of flings upon other parties if they agree to electronic
service; parties are strongly encouraged to use electronic service
if feasible.
These modifcations will remain in effect until further order of
the Court.