Daniel E. Schall v. Lori M. Sealy

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Daniel E. Schall, Appellant,

v.

Lori M. Sealy, as Personal Representative for the Estate
of Claude L. Mullwee a/k/a Claude Lee Mulwee, and the
Estate of Deloris Robinson Mulwee, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001861

Appeal From Spartanburg County
Shannon Metz Phillips, Master-In-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-310
Submitted June 1, 2026 – Filed June 24, 2026

AFFIRMED

A. Todd Darwin, of Holcombe Bomar, PA, of
Spartanburg; and Sarah P. Spruill, of Haynsworth Sinkler
Boyd, PA, of Greenville, both for Appellant.

Ryan Frederick McCarty, of Killoren, Kissinger, Dantin,
Denton & Dunham, P.C., of Spartanburg, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Daniel E. Schall (Buyer) appeals the master-in-equity's order
finding a real estate contract between himself and Lori M. Sealy, as personal
representative for the estates of Claude L. Mullwee a/k/a Claude Lee Mulwee and
Deloris Robinson Mulwee (Seller), had been validly terminated and denying his
requests for specific performance and damages. On appeal, Buyer argues the
master erred by (1) finding Seller properly terminated the contract and failing to
award specific performance to Buyer and (2) failing to award special damages and
attorney's fees and costs to Buyer. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

We hold the master did not err in finding Seller validly terminated the parties'
contract pursuant to the casualty clause. See Electro-Lab of Aiken, Inc. v. Sharp
Constr. Co. of Sumter, 357 S.C. 363, 367, 593 S.E.2d 170, 172 (Ct. App. 2004)
("An action for breach of contract is an action at law."); Bluffton Towne Ctr., LLC
v. Gilleland-Prince, 412 S.C. 554, 562, 772 S.E.2d 882, 887 (Ct. App. 2015)
("When reviewing a master-in-equity's judgment made in an action at law, 'the
appellate court will not disturb the master's findings of fact unless the findings are
found to be without evidence reasonably supporting them.'" (quoting Silver v.
Aabstract Pools & Spas, Inc., 376 S.C. 585, 590, 658 S.E.2d 539, 542 (Ct. App.
2008))); id. ("Nevertheless, the 'reviewing court is free to decide questions of law
with no particular deference to the [master].'" (quoting Silver, 376 S.C. at 590, 658
S.E.2d at 542)). The contract permitted termination if "the Property [was]
damaged wholly or partially by fire or other casualty prior to Closing" and
although the term "casualty" is not defined in the contract, neither party argued it
was ambiguous. See Bardsley v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 405 S.C. 68, 76, 747 S.E.2d
436, 440 (2013) ("[A] provision . . . is not ambiguous merely because its terms are
undefined . . . . It is a well-settled principle of contract interpretation that absent a
contractual definition to the contrary, contract language is given its ordinary and
plain meaning."); Casualty, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining
"casualty" as "[a] chance occurrence having unfortunate consequences" or "[a]
person or thing that has been harmed, lost, or destroyed"). The record supports the
master's finding that Buyer represented the property had sustained significant and
unexpected damage after the parties entered the contract. In his April 23, 2018
email, Buyer asserted vegetation had been removed from the Property, additional
damage had occurred to a building, and trash had been scattered throughout the
structures, and he communicated he would not close until the issues were
addressed. Buyer later described the vegetation as "heirloom plants," asserting
their removal affected the beauty and value of the Property and sought concessions
relating to the alleged losses. Under these circumstances, we hold the master did
not err in concluding that the alleged conditions constituted casualties within the
plain and ordinary meaning of the term.
We also hold the master's finding that Seller timely terminated the contract is
supported by the record. See Bluffton Towne Ctr., LLC, 412 S.C. at 562, 772
S.E.2d at 887 ("When reviewing a master-in-equity's judgment made in an action
at law, 'the appellate court will not disturb the master's findings of fact unless the
findings are found to be without evidence reasonably supporting them.'" (quoting
Silver, 376 S.C. at 590, 658 S.E.2d at 542)). Buyer's email dated April 23, 2018,
constituted notice of the alleged damage, and Seller delivered written notice of
termination on April 28, 2018, within the contractual five-business-day period.

Because we hold that Seller timely and properly terminated the contract pursuant
to the casualty clause, we need not address Buyer's arguments regarding
entitlement to specific performance, damages, and attorney's fees and costs. See
Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d
591, 598 (1999) (ruling an appellate court need not address remaining issues when
its resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).

AFFIRMED.1

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and TURNER, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.