State v. Ryan L. Manigo (2)

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Ryan Lenard Manigo, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2024-001818

Appeal From Colleton County
Robert J. Bonds, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 6149
Submitted May 1, 2026 – Filed June 24, 2026

DISMISSED

Chief Attorney S. Boyd Young and Capital Defender
Robert Louis Bank, Jr., both of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown,
of Columbia, and Solicitor Isaac McDuffie Stone, of
Bluffton, all for Respondent.

THOMAS, J.: Ryan Lenard Manigo is a pretrial detainee currently being held in
the Colleton County Detention Center. Manigo was arrested on July 2, 2023, and
charged with five counts of murder, arson first degree, two counts of criminal
sexual conduct first degree, two counts of criminal sexual conduct with a minor,
two counts of kidnapping, six counts of possession of a deadly weapon in the
commission of a violent crime, burglary first degree, attempted murder, and incest.
The charges remain pending. Following the media's release of Manigo's jail
telephone calls, he appealed, arguing the circuit court erred in failing to find that:
(1) pretrial detainee telephone calls are not subject to the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA); (2) the release of pretrial detainee telephone calls violates the pretrial
detainee's Federal and State Constitutional rights; (3) FOIA's statutory exemptions
prevent the release of pretrial detainee telephone calls; and (4) the release of
pretrial detainee telephone calls violates public policy. We dismiss Manigo's
appeal because the circuit court's order is not immediately appealable.1

We hold the circuit court's order allowing the release of the pretrial telephone calls
is an interlocutory order that is not immediately appealable. "[An a]ppeal may be
taken, as provided by law, from any final judgment, appealable order or decision."
Rule 201(a), SCACR. "An appeal in a criminal case must attend the final
judgment rendered on the indictment." State v. Hubbard, 277 S.C. 568, 569, 290
S.E.2d 817, 817 (1982); see also State v. Miller, 289 S.C. 426, 426, 346 S.E.2d
705, 705 (1986) ("In South Carolina, a criminal defendant may not appeal until
sentence has been imposed."). An interlocutory order is "[a]n order that relates to
some intermediate matter in the case; any order other than a final order." Brown v.
Se. Servs., H.H.I., LLC, 446 S.C. 105, 112, 917 S.E.2d 925, 928 (Ct. App. 2025),
reh'g denied (June 27, 2025), cert. denied (Nov. 18, 2025) (internal citation
omitted). An interlocutory order is not immediately appealable unless it involves
the merits of the case or affects a substantial right. S.C. Code Ann. § 14-3-330
(2017). Although finality is a general requirement of appealability, there are
certain interlocutory orders that are immediately appealable. See Ex parte Wilson,
367 S.C. 7, 13, 625 S.E.2d 205, 208 (2005) ("Absent some specialized statute, the
immediate appealability of an interlocutory or intermediate order depends on
whether the order falls within [section] 14-3-330."). Our appellate courts have
jurisdiction to review:

(1) Any intermediate judgment, order or decree in a law
case involving the merits in actions commenced in the
court of common pleas and general sessions, brought
there by original process or removed there from any
inferior court or jurisdiction, and final judgments in such
actions; provided, that if no appeal be taken until final

1
By virtue of this dismissal, we decline to rule on the merits of the outstanding
motions in this appeal. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335
S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (declining to address the remaining
issues where a prior issue was dispositive).
judgment is entered the court may upon appeal from such
final judgment review any intermediate order or decree
necessarily affecting the judgment not before appealed
from;

(2) An order affecting a substantial right made in an
action when such order (a) in effect determines the action
and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be
taken or discontinues the action, (b) grants or refuses a
new trial or (c) strikes out an answer or any part thereof
or any pleading in any action;

(3) A final order affecting a substantial right made in any
special proceeding or upon a summary application in any
action after judgment; and

(4) An interlocutory order or decree in a court of
common pleas granting, continuing, modifying, or
refusing an injunction or granting, continuing, modifying,
or refusing the appointment of a receiver.

§ 14-3-330. "The provisions of section 14-3-330 . . . have been narrowly
construed, and the immediate appeal of orders issued before or during trial
generally has not been permitted." State v. Wilson, 387 S.C. 597, 601, 693 S.E.2d
923, 925 (2010). South Carolina law has long held that a criminal defendant may
not appeal until a conviction and sentence have been rendered. See State v.
Looper, 421 S.C. 384, 389, 807 S.E.2d 203, 205–06 (2017) (dismissing a criminal
defendant's appeal prior to conviction and sentencing as premature because the
circuit court's order did not purport to determine guilt or impose any sentence on
the defendant; therefore, it was not a final judgment); State v. Hill, 314 S.C. 330,
331, 444 S.E.2d 255, 256 (1994) (finding orders setting bail for each defendant in a
capital murder case were not appealable by the State because they "do not involve
the merits, nor do the orders affect a substantial right which determines or
discontinues the action"); In re Lorenzo B., 307 S.C. 439, 439, 415 S.E.2d 795, 795
(1992) (holding an order adjudicating a juvenile delinquent is not appealable until
imposition of final judgment at the dispositional hearing); Parsons v. State, 289
S.C. 542, 542, 347 S.E.2d 504, 504 (1986) (holding denial of bail pending trial is
not immediately appealable); State v. Washington, 285 S.C. 457, 458, 330 S.E.2d
289, 289 (1985) (noting a conviction at a trial in absentia prior to imposition of
sentence is not immediately appealable); Hubbard, 277 S.C. at 569, 290 S.E.2d at
817 (holding the denial of a motion to suppress evidence is not immediately
appealable).

We do not see how Manigo can prove that any error by the circuit court resulted in
prejudice to him as he has not yet been tried, convicted, or sentenced. See State v.
Black, 400 S.C. 10, 16–17, 732 S.E.2d 880, 884 (2012) ("To warrant reversal, an
error must result in prejudice to the appealing party."). Manigo argues his rights to
privacy, a fair trial, equal protection, and due process have been violated by the
media's release of his calls. However, pretrial publicity does not automatically
prejudice a criminal defendant, and he is afforded other avenues to protect his right
to an impartial jury such as a motion to change venue or specific voir dire
questions. This court recognized this in its May 5, 2025, order when it found
Manigo would not "suffer irreparable harm or a miscarriage of justice due to the
release of the recordings." While pretrial publicity may prejudice a criminal
defendant in South Carolina, our courts require evidence of actual juror bias rather
than presuming prejudice from media exposure alone, with adequate voir dire
examination serving as the primary safeguard against potential prejudice. State v.
Kelsey, 331 S.C. 50, 67–68, 502 S.E.2d 63, 72 (1998) (finding it is the defendant's
burden to demonstrate actual juror prejudice because of news accounts of the
case); State v. Owens, 293 S.C. 161, 167, 359 S.E.2d 275, 278 (1987) ("[A
defendant's] mere assertion that the jurors could have been subconsciously affected
by . . . media exposure is insufficient to show prejudice."). Further, even before
the calls were released, there was significant media publicity based solely on the
sensational allegations of the crime. As an additional consideration, the release of
the telephone calls may be rendered moot by the time trial comes. There is no
guarantee at this juncture that the calls will be used as evidence at trial. The calls
may be introduced at trial, and at that time, a review of their admissibility would be
proper. State v. Mueller, 319 S.C. 266, 268, 460 S.E.2d 409, 410 (Ct. App.
1995) (holding that pretrial motions are generally not final orders because "the
evidence developed during trial may warrant a change in the ruling").2

DISMISSED.3

2
There is a scenario in which a pretrial order in a criminal case may be appealed
prior to final judgment; however, that is not applicable here. The State may appeal
some orders before final judgment. "A pre-trial order granting the suppression of
evidence which significantly impairs the prosecution of a criminal case is directly
appealable under . . . § 14-3-330(2)(a)." State v. McKnight, 287 S.C. 167, 168, 337
S.E.2d 208, 209 (1985).
3
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
MCDONALD and TURNER, JJ., concur.