State v. Barry W. Jones

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Barry Wayne Jones, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000046

Appeal From Edgefield County
Walton J. McLeod, IV, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 6147
Heard March 11, 2025 – Filed June 10, 2026

AFFIRMED

Senior Appellate Defender Lara Mary Caudy, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, Assistant
Attorney General Richard Brandon Larrabee, all of
Columbia; and Solicitor Samuel R. Hubbard, III, of
Lexington, all for Respondent.

MCDONALD, J.: An Edgefield County jury convicted Barry Wayne Jones of the
murder of Milledge Hall and acquitted him of the subsequent attempted murder of
a police officer. Jones appeals his murder conviction and sentence, arguing the
circuit court erred in (1) denying him immunity from prosecution under the
Protection of Persons and Property Act; (2) declining to exclude evidence that he
attempted suicide shortly before he was taken into custody; and (3) failing to tailor
the self-defense instruction to adequately reflect the facts and theories Jones
presented at trial. We affirm the conviction and sentence.

Factual and Procedural Background

Numerous witnesses testified at Jones's pretrial immunity hearing and at his
subsequent trial. Jones testified at both proceedings as to his background, the
incidents leading up to the day of the shootings, and the events for which he was
indicted. Jones explained that after the death of his wife, he took early retirement
from his job at the Savannah River Site (SRS) and moved back to Johnston, where
he became a frequent patron at the Johnston Pool Room, a local sports bar. Jones
began dating Angie Smith in September 2017 and eventually moved in with her.
During their relationship, Angie introduced Jones to her cousin, Milledge "B'Boy"
Hall (Decedent).

In late 2017, Decedent's grandson, Clayton Hall (Hall), and his wife purchased the
Pool Room. Decedent invested in his grandson's business and occasionally helped
with cleaning and other tasks. Decedent was also a frequent patron and often
visited with friends and family at the Pool Room.

From the time Hall purchased the Pool Room, he had "frustrations" with Jones.
Jones criticized how Hall ran the business and complained about the food, the
staff's clothing, the temperature, and the fact that Hall allowed smoking. Jones's
criticisms bothered Hall and "the entire bar staff," but his behavior had not yet
caused Hall to ban Jones from the establishment or call the police.

In April 2018, Jones learned Decedent had been telling others that Jones was fired
from his job at SRS. This upset Jones because he considered his early retirement
"deeply personal." When Jones asked Decedent if he was spreading these rumors,
Decedent admitted that he told others Jones was fired but refused to tell Jones from
whom he learned this. During this exchange, Decedent quickly stood up from his
bar stool and "got all up in [Jones's] face." According to Jones, he "had to start
backing up to get away from [Decedent] and put [his] hands up like this, like,
whoa." Jones stated Decedent also told him, "I'll beat your little a-s-s all about this
bar." On this occasion, Jones and Angie immediately left, and Jones stopped going
to the Pool Room so often. He further claimed that when he did go, he kept his
distance from Decedent.
On Saturday, May 5, 2018, Jones and Angie were back at the Pool Room. Jones
believed there was an error of approximately fifty cents on his bill, and he brought
this to the attention of his server. Hall testified that Jones argued with him over the
discrepancy in an "aggressive tone," but Jones denied losing his cool that day. The
next morning, Hall and his wife decided to take an overnight trip to "get out of
town specifically due to stress from Jones." Hall also told Decedent that the next
time he saw Jones, he was "gonna ask him not to come back to the establishment
anymore." Decedent advised Hall to have this conversation with Jones outside to
avoid disturbing other patrons or embarrassing Jones.

Two days later, Jones checked on his elderly father and ran some errands before
stopping at the Pool Room between 4:00 and 4:45 p.m. to meet friends. As Jones
socialized, he realized he had missed Angie's text messages at 5:06 and 5:15 p.m.
Jones responded at 5:17, apologizing for not hearing the text notices and letting
Angie know he was at the Pool Room. Angie then sent a series of texts stating,
"[W]hat? I can't believe you. . . . [W]e're not gonna make it like this. You need to
come talk to me. . . . I'm really pissed now. . . . If you don't come talk to me, it
won't be pretty when you get home. . . . Answer me. . . . I'll come show out."
Jones did not respond to these texts.

A few minutes later, Angie strolled into the Pool Room and declined to
acknowledge Jones. Instead, she went to the back of the bar and sat next to
Decedent. Jones claimed that at that point, he decided to leave. He also decided
he was finished with Angie—he planned to break up with her and move out of her
house. Jones left the Pool Room at 6:30 p.m. and was followed by his friend,
Randy Yonce; Decedent walked outside at 6:31. As Jones pulled out of the
parking lot, Decedent slapped the rear right fender of Jones's silver Mercedes
sedan, yelled something, and threw his hands up in the air. Jones claimed this
startled him as he was pulling out onto the road.

Jones drove straight to Angie's house and packed his valuables, including his mail,
medicine, a safe, several Clemson shirts his wife had given him, and a bag of
guns—along with magazines and ammunition. Between 6:33 and 6:47 p.m., Angie
sent Jones a series of texts: "You couldn't even come and speak"; "Everyone stared
at me"; and "See you soon. No fighting." Jones claims he interpreted this final
text to mean Angie had calmed down and that it was safe for him to return to the
Pool Room.

At 6:49 p.m., Jones texted his friend, Joe Mims, "Can you come calm me down?"
Thirty seconds later, he sent Mims another text, which read, "I'm gonna kill that
BBoy." Jones maintains he was merely venting his frustrations and denies that this
text suggested he was literally going to kill B'Boy. At 6:52 p.m., Jones texted a
Johnston Police Department sergeant to ask if he was available to be at the Pool
Room while he broke up with Angie, but the officer did not respond. 1

At 7:06 p.m., Jones parked directly in front of the Pool Room in the hope that
Angie would see his car and come outside to talk. Jones claimed he planned to call
or text Angie if she did not come outside on her own. But after Jones had been
sitting in the parking lot for several minutes, Decedent walked outside and
approached his vehicle. 2 Decedent motioned for Jones to get out of the car, but
Jones refused because he was "scared of him." Instead, Jones rolled down his
window about six inches—he testified that he did not want to roll it down any
farther because he did not know if Decedent "was gonna grab [him] and [pull] him
out of the car." Jones stated Decedent berated him for nearly ten minutes about his
treatment of Angie and for trying to ruin the Pool Room. Jones testified that when
he started his car to "try to leave," Decedent lunged at him several times while
repeatedly demanding that he exit his vehicle so Decedent could "beat [his] ass."
Jones smelled alcohol on Decedent's breath and alleged he felt "threatened" and
"fearful [for his] life." 3 According to Jones, Decedent presented a gun, returned it
to his waistband, and later pulled up his shirt again to show Jones the weapon. 4 At
that point, Jones felt "threatened for [his] life," reached for his gun bag on the back
seat, and grabbed "the first gun [he] could get off the top."

Jones testified that he placed this gun on his lap and rolled down his window as
Decedent became increasingly angry about his refusal to get out of the car to fight.
Although Jones admitted that Decedent told him to leave the premises, he stated he

1
Jones knew this officer from the Pool Room and testified that he had previously
asked him to help him calm Angie when she was drinking.
2
One of the Pool Room patrons, Roger Bryan, had reported Jones's return. Bryan
witnessed Decedent point at Jones in a manner indicating Jones should leave;
Decedent then "turned and started back towards the building and [Jones] must have
said something to him. . . .That's when [Decedent] raised his hands again like
telling him to leave again."
3
At the time of his death, Decedent was 6'1" and weighed approximately 300
pounds; his blood alcohol content was 0.12. Decedent's widow testified that he
was still under a doctor's care following a 2016 triple bypass surgery.
4
The State contends this object was a phone. Multiple witnesses testified that
Decedent did not own or carry a gun, and no gun was found. Jones did not deny
that Decedent had a large phone clipped to his right front pocket.
did not want to back out of the parking lot until Decedent returned inside the bar.
The video reflects that Decedent began walking toward the bar door before
abruptly spinning around and heading back towards Jones's sedan. Although Jones
admitted Decedent was still telling him to leave at this time, Jones exited his
vehicle and shot him, twice.5

At his trial, Jones explained:

There's a certain point where I can't see his right hand. I
know he's got a gun. I know he can draw it, and it gets to
the point where I don't feel safe at all. My life is
threatened and on the line and my heart's beating 150
beats per minute.

Once Decedent was on the ground and his friends began coming outside, Jones
returned to his car and drove away.

Captain James Florida of the Edgefield County Sheriff's Office (ECSO) was off
duty when he heard the dispatch call reporting the Pool Room shooting and the
suspect's silver Mercedes. He saw a silver Mercedes at an intersection, ran the tag,
and began following Jones. Florida testified that he did not initially activate his
blue lights because he was waiting for backup before attempting to stop the
suspect's vehicle.6 Jones also described this pursuit, contending the officer was
"laying way back" from his car before aggressively pulling up very close like he
was going to "run me off the road." Jones claimed that the last time the officer
pulled up close, Jones saw a gun in his hand. Once the officer backed away again,
Jones turned onto Pleasant Lane, hoping to lose him.

5
Betty Edwards, who was shopping at a nearby IGA, "heard a confrontation
between two people . . . . [she] couldn't hear what they [were] saying, but . . . it
was loud." She identified the individuals as Decedent and the "gentleman that was
in the car." Another witness, Lanyce Hatcher, testified that when he arrived at the
Pool Room, Decedent "was arguing with somebody in a car. I couldn't see who
was in the car, but you could tell they were arguing." Decedent said "no, I'll tell
you what you're gonna do, you're gonna leave and not come back, and that's—
that's all I heard and by then I was almost to the door and I didn't hear any more."
6
Captain Florida's dashcam was not working properly on the day of the murder,
but dashcam footage from Corporal Keith Kathman, a City of Edgefield police
officer providing backup, supports Florida's version of Jones's attempted ambush.
Jones then turned onto Log Creek Road and "threw" his vehicle in park, retrieved
an AR-15 style rifle from his trunk, and moved the assault weapon to his back seat
when the officer "sped by." Jones explained that once he found "somewhere safe,"
he backed into a small clearing, exited his car, and started drinking a beer. He
claimed the officer then drove by and fired a weapon at him before stopping and—
unprovoked—firing at him again. Jones testified that only then did he return fire;
he maintained he felt "helpless" because "somebody was trying to kill [him]" and
he thus decided "that no matter who was in the car that [he] had to defend
[himself]."

Captain Florida's description of his encounter with Jones differed significantly.
Florida testified that he lost sight of Jones when he veered off onto Pleasant Lane.
As Florida drove slowly looking for the silver sedan, he saw that Jones had "turned
his vehicle facing Pleasant Lane on Log Creek Road which is a dirt road." The
driver's side door was open, and Jones "was standing outside aiming the assault
rifle at [Florida]." Florida then accelerated past Jones, radioed to report that the
suspect was armed with an AR-15, and "started hollering to [Corporal Kathman]
on the radio to back up, back up." At this time, Jones began shooting at him.7

While taking cover, Florida initially returned fire with his Glock but switched to
his shotgun. After Jones shot out the back window of Florida's marked patrol
vehicle, Jones "turned and started shooting toward Officer Kathman." Jones
sustained several gunshot wounds, including a self-inflicted shot to his chin/neck
area. Jones later told Florida "that he wanted [him] to let him bleed to death," but
Florida responded that he could not do that." 8 Eventually, other officers who had
arrived on scene pulled Jones from behind his car, handcuffed him, and placed him
on an ambulance stretcher for transport to the hospital.

Jones was indicted for Decedent's murder and the attempted murder of Captain
Florida. After a two-day hearing, the circuit court found Jones was not entitled to
immunity under the Protection of Persons and Property Act. Following his
subsequent seven-day trial, the jury convicted Jones of Decedent's murder but

7
Florida knew Kathman was also in pursuit and explained that he did not want him
to enter Jones's line of fire. Kathman confirmed that Jones "shot first at us."
8
Jones denied saying this. Instead, Jones claimed he asked for help and Florida
responded that he could not do that. Jones testified, "That's what I remember as far
as I cannot do that and also he told me even while I was laying back on the ground,
I couldn't hardly move at all, he told me that he was gonna get his fully automatic
AR-15 and come kill me."
acquitted him of the attempted murder of Captain Florida. The circuit court
sentenced Jones to thirty-five years' imprisonment. Jones filed a motion for a new
trial, which the circuit court denied. Jones timely appealed.

Law and Analysis

I. Protection of Persons and Property Act

Jones argues the circuit court erred in denying him immunity from prosecution
because he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to
immunity under the Protection of Persons and Property Act (the Act). 9 We
disagree.

"Circuit courts utilize pretrial hearings to determine whether a defendant is entitled
to immunity under the Act, employing a preponderance of the evidence standard."
State v. McCarty, 437 S.C. 355, 365, 878 S.E.2d 902, 908 (2022) (quoting State v.
Cervantes-Pavon, 426 S.C. 442, 449, 827 S.E.2d 564, 567 (2019)). "This Court, in
turn, reviews an immunity determination for an abuse of discretion." Id. "An
abuse of discretion occurs when the [circuit] court's ruling is based on an error of
law or, when grounded in factual conclusions, is without evidentiary support." Id.
(quoting State v. Jones, 416 S.C. 283, 290, 786 S.E.2d 132, 136 (2016)).

The Act grants a person immunity "'from criminal prosecution and civil action for
the use of deadly force' in circumstances that are permitted by the Act or by
another provision of law." McCarty, 437 S.C. at 366, 878 S.E.2d at 908 (quoting
S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-450(A) (2015)). The General Assembly stated its intent in
section 16-11-420 of the South Carolina Code (2015):

(A) It is the intent of the General Assembly to codify the
common law Castle Doctrine which recognizes that a
person's home is his castle and to extend the doctrine to
include an occupied vehicle and the person's place of
business.

(B) The General Assembly finds that it is proper for
law-abiding citizens to protect themselves, their families,
and others from intruders and attackers without fear of

9
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-11-410 to -450 (2015).
prosecution or civil action for acting in defense of
themselves and others.

....

(E) The General Assembly finds that no person or victim
of crime should be required to surrender his personal
safety to a criminal, nor should a person or victim be
required to needlessly retreat in the face of intrusion or
attack.

Section 16-11-440 of the South Carolina Code (2015) sets forth the circumstances
under which the Act allows the use of deadly force. In relevant parts, the statute
provides:

(A) A person is presumed to have a reasonable fear of
imminent peril of death or great bodily injury to himself
or another person when using deadly force that is
intended or likely to cause death or great bodily injury to
another person if the person:

(1) against whom the deadly force is used is in the
process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or has
unlawfully and forcibly entered a dwelling, residence, or
occupied vehicle, or if he removes or is attempting to
remove another person against his will from the dwelling,
residence, or occupied vehicle; and

(2) who uses deadly force knows or has reason to believe
that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and
forcible act is occurring or has occurred.

....

(C) A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity
and who is attacked in another place where he has a right
to be, including, but not limited to, his place of business,
has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his
ground and meet force with force, including deadly force,
if he reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent death
or great bodily injury to himself or another person or to
prevent the commission of a violent crime as defined in
Section 16-1-60.

In State v. Curry, our supreme court discussed "the legislative intent regarding a
trial court's authority to weigh the underlying claim of self-defense in determining
an accused's entitlement to immunity." 406 S.C. 364, 371, 752 S.E.2d 263, 266
(2013). "Consistent with the Castle Doctrine and the text of the Act, a valid case
of self-defense must exist, and the trial court must necessarily consider the
elements of self-defense in determining a defendant's entitlement to the Act's
immunity. This includes all elements of self-defense, save the duty to retreat." Id.;
accord Jones, 416 S.C. at 301, 786 S.E.2d at 141. The court then noted the
elements necessary to establish a claim of self-defense:

First, the defendant must be without fault in bringing on
the difficulty. Second, the defendant must have actually
believed he was in imminent danger of losing his life or
sustaining serious bodily injury, or he actually was in
such imminent danger. Third, if his defense is based
upon his belief of imminent danger, a reasonably prudent
man of ordinary firmness and courage would have
entertained the same belief. If the defendant actually was
in imminent danger, the circumstances were such as
would warrant a man of ordinary prudence, firmness and
courage to strike the fatal blow in order to save himself
from serious bodily harm or losing his own life. Fourth,
the defendant had no other probable means of avoiding
the danger of losing his own life or sustaining serious
bodily injury than to act as he did in this particular
instance.

Curry, 406 S.C. at 371 n.4, 752 S.E.2d at 266 n.4 (quoting State v. Davis, 282 S.C.
45, 46, 317 S.E.2d 452, 453 (1984)). "It is the fourth element—the duty to
retreat—that is excused under the Act and the Castle Doctrine." Id.

Jones claims he is entitled to immunity because he feared for his life and was "not
at fault in bringing on the difficulty" with Decedent. The circuit court properly
rejected this assertion. Although Jones may have been preoccupied with his
decision to end his relationship with Angie—and it is undisputed that he had no
interaction with Decedent on the day of the shooting until Decedent slapped
Jones's car when he first left the parking lot—such does not negate the fact that
Jones returned to the Pool Room parking lot just thirty-five minutes later with a
veritable arsenal.

Jones argues that when Decedent "aggressively struck" the rear of his car, it
"caused Appellant renewed fear of [Decedent] after [Decedent]'s threat against
Appellant about a month prior coupled with Appellant's knowledge of [Decedent]'s
reputation for violence." 10 However, Jones's decision to return to the Pool Room
parking lot that night belies any claimed feelings of "renewed fear." Even if one
accepts Jones's claim that he only returned to the Pool Room to end things with
Angie, his decision to return necessarily factors into the immunity analysis.
Further, during the short period of time in which Jones left and returned to the Pool
Room parking lot with his bag of guns; several magazines; and ammunition, he
texted Mims, "I'm gonna kill that BBoy." Although Jones asserted he was merely
venting and denied this text meant he intended to kill anyone, the fact remains that
he returned to the Pool Room—heavily armed—a mere seventeen minutes after
sending this text. Thus, in our view, Jones failed to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that he was without fault in "bringing on the difficulty."

But even if we accept for purposes of argument that Jones was without fault in
bringing on the difficulty, his self-serving testimony is the only evidence in the
record suggesting Jones was in imminent danger (or, indeed, any danger at all).
After reviewing the surveillance video, we are unable to identify the black object
that Jones argues was Decedent's gun. Multiple witnesses testified Decedent did
not own or carry a gun, and no gun was found on or anywhere near him just after
the shooting. Still, we recognize Jones's implication that Roger Bryan can be seen
picking up the "black object" in the surveillance video. 11

Jones also disputes that Decedent asked him to leave the premises early into their
approximately ten-minute encounter, although he admits Decedent eventually did
ask him to leave. Hatcher, who saw the two men arguing, testified that Decedent
said "no, I'll tell you what you're gonna do, you're gonna leave and not come back,
and that's—that's all I heard and by then I was almost to the door and I didn't hear
any more." Jones maintains he started his vehicle because he wanted to leave but

10
In addition to Jones's testimony that Decedent had previously threatened to beat
him up, Jones's friend, Tony Friar, testified that Decedent "was a fighter based on
what [he] knew about [Decedent] in elementary school" and that Decedent
previously told Friar he was going to "take care" of Jones.
11
Only Jones claims to have seen a gun, and we do not see this on the video.
was afraid to do so because he "believed using his hands to operate the vehicle and
taking his eyes off of [Decedent] even for an instant would expose him to further
harm." Yet, we note that even when Decedent initially walked away from Jones's
vehicle to go back inside the Pool Room, Jones made no attempt to leave—and
some witnesses testified Jones called to the Decedent as Decedent walked away.

Jones next argues that even if his self-defense claim fails in one or more respects,
he is still entitled to immunity under sections 16-11-440(A) and (C). As noted
above, Jones testified that Decedent demanded that he exit his vehicle and fight
him. He further alleges Decedent, "pulled on [his] door handle to check and see if
it was locked or not" and "put his hands on top of the vehicle." These actions
might approach the statute's intent to protect against someone "unlawfully and
forcefully entering . . . [an] occupied vehicle" or "attempting to remove another
person against his will from entering . . . [an] occupied vehicle," but only if the
person making such claims is credible. And Jones is not credible—indeed, like
Officer Kathman's dashcam video, the parking lot surveillance video (along with
the testimony of multiple witnesses) contradicts Jones's story. See, e.g., State v.
Oates, 421 S.C. 1, 13, 803 S.E.2d 911, 918 (Ct. App. 2017) (reiterating that a trial
court is not required "to accept the accused's version of the underlying facts" in
considering a claim of immunity (quoting Curry, 406 S.C. at 371, 752 S.E.2d at
266)). The surveillance video shows that when Jones exited his vehicle and fired
at Decedent, Decedent was merely reapproaching the front of the Mercedes from
the Pool Room's entrance; he was neither close enough to "unlawfully and
forcefully" enter (or try to enter) the car nor in a position to try to remove Jones
from it. Finally, while it is undisputed that Jones was initially "not engaged in an
unlawful activity" and was in a "place where he ha[d] a right to be," Jones lost his
right to be on the Pool Room premises when Decedent asked him to leave. For all
of these reasons, we find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ruling
Jones failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to
immunity.

II. Evidence of Attempted Suicide

Jones next contends the circuit court erred in denying his motion to exclude
evidence that he attempted suicide in the moments before he was taken into
custody. He argues State v. Cartwright precluded this evidence because the State
failed to prove "an unmistakable nexus exists by clear and convincing evidence
linking the suicide attempt to a guilty conscience derivative of the offense for
which the defendant is on trial." 425 S.C. 81, 92, 819 S.E.2d 756, 762 (2018).
Jones further asserts that the probative value of this evidence was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Rule 403, SCRE. Again, we
disagree.

"The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court and its ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of a
manifest abuse of discretion accompanied by probable prejudice." Cartwright, 425
at 89, 819 S.E.2d at 760 (quoting State v. Douglas, 369 S.C. 424, 429, 632 S.E.2d
845, 847-48 (2006)). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the
trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law." Id.
at 89-90, 819 S.E.2d at 760 (quoting Douglas, 369 S.C. at 429-30, 632 S.E.2d at
848). "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of South Carolina,
statutes, these rules, or by other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of South
Carolina." Rule 402, SCRE. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Rule 403,
SCRE. "The determination of the prejudicial effect of the evidence must be based
on the entire record and the result will generally turn on the facts of each case."
State v. Gillian, 373 S.C. 601, 609, 646 S.E.2d 872, 876 (2007).

Evidence of attempted suicide may be admitted if the State establishes:

(1) a jury could reasonably find that a suicide attempt
occurred; (2) the defendant was aware of the occurrence
of the alleged crimes at the time of the suicide attempt;
and (3) an unmistakable nexus exists by clear and
convincing evidence linking the suicide attempt to a
guilty conscience derivative of the offense for which the
defendant is on trial. If the trial court concludes that the
three factors have been established, the evidence is
relevant and may be admitted, subject to a Rule 403,
SCRE analysis.

Cartwright, 425 S.C. at 92, 819 S.E.2d at 762. "Clear and convincing evidence is
that degree of proof which will produce in the minds of the trier of facts a firm
belief as to the allegations sought to be established." In re Dickey, 395 S.C. 336,
354, 718 S.E.2d 739, 748 (2011) (quoting Peeler v. Spartan Radiocasting, Inc.,
324 S.C. 261, 265 n.4, 478 S.E.2d 282, 284 n.4 (1996)). This is an intermediate
measure of proof, "more than a mere preponderance" but less than that "required
for proof beyond a reasonable doubt; it does not mean clear and unequivocal." Id.

In Cartwright, the appellant was charged with molesting his daughter and two
stepdaughters. 425 S.C. at 85, 819 S.E.2d at 758. While he was detained prior to
trial, Cartwright attempted suicide by hanging himself from his bunk with a sheet
wrapped tightly around his neck. Id. at 89, 819 S.E.2d at 760. Noting the case
presented "a close question," our supreme court found:

[T]he facts here survive the strict test for admissibility,
including the trial court's Rule 403 determination that the
probative value of the suicide-attempt evidence was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. Prison authorities found Cartwright hanging
in his cell, the same day Cartwright was served with
additional warrants. Cartwright admitted that he
attempted suicide after he became aware of the new
charges. The record further reflects Cartwright
threatened to commit suicide if the victims (Daughter,
Stepdaughter One, and Stepdaughter Two) told anyone
about the sexual abuse. The fact that Cartwright acted on
his threat and attempted suicide enhances the probative
value of the evidence. Therefore, we hold evidence of
Cartwright's suicide attempt was relevant and properly
admitted.

Id. at 93, 819 S.E.2d at 762.

Here, ECSO Deputy Robert Harter participated in the takedown on Log Creek
Road. Harter was one of the officers who converged on Jones as he was lying on
the ground near his vehicle. When Harter approached, he saw two weapons on the
ground next to Jones: an "AR-15 type rifle" and a silver .38 revolver. Once Jones
was in handcuffs, "[s]omeone asked [him] if he was hurt because he had a lot of
blood on the front of him. He did say that he was hurting and that he had shot
himself." Jones did not "give any explanation for why he shot himself" and he did
not mention the word "suicide." In a statement prepared shortly after the event,
Harter wrote that Jones said "he was hurting and had tried to shoot himself under
the chin."
Sergeant James Morgan arrived on the Log Creek scene after the gunfire had
ceased but before Jones was taken into custody. He and Sergeant James Densmore
moved in to arrest Jones when Captain Florida gave the command. Once Jones
was in custody and handcuffed, Morgan asked "about his current medical state."
Jones told Morgan "where he was shot at, where he was hurting at, around his
chest, stomach, arm there, and then he lifted his head and he said I'm also shot
here." Jones then volunteered, "I tried to kill myself and I couldn't even do that."

Jones was already in custody when Officer Samuel Sherrill arrived. Sherrill
accompanied Jones to the ambulance and rode with him to the hospital. He
testified that while on the stretcher, Jones said, "I wish y'all would have killed
me. . . . Y'all should have just let me die." Later, on the way to the hospital, Jones
said, "The only hole that hurts is the one . . . I put in my neck."

While Jones conceded at trial that the State met its burden of proof as to the first
two elements of the Cartwright analysis, he asserts the State failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he "tried to commit suicide because he feels so
guilty [about] his participation in the shootout with law enforcement on Log Creek
Road that he's just going to commit suicide over his guilt over those two things."
Emphasizing our supreme court's finding in Cartwright that "suicide attempt
evidence is fraught with the potential for extreme prejudice," 425 S.C. at 91, 819
S.E.2d at 761, Jones argues any probative value such evidence might have was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

The circuit court disagreed, finding the State met all three Cartwright factors. The
circuit court noted the chain of events, including the Pool Room shooting; the
events leading up to the confrontation with law enforcement some forty minutes
later; and Jones's own statements about his self-inflicted wound "demonstrate a
nexus by clear and convincing evidence of attempted suicide that can be linked to a
guilty conscience." The court then explained that in light of the specific facts of
this case, "the highly probative nature that encapsulates that entire story of facts
outweighs the prejudicial effect of the evidence of attempted suicide."

Although there is no testimony that conclusively establishes why Jones shot
himself, his own actions and statements demonstrate "an unmistakable nexus exists
by clear and convincing evidence linking the suicide attempt to a guilty conscience
derivative of" the offenses for which Jones was on trial. Cartwright, 425 S.C. at
92, 819 S.E.2d at 762. First, if Jones believed he acted in self-defense in shooting
Decedent, there was no need for him to flee the scene with his weapons and
ammunition, hunker down, and engage law enforcement in a shootout. Jones
claims his "encounter with law enforcement served as a break in the causal chain
between [Jones] shooting [Decedent] in self-defense and his suicide attempt where
almost an hour passed between when [Jones] shot [Decedent] and when he
attempted suicide, particularly where [Jones] did not attempt suicide during that
hour."

We see no such break in the causal chain and find the circuit court properly
exercised its discretion in denying Jones's motion to exclude evidence of his
suicide attempt. There is no evidence in the record to suggest Jones was suicidal
on the day he armed himself and returned to the Pool Room after threatening by
text to "kill that BBoy" or that he made any statements suggesting he was suicidal
before starting his shootout with law enforcement. Nor did the circuit court abuse
its discretion in finding the probative value of Jones's suicidal actions and
statements was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See
Gillian, 373 S.C. at 609, 646 S.E.2d at 876 (explaining a Rule 403 "determination
of the prejudicial effect of the evidence must be based on the entire record and the
result will generally turn on the facts of each case").

III. Jury Charge – Self Defense

Finally, Jones argues the circuit court erred in failing to tailor the self-defense
charge to adequately reflect the facts and theories he presented at trial. He
contends the circuit court should have instructed the jury that Jones had the right to
act under the law of self-preservation to prevent his assailant from "getting the
drop on him." He asserts such a tailored charge was supported by the evidence and
crucial to the jury's understanding of the law of self-defense. We see no error in
the circuit court's well-reasoned, tailored instruction.

"In reviewing jury charges for error, we must consider the court's jury charge as a
whole in light of the evidence and issues presented at trial." State v. Zeigler, 364
S.C. 94, 106, 610 S.E.2d 859, 865 (Ct. App. 2005). "A jury charge which is
substantially correct and covers the law does not require reversal." Id. "To
warrant reversal, a trial judge's charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial."
State v. Otts, 424 S.C. 150, 155, 817 S.E.2d 540, 543 (Ct. App. 2018) (quoting
State v. Taylor, 356 S.C. 227, 231, 589 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2003)).

Jones submitted numerous written charge requests including "Request to Charge
No. 6," which addressed self-defense and the right to act on appearances. The
requested charge stated, in pertinent part:
One who acts in self-defense may act on appearances.
He may be mistaken. The law does not hold him to a
refined assessment of the danger, provided, of course, he
acted as the person of ordinary coolness and courage
would have acted or should have acted in meeting the
appearance of danger. He doesn't have to wait until his
assailant gets the drop on him. He has a right to act
under the law of self-preservation and prevent his
assailant getting the drop on him; if it is apparent, or
reasonably apparent his assailant is taking steps to get the
drop on him, one who acts in self-defense must take steps
first to prevent such assailant from getting the drop on
him. See State v. Rash, 182 S.C. 42, 50 (1936); State v.
Starnes, 340 S.C. 312, 322 (2000).

Following a lengthy charge conference in chambers, defense counsel put his
arguments on the record, specifically objecting to the circuit court's ruling not to
charge "Request to Charge No. 6" in full. The circuit court acknowledged it did
not "take [the] charge verbatim," but noted it granted the request in part.

The circuit court ultimately gave the following charge as to a defendant's right to
act on appearances:

The defendant does not have to show that he was actually
in danger. It is enough if the defendant believed he was
in imminent danger and a reasonably prudent person of
ordinary firmness and courage would have had the same
belief. One who acts in self-defense may act on
appearances. He may be mistaken. The law does not
hold him to a refined assessment of the danger, provided,
he acted as the person of ordinary coolness and courage
would have acted or should have acted in meeting the
appearance of the danger. It is for you to decide whether
the defendant's fear of immediate danger of death or
serious bodily injury was reasonable and would have
been felt by an ordinary person in the same situation.

"[T]he trial court is required to charge only the current and correct law of South
Carolina.'" State v. Brandt, 393 S.C. 526, 549, 713 S.E.2d 591, 603 (2011)
(quoting Sheppard v. State, 357 S.C. 646, 665, 594 S.E.2d 462, 472 (2004)). "The
law to be charged must be determined from the evidence presented at trial." State
v. Cole, 338 S.C. 97, 101, 525 S.E.2d 511, 512 (2000). "The substance of the law
is what must be instructed to the jury, not any particular verbiage." State v. Angie,
315 S.C. 547, 554, 446 S.E.2d 411, 415 (1994).

Here, the circuit court properly declined to give the defense's requested charge
verbatim and correctly addressed the substance of the law, including the legal tenet
that "one who acts in self-defense may act on appearances." The circuit court
instructed the jury on this point even though the video evidence suggests Decedent
was not attempting to forcibly (or otherwise) enter Jones's vehicle or remove Jones
from it and was not pointing—or in possession of—any weapon. The charge
included language instructing that the law does not hold a defendant to a "refined
assessment of the danger" and that a defendant may even be mistaken in his
perception of the danger. It was then the jury's prerogative to determine whether
"a reasonably prudent person of ordinary firmness and courage" would have
believed he was in immediate danger of death or bodily injury at the time of the
shooting.

The video surveillance alone demonstrates most—if not all—of the elements of
self-defense are absent here. Decedent was not charging at Jones, had no weapon
drawn, and was not endangering anyone when Jones chose to get out of his car and
shoot the Decedent twice before fleeing the scene. The evidence at trial simply did
not support a jury charge instructing that a defendant "doesn't have to wait until his
assailant gets the drop on him." For this and the other reasons discussed, we find
the circuit court's instruction was properly tailored to the evidence, issues, and
theories presented at trial.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Jones's murder conviction and sentence are

AFFIRMED.

KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., concur.