200 River Landing v. Watkins Service, Inc.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

200 River Landing Drive Phase I Condominium
Association, Inc., and Steven Garcia and Janis Zomber,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Respondents,

v.

Watkins Service, Inc., First Exteriors, LLC, Getulio
Perela Chagas, FBM Construction, LLC d/b/a Fernando
Monteiro, and John Doe Subcontractors or Material
Suppliers 12-50, Defendants,

Of whom Getulio Perela Chagas is the Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001832

Appeal From Berkeley County
Bentley Price, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-168
Submitted October 1, 2025 – Filed April 8, 2026

AFFIRMED

Christopher Clinton Mingledorff, of Mingledorff Law
Group, LLC, of Charleston, for Appellant.
Christopher Paul Deters, of Romeo Deters, LLC, and
Jesse A. Kirchner and Michael A. Timbes, both of
Thurmond Kirchner & Timbes, P.A., all of Charleston,
for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: In this class action construction defect case, Getulio Perela
Chagas appeals the circuit court's order awarding 200 River Landing Drive Phase I
Condominium Association, Inc. (River Landing) and Steven Garcia and Janis
Zomber, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated (collectively,
Respondents), $22,479,523 in damages against Chagas. Chagas argues the
damages award should be set aside as harsh and unwarranted because it was not
supported by a preponderance of the evidence. We affirm.

We hold the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Respondents
$22,479,523 in damages because Chagas was not entitled to an apportionment of
damages and the award amount was supported by evidence. See Austin v.
Specialty Transp. Servs., Inc., 358 S.C. 298, 310, 594 S.E.2d 867, 873 (Ct. App.
2004) ("The [circuit court] has considerable discretion regarding the amount of
damages, both actual or punitive."); id. (providing appellate review of a damages
award "is limited to the correction of errors of law"); id. at 311, 594 S.E.2d at 873
(stating the task of appellate courts "in reviewing a damages award is not to weigh
the evidence, but to determine if there is any evidence to support the damages
award"). Initially, the circuit court's determination that Chagas admitted the
allegations in Respondents' second amended complaint by way of default is the law
of the case because Chagas did not appeal the circuit court's denial of his motion to
set aside default. See Lindsay v. Lindsay, 328 S.C. 329, 338, 491 S.E.2d 583, 588
(Ct. App. 1997) ("[An] unchallenged ruling, 'right or wrong, is the law of the case
and requires affirmance.'" (quoting Buckner v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 255 S.C.
159, 161, 177 S.E.2d 544, 544 (1970))). Specifically, Chagas admitted he was
negligent, grossly negligent, and jointly and severally liable for the damages
alleged in the second amended complaint. Moreover, in his final brief of appellant,
Chagas does not challenge the circuit court's findings in its order of judgment that
his negligence and gross negligence contributed to the indivisible damages and that
he was jointly and severally liable. See id. ("Failure to challenge the ruling 'is an
abandonment of the issue and precludes consideration on appeal.'" (quoting Biales
v. Young, 315 S.C. 166, 168, 432 S.E.2d 482, 484 (1993))).

As to the damages award, we conclude Chagas was not entitled to apportionment
because he admitted Respondents' allegations of gross negligence by way of
default and under section 15-38-15(F) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2025),
apportionment is not available to a defendant who is determined to be grossly
negligent.1 See § 15-38-15(F) (providing section 15-38-15 "does not apply to a
defendant whose conduct is determined to be wilful, wanton, reckless, grossly
negligent, or intentional"); see generally Green v. McGee, 446 S.C. 343, 351, 919
S.E.2d 903, 906 (2025) (holding defendants were jointly and severally liable for an
actual damages award because "subsection 15-38-15(F) . . . prohibits the
application of a 60/40 allocation of fault between [defendants when] the jury found
both acted recklessly, willfully, and wantonly"); Oaks at Rivers Edge Prop.
Owners Ass'n v. Daniel Island Riverside Devs., LLC, 420 S.C. 424, 442 n.5, 803
S.E.2d 475, 485 n.5 (Ct. App. 2017) (noting the circuit court did not err in denying
a motion to apportion damages among appellants found grossly negligent).

As to the amount of damages, we conclude evidence supports the circuit court's
$22,479,523 damages award. See Jackson v. Midlands Hum. Res. Ctr., 296 S.C.
526, 529, 374 S.E.2d 505, 506 (Ct. App. 1988) ("In a default case, the plaintiff
must prove by competent evidence the amount of his damages, and such proof
must be by a preponderance of the evidence."); id. ("Although the defendant is in
default as to liability, the award of damages must be in keeping not only with the
allegations of the complaint and the prayer for relief, but also with the proof that
has been submitted."); Roland v. Palmetto Hills, 308 S.C. 283, 286, 417 S.E.2d
626, 628 (Ct. App. 1992) ("[T]he cost of repair or restoration is a valid measure of
damages for injury to a building."); Magnolia N. Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Heritage
Cmtys., Inc., 397 S.C. 348, 375, 725 S.E.2d 112, 126-27 (Ct. App. 2012) (holding
expert witness testimony as to cost estimates and building diagnostics provided "a
sufficiently reasonable basis of computation of damages" to support submission to
the jury in a construction defect case). At the damages hearing, Respondents
presented the testimony of two expert witnesses, a scope of repair, and a cost
estimate. Respondents' architecture expert opined the water and termite damage to
the 200 River Landing building resulted from Chagas's work and that the damage
was indivisible because it was impossible to segregate the damage. In addition,
Respondents' construction and cost fee estimate expert prepared a cost estimate
totaling $37,939,523 based on the architecture expert's report detailing the scope of
repair needed to remedy the damage. On cross-examination, Chagas questioned
Respondents' expert witnesses only as to whether they could discern the work
Chagas performed and how the work related to the prior settlement amounts; he

1
Effective January 1, 2026, section 15-38-15(F) no longer includes gross
negligence; however, the amended statute applies only to causes of action or
claims arising or accruing after January 1, 2026. See 2025 Act. No. 42, § 11.
did not question them as to the scope of work report and repair estimates. Further,
the circuit court determined Chagas was entitled to a $15,460,000 setoff for the
total settlement amounts Respondents received from all settling defendants as
evidenced by the settlement agreements. See Welch v. Epstein, 342 S.C. 279, 312,
536 S.E.2d 408, 425 (Ct. App. 2000) ("A nonsettling defendant is entitled to credit
for the amount paid by another defendant who settles."); Palmetto Pointe at Peas
Island Condo. Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Island Pointe, LLC, 445 S.C. 543, 549, 915
S.E.2d 501, 505 (2025) ("A non-settling defendant's right to setoff arises by
operation of law when the settlement funds are paid to compensate the same
plaintiff on a claim for the same injury.").2

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's order awarding Respondents
$22,479,523 in damages against Chagas.

AFFIRMED.3

KONDUROS, GEATHERS, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

2
Chagas's argument that the pleadings did not support the judgment amount is
without merit. The second amended complaint defined Chagas as a subcontractor
who worked on the subject construction project and detailed the specific work he
allegedly performed. Respondents' allegations of negligence, gross negligence,
and breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike service applied to the defined
subcontractors, including Chagas. Therefore, because Chagas admitted these
allegations by default and they related to the building damage Respondents' expert
witness identified, the allegations contained in Respondents' second amended
complaint related to the judgment. See Roche v. Young Bros., of Florence, 332
S.C. 75, 81, 504 S.E.2d 311, 314 (1998) ("It is well settled that by suffering a
default, the defaulting party is deemed to have admitted the truth of the plaintiff's
allegations and to have conceded liability."); see also Schein v. Lamar, 284 S.C.
252, 255, 325 S.E.2d 573, 574 (Ct. App. 1985) (finding a first amended complaint
was no longer the operative pleading when a second amended complaint was
filed).
3
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.