Melanie P. Hozey v. Alan L. Rutherfurd

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Melanie P. Hozey, Appellant,

v.

Alan L. Rutherfurd and Susan M. Rutherfurd,
Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2024-000545

Appeal From Aiken County
M. Anderson Griffith, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-121
Submitted February 3, 2026 – Filed March 18, 2026

AFFIRMED

Clarke Wardlaw McCants, III, and Clarke Wardlaw
McCants, IV, both of Nance & McCants, of Aiken, for
Appellant.

Dione Cherie Carroll, of Carroll Law Offices, PA, of
Aiken, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Melanie P. Hozey appeals the master-in-equity's order denying
her claim of adverse possession to a portion of land that Alan Rutherfurd and
Susan Rutherfurd (collectively, the Rutherfurds) used as a privacy buffer between
the parties' properties. On appeal, Hozey argues the master erred in determining
that (1) her possession and use of the disputed land was not notorious, hostile, and
exclusive and (2) she trespassed upon the Rutherfurds' property. We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. We hold the master did not err in concluding that Hozey failed to establish
averse possession of the disputed land because her possession was not hostile for
the required ten-year period.1 See Jones v. Leagan, 384 S.C. 1, 10, 681 S.E.2d 6,
11 (Ct. App. 2009) ("[A]n adverse possession claim is an action at law."); Frazier
v. Smallseed, 384 S.C. 56, 61, 682 S.E.2d 8, 11 (Ct. App. 2009) ("In an action at
law tried by a judge without a jury, the appellate court will correct any error of
law, but it must affirm the [circuit] court's factual findings unless no evidence
reasonably supports those findings."); Jones, 384 S.C. 10, 681 S.E.2d at 11 ("The
party asserting adverse possession must show continuous, hostile, open, actual,
notorious, and exclusive possession for a certain period of time."); id. at 10-11, 681
S.E.2d at 11 ("To meet this burden of proof, the party asserting the claim must
show by 'clear and convincing' evidence he has met the requirements for adverse
possession."); id. at 10, 681 S.E.2d at 11 ("In South Carolina, adverse possession
may be established if the elements of the claim are shown to exist for at least ten
years."); Davis, 289 S.C. at 180, 345 S.E.2d at 726 ("To invoke adverse
possession, the possession must be adverse and not permissive."); McDaniel v.
Kendrick, 386 S.C. 437, 444, 688 S.E.2d 852, 856 (Ct. App. 2009) (explaining that
"a party cannot adversely possess property used with permission" and may begin to
satisfy the requirement of hostility "upon a clear disclaimer of the owner's title");
Clark v. Hargrave, 323 S.C. 84, 90, 473 S.E.2d 474, 478 (Ct. App. 1996)
(affirming the master's conclusion that the claimant's possession was open,
notorious, hostile, and exclusive because he exercised exclusive dominion over the
property by blocking access with cables and locks, posting "No Trespassing" signs,
and granting or denying entry to others solely at his discretion, all undermining the
record owner's interests); Brevard v. Fortune, 221 S.C. 117, 130-31, 69 S.E.2d
355, 361 (1952) (acknowledging the payment of taxes does not confer title, but
recognizing our case law states that the failure to do so may weaken a claim of
ownership).

1
We do not address the master's findings concerning the remaining elements of
adverse possession because our analysis on the hostility element conclusively
resolves this issue. See Davis v. Monteith, 289 S.C. 176, 180, 345 S.E.2d 724, 726
(1986) ("[A party's] claim of adverse possession fails because an essential element
of adverse possession is lacking.").
2. We hold the master did not err in determining Hozey trespassed on the
Rutherfurds' land because Hozey intentionally entered and remained on the
Rutherfurds' land after the Rutherfurds revoked their tacit permission for her to
utilize the area by issuing multiple notices of the revocation, including sending
certified letters and posting "No Trespassing" signs. See Cedar Cove Homeowners
Ass'n v. DiPietro, 368 S.C. 254, 258, 628 S.E.2d 284, 286 (Ct. App. 2006) ("[A]
trespass action is one at law . . . ."); Frazier, 384 S.C. at 61, 682 S.E.2d at 11 ("In
an action at law tried by a judge without a jury, the appellate court will correct any
error of law, but it must affirm the [circuit] court's factual findings unless no
evidence reasonably supports those findings."); Snow v. City of Columbia, 305 S.C.
544, 552, 409 S.E.2d 797, 802 (Ct. App. 1991) ("The unwarrantable entry on land
in the peaceable possession of another is a trespass, without regard to the degree of
force used, the means by which the enclosure is broken, or the extent of the
damage inflicted."); id. at 553, 409 S.E.2d at 802 ("To constitute an actionable
trespass, however, there must be an affirmative act, the invasion of the land must
be intentional, and the harm caused must be the direct result of that invasion."); id.
("Trespass is an intentional tort; and while the trespasser, to be liable, need not
intend or expect the damaging consequence of his entry, he must intend the act
which constitutes the unwarranted entry on another's land.").

AFFIRMED.2

WILLIAMS, C.J., and KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.