State v. Jonathan C. Dawkins

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Appellant,

v.

Jonathan C. Dawkins, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000274

Appeal From Newberry County
Frank R. Addy, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-058
Heard December 10, 2025 – Filed February 11, 2026

AFFIRMED

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Senior
Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, and
Assistant Attorney General Ambree Michele Muller, all
of Columbia, for Appellant.

Senior Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: The State appeals an order on a pretrial motion to suppress
evidence. The circuit court found the evidence was seized during an unlawful "Terry
frisk." The State argues that even if the search exceeded what is permitted by Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the search can be justified as a lawful search incident to
arrest.

Though some of the language in the circuit court's oral ruling supports the State's
argument, we respectfully reject it for two reasons. First, despite the circuit court's
comment that the officers "had the right" to arrest Respondent and "could have done
so," we do not see an objective basis supporting probable cause for an arrest. Much
of the evidence for probable cause depended on the credibility of the officers, and
two circuit court judges had serious questions about credibility. Second, the State
has not consistently identified the offense (or offenses) for which Respondent
supposedly could have been arrested. We will discuss these reasons in more detail
below.

The State argues the circuit court erred in evaluating the credibility of officer
testimony rather than analyzing whether there was an objective basis to substantiate
probable cause. In support of that argument, the State relies on cases holding an
officer's subjective beliefs are irrelevant and that a search must be upheld if an officer
had probable cause to make an arrest. See State v. Moultrie, 316 S.C. 547, 551, 451
S.E.2d 34, 37 (Ct. App. 1994) ("The fact that an arresting officer improperly based
a search of an individual on a Terry-stop rationale does not prevent the State from
otherwise justifying the search by proving probable cause to make a warrantless
arrest of the individual existed prior to the search."); see also Devenpeck v. Alford,
543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (explaining an officer's subjective intent "is irrelevant to
the existence of probable cause"). "But those cases merely hold that a stop or search
that is objectively reasonable is not vitiated by the fact that the officer's real reason
for making the stop or search has nothing to do with the validating reason." Florida
v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 10 (2013).

In Moultrie, this court explained that "probable cause for a warrantless arrest
generally exists 'where the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's
knowledge are sufficient for a reasonable person to believe that a crime has been or
is being committed by the person to be arrested.'" 316 S.C. at 552, 451 S.E.2d at 37
(quoting United States v. Miller, 925 F.2d 695, 698 (4th Cir. 1991)). There was no
serious dispute about probable cause in Moultrie because when deputies arrived on
the scene, there was "a crowd of people surrounding Moultrie, a package of
marijuana at Moultrie's feet, and a paper bag filled with cocaine, crack cocaine, and
marijuana at the edge of the woods, exactly where [the informant] had told the
deputies Moultrie stored his inventory of drugs." Id. at 552–53, 451 S.E.2d at 38.
This court affirmed because "[t]h[o]se facts, when viewed under the totality of
circumstances, were sufficient for a reasonable person to believe that Moultrie had
been, or was currently, conducting drug transactions in front of his house." Id. at
553, 451 S.E.2d at 38.

Conversely, in State v. Bash, the circuit court suppressed the fruits of a search finding
the officers "roll[ed] up in the backyard solely to search for drugs. And there's no
reasonable interpretation of the officers' testimony other than . . . [t]hey were there
to see if they could find any [drugs]." 419 S.C. 263, 273, 797 S.E.2d 721, 726
(2017). Our supreme court agreed because "the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the officers' entry into the grassy area objectively demonstrate[d] their
purpose was to conduct a search of the grassy area . . . ." Id. at 274, 797 S.E.2d at
727.

We do not see abundant probable cause in this record like there was in Moultrie.
Respondent was unarmed when the officers approached him and they acknowledged
that Respondent was "minding his own business." The officers testified their
suspicion only arose after Respondent stated he believed he was going to be
searched—an assertion later characterized as "giving himself away." The body
camera videos show that there was no pat down of Respondent's clothes for weapons
as Terry allows. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 28–29 (permitting an officer to conduct
a protective pat-down search for weapons when the "officer is justified in believing
that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is
armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others"). Instead, the officers
reached directly into Respondent's pockets as if looking for contraband. See
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375–76 (1993) (finding an officer may seize
contraband during a Terry frisk only "[i]f a police officer lawfully pats down a
suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity
immediately apparent"); see also id. at 378 (agreeing with the Minnesota supreme
court's conclusion that the challenged evidence was inadmissible because the officer
only determined the object was contraband after "manipulating the contents of the
defendant's pocket"). We cannot say the circuit court erred in viewing this as a case
where the officer's justification followed—rather than preceded—the search itself.

The State has not consistently or definitively identified a justification or offense
providing probable cause to arrest Respondent. At the first suppression hearing, the
officers initially testified that this was a Terry frisk. As the hearing evolved, the
solicitor attempted to guide them towards it being a search incident to arrest for
unidentified violations of the local municipal code. During oral argument at this
court, the State asserted officers had probable cause to arrest Respondent for a litany
of offenses including third degree assault and battery.
We cannot consider new arguments that were not presented below. See State v.
Passmore, 363 S.C. 568, 583, 611 S.E.2d 273, 281 (Ct. App. 2005) ("The general
rule of issue preservation states that if an issue was not raised and ruled upon below,
it will not be considered for the first time on appeal."). As for the argument that the
officers had probable cause to arrest Respondent for public intoxication, we interpret
the circuit court's ruling as rejecting this because the court appears to have been
deeply troubled, and understandably so, by the fact that the officers' testimony was
directly contradicted by the body camera videos of what actually occurred. The
standard of review requires us to defer to the circuit court. See Laughon v. O'Braitis,
360 S.C. 520, 524–25, 602 S.E.2d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2004) (explaining appellate
courts defer to credibility determinations because the circuit court "was in a better
position to assess the credibility of the witnesses"). The argument that Respondent
exhibited signs of public intoxication turns on the credibility of the officers'
testimony. The mere fact that Respondent had a bottle of vodka in his back pocket,
standing alone, does not objectively establish probable cause sufficient to justify a
search incident to arrest.

AFFIRMED.

MCDONALD, HEWITT, and TURNER, JJ., concur.